opposition

Growing opposition within Israel is raising questions about the government’s military strategy in southern Lebanon. As Al Jazeera’s Nida Ibrahim reports, many warn of an open-ended conflict as Hezbollah remains a strong force on the ground.

March 23 (Asia Today) — People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyuk on Sunday criticized a parliamentary probe plan led by the ruling party, along with the government’s real estate policy and its response to the Iran crisis.

Speaking at a party leadership meeting at the National Assembly, Jang questioned the need for an investigation into alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the previous administration.

“If a fabricated indictment can be proven through a parliamentary probe, it would be much faster to obtain an acquittal in court,” he said. “The investigation will ultimately only confirm that the prosecution and trial were justified.”

Jang also invoked remarks previously made by President Lee Jae-myung, saying, “If a president commits a crime, he should go to prison,” adding that he was “returning those words as they are.”

The conservative party boycotted the National Assembly plenary session a day earlier and held a protest rally outside the chamber. A brief confrontation occurred with ruling party lawmakers after the probe plan passed.

Jang criticized the government’s real estate policy, accusing the president of centralizing decision-making while excluding public officials from the process.

“By that logic, the president, who is facing multiple trials, should step away from judicial policy,” he said.

He also warned against expanding fiscal spending in response to the Iran crisis, citing concerns over inflation, exchange rates and rising oil prices.

“With a triple shock of high exchange rates, inflation and oil prices, releasing an additional 25 trillion won, about $18.7 billion, would push prices and the currency higher,” he said. “This is not the time for cash handouts but for stabilizing the economy.”

Floor leader Song Eon-seok echoed the criticism, accusing the administration of attempting to consolidate power and warning against what he described as excessive control over parliamentary committees.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260323010006783

KTLA-owner Nexstar Media Group said it has closed its deal to acquire rival Tegna’s TV stations, despite opposition from eight state attorneys general who filed a lawsuit to block the merger.

The acquisition was approved by the Federal Communications Commission’s Media Bureau and the Justice Department, Irving, Texas-based Nexstar said Thursday.

“This transaction is essential to sustaining strong local journalism in the communities we serve,” Nexstar founder and Chief Executive Perry Sook said in a statement. “By bringing these two outstanding companies together, Nexstar will be a stronger, more dynamic enterprise — better positioned to deliver exceptional journalism and local programming with enhanced assets, capabilities and talent.”

Sook also mentioned President Trump and FCC Chairman Brendan Carr by name in the statement, saying the company was “grateful” they recognized the “dynamic forces shaping the media landscape” and allowed the transaction to move forward. Trump had supported the deal.

The surprise announcement came only a day after eight state attorneys general, including California’s Rob Bonta, sued to stop the deal, arguing it would give Nexstar too much control of local TV stations. At the time, Bonta said the combination would cause “irreparable harm to local news and consumers who rely on their reporting as a critical source of information.”

Nexstar is the largest TV station owner in the U.S., with 164 outlets including KTLA in Los Angeles. If the merger with Tegna succeeds, Nexstar would have 265 TV stations reaching 80% of the U.S. and multiple outlets in a number of markets.

The suit also claimed it would give the combined company too much leverage in negotiating fees from pay-TV providers that carry their stations, which could raise costs for consumers.

The plaintiffs in the suit also include state attorneys general in Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia.

FCC Commissioner Anna Gomez said the merger violates the existing national ownership cap of 39% under federal law and said the acquisition did not receive a vote before the entire commission. The FCC approved this deal with waivers, meaning the company can operate in violation of that ownership cap.

“A transaction of this magnitude, which includes new and novel issues before the FCC, demands open deliberation before the full Commission, not a quiet sign-off meant to avoid public scrutiny,” Gomez said in a statement. “Given the increasingly alarming pace of reckless media consolidation, the American public deserves to know how and why this decision was made.”

The FCC did not respond to an immediate request for comment.

Times staff writers Stephen Battaglio and Meg James contributed to this report.

March 13 (Asia Today) — A senior opposition leader said Friday that allegations of pressure to drop criminal charges linked to aides of President Lee Jae-myung could amount to grounds for impeachment if proven true.

Song Eon-seok, floor leader of the conservative People Power Party, made the remarks during a party strategy meeting at the National Assembly.

Song cited claims made by journalist Jang In-soo during a YouTube broadcast hosted by political commentator Kim Eo-jun.

According to Song, the journalist alleged that a senior government official close to the president conveyed messages to several prosecutors asking them to drop charges in a case related to Lee.

“If such allegations are true, it would constitute grounds for impeachment of the president,” Song said.

Song also accused Justice Minister Jeong Seong-ho of acknowledging remarks that could be interpreted as pressure on prosecutors.

He argued that any attempt by a sitting minister to influence decisions about dropping charges would represent an abuse of authority and could justify impeachment proceedings against the minister.

The People Power Party is considering introducing an impeachment motion against Jeong as early as next week, according to party officials.

Opposition lawmakers also criticized recent judicial reform legislation passed by the National Assembly under the ruling party’s leadership.

Kim Eun-hye, a senior policy deputy floor leader of the People Power Party, said the justice minister should serve as a guardian of the rule of law rather than “a shield for a single individual.”

She argued that the allegations involving pressure on prosecutors and the judicial reform bills could undermine the independence of the judiciary.

Meanwhile, the ruling Democratic Party filed a defamation complaint Thursday against journalist Jang In-soo over the allegations raised during the YouTube broadcast.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260313010004004

Changes in Venezuela are slow and imperfect, but they are happening. The question is not whether chavismo will attempt to produce results that benefit Venezuelans, because it has no alternative. The real question is how it will do so and who is on the playing field trying to shape those outcomes.

The reform of the Hydrocarbons Law, the enactment of the Amnesty Law, and the proposed reform of the Mining Law seem to indicate that the vehicle for implementing the institutional measures demanded by the United States is the National Assembly. A National Assembly that lacks legitimacy and does not represent the majority of the country’s political sectors.

Two weeks ago, Tareck William Saab resigned from his position as chief prosecutor, and Alfredo Ruiz resigned as ombudsman. Both had held those posts since August 2017 and had used the justice system against those who think differently. Following their resignations, the National Assembly confirmed Larry Devoe as acting head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Ministerio Público) and appointed Saab himself as acting ombudsman. While Saab’s resignation represented a step forward, appointing Saab as acting ombudsman was a direct violation of the Constitution. These dissonant signals only confirm that the Rodríguez leadership has no political will to move toward a democratic transition.

The process to appoint the heads of the Citizen Power branch has begun with the convening of the Evaluation Committee, and once again the academic world and civil society organizations have decided to participate. The nomination of Dr. Magaly Vásquez for chief prosecutor is a clear example and reflects the same logic that led human rights organizations to participate in the discussions around the Amnesty Law: when civil society comes together, it can take advantage of even minimal conditions to make itself heard and push decision-making toward, at the very least, more “palatable” outcomes.

Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized?

In this process, as in the legislative debates mentioned earlier, there is an absence: the representation of all the country’s political actors. This absence (which includes a large portion of the opposition) is not simply an act of selfishness. On the contrary, their position is rooted in values and principles that prevent them from recognizing any legitimacy in the National Assembly. That stance deserves respect and admiration. However, it is worth asking whether that inflexible position is preventing them from becoming involved in processes that are producing real consequences for real people, inside and outside the country.

We know that these steps are not gestures of democratization. They appear instead to be targeted concessions designed to manage external pressure and preserve power. But achieving the appointment of a credible chief prosecutor or ombudsman could, even if only gradually, begin to rebuild a degree of institutional independence.

This leads me to ask those in the opposition who still remain on the sidelines: if we do not recognize these processes from their origin, what happens to their results when an eventual political change arrives? Will a future democratic government treat the Amnesty Law as illegitimate? Will the hydrocarbon contracts signed by the interim government of Delcy Rodríguez be recognized? Will the institutional reforms that may emerge within the framework of the path outlined by the US be rejected? These questions arise when one notices the absence of the main political figures, or when their presence remains limited to criticism.

These are not rhetorical or ill-intentioned questions. Nor is this about abandoning principles. Rather, it is about recognizing that civil society organizations need backing, especially from political parties and movements. As was demonstrated on July 28, 2024, when society’s desire for change translates into participation and is channeled by political parties, it becomes an overwhelming movement with the potential to materialize that will for change.

At the same time, we must be realistic: the response of opposition leaders cannot be unconditional recognition of the National Assembly. Structurally, it remains an instrument of authoritarian control. What can materialize, however, is support for civil society in the processes in which it is already participating. These expressions of support do not seek to legitimize lawmakers elected under questionable circumstances. Rather, they seek to recognize the work and struggle of the intermediary organizations that are fighting to open spaces for institutional life.

Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding.

A clear example of support could be the one mentioned earlier. The process to appoint the heads of Poder Ciudadano should not be rejected from the outset. Instead, those who have chosen to submit their candidacies before the National Assembly’s Evaluation Committee—and who possess the necessary technical and civic credentials—should receive public support, while their names are circulated in the public arena. Put more plainly: make noise about it. Doing so would increase the cost for the regime, in the eyes of the Trump administration, of selecting individuals who are the complete opposite: people without technical qualifications or chosen solely for political loyalty.

Choosing to support participation from an external position carries implications that become clearer with every issue appearing on the legislative agenda. The reform of the Mining Law presented this week, for example, cannot follow the path taken by the Hydrocarbons Law, which was approved without consultation, transparency or the participation of those who will bear its costs.

Venezuelan scholars, environmental organizations, and Indigenous communities must be sitting at the table in the discussions on the mining law. And the opposition, if it truly aspires to represent Venezuelans and not simply oppose the regime, could present its own reform proposals to the organizations that decide to participate in the process. In this way, participation would be effectively “outsourced.” The direct actors are not recognized, but the work of leading institutions is acknowledged.

What is at stake is more than a specific law or appointment. January 3 set in motion a process of transition in Venezuela that we hope will reach a safe harbor and conclude with free elections. But we cannot forget that there is also a risk that these changes will become little more than a negotiation between the US and remnants of chavismo. Turning this transition into a Venezuelan process requires Venezuelan actors to claim leadership over the institutional processes now unfolding. On one side, civil society must act as the principal driver. On the other, the opposition must decide whether it will remain on the margins or become an active ally.

Transitions are never perfect, because in most cases the preexisting institutions are not trustworthy. Yet decisions made within those institutions tend to be more durable than the circumstances that gave rise to them. Participating in a flawed process does not mean surrendering one’s principles. Refusing to acknowledge the reality of the moment, by contrast, allows others to shape what will become the legal and institutional architecture of the transition. And possibly, the political landscape of the coming decades.

Decree strips parties of legal status and assets, as opposition leader calls on Guineans to resist

Guinea’s government has dissolved 40 political parties, including the country’s three main opposition groups, in a move critics say marks the final step towards a one-party state under President Mamady Doumbouya.

The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation issued the decree late on Friday, citing the parties’ failure to meet their legal obligations.

Beyond stripping them of their legal status, the order froze their assets and banned the use of their names, logos and emblems, with a government-appointed curator assigned to oversee the transfer of their holdings.

The three most prominent parties dissolved are the Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG), the Rally of the Guinean People (RPG) – the party of ousted former President Alpha Condé – and the Union of Republican Forces (UFR).

All three had already been suspended last August, weeks before a constitutional referendum that cleared the way for Doumbouya to stand in December’s presidential election.

UFDG leader Cellou Dalein Diallo, speaking from exile, accused Doumbouya of dismantling democratic life to entrench his grip on power. In a video posted to Facebook on Sunday, he said the dissolution was part of a deliberate drive to build a “party-state” and urged supporters to “rise as one” against a government that had lasted “far too long”.

He said that dialogue and legal routes had been exhausted, while his party’s communications coordinator went further, describing the decree as “the final act of a true political farce” aimed at cementing single-party rule.

Ibrahima Diallo, a leader in the pro-democracy National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, said the move had “formalised a dictatorship” and warned that Guinea was sinking into “profound uncertainty”.

The crackdown is the latest in a sustained campaign against dissent under Doumbouya, who seized power in a 2021 coup before winning a presidential election in December, a vote from which all major opposition figures were barred.

Since taking power, his government has shut down media outlets, banned protests and arrested or driven into exile scores of opposition figures and civil society activists.

Several relatives of prominent dissidents have also been abducted, and two well-known pro-democracy activists have been missing since July 2024.

Wave of coups

A wave of coups has brought military leaders to power in Africa, across a belt stretching from the Atlantic through the Sahel region to the Red Sea since 2020, while an attempted coup in Benin failed in late 2025.

The development has led to what analysts have described as a “coup belt“.

Madagascar’s and Guinea-Bissau’s armies most recently removed civilian leaders in their respective countries from power in late 2025, underscoring growing discontent with elected governments.

Although often carried out with popular backing, the military takeovers have also seen civil liberties clawed back.

A 2025 study found that while military takeovers have declined globally, the risk of coups in Africa remains comparatively high.

Two months after January 3, the country has found itself at an unprecedented crossroads with three main political actors: the chavista regime, the government of the United States, and the Venezuelan opposition.

Chavismo now faces a historically unique situation after 27 years of political (as well as social and economic) control. It is under pressure from the US to move toward a transition, while at the same time trying to contain the tensions that exist within its own internal structures.

For its part, Washington is trying to steer a transition in Venezuela that is acceptable for both its domestic and foreign policy, leveraging the influence it gained from the capture of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores over both the regime and the opposition.

And the opposition has entered a situation of undeclared conflict. In just a few days, the opposition landscape has shifted in unimaginable ways, with the perception of inaction from María Corina Machado, the sudden emergence of Enrique Márquez during the State of the Union address, and the rest of the opposition reassessing its options.

The inevitable amid uncertainty

The path toward a transition at this moment is uncertain. The regime is seeking a balance between satisfying US demands while avoiding, as much as possible, the deterioration of its own internal political and economic arrangements. At the same time, it continues to move quickly to consolidate control over the process, and more and more details are emerging about how it is setting the guidelines for the Rodríguez siblings. For instance, the visit this week by Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum.

The opposition universe appears to be an earthquake, above all amid the practical disappearance of María Corina Machado from public debate and, more recently, the “Márquez effect,” whose medium or long-term impact remains uncertain. Where there is consensus, however, is on the need for a new election. Marco Rubio, María Corina Machado, and now Enrique Márquez are on the same page: there must be new elections that legitimize the political transition. As for the Rodrigato, we can imagine what it thinks about that.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room.

Until just a few days ago, it would have been easy to argue that the opposition’s presidential candidate should be Machado. After all, the results of July 28, 2024 were fundamentally the result of her leadership, and she would have been the presidential candidate if the Maduro regime had allowed it.

But Márquez’s appearance in Washington DC and his subsequent press conference suggested that this Zuliano “black swan” could be acting with the acquiescence of both the Rodrigato and the Trump administration. Evidence of this includes Márquez being invited to Trump’s address, as well as his comments about a figure as close to the Rodríguez siblings as José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

For that reason, it now seems that there will be an election sooner or later. It also seems that, as things stand today, we could head into that election with at least two candidates on the opposition side.

That would be a good scenario for the Rodrigato.

New primaries

In times of legitimacy crisis, the proper course is to look to the sovereign. Given everything that has happened, it seems necessary to call a new primary vote to choose an opposition candidate—whoever the Rodrigato’s candidate may be—in the presidential election that must take place given Maduro’s absolute absence.

A new election to choose the opposition’s presidential candidate would be a way to confront several elephants in the room. The first is the need to present the other two actors (the regime and the United States) with an electoral calendar that should not be unnecessarily delayed. The second is the convenience of unifying and strengthening party structures. If the process is well managed, it could encourage a reunion of the different opposition forces around a common and higher objective.

Another elephant shaking Venezuela’s narrow public space is the urgency of restarting citizen mobilization around a concrete political initiative. Finally, those primaries could once again make it possible to go into a presidential election with a single candidate, preventing the regime from promoting multiple “opposition” candidacies to divide the electorate.

The primaries that chose Henrique Capriles as the candidate for the 2012 presidential election, and the primaries that selected María Corina Machado as the candidate for the 2024 presidential election, were good precedents for successfully resolving several political problems. Considering the sovereign is a good idea, or at least most of the time.

Feb. 27 (Asia Today) — The People Power Party on Thursday condemned a joint prosecutors-police raid on its headquarters as a politically motivated investigation and warned it could resort to what it called “extraordinary measures.”

The joint investigation team earlier in the day searched the party’s central office in Yeouido and a company managing its membership list as part of a probe into allegations that members of the religious group Shincheonji were improperly enrolled as party members during the 2021 presidential primary.

According to reports, the warrant cited alleged violations of the Political Parties Act and obstruction of business.

In a statement, senior party spokesperson Park Sung-hoon called the search “a targeted investigation against the main opposition party,” alleging it was intended to deflect criticism over the ruling party’s handling of controversial judicial reform bills.

“This is blatant oppression of the opposition,” Park said, accusing investigative agencies of acting as “shields for those in power while wielding swords against the opposition.”

Party lawmakers also questioned why other allegations involving figures linked to the ruling camp had not seen similar investigative momentum.

Rep. Joo Jin-woo cited bribery allegations involving former Oceans Minister Jeon Jae-soo, claiming the joint team was prioritizing action against the opposition while sidelining probes into ruling party figures. He called for the immediate appointment of a special prosecutor.

Rep. Jin Jong-oh urged authorities to apply the same investigative standards to the ruling Democratic Party, while floor leader Song Eon-seok described the situation as “suppression and annihilation of the opposition,” warning that the party would mobilize “extraordinary measures” in response.

Following news of the search, party leader Jang Dong-hyuk and other senior officials went to the headquarters to review the warrant with legal advisers and discuss countermeasures.

The investigation centers on claims that Shincheonji officials directed followers to register as responsible party members during the 2021 primary process. Authorities have not publicly detailed specific findings.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260227010008383