opinion

This year, in the US-China trade war and the grand military parade, China demonstrated economic and military strength that forced the United States to back down. However, Beijing merely displayed its power; various parties discovered that this giant does not know how to wield it.

The US paused its economic attacks on China, but the Dutch government directly “took control of” a Chinese-owned company in the Netherlands—Nexperia—through public authority. The EU expanded anti-dumping measures against China, with France as the main driver behind anti-China economic policies.

The US publicly acknowledged that China’s rising military power in the Western Pacific can no longer be suppressed and adjusted its global strategy to focus on the Western Hemisphere. Yet Japan shifted the Taiwan issue from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, adopting a more confrontational posture and challenging China’s bottom line. Regional countries, in various ways, have called for “peace” in the Taiwan Strait—support that amounts to nothing less than opposing China’s unification and indirectly endorsing Japan’s position. Meanwhile, the Philippines, mired in internal chaos, continued to provoke China in the South China Sea.

Since China has the capability to confront the US, it should have the ability to punish Europe, Japan, and the Philippines for their unfriendliness toward China. But Beijing did not do so. When facing challenges from these parties, it only issued symbolic verbal protests or took measures that failed to eradicate the problems—putting on a full defensive posture but lacking concrete and effective actions. As a result, events often started with thunderous noise but ended with little rain, fizzling out in the end.

From Beijing’s appeasement toward Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, all parties have reason to believe that China is a giant that doesn’t know how to use its own power. This presents a strategic opportunity for the weak to overcome the strong—especially now, as the US contracts its global strategy and distances itself from its allies. Maximizing benefits from China’s side is the rational choice.

For example, with Japan: Beijing responded to Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan issue with high-intensity verbal criticism, but its actions were inconsistent with its words. Although it revisited the “enemy state clauses” at the UN, raised the postwar Ryukyu sovereignty issue, and even conducted joint military exercises with Russia 600 kilometers from Tokyo, these actions were far less intense than the rhetoric. Even the verbal criticism cooled down after a month.

The US maintained a low profile on the China-Japan dispute, adopted a cool attitude toward Tokyo, and even indirectly expressed condemnation—likely the main reason Beijing de-escalated. This shows that China’s original intent in handling the incident was to force the US to “decouple” from Japan on the Taiwan issue and isolate Tokyo, which maintains close ties with Taipei.

Influenced by official attitudes, the Chinese people once again mistook official rhetoric for commitments, believing Beijing would go to war if necessary to eradicate Japan’s interference in internal affairs. After all, unresolved deep-seated hatred—akin to a sea of blood—remains between China and Japan. Moreover, this year marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, with various events held throughout the year to engrave in memory the national humiliation of Japan’s invasion of China.

But after Trump indirectly criticized Japan for provoking unnecessary disputes, Beijing seemed satisfied and stepped down gracefully. Although the dispute has not ended and continues to develop, like its handling of Philippine provocations, China has placed disputes with neighbors into long-term games, effectively shelving the issues—and causing the Chinese people renewed frustration.

After this three-way interaction, the asymmetry between Beijing’s words and actions has likely become deeply ingrained. In the future, it will be much harder for Beijing to mobilize the 1.4 billion people’s shared enmity.

The key point: In this dispute, who—China, Japan, or the US—gained the greatest substantive strategic benefits? So far, it’s hard to say who won the first round. China appeared to come out looking the best, preserving the most face, yet Japan also gained, and the US obtained leverage for future talks with China.

In the first round of this dispute, China strategically established the legitimacy of denying Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan issue, narrowing Tokyo’s diplomatic space for anti-China actions via Taiwan. Japan’s right wing advanced toward national normalization, hollowing out its peace constitution to cope with US strategic contraction; additionally, the Liberal Democratic Party regained public support. The US demonstrated its influence in East Asia—even after “withdrawing” its military to the second island chain—and raised its bargaining chips at the US-China negotiation table.

However, from a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan gains nothing worth the loss: the Ryukyu Islands will become a burden rather than an outer defense wall. The two major powers, China and the US, will orderly redraw their spheres of influence in East Asia; the US will gain a dignified pretext for abandoning Taiwan, while China will recover Taiwan at a lower cost.

Conversely, beyond the asymmetry between words and actions, there is also asymmetry between actions and strength. Beijing’s greatest loss is that the international community—especially its neighbors and Europe—has seen through China’s essence of appearing fierce but being timid inwardly. They have once again discovered that antagonizing China brings no adverse consequences; on the contrary, it can yield unexpected benefits—provided they give China the face it needs to achieve strategic gains.

For example, Vietnam: After the China-Japan dispute cooled, a Vietnamese warship transited the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of freedom of navigation without prior notification to China, signaling it is not a vassal of Beijing and aligning with Washington’s position.

Vietnam is a major beneficiary of the US-China confrontation, with massive Chinese goods rerouted through Vietnam to the US; transit trade has skyrocketed its economic growth. Thus, it firmly believes maximizing benefits lies in a neutral stance between China and the US. However, from a supply chain perspective, China is the supplier and the US the customer—the latter slightly more important. Factoring in China-Vietnam South China Sea disputes and China’s habitual concessions versus the lethal US carrot-and-stick approach, Vietnam naturally leans more pro-US.

Additionally, during the China-Japan dispute, Singapore’s prime minister publicly sympathized with Japan, while Thailand and Vietnam jointly called for peace in the Taiwan Strait—showing Southeast Asian nations, like Japan, hope to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose military conflict in the region, which is equivalent to opposing China’s recovery of Taiwan. Of course, Northeast Asia’s South Korea holds the same view; some countries publicly state it due to internal and US factors, while others choose silence.

China’s neighboring countries all see the fact that the Philippines’ intense anti-China stance has gone unpunished. Despite deep internal political turmoil, Manila can still spare efforts to provoke China in the South China Sea—clearly a profitable path. Neighbors conclude: If China can concede on core interests, what can’t it concede?

On the other side of the globe, Europe has noticed this phenomenon too. The Dutch government rashly took over a Chinese enterprise, severely damaging China’s interests and prestige; Beijing’s response started strong but ended weakly—mainly to avoid impacting China-EU trade, even amid decoupling risks everywhere. No wonder Britain subsequently sanctioned two Chinese companies on suspicion of cyberattacks, unafraid of angering Beijing just before Prime Minister Starmer’s planned January visit to China.

In short, whether on the regional Taiwan issue or extraterritorial China-EU economic issues, China faces a broken windows effect. Although from a grand strategic view, all related events remain controllable for Beijing, appeasement only invites more trouble. It’s not impossible that China will eventually be unable to suppress public indignation and be forced to suddenly take tough measures—like at the end of the pandemic, when people took to the streets and Beijing immediately lifted lockdowns, rendering all prior lockdown justifications untenable overnight.

Indeed, China currently appears as a giant that doesn’t know how to use its power. But when a rabbit is cornered, it bites. When Beijing is forced to align actions with strength, the intensity will be astonishing; then, China will want more than just face.

There’s a saying: Attack is the best defense. But with its long history, this nation views offense and defense more comprehensively. The Chinese believe that when weak, attack is the best defense; when holding an advantage, defense is the best attack. As long as the opponent’s offense can be controlled within acceptable limits, persistent defense inflicts less damage than the opponent’s self-exhaustion in stamina. Conversely, when at a disadvantage, a full assault is needed to reverse it.

In other words, China doesn’t fail to know how to use power; it deems using power uneconomical. This explains why the West walks a path of decline while China continues rising—the latter accumulates power, and the former overdraws it.

President Trump is shrewd and pragmatic; he knows cornering China awakens the giant, so he eased US-China relations. But simultaneously, the US doesn’t mind—and even quietly encourages—its allies to provoke China, while positioning itself as a mediator to benefit. This is a reasonable tactic and the most effective offensive against China.

Xi Jinping once said China has great patience—implying that if patience is exhausted, the world will see a completely different China, one that uses power without regard for cost.

The Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2025 identified eight key tasks for China’s economic work in 2026. Several of these areas particularly interest me as a China expert. Among the most important tasks for China’s economic work in 2026 is promoting a policy of supporting service exports through various measures to boost household income, raise basic pensions, and remove restrictions in the consumer sector. What struck me most during the Central Economic Conference meetings in Beijing in December 2025 was its emphasis on China’s continued opening up. This will provide tremendous global growth opportunities by expanding trade and investment, especially in the technology and renewable energy sectors, deepening integration into global value chains, and increasing demand for resources. This will drive the global economy in conjunction with China and create new partnerships, focusing on “high-quality development” and “high-level opening up” as fundamental pillars for mutual benefit and to stimulate innovation within the Chinese economy.

–            Main Tasks of the Beijing Economic Conference in December 2025

1)       Providing a huge market and investment opportunities: By increasingly encouraging the opening of its doors to foreign companies, China will create diverse opportunities in various sectors such as technology, innovation, and services.

2)       Making the Chinese economy an engine of global growth: The recovery and growth of the global economy depend heavily on China’s contribution, which accounts for a large share of the global economy.

3) Expanding free trade: China strongly supports free trade and the signing of regional agreements, reducing barriers and promoting trade exchanges.

4) Expanding the wheel of Chinese overseas investment: By significantly deepening the contribution of Chinese direct investment abroad to the economic development of other countries.

5)       Promoting innovation-led development in China to accelerate the development of new growth engines in 2026: This will bring significant benefits to foreign consumers and investors.  The meeting approved a package of policies aimed at strengthening the role of companies in innovation and implementing a new round of measures to develop high-quality key industrial chains, deepening and expanding fields such as artificial intelligence, which will bring more innovation opportunities to the world.

– Sectors in which China will expand in the future:

A) Innovation and Technology: China is a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and agricultural technology, driving global innovation.

B) Advanced Manufacturing: China’s rapid transition to high-quality development focuses on industrial upgrading and technological innovation, creating new products and services.

C)     Promoting Globalization: China opposes protectionism and supports inclusive economic globalization, creating a more interconnected and integrated global economy.

D)     Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind: The ultimate goal of China’s economic growth is to achieve common development and improve livelihoods for all, promoting win-win international cooperation.

–             Areas of China’s contribution to global development and the global economy in 2026, through:

1)       Product supply: As the “world’s factory,” with a focus on advanced technology.

2)       Demand stimulation: China’s enormous demand for commodities, energy, and raw materials supports other economies.

3)       Knowledge and technology transfer: Through investments and joint ventures.

4)       Support for sustainable development: By focusing on clean energy and green sectors.

   Accordingly, we understand that the main tasks for 2026, identified during the Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2026, are comprehensive and diverse. Chief among them is building a strong domestic market in China, reflecting a future strategic direction for the Chinese economy. This will promote sustainable development, support high-quality growth, foster innovation-led development, and uphold openness to the outside world. This means providing broader development opportunities for foreign investment and achieving growth that is synchronized with the development of the Chinese economy.

The Thai-Cambodian tension is almost uniformly treated as a manageable bilateral issue, serious but contained, sensitive but familiar. This is a mistake. The real implication of the dispute is not the danger it poses of immediate escalation but rather what it indicates of the future security order of Southeast Asia and of ASEAN’s decreasing strategic relevance in the formation of that order. The problem is not that ASEAN lacks goodwill or experience, but that it is increasingly misaligned with the type of conflicts now emerging within its own region. At the heart of the dilemma is a category mistake: ASEAN was never constituted to arbitrate or adjudicate, only to regulate. Its diplomatic culture emphasizes confidence-building practices and the maintenance of open, institutionalized avenues for dialogue. Those are things necessary and reasonable. Territory sovereignty is different; it is zero-sum and domestically chiseled. As such, solving such disputes with ASEAN’s traditional toolkit is to operate outside one’s skill set, not unlike an artist trying to bake a cake.

Border tensions play a role in domestic politics on both sides. They play into narratives of sovereignty, justify military readiness, and distract from internal pressures. Crucially, escalation is not an end in itself. Escalation has its risks; resolution has its concessions. Protracted ambiguity, on the other hand, can be handled politically. ASEAN’s preference for dialogue without deadlines, restraint without enforcement, and consensual rather than arbitrated decision-making seems to reproduce this state of equilibrium. This dynamic is often misinterpreted as diplomatic paralysis. It is instead the reflection of a stable, albeit fragile, strategic equilibrium. ASEAN offers a forum for de-escalation. From the standpoint of member states, this is not an institutional malfunction but a rational outcome. The costs of change exceed the benefits, especially when national leaders must answer to domestic audiences that reward toughness over compromise. Where this method turns strategically perilous is in the aggregate. Managed conflicts are not frozen conflicts; they harden over the years. Military interventions are normalized, crisis rhetoric becomes established, and trust dribbles away. What begins as stability based on restraint gradually transforms into militarized coexistence. This process is not the escalation of the crisis but its solidification. As strife becomes routine, the region becomes accustomed to permanent insecurity, and politicians come to treat it as usual, not abnormal.

The regional context renders this trend more significant. Southeast Asia is not functioning in a permissive strategic environment today. Competition among the great powers is increasingly shaping the calculations of states in the region. Thailand’s security ties and Cambodia’s external alignments are not marginal to the conflict; they are part of its strategic backdrop. With external alignments solidifying, tensions within the region are becoming less easy to isolate. Even when they are not directly involved, the great powers’ presence changes bargaining behavior, threat perceptions, and strategic confidence. ASEAN can least afford to see its centrality challenged now. Centrality is strategically and politically meaningful when regional institutions make rather than take outcomes. When disagreements are settled outside the ASEAN framework through bilateral interests, external balancing, or strategic ambiguity, the organization’s role is so minimal as to be symbolic at worst. The consultations and statements continue, but the real influence is shifting elsewhere. ASEAN, over time, also runs the risk of becoming a platform on which it simply reacts rather than organizes and shapes regional strains.

The economic aspect makes the matter even more complex. ASEAN’s integration project presupposes a degree of predictability and strategic restraint. However, it is not entirely effective while security tensions between the two remain unresolved. Border disputes impede cross-border trade and infrastructure planning and introduce risk into investment calculations. They seldom produce immediate or dramatic changes, but they do build up. For a while, economic integration can coexist with political tensions, but not forever. Often, uncertainty begins to erode confidence, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, where connectivity is most vulnerable to instability. The fundamental problem, then, is not whether ASEAN can stop war. It pretty much can, and it often does. The more profound question, then, is whether war prevention is sufficient in a region under such long-term strategic duress. A security order based solely on restraint, without avenues for resolution, will erode its ability to adapt. It treats the symptoms and not the causes of these problems. This does not necessitate that ASEAN turn away from its founding principles, but rather that it apply them in new and innovative ways. Consensus and respect for non-interference continue to be the pillars of regional cohesion. However, they no longer suffice. Without additional tools in the toolbox, such as informal arbitration, issue-specific mediation regimes, or more explicit regional norms on appropriate dispute behavior, ASEAN will remain trapped in a stance of containment, with no progress.

Overall, the Thai–Cambodian tension is no mere side issue. It shows how latent tensions, domestic politics, and external competition converge in ways that ASEAN cannot fully control. The risk is not a sudden breakdown but strategic stagnation: a region at peace but progressively divided, stable but strategically tenuous, and whose members continue to hesitate over which direction they want to take. If ASEAN is ever to have a fundamental, not just a token, role, it has to face up to this fact, not just in rhetoric but in its structures. This decision will determine whether the future security structure in Southeast Asia is built on deterrence of conflict or on the tolerance of latent tensions as the price of regional cohesion.

The Central Economic Conference meeting in Beijing in December 2025 proposed that “adhering to opening up to the outside world and promoting win-win cooperation in various fields” should be one of the main tasks of China’s economic work in the coming year. In 2025, China issued the “Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment in 2025,” and simultaneously, the 8th China International Import Expo 2025 was held in Shanghai. It was also agreed that the Hainan Free Trade Port would officially launch island-wide independent customs operations on December 18, 2025. This would bring numerous opportunities and momentum to support China’s continued opening up for global economic development.

 The year 2026 marks the launch of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. The Central Economic Conference was held in Beijing in December 2025, a significant historical juncture as the 14th Five-Year Plan drew to a close and the 15th began. This held particular significance, as the world looked to China’s economic planning for the coming year for inspiration and opportunities. China’s continued opening up in 2025 represents a vital engine for the global economy, contributing approximately 30% to global growth.

–            The opportunities and momentum generated by these policies are evident in the following areas:

1)       Deepening Institutional Opening through the Hainan Free Trade Port

  The launch of independent customs operations at Hainan Port on December 18, 2025, marked a milestone, transforming the port into a special customs zone governed by high-level international trade regulations.  With China’s ambitious trade facilitation plan, the percentage of duty-free goods in Hainan has risen from 21% to 74%, attracting significant investment. The island has already attracted more than 1.2 million enterprises.

2)       Stabilizing Foreign Investment (2025 Action Plan)

The “2025 Foreign Investment Stabilization Action Plan” aims to boost international investor confidence through practical measures, including opening new sectors by expanding pilot programs in telecommunications, healthcare, and education and supporting manufacturing and services by lifting restrictions on foreign investment across the entire manufacturing sector and encouraging investment in high-tech industries and green development. This has yielded numerous positive results for the Chinese economy, with China registering more than 49,000 new foreign-funded companies in the first half of 2025, representing a year-on-year increase of over 16%.

3)       China International Import Expo (CIIE 2025)

  The eighth edition of the expo in Shanghai solidified China’s position as a global launchpad for new products, achieving record-breaking figures. The expo saw record initial deals worth US$83 billion, a 4.5% increase over the previous year. With broad international participation, more than 4,500 companies from 138 countries participated, showcasing 461 new products and technologies.

4)       The Strategic Direction of the Chinese Economy for 2026 and Beyond

  The Central Economic Work Conference, held in Beijing in December 2025, affirmed that the main task for the coming year, 2026, is to ensure a strong start to the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) while achieving mutually beneficial cooperation. This will be accomplished by China focusing on aligning its domestic regulations with high-level international economic and trade standards in areas such as government procurement, e-commerce, and finance.  This should coincide with achieving sustainable growth in the Chinese economy, especially given the International Monetary Fund’s upward revision of its growth forecast for China to 5% for 2025, which underscores the resilience of the Chinese economy in the face of global shocks.

  Accordingly, we understand the extent of China’s aspirations to achieve new developmental and economic leaps during 2026, with numerous promising future opportunities available to China. It possesses the capacity to simultaneously improve the quality and scale of development, achieve a strong launch for its 15-year plan, and offer more ambitious investment and development opportunities to the world. 

The Technology Mind Health half-day summit, hosted by the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG) and its partners, brought together interdisciplinary leaders, researchers, and thinkers to explore the intersection of digital technologies and human psychological well-being. Reflecting the Academy’s foundational mission to enhance the development of governments, businesses, academia, civil society, and consumers through ethical and human-centered deployment of technology, the event underscored that technological progress, when governed thoughtfully, can strengthen individual and collective mental health rather than undermine it.

What made this event truly unparalleled on a global scale was its extraordinary diversity, uniting every geography and every generation under the Global Academy’s platform. No other gathering brings together both the developing and the developed world in such a format—not only in its audience but also among its speakers.

The summit indeed offered a genuinely equal platform across continents and age groups: from seasoned experts and leading professionals to the youngest participant, just 11 years old. All stood side by side, engaged in a shared mission to confront one of the most urgent issues of our time, the relationship between technology, mind, and health, and to collectively explore the challenges and chart future pathways.

Or, as the Development-8 Secretary-General, Isiaka A. Imam, urged previously, the emerging digital world must be co-written by all nations, not inherited by a few. These are words that were further detailed by Charles Oppenheimer, who warned that AI is a new primordial fire, powerful enough to uplift humanity or to undo it. 

Mission and Framing

Founded to advance the ‘3M’ matrix (maximum good for maximum species over maximum time), mindful, measurable, and mutually beneficial technological integration across sectors, the Global Academy for Future Governance promotes sustainable progress free of hidden social, environmental, and health costs. Its interdisciplinary, multispatial, cross-sector mandate aligns with pressing global needs to distinguish substantive technological challenges from hype and to strengthen frameworks that enable early identification and mitigation of risks.

The Technology Mind Health summit of early December 2025 opened with a warm introduction delivered by Dr. Philippe Reinisch, GAFG co‑founder. He highlighted this gathering as the inaugural event for the newly created GAFG and emphasized the importance of bridging technology and society with human enhancement, including human mental wellness.

Acting as the GAFG host, Jesinta Adams, Assistant Director-General of GAFG, spoke passionately about the central role different generations play at the intersection of technology and mind health. 

Voices from Leadership and Thought

The event began with a prerecorded (unauthorized) address by Dr. Khaled El‑Enany Ezz, a candidate for UNESCO Secretary‑General. This powerful note reflected on humanity’s current crossroads amid rapid technological change, underscoring rising challenges related to health, wealth inequality, and psychological well‑being. He emphasized education as the essential tool for guiding technological deployment with wisdom, extending beyond technical mastery into cultural and ethical literacy. His message was clear: “Use technology as a tool rather than a master.”

Following this, Vladimir Norov, former Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan and former Secretary‑General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, addressed the Summit. He drew attention to expanding societal risks, including threats to mental health, social cohesion, privacy, and equitable access, but urged attendees to consider the transformative potential of AI when governed ethically. Highlighting examples from medical innovation in Central Asia, Norov stressed three core principles for beneficial technological integration: human‑centered design, ethical governance, and resilience building. He concluded, “Technology does not replace us but elevates us.” 

Expert Contributions on Mind, Health, and Technology

Closing on the high level, the keynote addresses and the substantive section as the central part of the Summit have started with Dr. KaT Zarychta, a specialist in technology, innovation, and holistic health. She opened by comparing artificial intelligence to the human mind, reminding audiences that AI cannot feel, empathize, or emotionally self‑correct. She argued that the most effective path forward lies in human‑AI collaboration, where evidence‑based digital tools support rather than supplant human capacities. Dr. Zarychta closed with a call to co‑create a world where psychological well‑being is nurtured and protected in tandem with technological innovation.

As the next speaker, Marisa Peer, RTT founder and bestselling author, focused on the role of social media as a source of disconnection and psychological distress. She highlighted the platforms’ addictive dynamics and their proliferation of unrealistic ideals that fuel dissatisfaction and self‑doubt. She urged reimagining digital spaces as tools for learning, growth, and mental enrichment—enabling technology to expand, not contract, human potential.

Prof. John A. Naslund, co‑director of the Mental Health for All Lab at Harvard Medical School, addressed the global mental health crisis, particularly rising depression rates. He introduced the EMPOWER Model, a psychosocial behavioral intervention framework emphasizing community‑based support and scalable delivery. Naslund highlighted the model’s adaptability, from teenagers to adults, and its multilingual expansion, demonstrating how evidence‑driven designs can strengthen resilience across populations.

Dr. Malek Bajbouj, Head of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at Charité Berlin, examined psychological health in contexts of conflict, pandemics, and ecological anxiety. He described the accelerating demand for mental health support and positioned trustworthy digital tools as essential if governed ethically. According to Dr. Bajbouj, resilient mental health systems rest on population‑wide strategies, transparent communication, and sustained trust in public institutions.

From Uruguay, Professor María Castelló of the Clemente Estable Research Institute investigated neurological and psychological effects of prolonged technology use, especially in youth. She highlighted concerns about brain development, anxiety, depression, and unhealthy digital habits. Yet Castelló also acknowledged potential cognitive benefits, such as enhanced memory, behavioral functioning, and multitasking skills. Her call to action called for policies that address digital inequities and mental health from a neuro‑social perspective rather than one‑size‑fits‑all approaches. 

In her part, Prof. Birgitta Dresp-Langley identified excessive childhood exposure to digital environments as a central factor underlying a range of growing health concerns. Prolonged screen time indoors reduces children’s exposure to natural daylight, which is essential for healthy visual development, sleep regulation, and metabolic balance. This deficit is linked to increasing rates of early myopia, obesity, sleep disorders, depression, and behavioral difficulties, with risks emerging even in very young children.

French professor Dresp-Langley proposes a unifying biological model in which reduced daylight and increased artificial light disrupt vitamin D and melatonin production, leading to deregulation of serotonin and dopamine pathways in the developing brain. These neurochemical changes resemble those seen in addictive disorders and may result in long-term cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences. She concluded her detailed writing contribution to the Summit by concluding that urgent awareness, preventive policies, and increased outdoor activity are needed to mitigate these risks.

Youth Engagement and Future Directions

The event culminated with the announcement of winners from the Technology Mind Health Essay Competition, led by Theodora Vounidi (Balkan Youth Initiative founder). Contestants (aged 14-18 and 18-28) discussed the correlation between digital technology and mental health and the need for balance between analog and digital time, as well as the newly formed ‘always online’ (sub-)culture.

With 40 global submissions comprising about 60 writers, as some elected to work in teams, including from the youngest entrant at age 11 (demoiselle Tess), the competition highlighted both the breadth of youth engagement and the global relevance of the human technology dialogue.

First place was awarded to Nikos Galitsis from Greece, second place to Claudio Monani from Italy, and third place was awarded to Kenedy Agustin from the Philippines, while fourth place was secured by a participant from India. Fifth place was awarded to the youngest entrant from Singapore. The top three winners of the competition were given the opportunity to present their work, offering insightful perspectives on the emerging intersection of technology and mental health. 

Main takeaways & future outlook

The Technology Mind Health summit highlighted a crucial truth—as encapsulated in the closing remarks by Prof. Anis H. Bajrektarevic, GAFG cofounder, “technological advancement is inevitable, but its impact on humanity is not predetermined—it depends on the collective choices we make.”

Across sessions, speakers emphasized that technology can either be a catalyst for psychological well-being or a source of disruption, depending on how it is designed, governed, and integrated into society. Ethical frameworks, evidence-based policies, and human-centered governance are essential to ensure that digital tools empower rather than diminish individual and collective mental health.

Equally important is the role of education, intergenerational dialogue, and global collaboration. As the GAFG summit demonstrated, solutions require insights from every sector, culture, and age group—from seasoned professionals to the youngest participants. By fostering awareness of risks such as digital overexposure, social media-induced stress, and inequitable access, while simultaneously encouraging innovative approaches for mental wellness, society can navigate the technological landscape thoughtfully.

Ultimately, the responsibility to shape a future where technology enhances rather than undermines human flourishing lies with all stakeholders—governments, academia, civil society, businesses, and individuals alike.

By successfully conducting such a complex and content-rich event, the GAFG demonstrated its true capability to provide flexible, impartial, and highly engaging solutions for the FAST technology to both the public and private sectors.

In recognition of the summit’s success and the youth essay competition’s impact, the Global Academy for Future Governance (GAFG) has decided to annualize both the Technology-Mind-Health Summit and the essay competition (with its BYI partner), ensuring ongoing dialogue and engagement at the intersection of technology, meridians, generations, and mental well-being.

As Afghanistan reevaluates its economic geography in light of the deteriorating relations with Pakistan, India has become a major option for Kabul in its quest for diverse trade routes. The recent top-level meetings between the Taliban and the Indian government indicate a desire on the part of the former to diminish their reliance on the Pakistani transit corridors and to gain more strategic independence. However, India’s role is more a matter of political calculation than of geographical convenience. Afghanistan has no direct land route to India, and therefore its trade with India is expensive routes via Iran with limited air corridors, making it very difficult for a sanctions-hit and cash-strapped economy to scale up. Although the engagement with New Delhi gives the Afghan government the chance to send diplomatic signals and obtain very limited economic relief, it also poses the question of whether India is going to be a long-term trading partner or merely a geopolitical counterweight in Kabul’s broader regional strategy.

Taliban officials have begun signalling a recalibration of economic policy. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar publicly urged Afghan traders to explore alternative transit corridors, accusing Pakistan of using border closures as a tool of political pressure. Shortly thereafter, Nooruddin Azizi, Minister of Industry and Commerce of Afghanistan, had an official visit to New Delhi on 19 November 2025 for official discussions aimed at increasing bilateral trade, enhancing the mechanisms for import and export and finding out different ways for Afghan businesses to trade. This visit comes after the Afghanistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi’s trip to India in October that lasted for eight days, which was his first trip to India, for which he was granted a temporary UN sanctions exemption, even though India has not yet recognized the Taliban government.

Over the past two decades, the Taliban’s propaganda has been persistently depicting India as a Hindu “kafir” state that is supporting the “anti-Islam” forces in Kabul, making Indian diplomats look like enemies and Indian consulates like secret intelligence stations working against Afghanistan and Pakistan. The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was declared as a holy war against the “un-Islamic idols” and the whole Buddhist-Hindu civilization, which was a clear indication of the Emirate’s hardline ideological approach. However, this narrative has changed for political and economic reasons.

Moreover, the Taliban, having once described the Indian state as their ideological enemy, are now actively courting India, even sending their foreign minister and commerce minister to New Delhi to get access to trade routes and investment in infrastructure. However, the newly established open channels of communication between the two parties are indicative of a major pragmatism shift, wherein the former rhetoric of enmity and ideological purity has been replaced by the language of using one another in business transactions, thus, signaling the willingness of Afghanistan to retrieve economic lifelines and gain a strategic position in a region.

Historically, Taliban’s official communications are filled with references to Islamic unity, historical connections, and the values of Muslim brotherhood in its relationship with Pakistan. However, when relations with Islamabad were strained over the Tehrik-i-Taliban support, as well as border management and refugees; the Emirate quickly turned to engagement with other regional states instead of reconciliation with its closest Muslim neighbor. This selective realism reveals a definite order of priorities; Afghanistan is ignoring Pakistan’s main security issues but is ready to do anything for a state that is Hindu-majority and can offer trade routes, investment, and international legitimacy.

This transactional approach is not only limited to regional politics but also encompasses the global economic system. The Taliban constantly criticized “Western economic slavery“, interest-based financial systems and considering themselves as an ideological alternative to the West. Nowadays, the Taliban are lobbying India who is heavily involved in the Western capital markets and global financial networks positively to get banking access, reconstruction projects, and investments. The ideological rigidity at home is sharply contrasted with the foreign policy flexibility; those states which were once labelled as anti-Islamic are now being courted for material and political gains.

The Taliban’s selective pragmatism is also evident in the territorial and security sensitive issues. On one hand, they keep on challenging the issue of the Durand Line with Pakistan, an internationally recognized border between both states, while on the other hand, they are quite liberal with India. Likewise, in the past, Taliban-associated clerics and militants celebrated jihad in Kashmir, denounced Indian government actions toward Muslims there and such discourse got muted during visits to Delhi. It is very clear that economic and diplomatic goals are prioritized over ideological or sectarian consistency.

Afghanistan’s trade pivot underscores the delicate balance between ambition and structural reality. While the Taliban’s efforts to diversify transit routes reflect a desire for economic autonomy and greater regional leverage, geographic constraints, limited infrastructure, and entrenched economic patterns impose severe limitations. Engagement with India offers symbolic and partial relief, yet Pakistan remains the linchpin of Afghan commerce, providing the fastest and most cost-effective access to global markets. The Emirate’s strategy is as much a political signal-demonstrating flexibility, pragmatism, and a quest for de facto recognition as it is an economic maneuver. Ultimately, Afghanistan’s “strategic heart of Asia” narrative will be tested not by intent but by its capacity to reconcile aspiration with the unyielding realities of terrain, logistics, and regional interdependence.

The Eurovision likes to sell itself as a glittering exercise in European unity, colorful, loud, proudly diverse, and (officially) above politics. Yet anyone who has watched the contest with both eyes open knows that “apolitical” has always been more of a brand promise than a lived reality. In late 2025, that gap widened into a full-blown crisis, as a number of broadcasters reported across outlets that Spain, Ireland, Slovenia, the Netherlands, and Iceland signaled they would not take part in Eurovision 2026 after the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) decided not to exclude Israel amid the ongoing war in Gaza, Palestine.

This episode is not simply “politics invading culture.” It reflects a shift in how legitimacy is demanded and contested in Europe’s cultural diplomacy, particularly when public broadcasters operate under constant online scrutiny. A constructivist lens helps explain why withdrawal can become socially “appropriate” not only because of interests, but because identities, norms, and public expectations set the boundaries of acceptable action.

Eurovision’s political DNA

Eurovision was launched in 1956 as a post-war cultural bridge. Its origin story is important: a shared stage was meant to build familiarity, and familiarity was meant to soften rivalry. That heritage still shapes the contest’s self-image. But Eurovision has long functioned as a stage where politics appears in coded ways through voting patterns, representation debates, and symbolic messaging.

In 2026, the argument is no longer coded. The EBU’s insistence that Eurovision must remain apolitical is being tested by publics who increasingly expect cultural institutions to reflect basic humanitarian values. This tension has been building for years, but the Palestine crisis and the EBU’s decisions have turned it into a legitimacy problem, not merely a public relations headache.

Why withdrawal became “appropriate”

Constructivism in international relations focuses on how identities and norms shape behavior. States and national institutions do not act only from material interests; they also act from what is socially acceptable, what fits their self-image, and the expectations of their audiences.

Three dynamics stand out.

Identity signalling, domestically and externally

For several withdrawing countries, participation carried an identity cost. Public broadcasters—especially those that see themselves as guardians of civic values—operate within national narratives about solidarity, rights, and moral responsibility. Remaining in the contest while public debate framed Israel’s participation as incompatible with humanitarian concerns risked looking like complicity or indifference. Withdrawal, by contrast, functioned as a signal: this is who we are, and this is the line we will not cross.

Importantly, this signalling was not addressed only to external audiences. It was also addressed inward towards domestic publics, artists, and civil society networks. In many European societies, those constituencies are no longer passive consumers of cultural events; they are active participants in the reputational economy surrounding public institutions.

Norm cascades and moral momentum

Once a few broadcasters moved towards withdrawal, the decision quickly gained social momentum. This is what Finnemore and Sikkink described as a “norm cascade”: when a norm shifts from being optional to being expected, and the reputational cost of non-compliance rises. In practical terms, it can start to feel safer to leave than to stay—because staying invites condemnation, while leaving can be framed as moral coherence.

This is also why the dispute escalated so quickly. A single broadcaster withdrawing is a story. Multiple broadcasters withdrawing is a pattern, and patterns trigger moral comparisons. The question changes from “Why did they leave?” to “Why are you still staying?”

The ‘apolitical’ norm is under strain because it looks selective.

The apolitical claim does not collapse simply because people become more emotional. It collapses when it appears inconsistent. Critics repeatedly pointed to Russia’s exclusion in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine and asked why a different standard was being applied now. The EBU, for its part, has emphasized the contest’s non-political ethos and introduced new rules aimed at insulating Eurovision from government influence.

But in the public sphere, the argument is not purely procedural. It is moral and comparative: if Eurovision can act decisively in one case, why not in another?

Constructivism predicts that institutions struggle when the norms they rely on no longer align with the moral intuitions of their audiences. That is exactly what this crisis reveals.

Digital activism as a legitimacy engine

If this controversy had happened twenty years ago, it would likely have moved more slowly, mediated by newspapers and official statements. Today it unfolds in a real-time digital public sphere where narratives travel quickly across borders and reputational costs escalate fast. Online mobilization—through petitions, artist statements, and hashtag campaigns—helped turn Eurovision into a symbolic battleground, pressuring broadcasters to respond to highly visible moral claims.

Two effects matter most. First, digital dynamics accelerate moral consolidation, which means once “selective neutrality” becomes a dominant frame, hesitation itself is read as a political stance. Second, institutions face continuous visibility. Decisions are no longer a single event but an ongoing justification process, renewed by viral moments and high-profile protest actions linked to Israel’s inclusion.

For cultural diplomacy, this shifts the logic of soft power from image-making towards moral credibility under public scrutiny.

Withdrawal as cultural diplomacy

Withdrawal from Eurovision is, in a strict sense, symbolic. But symbolism is precisely what cultural diplomacy trades in. The act of leaving, particularly when done by public broadcasters, served three strategic functions.

First, moral signalling, which meansbroadcasters and states communicated alignment with humanitarian values and a refusal to normalize perceived injustice.

The second one is reputation management.  In a digital environment, silence can be more costly than action. Withdrawal can reduce domestic backlash and preserve trust in public institutions.

Last, this is ethical positioning as soft power.  The logic of soft power is shifting from colorful branding to ethical coherence. A state may gain credibility not by appearing “fun,” but by appearing consistent with its professed values.

These functions help explain why the controversy is bigger than Eurovision. What is being tested is the idea that cultural platforms can remain insulated from global crises. Many audiences no longer accept that separation.

The EBU’s dilemma: rules, legitimacy, and consistency

The EBU now sits at the center of competing demands. On one side is the institutional need for predictability: rules that keep Eurovision from becoming an arena for state-to-state confrontation. On the other side is the public demand for moral consistency: rules that do not appear selective or politically convenient.

The EBU’s recent approach of avoiding an immediate exclusion decision while adjusting rules—may be defensible from a governance perspective.

Yet governance solutions do not automatically restore legitimacy, because legitimacy is also emotional and relational. It depends on whether audiences believe the institution is acting in good faith and applying standards fairly.

This is where cultural diplomacy meets a hard truth: neutrality is not simply declared; it is earned. And in the digital age, it is re-earned continuously.

What this means for Europe’s cultural diplomacy

Three implications stand out.

First, moral expectation is becoming structural.  European publics increasingly demand moral coherence not only from governments but from cultural institutions as well. Cultural diplomacy is being asked to carry ethical weight.

Second, “European values” are being operationalized. They are no longer abstract slogans. They are used as benchmarks to judge institutions and to accuse them of hypocrisy when they fall short.

Third, public opinion has become a strategic force, not background noise.  Digital mobilization can shape state behavior indirectly by pressuring broadcasters, artists, and institutions that sit at the heart of national identity.

Policy takeaways

If the EBU seeks to protect Eurovision’s legitimacy without turning it into a geopolitical tribunal, three steps would help. First, it should clarify participation principles by defining what “neutrality” means operationally and what thresholds trigger institutional action. Second, it should build a credible consistency mechanism, as audiences will continue comparing cases and demanding transparent reasoning. Third, the EBU should treat the digital sphere as part of governance: proactive engagement and rapid clarification now shape institutional survival as much as formal rule-making.

Conclusion

Eurovision 2026 is not simply a cultural controversy with political noise attached. It is a case study in how identity, norms, and digital activism are reshaping Europe’s cultural diplomacy. Constructivism helps explain why withdrawal became not only possible but, for some, necessary: it aligned state-linked institutions with the moral expectations of their publics.

Eurovision was built to bridge Europe after war. Ironically, its newest crisis shows that unity today is conditional: audiences increasingly expect cultural institutions to be transparent, consistent, and ethically credible, especially when global suffering is impossible to ignore.

In June 1967, when the sun was rising over the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Israeli fighter squadrons skimming through the coastlines at low altitude struck Egyptian airbases with a devastating blow. Within barely a couple of hours, most of the Egyptian air forces were destroyed. Operation Focus was not a mere initiation of the Six-Day War, but it determined the final outcome of the war. When the ground offensives advanced across the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, Israel had already established its critical military superiority, namely, air supremacy. The Six-Day War remains a typical case of how a short, incisive, and highly compressed conflict could overturn the premise of regional deterrence and restructure the long-term strategic reality.

Almost 60 years later, a very different state is studying similar lessons. Based on its nuclear and missile capabilities and deepened defense cooperation with the Russians, nuclear-armed North Korea is refining tools that could enable its own version of a swift and high-impact attack. North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24 series—quasi-ballistic missiles modeled upon the Russian Iskander-M—have irregular, low-altitude trajectories that are designed to complicate missile defense. Through their recent use by Russia against Ukraine, North Korea has gained invaluable live-fire battlefield data, accelerating improvements in precision, reliability, and mobility during flight. In addition, thanks to Russian assistance—advanced technology, training assistance, and potential space-oriented targeting support—North Korea is securing capabilities that were unattainable in the past.

The strategic risk lies not in whether Pyongyang could literally replicate Operation Focus. Instead, the genuine risk lies in Kim Jong-un drawing wrongful lessons from the Six-Day War and the Russia-Ukraine War: that surprise, speed, and concentrated firepower could overwhelm the opponent before activating an effective response. If Pyongyang is convinced that a blitzkrieg is achievable or judges that nuclear blackmail could suppress the US and Japan’s intervention for a certain timeframe, the incentives for war could increase.

Ways That North Korea Could Attempt a Six-Day War-Style Blitzkrieg

Such perception—that momentum has changed—endangers the nowadays Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are expanding both in terms of magnitude and precision. Meanwhile, North Korea’s SRBM and MLRS systems could strike almost all major airbases and C2 nodes located within South Korea. North Korean SOF, who have long trained themselves with penetration operations via tunnels, submarines, and UAV drops, are carefully analyzing Russian tactics used in the Russia-Ukraine War, ranging from loitering munition to precision targeting of critical infrastructures. Pyongyang may imagine that by combining missile salvos, swarm drones, electronic jamming, SOF penetration, and nuclear escalation, it could paralyze South Korea’s initial response in the first few hours of the war and create a meaningful fissure in alliance coherence.

Here the Six-Day War offers a second powerful lesson. The opening phase of the war has greater importance than other phases. In 1967, Israel’s preemptive strike wiped out Arab air forces on the ground, granting unlimited air dominance to the IDF. Although North Korea could not attain air superiority, it could attempt something functionally similar—denying the US, Japan, and South Korea’s ability to conduct operations normally in the initial hours of the war. This could include simultaneous missile saturation on air defense batteries, fuel depots, hardened aircraft shelters, runways, and long-range sensors. Meanwhile, missiles with irregular trajectories might avoid radar detection and try to penetrate interception layers comprised of PAC-3, L-SAM, THAAD, and Aegis destroyers. Swarm drones could overwhelm short-range air defense or neutralize petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) depots and movable C2 vehicles. Cyber operations and GPS jamming would complement such a kinetic assault, creating friction and delays in the alliance response cycle.

Eventually, Pyongyang could conduct its own version of Operation Focus ‘in reverse,’ not to secure air dominance but to prevent opponents from achieving air supremacy. This is to enable North Korea to conduct SOF penetration, a limited armored push in and around the DMZ, and nuclear blackmailing to prevent reinforcement. Such an operation would be based on the similar logic—the ideal mixture of shock, speed, and confusion—that Israel showcased in Sinai and the Golan Heights.

Deterring Blitzkrieg: Lessons for the US, Japan, and South Korea

By using the Six-Day War as a reference, the US, Japan, and South Korea could figure out ways to deter North Korea’s aforementioned provocations. Israel’s victory in 1967 was not achieved solely by air supremacy but also through resilience in its mobilization system and the adaptability of its reserve forces. Once securing air dominance, the IDF swiftly mobilized its reserve forces, stabilized major frontlines, and executed critical maneuvers before Arab countries coordinated with one another. Meanwhile, North Korea might use an intensive SOF operation in the initial phase of the war to wreak havoc on South Korea—recreating the chaos that Israel’s opponents had to experience in 1967—by attacking leadership, transportation centers, and communication nodes.

The solution is clear. If South Korea could prevent internal paralysis in the first 24 to 48 hours of the war, North Korea’s ambitious surprise attack would be largely unsuccessful. Therefore, Seoul should treat protection against SOF, city defense, and civil-military resilience at a level equivalent to ‘air superiority.’ This means diffusion of C2, reinforcement of police and reserve forces, hardening communication, and ensuring that local governments could fully function even under missile strikes and SOF infiltration. Irrespective of the high intensity of an opening barrage, state function should be able to survive, maintain consistency, and prepare for countermeasures.

The political aftermath of the 1967 war is also an important lesson. Israel’s swift victory engendered long-term strategic burdens: the occupation problem, regional backlash, and disputes on legitimacy. It well demonstrates that a short and decisive war could create unpredictable, long-term spillover effects. Applying it to the Korean Peninsula, the US and its allies should have a clear picture regarding North Korea’s failed surprise attack or a regime change. Issues like securing WMD, China’s intervention, refugee flow, humanitarian stabilization, and restructuring North Korea’s political order cannot be managed in an impromptu manner.

The strategic task for Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul is to deny Pyongyang any illusion of a short war. Deterrence should be based on the confidence that North Korea cannot achieve within 6 hours what Israel achieved in 6 days. To make that happen, integration of missile defense systems, real-time intelligence sharing, enhancing the survivability of air bases, diffusion of key assets, and rapid counter-strike capabilities are necessary. Moreover, the US and its allies should establish a political foundation that could withstand a war of attrition—a type of conflict that North Korea cannot tolerate.

The global green transition has long been seen as a critical path to addressing climate change and reshaping economies. Yet, since 2020, this vision has faced a growing backlash. Rising energy prices, inflation, and the mounting financial strain on the middle class have made green policies increasingly unpopular in many developed nations. In the U.S., for instance, under the Trump administration, the green transition has been delayed under the pretext of inflation and job security. In Europe, despite some countries’ continued commitment to green initiatives, conservative political forces have begun to push back, casting doubt on the future of the green agenda. Even frameworks like Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) policies, once seen as a driving force for the green transition, are now under attack for “greenwashing”, further undermining their credibility.

What was once an ambitious, unified global vision for a greener future is now splintering into a series of competing political agendas. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, China’s green transition has shown a distinctive sense of continuity.

Unlike many Western nations, China’s green transition is not just about international agreements or ideological alignment. It is driven by deep, internal imperatives to address chronic pollution, improve public health, and upgrade its industrial base. The need for cleaner air and a more sustainable economy is not just a policy choice for China but an urgent requirement for the country’s reality.

This internal drive gives China a unique position to lead the charge in creating a “non-politicized global green coalition”, focused not on ideological divides, but on pragmatic, shared solutions.

With the U.S. scaling back its green subsidies and Europe facing political fragmentation, a leadership vacuum is emerging in global climate governance. In countries like France, Italy, and the Netherlands, right-wing forces are calling for delays to energy taxes and carbon-reduction targets, seeing the green agenda as an economic burden. Meanwhile, in the Nordic countries, while policies remain green, their influence is limited by their small size and capacity to drive global change.

This creates an opportunity for China to step in.

If China can embrace a pragmatic and non-politicized approach, it can work to rebuild cross-regional cooperation on green policies and lay the foundation for a new global green alliance. Such a coalition, focusing on technology, green finance, and shared standards, could bring together countries from East Asia, the Middle East, and emerging economies in Africa and Southeast Asia.

China’s green transition is driven by urgent domestic needs. In 2024, official statistics indicate that the proportion of days with good air quality in China reached 87.2 percent last year, up 1.7 percentage points from the previous year, though pollution remains a problem to be tackled. As China strives to reduce healthcare burdens and improve the quality of life for its citizens, its green transition becomes a necessity, not just a global strategy.

Unlike countries that frame their green policies in ideological terms, China’s approach is rooted in a concrete need for environmental and public health improvement. This focus on sustainabilitypositions China as a potential leader in advocating for non-ideological global cooperation on climate issues.

Indeed, China has already made significant strides in “green diplomacy”. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has increasingly focused on green development, with projects in clean energy, sustainable transportation, and ecological conservation now spread across over 100 countries. China’s leadership in renewable energy production, from photovoltaic modules to electric vehicles, gives it a competitive advantage in driving the green agenda forward. China is already the world’s largest producer of clean energy technology, with production capacities for solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries outpacing any other country.

But China’s green transition is not just about technology. The country is also emerging as a leader in green finance. China accounts for 60% of Asia’s green finance, which is roughly $200 billion. Its ability to offer affordable, high-quality green technologies to developing nations, combined with its leadership in green finance, makes it well-positioned to spearhead a new global green coalition.

While China has significant advantages, there are still challenges ahead. Some countries may perceive China-led green initiatives as another form of geopolitical influence. Western nations still control many critical certification systems and intellectual property related to green technologies, which could limit its ability to fully shape the global green agenda. Additionally, the long investment cycles and uncertain returns of green projects could stretch China’s financial resources.

To mitigate these risks, China could focus on building trust through joint projects with other nations and involving Western capital as investors or observers. Focusing on less politically sensitive areas, such as energy storage, carbon trading, and climate education, would also help to avoid ideological conflicts and build a more inclusive global green network.

The global green transition is not just an economic challenge. It is an opportunity to redefine international governance based on shared survival pressures. If China can lead the way with a focus on non-ideological cooperation and pragmatic action, it can help the world move beyond the current political fragmentation and build a greener, more sustainable future for all.

The first National Security Strategy of the United States of America was released in 1950 under President Truman. It set firm strategic goals based on the containment doctrine to limit the influence of communist ideology in the global order. This first national security strategy marked the beginning of limited global policing in US geopolitics, but it was less pragmatic and more principled realism.  American interests became specific to liberal internationalism and focused only on areas facing the spread of the communist threat.

The Core Security Thinking of the US

The core security thinking of Americans was to preserve their sphere of influence from any adversarial influence or intervention, echoing the Monroe Doctrine. The initial period had this core, and the first national security strategy laid the groundwork for this security thinking. In 1988, the scope of core security thinking expanded, and elements of realism advanced further, with the US beginning to engage in deterrence calculations and global outreach to build collective military alliances against the Soviets. Most importantly, the strategy also focused on strengthening the economy. The core security thinking in the US’s national security strategy by the late 1980s began to realize that, while the Monroe Doctrine is important, US strategic interests must also require adopting flexibility in its confrontational approach, guided by liberal internationalism and the containment of communism.

Pragmatism and Realism

After the Soviet disintegration, US National Security Strategy focused on navigating a multipolar world by reinforcing the idea of collective security under the H.W. Bush Administration. The 1991 and 1993 US National Security strategies expanded on the concepts that started to emerge in the late 1980s—deterrence and engagement. In the 1990s, this strategy was continued through Powell’s four pillars: strong defense, forward presence, alliances, and coalition-building. The national security strategy designs suggest that elements of pragmatism and distinctions of pure realism gradually began to take center stage in the US national security approach.

Strategy in Crises

The National Security Strategy changed after 9/11, possibly in response to shifted security priorities. The previous approach of principled realism, which involved pragmatic and defensive tactics, now showed a slight shift, with the US’s national security strategy emphasizing more openly offensive realism and dogmatism. By the mid-2000s, the US had reactionary national security strategies, moving away from the approach that began to develop in the late 1980s. Key shifts in security strategies after 2001 included the doctrine of preemption and unilateral actions, but another significant change was a major shift in the collective engagement perspective, differing from earlier ideas of shared strategic responsibilities among allies.

After 9/11, the US called on allies, particularly in NATO, to bear a greater share of the burden for collective defense efforts, shifting away from reliance solely on the US. The core security thinking, rooted in peace through engagement, shifted during the 1990s toward peace through strength. Another aspect, after the Monroe Doctrine, peace through strength, gained a label of permanence in the US National Security Strategy, though its effectiveness and emphasis varied over time.

Trump’s National Security Strategy: Rebooting and Readjustments

Trump’s 2025 national security strategy resembles his 2017 National Security Strategy. The nationalist ideals of America First and the focus on economic engagement—which is the main security approach this time—are a mix of realizations and reactions. The first reaction to the current global situation is reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, dubbed “Trump Corollary,” and the second is showing the will for peace through strength by deterrence. Even if conflicts occur, the strategy emphasizes engaging in conflict with strategic skill to quickly win wars with little to no casualties. The realization part of the strategy is the US increasing its understanding of collective efforts and economic strength. The strategy highlights stronger partnerships with countries like India for the Indo-Pacific.

Reaction and Challenge

The realistic approach in this strategy is flexible realism, aiming not at domination but at maintaining a balance of power, while not fully adopting defensive realism. The United States has embraced both offensive and defensive realism. Over the past ten years, the US National Security Strategy under Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden has incorporated elements of defensive realism along with principled realism, with the US gradually increasing its efforts to balance power through the promotion of liberal and pro-democratic values—examples include its Middle East policy and the revival of QUAD in 2017. However, a notable development in the 2025 strategy is the US’s willingness to undertake offensive actions to maximize security, such as Operation Midnight Hammer against Iran and expanding operations in Latin America against Venezuela. Another prominent aspect of this strategy is the US’s focus on Europe’s burden-sharing, attempting to lighten its responsibilities and emphasizing that Europe should stand on its own, while the US remains a facilitator in Europe’s development. However, it is no longer willing to assume a broader role—similar to sentiments after 9/11. This strategy likely reflects the challenges posed by a rising China, Russia’s multipolar approach, and increasing strategic competition in multilateral arenas. The Trump approach—as mentioned in the strategy—is not just a reboot of the US National Security strategy after the 2000s but with some realizations.

Realization

There is a growing realization, as highlighted earlier, that the US can no longer sustain a confrontational approach and aggressive, offensive realism. The Trump strategy for 2025 recognizes the need to incorporate elements from both the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The latter was characterized by defensive realism and principal realism features—approaches that the US emphasized during the Clinton years, when embracing multilateralism, economic diplomacy, and regional collective engagements became central to US national security strategy, paving the way for more pragmatic interventions. A similar recognition of Clinton’s policy of enlargement through engagement is reflected in Trump 2.0 National Security Strategy—Shifting from Aid to Trade with Africa, which exemplifies this focus on promoting economic diplomacy and broadening engagement.

The US National Security Strategy 2025 reflects the nation’s understanding of how to adapt its engagement with the global order while maintaining realism. This time, US security thinking appears to find a balance between engagement and deterrence, which in previous years often seemed to conflict.

Tourism has been said to be The Gambia lifeline. The Smiling Coast has been receiving thousands of visitors who come to the region due to its warm reception and lively culture. Tourism has been touted as one of the greatest success stories in the country with almost a fifth of the national GDP and with thousands of employees in the formal and informal sectors. But it is a silent fact, seldom admitted, that beneath the smiling faces and the colorful postcards there is a lot more to be lost than gained by the Gambia in its tourism business. Tourism appears as a treasure of the state, however, to a great extent it turned out to be a trap in the economy.

The Gambia imported into its own country has followed an economic paradigm of liberalism, despite the fact that it idealizes open markets, deregulation, and foreign investment as the fastest way to development. The premise was straightforward, with opening up the tourism industry to foreigners, the nation would acquire employment, expertise, competition and eventually general prosperity. The tourism situation in Gambia today however tells a different story. It is not romantic, empowering or lucrative as many make it out to be. Interdependence has not brought about mutual prosperity; it has brought dependence.

 A report released by UNCTAD (2022), the Gambia is losing up to 70 percent of its tourism income to foreign owned hotels, offshore booking systems, imported goods, airlines and repatriation of earnings. Most of the payments that are made by many tourists are made in Europe prior to getting on the plane. The government of Gambians has lost most of the potential earnings by the time they find themselves in Banjul.

This trend in the economy is not solely possible. It is indicative of a world dynamic as such as defined by dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank (1966) who opined that developing countries tend to provide labour, culture, and even resources, as wealth and power is drained to more dominant players in the global arena.

Control of tourism in Gambia by the foreigners is not merely a matter of cash but a question of power. Major tour operators, international booking networks and foreign hotel chains are often in charge of the decisions of marketing, pricing, target groups and national branding. The industry involves local stakeholders, such as guesthouse owners, tour guides, craft sellers, musicians, farmers, taxi drivers, etc., who are not architects of the industry.

According to Robert Gilpin, a political economist (1987) cautioned that the global marketplace does not operate in terms of morality and fairness but on the basis of power, interests and strategic advantage. The adoption of liberal optimism in Gambia presupposed that the openness would bring about prosperity by default. But openness lacks strategy, and interdependence has no bargaining power; it is easy to exploit such weaklings. Well-intended policies without strategic protection are now yielding their results on the Gambia.

This does not imply that The Gambia should isolate and give up tourism. Tourism is one of the most feasible pillars of development of the country with limited natural resources, small domestic market, small industrial capacity and its geographical location. The problem of the model is not its structure, but its structure. The problem is not the existence of the foreigners but the lack of Gambians in the core of the industry. The issue is with ownership and control, unequal distribution of ownership, control and value.

Here the contemporary mercantilistic approach applies. Global engagement is not rejected in mercantilism but there must be strategic engagement.  It does not see national wealth as the by-product of open markets, but a resource that has to be maintained and nurtured. A state that is mercantilist does not just watch over markets, it controls them. This is not to shut the borders but to make sure that national interests take precedence, relationships have to be founded on equal footing and economy has to feed its own citizens before it feeds others.

According to Peter Evans (1995), a political economist, refers to this as embedded autonomy a model, in which the state is strong, capable and visionary, but is also tightly related to society and local industries.

Three strategic pillars on which a mercantilist turn in Gambian tourism must be based are:

The ownership of the Gambians should be central and not peripheral.

The government assistance should be in form of available financing, taxation reforms, tourism incubators, land protection policies, investment literacy and procurement reforms which will favor Gambian owned hotels, lodges, transport organizations, tour agencies and tourism academies. No country can establish long term prosperity based on leased platforms.

Tourism has to be associated with agriculture, manufacturing, and creative industries.

Importation of food, drinks, furniture, art, souvenirs, and building materials has been a significant missed opportunity to most tourist hotels. The hospitality industry should be provided by Gambian farmers, carpenters, craft makers, tailors, artists, and designers. Once tourism sustains other industries, the money circulates and multiplies and is retained in the country.

The Gambia has to regain its tourism identity and branding.

It is now being promoted as a cheap winter resort to the rest of the world instead of a cultural giant. The Gambian culture, heritage, and values should become the driving force of the new tourism narrative, developed by Gambians themselves.

Critics tend to believe that The Gambia is too small to make bargaining power. However, size is not as important as strategy in international politics. Through ECOWAS and the African Union, small states are able to form regional blocs and speak with one voice.

The current trends in the world are not towards economic liberalism blindly. Even countries that were once the proponents of open markets are currently reshoring their industries, subsidizing, and empowering national value chains.

I recall how, when I was still teaching EU law at ULB, I used to point to Article 122 TFEU with a certain pride bordering on mischief. “Students,” I would say, “we always complain that the treaties leave us powerless in a crisis—but look, quietly hidden in plain sight, there is this little Swiss-army-knife provision that lets the Council act fast, by qualified majority, in a spirit of solidarity, when severe economic difficulties arise.” I presented it as one of the smartest pieces of constitutional engineering in the entire treaty. Today, I am no longer so proud.

The European Commission is now invoking that very Article 122(1) TFEU in December 2025 to make the immobilization of €210 billion of Russian central bank assets permanent and to transform them into collateral for massive loans to Ukraine. Yet Article 122 is an economic-policy tool—not a foreign-policy or sanctions instrument. Freezing a third country’s sovereign reserves is, by definition, a restrictive measure governed by Article 215 TFEU, which requires unanimity under the CFSP.

The objective behind this legal switch is transparent: to bypass the vetoes of Hungary and possibly Slovakia. But this is a textbook evasion of the unanimity rule, the very type of maneuver the Court of Justice has repeatedly condemned—most famously in its 2012 ruling on sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Nor are the textual prerequisites of Article 122(1) even remotely satisfied. Its triggers—“severe difficulties in the supply of certain products, notably energy” or threats to the balance of payments—simply do not correspond to political inconvenience in renewing sanctions. And the Court has never equated a geopolitical stalemate with an “economic emergency.”

The Commission’s approach also stretches the Union’s powers far beyond their constitutional limits. The EU does not possess a general emergency competence and has no authority to adopt quasi-confiscatory measures against the central bank of a third state. Under customary international law, central-bank assets enjoy near-absolute immunity; using them as loan collateral without judicial process or a peace treaty amounts, in many experts’ view, to unlawful expropriation.

Such a precedent would be economically reckless. The ECB has repeatedly warned—if mostly behind closed doors—of the catastrophic effects this could have on the euro’s status as a reserve currency. The “without prejudice” clause in Article 122 does not grant it supremacy over more specific legal bases that deliberately require unanimity.

And even if one were to ignore these structural limits, the litigation risk is enormous. Should the Court annul the regulation—a highly probable outcome once Belgium files—the assets will need to be released, the loans will become illegal, and both the Union and Euroclear could face joint liability in the hundreds of billions.

For all these reasons, the overwhelming majority of independent EU and international-law scholars view the attempt to rely on Article 122(1) as legally indefensible. The political majority may still force the measure through in December 2025, but litigation is inevitable. When the action for annulment reaches Luxembourg, the court is likely to strike it down within one or two years. And in the process, my once-beloved Article 122—the provision I used to celebrate as a masterpiece of flexible, solidarity-driven drafting—may emerge severely damaged, perhaps permanently.

I never thought I would live to see the day when this provision would be twisted into what the Belgian Prime Minister has openly called “theft.” One further doctrinal point makes the misuse even clearer: Article 122(1) defines its object and purpose with remarkable precision. It authorizes Council action “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States” when Member States face severe economic difficulties. This solidarity clause is not decorative; the Court has repeatedly affirmed its binding nature.

A systemic reading reinforces this conclusion. Article 122(1) cannot be used to grant financial assistance—a power explicitly reserved for Article 122(2), which functions as a lex specialis. Measures under paragraph 1 therefore cannot include loans or any other form of financial aid, let alone the conversion of a third country’s frozen sovereign assets into collateral for a €100–200 billion lending operation to another third country. The Commission’s proposal is not merely constitutionally illegitimate for hijacking a CFSP sanction; it is textually impossible.

Recent developments only underscore the trend toward abusing Article 122 as a general crisis-financing mechanism. On 19 March 2025, the Commission proposed a Council regulation establishing the “SAFE instrument” (Security Action for Europe) to rapidly expand Europe’s arms industry. Although the proposal generically cites “Article 122 TFEU,” it is clear from its substance—providing financial assistance to Member States to support urgent, large-scale defense investments—that it relies on Article 122(2).

The SAFE regulation would mobilize €150 billion from the EU budget in the form of subsidies and subsidized loans for national defense projects. Since Member States may receive financial aid from the Union budget on account of severe difficulties only under Article 122(2), the proposal cannot be grounded in Article 122(1). Its explanatory memorandum invokes the “exceptional security context” and the need for “massive investments” in defense manufacturing—but these are political arguments, not legal ones.

Taken together, the Russian-assets plan and the SAFE proposal amount to a systematic attempt to transform Article 122 into a universal crisis and security financing clause—a purpose it was never designed to fulfill.

The European Parliament, while strongly supportive of assisting Ukraine, has raised alarm over this distortion of a 1957 economic-emergency provision, adopted in secret, by a qualified majority, without parliamentary scrutiny. When the case reaches Luxembourg, the Parliament will argue—rightly—that the Emperor has no clothes. And on current jurisprudence, the Court is likely to agree.

Article 122 allows the Council to legislate alone. That was grudgingly tolerated for €3 billion of extraordinary own resources during COVID. For €210 billion of another state’s sovereign assets in peacetime, it is constitutionally explosive.

The real motive remains the neutralization of Hungary’s veto in the CFSP. But the Court has annulled every previous attempt to launder a CFSP measure through a non-CFSP legal basis (see Case C-130/10). And while the war undeniably harms Europe’s economy, the Court has never accepted “we need to bypass a veto” as equivalent to an energy-supply crisis or a balance-of-payments emergency.

If the General Court or the ECJ strikes down the €150 billion defense fund for exceeding the scope of Article 122, then the Russian assets regulation—which is even further removed from classic economic policy grounds—has virtually no chance of surviving judicial review.

China has successfully achieved economic development in recent years by shifting towards a model that relies on stimulating domestic demand. This not only ensures economic stability but also addresses crucial considerations related to China’s national security and international competitiveness. China has indeed succeeded in this by focusing on four key factors that are the main determinants of its remarkable economic growth: economic reform policies, the government’s commitment to Chinese-style reform, the government’s dedication to integrating into the global economy, and industrial upgrading and technological innovation. The Chinese government has also unveiled measures to boost service consumption and pledged to open up more sectors, such as the internet, culture, and the promotion of hosting international sporting events, in an effort to bolster the Chinese economy and connect it globally.

 China’s Fifteenth Five-Year Plan further spurred this shift from high-speed growth to high-quality growth, placing science and technology at the forefront of national priorities.  Over the past five years, China has strengthened its comprehensive opening-up policy, implementing practical measures to improve the business environment and fostering continued cooperation with all countries, especially developing nations of the Global South, through its Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative has become a model for a new type of international cooperation and has been recognized as such by international organizations, including the United Nations. During this same period, China has also made concerted efforts to improve the ecological environment and fulfill its international commitments through its “green economy” policy. This policy emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to environmentally friendly economic projects worldwide, particularly in African, developing, and Globally Southern countries. China is rapidly advancing a cleaner and greener economy, with strong commitments to environmental protection, clean energy, ecological protection, and the development of green industries.

 China’s economic development has achieved remarkable success in recent years through a long-term plan focused on economic reforms. This plan involved transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, adopting a policy of openness to foreign investment, establishing special economic zones to attract foreign investment, and investing heavily in infrastructure development, particularly in transportation, energy, communications, information technology, and artificial intelligence. China has also become the world’s largest exporter of advanced technology, with the Chinese government allocating approximately 2.6% of its GDP to research and development across various economic sectors. Furthermore, China boasts the world’s fastest-growing consumer market and is the second-largest importer of goods.  China’s industrial output is double that of the United States. The Chinese government has addressed poverty through development, guided by market principles, economic restructuring, the utilization of domestic resources, peaceful production development, and the strengthening of self-reliance and development capabilities. It has employed various methods and approaches to reduce poverty through self-reliance and hard work, building infrastructure in agriculture, industry, roads, and irrigation, providing the necessary funds for development and training, and allocating all necessary resources for technological advancements in each sector. Simultaneously, efforts have been made to protect the environment by conserving soil and water, promoting ecological construction, and implementing the sustainable development strategy set by the central government. China has not only eradicated poverty but has also raised the standard of living in all areas, enabling it to compete with developed nations in many fields.

 One of the most prominent strengths of the Chinese economy in recent years is its success in achieving high levels in education and scientific research. China spends 2.5% of its GDP on research and development.  The number of people employed in research and development sectors is approximately 1,687 per million inhabitants, enabling China to remain a leading exporter of high-tech goods globally. This has been achieved while the Chinese government has encouraged the formation of rural and private enterprises, liberalized foreign trade and investment, eased state control over certain prices, and invested in industrial production and workforce education.

For the first time since the termination of the Cold War, a major military crisis is heating up in the Caribbean. Since early September 2025, United States aerial combat drones have been patrolling and targeting the suspected smuggler boats in the international waters of the Caribbean Sea. These strikes were initially portrayed as kinetic measures to choke off the drug trade through the Caribbean Sea. According to US officials, by 04 December, 22 strikes have been conducted and 87 narco-terrorists have been killed. However, it’s worthy to note that the majority of cocaine production is centered in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico and enters into the United States through an inland or Pacific route—not through the Caribbean Sea. Out of 22 strikes, only 10 have been conducted in the Pacific waters.

Washington’s political ambitions eventually became evident in October once it forward deployed a naval flotilla at the strike range to Venezuela. Currently, eight US Navy vessels are operating in the Caribbean Sea. The USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier, with its vast combat aviation wing comprising F-35C Lightning IIs, F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, and a variety of support fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, is currently stationed in the US Virgin Islands. Other forward-deployed naval vessels include the MV Ocean Trader command vessel and the USS Iwo Jima amphibious assault ship with over 4,000 marines. These ships are supported by two Ticonderoga-class cruisers, two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and the USS Newport News, a Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), each equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The presence of this naval flotilla suggests that the USN has mustered enough capability to not only launch aerial and cruise missile strikes but also conduct amphibious operations at the Venezuelan coast. In parallel, Venezuelan airspace has been declared ‘closed’ by the Trump administration. Such assertive measures are not meant for anti-narcotic operations but perhaps for regime change either through coercive diplomacy or through direct military action. Whatever the case may be, it’s evident that for the first time in decades, the United States is apparently preparing for a direct military conflict in its own hemisphere.

Understanding how this crisis escalated requires looking back at the recent history of bilateral tensions. The fractures began to appear in US-Venezuela relations from 1999, when Hugo Chávez came to rule on a wave of anti-American populism and nationalized the country’s oil industry. Within three years, mutual relations collapsed so abruptly that first Washington imposed sanctions and then briefly removed Chávez from power through a CIA-backed coup. Chávez regained the rule in a matter of a few days. This move, however, further intensified anti-American sentiments in the Venezuelan public. Chávez made subversion of Washington a political identity; his successor Nicolás Maduro turned it into state doctrine. In 2019, Washington even declared Juan Guaidó, the opposition leader of Venezuela, as the country’s ‘legitimate president.’ Besides the open political signaling of the White House, the CIA also attempted another coup to topple the Maduro regime but again failed to achieve the requisite results.

Maduro successfully exploited continuous intervention by the United States to augment its political narrative at the public level and managed to earn a third consecutive term in 2025. However, the results of elections were regarded as dubious and were generally dismissed as fraudulent, further degrading relations with the West.

For Venezuela, oil has attracted more trouble than prosperity. The country has more than 300 billion barrels of proven oil reserves—more than Saudi Arabia (267 billion barrels)—yet it produces less than 10 percent of its 1990s highest productivity rate. The Venezuelan crude oil is ultra-heavy (8-12° API) and has very high sulfur content. Such dense oil is not only very challenging to refine—both economically and technologically—but also very hard to transfer and cannot be pumped through pipelines without imported diluents. In a nutshell, despite possessing the largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela cannot refine and export its black gold without significant foreign assistance. The current oil infrastructure, developed during the Cold War, is gradually crumbling. Pipelines are either blocked or leaking, and refineries are now operating below 15 percent capacity. Approximately 58 billion USD worth of investment is required to repair and revive the current infrastructure. Being a struggling economy, Venezuela simply does not have the financial capacity to do so. Meanwhile, the majority of technical expertise has been eroded due to brain drain. For example, PDVSA once employed more than 40,000 engineers but now has a total strength of only 12,000 with a large portion of untrained manpower. Currently, while Gulf nations are earning huge revenue from oil exports, Venezuela stands isolated as an oil superpower that cannot even power itself.

The aforementioned factors have imparted grave consequences on the Venezuelan economy. Its national GDP has shrunk from about 300 billion USD to a mere 110 billion USD approximately. More than half of the population is living in poverty, and unemployment has crippled public development. Roughly 28 percent of the total population is in need of humanitarian assistance. These financial woes have compelled common Venezuelan citizens to seek refuge outside the country. Currently, nearly 8 million locals have left the country and are living as refugees in neighboring countries, including Columbia, Peru, Brazil, and even the United States.

To survive internal implosion, Caracas has sought external assistance from Washington’s strategic competitors, including Russia, China, and even Iran. Both Russia and Venezuela are signatories of the 10-year Strategic Partnership Treaty, which was ratified in Oct-Nov 2025 with the overarching objective of combating unilateral coercive measures. Russia has provided military assistance and technical support for the training of troops and maintenance of military equipment, which is predominantly of Soviet origin. China has repeatedly provided diplomatic support and financial loans to support Venezuela’s energy infrastructure. Both Russia and China have vetoed resolutions at the UN Security Council for imposing stringent sanctions against Venezuela. With Iran, Venezuela also shares a strong relation, which was formalized by a 20-year agreement in 2022. Their domains of cooperation include trade, repairing of energy infrastructure, modernization of the defense force, and technology sharing for refinement of crude oil. For the United States, these collaborations are meant to develop a foothold in Latin America by Russia, China, and Iran—something Washington considers intolerable.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, within weeks, it scrapped Chevron’s license, eliminating Venezuela’s last stable revenue stream. The most significant escalation came on July 25, 2025, when the US Treasury designated Venezuela’s military leadership—the Cartel de los Soles—as a global terrorist organization. No foreign military in American history had ever received such a label. Simultaneously, the reward for the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro has been doubled to 50 million USD by the Trump administration on federal charges of narcoterrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine. And now, with a fully equipped US naval strike force sailing in the Caribbean Sea, the situation is getting increasingly volatile. The Venezuelan military simply does not possess the capability to defend against such a strike force.

If hostilities break out, then instead of placing boots on the ground, the United States is likely to conduct targeted strikes at key assets, impose and sustain a naval blockade, and eventually undermine the Venezuelan military’s and nation’s loyalty to Maduro through coercive diplomacy. The current crisis illustrates that although the Trump administration claims to have taken numerous initiatives to end conflicts and promote trade & collaboration in the Eastern Hemisphere, it will show little to no tolerance for the growing influence of Moscow and Beijing in the Western Hemisphere. Under the Monroe Doctrine, the United States seeks to sustain its control in the Western Hemisphere, including Latin America. For Trump, an example can be crafted out of Venezuela to demonstrate the potential consequences of deepening collaboration with Moscow and Beijing in Washington’s backyard.

When French President Emmanuel Macron inaugurated France’s Space Command in Toulouse on 12 November 2025 and declared that “space is no longer a sanctuary; it has become a battlefield,” few expected such swift validation. Two weeks later, at the ESA Ministerial Council in Bremen on 26–27 November, member states delivered the largest budget in the agency’s history—€22.1 billion for 2026–2028, a 30% increase over the previous cycle—with an unprecedented focus on security, defense, and strategic autonomy. The Bremen decision has transformed Macron’s stark warning from rhetoric into funded reality and confirmed that Europe is finally awakening to the fact that the next decisive domain of great-power competition lies far above the Earth’s atmosphere.

Paris is preparing to invest about €4.2 billion in military space activities from 2026 to 2030 and around €16 billion in civilian and dual-use programs by the end of the decade. The ambition is to strengthen Europe’s resilience in orbit, reduce dependence on non-European systems, and create an industrial base capable of supporting long-term security objectives.

French planners are betting on a new generation of proximity‑inspection satellites to anchor this strategy, with demonstration flights envisaged in the second half of the decade and operational testing to follow. These satellites can approach, observe, and, if required, interdict suspicious objects in orbit. France is also exploring non‑kinetic tools—lasers and electromagnetic systems among them—designed to disrupt hostile platforms without creating debris. Paris has rejected destructive anti-satellite testing and argues that Europe must enhance space security without undermining international norms.

The European Union is entering this field late. Russia and China have already developed advanced inspection and interference capabilities. In September 2025, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius revealed that two Russian Luch or Olymp satellites were shadowing Intelsat platforms used by the Bundeswehr. The episode underscored Europe’s lack of awareness and defensive capacity in orbit.

In Brussels, officials are floating the idea of a “European Space Shield”—a more integrated architecture to protect satellites and align EU and NATO postures. Success will depend on the willingness of member states to coordinate procurement, share data, and harmonize strategic objectives. Europe’s current system remains fragmented and is often slowed by national industrial preferences.

Macron has also called for reform of the European Space Agency’s geographic return rule, which distributes contracts according to member-state contributions rather than technical merit. The French position is that this rule limits innovation and prevents Europe from responding quickly to fast-moving threats in orbit.

There are challenges. Even non-kinetic defenses can be misinterpreted as escalatory. The orbital environment is crowded, vulnerable to miscalculation, and poorly regulated. France has therefore paired its military investments with calls for new rules of behavior and a European proposal for an orbital code of conduct. Such a framework would help prevent misunderstandings and promote transparency.

The ESA Ministerial Council that concluded in Bremen on 27 November delivered what many had doubted was possible: a €22.1 billion envelope for 2026–2028 that explicitly prioritizes space security, resilient navigation (FutureNAV), Earth-observation continuity, and dual-use technologies. Germany increased its contribution by nearly a third despite domestic fiscal constraints, while the package includes more than €1 billion for programs directly supporting defense and sovereignty. Crucially, ministers opened the door to greater flexibility on the controversial “geographic return” rule for critical security projects—a French demand that had been resisted for years. Bremen did not create a fully unified European space-defense policy overnight, but it transformed Macron’s Toulouse rhetoric into funded reality and gave the proposed European Space Shield its first serious financial and political tailwind.

Satellites underpin critical EU functions, including climate monitoring, secure communications, trade logistics, and border management. Rivals are developing tools that can dazzle, jam, or disable them. Europe cannot assume that these systems will remain safe without deliberate action.

Macron’s announcement in Toulouse should be seen as a strategic warning. Europe has the capacity to protect its interests in orbit, but only if it acts with coherence and political determination. The challenge for the European Union is not technological. It is the ability to work collectively and with a sense of urgency. In an era in which conflict begins long before military forces deploy, the EU’s strategic autonomy may depend on decisions made far above the atmosphere.

Oscar-winning director Guillermo del Toro’s new film Frankenstein brings Shelley’s old questions back into sharp focus. Watching it, I wasn’t thinking about the film alone but about the world we now inhabit: a world driven by machines that imitate judgement, technologies released faster than any ethics can catch them, and creators who often step back from the consequences of what they build. The story became a frame for thinking about invention without care and the human cost of systems that move ahead of responsibility.

From the first shot, it was clear del Toro wasn’t interested in telling a simple horror story. He was asking what happens when creation slips away from responsibility. His protagonist Victor Frankenstein is a man capable of making life but unwilling to face what follows. His Creature is marked by a worn, unmistakably human presence, punished simply for existing. Together they pull Shelley’s story into the present, where knowledge outruns empathy and creators disown the harm their inventions cause. This isn’t a film review. It’s a way of thinking about an age built on AI, automated judgement and systems that move faster than the societies they reshape.

The Image as Argument

Del Toro’s visuals feel like political claims. Inside the lab, everything shines with promise, but the world around it already feels smaller, narrowed by Victor’s drive. Step outside, and the landscape is hard and unwelcoming. The images hint at a future where speed counts for more than judgement, and the tools we build quietly take choices away from the people who have to live with them.

The Creature and the Human Left Behind

The Creature’s journey exposes what gets left behind when systems evolve without accountability. His struggle is not mythic fortitude. It is the fight of someone denied belonging, yet still reaching for it. His suffering comes not from nature but neglect. That is where the story finds its political edge. When institutions, technologies or creators step back, people fall through the cracks. Monsters are produced through abandonment long before they ever lash out.

The Wound of Inheritance

Endurance teaches survival, but survival alone cannot heal neglect. To understand where that wound begins, we have to turn from myth to the people who make it. Like Shelley, the director builds his story on failed fathers: men who mistake intellect for affection and principle for presence.

In Shelley’s novel, Victor’s father is distant, a man of education and propriety who believes guidance is best delivered through correction rather than warmth. When Victor loses his mother, his father’s stoic restraint becomes a model of civility that hides a failure of empathy. That early absence of emotional attention shapes Victor’s later obsession with mastering life instead of understanding it. Shelley knew this pattern intimately.

Her father, William Godwin, preached liberty and reason but struggled with tenderness. He married Mary Wollstonecraft, the feminist intellectual, only after her death, a gesture that exposed how intellect can perform care without ever practising it. Shelley grew up inside that contradiction: a father who believed in just progress yet withheld warmth. Frankenstein became her answer to that hypocrisy. Victor Frankenstein is Godwin’s idea of pure reason turned human. He creates life but cannot care for what he has made. His emotional detachment does not just inform his choices; it defines his mythic role.Victor became the modern Prometheus. By the end, he finally confesses what drives him: pride, greed, and the hunger to control. It is the only peace he earns, and it feels like the confession of our own age.

Del Toro recognises the same model and turns it outward. His Victor belongs to our century of technocrats who build systems and then deny their consequences. He is our era’s new aristocracy of tech feudalism: ambitious, efficient, and unaccountable. The technology elite speak of optimisation, disruption, long-term futures and existential threats, but rarely of the ordinary lives reshaped by their decisions. Some imagine themselves visionaries, others saviours, others guardians of civilisation. But Shelley’s question cuts through that confidence. What does it mean to create something powerful, then step aside when it begins to rearrange the world?

Systems Without Stewards

The logic of the story echoes the world we now occupy. Tools built to support us now automate decisions about welfare, policing and work. Machine learning reshapes social life faster than regulators can understand it. Data systems expand with no clear stewards. What Shelley framed as a private tragedy now feels structural. Victor’s refusal to care has become a model reproduced across industries.

And this is where the parallel lands. We’ve slipped into a century shaped by people who build vast systems yet refuse to own the worlds those systems produce. Think of Elon Musk’s faith in acceleration, or Peter Thiel and Alex Karp insisting that Palantir’s surveillance tools are essential for democracy. Each stance mirrors Victor’s belief that intellect alone justifies power. They cast themselves as guardians of progress, yet their creations are already remaking social life faster than any public can respond. Frankenstein unsettles because it shows what follows when men commanding immense influence refuse to look directly at the people caught beneath their ambitions.

That is why the Frankenstein story matters again. It does not tell us how to regulate AI. It reminds us that danger begins when makers decide they are above the consequences of their work. Shelley wrote a warning. Del Toro simply holds up the mirror. The question is no longer whether Victor failed. It is whether we, facing our own age of unsupervised power, will choose to do any better.

Over the next eighteen months, Morocco aims to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Chinese counterparts in two main fields: artificial intelligence and electric vehicles, including batteries and components. This document examines the current factors driving cooperation, predicts the development of technology transfer and industrial growth, and highlights the promising prospects for Moroccan industries to expand into global markets by 2026. The analysis presents recent developments, such as plans for battery factories, the entry of Chinese electric vehicle brands, and increased AI initiatives, and offers policy suggestions to maximize benefits while reducing potential risks. 

Morocco’s industrial strategy over the past decade has been primarily focused on exports and anchored by major firms. Large assembly plants such as Renault and Stellantis, along with upgrades to ports and logistics networks like those in Tangier, have helped establish the country as a key auto hub serving Europe and Africa. At the same time, Morocco is actively advancing its digital and artificial intelligence capabilities through government conferences, initiatives to support startups, and collaborations between the public and private sectors. On the Chinese side, policies and corporate strategies aim to position battery and electric vehicle value-chain assets near Europe. They are also working to diversify manufacturing locations and secure supplies of rare earth elements and other upstream materials. Recent announcements, including plans for a significant Chinese gigafactory and several upstream projects around Tangier and Jorf Lasfar, suggest a strong potential for collaboration. Morocco’s strategic location, combined with China’s manufacturing ambitions, makes their partnership highly promising.

1.⁠ ⁠Two Pillars of Cooperation: What to Expect

 Electric vehicles and batteries.

Chinese companies are investing heavily in Morocco’s battery and component plants, including a gigafactory, while Chinese EV brands enter the local market through distributors. Meanwhile, global vehicle makers are expanding EV production, increasing demand for batteries and parts.

Likely near-term developments up to 2026:

1. Battery production will broaden, with final outputs (tens of GWh) from Chinese investments coming online or under construction. This will enable local assembly and some exports to Europe and Africa, transitioning Morocco from an assembly hub to also producing cells, cathodes, and anodes.

2. The local parts ecosystem will strengthen. Chinese upstream investments like copper and electrode factories will strengthen Moroccan suppliers in metal stamping, wiring harnesses, and thermal systems, enabling them to elevate and compete for supply contracts.

3. Chinese EV brands like BYD are expected to expand sales and may establish CKD (complete knock-down) assembly operations in Morocco or North Africa. This would reduce logistics costs and tariffs while serving regional markets.

Why this is likely to occur: Morocco’s strategic location near the EU, favorable trade agreements, and rising local content rates at key plants, combined with competitive labor and logistics costs, make it an attractive hub for Chinese firms aiming to serve Europe and Africa. These factors also help mitigate risks related to geopolitical trade tensions.

2. Technological Innovation

What is the current status? Morocco has initiated national projects focused on technological development, hosted numerous industry conferences, and is fostering innovation hubs in Casablanca and Rabat, supported by active universities and startups. Meanwhile, Chinese technology companies and research institutions are becoming increasingly engaged across Africa, especially in areas such as cloud computing, surveillance, smart cities, and industrial automation.

Short-term outlook to 2026:

1. Manufacturing technology: Chinese original equipment manufacturers and battery producers are likely to develop or collaborate on new systems for predictive maintenance, quality assurance via vision technology, and automation within factories. Moroccan suppliers and engineering companies are predicted to serve as key local partners, opening up opportunities to export services and software.

2. Data infrastructure and edge computing: Investments are expected in launching data centers or edge computing resources near ports and industrial areas. These will support electric vehicle telematics, smart logistics, and training systems, allowing Moroccan companies to offer combined telematics services across the region.

3. Skills and research partnerships: Agreements between Chinese and Moroccan organizations, including training programs and joint laboratories, will help develop expertise in areas such as machine learning, data management, and implanted systems—laying the footing for a domestic technology industry capable of exporting software and solutions.

By 2026, the combination of Chinese industrial commitments and Morocco’s own policy momentum is expected to bring several tangible benefits to the Moroccan industry in international markets:

First, the composition of exports will become more sophisticated, moving beyond a narrow range of assembled chassis or low-value parts. Instead, Morocco will export higher-value items such as battery modules, electric vehicle (EV) subassemblies, and software or telemetry services. Early shipments of these battery modules and vehicles with higher content will boost the average export value and enhance trade balances. The establishment of a battery gigafactory shifts the focus of value creation within vehicle exports.

Second, Morocco’s strategic geographic location and trade advantages—including proximity to the European Union and its role as an African gateway—combined with Chinese manufacturing capacity, will allow Moroccan producers to better serve markets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Chinese firms may use the Kingdom as a hub for assembly, battery-pack finishing, and software services, thereby generating re-export opportunities and local production credits, strengthening Morocco’s position as an electromobility export hub.

Finally, new factories and the adoption of artificial intelligence will generate employment opportunities not only in manufacturing but also in engineering, data management, and quality assurance. Local suppliers securing tier-1 contracts will be compelled to meet international standards such as ISO, IATF, and environmental requirements, thereby increasing their competitiveness for foreign contracts. Additionally, vocational training programs—both public and private—will develop a skilled technician workforce that is enticing to foreign original equipment manufacturers.

This part highlights the development of new exportable service lines, including software, telematics, and analytics. The adoption of industrial AI systems has increased demand for these technologies, including predictive maintenance platforms, battery management software, and analytics dashboards. Moroccan IT companies and startups that collaborate on or adapt these systems for French-speaking and African markets will gain a competitive edge as early movers. This approach broadens Moroccan exports into higher-margin digital services.

Additionally, branding around green initiatives and regulatory standards creates opportunities. Manufacturing electric vehicle (EV) components, especially alongside renewable energy sources, enables Morocco to position itself as an environmentally friendly supplier to European buyers, who are increasingly concerned about carbon footprints and ESG compliance. This strategy could open doors to premium markets and green procurement contracts. Recent government focus on renewable energy and desalination further supports a narrative of sustainable industrial growth.

However, some risks and constraints must be managed. These include overreliance on a limited number of foreign partners, particularly Chinese firms, which could lead to dependence issues. Morocco needs to diversify its investor base and contain clauses on technology transfer and local value creation. Another challenge is the country’s limited capacity to absorb rapid industrialization, calling for the expansion of vocational training and university-industry R&D partnerships. Environmental and social standards are also critical, especially in battery production and chemical manufacturing, requiring strict regulation and the integration of green energy to prevent reputational damage. Geopolitical tensions, especially with shifting trade policies in Europe and the U.S., may complicate export access, so transparency and strategic alignment are essential.

To cope with these challenges, Morocco should implement local-content requirements with phased incentives, establish joint R&D centers and training quotas, conduct thorough environmental impact assessments, and negotiate trade frameworks with EU partners that safeguard tariff protections.

3. Policy recommendations to redouble 2026 outcomes

            1. Conditional incentives: Connect tax breaks and land allocation to measurable local content, technology transfer, and training objectives.

            2. National AI+Industry platform: Fund applied AI labs that link Moroccan engineering institutions with Chinese corporate R&D to adapt industrial AI use cases for local SMEs.

            3. Export facilitation for services: Start up fast-track export credit and soft-landing programs for Moroccan software companies to pilot resolutions in francophone Africa and the EU.

            4. Green manufacturing mandate: Require or incentivize renewable energy sourcing (PPA) for battery and chemical plants to sustain green branding.

            5. Standards & accreditation push: Large testing/certification labs (battery safety, automotive standards, software security) to enhance compliance for global markets.

To that end, the strategic partnership between China and Morocco in AI and electric vehicles offers Morocco a valuable opportunity to advance along the automotive and digital value chains. This shift could transform its export model from solely assembly to one that also emphasizes battery production and software development. Suppose policies focus on increasing local content, developing skills, setting standards, and ensuring environmental responsibility. In that case, the partnership is likely to lead to greater export diversity, the creation of more high-value industrial jobs, and a more substantial Moroccan footprint in European, African, and Middle Eastern markets by 2026. Recent investments and industrial growth offer a timely opportunity; however, the real test will be how swiftly Morocco can establish effective technology transfer, training programs, and regulatory frameworks, turning these opportunities into a sustained strategic alliance.

This year marks a critical juncture for the global realisation of the right to education.

In just three weeks, we will start the final four-year countdown to 2030, when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) should have been achieved. That includes SDG 4, which calls for inclusive, equitable, and quality education and lifelong learning opportunities for all.

At the heart of the commitment to lifelong learning was the recognition that free primary education alone is insufficient to prepare children to succeed in today’s world.

Early learning opportunities create vital foundations

Early childhood learning has profound long-term benefits for children’s cognitive and social development, educational attainment, health, and employment prospects. It’s also a powerful equaliser. It can narrow early achievement gaps for children from disadvantaged households and place them on a more equal footing with better-off peers.

Giving children access to quality early childhood care and pre-primary education can help get them ready to learn in primary school, supporting them to acquire vital early literacy and numeracy skills.

Despite these benefits, nearly half of all children miss out on early childhood education. In low-income countries, just one in five children has access to preschool.

Secondary education is the key to unlocking more and better human capital

Secondary education is also increasingly important for success in today’s world. Children with secondary education are more likely to find work as adults, earn more, and escape or avoid poverty.

The inclusion in the SDGs of both early childhood and secondary education reflects a broad international consensus that they are essential to children’s development and national progress.

Unfortunately, this consensus is not adequately reflected in international human rights law.

Strengthening children’s right to education

Existing international law guarantees children free and compulsory primary education. However, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) says nothing explicit about early childhood education. Nor does it require states to guarantee every child free secondary education.

While the SDGs are significant political commitments, they do not have the force of law. Countries report on their progress through voluntary national reviews, with no formal mechanism for children to claim redress if governments fail to deliver, nor a plan for ensuring progress beyond the year 2030.

Better legal protection, monitoring and realisation

A strong and clear legal standard in a human rights instrument would have the force of law, be subject to independent monitoring mechanisms, and need not be limited to a specific time period.

This is why Sierra Leone, Luxembourg, and the Dominican Republic moved a resoultion at the UN Human Rights Council calling for the development of a new human rights treaty that makes early years, pre-primary, and secondary education an undeniable part of the right to education.

I am delighted that the resolution was co-sponsored by 49 additional states and that significant progress was achieved during consultations on the initiative in Geneva earlier this year.

The power of international law to effect change

I am under no illusion that a new human rights instrument will offer a panacea to the challenges many states face in delivering a quality education to children. In fact, some people argue that international law in general—and international human rights law in particular—has had its day.

It’s true that the international human rights regime faces significant challenges and serious threats. But universal human rights laws and practices still have a central part to play in defending and advancing human dignity.

International human rights law has shaped legal and public understandings of human dignity and non-discrimination, resulting in improved rights for individuals, including women, children, persons with disabilities, minorities, and other vulnerable groups. Billions of people now possess rights that protect them from practices that had long been common in many societies.

For example, in the decade following the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, nearly twenty countries, including Sierra Leone, adopted or amended national legislation to raise their minimum age of voluntary recruitment to at least 18.

Human rights treaties can and do influence policy and practice. They also help build political will to ensure that the rights they set out can be enjoyed in practice.

Affirming our commitment to education

As the due date of the SDGs approaches, there is still a wide gap between what we committed to and what we have achieved.

Supporting this new human rights treaty, which will make it clear that the right to education includes learning both before and beyond primary school, is an important way to commit to closing that gap.

It will also provide a much-needed signal that international cooperation to advance human rights is still viable.

So on International Human Rights Day, I urge other UN member states to join Sierra Leone and the other countries supporting an Optional Protocol on the right to education, to ensure that every child has the opportunity to receive a quality, free pre-primary and secondary education.

Several important agreements were signed during the India visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin (December 4-5, 2025). Apart from the bilateral dimension of the visit — where several agreements were signed — both sides sought to strengthen their partnership under the umbrella of the UN and other multilateral platforms including G20, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS. Putin and Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi held talks on a wide range of issues during the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit held at New Delhi.

A joint statement issued after the summit, while referring to BRICS+, stated that both sides:

    “.. further committed themselves to promote cooperation in the expanded BRICS under the three pillars of political and security, economic and financial, cultural, and people-to-people cooperation. They reaffirmed their commitment to the BRICS spirit of mutual respect and understanding, sovereign equality, solidarity, democracy, openness, inclusiveness, collaboration, and consensus. Russia pledged its full support for India’s upcoming BRICS Chairmanship in 2026.”

BRICS Common currency and trade in local currencies

One of the aspects that was discussed during Putin’s visit was the issue of a common BRICS currency and trade in local currencies between BRICS members. Intra-BRICS trade has grown in recent years with the entry of new members—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025. If one were to look at intra-BRICS trade in local currencies, this too has witnessed a significant rise. 90% of bilateral trade between Russia and China is in local currencies, while a significant percentage of trade between India and Russia—estimated at well over 90%—is in local currencies. BRICS member states have been pushing a common payment platform for giving a push to trade. This issue was high on the agenda at the 2024 BRICS Summit held at Kazan, Russia, as well as the 2025 BRICS Summit held at Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). While speaking at the 2024 BRICS Summit, Putin had said:

“The dollar is being used as a weapon. We really see that this is so. I think that this is a big mistake by those who do this.”

While trade in local currencies is essential to circumvent sanctions and several countries are seeking to diversify economic relations, the idea of a common currency has been rejected by most BRICS members, including Russia. During his India visit, Putin while highlighting the need for increasing bilateral trade — including in local currencies — said that the organisation needed to be cautious as far as the idea of a common BRICS currency was concerned. In a media interview the Russian President said:

“There is no need for haste. And if there is no hurry, then you will avoid many grave mistakes.” 

He underscored the need to learn lessons from the Eurozone, saying that countries cannot be forced to follow a “common system” if structures are not aligned.

India which will be chairing the BRICS Presidency, in 2026, has taken a nuanced position. While pushing for trade in local currencies and pitching for other BRICS countries to adopt the Unified Payment Interface (UPI), it has categorically distanced itself on more than one occasion from the idea of a common BRICS currency. Apart from the economic factors for the same, there is a clear geopolitical reason – India is sceptical about sharing a currency with China.

BRICS, De-dollarisation, sanctions and the US Dollar

 It is important to understand that a changing geopolitical situation, especially economic sanctions, has propelled several countries to trade in local currencies, but this does not mean that all of them are doing it with the objective of undermining the US dollar. Those who believe that the US Dollar will be threatened by trade in local currencies – including the US President Donald Trump – need to adopt a more nuanced approach vis-à-vis the growing trade in local currencies between developing countries – especially members of BRICS. Recently, American investor and the author of ‘Rich Dad Poor Dad’ Robert Kiyosaki while commenting on the announcement of a Gold currency by BRICS in a post on X highlighted the need for investors to move away from the US Dollar and explore alternatives such as cryptocurrencies and precious metals. In his post, he wrote, “…Bye Bye US Dollar…”

In conclusion, the idea of a BRICS common currency is unfeasible, while trade in non-dollar currencies is likely to grow due to sanctions imposed upon Russia. Countries are looking to reduce their dependence upon the US Dollar, but this phenomenon is extremely complex and cannot be viewed from simplistic binaries as has been mentioned earlier.

A New Financial Reality

The release of Digital Yuan 2.0 in 2025 will change the way money works in Asia. This technology links the People’s Bank of China directly to the ASEAN cross-border payment network, which speeds up transactions compared to older systems like SWIFT, which take 3 to 5 days. Beijing is developing the groundwork of a regional financial infrastructure that speeds up transaction settlements while minimizing reliance on the US dollar.

Reports from Yuan Adoption Tracker say that in the first quarter of 2025, the Renminbi was used a lot more in international trade settlements, and its share of the global foreign currency market kept growing. This shows that the e-CNY project is not just a test in China, but also part of the country’s larger plan to make its currency more global.

This push for growth is also in line with the global trend of de-dollarization. China is using the competition between its economy and the US to spread the use of e-CNY across Asia. Experts say that 2025 will be a key year for the digital yuan to become more powerful outside of China, notably in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN borders.

The Digital Yuan raises a strategic problem for ASEAN: should they prioritize transaction efficiency or monetary sovereignty? On the one hand, integrating e-CNY is cheap and fast. Beijing’s control over cross-border payment systems, on the other hand, could limit ASEAN central banks’ policy options. The fact that Thailand is involved in the m-CBDC initiative, Indonesia is involved with Rupiah Digital, and Vietnam is focused on regulating crypto in its own country shows that the region is not the same in how it reacts to Chinese financial technology entering its markets.

China’s Strategic Intent

Since its 2020 inception, Beijing has never limited e-CNY to local innovation. ASEAN trade aggressively promotes the digital Yuan as a cross-border payment method. The China Crunch analysis found that ASEAN e-CNY transactions exceeded 500 billion yuan in the first three quarters of 2025. This suggests that e-CNY is becoming a popular SWIFT alternative.

China views the US dollar’s dominance as a political weakness. Beijing is creating an alternative financial system by making e-CNY more popular. This will reduce global dollar dependence, which Russia and other BRICS countries want. Observer Research Foundation predicts that e-CNY will aggressively spread internationally in 2025, particularly in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN.

Digital Yuan boosts soft power and speeds up transactions. Beijing becomes a rule-maker by adding ASEAN to e-CNY. China gains political leverage because ASEAN countries that use the e-CNY will find it tougher to oppose Beijing’s economic and diplomatic aims.

China is advancing the Multiple Central Bank Digital Currency Bridge (mBridge) project with Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE. This experiment tests how rapidly e-CNY can be utilized for cross-border transactions and improves regional financial strength. Beijing is utilizing mBridge to provide technology and create a new financial system to replace the West.

ASEAN’s Dilemma

The initiative is handled differently by each ASEAN nation. Thailand hopes to cut cross-border money transfer costs and strengthen financial integration. Indonesia made only the Rupiah Digital legal for digital payments. Clear goal: retain rupiah independence and prevent foreign currency takeover. Vietnam is regulating crypto more internally. According to PwC, Vietnam views crypto as an investment tool, rather than a payment method. Singapore’s latest project, BLOOM, uses tokenization and stablecoins to enable cross-border payments, maintaining system flexibility and preventing the dominance of a single currency. This suggests that several Southeast Asian countries are eyeing the growth of e-CNY.

Adding e-CNY may constrain ASEAN central banks’ policy options. If not regulated, cross-border CBDCs might cause capital flight and monetary instability, according to the IMF. Transaction efficiency may cost domestic stability through loss of influence. If ASEAN approves the e-CNY, the system would be more efficient and cost-effective, but more dependent on Beijing. If ASEAN rejects e-CNY integration, it would maintain monetary sovereignty but risk falling behind in global financial innovation.

Long-Term Risk for ASEAN

The digital yuan in ASEAN’s cross-border payment system could complicate monetary policy decisions. Each country’s central bank, which previously regulated liquidity and monetary instruments, will face new challenges when many cross-border transactions rely on the e-CNY.

Weaker economies in ASEAN, such as Timor-Leste, Laos, and Cambodia, that trade substantially with China will lose the ability to adjust their fiscal and monetary policies. The Digital Yuan is a data-driven payment system. China’s financial system may log all e-CNY cross-border transactions. The Atlantic Council CBDC Tracker notes that the e-CNY helps Chinese regulators track cash movements in real time. Others worry that Beijing could use financial data to influence politics, such as pressuring ASEAN countries that don’t support its strategic aims.

People desire to use e-CNY because it simplifies cross-border transactions, but widespread use could lead to structural reliance. ASEAN countries that overrely on China’s payment system will struggle to diversify their trade and maintain financial independence. E-CNY’s quick expansion in Hong Kong’s retail sector and beyond ASEAN boundaries by 2025 suggests that Beijing wants the Renminbi to be the region’s most significant currency. Beijing’s payment structure makes it difficult for countries to reject China’s diplomatic and investment offers.

Policy Implication

ASEAN needs to develop the Digital Payment Hub as a framework for regional integration. This will reduce the risk of single-party dominance of the e-CNY while strengthening interoperability between central banks. Cross-border coordination in CBDC development can prevent fragmentation of the global payment system and maintain regional monetary stability.

Digital Yuan carries financial surveillance risks. ASEAN must strengthen related regulations, Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), and Countering Financing of Terrorism (CFT). Strong regulation of fintech and CBDC is necessary to protect state sovereignty from excessive external influence.

Indonesia, with Rupiah Digital, and Vietnam, with domestic crypto regulations, show that a hedging strategy can maintain monetary policy space. ASEAN needs to encourage each country to develop a domestic digital currency as a bulwark against external domination. Small countries can maintain policy space by developing alternative monetary instruments that strengthen financial sovereignty.

Finally, ASEAN must act as a collective bloc in international forums such as the G20 and the IMF to negotiate global CBDC standards. This will strengthen ASEAN’s bargaining position in the face of payment system dominance from major powers. Regional coordination in the face of global pressure is key to maintaining economic stability and national security.

Conclusion

The digital yuan has evolved from a mere financial innovation into a geopolitical instrument challenging the global monetary architecture. Its presence in Southeast Asia places ASEAN in a strategic dilemma: accept the cross-border transaction efficiencies offered by Beijing or maintain monetary sovereignty by developing a regional alternative.

The long-term risks that arise cannot be ignored. The integration of e-CNY has the potential to narrow policy space central bank, opening up opportunities for financial surveillance by Beijing, and creating structural dependencies that undermine the political and economic autonomy of ASEAN countries. The fragmentation of responses between countries further increases the region’s vulnerability to single-party domination.

Therefore, ASEAN needs to assert its collective position through the development of a regional CBDC framework, diversification of financial partners, strengthening regulations, and coordination in global forums. Without concrete steps, the region risks becoming an arena for great power competition, rather than an actor capable of determining the direction of the regional financial future.