Russias

Russian “shadow vessels” are using false flags to skirt sanctions imposed on Moscow over its war in Ukraine, according to a new report.

A total of 113 Russian vessels have flown a false flag in the first nine months of this year, transporting some 11 million tonnes of oil valued at 4.7 billion euros ($5.4bn), according to the report published on Thursday by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a Helsinki-based think tank.

“The number of Russian ʻshadowʼ tankers sailing under false flags is now increasing at an alarming rate,” said report co-author Luke Wickenden.

“False-flagged vessels carried 1.4 billion euros ($1.6bn) worth of Russian crude oil and oil products through the Danish Straits in September alone.”

Russia’s clandestine shadow fleet transports sanctioned commodities, especially oil, under non-Russian flags to evade scrutiny.

Every vessel sailing on the open seas is required to fly a flag that provides it with legal jurisdiction for its operations in international waters.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allows countries to grant their nationality to ships and fly their flag.

Some countries provide open registries that allow foreign-owned or controlled vessels to use their flag, a practice favoured by some shippers due to lower regulatory burdens and registration costs.

In its report, CREA said that 96 sanctioned vessels had flown a false flag at least once this year as of the end of September.

A total of 85 vessels registered at least two flag changes six months after being sanctioned by the European Union, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) or the United Kingdom, according to the think tank.

Six flag registries that had not flagged a Russian ship before Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had at least 10 such vessels each in their fleet in September 2025, according to CREA, for a total of 162 shadow vessels.

“In addition to the risks of false flagging, we also see that ʻshadowʼ vessel operators are taking advantage of capacity limitations of economically weak nations to exploit their flags and existing regulations to gain passage rights to deliver blood oil,” said co-author Vaibhav Raghunandan, calling on the EU and the UK to reform their flagging regulations and practices.

CREA said it based its report on vessel ownership and flag registry records obtained from maritime safety platform Equasis.

It said it cross-referenced the data with the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GSIS), a global shipping industry database.

‘More evasive techniques’

Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, said the CREA’s findings aligned with previous reports on Russia’s shadow fleet.

Ziemba said Moscow had resorted to “more evasive techniques” on the back of increased pressure from the EU, as well as moves by China to block so-called “zombie vessels”, which use the registration numbers of retired vessels.

While the US and the EU have continued to roll out new sanctions on Russian oil, “there is an open question about enforcement”, Ziemba said.

With sanctions enforcement becoming more difficult due to the growing illicit trade, countries would need to target vessels, intermediaries and buyers to significantly reduce Russia’s oil sales, she said.

“But that comes with costs,” Ziemba said, suggesting that China, a major buyer of Russian oil, could retaliate against countries that tightened sanctions.

“Plus, actual enforcement might mean more quasi-military stoppages of vessels to check papers, something that these countries might be wary of doing,” she added.

The United States and Ukraine have announced a revised framework for ending the Russia-Ukraine war after an earlier proposal by Washington drew criticism for being too favourable to Moscow.

US and Ukrainian officials said on Sunday that they agreed that any deal to end Russia’s war should “fully uphold” Ukraine’s sovereignty as they unveiled an “updated and refined peace framework” that was scant on details.

“Both sides agreed the consultations were highly productive. The discussions showed meaningful progress toward aligning positions and identifying clear next steps,” officials said in a joint statement following talks in Geneva, adding that the sides agreed on the need for a “sustainable and just peace”.

Washington and Kyiv also reiterated their readiness to keep working together to “secure a peace that ensures Ukraine’s security, stability, and reconstruction”, the joint statement said.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio earlier on Sunday said the sides had made “tremendous” progress during the talks, though their joint statement offered no specifics for resolving the many thorny points of contention between Moscow and Kyiv.

Rubio said negotiators had made some changes to US President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan, including around the role of NATO, to narrow the differences between the sides.

“I can tell you that the items that remain open are not insurmountable. We just need more time than what we have today. I honestly believe we’ll get there,” Rubio told reporters at the US mission in Geneva.

Rubio declined to go into specifics about the amendments to the draft proposal, including whether Kyiv had agreed to compromise on key Russian demands, such as territorial concessions.

“But I can tell you, I guess, that I feel very optimistic that we can get something done here because we made a tremendous amount of progress today,” Rubio said.

Rubio’s cautiously optimistic remarks came after Trump, who has given Ukraine until Thursday to accept his 28-point plan, had earlier accused Kyiv of being insufficiently grateful for his administration’s assistance.

“UKRAINE ‘LEADERSHIP’ HAS EXPRESSED ZERO GRATITUDE FOR OUR EFFORTS, AND EUROPE CONTINUES TO BUY OIL FROM RUSSIA,” Trump posted on his social media site, Truth Social.

Shortly after Trump’s comments, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on X that he was grateful to the US and “personally to President Trump” for Washington’s assistance in repelling Moscow’s invasion.

Trump’s leaked blueprint for ending the war has caused consternation in Kyiv and European capitals due to its alignment with many of Moscow’s hardline demands, including that Ukraine limit the size of its military and give up Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk.

Zelenskyy said in a sombre national address last week that the plan put Ukraine in the position of having to choose between “losing dignity” or “losing a key partner”.

European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen said on Sunday that any peace plan needed to respect Ukraine’s freedom to “choose its own destiny,” including to join the bloc.

“It starts with the country’s reconstruction, its integration into our Single Market and our defence industrial base, and ultimately, joining our Union,” von der Leyen said in a statement.

Asked whether a deal could be reached by Trump’s Thursday deadline, Rubio said “we want to get this done as soon as possible”.

“Obviously, we would love it to be Thursday,” he said.

Rubio said the peace plan was a “living, breathing document” and would continue to change.

The top US diplomat also said the deal would need to be presented to Moscow for its approval.

“Obviously, the Russians get a vote here,” he said.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Friday that Trump’s plan could form the basis for a final peace settlement, but warned that Moscow would advance further into Ukrainian territory if Kyiv refused to negotiate.

HALIFAX, Canada — Several U.S. senators said Saturday that Secretary of State Marco Rubio told them that the Trump administration’s plan for ending the Russia-Ukraine war that it is pressing Kyiv to accept is a Russian “wish list” and not the actual plan.

A State Department spokesperson denied their account, calling it “blatantly false.”

The 28-point peace plan was crafted by the Trump administration and the Kremlin without Ukraine’s involvement. It acquiesces to many Russian demands that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has rejected on dozens of occasions, including giving up large pieces of territory. Trump says he wants Ukraine to accept the plan by late next week.

At a security conference in Canada, independent Sen. Angus King of Maine, Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire and Republican Sen. Mike Rounds of South Dakota said they spoke to Rubio after he reached out to some of them while on his way to Geneva for talks on the plan.

King said Rubio told them the plan “was not the administration’s plan” but a “wish list of the Russians.”

“This administration was not responsible for this release in its current form,” Rounds said. “They want to utilize it as a starting point.”

Rounds said that “it looked more like it was written in Russian to begin with.”

Rubio, who serves as both national security advisor and secretary of State, was expected to attend a meeting in Geneva on Sunday to discuss Washington’s proposal as part of a U.S. delegation, according to an American official who was not authorized to publicly discuss the U.S. participants before the meeting and spoke on condition of anonymity.

Tommy Pigott, a State Department spokesperson, denied the senators’ claim.

“As Secretary Rubio and the entire Administration has consistently maintained, this plan was authored by the United States, with input from both the Russians and Ukrainians,” Pigott wrote on X.

The senators earlier Saturday said the plan would only reward Moscow for its aggression and send a message to other leaders who have threatened their neighbors.

The senators’ opposition to the plan follows criticism from other U.S. lawmakers, including some Republicans, none of whom have the power to block it.

“It rewards aggression. This is pure and simple. There’s no ethical, legal, moral, political justification for Russia claiming eastern Ukraine,” King said during a panel discussion at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada.

Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the proposal late Friday, saying that it “could form the basis of a final peace settlement” if the U.S. can get Ukraine and its European allies to agree.

Zelensky, in an address, did not reject the plan outright, but insisted on fair treatment while pledging to “work calmly” with Washington and other partners in what he called “truly one of the most difficult moments in our history.”

In its 17th year, about 300 people gather annually at the Halifax International Security Forum held at Halifax’s Westin hotel. The forum attracts military officials, U.S. senators, diplomats and scholars, but this year the Trump administration suspended participation of U.S. defense officials in events by think tanks, including the Halifax event.

A large number of U.S. senators made the trip this year in part because of strained relations between Canada and the United States. Trump has alienated America’s neighbor with his trade war and claims that Canada should become the 51st U.S. state. Many Canadians now refuse to travel to the U.S., and border states like Shaheen’s are seeing a dramatic drop in tourism.

“There’s real concern about that strain. That’s one reason why there’s such a big delegation is here,” the New Hampshire Democrat said. “I will continue to object to what the president is doing in terms about tariffs and his comments because they are not only detrimental to Canada and our relationship, but I think they are detrimental globally. They show a lack of respect of sovereign nations.”

Gillies writes for the Associated Press.

Russia’s policy towards Southeast Asia is undergoing a remarkable adjustment period. From focusing on defense cooperation, which has been its traditional strength, Russia is gradually shifting its focus to more sustainable areas. This shift reflects Russia’s flexible efforts to maintain its presence in a region strongly affected by great power competition, while demonstrating its ambition to position itself as a reliable and independent partner, contributing to the balance of influence against the expanding US involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

From diplomatic presence to substantive cooperation

For many years, Russia’s Southeast Asia policy has been largely confined to diplomatic presence and participation in ASEAN-led multilateral forums. However, in the wake of Trump 2.0’s tariff adjustments, Moscow has increasingly recognized Southeast Asia as a potential market to fill the economic void left by sanctions. This realization has led to more proactive and substantive shifts in Russia’s regional policy.

Since the beginning of 2025, Russia has stepped up bilateral cooperation with key ASEAN economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, focusing on areas that the US and China have not yet focused on competing in, such as oil and gas exploitation, agriculture, and civil nuclear power. At the same time, Russia has also expanded its network of embassies, cultural centers, and trade promotion agencies in most ASEAN countries, thereby creating a multi-layered approach from politics to economics.

One of the most notable changes is the shift of Russia’s traditional trade to non-dollar payment mechanisms to minimize the risk of sanctions. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, in 2024, trade turnover between Russia and ASEAN reached a record for the second consecutive year, increasing by 5.8%. Over the past decade, trade turnover has increased by 70%, with most transactions being settled in local currencies or currency swaps. At the same time, Southeast Asia is also a potential area to promote exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), fertilizers, and military materials, helping to reposition Russia as a stable energy supplier.

Diversifying partners outside of China

The trend of diversifying partners beyond China has emerged as a new driving force in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy. After years of relying on the Chinese market as a “lifeline” for its wartime economy, Russia has increasingly recognized the asymmetry in its trade relations as China has gradually gained an overwhelming position. This has forced Russia to rebalance its dependence and expand its influence by seeking alternative partners.

The “multi-directional” policy that Russia is implementing is clearly demonstrated through the strengthening of bilateral economic relations with a number of countries in the region. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, the international situation is opening up many new opportunities for Russia to strengthen relations with the region of more than 650 million people. On the contrary, from the perspective of ASEAN, cooperation with Russia has its own appeal, because investment capital from Russia is considered less politically binding than the “debt trap” risks often associated with projects within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, limited financial resources have caused this direction of Russia to largely stop at the level of framework agreements or projects waiting to be launched.

In addition, Russia has also proposed establishing cooperation mechanisms focusing on less sensitive areas such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief. Although these initiatives have not yet reached the institutional level, they reflect Russia’s efforts in the regional innovation race with the US and China.

Connecting Southeast Asia to the Eurasian Axis and the Global South

Since launching the “Pivot to the East” policy in 2014, Russia’s strategic interests have gradually shifted from the European region to a vision of Eurasian integration. While in the early stages, this policy was mainly aimed at demonstrating efforts to “pivot” according to the trend of global power shifts; entering the 2020s, Russia has concretized its orientation with in-depth initiatives.

Following the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Vietnam in 2015, Russia continued negotiations with Indonesia and Thailand, aiming to form an economic network that is less dependent on the dollar system. Russia is also promoting initiatives for the construction of a connecting corridor between the Russian Far East and Central Asia with maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Speaking at the International Conference on Eurasian Security in Minsk, Belarus, on October 28, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia wants to build a common development structure for the entire region and does not exclude any country on this continent. Transcontinental connectivity projects such as the Vladivostok-Chennai transport corridor or the Asia-Europe maritime and air route are integrated by Russia into its vision of an expanded Asia-Europe economic space, reflecting its efforts to bring Southeast Asia into the Russia-led “Greater Eurasia” strategy.

At the same time, Russia has been actively promoting the “multipolarization” discourse through mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in collaboration with China and India, to strengthen the image of a post-Western order. Russia’s support for Indonesia’s entry into BRICS not only reflects the group’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence but also demonstrates Russia’s strategy of integrating Southeast Asia into the emerging South-South partnership network. Through this, Russia wants to demonstrate its flexible integration into the Asia-Pacific region while also being a voice to show that Russia is not isolated in the process of restructuring the global order.

Taking advantage of ASEAN principles

One of the factors that helps Russia maintain a stable position in Southeast Asia is its ability to effectively exploit ASEAN’s neutral space. Unlike the US or China, which often pursue a strategy of competing for influence by “choosing sides” under pressure, Moscow chooses a flexible approach based on the principle of non-interference in ASEAN’s internal affairs and consensus.

Thanks to these principles, Russia’s participation in ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms is not interpreted as an attempt to form political alliances or challenge the existing order, but on the contrary, is seen as consistent with the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. It is ASEAN’s neutral space that provides Russia with access in a variety of roles, from observer to dialogue partner to direct participant, thereby legitimizing Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia.

In fact, Russia actively participates in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) to promote cooperation in less sensitive areas, helping Russia both strengthen its image as a constructive contributor and avoid creating suspicion from the West.

Rebooting defense and energy diplomacy

Through the two pillars of defense and energy, Russia has put into its foreign policy to reaffirm its position. These are considered the spearheads by which Russia still maintains its most substantial competitive capacity compared to the US.

In the defense sector, Russia is restoring bilateral cooperation with traditional partners such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Previously, Russia accounted for about 25% of the arms market share in Southeast Asia, maintaining its position as the largest supplier in the region. However, instead of continuing to rely on sales contracts, Russia is now focusing on expanding the “after-sales” sector, such as training, maintenance, technology transfer, and joint research in the defense industry. At the multilateral level, Russia actively participates in high-level defense dialogue mechanisms such as ADMM+ and ARF to demonstrate the voice of a responsible partner, promoting peace and stability in the region.

Along with defense, Russia considers energy a common concern to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Russia takes advantage of its deep-sea oil and gas exploitation techniques and develops nuclear power technology to strengthen cooperation with developing economies with large energy consumption needs. Leading energy corporations such as Zarubezhneft and Rosatom have been cooperating with Vietnam in gas exploitation projects on the continental shelf of the East Sea. Russia also boosts LNG exports to Thailand and the Philippines to expand its market share in the region while cooperating with Indonesia’s Pertamina Group in developing petrochemical refining and building civil nuclear energy infrastructure. These steps reflect Moscow’s efforts to establish an Asian energy supply chain to replace the disrupted European market.

Position on the East Sea dispute

Russia’s stance on the East Sea dispute is clearly cautious. Basically, Russia supports the settlement of disputes by peaceful means based on international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while emphasizing the central role of ASEAN in conflict management. Unlike the US, which always emphasizes the issue of freedom of navigation, Russia chooses the role of a “balancing third party,” maintaining cooperative relations with all parties. However, Russia also avoids making specific statements regarding China’s sovereignty claims in order not to harm the Russia-China relationship, which is currently the leading pillar of its foreign policy.

In addition, Russia also supports the early completion of the Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), considering it an important tool to maintain stability and calling on all parties to exercise restraint. Instead of directly engaging in disputes, Russia maintains its presence through limited oil and gas cooperation within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demonstrating Russia’s commitment to the legitimate sovereignty of its partner countries. At the same time, participating in joint exercises with ASEAN countries also helps Russia affirm its image as a responsible power, promoting trust and the ability to coordinate security at sea.

However, Russia’s influence in the South China Sea is still limited. The war in Ukraine has significantly reduced the frequency of Russian military patrols in the region. In addition, the increasingly close relationship between Moscow and Beijing has also made some ASEAN countries cautious, worried that Russia’s “neutrality” could be broken.

The adjustments in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy clearly reflect Russia’s efforts to adapt to a situation where it has to allocate resources to multiple goals. It is easy to see that Russia has chosen to shift from an ideological orientation to a pragmatic strategy, focusing on areas that can generate specific benefits. Instead of directly confronting the US or competing for influence with China, Moscow seeks to exploit gaps to position itself as a balancing factor.

Russia’s current Southeast Asia policy is a survival adaptation, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain influence in a regional structure that is reshaping under the pressure of US-China competition. Under increasing pressure from the US, Russia is forced to pursue a more autonomous path in Southeast Asia to maintain its strategic space. However, Russia’s influence is still limited by its internal capacity and competition from other powers. Russia may not be able to shape the rules of the game or lead the order, but it is certainly a factor that cannot be left out of the Southeast Asian strategic chessboard.

As Ukrainian forces struggle to hold onto the embattled eastern city of Pokrovsk, they are facing increasing pressure about 55 miles to the southwest in the Zaporizhzhia region. The Ukrainian Southern Command on Wednesday said its forces pulled out of the small hamlet of Rivnopillia, the latest in a string of withdrawals in the area since Tuesday. The retreat puts Russian troops a little more than 50 miles east of Zaporizhia, one of Ukraine’s biggest cities with a population of more than 700,000.

The two fronts, in adjacent regions, are related, given Russia’s overwhelming advantage in troop strength and Ukraine’s more limited ability to generate forces to defend both areas. As a result, there are serious questions about how much longer Ukraine can hold onto Pokrovsk and the strategic impact of its potential fall. So we reached out to one battlefield commander with troops in Pokrovsk who offered us some insights about the front-line situation. He spoke to us on the condition of anonymity to talk about operational details.

“If Russia manages to advance deeper into Pokrovsk, it would be one of the most serious challenges for Ukraine in recent months,” the commander explained. “Pokrovsk is not just another city. It’s a logistical and strategic hub that connects multiple directions across the Donetsk front. Losing it would mean breaking one of the last strong defense lines before Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, the industrial heart of this part of Ukraine.”

Losing Pokrovsk would also have a cascading effect on the Zaporizhia front and elsewhere.

“For the enemy, Pokrovsk is a gate,” he added. “Once they control it, they can project artillery farther west and threaten supply lines feeding the entire eastern group of Ukrainian forces. For us, it would mean longer supply routes, higher risk for convoys, and pressure on our reserves.”

Meanwhile, “simultaneous pressure on adjacent sectors [like Zaporizhzhia] forces Ukraine to keep reserves thin and limits the ability to plug gaps quickly.”

Russia, which has been trying to capture Pokrovsk for more than a year, is paying a heavy price for its advances, the commander stated.

“Around Pokrovsk, the Russians are taking enormous losses,” he posited. “They’re throwing wave after wave of troops into the fight — mostly poorly trained men, often with no proper coordination or cover. Every assault costs them dozens, sometimes hundreds of lives.”

“You can feel it on the ground,” he continued. “The smell of burned vehicles, the sound of their medevacs running nonstop. It’s not a battlefield anymore; it’s a graveyard for their infantry. They’re losing entire assault groups just to take a few hundred meters, and they have to start over the next day.”

For a long time, Ukraine held an advantage in defending Pokrovsk. The city has high-rises, industrial buildings and underground passageways that made it difficult to attack and allowed Ukrainian troops freedom of movement. However, as more Russian troops pour into the city, they gained the upper hand.

“Russian units are fighting for high-rises and interior city blocks, which increases cost per meter held and reduces freedom of movement for defenders,” the commander noted. “Attacks from multiple axes (especially the west toward Myrnohrad, about a mile to the east), create the risk of semi-encirclement, and strain supply lines. Russia is massing forces and sustainment here — meaning Ukraine’s defense must absorb a high tempo of small assaults.”

Ukrainian logistic lifelines “are under fire from Russian drones and mining, complicating resupply and reinforcement.”

The weather is making matters worse, impeding drone operations and making it harder to pinpoint the location of Russian troops.

“Urban fog, poor visibility, and dense architecture favor attacker surprise and make defensive coordination harder,” the commander noted.

To hold onto Pokrovsk, “Ukraine must deny Russian resupply, prevent consolidation in high-rise anchors, keep constant counter-mobility (mines, obstacles), and rapidly move reserves into threatened zones,” according to the source.

Kyiv, Ukraine – The collective West is scared of Moscow’s new, nuclear-powered cruise missile because it can reach anywhere on Earth, bypassing the most sophisticated air and missile defence systems, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has claimed.

“They’re afraid of what we’ll show to them next,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told the RIA Novosti news agency on Sunday.

Days earlier, she said Moscow was “forced” to develop and test the cruise missile, which is named the Burevestnik, meaning storm petrel – a type of seabird, in response to NATO’s hostility towards Russia.

“The development can be characterised as forced and takes place to maintain strategic balance,” she was quoted by the Itar-Tass news agency as saying. Russia “has to respond to NATO’s increasingly destabilising actions in the field of missile defence”.

With much pomp, Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday handed state awards to Burevestnik’s developers.

Also awarded were the designers of Poseidon, an underwater nuclear-powered torpedo which Putin has also claimed has been successfully tested.

Russia says Poseidon can carry nuclear weapons that cause radioactive tsunamis, wiping out huge coastal areas. The “super torpedo” can move at the speed of 200km/h (120mph) and zigzag its way to avoid interception, it says.

“In terms of flight range, the Burevestnik … has surpassed all known missile systems in the world,” Putin said in his speech at the Kremlin. “Same as any other nuclear power, Russia is developing its nuclear potential, its strategic potential … What we are talking about now is the work announced a long time ago.”

But military and nuclear experts are sceptical about the efficiency and lethality of the new weapons.

It is not unusual for Russia to flaunt its arsenal as its onslaught in Ukraine continues. Analysts say rather than scaring its critics, Moscow’s announcements are merely a scare tactic to dissuade Western powers from supporting Kyiv.

“There’s nothing revolutionary about,” the Burevestnik, said Pavel Podvig, director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project at the the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

“It can fly long and far, and there’s some novelty about it, but there’s nothing to back [Putin’s claim] that it can absolutely change everything,” Podvig told Al Jazeera. “One can’t say that it is invincible and can triumph over everything.”

The Burevestnik’s test is part of Moscow’s media stratagem of intimidating the West when the real situation on the front lines in Ukraine is desperate, according to a former Russian diplomat.

The missile is “not a technical breakthrough but a product of propaganda and desperation”, Boris Bondarev, who quit his Russian Foreign Ministry job to protest against the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, wrote in an opinion piece published by the Moscow Times.

“It symbolises not strength but weakness – the Kremlin’s lack of any tools of political influence other than threats.”

Few details about ‘unique’ missile

The problem is that officials have so far unveiled very little about the Burevestnik, which NATO has dubbed the SSC-X-9 Skyfall – a missile that has a nuclear reactor allegedly capable of keeping it in the air indefinitely.

On October 26, when fatigues-clad Putin announced Burevestnik’s successful test, he was accompanied by his top general Valery Gerasimov.

“This is a unique item; no one else in the world has it,” said Putin, in televised remarks.

Gerasimov said the Burevestnik had flown 14,000km (8,700 miles) in 15 hours during a recent test. It can manoeuvre and loiter midair, and unleash its nuclear load with “guaranteed precision” and at “any distance”.

“There’s a lot of work ahead” before the missile is mass-produced, Putin concluded, adding the test’s “key objectives have been achieved”.

A Ukrainian military expert ridiculed the Kremlin’s claims.

“Much of the news report is fake, the (Burevestnik) missile is subsonic, it can be detected and destroyed by missile defence systems,” Lieutenant General Ihor Romanenko, former deputy head of Ukraine’s general staff of armed forces who specialised in air and missile defence, told Al Jazeera.

As for the Poseidon nuclear drone, it is too destructive – and can be used only as a second-strike, retaliatory weapon after the start of a nuclear war, experts warned. As with the Burevestnik, the lack of detailed information about Poseidon casts doubt upon the Kremlin’s claims.

Trump decries ‘inappropriate’ tests

The announcements followed Washington’s scrapping of United States President Donald Trump’s summit with Putin in Budapest, Hungary.

Trump has called the Burevestnik’s test “inappropriate” and ordered the Pentagon to resume the testing of nuclear weapons and missiles.

But ahead of next year’s midterm elections, he may seek to show how he forced the Kremlin to stop hostilities in Ukraine.

“Trump will have to play with pressure on Russia,” Romanenko said. “Hopefully, the circumstances will force Trump to act.”

What Putin has not mentioned is that only two of the Burevestnik’s dozen tests, starting in 2019, have been successful.

Its 2019 launch near the White Sea in northwestern Russia killed at least five nuclear experts after a radioactive explosion, Western experts said at the time. Russia’s state nuclear agency acknowledged the deaths, but officials and media reports do not provide video footage, detailed photos or other specifics of the Burevestnik and its testing route – making Putin’s latest claims hard to corroborate or disprove.

Western experts were able to identify the Burevestnik’s probable deployment site in September. Known as Vologda-20 or Chebsara, it is believed to be 475km (295 miles) north of Moscow and has nine launch pads under construction, the Reuters news agency reported last year.

The missile’s capabilities have divided military analysts.

“In operation, the Burevestnik would carry a nuclear warhead (or warheads), circle the globe at low altitude, avoid missile defences, and dodge terrain; and drop the warhead(s) at a difficult-to-predict location (or locations),” the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a US nonprofit security group said in a 2019 report after the missile’s first somewhat successful test.

A year later, the US Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center said, if brought into service, Burevestnik would give Moscow a “unique weapon with intercontinental-range capability”.

‘Burevestnik is a mystification’

Others doubt the missile’s functionality.

“Burevestnik is a mystification for the whole seven-and-a-half years since it was first announced,” Pavel Luzin, a visiting scholar at Tufts University in Massachusetts, told Al Jazeera.

“It’s impossible to create a reactor that is compact and powerful enough to ensure a cruise missile’s movement,” Luzin said. “This is a basic physics textbook.”

Moscow claims that Burevestnik utilises nuclear propulsion instead of turbojet or turbofan engines used in cruise or ballistic missiles.

But Luzin said the smallest nuclear reactors used to power satellites weighed 1 metric tonne, supplying several kilowatts of energy – roughly equal to what a regular household consumes – while emitting some 150kw of thermal energy.

The experimental nuclear reactors developed in the 1950s and the 60s for aircraft weighed many tonnes and were the size of a railway carriage, he said.

An average engine for a cruise missile weighs up to 80kg, generates 4kw for onboard electric and electronic devices, and about 1 megawatt of energy for propelling the missile, he said.

Other analysts think that Burevestnik’s nuclear engine can function, but do not consider the weapon groundbreaking.

Russia has launched the first of its new Project 08951 class of nuclear-powered submarines, named Khabarovsk, which is intended to be armed with the Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped, ultra-long-endurance torpedo. At this stage, details of the new submarine remain scarce, but its completion, though long delayed, reflects the continued priority Moscow is assigning to strategic weapons systems, including novel ones without direct comparison.

The Khabarovsk was launched in Severodvinsk in Russia’s Arctic North over the weekend, in a ceremony attended by Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, as well as the commander of the Russian Navy, Adm. Alexander Moiseev, and the heads of the United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Sevmash shipyard. Imagery released from the event primarily shows the rear part of the submarine, still out of the water, in the construction hall.

The Khabarovsk is described by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a “nuclear-powered missile cruiser,” a broad category that Russia usually applies to nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). However, there is no indication that the new boat will carry ballistic missiles, with the primary armament of Poseidon torpedoes instead likely to be supplemented by land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles and traditional torpedoes. The Russian military also says the submarine will be equipped with unspecified robotic systems.

The submarine was designed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering and is reported to be based on the hull of the Borei class SSBN. This should reduce the program costs and make it stealthier than many other Russian submarines. The Khabarovsk has a similar-looking stern section to the Borei class, including the pump-jet propulsor, which was partly covered to obscure any details.

The end result, however, is significantly smaller, since the ballistic missile section is removed. The Khabarovsk reportedly has a surfaced displacement of around 10,000 tons, compared to close to 15,000 tons for the Borei class. The Project 08951 is thought to have a length of around 370 feet, while the Borei class is almost 560 feet long.

Most notable, however, is the fact that the Project 08951 class has been designed around the Poseidon torpedo from the outset. It is understood to be able to carry six examples of these weapons, each of which is around 66 feet long, approximately six feet in diameter, and weighs 110 tons.

Last week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said that the country had, for the first time, conducted the first long-range test of a Poseidon torpedo from a submarine, as you can read about here.

“For the first time, we managed not only to launch it with a launch engine from a carrier submarine, but also to launch the nuclear power unit on which this device passed a certain amount of time,” the Russian president claimed.

The Khabarovsk is the second Poseidon-capable submarine that we know of, after the Project 09852 Belgorod, which entered service with the Russian Navy in 2022. However, this boat is a conversion of an existing Oscar II class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN). Once heavily reworked, it added the capacity to carry six Poseidon torpedoes but is also expected to fulfill other roles.

Russia has described the Belgorod as a “research” vessel able to conduct “diverse scientific expeditions and rescue operations in the most remote areas of the world ocean.” In fact, it’s considered to service more as a ‘mother ship’ that can also deploy a variety of deep-sea drones, a deep-diving nuclear-powered minisub, and a submersible nuclear powerplant to power an undersea sensor network.

The Russian Ministry of Defense says the Khabarovsk “is capable of effectively defending Russia’s maritime borders and ensuring the security of its interests in the world’s oceans.”

It would appear, however, that carrying the Poseidon torpedo is its primary purpose.

The Poseidon is a unique weapon that we have described in the past:

“It is assumed that the primary mission of the Poseidon is to strike coastal installations with little to no warning. There have been various reports that it’s armed with an especially ‘dirty’ warhead, which would ensure not only the usual thermonuclear destruction but also spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. There have also been accounts suggesting that it could potentially be detonated further out to sea to create a kind of radioactive tsunami that could bring even more destruction and contamination to a wider coastal area, although the accuracy of these reports is debatable.”

“…with its nuclear propulsion, the weapon should have the ability to cruise around the oceans for extremely long periods before unleashing a surprise attack. This is especially concerning, since it would make it difficult to defend against. Like the Burevestnik [ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile], if perfected, it would provide Russia with a strategic nuclear option that avoids existing missile defense systems.”

It appears that Russia is seeking to deploy Poseidon as a new type of second-strike capability. This capability means that even if a surprise nuclear barrage were to knock out Russia’s nuclear weapons capability, it still has the ability to make the attacker pay dearly via a retaliatory nuclear attack. Second-strike is considered the pinnacle of nuclear deterrent strategies and, in a Russian context, traditionally relies heavily on SSBNs. A more versatile second-strike capability could be more important once the United States fields its planned Golden Dome missile defense system.

U.S. President Donald Trump, the prime architect of Golden Dome, has meanwhile responded to recent Russian tests of the Burevestnik and Poseidon systems. Following on from Putin’s bellicose comments on the Burevestnik test, Trump said: “I don’t think it’s an appropriate thing for Putin to be saying,” reminding the Russian leader that the priority was to bring an end to the war in Ukraine. The U.S. leader then announced that the Department of War is to start testing nuclear weapons “immediately,” though the implications of this remain unclear.

Regardless of how Poseidon might actually be used in an operational scenario, the addition to the Russian fleet of an entirely new category of submarine provides potential adversaries with a notable headache.

Already, much of NATO’s anti-submarine warfare effort goes into tracking and potentially defeating Russian SSBNs and SSGNs, as well as the hunter-killer submarines that are tasked, among other things, with protecting them. With its strategic nuclear weapons, the Project 08951 class could potentially emerge as another leg of Russia’s seaborne nuclear deterrent, but one that is able to launch its weapons from unexpected vectors and at huge distances from potential targets.

In the past, analysts have suggested that Poseidon could have a range of 6,200 miles. Once launched, it is also likely also very difficult to defeat. There have even been some claims that it can reach a speed of up to 100 knots, although this is probably an exaggeration. Even at much reduced speeds, the Poseidon would be hard to intercept and may demand new kinds of methods and technologies to counter it.

The result, depending on how quickly the Khabarovsk enters operational service and how many other boats in this class will be completed, could have a significant disruptive effect on the way that NATO goes about anti-submarine warfare.