Russias

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine make that the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At leats one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it’s size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

A new Ukrainian intelligence report details the complex production chain behind Russia’s shadowy 3M22 Zircon missile and identifies U.S.-origin electronics inside one of Russia’s most advanced weapons. New details also add weight to the theory that the weapon is a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile rather than a true hypersonic cruise missile.

The unusually detailed new breakdown of the Zircon missile identifies 70 enterprises and 84 individuals involved in its development and production while providing a component-by-component look at one of Moscow’s most closely watched — and least-understood — weapons.

The first evidence of Zircon’s combat use emerged in February 2024, when Ukrainian officials displayed recovered debris after a Russian strike. The wreckage included distinctive engine and steering-system components that Ukrainian specialists used to identify the weapon.

Russia has since employed the missile on other occasions. Ukrainian authorities reported that a Zircon was launched from occupied Crimea during a major missile and drone strike in January 2026, as we reported at the time.

While initially developed for use from warships and submarines, Zircon is understood to have been employed from ground-based launchers against Ukraine, with modified launchers from the K-300P Bastion coastal defense system considered the most likely candidate.

The new entry on Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) War & Sanctions portal includes an interactive 3D model and identifies systems ranging from the missile’s radar seeker and onboard computer to its propulsion system and warhead. It also identifies foreign-origin electronics, including components associated with U.S. manufacturers.

Among them, according to the GUR report, is a TGA2704 amplifier associated with TriQuint Semiconductor, now part of U.S. company Qorvo. The GUR also identifies an Altera Cyclone II EP2C5T144I8N field-programmable gate array (FPGA) associated with Altera Corporation, now part of Intel, and lists it as originating in the United States.

The alleged findings do not establish that either company knowingly supplied Russia’s defense industry, nor do they explain precisely how the components reached Russian production lines. The GUR says it’s seeking additional information on their origins and supply chains. Bearing in mind previous precedents, China could potentially be one source, being a known vector globally for recycled chips.

Nevertheless, the disclosure highlights the continued presence of Western-origin electronics in Russia’s advanced weapons programs despite sanctions and export controls.

The GUR lists the Zircon as approximately 26 feet long, with a body diameter of 2.2 feet, and a warhead weighing about 265 pounds.

The agency gives a maximum speed of Mach 8-9, a flight altitude of approximately 19-25 miles, and a separate “maximum fixed speed” (presumably, sustained cruising speed) of Mach 6.8. These are Ukrainian intelligence assessments and cannot be independently verified.

The database identifies the 3B222 active radar-homing head, manufactured by NPP Radar MMS, and a Baget-83 onboard digital computer produced by KB Korund-M.

It also identifies the 3B915 guidance units, the 3G22 warhead, and the 3L2211 solid-fuel rocket motor manufactured by NPO Iskra. Other Russian companies provide altimeters, control systems, power supplies, and other components.

The reported propulsion information is particularly significant.

Russian and other sources have consistently described Zircon as a hypersonic cruise missile, implying an air-breathing propulsion system burning liquid propellant, capable of sustaining hypersonic flight.

However, the physical evidence for such a propulsion system has always been less clear.

Open-source analysis by Fabian Hinz has highlighted the apparent absence of a conventional air intake on Zircon. A scramjet- or ramjet-powered missile requires an intake to bring atmospheric oxygen into the engine, yet available imagery does not clearly show one. A Russian patent associated with the missile’s jettisonable launch cap likewise does not reveal an obvious intake arrangement.

More significant is evidence from recovered missile debris.

Material examined by Ukraine’s Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise included a circular metal structure interpreted as part of a solid-propellant rocket motor. The hardware appeared to be associated with Zircon’s second stage rather than simply its launch booster (which would be used on a true hypersonic cruise missile to bring it up to operating speed). This suggests a two-stage weapon, with a solid-propellant rocket in each. This would match with what we have seen during shipboard launches.

That finding is consistent with Russian patent activity involving NPO Mashinostroyeniya and NPO Iskra. Patents associated with the companies describe solid-propellant rocket motors incorporating arrangements for aerodynamic-control equipment around the motor’s exhaust system.

There is also evidence that Russian engineers developed advanced composite solid propellants specifically for Zircon.

None of this conclusively proves the missile lacks an air-breathing engine, but it certainly raises more questions about its classification. It should be noted that there are also some solid-fuel ramjet concepts, but these are much rarer applications.

If Zircon is primarily rocket-powered, it may be better understood as a maneuverable quasi-ballistic missile that nonetheless reaches hypersonic speeds.

Such a weapon would use rocket propulsion to accelerate rapidly and climb to high altitude before descending toward its target along a trajectory that is partly ballistic but incorporates aerodynamic maneuvering — a so-called ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory. It could therefore reach hypersonic speeds without requiring sustained cruise under the power of an air-breathing system. The combination of high speed and unpredictable trajectory also makes it notably difficult for air defenses to deal with, characteristics shared with the air-launched Kinzhal, another Russian quasi-ballistic missile.

That interpretation could also help explain reports of a highly variable Zircon speed profile.

Russian officials have claimed that the missile can reach approximately Mach 9. During a 2020 test, Russian military leadership said Zircon reached more than Mach 8 while flying to an altitude of roughly 17 miles.

A Russian Ministry of Defense video that claims to show the Zircon test in the White Sea on Oct. 6, 2020:

Первый пуск гиперзвуковой ракеты «Циркон» с борта фрегата «Адмирал Горшков»

Ukrainian assessments have described a more complicated profile, with the missile reportedly flying at around Mach 5.5, accelerating to approximately Mach 7.5 near the target, and then slowing before impact. Those figures cannot be independently confirmed, but a boost-and-glide or quasi-ballistic trajectory could produce such a profile more naturally than sustained powered cruise.

At the same time, it should be recalled that ‘hypersonic’ does not necessarily imply a ‘hypersonic cruise missile.’ A ballistic or quasi-ballistic weapon can travel well above Mach 5, which appears to be the case here. The characteristics of the Zircon, as presented by the GUR, would also help explain official Ukrainian claims that the missiles have been intercepted successfully by Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems.

There is also a relevant technological precedent. NPO Mashinostroyeniya has previously patented solid-propellant missiles using quasi-ballistic trajectories, including designs intended to maneuver at high-supersonic and hypersonic speeds. That does not establish a direct lineage to Zircon, but it does show that the concept is consistent with the company’s history.

The other major takeaway from the release is the scale of Zircon’s production network.

One of Russia’s leading missile houses, NPO Mashinostroyeniya is identified as the missile’s main designer and manufacturer and prime contractor for Russian Ministry of Defense contracts covering its development and production.

But the weapon depends on dozens of other organizations. NPO Iskra supplies the solid-fuel motor; NPP Radar MMS provides the radar seeker; KB Korund-M produces the onboard computer; and other enterprises supply guidance systems, altimeters, control electronics, warheads, power systems, and other specialized equipment.

Another video, released by the Russian Ministry of Defense in May 2022, is said to show the Gorshkov launching a Zircon, although the missile is seen only at a distance with no details visible:

Russia shows off Zircon hypersonic cruise missile

The U.S.-origin electronics claimed to have been identified by GUR are particularly notable because they demonstrate how Russia’s sophisticated weapons production remains connected to international semiconductor supply chains.

By linking specific enterprises and individuals to individual missile components, Ukraine has provided governments and investigators with new information that could be used to pursue sanctions, export-control enforcement, and efforts to disrupt Russia’s supply chain.

The report also adds weight to continued open-source assessments of what kind of missile Zircon actually is.

Regardless of its classification, Zircon remains a formidable weapon. A rocket-powered missile capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, flying at high altitude, maneuvering, and potentially accelerating during its terminal approach presents a serious challenge to missile defenses. With Ukraine’s ability to intercept even more conventional ballistic missiles already severely eroded, the weapon further complicates the country’s troubling air defense picture.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Both Russia and Ukraine vow not to strike each other’s capitals for three days during talks in Moscow and Kyiv.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has begun talks with United States envoys on ending more than four years of war in Ukraine, ahead of their first visit to Kyiv expected on Sunday.

Putin met Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner – respectively President Donald Trump’s special envoy and business ally, and his son-in-law – at the Kremlin on Saturday.

“Dear colleagues, I warmly welcome you to Moscow. The situation is, of course, not simple,” Putin told the envoys in a grand Kremlin hall in footage aired by Russian TV.

Both Russia and Ukraine vowed not to strike each other’s capitals for three days during the negotiations, as Washington tries to revive US-led talks to end Europe’s worst conflict since World War II.

Trump earlier said Kushner and Witkoff were bringing “a proposal to end the war”.

In Putin’s address to the two men, he said: “I would like to ask everyone to convey their best wishes and words of gratitude to US President Mr Trump”.

Witkoff said Trump had sent his best wishes to Putin and ⁠thanked him for ⁠the limited ceasefire during the delegation’s visit. Putin said ⁠Russia would do its ⁠utmost to ensure ⁠the safety of the mediators.

‘Refrain from strikes’

The talks come as the grinding war – which began with a Russian invasion in 2022 – has seen increasing civilian deaths and attacks this summer.

Putin has repeatedly said Moscow intends to seize the rest of east Ukraine.

Russian strikes on Ukraine on Saturday killed at least seven people, including in the Kyiv suburbs, Ukrainian officials said.

The Kremlin said it would not strike Kyiv from midnight on Saturday, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he would halt strikes on Moscow “from now” until Monday.

“The Russian president, the commander-in-chief, has given the order from midnight tonight not to strike Kyiv for three days,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said.

Zelensky – who had offered a truce during the US visits – later said he had spoken to the US envoys and also promised Kyiv would not strike Moscow.

“From now through the end of Saturday, as well as on Sunday and Monday, Ukraine is ready to refrain from strikes on Moscow,” Zelensky said on social media.

The Ukrainian leader said he had spoken to the US officials and that he expected them in Kyiv on Sunday.

It will be the first time that Witkoff and Kushner visit Kyiv since Trump returned to office last year with a pledge to resolve the conflict.

As the war drags on in Ukraine, its civilians are again suffering.

Thirty-eight people were killed in the village of Myla on August 29, when a Russian drone attack struck an ammunition depot. Another 12 were killed in attacks across the country on September 1.

Civilian deaths have sharply increased this summer as Russia is using jet-powered drones, which fly at about half the speed of a passenger jet and are more difficult to intercept than propeller-powered drones.

Jet-powered drones numbered about 2,800 in August, said Ukraine Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat, compared with about 1,500 in July, several times the number launched in June. Ukraine has an interception rate of more than 90 percent against propeller-powered drones, but only 60 percent against the jet-powered variant, Ihnat said.

Ukraine said Russian forces suffered 42,020 casualties last month, as Moscow’s territorial gains dropped to a fraction of last year’s rate of advance.

Ukrainian armed forces figures showed Russia’s monthly casualties were only slightly below July’s 42,860 and well above the 39,290 in June.

Al Jazeera cannot independently verify casualty estimates by either side, but if accurate, those summer figures – 25.8 percent higher than the casualties Ukraine inflicted in the spring – suggest the high Russian casualty rate is not a passing event.

Russian recruitment rates are thought to be well below those totals, estimated by Ukraine at about 32,500 a month this year.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has publicly shared intelligence suggesting that Russian leader Vladimir Putin will conscript 300,000 or more troops next month.

Zelenskyy has said that up to 80 percent of Russian casualties were inflicted in Kostiantynivka, the southernmost of Ukraine’s “fortress belt” of cities in the eastern Donetsk region, whose capture Putin has repeatedly prioritised.

Russian forces are thought to control only a portion of the city, but have infiltrated more than 70 percent of it with scattered individual troops sent to drop supplies and await reinforcements. Ukrainian drone operators have been targeting the troops as Russia replenishes them.

This week it was revealed that Ukrainian commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi, reinforced the Donetsk front around Sloviansk and Dobropillia, north and south of Kostiantynivka, respectively, but kept the Kostiantynivka front largely unchanged. That suggests Ukraine may be adopting the tactic of fighting a prolonged rearguard in the urban landscape to inflict attritional losses, as it did in the battles of Bakhmut, Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar.

The fight for Kostiantynivka has sapped troop strength elsewhere on the front line, where Ukraine liberated 130sq km (50 square miles) of its land in August, limiting Russia’s overall advance.

Russia seized just over 90sq km (35 square miles) in August, estimated the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank that assesses territorial gains using open-source geolocated sources.

While still a net gain, that is less than a fifth of the land Russia seized in August last year.

During June, July and August this year, the ISW assessed that Russia gained firm control of 160sq km (60 square miles), compared with 1,440sq km in the summer months of 2025 (560 square miles) – a 90 percent decrease.

Ukraine’s response

Ukraine has turned its focus from Russian refineries to strikes against Russian air defences, radar systems and drone launch sites.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (SBS) destroyed 33 air defence elements in August, increasing the annual total to 263.

Ukraine also kept up some strikes on refineries, hitting 12 in August, along with two gas-processing plants and three oil transshipment terminals, according to its defence ministry.

During the past week, Ukraine struck the Yanos refinery in Yaroslavl and the Kirishi and Ust-Luga refineries near Leningrad, all 800km (500 miles) from its border.

Those strikes have caused petrol shortages, further hurting Russia’s economy.

Ukraine’s military intelligence reported that certain Russian exports had fallen by 80 percent compared with pre-war levels. Oil has been among the hardest hit, as Ukraine has struck terminals and hundreds of tankers carrying Russian oil in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Russian oil exports from the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk fell from 800,000 barrels a day in July to 350,000 barrels per day in August, said Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

“The Russian side acknowledges that its Black Sea Fleet ships are effectively blockaded in Novorossiysk due to our drone strikes and are unable to operate at sea,” said Zelenskyy.

“Since the Russian fleet is unable to provide escorts for the commercial and shadow fleet …  one of the solutions being considered is to equip civilian ships with small arms, electronic warfare (EW) equipment and military personnel,” he said. “We will prepare appropriate countermeasures.”

The strikes on the oil industry have not only reduced exports. They have reverberated across the Russian economy, creating queues at petrol stations and raising prices for motorists.

This week, Russia extended its ban on diesel exports to the end of September to keep its army and transport industry supplied and sought to import petrol.

Occupied Crimea, where petrol distribution has been restricted to government-owned vehicles, has been hard hit.

The Russian-appointed governor of the region, Sergei Aksyonov, said on September 2: “Fuel supplies to the region are currently not fully meeting the needs of the residents. Unfortunately, some residents of Crimea will, at this stage, face limited access to gasoline”.

Kyiv, Ukraine – Russian Aerospace Forces (RAF) chief Aleksandr Chayko barely survived a blast that killed his son-in-law.

Chayko, who turned 55 in the last week of July, was reportedly having a belated birthday party on August 1 at a high-end Italian restaurant in central Moscow.

But the celebration was cut short, as an ‌unidentified woman carrying a homemade bomb tried to enter the restaurant. She was stopped by a security ‌guard, according to Russia. The explosive in her bag detonated, killing at least five people.

The Kremlin did not confirm the casualties, but blamed the attack on the “bloody tentacles” of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government.

Kyiv has not commented on the attack.

Russia’s space programme in the firing line

Chayko helped lead Russia’s intervention in Syria and commanded Russian forces north of Kyiv in early 2022.

Ukraine has accused him of war crimes.

In May, President Vladimir Putin appointed him commander-in-chief of the RAF that controls the military component of Russia’s space programme.

The RAF’s satellites and ground-space facilities have been used for gathering intelligence, navigation, and supporting the coordination of ground troops and drone and missile attacks.

These facilities are located mostly in western Russia, and new Ukrainian long-range drones and missiles are capable of striking them.

“Key factories are few, and they all are within the reach of Ukrainian missiles,” Nikolay Mitrokhin, a researcher with Germany’s University of Bremen, told Al Jazeera.

“These attacks may result – and certainly will – in the problems with all of Russia’s space programme, including specifically civilian and international programmes,” he said.

‘Long-range sanctions’

In late June, Ukrainian drones hit the giant space communications centre in the leafy, tranquil town of Dubna outside Moscow that managed reconnaissance satellites and processed military data.

The strike damaged a 32-metre (105-foot) satellite antenna, hardware modular complexes, central control consoles and technical buildings.

“Our long-range sanctions against Russia for this war once again reached the Dubna space communications centre,” Zelenskyy said on June 30.

Russian authorities said an unspecified building in Dubna was damaged and a six-month-old baby died.

Ukrainian drones also struck three smaller space communication centres in western Russia and annexed Crimea.

“These centres are very expensive, very labour-consuming from the viewpoint of construction,” Anatoly Zak, a United States-based author and one of the foremost experts on the Russian space programme, told Al Jazeera. “It’s very difficult to transfer their functions to another infrastructure” because they manage geostationary satellites “tied” to a certain location.

So far, there have been no signs that the satellites lost orbit or became unmanageable, but “behind the scenes there are for sure serious communication problems”, Zak said.

Ukraine attacks ‘when there’s a fully-fuelled rocket on the launchpad’

On August 23, swarms of Ukrainian drones flew more than 1,800km (1,120 miles) to reach Russia’s northwestern Arkhangelsk region.

Some 40 drones were downed, regional authorities claimed, but at least two reached the area near Plesetsk, Russia’s military cosmodrome, or spaceport, and launchpad for intercontinental ballistic missiles and rockets carrying military satellites.

No harm was done. A day later, Roscosmos, the state-run space corporation, reported the successful launch of a rocket with unnamed “military satellites”.

The timing of the Ukrainian attack – along with two more strikes earlier this year – was calculated to strike a booster rocket that had just been fuelled and lifted for takeoff.

“There have been three attempts to air-raid Plesetsk, and not just air-raid, but air-raid at the moment when there’s a fully-fuelled rocket on the launchpad that is about to start,” Zak said.

The attempts were serious enough to be publicly reported to Putin.

“Our [Ukrainian] ‘friends’ did everything to make this launch not happen,” Dmitry Bakanov, head of the Kremlin-run Roscosmos space agency, told Putin in April.

At least a dozen drones are necessary to damage Plesetsk’s launch table or rocket assembly shop, according to Pavel Luzin, an analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank in Washington, DC.

The military satellites launched from Plesetsk are part of the Rassvet (Dawn) satellite fleet designed to rival and replace Starlink satellite modems by Elon Musk’s SpaceX company, Moscow claimed.

The world’s most launched spaceship

Sputnik 1, the Earth’s first artificial satellite, was the size of a fitness ball, and had nothing but a radio transmitter and three silver-zinc batteries inside.

The “Sputnik moment” was the US’s realisation, after the Soviet Union launched the first satellite in 1957, that the USSR had taken the lead in space technology and science.

But Sputnik 1 was launched on a modified R-7 – the world’s first intercontinental ballistic missile, designed to carry a hydrogen bomb across continents. The same rocket technology that could deliver a nuclear warhead into the US had been repurposed to put a satellite into orbit.

The R-7 became a prototype of the Soyuz booster rockets, the world’s most launched spaceships that made Soviet and then Russian launches routine and precise, unlike US launches of space shuttles.

“Rain or shine or sleet or snow don’t matter,” Mark Bowman, deputy director of NASA’s human spaceflight programme, told this reporter in 2007 at the Baikonur spaceport, the world’s oldest in southern Kazakhstan that Russia leases.

The only place where the Soyuz rockets are produced is the Progress Rocket and Space Centre in the Volga River city of Samara – and Ukrainian missiles struck it on August 15. The attack ignited a fire and slightly damaged one of the facilities.

“So far, we see that the damage in Samara wasn’t critical,” Luzin said.

If it becomes critical, Russia would be unable to manufacture the Soyuz rockets, but the existing stash of rockets would still last a year, he said.

Communist Moscow never advertised the military component of its space programme, emphasising its “peaceful exploration of space”.

The USSR was first to send a dog, a man and a woman into space, and to launch the world’s first space station. In 1988, its Buran space shuttle became the first to complete an unmanned orbital flight and land automatically.

Its unmanned probes soft-landed on Venus and Mars and took the first photos of the moon’s dark side.

Some key figures of the Soviet space programmes were born in what is now Ukraine, and a string of crucial design bureaus and manufacturing facilities kept working there after the 1991 Soviet collapse.

Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent breakdown in Russian-Ukrainian relations, Ukrainian aerospace facilities severed their longstanding ties with Moscow, disrupting decades-old supplies of booster rockets, guidance systems, electronics and other components.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also deepened the international isolation of its civilian space programme, with Western governments and space agencies suspending or abandoning several planned missions and partnerships.

After the war began in 2022, the European Space Agency terminated its cooperation with Roscosmos on ExoMars, removing the Russian-built Kazachok landing platform from the mission designed to search for signs of past life on Mars.

The same year, Berlin switched off its X-ray telescope on Spektr-RG, a Russia-German space observatory that maps clusters of galaxies and surveys the universe for black holes.

For the sake of seizing insignificant areas in eastern Ukraine, “Putin will waste the Russian space programme the way he wasted the rest of the Soviet legacy”, analyst Mitrokhin believes.

Yet Russia has not been completely cut off from international space cooperation.

Despite the collapse of some partnerships, NASA and Roscosmos have continued to work together on board the International Space Station, while Moscow has turned to China and other non-Western partners for new projects.

Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov has made a surprise appearance at United States-hosted G20 finance talks in North Carolina, sparking frustration and dismay among European ministers and officials.

Siluanov’s appearance at the talks in Asheville on Monday marks the first time the minister, who was appointed in 2011, has attended a G20 meeting in person since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

He held a bilateral meeting with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, with Russia’s Ministry of Finance saying the two men discussed financial cooperation within the G20 framework.

A US official said the meeting focused on US President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Ukraine.

Asked about the invitation to Siluanov, Trump told reporters: “We like getting along with everybody. One of the reasons I’m so successful, I get along with everybody.”

European officials, however, criticised the move.

Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Domanski said he was unhappy to see Moscow represented, although he recognised the right of G20 hosts to invite guests.

“We do not trust Russia. They lie constantly, and you need to be really, really cautious while discussing with them,” ⁠he told the Reuters news agency, stressing that Russia was the aggressor in its conflict with Ukraine.

“So for me, it would be very difficult to have any kind of conversation with Russia.”

‘Troubling’ signal

German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil said the US’s decision to welcome Siluanov sent a “signal I find troubling”.

He said he told Siluanov during a plenary session that Moscow had to end the war and “that we clearly support Ukraine”.

He also said Europe was preparing a further package of sanctions against Russia and hoped for close cooperation with Washington on the measures.

European ministers and central bankers also opposed appearing with Siluanov in the traditional G20 “family photo”, European officials said. The photograph was ultimately taken without the Russian minister.

Klingbeil said European officials, including European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde, had discussed Russia’s involvement on Sunday and agreed that maintaining an avenue for dialogue could allow them to deliver a frank message to Moscow.

“However, the mere fact that the Russian finance minister is back – after, I believe, four G20 meetings without Russian participation – indicates an attempt at normalisation, and that makes it all the more important for us to push back,” he said.

Siluanov’s appearance marked a sharp contrast with the G20 meeting in Washington, DC, in April 2022, when his virtual participation prompted officials from Canada, the United Kingdom, the US, and the European Central Bank to walk out.

White House defends talks with Russia

Asked about Siluanov’s attendance, White House spokesman Kush Desai told the AFP news agency that the Trump administration had been working with Russia to push for a deal that “would stop the endless bloodshed that the president has really condemned”.

“The president and the administration will never shy away from talking with the folks we need to talk to, to further that,” he said. “That’s what we’re working on here at the G20.”

Separately, Reuters and AFP, citing sources familiar with the Washington-Moscow talks, said Bessent had made clear that the US would not provide Russia with economic relief until war in Ukraine was over.

Trump has pushed Moscow and Kyiv to reach a deal to halt the fighting, but an initial 28-point plan that largely adhered to Russia’s demands was criticised by Ukraine and European governments.

The US, which currently holds the rotating G20 presidency, did not invite South Africa, last year’s G20 host, to the gathering. Poland, which is not a permanent G20 member, was invited.

Certain reporters from major US newsrooms, including The New York Times and Bloomberg News, were not granted credentials to cover the gathering.

The decision was condemned by the National Press Club, which said that “no administration should be allowed to handpick the press corps that scrutinizes it”.

The two-day meeting comes as global debt levels have reached a record of nearly $353 trillion and the global economy faces an energy shock triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran. The talks also come amid rising tensions over China’s large trade surplus and uncertainty over the effects of a surge in artificial intelligence investment.

Niger’s military government has contained an attempted mutiny in the capital, but the uprising has exposed tensions inside an army struggling to contain persistent attacks by armed groups.

It has also highlighted the changing nature of Niger’s security partnerships, with Russian personnel helping government forces contain the unrest.

The mutiny began on Saturday at Base 101, a military installation at Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey, before fighting spread to other sensitive sites, including areas near the presidential palace and the state broadcaster.

Niger’s army said it regained control of the base after hours of fighting. State media reported that dozens of soldiers were killed or arrested, although Reuters said it could not independently verify the figures.

Russia’s Africa Corps was involved in the government’s response.

Russia’s ambassador to Niger, Viktor Voropaev, said Nigerien authorities requested the force’s assistance to neutralise the mutineers. The Associated Press reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support to forces loyal to the government.

The intervention is significant because Russian forces were helping Niger’s military government confront an armed challenge from within its own military.

What happened in Niamey?

The unrest began with a hostage situation at the military base, according to the Associated Press. Soldiers took fellow servicemen hostage before opening fire and attacking what Niger’s Defence Ministry described as “sensitive” sites in the capital.

Gunfire and explosions were heard around the airport, while the state broadcaster was temporarily taken off air. The presidential palace was also targeted, according to Reuters and Al Jazeera.

Government forces eventually regained control of Base 101, while the Presidential Guard remained loyal to General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in a July 2023 coup.

The precise size and leadership of the mutiny remain unclear. Nigerien state media said hundreds of soldiers were involved, but Reuters said it could not independently verify that figure.

Some of those involved were reportedly from areas including Ouallam, Tera and Dosso in southwestern Niger, where the army has suffered heavy losses fighting armed groups.

The uprising appears to be the most serious internal challenge to Tiani’s rule since he came to power.

Why are Niger’s soldiers under pressure?

The precise motives of the mutineers have not been publicly established.

But analysts and security sources have linked the unrest to frustration over worsening insecurity and heavy military losses.

Niger’s army has been fighting groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), particularly in the country’s west.

Reuters reported that an attack by an ISIL affiliate earlier this month killed 18 Nigerien soldiers. The airport complex where Base 101 is located was also attacked earlier this year, including in January by an ISIL affiliate and in June by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate.

The mutiny therefore came against the backdrop of the same security crisis that helped bring the military government to power.

Tiani and other officers who seized power in 2023 accused the elected government of failing to contain armed groups and promised to restore security. But the threat has persisted.

The unrest raises questions about the pressure facing front-line units as Nigerien forces continue to suffer casualties in their fight against armed groups.

Why did Africa Corps intervene?

Africa Corps is a Russian force operating under the Ministry of Defence that took over much of the Wagner Group’s role in Africa after Moscow reorganised its operations following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023.

The force includes former Wagner personnel and operates under Russian state control.

Africa Corps personnel are stationed at Base 101, according to AP, which reported that the force has between 200 and 300 personnel in Niger.

Voropaev said Niger had requested Russian assistance during the mutiny.

AP reported that Africa Corps provided ground and aerial support after forces loyal to the government struggled to regain control of the base.

The episode does not establish that Russia controls Niger’s armed forces.

But it demonstrates that when Niger’s military government faced an armed challenge from within its own military, it was able to call on Russian forces already operating inside the country.

That underscores how significantly Niger’s post-coup security arrangements have changed.

What does Russia gain from Niger?

Niger’s relationship with Russia has deepened since the 2023 coup.

The military government pushed French forces out of the country, while United States forces later withdrew. Niger also joined Mali and Burkina Faso in forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), as the three military-led governments moved away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Moscow has cultivated closer military ties with all three governments.

Africa Corps is part of that wider security relationship, taking over much of Wagner’s former role while operating under Russian state control.

Its intervention in Niamey gives that partnership a new dimension.

Russia was not simply helping Niger fight armed groups. Its personnel were involved in helping the government respond to an armed challenge from within the military itself.

Whether that translates into greater Russian political influence over the military government remains unclear.

What role did Algeria play?

Russia was not the only foreign actor to support Niger during the crisis.

Niger’s presidential office said Algeria provided military assistance. Reuters reported that Algeria sent four fighter jets, a transport aircraft and a refuelling tanker.

The Alliance of Sahel States also backed Niger’s military government, while Turkiye expressed solidarity and called for restraint.

It was not immediately clear whether Mali or Burkina Faso provided direct military assistance. Their political support should therefore not be presented as evidence that their forces participated in suppressing the mutiny.

What does this mean for France and the UK?

The crisis highlights the reversal of Western military influence in Niger.

France had a major military presence in the country as part of its wider counterinsurgency campaign in the Sahel, but French forces withdrew after relations with the military government collapsed following the 2023 coup.

The US subsequently withdrew its forces from Base 101 and Niger’s other military installations.

Niger has since moved closer to Russia and strengthened its ties with Mali and Burkina Faso.

There has been no confirmed new French or British military response to this specific mutiny in the latest reporting.

France’s relevance is therefore primarily its withdrawal from Niger and the resulting shift in the country’s security partnerships. The United Kingdom had a much smaller military role in Niger than France.

Can Russia solve Niger’s security problem?

Africa Corps may have helped the military government contain the immediate threat, but its intervention does not resolve Niger’s wider security crisis.

Armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL remain active, while Nigerien soldiers continue to face heavy losses.

Tiani came to power promising greater security and sovereignty. Yet three years later, the armed-group threat persists, and soldiers have mounted an internal challenge to the government.

Russia can provide personnel and operational support. But there is no evidence from this episode that the Africa Corps can by itself resolve the insecurity driving Niger’s conflict or the pressures facing its military.

The immediate challenge to Tiani has been contained.

But the episode exposes a difficult contradiction for Niger’s military government: it seized power promising to make the country more secure, yet it continues to face a serious rebellion while confronting unrest within the armed forces.

For Russia, meanwhile, the crisis demonstrates the practical value of its growing security relationship with Niger.

When the government faced an internal military crisis, Africa Corps was already on the ground.

That does not mean Russia has replaced Niger’s own armed forces.

But it shows how far Niger’s security architecture has shifted since the 2023 coup, from one heavily reliant on Western partners to one in which Russian forces now have a visible supporting role.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova told a briefing held on August 20, 2026, that “a substantial package of intergovernmental documents and commercial contracts is planned to be signed during the Russia-Africa summit, scheduled for late October.” Given the “mutual interest in stepping up our trade and investment cooperation, we plan to focus the agenda of the upcoming summit meeting on economic matters,” she said.

There, the attendees can discuss in substance a wide range of matters, including boosting Russian-African ties in agriculture, healthcare, education, and scientific-technical and cultural cooperation. “We expect to sign a substantial package of interstate documents and commercial contracts during the event. Well, and we also note, of course, with satisfaction, our partners’ considerable interest in the forthcoming event. Many African capitals have already confirmed their attendance and declared their intention to send representative delegations to Moscow, including heads of state entities and businessmen, of course,” Zakharova explained.

“We have a huge potential in this sphere, which has not yet been fully realized, as everyone admits. Key priorities have also been determined: to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear power; to develop independent payment systems, food security, and digitalization, including the adoption of artificial intelligence,” Zakharova underlined.

It is time to face rising realities and the balance of investment power in this 21st century. Whether Russia colonized Africa or never colonized Africa, the most convincing and essential factor is Africa simply has to work with the world’s players. Africa should collaborate with potential foreign investors with adequate funds, in practical terms, ready to invest in its development as exemplified by China. And there is still a growing sense of analytical debates over Russia’s policy approach, though. Ultimately, at least three fundamental assumptions, or appropriately primary principles, can be described as follows:

*Russia’s forthcoming October 2026 The Russia-Africa summit is framed as a chance to consolidate dozens of prior agreements and shift toward concrete economic cooperation in trade, investment, nuclear energy, food security, digitalization, and independent payment systems, yet critics note that rhetoric and signed MoUs have so far produced limited tangible results on the ground.

*Despite historical Soviet-era goodwill and frequent high-level visits, Russia remains a marginal player in African infrastructure, industry, and agriculture compared with China, the EU, and the United States; many announced projects have stalled, financing instruments are weak, and younger Africans see little contemporary economic impact beyond anti-Western messaging.

*Experts and African partners urge Moscow to move beyond nostalgia for past assistance, deliver on existing pledges with real capital and project execution, leverage platforms such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and engage Africa’s large youth and middle-class markets if it wishes to convert political alignment into sustained, mutually beneficial economic partnership.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable platform for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.4 billion people. The growing middle class, estimated at 380 (twice the aggregate of Russia’s population), among other factors, constitutes huge market potential in Africa. The African continent, currently, has enormous potential as a huge market, which some experts often refer to as the last business market frontier. Nevertheless, Africa’s trade with the European Union stands at $400 billion, and with China, almost $300 billion. And based on military equipment and weapons and agricultural products such as ice cream, chicken meat, fertilizers, and grain exports, Russia quoted a bilateral trade figure as $27 billion in June 2026.

The world is, increasingly, becoming multipolar. Therefore, Africa’s strength has to be directed at continental development and entrepreneurship, not at building solidarity for geopolitical games. Many African countries are enacting economic reforms; demand is growing for high-quality, competitive products. Russian businesses are interested in this niche, but Russian operators are extremely slow. The ‘snail-pace approach’ reflects their inability to determine financial instruments for supporting trade with Africa and corporate investments in Africa.

There is some level of optimism for a change, though. Russia plans to hold the next Russia-Africa summit in late October 2026. And Sergey Lavrov, minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, indicated in an explicit message mid-July that “in these difficult and crucial times, the strategic partnership with Africa has become a priority of Russia’s foreign policy. Russia highly appreciates the readiness of Africans to further step up economic cooperation.”

At a meeting of the ministry’s collegium, Lavrov strongly suggested the necessity of borrowing a chapter on policy approaches and methods adopted by China in Africa. In fact, Lavrov’s suggestion exposes the inability to play catch-up and, most significantly, Russia’s financial fragility. Lavrov also said, “It is in the interests of our peoples to work together to preserve and expand mutually beneficial trade and investment ties under these new conditions. It is important to facilitate the mutual access of Russian and African economic operators to each other’s markets and encourage their participation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

During the past years, there have been several meetings of various bilateral intergovernmental commissions both in Moscow and in Africa. The first Sochi summit discussed broadly the priorities and further identified opportunities for collaboration. There were 92 agreements signed in Sochi, which totaled RUB 1.004 trillion (equivalent to $12.5 bn), and approximately 240 agreements during the African Leaders Summit held in St. Petersburg, according to official documents. It, however, requires understanding the specific tasks and emerging challenges. The current tasks should concretely focus on taking practical and collaborative actions leading to goal-driven results. Notwithstanding the lapses, Lavrov hopes “the signed agreements and the results will be consolidated at the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit.”

Accentuating the importance of multilateral cooperation between Russia and Africa, Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Anton Kobyakov said, “The current situation in the world is such that we are witnesses to the formation of new centers of economic growth in Africa. Competition for African markets is growing, accordingly. There is no doubt that Russia’s non-commodity exporters will benefit from cooperating with Africa on manufacturing, technologies, finances, trade, and investment.”

Kobyakov pointed to modern Russia, which already has experience of successful cooperation with African countries under its belt, as ready to make an offer to the African continent that will secure a mutually beneficial partnership and the joint realization of decades of painstaking work carried out by several generations of Soviet and Russian people.

The Soviet Union was quite extensively engaged in Africa, comparatively. Historical documents show that after the Soviet collapse, there were approximately 380 mega-projects across Africa. In the early 1990s, Russia exited, closed a number of diplomatic offices, and abandoned all these, and now there are hardly any signs of Soviet-era infrastructure projects across Africa. And now post-Soviet relations are interestingly engulfed in extensive geopolitics; Russia has only engaged in trading anti-Western slogans on the continent, which also threatens the African Union’s steps to consolidate African unity. 

In addition, Russia has only been criticizing other foreign players during the past two decades without showing any of its own template model of building relationships directed at transforming Africa’s economy. Moreover, Russian officials have underestimated the fact that Russia’s overall economic engagement is largely staggering; various business agreements signed are still not fulfilled with many African countries. Its foreign policy goal is simply to sustain the passion for declarations, signing several MoUs and bilateral agreements with African countries. Grappling with reality, there are equally many investment challenges, including official bureaucracy and the governance system in Africa.

Despite this policy rhetoric and attractive summit outlines, Russia still plays very little role, particularly in Africa’s infrastructure, agriculture, and industry. Investing in agriculture to ensure food security and investing in industry to add value to raw materials in the continent. While, given its global status, it ought to be active in Africa with noticeable corporate investments, similar to policy models of Western Europe, the European Union, the United States, and China, it is all but absent, consistently engages in geopolitical symbolism and rhetoric, and plays a negligible role, according to Professor Gerrit Olivier at the Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, and former South African Ambassador to the Russian Federation.

Now at the crossroads, it could be meandering and longer than expected to make the mark. If existing challenges, obstacles, and impediments are not addressed, Russia’s return journey could take another generation to reach its destination, Africa. If not at the crossroad, then possibly at the periphery of Africa. With the current rapidly changing geopolitical world, Russia has to redefine and reassess policy parameters and adopt a more strategic approach, working with absolute consistency within the principle of finding common solutions to Africa’s development expectations and consolidating its economic sovereignty.

*This is part of the forthcoming book: Putin’s African Dream: Emerging Challenges and Opportunities (Third e-handbook).

Ukraine hits Russia’s Afipsky oil refinery and gas plant in latest attacks targeting energy infrastructure.

A fire broke out at the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia’s Krasnodar region following a drone attack, local authorities have said.

At least two people were killed and two others were injured due to falling drone debris at the Afipsky railway station, Governor Veniamin Kondratyev said on Tuesday.

Ukraine has been targeting Russia’s oil refineries and ⁠other infrastructure, attempting to undermine ⁠Moscow’s war efforts and reduce financial revenue.

Ukraine’s General Staff said its forces struck facilities at Afipsky.

It said its forces also hit a gas processing plant in Russia’s Astrakhan region overnight.

Russia’s Ministry of Defence said its forces had struck a cargo vessel carrying goods for the Ukrainian army in the port of Pivdennyi near Odesa, as well as port infrastructure facilities used for unloading military cargo.

The ministry said Russian air defences shot down 148 Ukrainian drones overnight.

Ukraine has ramped up attacks on Russian energy infrastructure in recent months, escalating a fuel crisis in the country.

Amid the continuing attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on Monday that would allow the state to take temporary control of critical infrastructure found to be inadequately protected from attack.

The attacks come after a meeting in Kyiv where Ukraine’s allies pledged to continue supporting the country during the ongoing war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the assembled leaders in an evening address that he wanted to “raise production” of drones and missiles to wage “more attacks” on Russia, matching its strikes on Ukraine.

The meeting was attended by 30 leaders of the so-called Coalition of the Willing, including British Prime Minister Andy Burnham, who called for negotiations with Russia, and French President Emmanuel Macron, who participated remotely and predicted that “NATO countries will be targeted and the provocations will multiply”.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb was also in attendance, urging Ukraine’s allies to help expand its ability ⁠to strike deeply inside Russia.

The Kremlin said on Tuesday that Burnham and Stubb belonged to the “party of war”.