presence

The Chinese strategy employs research and intelligence institutions working to foster closer ties between Iranian national security institutions and the Egyptian military, aiming to undermine the American presence in the Middle East. Prominent among these institutions are the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, the China Institute of International Studies, and the Center for West Asian and African Studies. These Chinese research centers, which shape China’s relations with countries in the region and the Gulf, include the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU), which directs studies related to security and defense issues and facilitates direct dialogue between think tanks in Iran and research centers in Egypt. Another example is the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), which reports directly to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and works to engineer diplomatic plans that align Egypt’s strategic interests with the objectives of Tehran and resistance movements in the region. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies also rely on a number of People’s Liberation Army-backed space intelligence companies, such as MizarVision and EarthEye. These Chinese companies have provided high-resolution satellite imagery and intelligence data to support operations targeting US bases in the Gulf and the Middle East. These Chinese entities coordinate and plan operations through various mechanisms and initiatives officially launched by China, most notably the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Beijing also uses forums, such as the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, to pressure Middle Eastern and Gulf countries to withdraw foreign forces and end US hegemony in the Gulf and the Middle East. This is framed as ending direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region. Beijing is also seeking to establish permanent overseas bases, most prominently the Djibouti naval base in East Africa, to support its regional alliances and ensure the continuity of global supply lines for Chinese interests and investments within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.

The relationship between Chinese military and intelligence think tanks and the Egyptian army is highlighted by their shared goal of countering American hegemony and expelling US military bases from the Gulf and the Middle East. China is strengthening its strategic cooperation with the Egyptian army as part of the Djibouti-UAE-Egypt axis, with Beijing relying on Cairo as a key launching pad to secure maritime navigation and reduce American military influence. Beijing is utilizing its strategic institutions and think tanks to provide technological and logistical support to the Egyptian army, aiming to create a regional power capable of maintaining strategic balance in the region against American hegemony and interventions. This escalating security and strategic relationship between the Egyptian and Chinese armies rests on several key pillars, most notably intelligence and military partnership. China aims to train the Egyptian military elite through Egyptian military academies and coordinate threat assessments and mutual monitoring of the military movements of the United States and its allies in the Gulf and the wider region. With the implementation of several joint exercises between the two sides, the Chinese vision crystallized in the (Civilization Eagles maneuvers), which brought together the air forces of China and Egypt. This paves the way for the transfer of military technology and the integration of Chinese systems with Egyptian defenses independent of the West, along with the localization of Chinese military industries in the heart of Cairo. China is negotiating with the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to develop local manufacturing capabilities and transfer defense technology. There are also reports of integrating Chinese systems into Egyptian systems to reduce Egypt’s dependence on American-supplied weaponry. Beijing seeks to create a counterweight to American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. China sees Egypt’s refusal to host any American military bases as a cornerstone of its strategy, relying on the Egyptian and Emirati armies to guarantee regional security as an alternative to the traditional American presence in the Gulf and the Middle East.

Chinese research, military, and intelligence think tanks are working to engineer an asymmetric strategic partnership to end American hegemony in the Middle East and the Gulf. Chinese think tanks, military research centers, and intelligence agencies are operating according to a clear strategic vision aimed at building asymmetrical partnerships in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf to reduce American influence and establish a multipolar world order. Beijing provides Tehran with technical and intelligence support to deter Washington, while simultaneously seeking to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt as a pivotal regional power. This strategy aims to diminish American influence and secure China’s vital economic interests. The Chinese strategy in the region rests on several pillars, most notably its strategy toward Iran and its technical and intelligence support for the country. China has secretly supplied Iran with advanced satellite technology from its BeiDou satellite system, bypassing Western and American GPS systems, as well as sophisticated air defense systems. This has significantly enhanced the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ability to monitor and target American military bases in the region and the Gulf.

The objectives of Chinese think tanks, political, strategic, military, and intelligence research centers become apparent here, as they attempt to plan a path to link Iran to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and transform Iranian military pressure into a tool for destabilizing the US bases deployed in the region and the Gulf. The convergence between China and the Egyptian military is highlighted through the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. Beijing is inclined to strengthen military cooperation with Egypt, capitalizing on its political stability and its geographic location controlling vital maritime trade routes, and to transfer advanced Chinese military technology to Egypt. Beijing has revealed its desire to be a major supplier of equipment to the Egyptian army, such as the J-10 aircraft. This aims to increase Egypt’s strategic maneuvering room and reduce the dominance of Western weaponry.

The stability achieved by the Egyptian leadership is a fundamental pillar supporting the comprehensive strategic partnership, as Beijing seeks to secure its economic and military interests with a stable and influential regional power. Therefore, China is investing in the Belt and Road Initiative, for which the Suez Canal is a vital artery in the Middle East. Cooperation extends to the exchange and transfer of military technology, joint military manufacturing, advanced air defense systems, and the evaluation of potential acquisitions of modern Chinese fighter jets. Furthermore, joint air exercises have been conducted, with the Egyptian Armed Forces carrying out their first-ever joint air exercise, dubbed Eagles of Civilization with China, involving multi-role fighter aircraft from both countries, underscoring the deepening defense partnership between them.

In this context, China relies on the Egyptian military within the framework of its strategic and African axis to counter American influence. For China, Egypt represents its strategic gateway to the African continent and a cornerstone in its maneuvers against the US Africa Command (USAFRICOM). In addition to joint military exercises, China and Egypt have conducted joint air force drills, a clear indication of an unprecedented military rapprochement that has drawn close American scrutiny. With China’s move to transfer technology and arms deals to Cairo, it is positioning itself to support the Egyptian army with advanced air defense systems, such as the HQ-9B. This enhances Egypt’s air deterrence capabilities and forms part of strategic military deals aimed at reducing dependence on the United States and its Western allies. On the other hand, China relies on Iran as a deterrent and direct driver, exerting pressure on American bases in the region. Iran represents the spearhead of China’s brinkmanship policy against American military bases in the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, with Tehran threatening to strike them should any regional conflict erupt. In conjunction with the economic and diplomatic alliance between Beijing and Tehran, China uses emerging alliances, such as the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to establish Iran’s political foothold. It sometimes resorts to mediation policies as a tool to reduce the likelihood of a direct confrontation with Iran, which could harm its commercial interests, such as China’s sponsorship of Pakistani mediation efforts between Iran and the United States to stop the war against Iran and allow the Strait of Hormuz to be opened to global trade and navigation.

China’s major objectives in the Middle East lie in a strategy of attrition against the United States. China uses Iranian actions as a clever pressure tactic to test and deplete American military technology without direct involvement in wars of attrition, while simultaneously attempting to create a new regional order. Here, Chinese intelligence agencies coordinate networks of overlapping interests to push countries toward understandings that transcend the American security umbrella, paving the way for the future withdrawal of foreign military bases. The pillars of China’s strategy for alternative hegemony are based on asymmetric partnerships. Beijing focuses on presenting itself as a reliable economic and technological partner without political conditions or interference in internal affairs, unlike the American model based on conditionality and direct military alliances. With China’s emphasis on the economy as a gateway to security, it utilizes the Belt and Road Initiative and its massive investments in infrastructure and ports, such as the Khalifa Port in the UAE and the Port of Duqm in Oman, to solidify its strategic presence and transform economic dependence into long-term geopolitical influence. With Beijing’s use of security diplomacy and mediation, Chinese decision-making centers have adopted a common security approach and offered political mediation, such as sponsoring the Saudi-Iranian agreement, to solidify Beijing’s role as an international peacemaker and portray the United States as a destabilizing force through the militarization of the region. This is coupled with China’s technological and intelligence penetration of the region and the Gulf, where Chinese partnerships focus on transferring 5G technologies, artificial intelligence, and space cooperation with Gulf states. This grants Beijing intelligence-gathering capabilities and allows it to connect the region’s vital systems to the Chinese technological infrastructure. Chinese think tanks and intelligence agencies are planning to cautiously fill the void, as China avoids direct military confrontation with Washington in the region and prefers to capitalize on the Gulf states’ desire to diversify their partnerships and hedge against the gradual decline of American interest in the Middle East.

Accordingly, we analyze that China’s military strategy in the Middle East and Africa relies on building defense partnerships with diverse objectives. It utilizes the Egyptian army as a pivotal regional power to bolster its influence and counterbalance the American presence through advanced training cooperation while simultaneously leveraging its relationship with Iran to exert pressure on American bases, particularly in the Gulf, and secure its oil interests all within a comprehensive policy aimed at dismantling American hegemony in the region.

UFC middleweight champion Sean Strickland was escorted out of a UFC Freedom 250 fan fest near the White House on Sunday evening for his own safety and the safety of other attendees, according to the U.S. Park Police.

Strickland was not on the card for the UFC event held on the White House South Lawn in connection with a summer-long celebration of the nation’s 250th anniversary. Instead, the 35-year-old fighter attended a viewing event on the Ellipse, causing a stir among fans as he eventually entered a wrestling ring set up in the area.

“At approximately 7 p.m., the U.S. Park Police received report of a disturbance within the UFC event,” the agency said in a statement emailed to The Times. “The unplanned presence of Sean Strickland drew significant attention from attendees, resulting in disorder. Due to concerns for Strickland’s safety and the safety of event patrons, personnel from the U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. Park Police, and other assisting agencies evacuated him safely from the area.”

In videos posted to his Instagram Story from, during and after the incident, Strickland states he “might be going to jail” and “may have been charged with disorderly conduct.”

However, the Park Police said that is not the case.

“Strickland was neither cited nor arrested in connection with the incident,” the agency said. “However, he was advised not to return to the venue for his own and public safety. USPP escorted him to his hotel without incident.”

Strickland was once a supporter of President Trump but has become a vocal critic over such issues as the Jeffrey Epstein files and the war with Iran. Still, he had expressed interest in attending UFC Freedom 250, which took place on Trump’s 80th birthday, but has said on X that the UFC told him he “wasn’t cleared by the white house.”

UFC president and chief executive officer Dana White has said that nobody, including Strickland, was banned from the event.

On Saturday, Strickland posted on X that he wanted to attend the fan fest on the Ellipse.

The next day, he posted a video on Instagram that shows him doing just that. Apparently filmed by the MMA star as he was being led through the crowd by another man (Strickland later said on X that a fan “snuck me in”), the video shows Strickland trying to avoid being recognized until getting to the ring.

Once there, however, he basked in the attention of a large crowd that chanted, “U-S-A! U-S-A!”

Strickland also posted a photo to Instagram of himself being escorted barefoot out of the event, with the caption “NOT AMERICAN ENOUGH.”

Brooke Mayo was just 4 when she started playing soccer. She was about 4½ when she started fantasizing about participating in the World Cup.

“I just fell in love with the game,” she said. “Like any soccer player, you dream about the World Cup, you know?”

That dream came true three years ago, though not quite in the way Mayo had imagined. Although she took part in four matches at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, she did so as an assistant referee, not a player, running up and down the field with a flag in her hand, not a ball at her feet.

Yet Mayo made history just the same, joining Tori Penso and Kathryn Nesbitt as the first American officials to work a World Cup final as a trio. More importantly, they performed so well they have been invited to officiate in the men’s World Cup this summer, where they will make more history as just the second all-female crew to work a game in the men’s tournament.

And while Mayo appreciates the barrier breaking, for the three women it’s just another day at the office.

“For us, it’s just business as usual,” she said. “I think there’s still a lot of places in the world that need to see this and that’s why it’s still important. But our colleagues are used to seeing women around.”

Mark Geiger, a two-time World Cup referee who is now general manager of the Professional Referee Organization (PRO), which manages officials for MLS, agrees. After decades of seeing U.S. and Canadian referees given little respect by FIFA — nor by international soccer in general — Geiger says the biggest takeaway from this summer’s tournament isn’t the gender of the domestic officials selected, but rather the number, 11, making it the largest contingent to work a World Cup.

In addition to Mayo, Penso and Nesbitt, the list includes Ismail Elfath, Armando Villarreal, Kyle Atkins, Corey Parker and Drew Fischer, who took part in the 2022 men’s tournament. Nesbitt, Elfath, Parker and Atkins all worked the final of that World Cup four years ago, Elfath as the fourth official, Nesbitt as the reserve assistant referee and Parker and Atkins as video assistant referees.

With Mayo’s team working the 2023 women’s final — alongside Villarreal, who was in the video booth — seven MLS officials have worked the last two World Cup finals and at least one PRO official has been assigned to 19 of the 32 knockout games in the most recent men’s and women’s tournaments.

No other league or country in the world is even close to that.

“Over the past few years I think we’ve shown that the quality of football and the quality of the officiating in the United States and Canada is at a really high level,” said Geiger, who made history of his own in 2014 when he became the first American center referee to work a Round-of-16 match in the men’s World Cup.

“We are in the normal conversation of knockout-stage games, we’re in the normal conversation for Tori to do the final. It’s not out of the realm of possibility.”

Another thing that makes this World Cup special for the PRO officials is that with the U.S., Mexico and Canada sharing host duties, the tournament will be played at home. The only other time the men’s World Cup was played in the U.S., in 1994, Arturo Angeles, a Mexican-born naturalized citizen, was the only American referee selected and he supervised just one group-play game.

“Any World Cup game anywhere is going to be special on some level,” said Fischer, a 45-year-old Canadian who has been a FIFA referee for 11 years. “It’s definitely a special feeling when you get to play host. It’s a little bit of welcoming the world into your backyard.

“There’s a certain hometown pride. So I’m definitely looking forward to that aspect of it.”

Joe Dickerson, U.S. Soccer’s reigning male referee of the year, received the FIFA international badge he needed to work major competitions just three years ago. Yet he will be a replay official in this World Cup, the first one he was eligible to work.

“This kind of happened so fast in the last couple of years,” said Dickerson, who became a professional referee in 2013, then began targeting the World Cup when it was awarded to the U.S., Mexico and Canada in 2018. “To work the biggest sporting event in the world in front of friends and family is really cool. And being a part of the celebration of culture happening in your own country and, as much as we can, celebrate our own culture, is really cool.”

It also makes things much easier on family and friends. When Mayo officiated her first group-stage game in the 2023 tournament in New Zealand, her wife, Falon Catalano, flew in for the match.

Referee Brooke Mayo looks on during a CONCACAF Nations League third place match between Jamaica and Panama in March 2024.

(Julio Cortez / Associated Press)

“I told her like hey, it’s our first World Cup. So she came to that and then went home,” said Mayo, 37, who wasn’t sure she’d get another game.

When she was assigned the England-Australia semifinal in Sydney, she called Catalano back.

“I said ‘this might be the biggest appointment in my entire career, in Australia in front of 75,000 fans. You’ve got to come to this,’” she pleaded.

So Catalano came then went before Mayo found out she would be doing the final. That led to another call. “I said, ‘well, you’ve gotta come back.’”

An exhausted and broke Catalano said no to the expense and fatigue of another 38-hour round trip, but after a group of MLS officials passed the hat to buy the ticket, Catalano surprised Mayo by making the match after all.

Making it to the semifinals — much less the final — was far from guaranteed since the World Cup is a meritocracy for officials as well as for the players. In fact, it’s harder to make the final as an official: There will be 170 officials from 50 countries taking part in this summer’s tournament as opposed to 1,248 players — or one referee for every 13 players.

“A lot of people underestimate how difficult it is for us to get there,” said Dickerson.

Referees are graded after every game and those who don’t measure up in their first match don’t work another one. Those who excel, however, continue to advance — as Mayo did in 2023.

“Just like teams try to kind of hit their stride in a tournament setting, that was similar with us. We just went in there focused on only one game in front of us,” she Mayo, who got her FIFA badge in 2018. “Our goal was to earn another game after that, do everything we can to clean up our communication. We’re like micro-managing ‘how could we have done this better?’

“You are just operating in sync. You’re spending every minute together. You’re together at breakfast. You’re together at training. You’re together at lunch. You’re traveling together. By the end, if they even sigh on the field, I know what that means.”

Mayo, like most officials, came to the game as a player — one good enough to play four years at Tennessee Tech. As a teenager she was moonlighting as a referee, raising enough money to fund a trip to South Africa to watch the 2010 World Cup as a fan.

“But I didn’t take reffing seriously,” she said. “Once I finished playing, I missed that competitive edge. When I realized I could do it in reffing, I was like, ‘Oh, this scratches that itch that I miss.”

Taking part in a World Cup remained a dream, however, and she got to scratch that itch three years ago. Now she’s working the tournament at home, where her family, who live in Colorado, will be just a few hours away should there be any frantic last-minute flights to catch.

Having already worked one World Cup final, anything short of the final this summer could feel like a failure.

“It’s a lot of skill, but it’s also a lot of luck. You have to be in the right place at the right time,” Mayo said. “There’s not that much that separates people at the top.

“We’re up against amazing referees. We’re going to fight for every game, one game at a time, knock it out of the park and hope for the best.”