Pakistan

Islamabad, Pakistan – After three days, talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Istanbul, aimed at ending a tense and violent standoff between the South Asian neighbours, appeared to have hit a wall in Istanbul on Tuesday.

Mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, the negotiations followed an initial round of dialogue in Doha, which produced a temporary ceasefire on October 19 after a week of fighting that left dozens dead on both sides.

But even though officials and experts said that “last-ditch” efforts were expected to continue to try to pull the two countries back from a full-fledged conflict, the prospects of new hostilities between them loom large after their inability, so far, to build on the Doha truce, analysts say.

Pakistani security officials said that on Monday, talks went on for nearly 18 hours. But they accused the Afghan delegation of changing its position on Islamabad’s central demand – that Kabul crack down on the Pakistan Taliban armed group, known by the acronym TTP. One official, speaking to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the dialogue, alleged that the “instructions received from Kabul” for the Afghan team were complicating negotiations.

Kabul, however, blamed the Pakistani delegation for a “lack of coordination,” claiming the Pakistani side was “not presenting clear arguments” and kept “leaving the negotiating table”, Afghan media reported.

The Afghan team is being led by the deputy minister for administrative affairs at the Ministry of Interior, Haji Najib, while Pakistan has not publicly disclosed its representatives.

Recent cross-border attacks between the militaries of the two countries have killed multiple people, troops and civilians, and injured many more in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

United States President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly sought credit for resolving global conflicts, also waded in, saying he would “solve the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis very quickly”, while speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) summit in Malaysia earlier in the week.

Yet, any long-term settlement appears difficult due to the two nations’ “profound mutual distrust and conflicting priorities”, said Baqir Sajjad Syed, a former Pakistan fellow at the Wilson Center and a journalist who covers national security.

Syed added that their historical grievances and Pakistan’s past interventions in Afghanistan make concessions politically risky for the Afghan Taliban.

“In my view, the core issue is ideological alignment. The Afghan Taliban’s dependence on TTP for dealing with internal security problems [inside Afghanistan] makes it difficult for them to dissociate from the group, despite Pakistani concerns,” he told Al Jazeera.

A fraught friendship

Historically, Pakistan was long perceived as the primary patron of the Afghan Taliban. Many in Pakistan publicly welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 after the withdrawal of US forces.

But relations have sharply deteriorated since, largely over the TTP, an armed group that emerged in 2007 during the US-led so-called “war on terror”, and which has waged a long campaign against Islamabad.

The TTP seeks the release of its members imprisoned in Pakistan and opposes the merger of Pakistan’s former tribal areas into its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Although independent from the Afghan Taliban, the two groups are ideologically aligned.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of providing sanctuary not only to the TTP but to other groups, including the Balochistan Liberation Army and the ISIL (ISIS) affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP), charges Kabul denies.

The Afghan Taliban have insisted that the TTP is a Pakistani problem, repeatedly arguing that insecurity in Pakistan is a domestic matter. And the Taliban have themselves long viewed the ISKP as enemies.

Mullah Yaqoob, Afghanistan’s defence minister who signed the ceasefire in Doha with his Pakistani counterpart, Khawaja Asif, last week, said in an interview on October 19 that states sometimes used the label “terrorism” for political ends.

“There is no universal or clear definition of terrorism,” he said, adding that any government can brand its adversaries as “terrorists” for its own agenda.

Meanwhile, regional powers including Iran, Russia, China, and several Central Asian states have also urged the Taliban to eliminate the TTP and other armed groups allegedly operating from Afghanistan.

That appeal was renewed in Moscow in early October, in consultations also attended by Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi.

Rising toll, rising tensions

In recent days, several attacks have killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers, including officers.

The year 2024 was among Pakistan’s deadliest in nearly a decade, with more than 2,500 casualties recorded, and 2025 is on track to surpass that, analysts say.

Both civilians and security personnel have been targeted, with most attacks concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. TTP operations have increased sharply in both frequency and intensity.

“Our data show that the TTP engaged in at least 600 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the past year alone. Its activity in 2025 so far already exceeds that seen in all of 2024,” a recent Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) report said.

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, an Islamabad-based security analyst, says that Pakistani negotiators must recognise that ties between the Taliban and the TTP are rooted in ideology, making it hard for Afghanistan’s government to give up on the anti-Pakistan armed group.

Journalist Sami Yousafzai, a longtime observer of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, agreed, saying that the prospects of a détente now look increasingly remote.

Both Mehsud and Yousafzai pointed to the Taliban’s history of sticking by allies even in the face of international pressure, and even military assault.

“We have seen this same attitude from the Afghan Taliban in 2001, when, after the 9/11 attacks, they continued to remain steadfastly with Al al-Qaeda,” Mehsud said.

According to Yousafzai, “the Afghan Taliban are war veterans, and they can withstand military pressure”.

Failed diplomacy?

In recent months, both sides have pursued diplomacy, nudged also by China, which has mediated talks between them, in addition to Qatar and Turkiye.

Yet, analysts say Islamabad might soon conclude that it has few nonmilitary options to address its concerns.

Syed pointed to Pakistani Defence Minister Asif’s recent threat of an “open war” and said that these comments could presage targeted air strikes or cross-border operations against alleged TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

“That said, mediators, particularly Qatar and Turkiye, are expected to make a last-ditch push to revive dialogue or shift it to another venue. There is also a small possibility of other countries joining in, especially after President Trump’s latest signal of readiness to step in and de-escalate the crisis,” he said.

Syed said that economic incentives, including aid, in exchange for compliance with ceasefire provisions could be one way to get the neighbours to avoid a full-fledged military conflict.

This is a tool Trump has used in recent months in other wars, including in getting Thailand and Cambodia to stop fighting after border clashes. The US president oversaw the signing of a peace deal between the Southeast Asian nations in Kuala Lumpur last weekend.

Unintended consequences

While Pakistan has far superior military capabilities, the Taliban has advantages, too, say analysts, cautioning against overconfidence on the part of Islamabad.

Yousafzai argued that the crisis with Pakistan had helped bolster domestic support for the Taliban, and military action against it could further elevate sympathy for the group.

“The response by the Afghan Taliban of attacking the Pakistani military on [the] border was seen as a forceful response, increasing their popularity. And even if Pakistan continues to bomb, it could end up killing innocent civilians, leading to more resentment and anti-Pakistani sentiment in [the] public and among [the] Afghan Taliban,” he said.

This dynamic, according to Yousafzai, should be worrying for Islamabad, particularly if the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, steps in.

“If Akhunzada issues an edict, declaring Jihad against Pakistan, many young Afghans could potentially join the ranks of [the] Taliban,” Yousafzai warned. “Even if it will mean a bigger loss for Afghans, the situation will not be good for Pakistan.”

The only beneficiary, he said, would be the TTP, which will feel even more emboldened “to launch attacks against the Pakistani military”.

In the southwestern corner of Pakistan, where the Arabian Sea meets the rugged Makran coast, Gwadar Port stands as one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure projects in South Asia. Once a quiet fishing village, Gwadar is rapidly evolving into a global trade hub under the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The port’s transformation is not just about maritime logistics; it represents a broader economic vision linking China, Pakistan, and a wider network of countries stretching across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia.

At the heart of this transformation lies China’s investment in Gwadar’s deep-water port facilities. Strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil passes, Gwadar gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the long and vulnerable sea route through the Malacca Strait. This geographic advantage is key to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering the country a shorter and more secure trade path to the Middle East and Africa. For Pakistan, Gwadar is both an economic lifeline and a symbol of modernization, promising to uplift the impoverished Balochistan province through new industries, employment opportunities, and infrastructure development.

The China-Gwadar-Africa trade corridor, projected to create around 25,000 jobs and contribute up to 30% of Gwadar’s district GDP by 2027, underscores the scale of ambition behind CPEC. The port’s free zone expansion is already attracting manufacturing, logistics, and technology firms that view Gwadar as a cost-effective alternative to congested Middle Eastern ports. Chinese companies, through 2025 agreements with the Gwadar Port Authority, are investing in industrial parks, real estate developments, and energy projects aimed at turning the port into a self-sustaining economic ecosystem. These projects extend far beyond shipping; they’re setting the stage for an integrated trade hub that could reshape the economic geography of the region.

Infrastructure connectivity remains the backbone of Gwadar’s development. The construction of new highways, railway links, and power plants ensures that the port is not an isolated enclave but a vital node in the global supply chain. The planned rail corridor connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang province will cut transport time for goods significantly, allowing trade between western China and the Arabian Sea in under a week. Complementary projects, like the Gwadar International Airport, desalination plants, and solar energy stations, are also underway to support the city’s growing economic and population base. Together, these developments represent a holistic approach to urban and industrial planning that aligns with Pakistan’s long-term economic diversification goals.

The Gwadar Free Zone, now entering its second phase of expansion, is perhaps the clearest indicator of the port’s economic potential. Modeled after successful trade zones in Dubai and Singapore, the zone is expected to house over 400 companies from sectors ranging from petrochemicals and logistics to tourism and high-tech manufacturing. The fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, streamlined customs procedures, and energy subsidies are designed to attract both local and foreign investors. As Chinese and Pakistani firms collaborate on industrial and commercial ventures, the zone is emerging as a microcosm of regional economic integration.

Sustainability, often overlooked in large infrastructure projects, is also beginning to shape Gwadar’s future. One of the more innovative developments is the introduction of solar-powered fishing boats, designed to replace diesel-run vessels that pollute the coastline. Supported by Chinese firms and local cooperatives, these boats aim to improve the livelihoods of local fishermen while reducing carbon emissions. Such projects demonstrate how economic growth and environmental responsibility can coexist when supported by technology and policy alignment.

That said, Gwadar’s journey is not without challenges. Security concerns in Balochistan, bureaucratic delays, and local dissatisfaction over land use and employment distribution continue to shadow its progress. Critics argue that without more inclusive development, ensuring that the people of Gwadar directly benefit from the port’s success, the city risks becoming an enclave that serves external interests more than local ones. Transparency in agreements, fair labor practices, and reinvestment in local education and healthcare will be crucial to maintaining social stability and long-term sustainability.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, Gwadar’s rise introduces new dynamics into the Indian Ocean trade landscape. It competes indirectly with regional ports like Chabahar in Iran (developed with Indian support) and Dubai’s Jebel Ali, both seeking to maintain their relevance in global shipping routes. For China, Gwadar enhances its strategic footprint in the Arabian Sea, complementing its investments in East Africa’s ports like Mombasa and Djibouti. For Pakistan, it’s a chance to transform from a transit economy into a trading powerhouse, leveraging its geography rather than being constrained by it.

The real measure of Gwadar’s success will depend on how effectively it integrates with surrounding economies and global trade networks. If managed wisely, the port could help rebalance Pakistan’s trade profile, attract foreign investment, and serve as a catalyst for industrial modernization. But its development must remain inclusive, transparent, and environmentally responsible to ensure that the benefits of CPEC reach beyond the port’s fences and into the lives of ordinary Pakistanis.

In essence, Gwadar Port is not merely a logistical project; it’s a statement of intent. It reflects Pakistan’s aspirations to join the ranks of regional trade powers and China’s ambition to secure diversified trade routes. As CPEC matures, Gwadar’s success will likely be judged not only by the volume of goods passing through its docks but also by the depth of prosperity it generates across borders and communities.

Recommendations

• Prioritize local employment and vocational training to ensure Baloch communities benefit directly.
• Strengthen environmental management through renewable energy initiatives and waste control.
• Enhance port security and digital surveillance for safe and efficient operations.
• Encourage public-private partnerships to diversify investment beyond China.
• Fast-track railway and power infrastructure to improve trade connectivity.
• Implement transparent governance and community engagement programs.
• Promote sustainable fisheries and ecotourism to complement trade growth.
• Align Gwadar’s development with Pakistan’s national logistics policy for long-term coherence.
• Foster maritime innovation through research centers and green port technologies.

Fighting comes as Taliban submits proposal at Pakistan-Afghanistan talks in Turkiye, while Islamabad warns of ‘open war’ if deal fails.

Fresh clashes near the border with Afghanistan have killed at least five Pakistani soldiers and 25 fighters, Pakistan’s army says, even as the two countries hold peace talks in Istanbul.

The Pakistani military said armed men attempted to cross from Afghanistan into Kurram and North Waziristan on Friday and Saturday, accusing the Taliban authorities of failing to act against armed groups operating from Afghan territory.

It said on Sunday that the attempted infiltrations raised questions over Kabul’s commitment to tackling “terrorism emanating from its soil”.

Afghanistan’s Taliban government has not commented on the latest clashes, but has repeatedly rejected accusations of harbouring armed fighters and instead accuses Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty with air strikes.

Delegations from both countries arrived in Istanbul, Turkiye on Saturday for talks aimed at preventing a return to full-scale conflict. The meeting comes days after Qatar and Turkiye brokered a ceasefire in Doha to halt the most serious border fighting since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021.

The violence earlier this month killed dozens and wounded hundreds.

‘Open war’

Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said the ceasefire remains intact and that Kabul appears interested in peace, but warned that failure in Istanbul would leave Islamabad with “open war” as an option.

Pakistan’s military described those involved in the weekend infiltrations as members of what it calls “Fitna al-Khwarij”, a term it uses for ideologically motivated armed groups allegedly backed by foreign sponsors.

United States President Donald Trump also weighed in on Sunday, saying he would “solve the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis very quickly”, telling reporters on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia that he had been briefed on the ongoing talks.

Separately, Taliban-controlled broadcaster RTA said on Sunday that Kabul’s delegation in Turkiye had submitted a proposal after more than 15 hours of discussions, calling for Pakistan to end cross-border strikes and block any “anti-Afghan group” from using its territory.

The Afghan side also signalled openness to a four-party monitoring mechanism to supervise the ceasefire and investigate violations.

Afghanistan’s delegation is led by Deputy Interior Minister Haji Najib. Pakistan has not publicly disclosed its representatives.

Analysts expect the core of the talks to revolve around intelligence-sharing, allowing Islamabad to hand over coordinates of suspected Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters for the Taliban to take direct action, instead of Pakistan launching its own strikes.

Pakistan seems to have caught the geopolitical winds just right. Last month, Pakistan signed a defence agreement with Saudi Arabia. Under this bold pact, an attack on one will be regarded as an attack on both, a dramatic escalation of security guarantees in a region already crowded with rivalries. At the same time, Islamabad has quietly dispatched rare earth mineral samples to the United States and is exploring deeper export agreements. Washington, for its part, appears newly interested in treating Pakistan as more than a peripheral irritant.

These moves suggest momentum. Commentators in Islamabad and Riyadh call it a renaissance of Pakistani foreign policy, a belated recognition of the country’s strategic indispensability. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s presence at the Gaza peace summit only reinforced the impression of a nation returning to centre stage in the Muslim world.

But this is no overnight miracle. It is the product of necessity, pressure and shifting alignments in a volatile region. Behind the optics lie harder realities.

The first driver of Pakistan’s foreign policy push is the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Washington’s abrupt exit left a vacuum it still struggles to fill. With a hostile Iran and an entrenched Taliban, the US needs a counterweight in the region. Pakistan, with its geography, intelligence networks and long entanglement in Afghan affairs, suddenly matters again.

US President Donald Trump’s demand that the Taliban hand over the Bagram airbase, five years after signing the deal that paved the way for the US withdrawal, underscores America’s search for leverage. If that gambit fails, Pakistan becomes the obvious fallback: the only state with both logistical capacity and political connections to help Washington maintain a presence in the region.

The second factor is the uneasy US-India relationship. Over the past decade, Washington has drawn New Delhi deeper into its Indo-Pacific strategy, strengthening its global profile in ways Pakistan sees as threatening. Yet US-India friction has grown. Disputes over visas and tariffs have festered. India’s embrace of Moscow has raised eyebrows in Washington.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s August visit to Beijing sent a clear signal that India is willing to hedge its bets with China. Economically, his “Make in India” programme, modelled on East Asia’s low-cost export strategies, could undercut US manufacturing. For Trump, eager to maintain balance in Asia, Pakistan appears useful again as a counterweight to India’s flirtations with Beijing.

The third and most precarious driver is mineral diplomacy. Islamabad’s outreach to Washington centres on promises of access to rare earth minerals, many of which are located in the restive region of Balochistan. On paper, this looks like a win-win: Pakistan gains investment, and the US secures critical resources. But the reality is darker. Balochistan remains Pakistan’s poorest province despite decades of extraction. Infrastructure projects stand underused, airports lie empty and unemployment remains stubbornly high.

The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025, passed by the provincial legislature in March, has only deepened discontent. Under the act, Islamabad is formally empowered to recommend mining policies and licensing decisions in Balochistan, a move that has provoked opposition across the political spectrum. Critics argue it undermines provincial autonomy and recentralises control in Islamabad. Even right-wing religious parties, such as the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F), seldom aligned with nationalist groups, have expressed opposition, portraying the law as yet another attempt to dispossess local communities of their rightful stake in the province’s resources.

This backlash underscores a dangerous trend. Resource exploitation without local participation fuels resentment and insurgency. By opening mineral wealth to foreign investors without social safeguards, Islamabad risks deepening the alienation of a province already scarred by conflict and militarisation. What looks like salvation in Islamabad can look like dispossession in Quetta.

Taken together, these drivers show that Pakistan’s foreign policy shift is less a renaissance than a calculated pivot under pressure. The Afghan vacuum, the recalibration of US-India ties and the lure of mineral diplomacy all explain Islamabad’s newfound prominence. But none erases underlying fragilities. Washington may once again treat Pakistan as disposable when its priorities change. India’s weight in US strategy is not going away. And Balochistan’s grievances will only deepen if resource deals remain extractive and exclusionary.

The applause in Riyadh, the visibility at the Gaza summit and the polite handshakes in Washington should not be mistaken for a strategic rebirth. Pakistan is manoeuvring carefully, improvising under pressure and seeking to turn vulnerabilities into opportunities. But the real test lies at home. Unless Islamabad can confront governance failures, regional inequalities and political mistrust, foreign policy gains will remain fragile.

In the end, no defence pact or minerals deal can substitute for a stable social contract within Pakistan itself. That is the true renaissance Pakistan still awaits.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Defence minister’s warning comes as countries hold talks in Istanbul to consolidate last week’s Doha ceasefire.

Officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan have met in Istanbul for talks on how to ensure a recent ceasefire deal between the two countries holds, with the Pakistani defence minister warning of “open war” should the efforts fail.

The discussions, which began on Saturday and are expected to continue on Sunday, come just days after a truce was brokered in Doha by Qatar and Turkiye to end deadly clashes between the neighbours. The cross-border violence killed dozens of people and injured hundreds more.

“We have the option, if no agreement takes place, we have an open war with them,” Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said from the eastern Pakistani city of Sialkot on Saturday.

“But I saw that they want peace,” he added.

Reporting from Istanbul, Al Jazeera’s Sinem Koseoglu said the “technical-level talks” in Turkiye are expected “to pave the way for a permanent solution between the two neighbours”.

While Afghanistan’s Deputy Interior Minister Haji Najib is leading his country’s delegation in Turkiye, Pakistan has not given details about its representatives.

On Friday, a spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the negotiations must address “the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil towards Pakistan”.

Pakistan has accused Afghanistan of harbouring what it calls “terrorist groups”, including the Pakistani Taliban (TPP). Kabul denies the allegation and has blamed Islamabad for violating its sovereignty through military strikes.

Key crossings between the countries remain shut following the recent fighting, with Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimating that traders are losing millions of dollars each day that the closure persists.

Ibraheem Bahiss, an International Crisis Group analyst in Afghanistan, told the AFP news agency that a key topic of discussion during the Istanbul talks would be intelligence-sharing on armed groups.

“For example, Pakistan would give coordinates of where they suspect TTP fighters or commanders are, and instead of carrying out strikes, Afghanistan would be expected to carry out action against them,” he said.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire that was announced in Doha last Sunday continues to hold.

“There has been no major full-scale terrorist attack emanating from Afghan soil in the last two to three days,” Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson Tahir Andrabi said.

“So, the Doha talks and outcome were fruitful. We would like the trend to continue in Istanbul and post-Istanbul.”

Pakistan’s diplomatic playbook for 2025 is shifting noticeably toward trade, sustainability, and the projection of soft power. Gone are the days when foreign policy revolved solely around security concerns or aid dependency. The country’s recent economic and diplomatic maneuvers suggest a clear intent to rebrand itself as a credible, reform-driven partner focused on growth, responsibility, and engagement. From seafood export approvals by the US to partnerships with France and major development financing commitments, Pakistan’s narrative is evolving, and for once, it’s a story of initiative rather than reaction.

The US government’s decision to extend Pakistan’s seafood export approval until 2029 is a quiet but significant achievement. The deal, worth roughly $600 million annually, underscores two critical things: the growing confidence in Pakistan’s sustainability standards and the country’s ability to meet global compliance norms. For years, Pakistani exporters have faced barriers due to outdated infrastructure and quality control issues. Now, improved regulations and environmental monitoring seem to be paying off. This approval not only secures a steady stream of revenue but also signals that Pakistani industries are capable of aligning with Western ecological and safety benchmarks, something that can serve as a model for other export sectors.

In a similar spirit, the Punjab government’s recent memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with France mark another leap toward deepening provincial and international trade ties. France’s interest in Pakistan’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) reveals confidence in the country’s industrial potential. For Punjab, the partnership could attract sustainable technologies, investment in renewable energy, and expertise in urban development. It also decentralizes diplomacy, shifting some of the engagement from federal corridors to proactive provincial actors, an approach that could make economic cooperation nimbler and more region-specific.

At the macro level, multilateral institutions are showing renewed faith in Pakistan’s economic reforms. The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) have jointly pledged a staggering $40 billion for development and private sector growth. This isn’t charity; it’s a bet on Pakistan’s capacity to absorb and utilize global capital effectively. The World Bank’s concessional loans, particularly targeting education and climate resilience, fit neatly into Pakistan’s national development goals. Meanwhile, the IFC’s $20 billion allocation to the private sector and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) speaks to an evolving understanding that long-term economic health depends on entrepreneurial vitality rather than government-led expansion alone.

Domestically, the banking sector is mirroring this new wave of confidence. The Bank of Punjab, for instance, has reported record profits, reflecting a resilient financial system despite broader global headwinds. A profitable and stable banking environment is a prerequisite for sustained trade diplomacy; it assures foreign investors that local institutions are capable of managing large inflows and transactions transparently. When financial institutions thrive alongside industrial and export sectors, it sends a reassuring message to international partners that Pakistan’s growth is not a temporary surge but a maturing cycle.

But economic diplomacy alone doesn’t build soft power. What sets Pakistan’s recent approach apart is the coupling of trade initiatives with cultural and environmental diplomacy. The government’s efforts to promote interfaith harmony, expand cultural exchanges, and invest in green infrastructure reflect a broader understanding of influence in the modern era. Soft power, after all, isn’t about dominance; it’s about attraction. Pakistan’s reforestation programs, ecotourism initiatives, and partnerships in climate resilience not only improve its environmental record but also enhance its moral credibility on the global stage. These projects project a vision of Pakistan as a responsible global citizen, one that contributes to shared planetary goals rather than merely negotiating for its own interests.

Tourism, too, plays a key role in this narrative. The revival of heritage sites, promotion of religious tourism for Sikh and Buddhist pilgrims, and international film collaborations are creating a gentler, more relatable image of Pakistan abroad. These cultural bridges complement trade diplomacy by humanizing the country in the eyes of investors and tourists alike. They help replace outdated stereotypes with more nuanced perceptions of a nation that’s young, creative, and striving for balance between tradition and modernity.

This pivot toward soft power and trade diplomacy is not accidental; it’s strategic. Pakistan seems to recognize that credibility in global markets depends not just on economic incentives but on the consistency of reform and image. The focus on sustainability and governance reforms aims to reduce dependency on loans and shift toward mutually beneficial trade partnerships. In doing so, Pakistan positions itself not as a passive recipient of aid but as a contributor to global growth.

Critically, these moves also reflect a certain self-awareness. The emphasis on sustainability, whether in fisheries, industry, or climate policy, acknowledges that the old model of extractive growth is no longer viable. Similarly, engaging institutions like the World Bank and IFC shows that Pakistan understands the importance of credibility and transparency in attracting international capital. Trade diplomacy, when backed by responsible domestic governance and inclusive growth, becomes more than an economic tactic; it turns into a long-term strategy for stability and respect.

That said, this strategy will need to be carefully managed. The challenge isn’t just to secure deals but to ensure they deliver equitable benefits. For instance, trade approvals and foreign investments must be accompanied by support for small exporters, labor reforms, and environmental safeguards. Otherwise, the benefits will stay concentrated among elites, undermining the very soft power Pakistan seeks to build. Likewise, diplomatic capital must not be squandered on short-term optics or domestic political point-scoring. Consistency, patience, and institutional continuity will determine whether this new vision can endure.

In many ways, Pakistan’s 2025 diplomacy embodies a pragmatic realism. It doesn’t reject global partnerships or rely excessively on one bloc. Instead, it seeks balance between East and West, between economic pragmatism and moral purpose. By intertwining trade with culture, sustainability, and finance, the country is sketching the contours of a diplomacy that’s as much about persuasion as negotiation. And in a fragmented world increasingly defined by narratives rather than alliances, that’s a powerful pivot.

Recommendations

·       Establish specialized trade diplomacy desks in embassies to promote sectoral exports, green investment, and SME partnerships.

·       Strengthen provincial economic offices abroad to attract investors in key sectors like textiles, agri-tech, and renewable energy.

·       Implement domestic policies for export diversification and improve digital trade facilitation to empower smaller producers.

·       Expand cultural diplomacy programs, including art, film, sports, and education exchanges, to enhance people-to-people connections and global goodwill.

·       Ensure policy consistency and transparency across all levels of government to solidify Pakistan’s reputation as a credible, reform-driven partner in global trade and diplomacy.

Growing up in Rawalpindi, a city adjacent to Pakistan’s capital Islamabad, Mahnoor Omer remembers the shame and anxiety she felt in school when she had periods. Going to the toilet with a sanitary pad was an act of stealth, like trying to cover up a crime.

“I used to hide my pad up my sleeve like I was taking narcotics to the bathroom,” says Omer, who comes from a middle-class family – her father a businessman and her mother a homemaker. “If someone talked about it, teachers would put you down.” A classmate once told her that her mother considered pads “a waste of money”.

“That’s when it hit me,” says Omer. “If middle-class families think this way, imagine how out of reach these products are for others.”

Now 25, Omer has gone from cautious schoolgirl to national centrestage in a battle that could reshape menstrual hygiene in Pakistan, a country where critics say economics is compounding social stigma to punish women – simply for being women.

In September, Omer, a lawyer, petitioned the Lahore High Court, challenging what she and many others say is effectively a “period tax” imposed by Pakistan on its more than 100 million women.

Pakistani governments have, under the Sales Tax Act of 1990, long charged an 18 percent sales tax on locally manufactured sanitary pads and a customs tax of 25 percent on imported ones, as well as on raw materials needed to make them. Add on other local taxes, and UNICEF Pakistan says that these pads are often effectively taxed at about 40 percent.

Omer’s petition argues that these taxes – which specifically affect women – are discriminatory, and violate a series of constitutional provisions that guarantee equality and dignity, elimination of exploitation and the promotion of social justice.

In a country where menstruation is already a taboo subject in most families, Omer and other lawyers and activists supporting the petition say that the taxes make it even harder for most Pakistani women to access sanitary products. A standard pack of commercially branded sanitary pads in Pakistan currently costs about 450 rupees ($1.60) for 10 pieces. In a country with a per capita income of $120 a month, that’s the cost of a meal of rotis and dal for a low-income family of four. Cut the cost by 40 percent – the taxes – and the calculations become less loaded against sanitary pads.

At the moment, only 12 percent of Pakistani women use commercially produced sanitary pads, according to a 2024 study by UNICEF and the WaterAid nonprofit. The rest improvise using cloth or other materials, and often do not even have access to clean water to wash themselves.

“If this petition goes forward, it’s going to make pads affordable,” says Hira Amjad, the founder and executive director of Dastak Foundation, a Pakistani nonprofit whose work is focused on promoting gender equality and combating violence against women.

And that, say lawyers and activists, could serve as a spark for broader social change.

The court docket describes the case as Mahnoor Omer against senior officials of the government of Pakistan. But that’s not what it feels like to Omer.

“It feels like women versus Pakistan.”

‘It’s not shameful’

Bushra Mahnoor, founder of Mahwari Justice, a Pakistani student-led organisation whose name translates to “menstrual justice”, realised early just how much of a struggle it could be to access sanitary pads.

Mahnoor – no relation to Omer – grew up in Attock, a city in the northwestern part of Pakistan’s Punjab province, with four sisters. “Every month, I had to check if there were enough pads. If my period came when one of my sisters had hers too,” finding a pad was a challenge, she says.

The struggle continued in school, where, as was the case with Omer, periods were associated with shame. A teacher once made one of her classmates stand for two entire lectures because her white uniform was stained. “That was dehumanising,” she says.

Mahnoor was 10 when she had her first period. “I didn’t know how to use a pad. I stuck it upside down; the sticky side touched my skin. It was painful. No one tells you how to manage it.”

She says that shame was never hers alone, but it’s part of a silence which starts at home and accompanies girls into adulthood. A study on menstrual health in Pakistan shows that eight out of 10 girls feel embarrassed or uncomfortable when talking about periods, and two out of three girls report never having received information about menstruation before it began. The findings, published in the Frontiers in Public Health journal in 2023, link this silence to poor hygiene, social exclusion and missed school days.

In 2022, when floods devastated Pakistan, Mahnoor began Mahwari Justice to ensure that relief camps did not overlook the menstrual needs of women. “We began distributing pads and later realised there’s so much more to be done,” she says. Her organisation has distributed more than 100,000 period kits – each containing pads, soap, underwear, detergent and painkillers – and created rap songs and comics to normalise conversations about menstruation. “When you say the word ‘mahwari’ out loud, you’re teaching people it’s not shameful,” she says. “It’s just life.”

The same floods also influenced Amjad, the Dastak Foundation founder, though her nonprofit has been around for a decade now. Its work now also includes distributing period kits during natural disasters.

But the social stigma associated with menstruation is also closely tied to economics in the ways in which its impact plays out for Pakistani women, suggests Amjad.

“In most households, it’s the men who make financial decisions,” she says. “Even if the woman is bringing the money, she’s giving it to the man, and he is deciding where that money needs to go.”

And if the cost of women’s health feels too high, that’s often compromised. “[With] the inflated prices due to the tax, there is no conversation in many houses about whether we should buy pads,” she says. “It’s an expense they cannot afford organically.”

According to the 2023 study in the Frontiers in Public Health, over half of Pakistani women are not able to afford sanitary pads.

If the taxes are removed, and menstrual hygiene becomes more affordable, the benefits will extend beyond health, says Amjad.

School attendance rates for girls could improve, she said. Currently, more than half of Pakistan’s girls in the five to 16 age group are not in school, according to the United Nations. “We will have stress-free women. We will have happier and healthier women.”

‘Feeling of justice’

Omer says her interest in women’s and minority rights began early. “What inspired me was just seeing the blatant mistreatment every day,” she says. “The economic, physical, and verbal exploitation that women face, whether it’s on the streets, in the media, or inside homes, never sat right with me.”

She credits her mother for making her grow up to be an empathetic and understanding person.

After completing school, she worked as a gender and criminal justice consultant at Crossroads Consultants, a Pakistan-based firm that collaborates with NGOs and development partners on gender and criminal justice reform. At the age of 19, she also volunteered at Aurat March, an annual women’s rights movement and protest held across Pakistan on International Women’s Day – it’s a commitment she has kept up since then.

Her first step into activism came at 16, when she and her friends started putting together “dignity kits”, small care packages for women in low-income neighbourhoods of Islamabad. “We would raise funds with bake sales or use our own money,” she recalls.

The money she was able to raise enabled her to distribute about 300 dignity kits that she and her friends made themselves. They each contained pads, underwear, pain medication and wipes. But she wanted to do more.

She got a chance when she started working at the Supreme Court in early 2025, first as a law clerk. She’s currently pursuing postgraduate studies in gender, peace and security at the London School of Economics and says that she will go back to Pakistan to resume her practice after she graduates.

She became friends with fellow lawyer Ahsan Jehangir Khan, who specialises in taxation and constitutional law. The plan to challenge the “period tax” emerged from their conversations.

“He pushed me to file this petition and try to get justice instead of just sitting around.”

Khan, who is a co-petitioner in the case, says that fighting the taxes is about more than accessibility and affordability of sanitary pads – it’s about justice. “It’s a tax on a biological function,” he says.

Tax policies in Pakistan, he says, are written by “a privileged elite, mostly men who have never had to think about what this tax means for ordinary women”. The constitution, he adds, “is very clear that you cannot have anything discriminatory against any gender whatsoever”.

To Amjad, the Dastak Foundation founder, the fight for menstrual hygiene is closely tied to her other passion – the struggle against climate change. The extreme weather-related crisis, such as floods, that Pakistan has faced in recent times, she says, hit women particularly hard.

She remembers the trauma many women she worked with after the 2022 floods described to her. “Imagine that you are living in a tent and you have mahwari [menstruation] for the first time,” she says. “You are not mentally prepared for it. You are running for your life. You don’t have access to safety or security. That trauma is a trauma for life.”

As temperatures rise on average, women will need to change sanitary pads more frequently during their periods – and a lack of adequate access will prove an even bigger problem, Amjad warns. She supports the withdrawal of taxes on sanitary pads – but only those made from cotton, not plastic ones that “take thousands of years to decompose”.

Amjad is also campaigning for paid menstruation leave. “I have come across women who were fired because they had pain during periods and couldn’t work,” she says. “When you are menstruating, one part of your brain is on menstruation. You can’t really focus properly.”

Meanwhile, opponents of the taxes are hoping that Omer’s petition will pressure the Pakistani government to follow other nations such as India, Nepal and the United Kingdom that have abolished their period taxes.

Taking on that mantle against the government’s policies didn’t come easily to Omer. Her parents, she says, were nervous at first about their daughter going to court against the government. “They said it’s never a good idea to take on the state,” she says.

Now, they’re proud of her, she says. “They understand why this matters.”

To her, the case is not just a legal fight. “When I think of this case, the picture that comes to mind … It’s not a courtroom, it’s a feeling of justice,” she says. “It makes me feel a sense of pride to be able to do this and take this step without fear.”

Maharaj, Harmer star with the ball as hosts are bowled out for 138, setting South Africa 68 to win the second Test.

South Africa have romped to an eight-wicket win over Pakistan on the fourth day of the second cricket Test in Rawalpindi, claiming victory before lunch to level the two-match series.

The home side were dismissed cheaply in the opening hour, collapsing from 94-4 overnight to be all out for 138 on Thursday.

South Africa then took 12.3 overs to reach the 68-run target with captain Aiden Markram scoring 42 before being trapped leg before wicket by Noman Ali, four runs from victory.

Tristan Stubbs was caught in the slips in the same over without scoring, leaving Ryan Rickelton (25 not out) and Tony de Zorzi, who did not face a ball, to complete the job.

It was the 11th win in 12 Tests for South Africa, with the only blemish their 93-run loss to Pakistan in last week’s first match of the series in Lahore.

“There were moments where guys had to put their hands up and stand up for the team and they really did that and excelled in that. It took a lot of confidence and a lot of belief from wins, but when your character’s tested and you managed to come out on the right side, I think that means quite a bit more,” said Markram.

Simon Harmer took 6-50 as Pakistan collapsed with fellow spinner Keshav Maharaj adding two more wickets to the seven he took in the first innings.

Pakistan lost their last six wickets for 44 runs to continue their trend of lower-order slumps despite starting the day with high hopes.

They needed a major contribution from star batsman Babar Azam, whose appearance at the stumps throughout the series saw a sudden spike in spectators and a noticeable increase in excited noise from the stands.

Babar, however, has not scored a century in his last 15 Tests since 161 against New Zealand in Karachi in December 2022.

He was on 49 overnight, sharing a 34-run partnership with Mohammad Rizwan that held out promise of getting Pakistan back into the contest with six wickets in hand and a 23-run lead.

But after going to his 50 with a single off the second ball of the morning, the 31-year-old Babar was trapped leg before wicket by Harmer in the first over.

After that, the home innings came tumbling down like a pack of cards as the 36-year-old Harmer, who has had a long career in county cricket in England but only 12 test appearances, bagged his first five-wicket haul in test cricket.

He had Rizwan caught at short leg for 18 and then Noman Ali nicked behind without scoring to mark a 1,000th first-class wicket.

“We have a lot to work on,” said home captain Shan Masood, “when it comes to lower order batting, when it comes to finishing the innings off, when it comes to the third innings of batting, also when it comes to the first innings where we could have posted something north of 400 but we didn’t.”

Narcotics worth more than $972m seized in two separate operations carried out within 48 hours.

The Pakistani navy, operating as part of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), has seized nearly $1bn worth of narcotics from two vessels sailing through the Arabian Sea.

The CMF, the naval network overseeing the operation, said in a statement on Wednesday that last week, the Pakistani navy intercepted the dhows in two separate operations over 48 hours and seized narcotics worth more than $972m.

The crew boarded the first dhow and seized more than 2 tonnes of “crystal methamphetamine (ICE) with an estimated street value of $822,400,000” on October 18, the CMF said in a statement.

“Less than 48 hours later, the crew boarded a second dhow and seized 350 kg of ICE worth $140,000,000, and 50 kg of cocaine worth $10,000,000.”

The CMF did not provide further details on where the vessels originated, but added that they were identified “as having no nationality”.

U.S. Central Command congratulates the Saudi-led Combined Task Force 150 of Combined Maritime Forces for successfully seizing more than $972 million worth of narcotics. Over a 48-hour period, Pakistan Navy Ship Yarmook conducted boarding operations of two dhows in the Arabian…

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) October 21, 2025

The operations were conducted in direct support of a Saudi-led Combined Task Force 150, which said “the success of this focused operation highlights the importance of the multi-national collaboration”.

It was “one of the most successful narcotics seizures for CMF”, said Saudi Arabian navy’s Commodore Fahad Aljoiad, commander of the CMF task force carrying out the operation.

The CMF is a 47-nation naval partnership tasked with inspecting more than 3.2 million square miles (about 829 million hectares) of waters, including some of the world’s most important shipping lanes, to prevent smuggling, the statement added.

In a separate statement, the Pakistani navy said the achievement highlighted its “unwavering commitment to regional maritime security, global peace, and the collective fight against illicit trafficking at sea”.

Islamabad, Pakistan – Allah Meer’s parents were among the millions of Afghans who fled their country after the then-Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

His family settled in a refugee village in Kohat in northwestern Pakistan. That’s where Meer, now 45, was born. Meer says that more than 200 members of his extended family made the journey from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which has been their home ever since.

Over the past two years, as Pakistan has moved to send back hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, the family has feared for its future, but managed to evade Islamabad’s dragnet.

Last week, the threat of expulsion hit home: Pakistan announced it would close all 54 Afghan refugee villages across the country as part of the campaign it began in 2023 to push out what it calls “illegal foreigners”. These include the villages in Kohat, where Meer and his family live.

“In my life, I visited Afghanistan only once, for two weeks in 2013. Apart from that, none of my family have ever gone back,” Meer told Al Jazeera. “How can I uproot everything when we were born here, lived here, married here, and buried our loved ones here?”

Amid heightened tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, which returned to governing Afghanistan in 2021, families like Meer’s are caught in a vortex of uncertainty.

Fighting erupted between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border earlier in October, pushing already strained relations into open hostility. On Sunday, officials from both sides met in Qatar’s capital, Doha, and signed a ceasefire agreement, with the next round of talks scheduled in Istanbul on October 25.

Yet, tensions remain high. And families like Meer’s fear that they could become diplomatic pawns in a border war between the neighbours.

From welcome to expulsion

Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As civil war gripped Afghanistan and the Taliban first rose to power in 1996, successive waves of Afghans fled across the border.

After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 following the September 11 attacks on the US, the Taliban’s fall prompted thousands of Afghans to return home. But their return was short-lived.

The Taliban’s stunning comeback in August 2021 triggered yet another exodus, when another 600,000 to 800,000 Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan.

However, as relations between Kabul and Islamabad soured during the past four years, Pakistan – which was once the Taliban’s principal patron  – accused Afghanistan of harbouring armed groups responsible for the cross-border attacks. The government’s stance hardened towards Afghan refugees, even those who have lived in the country for decades – like Meer.

A father of 10, Meer earned a degree in education from a university in Peshawar, and now runs a vocational training project for Afghan refugee children backed by the United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR.

Since 2006, the UNHCR has issued what are known as Proof of Registration (PoR) cards to document Afghan citizens living in Pakistan. These cards have allowed them to stay in Pakistan legally, giving them some freedom of movement, although this is restricted, as well as access to some public services, including bank accounts.

But from June 30 this year, the Pakistani government has stopped renewing PoR cards and has invalidated existing ones.

“We all possess the UNHCR-issued Proof of Residence cards, but now, with this current drive, I don’t know what will happen,” Meer said.

In 2017, Pakistan also started issuing Afghan Citizenship Cards (ACC) to undocumented Afghan nationals living in the country, giving them identification credentials to provide them with a temporary legal status.

But the ACC is not a protection against deportation any more.

According to the UNHCR, more than 1.5 million Afghans left Pakistan – voluntarily or forcibly – between the start of the campaign in 2023 and mid-October, 2025.

‘Illegal in our home’

About 1.2 million PoR cardholders, 737,000 ACC holders and 115,000 asylum seekers  remain in Pakistan, Qaiser Khan Afridi, the UNHCR’s spokesperson in Pakistan, told Al Jazeera.

Pakistan’s tensions with the Taliban have added new precarity to their status.

“For over 45 years, Pakistan has shown extraordinary generosity by hosting millions of Afghan refugees,” Afridi said. “But we are deeply concerned by the government’s decision to de-notify refugee villages all over Pakistan and to push for returns [to Afghanistan].”

“Many of those affected have lived here for years, and now fear for their future. We urge that any return should be voluntary, gradual, and carried out with dignity and safety.”

Meer, who has volunteered for the UNHCR over the years, said that seven refugee villages in Kohat alone house more than 100,000 people. He accused both Pakistan and Afghanistan of using the refugee issue as political leverage.

“With the latest situation, our family elders have sat together to discuss options. We thought about sending some of our young men to Afghanistan to look for houses and means to do business, but the problem is, we have no connections there at all,” he said.

With his PoR card now invalidated by the Pakistani government, he has no recognised identity card, making it hard for him to access even medical facilities when his children need treatment for any illness.

“We are, for all practical purposes, considered illegal in a country that I and my children call home,” he said.

Caught between borders

Pakistan’s plan to expel Afghan residents began in late 2023, amid a rise in rebe attacks. Since then, violence has surged, with 2025 shaping up to be the most violent year in a decade.

Pakistani authorities argue Afghan refugees pose a security risk, accusing the Taliban government of sheltering armed groups, a charge Kabul denies.

Two years ago, Pakistan’s then interior minister, Sarfraz Bugti, alleged that 14 out of 24 suicide bombings in the country in 2023 were carried out by Afghan nationals. He did not provide any evidence to back his claim, and he did not clarify if the individuals were refugees living in Pakistan, or Afghan nationals who had crossed the porous border between the two countries.

But Meer fears that Afghan refugees in Pakistan will be distrusted back in Afghanistan, too, given the climate of animosity between the neighbours.

“We will be seen as Pakistanis, as enemies there, too,” he said.

Afridi, the UNHCR spokesperson, urged Pakistan to reconsider its repatriation drive.

“UNHCR calls on the government to apply measures to exempt Afghans with international protection needs from involuntary return,” he said.

“Pakistan has a proud history of hospitality, and it’s important to continue that tradition at this critical time,” he said.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to an “immediate ceasefire” after a week of deadly clashes along their border, as the ties between the two South Asian neighbours plunged to their lowest point since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

Both countries agreed to stop fighting and work towards “lasting peace and stability” after peace talks in Doha, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Sunday, about the deal it mediated alongside Turkiye.

Dozens of people have been killed and hundreds wounded in the worst bout of violence in recent years. The violence erupted on October 11 at multiple fronts along their 2,600km (1,600-mile) border, after Islamabad allegedly carried out strikes in Kabul and the southeastern province of Paktika against what it said were armed groups linked to attacks inside Pakistan.

So, what do we know about the truce agreement and what might come next?

What do we know about the ceasefire?

After a round of negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Qatari capital, Doha, “the two sides agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries,” Qatar’s Foreign Ministry announced in a statement.

“The two parties also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in the coming days to ensure the sustainability of the ceasefire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner, thus contributing to achieving security and stability in both countries,” the statement added.

Following the Qatari ministry’s statement, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif posted confirmation of the deal on X.

“Cross-border terrorism from Afghan territory will cease immediately,” Asif wrote. “Both countries will respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Asif further confirmed a “follow-up meeting between the delegations is scheduled to take place in the Turkish city of Istanbul on October 25 to discuss the matters in detail.”

Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the truce was “the first step in the right direction”.

“We look forward to the establishment of a concrete and verifiable monitoring mechanism, in the next meeting to be hosted by Turkiye, to address the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil towards Pakistan. It is important to put all efforts in place to prevent any further loss of lives,” he posted on X.

Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson, said that under the terms of the agreement, “both sides reaffirm their commitment to peace, mutual respect, and the maintenance of strong and constructive neighbourly relations.

“Both sides are committed to resolving issues and disputes through dialogue,” Mujahid said in a post on X. “It has been decided that neither country will undertake any hostile actions against the other, nor will they support groups carrying out attacks against the Government of Pakistan.”

Mujahid said the countries have agreed on refraining “from targeting each other’s security forces, civilians, or critical infrastructure”.

Mujahid, as well as Dar and Asif, thanked Qatar and Turkiye for their role in facilitating the talks that led to the ceasefire.

Why Pakistan has blamed the Taliban for attacks inside its territory?

Pakistan wants the Taliban to rein in armed groups such as the Taliban Pakistan, known by the acronym TTP, and others blamed for carrying out attacks on its territory. Armed attacks by TTP rebels and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which operates in the resource-rich Balochistan province, have surged in recent years, with 2025 on track to become the deadliest year.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, which border Afghanistan, have borne the brunt of the violence.

At least 2,414 deaths have been recorded in the first three quarters of this year, according to the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an Islamabad-based think tank.

Pakistan and the Taliban, once allies over shared regional security interests, have fallen out as Islamabad claims that Afghanistan is giving haven to the TTP – an allegation Kabul has rejected.

Kabul and Islamabad have also clashed over their international border, called the Durand Line, which is recognised by Pakistan but not by Afghanistan.

TTP’s ideology is aligned with the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the groups have different goals and operate independently.

Pakistan has sought assurances from the Taliban that these groups, which operate in the porous border regions with Afghanistan, will not be allowed to operate freely and that the attacks across the border will cease.

In a post later on Sunday, Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman, stressed that the Afghan soil “will not be allowed to be used against any other country”. It is “the consistent stance of the Islamic Emirate” he said, referring to the official name of the Afghanistan government.

“It does not support any attack against anyone and has always emphasised this stance,” he posted on X.

Islamabad also wants the Taliban to prevent the regrouping or expansion of anti-Pakistan networks within Afghanistan, which the government considers a threat to Pakistan’s stability and broader regional strategy.

Abdullah Baheer, a political analyst based in Kabul, said the bombing of Afghanistan and killing of civilians is “a problematic model”.

“Show me one piece of evidence that shows they hit any TTP operative in Afghanistan in the past week of bombing, despite the 50-odd dead and 550 injured,” he told Al Jazeera.

He added that the TTP is a local rebel group within Pakistan that far precedes the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan. “Are you expecting the Taliban to come forth and stop the TTP from pursuing any of its political or military goals?” he asked.

“Let’s take the argument that TTP are operating from safe havens within Afghanistan. The question is, you mistake influence over a group that is an independent group to an extent of controlling them,” he added.

As previously mentioned, the Taliban denies providing safe haven to TTP within Afghanistan’s borders.

Why the spike in attacks inside Pakistan?

Islamabad was the prime backer of the Taliban after it was removed by US-led NATO troops in 2001. It was also accused of providing a haven to Taliban fighters as they waged an armed rebellion against the United States’ occupation of Afghanistan for 20 years.

But relations have soured over the surge in attacks inside Pakistan.

The TTP has re-emerged as one of Pakistan’s biggest national security threats, as it has conducted more than 600 attacks against Pakistani forces in the past year, according to a report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an independent nonprofit.

According to the CRSS, the Islamabad-based think tank, the first three-quarters of this year have seen a 46 percent surge in violence compared with last year.

The violence attributed to the TTP had decreased from its peak in the late 2000s and early 2010s after Islamabad involved the armed groups in talks and addressed some of their demands in 2021, which include the release of their members from prison and an end to military operations in the tribal areas.

The TTP also demanded the reversal of the 2018 merger of the tribal region with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. A stricter imposition of their interpretation of Islamic law is also one of their demands.

A month after the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, it mediated talks between the Pakistani military and the TTP, a decision endorsed and pushed by Imran Khan, Pakistan’s then-prime minister. But Khan, who championed talks with the armed groups, was removed as prime minister in April 2022.

Violence surged after the TTP unilaterally walked out of the ceasefire deal in 2022, after accusing Islamabad of renewed military operations in the region.

Since its founding in 2007, the TTP has targeted civilians and law enforcement personnel, resulting in thousands of deaths. Their deadliest attack came in December 2014, when they targeted the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar, killing more than 130 students.

The group remains banned in Pakistan and has been designated a “terrorist” group by the US.

The Pakistani army has conducted multiple operations to eliminate the group, but has struggled to achieve its goal as fighters have used the porous border to move back and forth between the neighbouring countries.

Baheer, the political analyst, said that there are “no winners in war. There are only losers”.

“This logic of bombing Afghanistan into submission didn’t work for the United States for 20 years of their occupation. Why do we think it will work now?” the Kabul-based analyst asked.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to stop fighting, after talks in the Qatari capital, Doha.

Cross-border violence in the past week or so marked the most serious escalation since 2021, when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan.

Islamabad accuses Kabul of harbouring fighters from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an armed group that’s stepped up attacks in Pakistan. Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders deny the accusations.

Mediators say the foundations have been laid for long-term peace. But what are the guarantees? And how does the conflict play out regionally?

Presenter: Adrian Finighan

Guests:

Javaid Ur-Rahman – Investigative journalist and parliamentary correspondent for The Nation, a Pakistani daily newspaper

Elizabeth Threlkeld – Senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center

Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government have agreed to an immediate ceasefire, mediated by Qatar and Turkiye. The agreement was reached after a week of deadly clashes and strikes along their disputed border.

The technology is expected to boost capacity in environmental monitoring, urban planning and disaster management.

Pakistan has sent its first-ever hyperspectral satellite into orbit, a “major milestone” it says will help advance national objectives from agriculture to urban planning.

The country’s space agency, SUPARCO, announced the “successful launch” of the H1 satellite from northwestern China’s Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre on Sunday.

Hyperspectral satellites can detect subtle chemical or material changes on the ground that traditional satellites cannot, making them especially useful for things like tracking crop quality, water resources or damage from natural disasters.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the technology is expected to “significantly enhance national capacities” in fields like precision agriculture, environmental monitoring, urban planning and disaster management.

It said its ability to pinpoint geohazard risks will also contribute to development initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which seeks to build infrastructure linking China’s northwestern Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.

🔊PR No.3️⃣1️⃣0️⃣/2️⃣0️⃣2️⃣5️⃣

SUPARCO Successfully Launches Pakistan’s First Hyperspectral Satellite https://t.co/N6dil4vaMe
🔗⬇️ pic.twitter.com/rFDSSIcstv

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Pakistan (@ForeignOfficePk) October 19, 2025

“The data from the Hyperspectral Satellite is poised to revolutionise agricultural productivity, bolster climate resilience, and enable optimised management of the country’s vital natural resources,” SUPARCO chairman Muhammad Yousuf Khan was quoted as saying in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper.

‘Pivotal step’

Pakistan also hailed H1’s deployment as a “pivotal step forward” in its space programme, as well as a reflection of its longstanding partnership with China in the “peaceful exploration of space”.

“The mission reflects the ever-growing strategic partnership and deep-rooted friendship between the two nations, who continue to cooperate in advancing peaceful space exploration and harnessing its benefits for socioeconomic development,” said the Foreign Ministry.

The mission is part of a recent push in Pakistan to grow its space programme, which has sent three satellites into orbit this year, according to SUPARCO.

The two other satellites – EO-1 and KS-1 – are “fully operational in orbit”, reported Pakistan’s The News International newspaper.

It may take about two months to calibrate the H1 satellite’s systems before it is fully operational this year, according to a SUPARCO spokesperson quoted in Pakistani media.

South Asian neighbours also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in coming days to ensure peace deal’s implementation.

Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to an immediate ceasefire after talks mediated by Qatar and Turkiye following a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their disputed border.

Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said early on Sunday that Afghanistan and Pakistan had agreed to the ceasefire “and the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries”.

Doha said the two countries also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in the coming days “to ensure the sustainability of the ceasefire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner”.

Earlier, both sides said they were holding peace talks in Doha on Saturday as they sought a way forward, after clashes killed dozens and wounded hundreds in the worst violence between the two South Asian neighbours since the Taliban seized power in Kabul in 2021.

Statement | Pakistan and Afghanistan Agree to an Immediate Ceasefire During a Round of Negotiations in Doha#MOFAQatar pic.twitter.com/fPXvn6GaU6

— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar (@MofaQatar_EN) October 18, 2025

“As promised, negotiations with the Pakistani side will take place today in Doha,” Afghan government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid had said, adding that Kabul’s negotiating team, led by Defence Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob, had arrived in the Qatari capital.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said earlier that the country’s defence minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, had led discussions with representatives of Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership.

“The talks will focus on immediate measures to end cross-border terrorism against Pakistan emanating from Afghanistan and restore peace and stability along the Pak-Afghan border,” the Foreign Office said.

Cross-border fighting between the one-time allies and Pakistani air strikes along their contested 2,600km (1,600-mile) frontier were triggered after Islamabad demanded that Kabul rein in rebels who had stepped up cross-border attacks in Pakistan, saying the fighters were operating from safe havens in Afghanistan.

The Taliban has denied giving haven to armed groups to attack Pakistan, and accuses the Pakistani military of spreading misinformation about Afghanistan and sheltering ISIL (ISIS)-linked fighters who have undermined the country’s stability and sovereignty.

Islamabad has denied Kabul’s accusations. Pakistan has accused Kabul of allowing armed groups to reside inside Afghanistan and wage war for years against the Pakistani state in a bid to overthrow the government and replace it with their strict brand of Islamic governance system.

On Friday, a suicide attack near the border killed seven Pakistani soldiers and wounded 13, security officials said.

“The Afghan regime must rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan and are using Afghan soil to perpetrate heinous attacks inside Pakistan,” Pakistani Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir said on Saturday, addressing a graduation ceremony of cadets.