opposition

As far as we know, the US invading forces that attacked the country on January 3 did not plant any mines on Venezuelan soil. But, figuratively speaking, they did, because every day, here and there, a situation erupts that is clearly a consequence of the bombing and the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores.

Some of these explosions even appear far more precise than the military operation – a term its proponents insist on using to describe it, despite the fact that it left more than a hundred people dead and caused significant material damage. In the four months that have passed since that traumatic morning, the country has witnessed what appear to be controlled demolitions at the very foundations of Venezuela’s 21st-century anti-hegemonic policy: the return of the US embassy; visits by high-ranking officials (including the head of the CIA); reintegration into the International Monetary Fund; reforms to fundamental laws; and even actions that appear motivated by a desire for symbolic humiliation, such as the removal of uranium from a historic but decommissioned nuclear reactor located on the outskirts of Caracas or Donald Trump’s alleged intention to annex Venezuela as the 51st state.

Every “mine” that explodes deepens a wound that, strictly speaking, is far from healing because it was inflicted on Venezuelan pride and hurts, above all, the Chavista base, but also people from other political camps who share a strong sense of nationalism.

Managing this systematic destruction of icons has been one of the most demanding challenges for the acting government, especially in terms of responding to its own supporters and to real internal power brokers, both within the sphere of popular power and within the military and police forces.

Peace and continuity

One of the most surprising aspects of the political period marked by the events of January 3 is that the country – which was invaded, bombed, and had its president kidnapped – has managed to maintain internal peace. Even more astonishing is that Chavismo, subjected to such a decapitation operation, has remained in power and has swiftly reestablished diplomatic and even cordial relations with the aggressor power.

This strange phenomenon was immediately exploited by internal and external opponents of the Bolivarian Revolution to disseminate accusations of treason. Those accused have responded by arguing that this was not a voluntary compromise, but rather concessions that any rational person would make in a hostage situation and under the threat of even worse attacks and reprisals.

In an unusual move, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres weighed in on this debate, voicing his suspicion that there was internal collusion in the military operation against Maduro.

A significant portion of Chavismo understands the need to reject these hypotheses and agrees that national peace is well worth the sacrifice of some of the slogans that propelled this movement to rise and remain at the pinnacle of political power.

The conflict arises when it becomes clear that, for many revolutionary activists, these slogans embody fundamental principles and values.

The controversy surrounding this issue lies dormant beneath the surface, like a geological fault line that became active following the bombing. At times, it surfaces in the form of minor tremors, through the critical attitudes of figures associated with Chavismo. The ground also trembles from the doubts and unanswered questions in the daily lives of sectors affiliated with or sympathetic to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).

One of the voices that has been speaking out from the ranks of the organic intelligentsia is that of Luis Britto García, who has raised objections to the reforms of the Hydrocarbons and Mining Laws, which, in his view, will allow for the unfettered plundering of Venezuela’s abundant natural resources and enable any disputes to be settled by foreign courts. He also rejects the return of the IMF, given the role that this and other multilateral organizations have played in imposing economic policies that are fundamentally anti-popular.

Britto García is unwavering in his ideological and legal objections, but he is also extremely careful not to present himself as an internal opponent of the acting president. Drawing on his immense moral authority, he has taken on the role of being the public voice for many who lack the ability or opportunity to express their views.

Meanwhile, some who clearly do not wish to be named say they have chosen to contribute through their silence, as the timing is highly inappropriate for taking sides.

Others, however, have chosen to openly dissent. Prominent among them is journalist Mario Silva, who built his career as an opinion-maker on the provocative television show La Hojilla and was later elected to the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and the 2021–2025 National Assembly. With his opposition to the oil and mining reforms as well as amnesty policies for opposition figures who participated in insurrections and riots, Silva has stirred up controversy, particularly among segments of the grassroots Chavista movement that identify with his dramatic and incisive style, which was once strongly supported by Commander Hugo Chávez.

In the vacuous yet highly topical realm of social media influencers, “dissidents” have also emerged, such as Diego Omar Suárez, “Michelo,” an Argentine YouTuber and TikToker who moved to Venezuela in 2024 and had been a key figure in the online discourse on these and other social media platforms, supporting the government of Nicolás Maduro and, in the early weeks, that of Delcy Rodríguez. However, he changed his stance to speak out against treason and collusion with the US. (1)

The Pilgrimage strategy

These disruptions have further obstructed the path of the interim government, which is grappling with a very difficult economic situation; they have become additional “landmines” along the way, forcing the government to move forward with extreme caution while navigating these threats.

One of the strategies designed to maintain popular support and mobilization has been the Pilgrimage against the blockade and the unilateral coercive measures or sanctions imposed by the US and its allies.

The Pilgrimage sought to mobilize support from the Chavista parties, which in the days immediately following January 3 had taken to the streets demanding the return of the presidential couple. That demand was redirected toward calling for a Venezuela free of economic sanctions.

Beyond giving new momentum to the Chavista camp, the mobilization sought to broaden the government’s support base by prioritizing the elimination of the blockade and sanctions.

To achieve this new consensus, the acting president has capitalized on the groundwork laid by the Amnesty Law, the Program for Peace and Democratic Coexistence, and other reconciliation initiatives, such as the one established for labor issues, which allowed her to get through May 1 by decreeing increases in bonuses without committing to meaningful wage hikes.

Fundamental in this regard has been the willingness of Chavismo to cede institutional spaces – such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Higher Education, several vice ministries, and several embassies – to figures from the moderate opposition. It is clear that the support obtained outside the Chavista camp has been the result of these prior concessions.

What about the opposition?

In this complex political landscape, the opposition forces appear, now more than ever, to be watching the game from the sidelines, standing around the table, while the pieces are moved by the acting government and the United States.

The moderate opposition, which participated in the 2025 parliamentary elections and entered the new National Assembly that began its term on January 5, has since January 3 wavered between capitalizing on the moment by supporting the so-called “reinstitutionalization” of the country and reverting to old obstructionist tactics that are largely ineffective given the overwhelming majority that Chavismo holds in the national legislature.

From the perspective of public opinion, everything seems to indicate that this opposition faction has failed to present itself to the country as a genuine option for change, with a platform capable of rallying the masses to follow its leaders.

At the other extreme is the faction led by María Corina Machado, clearly identified as the one that demanded (and continues to demand) most vehemently that the country be sanctioned, blockaded, and attacked militarily, based on the premise that she would automatically be called upon to head a de facto government resulting from the bombing and the kidnapping of the constitutional president.

Donald Trump’s surprising support for Delcy Rodríguez’s government has left Machado high and dry. Neither her obsequious submission to the US president nor her lobbying of the Western corporate elites has done her any good so far, as she remains relegated to the sidelines – a situation that must be particularly humiliating for her.

Under the current circumstances, Machado appears more a part of the internal US political diatribe than of the Venezuelan political scene. Following her failed efforts to secure Trump’s endorsement (to whom she gifted her Nobel Prize), she seems to be actively working with the Democrats and elements of the Deep State with the aim of inflicting a defeat on the Republican president in the midterm elections.

It seems her allegiances have shifted, creating a bizarre paradox: Venezuela’s radical opposition is betting against Trump, while Chavismo feels more secure if the president who ordered the brutal military aggression does not emerge too battered from the November contest.

It appears, then, that the “metaphorical landmines” planted by the US during its brief invasion are also exploding, one after another, on the grounds of the right and the far right.

(1) Editor’s note: this article was written before the May 16 handover of former minister and diplomatic envoy Alex Saab to US authorities.

Clodovaldo Hernández is a journalist and political analyst with experience in higher education. He won the National Journalism Prize (Opinion category) in 2002. He is the author of the books Reinventario (poetry and short stories) De genios y de figuras (journalistic profiles) and Esa larga, infinita distancia (novel).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Venezuelan editorial staff.

The ruling Democratic Party’s (DP) push to put a constitutional change to a national vote in the upcoming local elections fell through Friday as the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) continued to boycott a parliamentary vote on the proposal.

Shortly after Friday’s plenary session opened, National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik announced that he will not put the amendment bill to a vote as the PPP warned it would launch a filibuster to block the proposal.

“I convened the plenary session again today in an effort to prevent the first constitutional amendment vote in 39 years from falling through,” Woo said. “But I believe further proceedings would be meaningless, seeing the (PPP) responding with a filibuster.”

The PPP boycotted a vote on the bill Thursday, leaving the unicameral parliament short of a quorum.

Cheong Wa Dae expressed regret over the National Assembly’s failure to pass the bill due to opposition from PPP lawmakers.

“The public will find it difficult to understand why they opposed even minimal constitutional changes aimed at safeguarding national security and democracy,” presidential spokesperson Kang Yu-jung said in a written briefing, noting that there had been broad public consensus on the need to “reflect the lessons” of former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s Dec. 3, 2024, martial law attempt in the Constitution.

“We urge the National Assembly to continue the discussions on the constitutional amendment with a greater sense of responsibility during the second half and to keep the promise it made to the people,” she added.

President Lee Jae Myung earlier highlighted the need to amend the constitution in “phases” if necessary, saying the Constitution, which has remained unchanged for nearly 40 years since 1987, may now be outdated.

The proposed bill aimed to tighten the rules for declaring martial law, requiring the president to obtain parliamentary approval without delay and stipulating that if the National Assembly rejects the declaration or fails to approve it within 48 hours, the martial law will be immediately nullified.

It also sought to include the 1980 pro-democracy uprising in Gwangju and the 1979 Busan-Masan pro-democracy protests in the preamble. It currently states that the country inherits the spirit of the April 19 revolution in 1960, which overthrew South Korea’s first president, Rhee Syng-man, over election fraud.

The bill was jointly proposed by 187 lawmakers from the DP and five minor parties.

A constitutional amendment requires two thirds of votes from sitting lawmakers to be put to a national referendum for final approval by a majority of ballots cast.

South Korea is set to hold its quadrennial local elections on June 3.

Copyright (c) Yonhap News Agency prohibits its content from being redistributed or reprinted without consent, and forbids the content from being learned and used by artificial intelligence systems.

Madrid, Spain – Venezuela’s opposition leader Maria Corina Machado is aligned with Spain’s main right-wing party on its economic visions, but they are divided by social issues such as abortion, analysts say.

On a visit to Spain this weekend, Machado chose to snub an invitation to meet Socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and the left-wing coalition government officials.

The Nobel Peace Prize winner said she had chosen not to meet Sanchez because he was hosting a summit of left-wing leaders from Latin America in Barcelona.

“What has transpired in the past few hours at the meeting held in Barcelona with various political leaders from different countries is proof that such a meeting was not advisable,” Machado told a meeting in Madrid on Saturday.

Instead, she held a series of meetings with leaders from the opposition conservative People’s Party (PP) and the far-right Vox party.

Machado received a rapturous welcome from Alberto Nunez Feijoo, the PP party leader and Venezuelan emigres in Madrid, on Friday.

On Saturday, the Venezuelan opposition leader met Isabel Diaz Ayuso, the populist conservative Madrid regional leader, one of Sanchez’s fiercest critics and a possible rival to Feijoo.

Ayuso presented Madrid’s gold medal to Machado, while Madrid’s Mayor Jose Luis Martinez-Almeida – also of the PP – handed her the keys to the city before a rally with Venezuelan supporters.

Machado also met Santiago Abascal, the leader of Vox, in the Spanish capital.

Feijoo praised how Machado had championed freedom even at the cost of going into hiding in Venezuela away from her family.

“Spain knows well the value of freedom; it cost us dearly to obtain it. The generations of our parents and grandparents know what it is to live without freedom. That is why we cannot look the other way,” Feijoo said.

What divides Venezuela and Spain’s opposition?

Despite the cordial welcome, there are significant differences between Machado and Feijoo, commentators said.

A liberal conservative, who has said she is an admirer of Margaret Thatcher, Machado has been dubbed Venezuela’s “Iron Lady”.

She moved from the right politically to the centre-ground during the 2024 presidential campaign to attract voters in the middle ground.

As a conservative, Machado heads a Venezuelan opposition that is split and which also contains more liberal factions.

In contrast, Feijoo heads a well-organised conservative political party, which has only recently suffered divisions after the formation of the hard-right Vox party in 2013, analysts said.

Carlos Malamud, an expert on Latin America at the Real Elcano Institute, a think tank in Madrid, said the structure of both opposition groups was different.

“Machado is the leader of a small, disorganised opposition, while Feijoo is the head of the PP, which is a well-organised national political party,” he told Al Jazeera.

Malamud said Machado did not demonstrate the traits of a would-be Venezuelan president by refusing to see Sanchez.

“If Machado wants to be the president of Venezuela next year, she needs to be prepared to meet the head of the Spanish government, whoever that may be,” he explained.

“Perhaps the Venezuelan opposition sees the Spanish Socialist Party as being allied to (former Spanish prime minister) Jose Rodriguez Zapatero.”

Zapatero has played a controversial role in acting as a mediator between Spain and the government of former Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, who was abducted by the United States in January.

Maduro faces charges of narcoterrorism, conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and corruption, which he denies.

Machado ‘more conservative’ on social issues

Malamud said one factor which unites Machado and Feijoo is that they came from political systems which suffered from polarisation.

“Venezuelan politics is the same as Cuban politics, or like Spanish. They all suffer from the same degree of polarisation,” he added.

Ana Ayuso, an investigator in Latin American affairs at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, said Machado shared the liberal economic theories of Feijoo, but they differed on social issues.

“She is in favour of freedom of trade and a small state, so she is quite liberal on economic affairs like Feijoo,” Ayuso told Al Jazeera.

“She is also closer to Isabel Diaz Ayuso in terms of economics, in terms of free trade and the participation of the state.”

“However, she is more conservative when it comes to social issues. Machado is against abortion, and religious affairs are important to her. She is close to the [Roman] Catholic Church. Feijoo supports the right to abortion.”

In an interview in 2024 with Spanish newspaper El Pais, Machado said she was against abortion but in favour of changing the law in Venezuela to allow abortion in cases of rape.

At present, the law in Venezuela allows abortion only when there is a risk to the life of the mother or child. Otherwise, it is illegal and can carry a jail sentence of up to two years.

“Machado does not have any similarities with Vox. Venezuela does not have a problem with immigration. Emigration is the problem,” added Ayuso.

She said the Venezuelan opposition leader had initially been a staunch supporter of US President Donald Trump, but he had shunned her in support of Delcy Rodriguez, the acting Venezuelan president.

Machado was now closer to Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state, who supported her cause within the MAGA movement, she added.

April 17 (Asia Today) — Jang Dong-hyuk, leader of South Korea’s main opposition People Power Party, has delayed his return from a U.S. visit by three days at the request of U.S. officials, party aides said Thursday.

Park Jun-tae, Jang’s chief of staff, told reporters at the National Assembly that Jang had originally planned to return later in the day but would now arrive early Sunday.

“While heading to the airport for departure procedures, special circumstances arose, leading to an extension of his schedule,” Park said.

The delay was made at the request of officials from the U.S. Department of State, Park added. He said speculation about possible meetings with Vice President JD Vance or Secretary of State Marco Rubio remained unconfirmed.

Some members of Jang’s delegation have already returned to South Korea, while others remain in the United States.

Jang departed for Washington on April 11 and was initially scheduled to return Friday via Incheon International Airport.

During the visit, he met with U.S. lawmakers including Bill Hagerty and delivered a speech at the International Republican Institute, where he emphasized the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

He also criticized the South Korean government’s policy toward North Korea, arguing it prioritizes dialogue over deterrence and risks weakening trust in the alliance. Jang called for “peace through strength” to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260417010005446

The recently concluded 14th Ministerial Conference of the WTO produced mixed results. While the multilateral system remains stuck on Appellate Body appointments, one of the most extensive pre-conference discussions focused on the Chinese-led Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (IFDA). With 129 member states backing the IFDA, including countries like Bangladesh and several least developed countries (LDCs) from Africa, this has put India’s position as a key representative of the third world into question.

However, a thorough examination of India’s position reveals deeper concerns about the WTO within the ever-changing framework of global economic governance. In this article, I argue that India’s opposition to the IFDA is based not merely on apprehensions about China’s strategic influence, but also on other considerations founded on the grounds of jurisdiction, sovereign right to regulate and the procedure.

The Jurisdictional Argument & Potential Fragmentation of the International Trade Regime:

India’s primary objection to the IFDA emerges from a very pivotal question in the field of international law, challenging the jurisdiction and mandate of the WTO. In a rules-based transnational system, international organizations operate on a mandate-based framework. This mandate is primarily derived from the substantive provisions of their founding agreements and the consent of member states. Historically, the WTO’s mandate has centred on trade, specifically the regulation of trade in goods and services, as well as certain trade-related aspects of intellectual property and investment. While instruments such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) incidentally touch upon investment, they do so only insofar as it is in relation with trade.

Given that the WTO’s mandate and primary focus are on trade, India maintains that the regulation of investment as an autonomous domain fall outside its negotiated competence. This position is grounded in the collapse of the “Singapore Issues,” which included investments as one of its four development agenda and were explicitly dropped from the Doha Developmental Agenda in 2004. The reintroduction of investment facilitation through the IFDA is thus viewed as lacking a legitimate mandate, raising serious concerns about the WTO’s overreach.

Another factor closely linked to the lack of mandate is the plurilateral character of the proposed agreement. Unlike multilateral agreements, which bind all WTO members on the basis of consensus, plurilateral agreements apply only to a subset of willing participants. While such arrangements are not unprecedented within the WTO framework, India views the IFDA as a symbolic representation of a broader trend towards fragmentation. The primary concern of New Delhi is the risk that plurilateralism brings to the system. India’s apprehension stems from creation of a two-tier system within the WTO, wherein economically powerful states effectively set the rules, leaving others in a position of reactive compliance. This seriously undermines the foundational principle of sovereign equality among the WTO members and erodes the consensus-based decision-making model that has historically been a salient feature of the WTO.

Right to Regulate

A further dimension of India’s opposition to the IDFA pertains to the preservation of regulatory autonomy. The IFDA, although framed as a facilitative instrument, introduces disciplines that may constrain domestic policymaking. The current bilateral system on which international investment law is based relies heavily on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and dedicated chapters on investment in comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA). This empowers developing countries such as India to specifically negotiate foreign investment policy in accordance with domestic requirements and national priorities.

However, under the IFDA’s plurilateral approach, India’s apprehension is grounded in obligations relating to non-discrimination, administrative review, and procedural standardisation, which over time may limit the flexibility required to implement industrial policy, promote local value addition, or regulate sensitive sectors in the public interest.

Further, India is also careful of the potential consequences that may arise from incorporating investment-related disciplines within the WTO framework. Although the IFDA does not formally include investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, its provisions could nonetheless be invoked indirectly in arbitral proceedings under bilateral investment treaties (BITs).

Given India’s prior experience with investment treaty arbitration and the subsequent revisiting of its Model BIT in 2016 to ensure regulatory balance, this concern carries considerable weight. While at face value these provisions might seem benign and aimed at facilitation of flow of investments, their pro-investor interpretations might create problems by exposing India to international liability.

Another vital dimension of India’s critique pertains to the procedural legitimacy of the IFDA negotiations. It is quite commonly observed that the legitimacy of outcomes is intricately linked to the legitimacy of the processes that produce them. These negotiations were initiated through a Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) which remains controversial within the WTO system. India’s argument relies on the absence of an explicit mandate which contradicts the WTO’s decision-making framework, which is based on consensus.

Beyond these factors, India’s position can also be understood as a negotiation strategy. By resisting the incorporation of new issues such as investment facilitation into the WTO package, India seeks to preserve negotiating leverage in ongoing and future discussions. Accepting the IFDA could open a pandora’s box for the introduction of other areas, including digital trade and e-commerce, thereby shifting the balance of negotiations away from priorities of developing countries, such as agricultural subsidies.

It is important to note that India does not oppose investment facilitation in principle; rather, its criticism is related to the form, venue, and legal consequences of introducing non-trade disciplines at the WTO. India has, in fact, undertaken substantial domestic reforms aimed at improving the ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Its objection is more precisely directed at the form, forum, and legal implications of embedding such non-trade disciplines within the framework of WTO.

In summary, the refusal of India to sign the IFDA is a reflection of careful consideration of complex legal factors combined with prudence regarding institutional development and developmental policy. It underscores a broader tension within the contemporary multilateral trading system aiming to balance the ever-expansive rule-making to protect & promote investments, with preservation of regulatory policy space for host states.