pact

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could join the joint defence agreement recently signed by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing Cairo’s accession as “possible” and the pact as open to further members.

Speaking to Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview for Al Muqabala (The Interview), which will air on Sunday evening on Al Jazeera Arabic, Erdogan said the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement commits signatories to taking unified steps should any one of them come under external attack.

“This agreement has sent an important message to the world,” Erdogan said, adding that Egypt’s participation was among the options for its future expansion.

The deal, also known as the Mecca Pact, was signed in the holy city last Friday by Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. It stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three would be treated as an attack against them all, a collective-deterrence provision that analysts have compared to NATO’s Article 5. However, officials in Islamabad have cautioned against interpreting it as a NATO equivalent or as being directed at any single country.

Erdogan spoke on a range of regional issues, including tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the wars in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

The Turkish leader said reopening the strait was a priority for Ankara, arguing that its continued closure served no one’s interests. He credited Qatar with playing an important role in mediation efforts to halt fighting in the region.

Syria, Gaza and Lebanon

Erdogan pledged that Turkiye would not leave its neighbours to face regional turmoil alone, singling out Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Ankara would do everything in its power to support stability in Syria, noting his plans to visit the country, and that Syria’s Kurds would have “a share of peace and stability”. Turkiye would also continue to strengthen ties with Kurdish communities and safeguard their rights across the region, he added.

Concerning Gaza, Erdogan said Turkiye “cannot leave Gaza alone” and would do whatever was necessary to support it. He said Hamas was meeting its commitments in good faith, while Israel continued its war.

Turning to Lebanon, the Turkish president said continued Israeli attacks were a source of serious concern for Ankara. He said he had raised the need to end the war on Lebanon with the US president during Donald Trump’s recent visit to Turkiye, stressing Washington’s role in bringing the fighting to a close.

Erdogan said Turkiye would continue to support Sudan and described his relations with the head of its Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as good. He said Ankara’s relations with Libya were stable and that Turkiye would not abandon it.

On Europe, Erdogan said the European Union did not appear willing to admit Turkiye, adding that membership was no longer a priority for Ankara and that Europe would be “the loser” as a result.

He also said he had received a promise from Trump regarding F-35 fighter jets and was waiting for it to be honoured.

Turkiye was removed from the multinational F-35 programme in 2019 after taking delivery of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system, which Washington argued could compromise the stealth jet’s technology. Standing beside Erdogan during the NATO summit in Ankara last month, Trump said his administration would lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkiye in December 2020 over the S-400 purchase, and said a return to the F-35 programme was “something certainly we’d consider”.

Any sale, however, still faces resistance in Congress and a 2020 law bars the Pentagon from transferring F-35s to Turkiye for as long as it retains the S-400 system.

One week on from Saudi ⁠⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signing their ⁠joint defence agreement, the Turkish defence ministry revealed more details about the alliance on Thursday. They include plans to hold ⁠⁠joint military exercises and to deepen cooperation between their defence industries.

The bid to deepen security cooperation between three of the biggest economies among Muslim-majority countries comes amid heightened military tensions and conflicts in the Middle East.

Over the course of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly hit by Iran, which says it is targeting US military assets in the Gulf.

Pakistan’s ⁠⁠foreign ministry said that the agreement states ⁠⁠that an armed ⁠⁠attack on any one of the ⁠⁠three countries would be ⁠⁠regarded as an ⁠⁠attack against them all –  similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in the Turkish capital Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the defence ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general ⁠⁠staff/armed forces commanders and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

What do we know about the Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan pact?

It follows a visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by army chief Asim Munir, to Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also travelled to Saudi Arabia on Friday to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and major oil ‌‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion – Egypt has been touted as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

How have similar defence pacts fared?

The mutual defence pact is similar to several others in the region and beyond, yet many have had mixed records in practice.

Such alliances have the potential to deter large-scale interstate wars against their members, analysts say. But their effectiveness drops once conflicts move into a ‘grey zone’, which can include military occupation, settlements, internal repression or proxy violence.

Experts say they often serve merely as a signal of a strengthened political alliance rather than being a true collective defence.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1949

NATO grew largely out of Cold War fears of aggression and expansionism by the Soviet Union.

The US, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom signed the initial treaty on April 4, 1949.

The group has expanded into a 32-member alliance, with Sweden being the most recent member two years ago.

Many argue that NATO was a factor behind the Soviet Union’s reluctance to directly attack Western European member states during the Cold War, and vice versa with the Warsaw Pact.

The US also entered multiple bilateral treaties with different countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This provided Washington with strategic reassurances to its pact partners and went some way to shape their domestic and foreign policies.

A key provision of the NATO treaty, the so-called Article 5, states that if one member of the alliance is attacked in Europe or North America, it will be considered an attack on all members. That effectively put Western Europe under the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the US.

NATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.

According to NATO, the alliance plays an important role in fighting “terrorism”.

Arab League Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty, 1950

The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was established in 1945 to promote economic, political and social cohesion among emerging Middle Eastern states Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

It came amid the formation of Israel and its threats to countries in the region.

In 1950, Arab states signed a mutual defence treaty, stating that an attack on one is an attack on all – at least on paper.

Inter‑American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947

Following the Second World War and the start of the Cold War, leaders in the Americas signed this treaty in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, also known as the Rio Treaty.

Its core principle was that an attack on one member country counts as an attack on all.

This treaty was invoked during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The ANZUS Treaty, 1951

In September 1951, the US, New Zealand and Australia signed a treaty pledging to meet the common dangers in the Pacific region.

Following the September 11 attacks, ANZUS was invoked for the first time.

In 1986, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand over Wellington’s anti‑nuclear policy. This effectively froze New Zealand out of the alliance, while US–Australia cooperation continued.

US-Japan Security Treaty, 1951

The US and Japan pledged in a bilateral agreement to act and meet the common danger in case either of them faced an armed attack.

This agreement was signed in 1951 in San Francisco alongside the World War II peace treaty.

While the treaty was never invoked, about 50,000 US military personnel are stationed in Japan.

US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty, 1953

Following the end of the Korean War, the US and South Korea pledged to help each other from external armed attacks. This treaty came into effect in 1954.

While it was never invoked, it gave the US a legal framework to station about 28,500 troops in South Korea.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s Peninsula Shield Force 1984

The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six countries in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The GCC was established in Saudi Arabia in 1981, aiming to promote economic, security, cultural and social cooperation between the six member states.

In 1984, the GCC established a standing coalition land force, the Peninsula Shield Force, tasked to defend the six-member states amid the Iran-Iraq War.

It is composed of infantry, armour, artillery and combat support elements from each of the states, with 40,000 personnel.

The 2000 Joint Defence Agreement was signed to develop a joint military industry for arms manufacturing.

In September 2025, when Israel attacked Hamas leaders in Qatar, the GCC pledged to “activate a joint defence mechanism”.

Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2009

The modern EU was officially formed in 1993 in the Netherlands with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

In 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the mutual defence obligation which was signed into EU law.

Under Article 42(7) of the TEU, if one EU member is the victim of “armed aggression”, others have an obligation to aid and assist by all the means in their power.

France has invoked this clause only once, in 2015, following the Paris attacks that killed 130 people. Other EU members provided bilateral military support — including deployments to French‑led operations abroad — so that France could redeploy troops to strengthen security at home.

Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 2002

The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance that includes some former Soviet republics.

Established in 2002, its members comprise Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus.

Article 4 of the CSTO states that aggression against one is considered aggression against all, with an obligation to provide necessary aid, including military.

The CSTO has deployed troops once, in 2022 in Kazakhstan upon the request of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to help manage demonstrations caused by rising fuel prices.

Three nations to group ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under the pact signed last week.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will group senior ministers, hold ⁠joint exercises and deepen defence industry cooperation under a military pact signed between the regional powers last week, Turkiye’s defence ministry says.

The three countries on August 7 signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, which stipulates that an armed attack against any member would be regarded as ‌an attack on all, similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the Defence Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Chiefs of General ⁠Staff/Armed Forces Commanders, and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

The ministry added that joint military exercises involving land, naval and air forces, as well as air defence and unmanned systems were planned, in ⁠addition to deeper defence industry cooperation.

“The aim is to provide not only product and system supply, but also joint ⁠development and production, technology cooperation, and sustainable maintenance and ⁠logistics support,” it said, adding that unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence capabilities would be prioritised.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and top oil ‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion — with Egypt as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

The ministry also said Turkiye ‌was ‌participating in meetings in Jeddah aimed at establishing an international coalition to protect Red Sea shipping.

On developments in the Middle East, ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Akturk said lasting peace and stability in the region would be possible if Israel ends its occupation and attacks in Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Israel continues attacks that have deepened the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, as also reflected in United Nations reports.

“Israel’s rejection of the 15-point Gaza Plan has been another indication that it is pursuing a policy of regional expansionism. On the other hand, despite the framework agreement that was signed, Israel similarly continues its attacks and military activities in southern Lebanon,” Akturk said, referring to the plan proposed by the United States.

“We once again emphasise that it is essential for the international community to take a more determined and stronger stance against Israel’s actions by upholding international law and humanitarian values in order to establish peace and stability in the region,” he said.

Tehran, Iran – Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have expanded their mutual defence pact to add Turkiye, raising questions about the emergence of a new security architecture at a time when the United States and Iran have yet to reach a final deal to end their war.

Under the agreement signed in Mecca on Friday, any external armed attack on either of the three countries will now be considered an attack on all.

The trilateral pact was announced more than five months after the US and Israel launched a bombing campaign against Iran, triggering a conflict that quickly spread to the Gulf and disrupted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, however, have been careful not to antagonise any regional or international actors while finalising what they said was the result of years of hard work and negotiations. They have stressed the pact, which does not identify a specific threat, is not targeted against any country – particularly Iran – and does not abrogate or replace any existing agreements with others.

In Tehran, the reaction has largely been subdued, with officials mostly focusing on aspects of regional and Muslim cooperation and what they perceive as a declining role for the US.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Friday that when Muslims stand together, “we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on”.

“Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood,” he wrote on X, without directly mentioning the trilateral agreement signed hours earlier.

But Iran certainly sees some reasons to be concerned in the long run, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a researcher and analyst on Iran and Middle Eastern geopolitical dynamics.

The associate at Clingendael Institute told Al Jazeera that the timing is important, since the agreement comes after months of a war in which Saudi Arabia has faced attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in neighbouring Iraq.

“From Tehran’s perspective, the concern is therefore not only that the pact could strengthen Saudi deterrence, but that it could eventually facilitate coordinated pressure on Iran in Yemen, Iraq, and even economically through Turkiye and Pakistan,” he said.

On Sunday, the Houthis claimed another successful drone strike on the Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan. Saudi Arabia confirmed a fire was extinguished without inflicting casualties, but did not mention the cause.

Separately in Yemen, Houthi missiles and drones struck the Saudi-backed and internationally recognised government’s Red Sea port of al-Makha, with officials reporting at least seven people killed, 15 wounded and severe infrastructure damage. The Yemeni group, which has also been hitting or turning back Saudi-linked ships in the Red Sea over recent weeks, said it targeted weapons depots.

‘A strong bloc’

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not released a formal statement about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye deal, but a senior official outlined Tehran’s diplomatic thinking in an interview with local media on Saturday.

Hossein Noushabadi, a director general for parliamentary and legal affairs, told the state-linked ISNA news service that the ministry predominantly regards the agreement within the context of a diminishing direct US presence in the region.

The pact “is being viewed as the beginning of the collapse of US security hegemony in West Asia and the Persian Gulf”, said Noushabadi.

“It appears that, in the not-too-distant future, a new regional security order based on cooperation among regional states will replace the power structures imposed by extra-regional actors, heralding the end of the prevailing security and geopolitical paradigm and West Asia’s departure from the sphere of vital US interests,” added the official, who is a former Iranian envoy to Oman.

Political scientist Vali Nasr said he does not believe the pact is currently a threat to Tehran.

“For now, these are all elements of a post-American security order in the Middle East,” the professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University told Al Jazeera.

“This is also as much a balance to the Abraham Accords as a direct challenge to Tehran,” he added, in reference to the US-pushed regional normalisation effort with Israel, which US President Donald Trump last month tied with a civil nuclear deal sought by Saudi Arabia.

Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University of Qatar, also agreed that decision-makers in Iran do not immediately feel threatened by the pact, especially since they have maintained cordial relations with both Pakistan and Turkiye even under trying circumstances.

“Ultimately, this pact is not that new, nor is it something that, at present at least, has a great deal of substance beyond its symbolic significance. For example, neither Turkiye nor Pakistan would be willing to get involved in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen despite recent Houthi attacks on the kingdom,” Kamrava told Al Jazeera.

Not all inside Iran are content with the pact, however, with some hardline lawmakers and media arguing that it could ultimately be directed against the “resistance front” of Tehran-backed armed forces across the region, and degrade Pakistan’s credibility as a main mediator between Iran and the US and others.

“It’s clear that Arab states finally understand security cannot be imported; it must be built within the region. However, a roadmap is still missing,” Ebrahim Azizi, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in a more hawkish viewing of the pact.

“Warning: Miscalculation is a historical mistake. Iran has proven that every error comes at a cost. Balance is the only way forward,” he wrote on X.

Ebrahim Rezaei, another member of the commission, also wrote on X that “a paper agreement with Turkiye and Pakistan” will not bring Saudi Arabia security, “just as years of one-sided dependence on the Americans did not bring them security”.

Is Iran missing out?

Clingendael Institute’s Azizi said Tehran’s priority will likely be to avoid turning the pact into an explicitly anti-Iranian coalition amid a war with regional repercussions, and that would mean preserving individual relations with each of the three countries.

He said Tehran can also continue to emphasise its long-standing argument that regional security should ultimately be organised by regional states rather than external powers.

“If those states come to see the pact as providing meaningful protection against Iran or Iran-aligned groups, that would make Iranian membership even more difficult,” said Azizi. “Over the longer term, however, if the arrangement evolves from a balancing coalition into a broader regional security architecture, the question of Iranian participation could look quite different.”

Experts also said it could be a possibility that Iran itself would be seeking potential membership in the pact in a distant future, but that would mean a sustainable end to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and across the region, while expansion to other regional Arab states seems more plausible in the near term. Egypt has already been floated as a candidate, but that could be a complex decision for Cairo to make.

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North African Programme at Chatham House, said the trilateral pact reflects both short- and long-term security concerns and opportunities for Riyadh, Islamabad and Ankara.

“They are driven together to forge greater diplomatic and defence cooperation in reaction to US unreliability, Israeli revisionism and Iranian retaliation,” she told Al Jazeera.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.

The pact includes an Article 5-style mutual-defence clause, but questions remain over how it would operate in practice and how Tehran will respond.

Turkish leaders have insisted that the new trilateral defence pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not directed at Iran.

Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Saturday that the pact does not identify Iran, or any other country, as a common threat.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed on Friday by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, stating that an armed attack on one of the three countries would be considered an attack on them all.

“There is no common threat that we have put in writing,” Fidan told Turkey’s state-run Anadolu agency, adding that countries that do not attack the signatories would not be considered targets.

An Article 5-style commitment

Fidan described the pact as “technically” similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective-defence clause, under which an attack on one member is treated as an attack on all.

But the response would depend on the circumstances.

A country under attack would have to request assistance and specify what kind of support it needed, Fidan said. That could range from intelligence and logistics to ammunition or the deployment of military units.

The alliance will also establish political and military committees, bringing together foreign and defence ministers and military chiefs, as well as a secretariat in Saudi Arabia.

Fidan said the three countries would work on joint training, intelligence sharing, logistics, threat assessments and military interoperability.

Defence-industry cooperation is also expected to be a notable part of the pact. Fidan said it was one of the main issues discussed by the three leaders in Mecca, including how the countries could benefit from each other’s military technologies.

The Turkish minister said preparations for the agreement had been under way for nearly two years and eight months, suggesting it was not drawn up simply in response to the current tensions involving Iran.

Iran pushes back

Despite Ankara’s assurances, some Iranian officials have questioned the agreement and warned Saudi Arabia against relying on its new partners for security.

Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of Iran’s parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said Saudi leaders should understand that cooperation with Turkiye and Pakistan would not guarantee their security.

Another commission member, Ebrahim Rezaei, similarly dismissed the pact as a “paper agreement”.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi did not directly mention the agreement in a message on X on Friday, but he called on regional states to rely on themselves and pursue what he described as “true brotherhood”.

At the same time, he stressed the strength and readiness of Iran’s armed forces.

Egypt could join next

Fidan portrayed the agreement as part of a broader effort to give regional countries greater responsibility for their own security.

“External hegemons coming into the region do not solve the problems; they make them more acute,” he told Anadolu.

He described Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as the “core countries” of the initiative and made clear that Ankara wants the arrangement to expand.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries,” Fidan said. “We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella.”

Several countries have already expressed interest, according to Fidan, who said he expected Egypt, which he described as a “natural partner”, to join once outstanding technical issues were resolved.

For now, many of the practical details remain to be worked out, including how the three militaries would coordinate in a crisis.

But the planned committees, permanent secretariat and focus on interoperability and defence-industry cooperation suggest the pact is intended to develop beyond a simple mutual defence declaration.

A new mutual defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Pakistan has raised questions about the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, where fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran has prompted some countries to seek new arrangements to safeguard their security.

The pact, termed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, was signed in the Saudi city of Mecca on Friday.

“The agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all,” a statement from the meeting reads.

“It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation among the three states.”

While it is not yet clear what such an agreement might look like in practice, analysts say the pact points to growing questions about the durability of US security guarantees.

“Regional states have harbored growing doubts about the reliability of the US security partnership for more than a decade,” Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, a Middle East fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, told Al Jazeera over email.

“Both the decision to begin military operations against Iran and the subsequent conduct of the war and the on-off attempts to resolve it have only intensified those concerns and accelerated efforts to diversify security and defence relations.”

But, Ulrichsen added, building new defence pacts is likely not intended “to replace or supplant the US, but to provide additional strategic and policy options”.

Uncertainty over US role

While the administration of US President Donald Trump has yet to weigh in on the pact, analysts say the agreement is an effort by the three countries to reorient themselves after the turmoil of the Iran war.

“This is one of the first major geopolitical signs that the regional order is being reshaped by the US-Israeli war on Iran,” Sina Toossi, an analyst at the Center for International Policy, told Al Jazeera.

“The significance is less about a formal military alliance than about what it says regarding how regional states are reassessing security.”

Toossi pointed to the long-running alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia. For decades, the two countries have enjoyed a strong relationship, hinged on shared security interests. But the pact could be a sign that Saudi Arabia is looking to expand its security alliances.

“Rather than relying primarily on Washington, Saudi Arabia appears to be broadening its security partnerships and laying the groundwork for more intra-regional security arrangements,” Toossi explained. “That is arguably the most important takeaway.”

Media reports have also indicated that US partners in the Middle East were frustrated that the Trump administration had launched February’s war against Iran with little apparent thought to the impact on allies in the region.

Iranian forces have launched waves of missile and drone strikes against US military facilities in the Middle East, causing bystander casualties. Iran has also targeted civilian infrastructure, including energy and desalination plants.

Tehran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz, a key conduit for the region’s energy exports, has also imposed a steep cost on local economies.

Despite heavy strikes by the US and Israel, Iran has largely maintained its ability to restrict traffic through the strait, and Washington has struggled to provide partners with sufficient air defence munitions, many of which went to Israel.

‘Normative deterrence’

Under the circumstances created by the war, the longstanding reliance on Washington for security in the region has become more strained.

“It’s a fluid, tabula rasa era in the Middle East,” Brett McGurk, a key architect of Middle East policy under former US President Joe Biden, wrote in a social media post.

But analysts note that Friday’s security pact is best understood as an effort to supplement regional security cooperation with other countries and deter Iran.

“These countries are all US partners, and they recognise that there is no framework that can replace the United States,” Yasmine Farouk, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera.

Farouk added that it would also be a mistake to see the pact as a step towards greater confrontation with Iran.

She noted that all three countries involved have generally called for mediation and de-escalation since the US and Israel first launched their attacks on Iran in late February.

“What these countries have in common is that they are not seeking regional escalation,” she said, underscoring that the importance of the agreement might be something closer to “normative deterrence”.

Iran, she explained, has emerged from the war hardened and more confident in its ability to use force to advance its goals.

“There is a long-term perspective here on strategic cooperation, not just a deterrent effect.”

For most of Israel’s history, disagreements between political leaders and the military remained largely private. Arguments over strategy, timing or risk were real, but they were managed away from the public eye. Citizens saw a country that, whatever its internal tensions, could present a coherent face in wartime.

That quiet arrangement has frayed. Nearly three years after the October 7 attacks, open clashes between ministers and senior officers have become almost routine. The latest began when Defence Minister Israel Katz criticised Major-General Avi Bluth, the commander of Israeli forces in the occupied West Bank, for seeking to extend the detention of an extremist settler. Katz then announced on live television that Bluth would be replaced, only for Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir to push back publicly, insisting that the general would remain in his post and that the proper procedures must be followed. What was once contained now plays out in full view.

This exchange, like many before it, is not the real story. The real story is what these repeated public ruptures reveal about a country still at war. The campaign that began with a demand for national unity has gradually redefined the relationship between those who set the direction and those who must turn it into reality. The disagreement is no longer mainly about tactics. It is about something more fundamental: Who has the right to define victory, to set the aims of the war, and to decide what is possible.

This change is bigger than a simple loss of discipline or a personal clash. Israel was never a state in which the army merely carried out orders. From the state’s earliest years, the military was a partner in shaping security policy, not a pure executive arm. David Ben-Gurion built the Israeli military as a central national institution. Later leaders – Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Benny Gantz, Yoav Gallant – rose from its ranks. The boundary between political authority and military judgement was always porous. The army did not simply implement policy; it helped define the realistic limits of what politics could demand.

For decades, that partnership rested on an unspoken understanding. The military, with its professional assessment of force, terrain, and risk, often set the ceiling of political ambition. Generals could, and frequently did, tell elected leaders: This is possible, this is not, this will cost more than you are prepared to pay. Politicians retained formal authority, but they operated within a framework of military realism that constrained excess. The army, in its own way, protected the political system from overreach by insisting on the boundaries of the achievable.

That relationship has inverted under the weight of a long war.

Four realities help explain why.

The first is time. Short wars allow disagreements to remain professional. A war that stretches across years turns almost every choice into a political one. How many reservists to call up, when to push deeper, how to weigh the lives of captives against broader military aims, how long a society can sustain the burden of repeated mobilisations – these are no longer purely operational questions. They touch families, communities, and the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As the fighting has continued into its third year, the space for quiet professional judgement has narrowed.

The second is the absence of a shared definition of success. Official statements still speak of dismantling Hamas’s military capacity, bringing the captives home, and restoring security to the border communities. In practice, these aims pull against one another and are valued differently by different actors. Some emphasise lasting control or the elimination of residual threats. Others place the captives first or warn against an open-ended occupation. When the meaning of victory itself remains unsettled, each side begins to measure progress by its own lights. Soldiers and their commanders look for results that can be sustained. Political leaders look for outcomes that can be explained to a weary public and to their own political bases.

The third is the divergence of human incentives. Senior officers live with the state of the force and with the consequences of decisions that send people into harm’s way. Ministers live with coalition pressures, public anger, and the next election. When these pressures collide, public disagreement becomes more likely. The longer the war continues without a clear and jointly accepted end, the more often those collisions occur in the open.

The fourth, and most revealing, is the reversal of who defines the possible. Previously, the army told the political leadership what could realistically be achieved. Today, political leaders increasingly tell the army what must be achieved – and attack it when the answer is no. The military is no longer the institution that sets the ceiling of ambition. It is expected to make the politically desired outcome possible, and it is blamed when the limits of force become visible. This is not a minor adjustment in tone. It is a structural inversion of the old partnership.

The result is a deeper uncertainty about authority. In a short campaign, the question of who ultimately directs the war can remain unspoken. In a long war, it becomes unavoidable. Does final responsibility rest with the prime minister, the security cabinet, the defence minister, or the chief of staff? Different answers produce different strategies, different tolerances for risk, and different timelines for ending the fighting. When these answers are disputed in public, the coherence of decision-making suffers, and so does the clarity of what is being asked of the people who must execute the decisions.

The practical effects are already felt. Shared objectives become harder to set. An end that both political and military leaders can accept becomes more difficult to reach. A single durable strategy grows less likely. These are not problems of personality. They are problems of a system under prolonged strain. A country that once relied on the military’s professional standing to define the realistic boundaries of political ambition now finds politicians demanding outcomes that the army is expected simply to deliver, while soldiers, reservists, and families continue to bear the human consequences.

The public dispute between a defence minister and a chief of staff may look, on the surface, like another round of personal or partisan conflict. It is better understood as the latest expression of a larger question that has accompanied Israel since October 7: When a war stretches across years rather than weeks, who finally decides what is possible – the politician whose survival depends on the appearance of control, or the general who believes he understands the limits of military power? The answer will shape not only the relationship between government and army, but the manner and the moment in which this war eventually ends, and the human price still to be paid until then.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

June 19 (Asia Today) — North Korea marked the second anniversary of its defense treaty with Russia on Friday by calling the agreement an “essential legal weapon” for achieving global strategic stability and pledging to further strengthen bilateral ties.

The Rodong Sinmun, the newspaper of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party, published an article titled “The Power of the North Korea-Russia Alliance Is Being Demonstrated More Forcefully” to commemorate the anniversary of the treaty.

The newspaper described the agreement as “a reliable guarantee” for establishing a new international order and securing a brighter future for humanity.

“It is the unwavering position and will of the government and people of our republic to permanently expand and develop the traditional North Korea-Russia friendship through close and multifaceted solidarity in all fields on the basis of the new interstate treaty,” the newspaper said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024. The agreement includes a mutual defense clause requiring either country to provide assistance if the other comes under armed attack.

The Rodong Sinmun said the treaty had led to an unprecedented increase in communication across politics, economics, culture, defense, diplomacy and security.

It also said cooperation had expanded in trade, science and technology, education, public health and the arts.

The newspaper cited the construction of a North Korea-Russia friendship hospital, the resumption of direct flights between Pyongyang and Moscow and North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine as results of the closer relationship.

“The victory of the sacred common cause of the peoples of North Korea and Russia is certain,” it said. “The great friendship between the two countries, forged in blood and growing stronger by the day, will remain immortal.”

North Korea has sent troops and weapons to support Russia’s war against Ukraine. Pyongyang and Moscow have presented their military cooperation as an implementation of the strategic partnership treaty.

Separately, Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and a senior Workers’ Party official, condemned a Group of Seven statement calling for the denuclearization of North Korea.

In a statement Thursday, Kim accused the G7 leaders of repeating what she called an outdated demand and said denuclearization was a matter that had been permanently closed.

“The nuclear weapons we acquired to defend ourselves after being subjected to constant and persistent nuclear threats from our adversaries should cause concern to no one except those who intend to harm us,” Kim said.

She said North Korea’s nuclear status was written into its constitution and portrayed the country’s arsenal as a defensive and retaliatory capability.

“Possession of nuclear weapons is our core interest that must be firmly defended, and denuclearization is an irreversible line that can never be crossed,” Kim said.

She warned that challenging the core interests of what she called a nuclear-armed state would be “the worst and most disastrous choice.”

South Korea’s Unification Ministry reiterated that Seoul remains committed to pursuing North Korea’s denuclearization through a phased and realistic approach.

“Our position remains unchanged that, based on reality, we must develop phased and feasible measures that are acceptable to both sides to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula,” Deputy Ministry spokeswoman Jang Yun-jeong said at a regular briefing Friday.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260619010006805

Mexico and Canada have backed extending the USMCA trade agreement for another 16 years as negotiations over its future continue. The proposal comes amid an ongoing trade dispute with the United States.

Venezuela is far from being the only country in the Americas where State institutions have been used to crack down on independent media and protect the interests of ruling elites. In Guatemala, the case of journalist José Rubén Zamora became one of the clearest examples of how prosecutors, courts and political power can converge to silence investigative journalism.

In early April 2025, I interviewed Ramón Zamora, son of Guatemalan journalist and elPeriódico founder José Rubén Zamora. His arrest following years of investigations into alleged government corruption led to the newspaper’s closure and the persecution of people close to him. During our conversation, Ramón Zamora described how Guatemala has developed a tacit network of complicity between State institutions and political authorities, a system that raises broader questions about this new form of power in Latin America and may also help explain how the chavista State in Venezuela operates.

After elPeriódico published two investigations on May 2 and May 3, 2021 into apparent cases of corruption in the government of former President Alejandro Giammattei, the media outlet was subjected to legal persecution that culminated in the arrest of Rubén Zamora, who had dedicated his work to investigating corruption in the Central American country. 

The persecution began with an investigation into alleged bribery by the newspaper to obtain information related to the publications. The judge who heard the case dismissed it. Later, in 2022, an investigation into money laundering related to the sale of works of art owned by Zamora to cover elPeriódico‘s costs was reopened, leading to his arrest.

The imprisonment of Zamora caught the attention of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression. In their 2022 and 2023 annual reports, the IACHR requested information from Guatemala regarding the country’s human rights situation and recalled that Zamora has benefited from precautionary measures since 2003 due to risks linked to his journalistic work. Guatemala rejected parts of the assessment as lacking objectivity. Amnesty International described Zamora as a prisoner of conscience and condemned his detention. Zamora was granted house arrest for the second time on February 12, 2026.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it.

During the arrest and initial detention of journalist José Rubén Zamora in 2022, Guatemala was governed by Alejandro Giammattei, a conservative president whose administration faced strong criticism from international organizations over corruption, institutional deterioration, and pressure against journalists and anti-corruption actors. Since January 14, 2024, Guatemala has been governed by Bernardo Arévalo, a progressive and anti-corruption reformist whose presidential term is scheduled to end in January 2028.

His son, Ramón Zamora, says that his father’s persecution is the result of an unwritten agreement between various powerful sectors within the State that aim to protect their interests.  “In Guatemala, there is something my father called the “Pact of the Corrupt.” The Pact of the Corrupts is a tacit agreement that forms a network of corruption spread across political parties and institutions, where those who reach positions of power must govern according to the pact.”

This explanation describes the composition of a de facto cross-cutting network, which has political parties, institutions, and security forces under its control, punishing dissent as a means of survival, subjecting its detractors to exile, imprisonment, and discredit.

“The judge presiding over the case ordered an investigation into my father’s defense attorneys and witnesses, causing his lawyer to go into exile just five days after his arrest. Currently, six of the twelve lawyers who have defended my father have been detained,” says Ramón, who is also outside Guatemala with his mother after the court issued an arrest warrant against both of them. 

“They also persecuted my family. My mother and I were outside Guatemala visiting the United States when the judge handling my father’s case issued an arrest warrant against us, so we decided not to return.”

But how can the Pact explain the nature of the chavista State?

Corruption as political capital

Chavismo is not exclusively a militarized organization or simply a drug trafficking operation. As in Guatemala with the Pact of the Corrupts, the institutions of the chavista State are co-opted and work in the tacit interest of their members, where one of the main means of maintaining the pact is loyalty based on impunity, while corruption operates as political capital.

Consequently, the exercise of power is not oriented toward citizens or the satisfaction of public demands, but rather toward preserving the internal balance of the Pact itself. Governing involves administering concessions, distributing power quotas, and avoiding any decision that could alter the network of interests that sustains the regime. Reforms, when they exist, do not constitute a project of institutional transformation but are carefully calibrated to avoid destabilizing the architecture of loyalties on which the system rests.

This model of governance, the pacted State, is complemented by a logic of repression, combining massive and indiscriminate terror against actors whose actions threaten the balance of the pact. Similar dynamics can be observed in regimes such as Russia, Belarus, Nicaragua, and several Central Asian States. Journalists, judges, political leaders, and internal and external dissidents are the main targets of a system of coercion designed not to mobilize the masses, but to send clear and disciplining signals to those who break the pact. The selectivity of repression does not mitigate its severity. On the contrary, it makes it more efficient and functional in sustaining the apparatus of power.

Reducing chavismo to a simple narco-structure simplifies the scope that the organization can have, since apparent drug trafficking would not be the essence of the system but rather an activity within it. The Venezuelan State has become a web of systematic corruption that makes crime a functional activity of power.

The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity.

In this context, ideology ceases to serve as the system’s organizing principle and takes on a strictly instrumental role. It is not the compass that guides the action of power, but rather an adaptable rhetorical resource used to justify decisions already made to sustain the pact. Chavismo does not act primarily to carry out an ideological project, but rather to preserve a balance of interests between civilian, military, and criminal elites, in which ideas can mutate without the system suffering. Ideology, thus, does not guide the organization: it accompanies it, decorates it, or excuses it, but does not determine it.

The thesis of a pacted State suggests that authoritarian stability rests not only on repression or ideology, but on a shared understanding among political, military, and economic elites that preserving the existing order is preferable to risking rupture. Such systems can appear remarkably resilient precisely because their survival depends less on ideological coherence than on the mutual guarantees exchanged within the ruling coalition.

The notion of a pacted State helps explain why chavismo has shown a capacity for survival that goes beyond personalistic or circumstantial explanations. The stability of the system is due to a network of mostly informal agreements between civilian, military, and economic actors who share a common interest: preserving an order in which rupture is more costly than continuity. As long as that calculation remains valid, the system does not collapse; it adapts, reconfigures itself, and absorbs pressures without altering its fundamental logic. Yet the resilience of pacted States is not immutable.

Such systems begin to weaken when influential actors within the ruling coalition conclude that the regime can no longer guarantee protection, resources, or political survival. Economic decline, succession disputes, international pressure, social unrest, or weakening coercive institutions can alter the cost-benefit calculations sustaining the pact. Similar dynamics were visible in Eastern Europe after November 1989, when regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Romania, and Bulgaria rapidly collapsed once the elite coalitions sustaining them began to fracture internally, a process that would also unfold in Albania.

History suggests that pacted States often project an image of permanence precisely until the internal understandings sustaining them begin, almost imperceptibly, to dissolve.