Russias

Ukraine has targeted a major Russian oil refinery in the Black Sea port city of Tuapse for the third time in less than two weeks, setting off a fresh blaze and prompting authorities to evacuate local residents.

Ukraine has released more details of Russia’s S-71K Kovyor — translated as Carpet — an air-launched missile that Kyiv says has been used in combat since late last year. The continued development of weapons in this class highlights the fact that Russia is looking for alternatives to its more established — and more costly — legacy air-launched cruise missiles, with current production levels struggling to meet wartime needs.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) today publicly released new information on the S-71K, including an interactive 3D model. The GUR had previously released details of companies involved in the manufacture of Russia’s Su-57 Felon fighter, and notes that the new missile was specifically developed for this platform.

“The new missile was first deployed by the enemy late last year and appears to represent the United Aircraft Corporation’s (UAC) initial venture into missile manufacturing,” the GUR says.

The GUR adds that the warhead of the S-71K utilizes a 551-pound OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb. This bomb, which was developed in the Cold War as a free-fall air-launched weapon, is integrated into the structure of the S-71K, which otherwise features a low-observable airframe.

The S-71K’s airframe is made from “a multi-layer fiberglass material with additional reinforcement,” with other internal elements made of aluminum alloys. The airframe has a low-observable shape, with a trapezoidal cross section, chined nose, pop-out swept wings, and an inverted V-tail. Available imagery of the wreckage reveals details of the top-mounted conformal engine intake, feeding a pentagon-shaped intake duct. There are, however, no signs of any low-observable coatings, such as radar-absorbent material, likely to keep costs down.

The GUR also provides information on various electronic components, of which it says “the vast majority” are of foreign origin, including items manufactured in China, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States. As the GUR says, “Continued access to foreign technologies and components allows the aggressor state to develop new weapons and scale their use in the war against Ukraine.”

This makes it one of many Russian weapons relying on foreign parts. For instance, a Russian Shahed-136 strike drone obtained by the GUR contained numerous components from the U.S. as well as parts from Iran, Taiwan, and other nations. Previously, we noted that the GUR found multiple foreign components in a Russian S-70 Okhotnik-B (Hunter-B) flying-wing uncrewed combat air vehicle (UCAV) downed in a case of friendly fire.

The S-71K is powered by a compact R500 turbojet engine, also produced by UAC, and features what the GUR describes as “an inertial navigation system based on simple sensors.”

With three separate internal fuel tanks, Ukraine assesses that the S-71K has an operational range of up to 186 miles. Earlier reports suggest that the missile flies at a speed of Mach 0.6 and at altitudes of up to 27,000 feet.

In 2024, it was reported that Sukhoi had received approval from the Russian Defense Ministry to begin producing the S-71, after it underwent “significant design changes” based on lessons from the Ukraine conflict.

These changes apparently included increasing the range and reducing the radar cross-section to improve survivability against air defenses.

The GUR has not said what platform or platforms are understood to have employed the S-71K in the war in Ukraine. As mentioned, the S-71K is known to have been developed with the Su-57 in mind and has at least been tested on this aircraft, with captive-carry trials in April 2024 at the Russian flight research center in Zhukovsky. There is no reason that it couldn’t also be carried by other Russian tactical jets; this would be necessary for large-volume employment, if significant production numbers are actually realized.

It is also expected that Russia will explore the integration of the S-71K with its S-70 Okhotnik UCAV.

Interestingly, there have also been reports that the S-71K may be complemented by a more advanced weapon, known as the S-71M Monokhrom. While described as a kamikaze drone, this is essentially an air-to-ground missile expected to have a “human-in-the-loop” capability, to allow dynamic targeting, including against moving targets, via a controller on the ground. In this way, it differs from the S-71K, which apparently features a fairly basic inertial guidance system, likely backed up by satellite navigation. The S-71M is also said to feature electro-optical sensors for day and night operations, and multiple warhead options, including high-explosive and shaped charges.

While the S-71K is externally carried by launch aircraft, the S-71M can reportedly also be accommodated in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or S-70 UCAV. So far, we have not seen S-71s with folding tailfins, which would be required for internal carriage.

Earlier this year, unconfirmed reports from Russia suggested that the S-71M Monokhrom may have been used in an attack on a Ukrainian HIMARS launcher in the Chernihiv region, although the Russian military stressed that the target was destroyed by a Geran loitering munition. Images released of S-71M test rounds indicate a missile design that is notably less stealthy than the latest S-71K, but the M-version may also have been refined in the meantime.

In March of this year, the GUR revealed details of another new Russian air-launched cruise missile, the Izdeliye 30, which you can read more about here.

The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published an interactive 3D model, the main assemblies, and components of the enemy’s new cruise missile “izdeliye-30,” as well as data on 20 enterprises involved in its production cooperation chain.

🔗: https://t.co/shMagPCZHE pic.twitter.com/6XgEsxVatf

— Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (@DI_Ukraine) March 2, 2026

This missile also has folding wings, but offers a much longer range of at least 930 miles. It is similarly powered by a compact turbojet engine but does not have a stealthy airframe.

Various components in the Izdeliye 30 appear to have been reused from existing weapons, reducing cost and complexity and speeding development.

Based on its range, the Izdeliye is likely intended as a cheaper, simpler alternative to the air-launched cruise missiles otherwise used by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, namely the Kh-101 and Kh-555 (the Kh-55 carries a nuclear warhead).

Meanwhile, the S-71K appears to be tailored for tactical crewed and uncrewed aircraft, while its more limited range is partly compensated for by the fact that it has low-observable features (and is intended for launch from low-observable platforms).

The S-71K should also offer a cheaper alternative to the Kh-69, a weapon widely associated with the Su-57, although it can also be launched by ‘legacy’ Russian tactical aircraft. You can read about this air-to-surface missile here.

1/ TASS reports that KTRV will display (a mock-up of) its Kh-69 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) at the upcoming “Army-2022” forum.

Specifications:
– Max range (km): 290
– Cruise speed (km/h): 700 – 1,000
– Warhead (kg): 300 – 310 (depending on configuration) pic.twitter.com/UD38MsNNpG

— Guy Plopsky (@GuyPlopsky) August 11, 2022

While it remains to be seen exactly how the S-71 series will be used in an operational context, it’s clear that Russia has a need for cheaper, easier-to-produce air-launched missiles for its combat aircraft fleet. 

Just as the U.S. military is facing the challenge of limited munitions stocks as it prepares for a potential future conflict with China, Russia has a requirement today for strike weapons that can be manufactured cost-effectively and in large numbers.

At minimum, the deployment of the S-71 poses an additional challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defense forces, especially given the continued scarcity of Western-supplied ground-based air defense systems.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Authoritarian leaders like President Vladimir Putin are faced with a dilemma: they require their military forces to competently conduct campaigns against external enemies, but these same capabilities make them more capable of successfully initiating coups to remove the incumbent leader.  Putin, like other leaders of his ilk, is forced to balance policies which promote competence in the armed forces with measures that ensure regime survival.  The latter are referred to as ‘coup-proofing’ measures, the implementation of which, to some extent explain the underperformance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

Counterbalancing and Parallel Forces

The coup-proofing measure of most consequence to Russia’s military performance in Ukraine is ‘counterbalancing’.  This involves the introduction of new security forces to counterbalance the military and each other.  A splintered security sector filled with various armed groups are in competition with each other for funding, recruits, and supplies, as well as the ruling autocrat’s attention, which is ultimately vital for attaining the aforementioned resources. 

Counterbalancing confers three advantages.  Firstly, it promotes loyalty by encouraging competition and distrust between militarized factions who must demonstrate allegiance to the leader to secure resources.  Secondly, it deters coups because the officers and senior figures distrust their counterparts in other organizations; and thirdly, it prevents the likelihood of a coup succeeding as it is more difficult for military and security forces operating under disparate chains of command to coordinate and cooperate effectively.

To quote, a 2017 paper appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, ‘If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be understood as an effort to add additional players to the game – actors who lack the incentive to move in concert with the others.’

Counterbalancing is rarely used in isolation and may be combined with other coup-proofing measures.  For example, authoritarian leaders frequently favour loyalty over meritocracy when selecting staff for senior military and security positions.

Mercenaries as Parallel Forces

Several parallel armed groups exist outside of the Russian military’s chain of command.  The most high-profile example is the use of mercenaries from Wagner Group, formerly led by Yevgeny Prigozhin until his demise in August 2023.  Wagner Group employs an estimated 50,000 soldiers, 40,000 of which are believed to be released prison convicts.  For Putin, the introduction of mercenaries to the war in Ukraine conferred several benefits including a degree of plausible deniability, less domestic blowback from casualties, and an alternative source of manpower which was especially valuable prior to the partial mobilization in September 2022.

From a coup-proofing perspective, the introduction of a private military company (PMC) with overlapping responsibilities to the regular military promoted greater competition between senior leaders.  This rivalry was exacerbated by the contest for vital resources like ammunition, supplies and personnel. 

The feud between Wagner’s late leader with Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov was especially bitter.  Prigozhin frequently levelled scathing criticism at the two men, and other senior military officers for their handling of the war, accusing them of stealing the credit for Wagner’s battlefield successes in Ukraine, and even attempting to sabotage the PMC’s efforts by withholding vital ammunition. 

For a time, this suited Putin.  Prigozhin was careful to avoid directly criticizing the Russian president himself which helped to deflect any blame Putin might receive from the public onto his generals.  Moreover, Prigozhin’s actions appeared to fit a preestablished pattern in Russian politics whereby senior figures jostle against each other to secure the president’s favour. 

There are several Russian PMCs in addition to Wagner Group.  Konstantin Pikalov, once thought to be Prigozhin’s right hand man and the head of Wagner operations in Africa, heads his own mercenary group called ‘Convoy’, which were founded in occupied Crimea in Autumn 2022.  Another group is ‘Redut’, which was likely formed to provide security for Russian-owned facilities in Syria, but it believed to have been one of the first PMCs to provide personnel during the invasion of Ukraine in February last year.

The Russian energy giant Gazprom also has mercenaries in the guise of ‘private security organizations’, which energy companies were permitted to create after a new law was passed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in February 2023.  It is unclear whether the various groups associated with Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Neft will exclusively guard the company’s energy facilities or whether they will take on active combat roles in Ukraine.

Other Parallel Forces

Mercenaries are not the only parallel forces at play.  In 2016, Putin formed the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) under the leadership of Viktor Zolotov, the president’s former bodyguard.  The formation of the Rosgvariya entailed the reorganization of preexisting internal security forces into a new agency which directly reports to Putin.  Ostensibly, the Rosgvardiya’s responsibilities largely concern public order, policing, and counterterrorism, but the 300,000 to 400,000 strong force certainly acts as a deterrent to would-be coup-plotters.  The Rosgvardiya has also reportedly seen action in Ukraine.

Similar examples of counterbalancing can be seen in the intelligence sphere.  Three of the country’s most important intelligence services, the GRU, the SVR, and the FSB, each have their own elite special forces contingents.  Competition and mutual distrust between the three is rife due to a high degree of overlapping tasks and low degree of cooperation.  The FSB have attracted a particularly high degree of rancour from the GRU and SVR because of its increasingly proactive role conducting operations beyond its domestic remit.  Additionally, counterintelligence officers from the FSB are embedded directly within the armed forces to monitor signs of dissent. 

Finally, there are parallel forces provided by the Russian republics.  Just two days after the invasion of Ukraine, Ramzan Kadyrov, the Kremlin-appointed leader of Chechnya, confirmed that the 141st Special Motorized Regiment – better known as the Kadyrovites – were operating in the country.  The Kadyrovites are essentially a paramilitary organization loyal to Kadyrov, functioning as his private army. 

Like Prigozhin, Kadyrov has been highly critical of the Russian military leadership but avoided levelling such critiques at Putin.  By emphasizing the effectiveness of Chechen fighters over regular Russian forces, Kadyrov may have been hoping to make himself appear more indispensable to Putin.

How Coup-Proofing Degrades Military Effectiveness

The introduction of several players incentivized to hold each other in mutual suspicion is not conducive to an effective and unified war effort, as events in Ukraine have demonstrated.  As explained by James M. Powell, coup-proofing ‘undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges in the field.’  Unity of command is necessary for a coup to be effective, but it is just as necessary for conducting a war.  The absence of unified command has thus jeopardized the entire Russian war effort.

The lack of a unified command structure was evident in the early stages of the war.  In the first months following the invasion, Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies and analysts were unable to identify a single overall commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.  Instead, it was believed that separate formations were drawn from each of Russia’s four military districts and placed under the command of senior officers from each district, with Putin taking on an oversized role, sometimes reportedly giving orders to field formations.  Last April, Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov was finally named as overall commander but there have been at least three reshuffles at the top since then.

Wagner’s increasing share of frontline duties further undermined unity of command, with Prigozhin and his mercenaries not subject to the authority of the regular armed forces.  Tensions between Prigozhin and the miliary leadership culminated in Wager Group’s mutiny in June.  A civil war or coup seemed momentarily possible in Russia until a deal was brokered by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.  Prigozhin was later killed in a plane crash in August removing him from the chessboard altogether, but his insubordination was a clear sign that Putin had miscalculated and allowed the rivalries simmering between the members of his inner circle to burn too hot.

Beyond Prigozhin’s dramatic rebellion, Coup-proofing has created other unintended consequences which have hindered Russia’s military efforts.  An overemphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence coupled with fierce competition between the security and defence services have created incentive structures that have undermined honesty and integrity, inter-service cooperation, and professionalism. 

These trends were identified by analysts as being particularly pervasive in the Russian intelligence community even before the invasion of Ukraine.  For example, a 2021 Congressional Research Service report noted that ‘Agencies compete with each other for greater responsibilities, budgets, and political influence, often at the expense of other agencies.’  As Mark Galeotti puts it, ‘The competition for presidential approval is especially strong and has led to a perverse competition to tell the boss what they think he wants to hear, not what he needs to hear.’  This culture likely incentivised the Russian intelligence community to provide briefings to Putin prior to the invasion that confirmed his preconceptions that Ukraine would offer little resistance.

It is equally questionable if the most competent officers have been granted the responsibility to lead Russia’s war on Ukraine.  Sergei Surovikin, a veteran of several conflicts and broadly considered to be capable officer by most military analysts, was made the overall commander of Russian forces in Ukraine in October 2022.  However, Surovikin was replaced in January the following year by Valery Gerasimov, despite the latter having already attracted much of the blame for implementing a faulty strategy in his role as the Chief of the General Staff.  In August, Surovikin was then stripped of his role as the commander of the Russian aerospace forces due to suspicions that he was linked to the Wagner rebellion. 

Other officers have met similar fates.  On July 12, Major General Ivan Popov, who led the 58th Combined Arms Army stationed in Ukraine’s southern Zaporizhzhya region, disclosed that he had been relieved of his command after he made complaints to Gerasimov regarding the lack of troop rotations.  He also highlighted issues his soldiers were having with counterbattery radar and artillery reconnaissance.  Popov’s dismissal indicates that senior military personnel are seemingly unable to report the facts on the ground to their superiors without facing charges of disloyalty or disciplinary action.  Such a culture, especially within the Russian military’s highly hierarchal command structure will make it increasingly difficult for commanders to make informed decisions based on accurate information.

Thus far, Putin’s coup-proofing strategy has succeeded in fragmenting the Russian security elite sufficiently to secure his hold on power, despite Prigozhin’s short-lived insubordination.  However, these same measures which have enabled Putin to safeguard his rule have seriously undermined Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.  The constituent parts of Russia’s defence and security apparatuses fail to act as a whole and there is ample evidence that senior leaders have been promoted on the basis of perceived loyalty over competence.  A culture of competition and distrust has hindered cooperation, coordination, and honesty, which has led to poor decision-making, the results of which have played out on the battlefields of Ukraine since February last year.

Plumes of black smoke were seen after Ukrainian drones targeted Russia’s Black Sea port of Tuapse. At least one person was killed. The strike was the second attack on the port in three days.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has arrived in Beijing as the United States blocks the Strait of Hormuz, through which China imports about a third of its oil supplies.

Lavrov received a red-carpet welcome on Tuesday, according to photos shared by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Beijing and Moscow have condemned the US and Israel over their war on Iran, with China also being economically affected by the energy crisis it has caused.

China, a big importer of Iranian oil, also slammed a recently imposed US scheme to blockade vessels entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, including in the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

“The Strait of Hormuz is an important international trade route for goods and energy, and maintaining its security, stability, and unimpeded flow is in the common interest of the international community,” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Guo Jiakun said on Monday.

Lavrov speaks to Araghchi

Al Jazeera’s Alan Fisher, reporting from Washington, DC, said the US’s goal is to choke Iran off by blocking everything coming in and out of Iranian ports.

“What the US hopes is that there’ll be pressure on Iran from some of its main business partners, including China,” he said, adding that Beijing imports about a third of its oil from Iran. “The United States is hoping that pressure on China will mean China putting pressure on Iran and forcing Iran to get back to the negotiating table.”

On Monday, Lavrov held a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi.

The top Russian diplomat told  Araghchi it was important to guard against any resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, and said Russia stood ready to help with a settlement, according to a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

“S Lavrov emphasised the importance of preventing a recurrence of armed confrontation and once again confirmed Russia’s unwavering readiness to assist in resolving the crisis, which has no military solution,” the ministry said.

It added Araghchi related to Lavrov details of US-Iran talks in Pakistan at the weekend, which failed to reach a breakthrough.

Beijing and Moscow are close economic and political partners, and the relationship has deepened further since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Wang also held a call with Lavrov on April 5, when they agreed that Beijing and Moscow would work together to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East.

Diplomacy traffic in Beijing

China welcomed a string of leaders of countries that have been affected by the war and its economic fallout this week, including Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and United Arab Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, also known as MBZ.

Chinese President Xi Jinping met MBZ and Sanchez on Tuesday morning, and Vietnamese President To Lam is expected in China for a four-day trip.

“I think what this really speaks to is that many people around the world have been surprised that China has not played a more active role in the Iran war, given it has such strong ties with Tehran, including as Iran’s largest trading partner and buyer of crude oil,” Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu, reporting from Beijing, said.

“But what China has been doing, besides calling for restraint and more negotiation, is taking advantage of this moment to really look at states that may be a little disenchanted with the US or looking to diversify from reliance on Washington,” Yu said.

“China has presented itself as the opposite of Washington – a reliable, stable and predictable partner. For many states, that message really appeals.”

Trump’s threats after ‘fabricated’ reports

Trump, who is scheduled to visit Beijing next month for talks with Xi, said on Sunday he would hit China’s goods with a 50 percent tariff if it provided military assistance to Tehran.

His comments came the same day CNN reported that US intelligence indicated China was preparing to deliver new air defence systems to Iran within the next few weeks, quoting three people familiar with the assessments.

On Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo said those reports were “completely fabricated”.

“If the US insists on using this as an excuse to impose additional tariffs on China, China will definitely take resolute countermeasures,” he said.

Russia’s intelligence agency accuses the second secretary at the British Embassy in Moscow of espionage.

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has ordered a British diplomat to leave the country within two weeks over allegations of economic espionage, which the United Kingdom rejected as “unacceptable” amid tensions over Russia’s war on Ukraine.

The FSB, the main successor to the Soviet-era KGB, on Monday said its counterintelligence officers had expelled Albertus Gerhardus Janse van Rensburg, the second secretary at the British Embassy in Moscow.

“The FSB ⁠uncovered signs that the diplomat was carrying out intelligence and subversive activities that threaten the security of the Russian Federation,” the agency said.

It added that the diplomat had attempted to “obtain sensitive information during informal meetings with Russian experts in the field of economics”.

“In order to avoid negative ⁠consequences, including criminal liability, the FSB of Russia recommends that compatriots refrain from holding meetings ⁠with British diplomats,” it said.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it had delivered a protest to Britain’s charge d’affaires over the alleged spy.

The British ⁠Foreign Office responded by saying that Russia’s accusations against ⁠its diplomats were “completely unacceptable” and that it would ⁠not tolerate “intimidation” of ⁠its ⁠embassy staff or their families.

Russia-UK discord

Russia has claimed British intelligence launched espionage activities at a level unseen since the depths of the Cold War to sow discord within the country, and it has long complained that its own diplomats are routinely harassed in key Western capitals.

The UK, ‌which supports Ukraine with money and weapons, sees Russia as its biggest immediate threat and accuses its intelligence of mounting cyberattacks, killings and sabotage campaigns across the Western world.

Since Russia launched its full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian authorities have sought to suppress opposition to the war while aiming to rally support for the war among Russian citizens.

Last week, Russia declared the teacher and main protagonist of the Oscar-winning documentary Mr Nobody Against Putin a “foreign agent“. Pavel Talankin spent two years documenting pro-war propaganda at a school in the Chelyabinsk region in west-central Russia while working as the school’s videographer.

“A bit” is what United States President Donald Trump thinks about the scale of Russia’s military aid to Iran.

Moscow “might be helping them a bit”, he told Fox News on March 13.

A day later, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated laconically that Moscow’s military cooperation with Tehran was “good”.

His words seemed to confirm earlier media reports that Russia is providing Iran with satellite and intelligence data on the locations of US warships and aircraft.

It may not sound like much, given the superiority of Western military satellites and Russia’s battlefield losses and communication problems after Elon Musk’s SpaceX company switched off smuggled Starlink satellite Internet terminals.

But data on US military assets Iran is receiving most likely comes from Liana, Moscow’s only fully functional system of spy satellites, according to an expert on Russia’s space programme and military.

“The [Liana] system has been created to spy on US carrier strike groups and other navy forces and for identifying them as targets,” Pavel Luzin, a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a US think tank, told Al Jazeera.

Eyes in the sky

Russia also played a key role in the development of Iran’s space programme and its key satellite, the Khayyam.

Launched in 2022 from Russia’s Baikonur cosmodrome, the 650kg (1,430 pound) satellite orbits the Earth at 500 kilometres (310 miles) and has a resolution of one metre (3.3 feet).

Moscow “can, in theory, receive and process data from Iran’s optical imaging satellite and share data from its own several satellites”, Luzin said.

On Wednesday, Tehran claimed to have struck the Abraham Lincoln carrier with multiple cruise and ballistic missiles, but the Pentagon called the claim “pure fiction”.

On Sunday, Iranian media claimed that a “massive blaze” was caused by a strike on a US destroyer refuelling in the Indian Ocean.

Washington did not comment on that strike.

Russia has, for decades, supplied weaponry to Iran, including advanced air defence systems, trainer and fighter jets, helicopters, armoured vehicles and sniper rifles, worth billions of dollars.

Since Washington and Tel Aviv began their strikes on February 28, Russia has continued aiding Iran with “intelligence, data, experts and components” for weaponry, Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, former deputy chief of Ukraine’s general staff of armed forces, told Al Jazeera.

While Moscow and Tehran loudly proclaim their strategic partnership, they do not have a mutual defence clause, and Moscow has not intervened in the conflict directly.

But the arms supplies have been mutual. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Tehran has provided Moscow with ammunition and artillery shells, firearms and short-range ballistic missiles, helmets and flak jackets.

Drones with ‘comets’

And then there are the Shahed kamikaze drones – slow, noisy, yet cheap to manufacture – which have been launched on Ukrainian cities in swarms of dozens and then hundreds. Ukraine became so adept at bringing these down – now mass-producing cheap interceptor systems specifically to target Shaheds – that it is now providing its own know-how to Gulf states where US military assets have come under fire from Iran in recent weeks.

In the course of its war with Ukraine, Moscow has manufactured and modernised Shaheds, making them faster and deadlier, and equipping them with cameras, navigators and, occasionally, artificial intelligence modules.

And now, some of the upgrades have made their way back to Iran.

A Shahed drone with a pivotal Russian component launched by Iran-backed Hezbollah from southern Lebanon was able to hit a British airbase on Cyprus on March 1, the UK’s Times newspaper reported on March 7.

It reportedly contained Kometa-B (Comet B), a Russian-made satellite navigation module that also acts as an anti-jamming shield, making drones more resistant to interference.

Russia has also perfected the tactic of sending waves of real and decoy drones to exhaust and overwhelm Western-supplied air defence systems in Ukraine.

These days, the scheme helps Iran hit targets in the Gulf, Western officials say.

“I think no one will be surprised to believe that Putin’s hidden hand is behind some of the Iranian tactics and potentially some of their capabilities as well,” British Defence Secretary John Healey said on March 12 after Iranian drones struck a base used by Western forces in Erbil, northern Iraq.

However, if Iran is suffering a shortage of drones – as some analysts believe it is – that would render the use of Russian tactics, as well as Russia-supplied satellite data useless, experts say.

“Russia does supply data, it’s obvious, the data helps Iran, but not much,” Nikita Smagin, a Russian expert who has written extensively on ties between Moscow and Tehran, told Al Jazeera.

After four days of intensive strikes using up to 250 drones a day in early March, Iran has been launching only up to 50 drones a day, according to Nikolay Mitrokhin, a researcher with Germany’s Bremen University.

“Iran ran out of steam really fast,” he told Al Jazeera.

‘A goodwill gesture’

Moreover, Moscow is not necessarily particularly interested in an Iranian military victory, as the war is benefitting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s own conflict in Ukraine.

Skyrocketing oil prices make “Putin financially capable of further hostilities,” Lieutenant General Romanenko said.

As Iran strangles shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the price of Brent crude – the international benchmark – has soared past $100 a barrel in the past three weeks. US President Donald Trump was forced to temporarily suspend sanctions on shipped Russian oil to ease the economic backlash. The result has been tankers laden with Russian oil bound for China making U-turns in the open ocean to divert to India, as countries scramble to grab Russian oil cargoes out at sea. The price of Urals crude has bounced.

Putin “hasn’t achieved his goals in Ukraine and will therefore use anything, including the war [in Iran] and lies to achieve his vision, press with his ultimatums,” Romanenko said.

The Kremlin “doesn’t pursue a breakthrough in this war, doesn’t help Iran break the United States and Israel,” Ruslan Suleymanov, an associate fellow at the New Eurasian Strategies Center, a US-British think tank, told Al Jazeera.

The current intelligence and military aid is “more of a goodwill gesture, an attempt to create an illusion of help, to show Tehran that despite the lack of formal commitments, Russia doesn’t leave its friend in need”, he said.

And Tehran fully understands how insufficient Moscow’s aid is – and therefore relies on its own stratagem of expanding hostilities to the entire region through strikes on neighbouring states and of crippling the global economy with soaring oil prices.

“Iranians understand that the forces are not equal and it’s impossible to defeat the United States and Israel on the battlefield, and no Russian aid is going to help,” he said.

It seems that Trump’s assessment that Moscow “might be helping them a bit” may not be too far wide of the mark.