perspective

PERSPECTIVE ON IMMIGRATION : Open the Door to Mexican Workers : A carefully drawn guest-worker program would help control our border and satisfyU.S. labor needs.

Frank del Olmo is deputy editor of The Times’ editorial pages.

President Clinton’s Mexican financial rescue package, which once looked so solid that it even had the support of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole and other leading Republicans, is in trouble. It’s stalled in a House committee, and Gingrich is warning that it could be defeated if it is brought to a vote too quickly.

Everyone is blaming somebody else for this impasse. Gingrich faults Clinton for poor leadership of balky Democrats. White House spokesmen ask why Dole and Gingrich can’t keep the Republicans in line.

In fact, both sides share the blame. They clearly underestimated the ability of demagogues like Ross Perot and Pat Buchanan to turn the Mexican loan guarantees into a symbolic issue. By railing against the proposal as a “bailout” of Wall Street and corrupt Mexican officials, these demagogues play to popular prejudices against both Mexico and big business.

So saving the Mexican loan guarantees won’t be easy, but it’s important that it be done. If you think that problems like illegal immigration are bad now, wait and see how tough things will get along our southern border if the Mexican economy goes into the tank for a decade rather than the couple of years most experts estimate it will take Mexico to recover if the loan guarantees are approved.

What could the White House offer skeptics in Congress to sell the loan guarantees? How about a plan to end illegal immigration on the Mexican border?

It wouldn’t be easy, of course, but control of our southern border can be achieved over time, and with the cooperation of the Mexican government. But it would not be done in the way envisioned by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) and other members of Congress who are demanding that Mexico send more police to the border to stop emigration in exchange for the loan guarantees. That would be politically unpalatable in Mexico.

But controlling illegal immigration could be done if we negotiated an agreement with the Mexican government that would open U.S. borders to a flow of Mexican workers, as long as they register with the appropriate authorities and agree to leave once they are done working here. Their return could be guaranteed by withholding part of their pay, say 25%, until they are back home.

This idea will sound familiar to anyone who has studied the history of the Mexican border. It’s an updated version of the bracero program, which brought Mexicans into this country to meet the farm labor shortage during World War II; more than 4 1/2 million had been admitted legally by the time the program ended in 1964.

There were, unfortunately, many abuses in the bracero program. Corrupt officials on the Mexican side gave preference to workers who paid them bribes. And some U.S. farmers treated Mexican workers little better than slaves, paying low wages and forcing them to live and work under miserable conditions. Such abuses would have to be avoided this time around, but that could be more easily done than in the past. For one thing, even the poorest Mexican peasant is much more sophisticated about his labor rights nowadays. The Mexican government is also more sophisticated, and has experts in think tanks like Tijuana’s Colegio de la Frontera Norte who have been researching the flow of Mexican migrants for years and could advise both Washington and Mexico City on how to set up a viable guest-worker program. And, with all the focus on immigration issues in the United States these days, the news media and Latino activists would surely raise a hue and cry over any abuses that did creep in.

In fact, the only real roadblock one can imagine to such a reasonable proposal might come from some of the more ardent immigration restrictionists in this country. But, if arrest statistics are any indication, 50% to 60% of the illegal immigrants they keep screaming about are Mexican. So if they are legalized, we eliminate half of the “illegal alien problem” in one fell swoop.

Such a program might even find such unlikely champions as Harold Ezell, a former immigration official and co-author of Proposition 187, and Gov. Pete Wilson, its biggest champion. Both have suggested a guest-worker program as a means of meeting any labor shortages that can’t be filled by U.S. workers.

Let’s face it, Mexican workers are going to keep coming here despite Proposition 187 and other anti-immigrant measures, because jobs are waiting for them in certain sectors of the U.S. economy, like agriculture and light manufacturing. So why not put aside any pretense that we don’t want them and cut a deal with Mexico that will benefit both countries?

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The New Approach of Trump Administration to NATO and the Perspective of Hague Summit

Donald Trump’s return to the office of presidency of the United States has restored to prominence issues of NATO’s unity and general strategic purpose. Backtracking from the emphasis of previous administrations on allied unity and common defense, Trump once more put in the spotlight issues of fiscal responsibility, pushing NATO allies to make good on economic commitments or risk reduced American involvement. This transactional orientation has renewed tensions at home in the alliance and challenged the very basic precept of collective defense. Preceding the forthcoming Hague Summit (24–26 June 2025), member states will prepare not only to deal with this American approach but also to encounter a rapidly deteriorating security situation produced by the relentless behavior of Russia in Ukraine.

Right from the first term to his present time in the office, President Trump has continually blamed NATO allies for very low defense investment, making them too dependent on the USA for protection. His insistence on all members reaching or going beyond the 2% GDP benchmark for military spending, as laid down in the 2014 Wales Summit declaration, has meanwhile remained the core of his NATO agenda. The public castigations at the 2018 Brussels Summit were particularly unsettling for transatlantic relationships, the major impact being felt mainly in Germany and Canada, where they failed to meet the target.

The Trump administration has chosen to deal with NATO as if it were a business rather than a multi-party security organization, with the main criterion for appraisal being how cheap the solution is. The new U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled in 2017 overlaps with the idea that the U.S. has allies that, first and foremost, are instrumental for U.S. national interest and not the most important guardians of a common security. The comparison has made European states start to weigh up their potential strategic recovery and long-term flexibility. Member states from the eastern flank of Europe, namely the Baltic countries, Romania, and Poland, are facing both a political and strategic puzzle as a result of the U.S. that is not firm in its commitment. These states are still very much dependent on the faith in U.S. deterrence capability. If there were no clear assurances, their defense strategies would be changed to more independent ones, which would mean the very transfer of the burden that Trump is asking for, but in forms that are not part of NATO.

The Hague Summit is being organized at a time when current geopolitics have been through a phase of a lot of uncertainty. Matters in Ukraine, such as the war entering year number four and NATO interpersonal debates on the subject of fiscal fairness and long-term burden sharing, are the issues that the summit is likely to deal with the most. The most expected themes for discussion include the alliance’s military support to Ukraine, the capabilities of advancing cyber and hybrid defense, the adjustment to new global power competition, and the restoration of unity within the alliance.

Even though officials from the Trump administration have shown their solidarity with Ukraine by stating that they will continuously provide material support, their approach remains centered on visible contributions and the return on the investment. The issue of the discussions at The Hague will most probably be finding a way to change and make military aid more solid and the beginning of the long-term integration of Ukraine into the Western defense frameworks, as well as the reinforcement of the deterrent posture along NATO’s eastern flank. This attitude has already started to change the internal dynamics of NATO decision-making. Member states, in such a situation, are trying out their options, and some are looking for stronger EU defense guarantees or bilateral partnerships, and others are going to the extreme of gaining the favor of Washington by increasing their expenditures or acquiring more defense from U.S. contractors. The pressure may yield short-term gains in spending but could prove corrosive in the long term by reducing trust and weakening the cohesion necessary for coordinated deterrence strategies.

Within NATO, President Trump has repeated calls for greater defense spending on the part of member nations, threatening that America might withdraw from the alliance if its allies do not fulfill financial commitments. Recently, he made a statement that if members “don’t pay their bills,” then he would “absolutely” withdraw from NATO. This stance has caused European nations to rapidly review their defense budgets and led to an increasing push for strategic autonomy among EU member states. Such situations could lead to disagreements concerning summit communiqués, the wording of final declarations, or even if to confirm those basic articles as Article 5 once more. If it is difficult for consensus to be reached, the summit can be like a festival of differences, which are able to be taken advantage of by the adversaries. Besides that, disagreement on the approach to global threats, for instance, on China or occurrences in the Indo-Pacific region, may block NATO’s strategic evolution and prevent its participation in those parts of the world where conflicts of interest will arise.

The summit also might be a major European initiative stage where visible leadership of the continent is given to some of the European Union members. States such as the Netherlands and Germany expect to demand stronger political commitments, while Central and Eastern European nations will require better security guarantees and more decisive action in response to Russian military escalation.

President Trump’s NATO policy resurrects a contentious but prevailing line of questioning within the alliance: who pays, and who benefits? While this emphasis on burden sharing has catalyzed long-needed changes in national defense spending, it also risks undermining the political basis on which NATO exists. The Hague Summit will need to reconcile these tensions and set the stage for a more robust and unified transatlantic security posture. Looking forward, NATO has to reinforce both mechanisms of fiscal transparency and collective strategic direction. NATO has to reconcile equitable contributions with an appreciation that security is not only a question of budgets. Political solidarity, institutional trust, and credible leadership are as important to deterrence as hardware. Above all, the summit must offer a clear vision for the next phase of the war in Ukraine. With the war grinding on and Russian forces intensifying operations, NATO cannot afford uncertainty. A concise, collective blueprint for long-term support, including logistics, infrastructure, and defense integration for Ukraine, will be critical to safeguarding European security.

Finally, the member states should use The Hague Summit as an opportunity to reaffirm NATO’s foundational role: not just as a defense alliance but also as a political community committed to peace, democracy, and the rule of law. Only by embracing both the material and moral dimensions of security can NATO adapt to meet the challenges of the next decade.

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