relations

Syria has been in talks on the fate of Khmeimim and Tartous bases, which Russia used to support ousted Assad regime.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa have held discussions, including on the fate of Russia’s military bases in the Middle Eastern country.

During a telephone call on Wednesday, Putin affirmed Moscow’s support for Syria’s territorial integrity and reiterated Russia’s rejection of Israeli attacks and violations of Syrian sovereignty, reports Syrian news agency SANA.

The Kremlin stressed that the discussion also concerned deepening political dialogue and cooperation in trade, among other areas.

The talks were aimed at further development of bilateral relations and strengthened cooperation, SANA noted.

However, the status of the Khmeimim airbase and Tartous naval base, which are highly strategic for Russia, remains the key topic between Damascus and Moscow.

The Kremlin said that Russia-Syria relations will continue through continued contact “at various levels” and that “both sides underscored the importance of the Memorandum of Understanding On the Reorganisation of the Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus Material-Technical Support Point, signed on August 9”.

Syria announced earlier this month that a deal had been agreed after 18 months of negotiations that will see Khmeimim and Tartous turned into “joint training and capacity-building centres”, with Syria to take control of civilian facilities at both bases.

Russia backed former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad throughout Syria’s 13-year civil war, intervening militarily to keep him in power and expanding the Russian footprint at the Khmeimim air base and Tartous naval base on the Mediterranean coast.

Since al-Sharaa led the ouster of the a;-Assad regime, Putin has worked to build relations with the new Syrian government and to secure the future of the bases, which are key to Russian efforts to maintain influence across the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Aug. 19 (UPI) — The United Arab Emirates announced it was indefinitely severing trade relations with Iran on Wednesday after accusing Tehran of firing two ballistic missiles at it.

The move was announced by the UAE’s Foreign Affairs Ministry communications director, Afra Al Hameli, who said “in light of regional escalations that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”

“The UAE remains firmly committed to safeguarding the integrity of the international financial system, in line with international law and the highest global standards,” she said in a statement, while stressing the UAE’s “steadfast commitment to dialogue cooperation and regional integration as essential means of advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the region.”

The UAE-Iran trade relationship was worth billions a year, with the Observatory of Economic Complexity platform stating the UAE exports nearly $6 billion in goods, mostly electronics, to Iran each year, while Iran exports nearly $500 million, mostly in grapes, nuts and crustaceans.

The announcement came hours after the UAE’s Ministry of Defense said its air defense systems had detected two ballistic missiles fired from Tehran toward maritime traffic, with both falling into the sea, one within the UAE’s territorial waters.

“The Ministry of Defense confirms that it is on high alert and readiness to deal with any threats, and to firmly confront everything that targets undermining the state’s security or the security of navigation in the region, thereby ensuring the preservation of the state’s sovereignty, security and stability, and protecting its interests and national capabilities,” it said in a statement.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei rejected the accusations that Iran had launched missiles toward the UAE, saying Abu Dhabi was violating “the principle of good-neighborly relations” in doing so, Iran’s Mehr News Agency reported.

According to the UAE’s Ministry of Defense, its air defenses have engaged more than 550 ballistic missiles, 29 cruise missiles and more than 2,265 drones fired at it by Iran since the war began on Feb. 28. However, Tuesday’s launches were the first since May.

Spain says the crisis in its North African enclave Ceuta is back under control, with most of the more than 50,000 migrants who stormed across its borders over recent days choosing to voluntarily go back to Morocco.

Tens of thousands of people crossed into Ceuta on Thursday and continued arriving overnight into Friday.

Most came by sea, swimming or in small boats, to get around the border fence. Some rushed border crossing points in such numbers that the guards were overwhelmed. Others tried to climb the breakwater that holds the border fence. At least 67 people died trying to reach Ceuta.

Many questions remain about what caused such a huge number of people to abruptly seek to illegally enter Spanish territory. It was clearly not a coincidence they all chose the same day to do so. Was it coordinated and planned in advance, and if so, by whom and for what purpose?

Here’s what we know:

Where is Ceuta and why is it significant?

Ceuta is an autonomous Spanish city on the northern coast of Africa bordering Morocco. Along with Melilla, it is one of the only two land borders between the European Union and Africa.

It first came under Portuguese rule in 1415 before becoming part of Spain in 1580. It remained under Spanish sovereignty after Portugal regained independence in 1640. After the decolonisation of Africa, Ceuta and Melilla are the only remaining European-held territories on the African mainland.

Its location has made it one of the main entry points for migrants and asylum seekers trying to reach Europe. The enclave is protected by high border fences, surveillance systems, and a permanent deployment of Spain’s Civil Guard and National Police.

What caused the sudden massive influx?

Authorities in Ceuta linked the surge in attempted crossings to a Spanish Supreme Court ruling published in July that barred authorities from immediately returning migrants who arrive by sea. The ruling does not apply to migrants who enter Spain by land, including by climbing over the border fence.

But several experts have questioned this theory, saying few migrants would have been aware of the court ruling.

Ignacio Cembrero, a Spanish journalist specialised in migration in North Africa, told the news agency AFP that “without a doubt, the July 8 ruling has played a role… but that doesn’t explain the level of mobilisation.”

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez blamed the sudden influx on human trafficking mafias who exaggerated the significance of the court ruling to convince vast numbers of migrants to take part in a mass coordinated surge into Ceuta.

Some believe that Morocco may have had a role in organising and facilitating the sudden mass breach of the border.

Morocco does not recognise Madrid’s sovereignty over the centuries-old Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, regarding them as occupied territory.

Morocco also stridently asserts its own sovereignty over Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony it annexed in 1975 where the Indigenous inhabitants, represented by the Polisario Front, oppose rule from Rabat and want independence.

In April 2021, Madrid allowed Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali to be treated in a Spanish hospital for COVID-19, infuriating Morocco, which regards him as a criminal in charge of an outlawed separatist rebellion.

Morocco recalled its ambassador from Madrid, and appeared to loosen its border controls in May, allowing about 10,000 migrants to enter Ceuta as a threat to Spain.

In 2022, Spain restored full diplomatic relations with Morocco after reversing its four-decade policy of supporting self-determination for the Indigenous people of Western Sahara and instead backing Moroccan sovereignty. It was widely assumed that Rabat achieved this goal by leveraging the vulnerability of the Spanish enclaves.

Last month, relations between Madrid and Rabat soured again because Sanchez made an official visit to Algeria – a country Morocco regards as a bitter enemy because of its unwavering support for the Polisario Front.

Some are speculating that the latest events in Ceuta show Morocco once again sending a warning to Spain.

What does this have to do with Israel?

Some observers believe that if Morocco did orchestrate the mayhem, it may have been encouraged by others, pointing at two leaders with a particular grudge against Sanchez – US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Sanchez is one of Europe’s most consistently pro-Palestinian voices. He has explicitly said Israel’s war on Gaza is genocide, has been highly critical of the US-Israel war on Iran, and refused to allow jointly operated US-Spanish military facilities to be used to facilitate that war.

Trump has been scathing about Spain because of its refusal to spend a greater share of gross domestic product to match the NATO target.

Morocco has been far friendlier than Spain to Israel. In 2024, Spain refused to allow a US-flagged cargo ship carrying weapons for Israel to dock at Algeciras, so the vessel redirected to Morocco instead. The same year, Moroccan authorities allowed an Israeli warship to dock at Tangier to refuel and resupply en route from the US to Israel, after Spain had refused the vessel port access.

Many Israelis consider Madrid’s support for Palestine hypocritical when Spain also occupies Arab territory.

In 2019, Netanyahu’s son Yair tweeted a map of Ceuta and Melilla, saying, “Dear Arabs and Muslims. Want to free occupied Arab Islamic lands? Here’s a good start!”

In March this year, an article written by American Enterprise Institute fellow Michael Rubin for the staunchly pro-Israel Middle East Forum urged: “Moroccans should gather, send bulldozers to the border, and then enter Ceuta and Melilla unarmed to raise the flag.”

In April, pro-Israel Moroccan analyst Amine Ayoub wrote an article for Israeli website Ynet News arguing: “US-Spain tensions over NATO, Iran create opening for Morocco to press claims on Ceuta and Melilla, with Israel positioned to back Rabat diplomatically within US-led alliance that increasingly favours cooperative partners over European holdouts.”

On Friday, with Ceuta invaded by tens of thousands of migrants, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, Danny Danon, posted a provocative comment on X.

“Spain, which never misses an opportunity to lecture Israel, has declared a state of emergency in Ceuta following the crisis over its immigration policy,” Danon wrote. “Maybe before it continues lecturing us, it’s time it explained to the world why it still maintains colonial enclaves in Africa.”

“Well, it’s all starting to become quite clear,” commented Spain’s transport minister, Oscar Puente, apparently suggesting he thought Israel was involved in what happened in Ceuta.

Pro-Israel sentiment has been steadily on the rise in Morocco, particularly as the country’s diplomatic relationship with both Israel and the United States has been deepening.

Days ago, it was announced that Morocco named a 1,055km (655.5-mile) highway over Western Sahara after Trump.

Experts said the gesture was far from surprising, as Morocco was one of the signatories to the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords, which saw the country normalise relations with Israel in 2020. In return, the Trump administration has provided crucial support to Morocco at the United Nations and through bilateral channels, bringing Rabat closer to securing greater control over Western Sahara.

There is no evidence that Morocco orchestrated events in Ceuta partly on behalf of Israel, just a lot of interesting coincidences.

But whether or not there was any conspiracy, one consequence of the episode is clear – the already frosty relations between the left-wing Spanish government of Sanchez and the far-right Israeli government of Netanyahu are now even chillier.

South Korea’s proposed cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is aimed at enhancing their own respective contributions to global peace and stability, Seoul’s foreign ministry said Tuesday, in its first response to recent concerns by Russia over what it described as growing military cooperation between Seoul and NATO.

“Cooperation between South Korea and NATO is aimed at strengthening each side’s capabilities across various sectors, including defense industry, new technologies and cybersecurity, so as to reinforce each side’s role and contribution to international peace and stability,” the ministry told Yonhap News Agency in a written statement.

“In addition, our government continues to hold necessary communication with the Russian side to stably manage South Korea-Russia relations and protect our people and companies,” it added.

Russia’s foreign ministry has expressed displeasure over Seoul’s deepening military cooperation with NATO, according to Russia’s Tass news agency.

“The Russian side expressed serious concern over Seoul’s growing drift toward NATO, as demonstrated, among other things, by the Republic of Korea’s practical steps to deepen military and military-technical cooperation with NATO, the consequences of which pose a threat to Russia’s security,” the ministry said in a statement Thursday.

Moscow further argued that Seoul’s growing cooperation with NATO made it a “de facto participant in NATO’s qualitative and quantitative rearmament process, as the alliance has openly declared its preparations for war with Russia.”

The Russian statement came after South Korean President Lee Jae Myung attended the NATO summit in Ankara earlier this month as one of the alliance’s four Asia-Pacific partners, marking his first appearance at NATO’s annual top-level gathering.

At a NATO summit defense industry forum, Lee proposed elevating South Korea-NATO defense cooperation to a “Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0″ to expand cooperation beyond weapons system transactions to joint research, production and operation in the defense sector.

“Our government is pushing for cooperation with various countries and international organizations, including NATO, under its principle of pursuing practical diplomacy centered on national interests,” the foreign ministry said.

Still, it added, “The country will continue to closely work with the international community while closely monitoring the related developments, as the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war and the military cooperation between North Korea and Russia are issues that have a negative effect on international peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and the region.”

Pyongyang and Moscow have repeatedly and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening their bilateral cooperation since signing a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty two years ago.

North Korea has also sent around 15,000 combat troops and conventional weapons to Russia to support Moscow’s war against Ukraine, Seoul’s spy agency has said.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

Istanbul, Turkiye – At around 19:30 GMT on July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coordinated attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s democratically elected government.

But within hours, the attempted takeover involving tanks and fighter jets had been quashed. Thousands of people poured onto the streets of major cities, joining loyalist members of the army and the police, and much of the chain of command, in defeating the putschists.

The failed coup attempt 10 years ago was not only the bloodiest in Turkiye’s modern history – some 250 were killed and more than 2,200 wounded – but also a watershed moment that fundamentally changed relations between civil and military authorities in the country.

“The failure of July 15 had three pillars,” said retired Colonel Unal Atabay.

“The resistance of the people, the officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers inside the Turkish Armed Forces who resisted the coup, and the institutional reflex of the armed forces themselves.”

Military intervention cast a long shadow over Turkish politics for decades.

The armed forces overthrew governments in 1960 and 1980; intervened through a memorandum in 1971; and forced another elected government from office in what became known as the “post-modern coup” of 1997.

Although civilian rule returned after each intervention, the military remained one of Turkiye’s most influential institutions, seeing itself as the guardian of the republic’s founding principles.

Yet that was not how the republic’s founders had envisioned civil-military relations. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, both commanders during the War of Independence of the early 1920s, entered politics only after leaving military service.

“If the military had remained involved in politics, it would most likely have been exploited by various groups in the uncertain and weak conditions of those early years of the republic. They made the most accurate diagnosis and said that the military should stay out of politics.

Political scientist Ali Carkoglu said separation between military command and civilian politics was regarded as one of the republic’s founding principles, calling it “the most accurate diagnosis”.

Over time, however, the armed forces increasingly came to see themselves as guardians of the state, repeatedly invoking that role to justify intervention in politics.

But 10 years since the latest attempt, few experts believe Turkiye faces another conventional coup.

“You never say never,” said Howard Eissenstat, a Turkiye specialist at St Lawrence University in New York. “But to bet on a military coup in Turkiye is to lose money.”

While the military’s political role appears to have receded, the broader consequences of the post-coup transformation remain the subject of debate.

Reducing the military’s influence over politics had already become a central objective of the governing Justice and Development Party, or AK Party, after it came to power in 2002.

Following years of tension with the military establishment, the government steadily expanded civilian oversight – and the failed coup accelerated that process dramatically.

Ankara accused the network of United States-based Muslim scholar Fethullah Gulen, designated by the Turkish government as the Fethullah Terrorist Organisation (FETO), of orchestrating the coup attempt. Tens of thousands of soldiers, judges, police officers, teachers and civil servants were dismissed or arrested. Military academies were replaced by the National Defence University, command structures were overhauled, and civilian oversight of the armed forces expanded.

Atabay said these changes have fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the military, the state and society.

He added the military has strengthened its internal oversight after the coup to prevent another organised infiltration, noting that both the armed forces and wider society are now more alert to attempts to penetrate state institutions.

“External centres of power may always make such attempts,” he said. “The important thing is to detect them early, expose them and build a system that prevents them from infiltrating the state.”

For Carkoglu, however, the military cannot be examined in isolation from the broader health of Turkiye’s democratic institutions.

He said bringing the armed forces firmly under civilian authority was essential. But civilian supremacy alone, he argued, does not necessarily amount to democratic consolidation.

“It is certainly a success that civilian authority has established greater control over the military,” he said. “But if that comes at the expense of democracy, then it is, at the very least, an unfortunate outcome for Turkish politics.”

Carkoglu noted that institutions derive legitimacy not simply from who controls them, but from whether citizens trust them.

“The healthy development of trust in institutions requires competitive politics and the possibility of free expression,” he said. “Otherwise, institutions themselves begin to lose credibility.”

That debate has become increasingly prominent in recent years.

The arrests of several opposition mayors – including Istanbul mayor and presidential candidate for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Ekrem Imamoglu, together with investigations into other opposition politicians, have fuelled criticism from political parties and rights groups, who argue judicial processes are increasingly being used against rivals.

The government rejects those accusations, saying the investigations are conducted independently and are based solely on evidence of criminal wrongdoing.

The debate has unfolded during a period of remarkable political continuity. Since coming to power in 2002, the AK Party has won every parliamentary election, most recently in 2023, when the governing People’s Alliance retained its parliamentary majority.

Rights groups, meanwhile, focus on a different legacy of the coup.

Human Rights Watch says emergency powers introduced after the 2016 coup attempt gradually evolved into broader restrictions on civil liberties. It argues the crackdown extended well beyond those responsible for the attempted overthrow, leaving many dismissed public employees unable to rebuild their professional lives even after acquittal.

The government says the measures were necessary to dismantle clandestine networks inside the state and prevent Turkiye from facing a similar threat again.

Ten years on, that effort continues. On Monday, two days before the anniversary, Turkish authorities launched coordinated operations across all 81 provinces targeting nearly 1,000 suspects over alleged links to FETO.

For the government, it was another reminder that the events of July 2016 remain an active national security issue rather than a closed chapter in the country’s history.

Authors: Marin Mae Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez*

The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) recently held a summit focused on “Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development.” While the May 15 meeting itself did not offer any groundbreaking resolutions, all five heads of the OTS member states participated and reaffirmed their commitment to greater cooperation and integration. This summit was just one example in a series of events that demonstrate growing unity and collaboration among the Turkic states.

How far integration will go between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, and Uzbekistan is debatable. There are several regional initiatives that are bringing these countries, as well as other states across the Caucasus and Central Asia, together, including connectivity projects such as the Middle Corridor and the Uzbek-Kyrgyz-Chinese railway, as well as agencies such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union.

However, to secure the success of most multilateral initiatives, bilateral relations between participating members must be consolidated. When ties between two countries are stabilized and routinely strengthened, a bilateral friendship serves as a building block for expanding to additional actors and ensuring constant, reliable dialogue and collaboration among all involved players.

Türkiye, the leader of the Turkic world in terms of population, economic strength, and growing global geopolitical influence, is leveraging shared Turkic heritage to deepen and cement engagement with other OTS members. Uzbekistan is a natural and important partner: as the most populous Central Asian state, it is the second-largest majority-Turkic state in terms of both language and population. The landlocked nation has the third-largest economy in the Turkic world and is rapidly developing economically and expanding its membership in international initiatives.

This commentary will thus provide an analysis of Ankara-Tashkent relations. However, while statements by presidents & joint economic and investment projects are important parts of this geopolitical puzzle, the true sign of integration between two nations often occurs at the cultural level.

BILATERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Bilateral relations between Türkiye and Uzbekistan are particularly dynamic. It is noteworthy that high-level meetings occur quite regularly: Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Türkiye and Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan met in Ankara on January 29, as part of the 4th meeting of the Joint Strategic Planning Group (JSPG). The two leaders signed several agreements, including the “Decision on Cooperation Mechanisms for Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations between the Republic of Türkiye and the Republic of Uzbekistan,” an agreement on health cooperation, a memorandum of understanding for the development of international transport corridors, and a memorandum of understanding for promoting cooperation in mining.

The two countries celebrated 34 years of diplomatic relations, and the Turkish state-run news agency Anadolu marked the occasion with a March op-ed; the essay described bilateral relations as evolving into a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” The Uzbek presidency has utilized the same wording to describe the current level of bilateral relations.

Trade between Türkiye and Uzbekistan has nearly tripled over the past decade, rising from USD$1.2 billion in 2016 to over USD$3 billion in 2025. Short and long-term trade targets amount to USD$5 billion and USD$10 billion, respectively. Türkiye is the fourth-largest trading partner of Uzbekistan, accounting for 3.7% of Uzbekistan’s foreign trade. Uzbekistan is not as high a trade priority for Turkiye: even in Central Asia, which is not Turkiye’s primary trade area, Kazakhstan is a larger overall partner. Although neither country is pursuing top trading status with the other, trade and engagement remain high priorities for both Ankara and Tashkent. The evidence clearly displayed that both nations have taken major strides to consolidate both political and economic engagement.

THE CULTURAL FACTOR

From a cultural standpoint, Türkiye has swiftly gained soft power traction in Uzbekistan. Turkish TV series and movies enjoy immense popularity in Uzbekistan: the appeal of Turkish media, coupled with expanded transit options between the two countries, has inspired a tourism boom to Türkiye. From January to October 2025, over 230 thousand Uzbek nationals traveled to Türkiye for various reasons, a 16.3% increase compared to the same period in 2024.

Conversely, Uzbek influence in Türkiye is also increasing. Turkish tourism to Uzbekistan is also rising: between January and April 2025, around 49,400 Turkish citizens visited Uzbekistan for tourism, a 57.4% increase compared to the same time period in 2024. Turkish businesses are also investing in Uzbekistan’s tourism sector: Turkish partners support 12 hotels and over 100 joint restaurants, and in 2025-2026, Turkish investors pledged to help finance 11 additional hotel projects.

Language is another area of soft power, as Turkish is one of the top five most popular foreign languages to learn in Uzbekistan. Factors, including the popularity of Turkish media, academic study, and career opportunities, have bolstered its appeal. Although the study of Uzbek in Türkiye is not as widespread, the linguistic overlap between the two makes it relatively easy for a native Turkish speaker to learn Uzbek and vice versa, making it a less daunting endeavor than the study of other languages.

Cultural relations and people-to-people diplomacy are sometimes overlooked in grand analyses of international relations, as analysts and scholars often focus on presidential summits, trade agreements, investment, or joint military initiatives. However, people-to-people relations, as well as cultural and public diplomacy, are important tools in a country’s toolkit for strengthening grassroots ties.

Generally speaking, the OTS and its member governments support initiatives to promote people-to-people relations and to continue developing a common Turkic identity. During the recent OTS summit, the five leaders reaffirmed their determination to deepen cooperation in digital transformation, innovation, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and sustainable economic development. More broadly, they highlighted their shared commitment to further deepening solidarity, mutual trust, and strategic cooperation within the Turkic World in line with the objectives of the “Turkic World Vision-2040.”

Specifically, the heads of state “laid a time capsule to officially launch the construction of the Center of the Turkic Civilization.” This Center has been described by regional officials as “a groundbreaking architectural complex that will utilize AI, VR, and holography to immerse visitors in the rich philosophy and history of the Turkic World.” Moreover, during the January meeting between Erdoğan and Mirziyoyev, the two heads of state signed a Cultural Cooperation Plan for 2026-2027. Thus, a key strategy for encouraging Turkish-Uzbek bilateral ties is to highlight their commonalities within the wider Turkic cultural and linguistic sphere.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

Tashkent-Ankara relations are generally strong, but additional factors complicate their full level of engagement. Although Ankara is very much interested in increasing connectivity with Central Asia via the Middle Corridor and engaging with the Turkic world, those are not its primary objectives. Issues like the Russo-Ukrainian War & the Black Sea; the recent conflict between Iran against the United States and Israel, as well as the related spillover across neighboring Lebanon and Syria; and even the upcoming elections in Armenia, are all arguably higher priorities for Ankara. Domestically, Türkiye is facing its own obstacles, as Erdoğan maintains a tight grip on power while the Turkish economy remains plagued by rising inflation and currency depreciation.

Similarly, Tashkent wants to improve connectivity with Türkiye via the Middle Corridor, but it also wants to increase trade and investment with China and attract investment and partnerships from the Gulf States and India. A good example of this diversification of partnerships is Tashkent’s new airport, to be built via investments and partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, Moscow remains committed to maintaining its historical influence across Eurasia (President Mirziyoyev visited Moscow for the May celebrations of the Great Patriotic War, one of the few leaders to do so), while the current US administration is focused on transactional diplomacy to secure access to critical minerals and rare earth elements that Uzbekistan has in abundance.

Ankara’s engagement in recent years with Central Asia via the OTS, the Middle Corridor, and bilateral interactions has attracted widespread academic and scholarly interest. However, there is a predictable focus on diplomatic, security, and trade & investment analyses; for example, a 2024 analysis on Tashkent-Ankara relations published by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute did not mention tourism, cultural diplomacy, or education (apart from military education).

That said, the frequently overlooked factors of cultural and public diplomacy will likely be critical to promoting long-term, successful cooperation between Türkiye and Uzbekistan: Turkish pop culture has had a strong influence in Uzbekistan, tourism is growing, and Turkish language study is increasingly popular there. population to learn Turkish. While Uzbekistan’s cultural and language appeal does not hold the same sway in Türkiye, the country is nonetheless growing in terms of global soft power appeal indicators. Uzbekistan’s rebranding as a globally-oriented and dynamic society steeped in rich Islamic and historical heritage -for example, by leveraging the legacy of legendary cities such as Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khiva- echoes the Kemalist model of a Türkiye embracing both modernity and its Ottoman historical legacy. Thus, framing the contemporary Uzbek national narrative as parallel to the Turkish one could help bolster its appeal in Türkiye and strengthen the sense of collective identity in the broader Turkic cultural space.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He is also a non-resident fellow at Cfive, a think tank headquartered in Astana, Kazakhstan.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or policies of any organizations with which the authors are affiliated.

RIVERSIDE — It would not have been an easy reelection bid in any case for freshman Rep. Ken Calvert (R-Riverside), who barely made it to Congress two years ago.

But now Calvert’s biggest reelection hurdle may be his own indiscretions, which also could pose a problem in surviving even his own party’s June primary.

The reason: After months of denying it, Calvert, 40, has admitted having sex in his car one night last November with a woman who police say is a known prostitute.

Initially, Calvert–a member of a prominent Riverside County family–said he was doing nothing wrong with the woman when police saw them together on a Corona street.

Corona police said simply that the congressman was spotted sitting in his car with a female, that there was no criminal activity and that after a few words the congressman drove off.

But the Riverside Press-Enterprise newspaper went to court to press Corona for release of confidential police reports that had been prepared by officers who were sensitive to the fact that they had a street-level encounter with their local congressman.

The city was ordered to release the report, which indicated that there had been evidence of a sex act under way, and an embarrassed Calvert responded with a prepared statement.

“My conduct that evening was inappropriate,” he said–not because it was illegal, but because “it violated the values of the person I strive to be.” He admitted that he was caught in “an extremely embarrassing situation.”

He said he did not pay for the sex. He said he “panicked and tried to drive away” when the officers confronted him, but “came to my senses” and cooperated with them.

Corona Police Capt. John Dalzell said Calvert was not detained or arrested because “while the officer saw certain things, he didn’t see everything necessary to support a finding that a crime was committed.” Dalzell said there was no witness to an exchange of money for services, and neither party claimed to be a victim.

Dalzell said Calvert did not try to exert influence to avoid arrest. He said the officer’s decision not to pursue the matter “wasn’t a close call. He didn’t even call for a supervisor.”

In his explanation for his conduct that night, Calvert said he had come back from a rough week in Washington and was reeling from his father’s suicide a year earlier, as well as his wife’s request for a divorce, which had been granted just a few weeks before.

“I was feeling intensely lonely,” he said. “I realize now that this, or a similar incident, was probably inevitable.”

Calvert, who worked in commercial real estate before his election to Congress in 1992, was expected to coast to his party’s nomination this year to represent western Riverside County in Washington. His opponent in the primary, conservative Joe Khoury, 47, a professor of finance at UC Riverside, ran second behind Calvert in the primary two years ago but thinks he can prevail this time.

“I thought he was vulnerable, even before this incident,” Khoury said. “Riverside is conservative, and voters’ reaction to this is not pleasant. It plays differently here than it would in, say, Los Angeles.”

Calvert’s campaign manager, Ed Slevin, agreed that Calvert will have his hands full winning the primary because of the Corona incident. “I assume he’s more vulnerable in June among conservative Republicans than he’ll be in November,” he said. “I think that, by then, it’ll be considered old news.”

If Calvert wins the primary, his Democratic challenger is expected to be Mark Takano, a high school history and English teacher and trustee of the Riverside Community College District. Takano lost to Calvert by a little more than 500 votes in 1992, and is expected to handily win his party’s nomination in June against a single challenger.

Takano scolded Calvert for not coming clean earlier about the Corona incident. “Mr. Calvert has only himself to blame for his becoming a bigger issue than putting people back to work, fighting crime and improving our schools,” Takano said.

Democratic Party strategists said that, even before Calvert’s encounter with the woman in Corona, the 43rd Congressional District seat had been targeted for turnover because of what they characterized as Calvert’s lackluster performance in Washington during his first stint there and his vulnerability back home.