pact

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have captured Mocha port and now threaten to control the main waterway of the Bab al-Mandeb strait. They have also attacked several cities in Saudi Arabia, wounding about 70 people, including women and children.

The repeated attacks against Saudi energy, civil, and defence facilities, combined with the maritime blockage by Iran and its Yemeni partner the Houthis, directly raise the question of the Mecca Pact’s operationalisation between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia can activate the mutual defence agreement. If that happens, what could a Pakistani and Turkish intervention look like?

The answer to this question necessitates some crucial background first.

The US – the main security partner of the Gulf states – has signalled for a while now that it expects regional countries to take primary responsibility for their own defence and deterrence, with US help remaining critical but limited.

That posture is already visible on the ground. Since the start of the US-Israel war on Iran, the US has not been able to provide comprehensive defence for its regional partners. On several occasions, it has even failed to stop attacks on its own bases in the Gulf.

With US presence receding and Washington emphasising regional burden-sharing, Gulf states have had to look into a new defence architecture. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed their first mutual defence agreement, which expanded in August this year to include Turkiye and became the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement.

The three countries have since established a joint secretariat, with its headquarters in Riyadh, with Pakistan taking the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

The pact remains in a gestation period. It does not publicly identify the thresholds or scenarios under which a member would move to direct military intervention. Its organisational and institutional structure, including rules of engagement, mechanisms of consultation, and collective defence and deterrence, are yet to be formally developed.

Now, back to the question of how the pact will be operational if a member state is attacked.

Earlier this week, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that an unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia, or a spillover of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom, would make the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement operational, adding that “there should be no doubt in this.”

Asif, however, did not share specific details on what shape that operationalisation would take. Last month, Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified that the Mecca Pact would work the same way as NATO: If a member state is attacked, it must actively request and define the specific type of help it needs.

NATO’s Article 4 allows for a member to call alliance consultations and exchange of information. Article 5 requires mutual assistance from allies, but it leaves each state to decide the nature of that assistance.

In 2012, after Syria shot down a Turkish warplane, Ankara invoked Article 4 for consultation and requested specific defence assistance. Instead of demanding direct military intervention, the Turkish government explicitly asked for Patriot missile defence batteries. NATO approved the request and deployed the systems to protect Turkish airspace.

In this context, if the Mecca Pact is to be operationalised, it would have to be Saudi Arabia that defines the type of military assistance and involvement that it needs. If, for example, Riyadh makes an actual request for Pakistani direct military intervention, beyond materiel and intelligence support, Islamabad would be obliged to comply. But the request, and the scale of the response, would still likely need to be defined and agreed in a consultation meeting.

For now, none of this has been tested as Riyadh has not invoked the pact with either Pakistan or Turkiye.

In the meantime, diplomatic efforts have intensified, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud talking to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Islamabad has also publicly urged Iran to rein in the Houthis from attacking Saudi Arabia and threatening the Bab al-Mandeb, and has reminded Tehran of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh’s defence through the pact. Ankara would likely play its own part in diplomatically restraining the Houthis and Iran.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or the Bab al-Mandeb continue, Turkiye and Pakistan would likely expand the air and technological support they already provide. Islamabad already has an air squadron of about 16 JF-17 Thunder multirole aircraft, defence systems, and thousands of troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

But a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains unlikely at the moment. Given the disastrous and lasting impacts of its participation in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US, Pakistan would be far more wary of joining a war against Iran and its allies, for fear of spillover into its western border provinces’ economy, domestic security, sectarian balance, and societal harmony. Pakistani leaders would find it hard to build domestic consensus for direct attacks on the Houthis or a fight with Iran.

The likely scenario is that Pakistan would increase joint diplomatic pressure on Iran to restrain the Houthis, further augment its support for Saudi defence, and push for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. Adopting this restraint would still keep the essence of the Mecca Pact intact, while putting more weight behind regional de-escalation.

The new security architecture that agreements like the Mecca Pact are setting up will take years to mature. Until the mechanisms and rules of collective response develop, Pakistan’s existing bilateral defence relationships with Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners will continue to focus on defence needs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could join the joint defence agreement recently signed by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing Cairo’s accession as “possible” and the pact as open to further members.

Speaking to Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview for Al Muqabala (The Interview), which will air on Sunday evening on Al Jazeera Arabic, Erdogan said the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement commits signatories to taking unified steps should any one of them come under external attack.

“This agreement has sent an important message to the world,” Erdogan said, adding that Egypt’s participation was among the options for its future expansion.

The deal, also known as the Mecca Pact, was signed in the holy city last Friday by Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. It stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three would be treated as an attack against them all, a collective-deterrence provision that analysts have compared to NATO’s Article 5. However, officials in Islamabad have cautioned against interpreting it as a NATO equivalent or as being directed at any single country.

Erdogan spoke on a range of regional issues, including tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the wars in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

The Turkish leader said reopening the strait was a priority for Ankara, arguing that its continued closure served no one’s interests. He credited Qatar with playing an important role in mediation efforts to halt fighting in the region.

Syria, Gaza and Lebanon

Erdogan pledged that Turkiye would not leave its neighbours to face regional turmoil alone, singling out Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Ankara would do everything in its power to support stability in Syria, noting his plans to visit the country, and that Syria’s Kurds would have “a share of peace and stability”. Turkiye would also continue to strengthen ties with Kurdish communities and safeguard their rights across the region, he added.

Concerning Gaza, Erdogan said Turkiye “cannot leave Gaza alone” and would do whatever was necessary to support it. He said Hamas was meeting its commitments in good faith, while Israel continued its war.

Turning to Lebanon, the Turkish president said continued Israeli attacks were a source of serious concern for Ankara. He said he had raised the need to end the war on Lebanon with the US president during Donald Trump’s recent visit to Turkiye, stressing Washington’s role in bringing the fighting to a close.

Erdogan said Turkiye would continue to support Sudan and described his relations with the head of its Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as good. He said Ankara’s relations with Libya were stable and that Turkiye would not abandon it.

On Europe, Erdogan said the European Union did not appear willing to admit Turkiye, adding that membership was no longer a priority for Ankara and that Europe would be “the loser” as a result.

He also said he had received a promise from Trump regarding F-35 fighter jets and was waiting for it to be honoured.

Turkiye was removed from the multinational F-35 programme in 2019 after taking delivery of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system, which Washington argued could compromise the stealth jet’s technology. Standing beside Erdogan during the NATO summit in Ankara last month, Trump said his administration would lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkiye in December 2020 over the S-400 purchase, and said a return to the F-35 programme was “something certainly we’d consider”.

Any sale, however, still faces resistance in Congress and a 2020 law bars the Pentagon from transferring F-35s to Turkiye for as long as it retains the S-400 system.

One week on from Saudi ⁠⁠Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye signing their ⁠joint defence agreement, the Turkish defence ministry revealed more details about the alliance on Thursday. They include plans to hold ⁠⁠joint military exercises and to deepen cooperation between their defence industries.

The bid to deepen security cooperation between three of the biggest economies among Muslim-majority countries comes amid heightened military tensions and conflicts in the Middle East.

Over the course of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Saudi Arabia has been repeatedly hit by Iran, which says it is targeting US military assets in the Gulf.

Pakistan’s ⁠⁠foreign ministry said that the agreement states ⁠⁠that an armed ⁠⁠attack on any one of the ⁠⁠three countries would be ⁠⁠regarded as an ⁠⁠attack against them all –  similar to NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.

At a weekly briefing in the Turkish capital Ankara on Thursday, the Turkish defence ministry said the pact’s fundamental goal was to ensure defence and military ties were put on a “more institutional and sustainable” footing.

“Under the accord, strategic political and military mechanisms plan to be established involving the defence ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general ⁠⁠staff/armed forces commanders and that coordination among the three countries will ⁠⁠be conducted at the highest level,” it said.

What do we know about the Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Pakistan pact?

It follows a visit by Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, accompanied by army chief Asim Munir, to Saudi Arabia to perform the Umrah pilgrimage in Mecca.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also travelled to Saudi Arabia on Friday to meet Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Turkiye, which has NATO’s second-largest army, has said the pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan and major oil ‌‌exporter Saudi Arabia was open to expansion – Egypt has been touted as a potential candidate — and did not seek to replace any existing alliances.

How have similar defence pacts fared?

The mutual defence pact is similar to several others in the region and beyond, yet many have had mixed records in practice.

Such alliances have the potential to deter large-scale interstate wars against their members, analysts say. But their effectiveness drops once conflicts move into a ‘grey zone’, which can include military occupation, settlements, internal repression or proxy violence.

Experts say they often serve merely as a signal of a strengthened political alliance rather than being a true collective defence.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 1949

NATO grew largely out of Cold War fears of aggression and expansionism by the Soviet Union.

The US, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom signed the initial treaty on April 4, 1949.

The group has expanded into a 32-member alliance, with Sweden being the most recent member two years ago.

Many argue that NATO was a factor behind the Soviet Union’s reluctance to directly attack Western European member states during the Cold War, and vice versa with the Warsaw Pact.

The US also entered multiple bilateral treaties with different countries in the 1950s and 1960s. This provided Washington with strategic reassurances to its pact partners and went some way to shape their domestic and foreign policies.

A key provision of the NATO treaty, the so-called Article 5, states that if one member of the alliance is attacked in Europe or North America, it will be considered an attack on all members. That effectively put Western Europe under the ‘nuclear umbrella’ of the US.

NATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US.

According to NATO, the alliance plays an important role in fighting “terrorism”.

Arab League Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty, 1950

The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was established in 1945 to promote economic, political and social cohesion among emerging Middle Eastern states Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

It came amid the formation of Israel and its threats to countries in the region.

In 1950, Arab states signed a mutual defence treaty, stating that an attack on one is an attack on all – at least on paper.

Inter‑American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947

Following the Second World War and the start of the Cold War, leaders in the Americas signed this treaty in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, also known as the Rio Treaty.

Its core principle was that an attack on one member country counts as an attack on all.

This treaty was invoked during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The ANZUS Treaty, 1951

In September 1951, the US, New Zealand and Australia signed a treaty pledging to meet the common dangers in the Pacific region.

Following the September 11 attacks, ANZUS was invoked for the first time.

In 1986, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations to New Zealand over Wellington’s anti‑nuclear policy. This effectively froze New Zealand out of the alliance, while US–Australia cooperation continued.

US-Japan Security Treaty, 1951

The US and Japan pledged in a bilateral agreement to act and meet the common danger in case either of them faced an armed attack.

This agreement was signed in 1951 in San Francisco alongside the World War II peace treaty.

While the treaty was never invoked, about 50,000 US military personnel are stationed in Japan.

US-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty, 1953

Following the end of the Korean War, the US and South Korea pledged to help each other from external armed attacks. This treaty came into effect in 1954.

While it was never invoked, it gave the US a legal framework to station about 28,500 troops in South Korea.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’s Peninsula Shield Force 1984

The GCC is a political and economic alliance of six countries in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The GCC was established in Saudi Arabia in 1981, aiming to promote economic, security, cultural and social cooperation between the six member states.

In 1984, the GCC established a standing coalition land force, the Peninsula Shield Force, tasked to defend the six-member states amid the Iran-Iraq War.

It is composed of infantry, armour, artillery and combat support elements from each of the states, with 40,000 personnel.

The 2000 Joint Defence Agreement was signed to develop a joint military industry for arms manufacturing.

In September 2025, when Israel attacked Hamas leaders in Qatar, the GCC pledged to “activate a joint defence mechanism”.

Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2009

The modern EU was officially formed in 1993 in the Netherlands with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty.

In 2009, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) created the mutual defence obligation which was signed into EU law.

Under Article 42(7) of the TEU, if one EU member is the victim of “armed aggression”, others have an obligation to aid and assist by all the means in their power.

France has invoked this clause only once, in 2015, following the Paris attacks that killed 130 people. Other EU members provided bilateral military support — including deployments to French‑led operations abroad — so that France could redeploy troops to strengthen security at home.

Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), 2002

The CSTO is a Russia-led military alliance that includes some former Soviet republics.

Established in 2002, its members comprise Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus.

Article 4 of the CSTO states that aggression against one is considered aggression against all, with an obligation to provide necessary aid, including military.

The CSTO has deployed troops once, in 2022 in Kazakhstan upon the request of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to help manage demonstrations caused by rising fuel prices.