opinion

Bandwagon Effect: Systemic Barriers to Global Governance and SDGs 16

Development agendas borrow a term common in the study of global governance that is shaped not only by policy, but also by the decision-making structures that determine who speaks, who is heard, and who ultimately adapts. In the contemporary multilateral landscape, the tendency of weaker actors to align their positions with dominant powers for the sake of security or accessibility has evolved beyond its classical definition in realist theory. It now operates as a subtle but consequential social mechanism, systematically reducing the diplomatic boldness of the Global South countries in international forums.

The bandwagon effect is not just a phenomenon of individual behavior, but a reflection of an institutionalized architecture of structural inequality. Under these conditions, the countries of the Global South often hide their authentic preferences. Not because of argumentative incompetence, but rather because of the incentives created by financial dependence, representation asymmetry, and limited diplomatic capacity. The consequence is a direct contradiction to Sustainable Development Goal 16, which mandates the building of strong, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

The Bandwagon Effect in the Context of Global Governance

From a realist perspective, countries that have identical votes in UNGA resolutions reflect similar preferences within the framework of the protection of sovereign norms. But empirical research shows a more complex reality. Khan’s (2020) study of Bangladesh’s voting patterns at the UNGA for the period 2001–2017 revealed that vote alignment does not always reflect the proximity of substantive preferences, but is often a product of geopolitical contexts and dependency relationships. Realists themselves recognize that this kind of voice alignment tends to collapse in crisis situations when countries are encouraged to self-help that makes it clear that a seemingly consensus-like may never really exist.

More direct evidence comes from a panel of 123 developing countries in a study of U.S. economic sanctions and UNGA voting patterns for the 1990–2014 period. The study, which limited its analysis to non-OECD countries because foreign aid was not considered to affect the voting behavior of rich countries, confirmed that external pressures, both in the form of incentives and sanctions, significantly shaped developing countries’ voting preferences on important issues. It further states that receive budget support and unconditional assistance from the US tend to vote in line with US interests. A correlation that is difficult to explain solely by the similarity of values.

This pattern was also identified structurally through the analysis of the UNGA voting network. Magu and Mateos (2017) found that the empirical distribution of voting similarity scores is right-skewed towards a value of 1, which means that clusters of countries with a high degree of alignment are much more common than can be explained by pure similarity of interest. This is consistent with the hypothesis that structurally weak states tend to move toward dominant power positions, not because of belief, but because of survival calculations.

The Inequality Architecture That Creates Bandwagon Incentives

Understanding why the bandwagon effect is so entrenched among the Global South requires a reading of the existing global governance architecture. At the International Monetary Fund, the United States holds 16.9 percent of the vote and has an effective veto since major decisions require an 85 percent majority. Meanwhile, Africa, which consists of 54 member states and accounts for most of the IMF’s 2026 active loan portfolio, only controls about 6.5 percent of the vote. On the UN Security Council, not a single African country holds a permanent seat, although more than 60 percent of the Council’s agenda is related to conflicts on the continent.

This representational inequality creates the conditions in which joining a majority position or with a certain power bloc becomes an administratively rational strategy, even when it is contrary to the long-term interests of a country.

The factor of dependence on military suppliers is also relevant. A study of the determinants of developing countries’ voting at the UNGA identified that the choice of military suppliers that placed countries in the orbit of Western, Russian, or Chinese influence also influenced voting tendencies. This provides important context for India’s abstaining position in the UNGA resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which is an inseparable decision from the fact that about 70 percent of India’s military equipment comes from Russia. This is not a moral inconsistency but rather a rationality imposed by the architecture of dependence.

Contradictions with SDGs 16: Measuring What Is Not Measurable

Sustainable Development Goal 16 mandates the development of institutions that are ‘peaceful, equitable, and inclusive at all levels’ is a mandate that explicitly encompasses global, not just domestic, governance. The SDG 16 Global Progress Report (UNDP/UNODC/OHCHR, 2023) describes an alarming situation where progress towards SDG 16 is very slow and in some cases even moving in the wrong direction. Violence is on the rise, inequality is hampering inclusive decision-making, and corruption is undermining the social contract.

On a broader level, the Sustainable Development Report 2024 (SDSN), which covers all 193 UN member states, found that on average only 16 percent of the SDG targets are on track to be achieved by 2030. SDG 16 is specifically mentioned as one of the goals that are furthest from the target. More significantly, among the five SDG targets that showed the most regression since 2015, press freedom, which is an indicator under SDG 16, is also included.

The connection between the bandwagon effect and the setback of SDG 16 is not just correlative. It is mechanistic. When countries are unable to express their authentic preferences in the multilateral negotiation process due to structural pressures, the three key pillars of SDG 16 inclusivity, accountability, and effectiveness are degraded simultaneously. Inclusivity is degraded as voices that are supposed to represent the global majority are eroded into a consensus designed by and for minorities. Accountability is degraded because countries that choose to go against the interests of their people in order to maintain relations with donors or trading partners cannot be held coherently accountable by their constituents. Effectiveness is degraded because resolutions born of pseudo-consensus will never be implemented with sincere commitment.

The Bandwagon Effect as a Social Phenomenon, Not an Individual Failure

It is important to emphasize that the bandwagon effect in this context is not a failure of diplomatic character or moral inconsistency. It is a rational response to unequal structural incentives. A quantitative analysis of UNGA voting in the period 1946–2014 shows that the voting patterns of developing countries consistently shifted to the dominant power configuration in that period not because of the convergence of values, but because of changes in the distribution of power and dependency.

This makes the bandwagon effect a social phenomenon in the strictest sense. It is not behavior that is freely chosen by individuals or states, but behavior that is conditioned by the structure of the system. As the literature on public voting behavior and foreign policy shows, public opinion and domestic pressures do influence foreign policy but in countries with low state capacity, external factors such as aid dependence and pressure from international financial institutions are often more decisive.

The consequences of this framing are very important in policy. The solution is not moral persuasion, but in the transformation of structural incentives. The countries of the Global South do not need to be educated to be braver, they just need to be given conditions where diplomatic courage does not mean financial suicide or geopolitical isolation.

Implications and Directions of Reform

If the bandwagon effect is understood as a product of the architecture of inequality, then meaningful reform must target that architecture. First, reform of representation in the Bretton Woods institutions remains a prerequisite that cannot be postponed. As long as the quota formula remains biased towards advanced economies and as long as the U.S. retains its veto, the structural incentives for the bandwagon will continue to exist. The SDSN Sustainable Development Report 2024 itself identifies strengthening UN-based multilateralism as one of the urgent needs of a recommendation that presupposes a more equitable representation architecture reform.

Second, transparency in the multilateral negotiation process must be expanded. If negotiating positions could be monitored more openly by civil society and the media, the space between publicly stated positions and actual behavior at the negotiating table would become narrower. This is especially relevant for the negotiation process in international financial institutions that have been operating with a high level of secrecy.

Third, strengthening a substantive south-south coalition that should go beyond solidarity rhetoric can also provide a buffer against external pressure. But this requires that the countries of the Global South build real policy coordination mechanisms in multilateral forums, not just in bilateral meetings. Without this kind of mechanism, Global South solidarity will continue to be an aspiration that is defeated by the calculation of bilateral dependency in critical moments.

Conclusion

The bandwagon effect in global governance is a manifestation of institutionalized inequality. It works discreetly, through incentives and dependencies, to produce consensuses that look strong on the outside but fragile on the inside. SDG 16 which mandates inclusive, accountable, and effective institutions cannot be realized as long as the global decision-making mechanisms themselves continue to produce conditions that encourage countries to hide their true preferences.

As UNDP affirms in its latest SDG 16 progress report, peace and prosperity for all people and the planet is only possible with decisive and innovative action on SDG 16. Such actions cannot be limited to the domestic realm alone, they must include a fundamental transformation in the global governance architecture that currently systematically penalizes diplomatic courage and incentivizes compliance.

Effective global governance is not built on consensus imposed by dependencies. It is built on genuine participation and genuine participation requires conditions in which authentic choices are not punished by structures that are supposed to serve all.

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How Materials, Infrastructure, and Geopolitics Redefine the 2030 Energy Transition

And while grid physics remains the starting point, the innovations shaping the 2030 landscape extend far beyond conductors and transmission lines. The energy transition of the early 2020s was framed as a moral and political imperative. But from 2026 onward, the debate shifts decisively. The center of gravity moves from ideological declarations to hard technical realities, material constraints, and industrial competitiveness. The path to 2030 is no longer about announcing targets; it is about solving the physical, economic, and infrastructural parameters that will determine whether decarbonization can advance without destabilizing grids or bankrupting entire sectors.

EU deserves a clear reminder. LNG corridors from the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are helpful, but they cannot resolve Europe’s energy challenges. They remain complementary measures. They do not correct the structural difficulties created over decades. A persistent green ideological rigidity limited the role of firm capacity. Domestic hydrocarbon production was phased out. Permitting essential infrastructure slowed significantly. These choices had predictable effects. They overlooked grid physics, materials, storage, reliability, and industrial policy. They weakened the system Europe now relies on. Three forces now shape the landscape. Grids must remain stable under very high RES penetration. Critical materials, from copper and aluminum to gallium, are becoming scarce and expensive. Existing fossil infrastructure must be used strategically to avoid premature asset stranding. Innovation is adjusting to these realities. New conductors, new storage solutions, new fuels, and updated regulatory frameworks are emerging because the previous assumptions no longer hold.

Materials and Conductors: The Silent Revolution in Grid Reinforcement

The rapid expansion of data centers and large RES clusters has exposed the limits of traditional copper‑based infrastructure. Prices, weight, and installation requirements make the full network reconstruction prohibitive. Aluminum, meanwhile, cannot handle the required current densities. This is where copper‑clad aluminum (CCA) becomes critical: it offers higher conductivity than aluminum, lower cost and weight than copper, and reduced thermal load in dense electrical environments. By 2030, CCA will be widely deployed in data centers, EV fast‑charging networks, and medium‑voltage grids across Europe and North America. Instead of rebuilding entire networks, operators turn to targeted CCA upgrades to ease congestion and unlock dormant capacity. Yet another constraint emerges: transformer shortages and slow permitting, now as acute as the bottlenecks facing RES deployment.

Hydrogen and Methane Pyrolysis: The End of the Universal Green Solution

The myth of the early transition collapses in the 2020s. Hydrogen is no longer viewed as a universal green solution. Life‑cycle analyses show that green hydrogen is only as clean as the electricity feeding the electrolyzers, while methane leakage undermines the value of blue hydrogen. This opens the door to methane pyrolysis, which produces hydrogen and solid carbon with lower emissions, provided methane leakage is tightly controlled. Yet its economic viability depends on stable, low‑cost methane supply. The shift from blue to pyrolytic hydrogen changes the chemical approach, and the geopolitics. Pyrolysis does not free Europe from geopolitical exposure because the continent still depends on external methane suppliers, such the US, Qatar, Algeria, East Med producers, and African exporters. Europe’s pursuit of low‑carbon hydrogen therefore intersects with the strategic interests of actors whose priorities do not always align with EU climate policy.

Hard Carbon and Sodium‑Ion Batteries: The New Geopolitics of Storage

As hydrogen is reconsidered, another development is quietly reshaping the storage landscape. Research from 2024–2025 shows significant advances in sodium‑ion batteries (SIBs). They use hard‑carbon anodes and improved electrolytes that extend performance, safety, and lifespan. Their cost structure is attractive, and their reliance on abundant materials makes them resilient to supply‑chain shocks. They remain short‑duration technologies, typically up to 10 hours, but they offer a robust alternative for stationary applications where energy density is less critical. Lithium keeps its lead in mobility and high‑power applications, yet it gradually loses its monopoly in grid storage.

The absence of lithium, cobalt, and nickel drastically reduces dependence on unstable or concentrated supply chains. Sodium, abundant and low‑cost, makes SIBs ideal for stationary applications. By 2030, SIBs will be deployed across industrial sites, distribution grids, substations, and hybrid long‑duration systems, often combined with hydrogen or thermal storage. China leads production, while Europe attempts to build its own supply chain to reduce import dependence. Sodium‑ion technology is emerging as a strategic counterweight to China’s dominance in lithium refining and cathode materials. By shifting to sodium, a resource with no geopolitical constraints, Europe and India seek to dilute China’s leverage over global battery supply chains. Storage is no longer just a technical field; it is a geopolitical chessboard.

Long Duration Storage Beyond Lithium

Lithium batteries remain essential for short‑duration storage, but the 2030 system increasingly depends on Long Duration Energy Storage (LDES). The cause is simple: high RES penetration creates multi‑day and multi‑week imbalances that no battery chemistry can economically cover. Hydrogen becomes the backbone of these long‑duration needs, not because of efficiency, but because it provides security of supply and seasonal flexibility. In shipping, e‑methanol emerges as the most practical ambient‑temperature hydrogen carrier, balancing energy density, safety, and infrastructure readiness.

The LDES ecosystem expands rapidly. Iron‑air and zinc‑air systems offer multi‑day discharge at low cost. Flow batteries provide long cycle life and deep‑discharge flexibility. Thermal storage and mechanical systems add further diversity. Together, these technologies form a portfolio that complements lithium and sodium‑ion, each serving a different segment of the duration curve.

Hydrogen‑Ready Infrastructure and the Management of Stranded Assets

This shift toward hydrogen‑compatible combined‑cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) is not ideological but economic. It allows investors to continue amortizing fossil infrastructure while gradually reducing emissions. Technical challenges such as, flame speed (much higher than natural gas), NOₓ formation, and material stress, are significant. By 2030 many such units will operate with 20–30% hydrogen blends. They will not eliminate emissions but provide a transition bridge and prevent massive asset write‑offs while stabilizing the grids during low‑RES periods. In fact, dispatchable capacity is becoming a strategic asset in a world where energy security is increasingly weaponized. From Russia’s pipeline leverage to Middle Eastern LNG politics, the vulnerabilities are unmistakable. In this environment, hydrogen‑ready CCGTs are not merely engineering choices; they function as geopolitical insurance policies.

SMRs and the Return of Firm Power

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) will move from concept to implementation in the late 2030s. Their value lies not only in nuclear physics but in industrial standardization, factory manufacturing, harmonized licensing, and integration into industrial heat networks. By 2030, the first SMRs will operate as firm‑power anchors for mining regions, isolated grids such as data centers, and large industrial sites. In a world of tightening supply chains and rising geopolitical competition, their role becomes both technological and strategic.

CBAM and the New Era of Tariff Diplomacy

As the transition moves from engineering constraints to system‑wide restructuring, the pressures are no longer purely technical. Materials, grids, storage, and firm capacity define what is physically possible and the global environment in which these technologies operate is increasingly shaped by trade policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical competition. This is where the next layer of the transition emerges: the regulatory and commercial instruments. They determine who captures value, who bears cost, and how global supply chains realign. Among these instruments, none is more consequential than the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. This mechanism does not offer technical solutions, it turns decarbonization from a voluntary commitment to a tool of trade. Exporters of steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, and electricity must prove low carbon intensity or pay tariffs that erase their competitiveness. For the European Union, CBAM is expected to accelerate investment in low‑carbon processes, often supported by IPCEI programs. Yet the counter‑argument gains weight: CBAM relies on ideological rather than technocratic CO₂ accounting. It ignores life‑cycle emissions, methane leakage outside the EU, the energy intensity of European grids, and emissions embedded in imports. Instead of reducing global emissions, it risks creating carbon leakage under another name.

CBAM sits at the intersection of great‑power competition and the emerging fracture lines of the global economy. For the United States, it is both challenge and opportunity. First, a challenge because European border carbon pricing can collide with U.S. industrial and trade interests. Secondly, an opportunity because, together with the Inflation Reduction Act, it can support a transatlantic low‑carbon industrial block capable of setting de facto global standards. Whether Washington and Brussels coordinate or drift into regulatory rivalry will shape investment flows for decades.

For China, CBAM is more than a tariff, it signals that the EU is prepared to weaponize market access in the name of climate policy. Beijing reads it alongside export controls on critical technologies and restrictions on Chinese clean tech in Europe. In response, China accelerates its own standards, consolidates its dominance in batteries, solar and critical materials, and secures long‑term offtake agreements with countries that feel penalized by European rules. CBAM thus reinforces Beijing’s narrative of Western “green protectionism” aimed at containing China’s industrial rise.

The BRICS expansion adds another layer. Many BRICS and “BRICS‑plus” countries, from India and Brazil to Gulf and African states, view CBAM as a unilateral imposition of European norms on their development paths. As they deepen South‑South cooperation, build alternative financial mechanisms, and explore their own carbon accounting systems, CBAM risks catalyzing parallel regulatory ecosystems: one centered on the EU, another around a looser BRICS‑led bloc rejecting externally imposed climate conditionality.

For much of the Global South, CBAM reinforces a long‑standing grievance: that advanced economies, having built their prosperity on cheap fossil energy, now deploy climate policy in ways that restrict others’ industrial development. Many fear it will confine them to raw‑material roles while eroding the competitiveness of their energy‑intensive sectors. This perception fuels diplomatic pushback, draws some countries closer to China or BRICS frameworks, and complicates Europe’s attempt to position itself as a partner in a “just transition. In this sense, CBAM is more than a tool of market protection or climate ambition. It is a lever that can either place Europe at the center of a rules‑based low‑carbon trade system or accelerate the fragmentation of the global economy into competing regulatory and geopolitical blocks.

Conclusion

The energy transition is not a single technological narrative. Some innovations concern grid physics, conductivity, stability, and thermal management; others shape the energy mix, storage, and industrial architecture of the coming decade. The energy system of 2030 will not be shaped by slogans but by physics, materials, and economics. The question is whether Europe will adapt in time, or whether reality will violently adjust its ambitions.

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The CIA’s China Playbook and the Shadow War

In a recent move, China’s top general and a longtime confidant of President Xi Jinping, Zhang Youxia, and Joint Staff chief Liu Zhenli were removed from the Central Military Commission (CMC). An editorial published in Liberation Army Daily described both men as “seriously betraying the trust and expectations” of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the CMC.

Beyond corruption allegations, Zhang was reportedly accused of leaking core technical data on China’s nuclear weapons programme to the United States. In the aftermath, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released a Mandarin language recruitment video targeting disaffected Chinese soldiers. Titled “The Reason for Stepping Forward To Save the Future,” portrays a disillusioned midlevel officer choosing to contact American intelligence. The outreach appears aimed at deepening internal doubts and positioning itself as an alternative confidant for officers who may feel exposed. However, this is not the first time the agency has sought to infiltrate the country.

A History of Intelligence Operations and Resets

Intelligence rivalry stretches back to the late 1940s, when the CIA tried to monitor the Soviet nuclear programme by placing listening devices within China and along its Soviet border. Surveillance also extended to the Xinjiang region, tracking uranium, gold, petroleum, and Soviet aid to the CPC during its war with the US backed Guomindang for regional control. Despite these efforts, the intelligence gathered remained minimal at best, from October 1950 to July 1953 the agency also failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting significant resources away from China’s military campaign in Korea.

As Cold War rivalries hardened, the CIA launched Operation Circus in the late 1950s to support Tibetan rebels against the CPC. The CIA supplied guerrilla groups, including the most active Chushi Gangdruk group, with arms and ammunition and trained fighters at Camp Hale. Allen Dulles, then CIA deputy director, saw the effort as an opportunity to destabilize the CPC and counter Communist influence across Asia. The group continued its operations from Nepal until 1974, when funding ended after US-China rapprochement.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the CIA cooperated with Chinese intelligence under Project Chestnut, establishing listening posts in the northwest to monitor Soviet communications. In 1989, as the Tiananmen Square protests rocked the CPC, the CIA provided communications equipment, including fax machines and typewriters to protestors. It also assisted in the escape of protest leaders with the help of sympathizers in Hong Kong under Operation Yellow Bird. Relations deteriorated in 2001, when an aircraft built in the US for General Secretary Jiang Zemin was found to contain at least 27 listening devices, including one embedded in the headboard of a bed, operable via satellite.

However, these gains proved fragile as major setbacks soon followed, with reports that between 2010 and 2012 Chinese authorities dismantled a large CIA network. In total, between 18 and 20 sources were killed or imprisoned, according to two former senior American officials. One asset was reportedly shot in front of colleagues in the courtyard of a government building as a warning to others suspected of working with the CIA.

Espionage in the Xi Jinping Era

Estimates in 2024 suggested the Ministry of State Security (MSS) employed as many as 800,000 personnel, compared with roughly 480,000 at the height of the KGB. After taking power in 2012, Xi further consolidated control over its security apparatus, chairing a high level national security task force.

His approach also followed revelations that an American informant network had infiltrated the MSS. An executive assistant to MSS Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei was discovered in 2012 to have passed sensitive information to the CIA. The ministry was also influenced by former security chief Zhou Yongkang, who was charged with abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets in 2014. He was subsequently expelled from the politburo in one of the most consequential purges in the country’s history.

In light of these developments, Xi’s “comprehensive state security concept,” promulgated in 2014, linked internal and external threats and underscored the dangers of destabilization through foreign subversion and infiltration. He also enacted the 2014 Counter Espionage Law, revised in 2023 to broaden espionage definitions, coinciding with detentions of foreign firm employees and tighter data controls.

Under his leadership, another major initiative allowed the MSS to establish direct public contact in 2015 through a hotline and website urging citizens to report threats to national security. In 2017, MSS offered rewards of up to 500,000 RMB for reporting suspected threats. In the same year, counterintelligence services also launched a broad awareness campaign through websites, animations, and television dramas promoting this “special work,” often targeting journalists, academics, and Chinese American and Taiwanese businesspeople.

Chinese courts have also imposed severe punishments in such cases. In April 2025, a former employee of a military research institute was sentenced to life imprisonment for selling secret documents to foreign intelligence agencies. The ruling followed the sentencing of a former engineer to death in March on similar charges.

China also deploys operatives abroad to curb criticism and preserve regime stability. Overseas police stations reportedly directed by provincial MSS offices combine administrative services with intelligence functions. One established in New York by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau drew headlines in 2023. In fact, the earliest cyber incidents targeting UK government systems in the early 2000s originated not from Russia but from China, and were aimed at gathering information on overseas dissident communities, including Tibetan and Uighur groups.

New Intelligence Order Enters a Decisive Era

As China’s influence grew in the 2000s, Western policymakers were focused on the war on terror and interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, political leaders often preferred that intelligence chiefs avoid publicly naming China. Businesses faced mounting pressure to prioritize access to its vast market, while remaining reluctant to acknowledge that their proprietary information was being targeted.

In 2021, the FBI reported opening a new Chinese espionage case roughly every 12 hours, most involving cyber disruption. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of Justice, and other US bodies repeatedly identified MSS affiliated actors in advisories and indictments. Analysts assess MSS linked groups have surpassed PLA associated actors in both the sophistication and scope of their hacking campaigns. In 2024, authorities announced that Salt Typhoon had breached major US telecommunications companies in one of the most damaging publicly reported cyber campaigns. The National Security Agency (NSA) also noted that China’s reliance on indigenous technology makes its networks harder to track.

Former CIA director William J. Burns, under the Biden administration described these intelligence shortcomings as a “pacing challenge.” The administration created a China Mission Centre and a technology intelligence centre to address it. An executive order was also issued in 2024, prohibiting funding for Chinese semiconductors, microelectronics, quantum computing, and certain AI applications in sectors that are considered capable of enhancing military capabilities.

When the Trump administration returned in 2025, it triggered significant disruptions across the US government. In early May 2025, plans were announced to cut 1,200  positions at CIA and 2,000 at the NSA, with similar reductions reportedly planned for other intelligence bodies as well. Such cuts were expected to disrupt operations and deter long term asset relationships. The “Signalgate scandal” further revealed that senior national security officials had shared classified information in an unsecured Signal group chat. These avoidable lapses posed a serious threat to operational security and heightened the risks faced by intelligence assets worldwide.

As China pursues its vision of a unipolar world while escalating espionage and global security threats, international attention on its actions has intensified. Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 will be closely watched to assess whether the recruitment videos are part of a broader strategy targeting Xi’s establishment or merely a pressure tactic.

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Pivot to Arctic: Why the Mastery of the North Matters?

Introduction

The Arctic has long been known as “high North, low tension”, as its frozen waters and permafrost landscape offered no incentives to the states. However, due to global warming, it is changing. The rate of warming in the Arctic region is four times faster than the globe, resulting in massive ice loss. This anthropogenic anomaly has made the Arctic a region of geopolitical significance.

The Strategic Importance

The strategic importance of any region primarily depends on two factors: The first is Geographical position; which not only emboldens its importance as a trade passage but also defines its fruitfulness as a strategic location in both peace and war. The second; its Resources which offer economic benefits to the states, which can be translated into military might. The Arctic, indeed, has manifested both qualities. Its seas are becoming navigable as the ice recedes. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest passage (NWP) provide the countries in the high latitudes lucrative trade opportunities. Similarly, the geo-economic weight of the Arctic is augmented by its huge reserves of petroleum and minerals. It holds almost 13% (90 billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered gas resources. Moreover, the Arctic has a large amount of mineral resources. For example, Greenland; which comprises almost 15% of the Arctic region and its second largest contiguous landmass, is estimated to possess large deposits of Rare Earths, Copper, Zinc, Iron ore, Gold, Nickel and Uranium. Therefore, the big powers have set eye on the Arctic, including the US; Russia and China, with ambitions to dominate which may be termed as The Arctic Great Game.

Strategic location of the Arctic

“Whoever holds Alaska will hold the world”, General Billy Mitchell was not wrong when he uttered this phrase in 1935. Indeed, during the Cold War, the possession of Alaska for the US, its only in the Arctic, proved fruitful. American early warning satellites and missile defenses were installed in Alaska to detect Soviet infiltration. The Cold War is over now, but the competition over the Arctic has reinvigorated. The US, under Trump administration, is ambitious to dominate

the Western Hemisphere. The Arctic, especially Greenland, can be defined as the head of the Western Hemisphere. The geographical position of the Greenland is indeed enviable. East of it runs the widest gap between the Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. Therefore, America holds the Island in esteem for its strategic location. The 2026 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the US military and commercial access to the Arctic, especially Greenland. It already operates the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in Greenland, in addition to its Alaskan military bases in the Arctic.

Russia, an important stakeholder in the region, enjoys one of the longest coastlines and largest territories in the Arctic. Russian activities in the Arctic are not novice. In the late 18th century, Russian emperor Peter the Great launched the ‘Great Northern Expedition’ which aimed to search for a northern sea route that could connect the Pacific and Europe. The quest for a such a sea route seems promising now as the Arctic waters become traversable. In 2020, Russia unveiled its Arctic policy till 2035. Among others, it emphasized the development of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as ‘a national transport communication of the Russian Federation that is competitive on the world market’. However, after Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin adopted a staunch outlook. In Feb 2023, Putin decreed to amend the country’s Arctic policy. The amended document mentioned the prioritization of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. For this purpose, Russia has endeavored to transform NSR into a global trade and energy route. Russia currently operates the largest Icebreaker fleet and thanks to this technology, the transit of trade vessels is expected to increase through the NSR.

Routes through the Arctic Ocean. Source: Author’s creation

However, any unilateral Russian action in the Arctic Ocean would not land off the attention of the other Arctic states. While Russia is ambitious to hew the Arctic Ocean as a “Russian Lake”, the other Arctic countries too deem the Arctic as their ‘number one priority’. The Nordic countries consider the Arctic as a security concern, they also see Russia as a threat in the region while emphasizing sustainable development in the region. Therefore, the strategic competition in the Arctic will, inevitably, shape the European security dynamics.

The strategic importance of GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) Gap, a body of open water between the three countries, is still relevant. During the Cold War, it provided the Soviet vessels an outlet into the North Atlantic Ocean which conferred optimal range to strike NATO targets. However, in late 2019, Russian submarines surged through the gap into the North Atlantic in what was a large-scale military exercise to which NATO forces counteracted with air missions to gather reconnaissance. Therefore, the Arctic is of strategic significance. It acts as a vanguard for the defenses of the Americas and Europe.

The most interesting case offered in the Arctic security is that of China, which lacks any geographical connection to the region. For Beijing, the Arctic begets new opportunities. China has already declared itself a “Near-Arctic State”  in its Arctic Policy 2018 and seeks to participate in the development of the Arctic shipping routes. China’s growing interest in the Arctic shipping routes can be interpreted as its efforts to diversify its trade routes. Compare the two routes which link China to the Western European markets: First is from the Chinese ports through the East and South China Sea, into the Indian Ocean, then crossing the Suez and reaching Mediterranean, squeezing through Gibraltar strait and reaching destinations. China’s apparition, utilizing this route, is evident in what has been translated as the “Malacca dilemma”. The second runs northerly from the Chinese ports and then cruising along the Arctic reaches Northern and Western Europe. The first is long, time-consuming and precarious in case of conflict given complex maritime features of the region. The second not only cost saving but also relatively more secure and safe. Therefore, the prospects for China to make the Arctic a “Polar Silk Road” are rewarding.

                  Probability of expansion of power in the Arctic of US, Russia and China
  Political Military Economic
United States high medium high
Russia high high high
China medium low high

Future Power Politics in the Arctic. Source: Author’s creation

The Race to Secure the Arctic Resources

President Trump, during his first term, had tried to buy Greenland. However, his efforts were reinvigorated after his re-election in late 2024. During his second term, he has repeatedly threatened to occupy Greenland by using military force, the island defined by him as a matter of national security. The strategic importance of the Greenland is evident. Trump’s interest in the Greenland can be defined by two reasons. First to oust China and Russia from the region who have been increasing their influence in the region, as he perceives. Secondly, Trump wants to secure the resources of the Greenland for the US. Greenland, as said earlier, is rich in rare-earth minerals, which have their application in military industries, medical equipment, oil refining and green energy. Currently, China is the largest exporter of the rare earths. US deems ramping up its rare earth’s resources crucial for countering the Chinese monopoly over them. Last year, a global supply chains crisis loomed following China’s restrictions on the exports of the critical minerals. Moreover, to meet the threat imposed by climate change, the real progenitor of the shift in Arctic security, the transition to renewable and smart energy sources demands sufficient mineral resources including the rare earths. These are used in wind turbines and electric vehicles.

Russia extracts a huge amount of its energy and mineral resources from the Arctic. It produces rare earths, nickel and cobalt from its Arctic territory. Russian Arctic also holds almost 37.5 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, 75% of Russia’s gas reserves. As the permafrost thaws and the sea ice melts in the Arctic, Russia will expand its efforts to secure the resources in the region. Therefore, the Kremlin keenly observes changing environmental and political dynamics in the Arctic.

Lastly, the ‘Near-Arctic State’ has also augmented its footholds in the Arctic. China has invested in economic sectors in the Arctic. It is yet to be unveiled whether China’s ambitions in the Arctic are solely for peaceful economic purposes or rather they embody a strategic objective. So far, China has remained innocuous, focusing on economic ties with the Arctic states which benefit all.

Conclusion

The Arctic is going to witness a tense geostrategic competition. Climate Change has transformed this previously unnoticed region into a new stage of strategic competition. Arctic routes and resources invite regional as well as extra-regional powers to vie for dominance in the high north. Therefore, states have shifted their focus to the Arctic. The political and strategic facts imply that in the future the master of the Arctic will decide the matters of the world.

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Mapping the Future: The 2026 Two Sessions and China’s Vision for the Global South

The 2026 Annual Sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), known as the “Lianghui,” are a pivotal event. They will witness the official launch and final adoption of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). This plan serves as a roadmap not only for China but also for countries of the Global South, focusing on the shift from quantitative growth to “new qualitative productive forces” based on innovation and technology. It is worth noting that formulating medium- and long-term plans to guide China’s economic and social development is a crucial method of governance employed by the Communist Party of China.

The “Two Sessions” meetings (National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) in China in 2026 represent a strategic focal point for the Global South, outlining the 15th Five-Year Plan, supporting high-quality development through new productive forces, and strengthening trade partnerships, particularly in the areas of energy, transportation, and the digital economy. Its importance to the Global South lies in China’s leadership of economic integration. China aims to promote openness and cooperation, providing an opportunity for the Global South to benefit from the growth of the world’s second-largest economy. Here, (The Global South’s benefit from China’s innovative development models): During the Two Sessions in March 2026, China will present a model of governance and technological innovation that developing countries and countries of the Global South can utilize to achieve sustainable development and digital transformation. Additionally, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and the Two Sessions in March 2026 will strengthen the foundations for trade between China and the Global South in particular: These meetings will pave the way for China to enhance trade with countries of the Global South in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, supporting infrastructure and economic growth in the Global South under China’s leadership. Most importantly, the Two Sessions in March 2026 and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will support the Asia-Pacific region and the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s Vision 2026 focuses on “building a community with a shared future,” promoting investment projects and economic exchanges with developing countries. Therefore, the upcoming two-day meeting in China in March 2026 is crucial in guiding the Chinese economy towards domestic consumption and innovation, opening new markets and opportunities for developing countries in the Global South.

This tenth five-year plan represents China’s economic and social roadmap for the second half of the current decade, emphasizing “high-quality development” and technological innovation that will benefit developing countries in the Global South. Thus, during the 2026 meetings, China will work to “promote the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative with high quality.” This “Chinese-style modernization” will contribute to creating more development opportunities for countries around the world, especially those in the Global South, in accordance with President Xi Jinping’s principles of a shared future for mankind, win-win cooperation, and mutual benefit for all, particularly developing countries. The developing world. It aims to achieve the goal of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping of doubling the size of China’s national economy by 2030. To this end, the State Council of China held a plenary meeting on February 6, 2026, to review the draft government work report and the draft 15th Five-Year Plan before submitting them to parliament during the joint sessions of the two councils in March 2026. The annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) to discuss the draft 15th Five-Year Plan is scheduled to begin on March 5, 2026, while the session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) will commence on March 4, 2026.

The meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026 are of exceptional importance, as they mark the official launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). These meetings, known as the “Two Sessions,” will chart China’s economic and political course for the second half of the current decade, with a focus on transitioning to “new productive forces.” The strategic significance of the Two Sessions in China in 2026 stems from adopting the Decade Roadmap: The 15th Five-Year Plan serves as a crucial link in achieving China’s goal of socialist modernization by 2035. Furthermore, the meetings will address how China will respond to global challenges: These meetings come at a time when China is facing a slowdown in global growth, geopolitical tensions, and internal structural pressures. With a discussion of the (mechanisms and plans for transforming China’s economic model): The upcoming meetings of the Two Sessions in March 2026 aim to shift the Chinese economy from reliance on traditional manufacturing to an innovation- and technology-driven economy. Emphasis will also be placed on further modernizing the state’s governance system and capacity, raising the level of social civilization, enhancing cultural confidence, continuously improving the quality of life for the Chinese people, achieving new progress in providing sufficient and high-quality employment, making significant new strides in building a “beautiful China,” establishing a green lifestyle and production model, strengthening national security, and effectively promoting the construction of a “safe China” at a higher level.

The Chinese political leadership is currently laying the groundwork for the Two Sessions in March 2026, which will determine the contours of the country’s social and economic development over the next five years. Chinese President Xi Jinping held meetings with senior officials to discuss the key priorities of the new Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), while Chinese state media launched a nationwide campaign to gather public feedback. During a symposium held in April 2025 to discuss the 15th Five-Year Plan, President Xi Jinping, in his capacity as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, emphasized that “in planning economic and social development for this period, it is essential to proactively assess the impact of changes in the international landscape on China and adapt to them by adjusting and improving the country’s economic structure.” President Xi highlighted several key areas, including ensuring economic stability by stabilizing employment, supporting businesses, and continuing China’s broad-based economic opening-up. During his speech at the April 2025 symposium to discuss China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, Xi Jinping strongly emphasized scientific and technological development. He specifically called for new, high-quality productive forces to play a more prominent role in the country’s economic revitalization. He also called for strengthening the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, developing emerging industries, and accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system.

In a speech published in the Communist Party’s magazine “Qiushi” in July 2025, President Xi Jinping stated that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century, making the technological revolution and competition among major powers increasingly intertwined.” He urged the Chinese nation to consolidate its strategic advantage in the global technology race.

Herein lies the most important strategic dimension of the 15th Five-Year Plan and its impact on the Global South, through leading the technological transformation. The plan aims to achieve “self-reliance” in advanced technology fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and semiconductors. For countries in the Global South, this represents an opportunity to break the Western monopoly on technology and gain access to advanced Chinese technological alternatives. Furthermore, China offers a “high-quality development model” during the 15th Five-Year Plan period, transitioning from labor-intensive industries to smart and green manufacturing. This approach provides the Global South with an inspiring model for integrating environmental sustainability with economic growth, particularly in the areas of solar energy and electric vehicles. Finally, the plan promotes “dual-cycle development” by focusing on reducing dependence on foreign markets and boosting domestic consumption. This transformation could lead to a reshaping of global supply chains, opening new horizons for countries in the Global South to export their products to the massive Chinese market, which is expected to reach $20 trillion by 2026. Furthermore, the timing of the launch and discussion of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan presents an opportunity to enhance regional and multilateral cooperation, coinciding with China’s hosting of the APEC summit.

  In 2026, the 15th Five-Year Plan will focus on (strengthening economic integration with Asia-Pacific and Global South countries), emphasizing the digital economy, transportation, and energy. Beyond its strategic security and resource implications for the Global South, the 15th Five-Year Plan includes new strategies for marine resource exploitation and deep-sea innovation, a vital area for many coastal developing countries seeking to develop their “blue economy,” drawing on China’s experience in this field.

The 15th Five-Year Plan, covering the period from 2026 to 2030, is expected to focus on enhancing economic resilience and strengthening China’s technological and innovative capabilities. It will be adopted during a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Chinese Five-Year Plans are the country’s most important policy blueprints, outlining strategic goals for economic and social development over a five-year period. These plans began with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. They define national priorities, particularly in the areas of economic growth, industrial development, education, and social development, and serve as binding guidelines for all local, regional, and national governments. China, a leading force and supporter of the Global South, draws upon its experience.

As for the main topics of discussion during the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will take place during the 2026 Two Sessions in China, legislative and political deliberations will focus on several key pillars, most importantly: how China can achieve technological independence and self-reliance. This will be accomplished by discussing mechanisms and plans for achieving “Chinese self-reliance” in critical technologies, such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. This will be achieved by studying and discussing ways to strengthen scientific and technological capabilities to achieve self-sufficiency in vital industries through advanced manufacturing and artificial intelligence, transforming the manufacturing sector towards smart technologies to enhance innovation. Emphasis will be placed on China’s firm commitment to the “Made in China policy,” aiming to propel China to the forefront of a range of high-tech industries, including aerospace, electric vehicles, robotics, and communications. The discussions will also explore ways to achieve common prosperity and well-being for the Chinese people by improving living standards and ensuring a more equitable distribution of the fruits of modernization.

The 2026 meetings of the Joint Conference will also focus on structural reforms, implementing over 300 reform measures to enhance the efficiency of the Chinese national economy within a complex international environment. This year’s meetings in China will also address the “green transition,” continuing to support clean technologies such as solar power and electric vehicles, and promoting renewable energy (solar and wind) to achieve peak carbon emissions by 2030. Furthermore, they will discuss boosting domestic demand by exploring ways to encourage household consumption as a primary driver of growth, rather than relying excessively on foreign investment. The meetings will also address strengthening national security, exploring ways to bolster industrial supply chains, and ensuring water and food security for Chinese society, including the modernization of 700,000 kilometers of pipeline infrastructure. Finally, they will discuss achieving maritime development by utilizing marine resources and innovating in deep-sea technology as part of balanced regional growth.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that the two sessions of the Global Summit in China in March 2026 represent a strategic pivotal point for reshaping globalization and the developments of the Global South under China’s leadership. This will lead to a more inclusive and multipolar world, moving away from traditional economic dependence, thus strengthening China’s position as a leader and key driver of development in the Global South in the coming decade.

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Beijing Unveils Competing Vision for Gaza After Rejecting US-Led Initiative

China officially announced in late January 2026 its refusal to join the Board of Peace at the “International Peace Council for the Administration of the Gaza Strip.” This council, proposed by the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump, is a new international entity launched by the US president as an alternative to traditional UN mechanisms. China confirmed in January 2026 that it had received a formal invitation from the United States to join the “International Peace Council” for Gaza, launched by President “Trump” as a global initiative to resolve the conflict. China’s stance toward this council is characterized by caution and a demand for further details while adhering to its established principles.

The reasons for China’s rejection of the US-sponsored peace council for the Gaza Strip are based on several strategic and legal justifications, the most important of which is the marginalization of the UN’s role by the International Peace Council, sponsored by Washington. Beijing believes that the council seeks to replace the role of the United Nations and the Security Council, and it affirms its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on international law. Regarding China’s criticism of the lack of Palestinian representation within the International Peace Council, China criticized the Council’s charter for failing to mention the Palestinians or respect their will, asserting that any arrangements for the future of Gaza must be based on the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine.” Furthermore, (China’s concerns about “American dominance” over the International Peace Council): Beijing warned that the Council could be a tool for Washington to impose “control” or establish military bases in the Gaza envelope area under the guise of reconstruction. Also, (China’s rejection of the financial membership criteria within the International Peace Council): The Council requires substantial financial contributions (up to one billion dollars for permanent membership), which China views as transforming peace into a “deal” driven by financial power rather than the legal rights of the Palestinians.

At the same time, China is demanding structural clarity regarding the resolution establishing the International Peace Council and its actual feasibility. China, through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” expressed concern that the resolution establishing the council lacks essential details, particularly concerning its structure, composition, and terms of reference, as well as the nature of the proposed “international stabilization force” in Gaza. Therefore, Beijing insisted on the UN’s authority in this matter, maintaining that any future arrangements for Gaza must be made under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions and with broad participation including Palestinian parties and Arab states. China rejected any “closed” or “unilateral” mechanisms that could marginalize the UN’s role. Furthermore, China categorically emphasized the principle of “Palestinian governance of Gaza,” considering the Gaza Strip an integral part of Palestinian territory. China rejects any plans aimed at imposing external trusteeship or control over its administration, affirming that the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” is the foundation for any post-conflict governance. China has supported Arab initiatives on post-war management of the Gaza Strip, explicitly endorsing reconstruction and peace plans proposed by Egypt and other Arab states, deeming them consistent with the aspirations of the Palestinian people. China firmly adheres to the two-state solution, maintaining that any peace efforts must ultimately lead to a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Therefore, the motives behind China’s rejection of the American request to join the International Peace Council on Gaza can be summarized as follows: China’s insistence on upholding the international legitimacy of the United Nations and its deep suspicions regarding the security and political objectives behind the council’s formation and Washington’s enthusiasm for it. The main reasons for China’s rejection of the International Peace Council on Gaza are China’s desire to protect the UN system. Beijing believes the proposed council seeks to replace or marginalize the role of the United Nations. The Chinese Foreign Ministry affirmed its commitment to an international system centered on the United Nations and based on its Charter and international law, rejecting any “alternative frameworks” outside of this scope. (Ambiguity in structure and tasks): The Chinese representative to the United Nations, “Fu Cong,” criticized the draft resolution concerning the council (Resolution 2803) for its lack of clear details regarding its structure, composition, and criteria for participation, describing it as “worrying.” In addition to China’s security concerns regarding the Gaza issue: Chinese intelligence reports indicate that one of the hidden objectives of the Washington-sponsored International Peace Council in Gaza is to destroy Hamas tunnels under the guise of “reconstruction,” which Beijing considers a “provocative and extremely dangerous” foreign military intervention. Furthermore, (China rejects American unilateralism in dealing with regional and global issues): China views the American International Peace Council initiative in Gaza as part of Washington’s attempts to impose “unilateralism” and exacerbate confrontation between blocs, which contradicts the “Global Governance Initiative” championed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping. ”.

Herein lies China’s alternative vision to the American initiative to form the International Peace Council: China, in its alternative to joining the Council, calls for the activation of the two-state solution as the only way to guarantee lasting peace in the Middle East and the implementation of the Beijing Declaration to support Palestinian national unity and strengthen the legitimacy of the Palestinian state. (UN Reform): Instead of creating parallel initiatives, Beijing calls for making the Security Council more responsive to the expectations of the world’s people on its 80th anniversary.

China proposes a different vision for managing the Gaza and Middle East issues, based on the following pillars: (Security Council Authority): This involves full adherence to UN Security Council resolutions as the sole basis for international legitimacy in Gaza. The Chinese call for (the principle of self-governance in the Gaza Strip): This involves China’s insistence that post-war administration of Gaza must be in the hands of the Palestinians themselves, rejecting any plans for forced displacement or external trusteeship. The Chinese call for a broad international peace conference on Gaza: Beijing calls for a more inclusive and credible international peace conference under UN auspices, with the aim of concretely implementing the two-state solution within a defined timeframe. With China prioritizing land routes over sea routes or temporary docks, as proposed by the US, China rejects maritime alternatives or “temporary docks” as substitutes for land corridors, viewing them as attempts to circumvent international obligations regarding humanitarian relief in the Gaza Strip.

From the preceding analysis, we understand that China considers itself a “positive stabilizing force” seeking to end the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip through comprehensive dialogue, in contrast to what it describes as the “unilateral” US approach, which it believes could deepen regional divisions. In short, while China does not reject participation in international dialogue on Gaza, it stipulates that the international peace council, sponsored by Washington, should be an instrument for strengthening international legitimacy, not a replacement for it, while preserving full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza.

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When the Strong Decide: Diego Garcia, Raw Power, and the Illusion of Conditional Access

On 18 February 2026, reports emerged that Britain was withholding American permission to use Diego Garcia in any hypothetical strike against Iran. The following day, Trump posted “DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA” on Truth Social, linking the base directly to potential operations against Tehran in terms that left no room for diplomatic interpretation. The sequence lasted forty-eight hours and revealed what months of careful legal construction had obscured: that the architecture of conditional access Britain had built around a strategically significant military installation was worth precisely what the decisive power chose to make it worth. Whether the intervention also carried tactical signalling toward Tehran is a legitimate question, and intra-alliance friction of this kind sometimes functions as maximalist positioning before settlement. What matters analytically, however, is not the post itself but what the post revealed when operational pressure arrived. It was also, for anyone who had read Washington’s December 2025 National Security Strategy carefully, entirely predictable.

Power Does Not Ask

There are two ways to understand how military power operates in the international system, and the Chagos episode forces a choice between them. The first holds that great powers are meaningfully constrained by the frameworks they inhabit, alliance structures, legal agreements, and diplomatic settlements, and that these frameworks produce stable, predictable behavior even when the underlying interests they were designed to manage come under pressure. The second holds that frameworks are expressions of power relationships at a given moment rather than independent constraints upon them, so that when power shifts or decides to assert itself, the frameworks adjust to reflect the new reality rather than containing it. The first is the language of liberal internationalism. The second is the language of realism, and what February produced was an unambiguous realist moment.

The December 2025 National Security Strategy had already committed this diagnosis to paper. The document did not describe Europe as weak through circumstance. It described Europe as having chosen weakness, identifying a “loss of national identities and self-confidence” as the continent’s defining condition and stating openly that it is “far from obvious whether certain European countries will have economies and militaries strong enough to remain reliable allies.” The strategy framed European concerns about Russia as evidence of that same condition, noting that this lack of self-confidence was most evident in Europe’s relationship with Russia, despite the fact that European allies enjoy a significant hard power advantage over Russia by almost every measure save nuclear weapons. Washington’s reading of its European partners, formalized two months before the Diego Garcia friction became public, was of states that had systematically preferred institutional solutions over sovereign ones, legal arrangements over unconditional control, and managed conditionality over the exercise of will. Britain’s handling of Chagos was, in that context, not an anomaly. It was a confirmation.

What is analytically significant about Trump’s intervention is not simply that he rejected the deal but that he did not engage it at all, did not address the ICJ ruling that gave it legal foundation, did not contest the lease terms that were its operational expression, and did not enter the diplomatic logic that had produced it over months of negotiation. A decision of this kind does not derive its authority from the framework it overrides, because it precedes that framework, and the framework itself only ever existed on the sufferance of the power now choosing to move against it. When Trump asserted that leases are “no good when it comes to countries,” he was not making a legal argument that could be answered within the same register. He was stating a principle about the nature of sovereign will: that when it moves, it moves prior to and above whatever conditional arrangements were constructed in the period of its dormancy.

This is realism in its purest operational form, in which states pursue interests, great powers pursue interests with the capacity to enforce them, and legal architecture functions as an instrument of power when it serves those interests and an obstacle to be displaced when it does not. The Chagos deal did not alter the underlying power relationship between Washington and London, but it did create a layer of conditionality over an asset Washington considers operationally essential, and when operational pressure arrived, that conditionality became intolerable, not because Mauritius is hostile, not because Britain is an adversary, but because no great power conducting military projection at a global scale can accept that a weak state sits structurally inside the chain of its operational decisions, regardless of how that state arrived there or how benign its intentions are understood to be.

Beneath the realist logic sits a transactional one, and the two reinforce each other in ways that matter for how Britain should read what happened. Trump does not evaluate alliance relationships by their historical depth or their institutional architecture. He evaluates them by what they yield in the current moment, and every asset is a leverage point to be maximized. Diego Garcia represents unconditional American operational value. The Chagos deal reduced that value by inserting a condition. From a transactional perspective, that insertion was not a diplomatic nuance to be managed but a concession to be reversed, because Trump’s governing principle across every alliance relationship is maximum American gain, and conditionality is by definition a reduction of gain. The decisionism explains how he responded. The transactionalism explains why.

The Geography of Decision

Diego Garcia is not incidental to American power projection in the region, though its significance is that of an enabler rather than a prerequisite. The base sits at the center of the Indian Ocean, within operational reach of the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Malacca, and the East African littoral, and it has supported American military operations across that entire arc for half a century through bomber rotations, logistics chains, and a sustained forward presence that no other installation in the basin fully replicates at the same scale and permanence. It does not make American power projection possible in any absolute sense, but it makes it faster, cheaper, and more sustained, which in the context of time-sensitive operational planning against a target like Iran is not a marginal difference but a meaningful one.

The Iran dimension exposes the conditionality problem with particular clarity because the operational context in which Diego Garcia’s value is most acute is precisely the context in which conditional access is most dangerous. American military assets have accumulated across the Middle East, talks are active, and a base capable of projecting strategic airpower directly into the Persian Gulf theater is not a background consideration but a variable whose availability, or unavailability, shapes what options exist and on what timeline. Britain’s reported reluctance to grant operational clearance, under a deal still unratified and still contested in domestic courts, still legally dependent on Mauritius’s continued cooperation, revealed that the conditionality embedded in the arrangement had already entered the operational calculus before any of the stabilizing assumptions behind the deal had time to establish themselves. Strategic friction did not arrive at the end of a long maturation period. It arrived in weeks, because operational pressure does not wait for diplomatic frameworks to consolidate.

That compression of the timeline is itself the most realistic lesson. Power does not defer to the developmental logic of legal arrangements, and when the operational moment arrives, whatever sits between a great power’s will and its objective is reclassified from a framework to be respected into a problem to be solved.

The Structural Position of the Weak

The analytical core of the Chagos case is not about Mauritius’s intentions, which by all available evidence are not hostile, but about the structural position that the deal assigned to it within the architecture of American operational planning, because in the logic of great power competition, it is position rather than intention that determines strategic relevance. By inserting itself, or being inserted, into the chain of conditions governing a great power’s operational freedom, a weak state acquires a form of leverage it could never achieve through military means, and the Chagos deal gave Mauritius exactly that position, not through hostility but through legal standing, not through power but through presence within a conditional architecture that a great power now had reason to find constraining.

For Washington operating within a decisionist strategic logic, that presence is categorically unacceptable regardless of Mauritius’s intentions. The relevant question is not whether Mauritius would obstruct American operations but whether, under the terms of the arrangement, it structurally could, and the answer is yes in a way that no amount of diplomatic goodwill can fully neutralize. Sovereignty transferred to Mauritius is not sovereignty parked with a neutral party but sovereignty that now sits within reach of Chinese economic leverage, meaning the lease does not merely introduce conditionality but introduces conditionality whose future content Washington cannot determine or guarantee. A great power conducting global military projection cannot organize its operational planning around the sustained goodwill of a small state whose strategic orientation it cannot guarantee. That such goodwill is required at all is the problem the deal created.

Weak states do not constrain great powers through legal arrangements in any durable sense, because the constraint only holds when the great power chooses to honor it, and great powers choose to honor constraints only when the cost of non-compliance exceeds the cost of compliance, a calculation that shifts decisively once operational necessity enters the equation and the framework reveals itself to be dependent on tolerance rather than grounded in power.

Conclusion

Britain converted unconditional sovereign control over a strategically significant military installation into a conditional leasehold arrangement whose operationalization depended on a small state’s legal cooperation and presented that conversion as a resolution of vulnerability rather than the creation of a new one. Britain was not being naive. It was an attempt to preserve the base’s long-term legal viability against mounting international pressure, a calculation that the alliance relationship would absorb any friction that followed. What Britain did not account for was that its ally evaluates arrangements not by their legal durability but by whether they constrain American will, and a solution sophisticated enough to satisfy international law was simultaneously insufficiently decisive to satisfy Washington.

From the perspective of the December 2025 National Security Strategy, that conversion was not a surprise. It was the predictable output of a European strategic culture that Washington had already formally diagnosed: one that reaches instinctively for institutional solutions when strong states would resolve through will, that mistakes legal legitimacy for strategic security, and that has internalized the habits of the post-Cold War order to the point where it can no longer easily distinguish between a framework and the power that makes frameworks real.

Trump’s response was the most realistic verdict on that presentation, not an argument against the deal’s legal coherence, which was never in question, but a decision that the framework was insufficient for the operational reality it was meant to serve, delivered in terms that made the underlying logic unmistakable. The framework did not collapse under the pressure. It was revealed, under pressure, to have rested entirely on the assumption that the decisive power would continue to choose not to decide otherwise, an assumption that realism has always identified as the central fragility of arrangements built on consent rather than grounded in power.

The strong do not negotiate with the architecture of constraint, and for Europe, February was less a shock than a reminder that the rules it has built its strategic identity around have always depended on the continued willingness of a decisive power to operate within them.

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No-Win Situation for Trump: Why the US Cannot Achieve Military Victory

The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, six frigates, three light warships, and approximately thirty fighter jets and support aircraft have entered the Middle East by order of Donald Trump who, by repeatedly touting the slogan “I have ended six/seven/eight wars,” has considered (and continues to consider) himself deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize. What objective do all these tensions that the U.S. administration has generated in the region actually pursue? The weakening of Iran, or the overthrow of the incumbent government? Whatever his and his administration’s aim may be, it appears that—within the cost–benefit calculations of his trader’s mindset—he has yet to arrive at a definitive conclusion as to what kind of blow, and at what scale, could deliver the desired outcome. His recent military posturing around Iran and his increasingly threatening rhetoric against the Islamic Republic have placed him in a no-win situation whose end few can predict.

Why a no-win situation for Trump?

First Strike Doubt: Trump and the constellation of officials currently in the White House—who, notably, are far from unified or aligned on how to approach Iran—have reached no certainty regarding the effectiveness of a first strike against Iran or the likelihood of achieving their desired results. It is evident to all that the Islamic Republic of Iran is neither Venezuela, nor Libya, nor Syria, nor Afghanistan, nor Iraq, nor anything akin to the historical cases in which the United States has intervened militarily in the name of democracy verbally and in pursuit of its own interests operationally. This very reality has, thus far, prevented Trump from issuing the order to “open fire” on Iran up to now.

On the other side, there is no sign of the flexibility or concession sought by the United States in the behavior or rhetoric of Iranian officials—a fact acknowledged by American officials themselves. This indicates that pressure, intimidation, and threats have thus far yielded no results. The reason is clear: the Islamic Republic views any potential confrontation as an existential war and is unwilling to grant any concessions. Trump, however—who seeks to manufacture achievements out of even the smallest events and whose penchant for exaggeration is among his defining traits—perceives such circumstances as detrimental to his personal prestige and standing.

Iran’s Resilience: The experience of the Israeli attack and the hybrid war launched against Iran in June 2025, with direct assistance from the United States and indirect support from so many others, demonstrated that the instability they sought within the governing structure of the Islamic Republic and even the internal social fragmentation and rifts that had been cultivated for years through various media tools did not materialize. Despite the blows inflicted on Iran, none of the long-term strategic objectives of the United States and Israel were achieved. Likewise, the unrest and riots of January 8 and 9, despite the violence and damage they caused to the public and the state, were ultimately brought under control and culminated in a multi-million-person rally on January 12 condemning the unrest and supporting the central government of the Islamic Republic.

High costs and Persian Gulf Worries: Operationalizing a military threat would impose heavy costs on the United States and its allies. The Islamic Republic has explicitly declared that any military action against its territory, at any scale, would be regarded as all-out war, and that, consequently, the entire region—as well as U.S. interests wherever they may be—would fall within range of Iran’s retaliatory strikes. This serious warning has also prompted Persian Gulf states to mobilize their capacities to dissuade Trump from attacking Iran. The strikes on U.S. bases at Ayn al-Asad and Al-Udeid entrenched the perception that the Islamic Republic does not shy away from responding to foreign aggression, even if large segments of the world regard the attacking state as a “superpower.”

Global Energy Risks: The ignition of war in the Persian Gulf would amount to a grave threat to global energy supply routes. Roughly 30 percent of the world’s crude oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas are supplied by Persian Gulf countries, and 20–25 percent of global crude oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. Any aggressive action by the United States would jeopardize the security of one-fifth of the world’s fuel and profoundly affect the global economy.

Although the U.S. National Security Strategy does not place the Middle East among America’s top strategic priorities, the same document states that: “We (the United States) want to prevent an adversarial power from dominating the Middle East, its oil and gas supplies, and the chokepoints through which they pass while avoiding the forever wars”, which shows Persian Gulf oil is still of high importance for Washington.

Tilting Power Balance: In addition, heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf would endanger China’s economic interests, and any large-scale military confrontation would likely lead to a more pronounced military-security presence by Russia and China in the Gulf—tilting the balance in favor of America’s rivals.

And finally?

The embers beneath the region’s ashes today could be ignited by the slightest breeze, engulfing a vast area. Israel, while likely the first target of Iran’s retaliatory response in the event of a U.S. attack, is nevertheless eager to initiate confrontation based on the calculation that a war waged with the full might of the United States could ultimately erode the very existence of the Islamic Republic or weaken it to the point of capitulation. In this context, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the disclosure of new documents and details concerning Trump’s links to the notorious Epstein case and his mysterious island may have been driven by the Mossad, as such revelations could compel the U.S. president to undertake an irrational action to divert attention elsewhere.

Today, Trump is acting more than ever in contradiction to his own professed principles—from trampling on his signature MAGA slogan and morphing it into MIGA (Make Israel Great Again), to undermining his administration’s efforts to reduce unnecessary international expenditures; from his paradoxical pride in having ended “eight wars” to the strategy of off-shore balancing the Middle East. Should a war of this magnitude and consequence erupt, no country involved—whether through direct action or geographic proximity—would be spared its consequences. Regarding these circumstances, it appears that the only desirable scenario for Trump, the region, and the world at large is the opening of a genuine dialogue, free from the shadow of threats, intimidation, and American bullying.

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Human or Bot? Who’s Really on the Other Side?

From what one should eat to what one should say, AI chatbots on your phone have the final say. The choice of bots, though, is totally in your hands, but what choice you will make with it is barely in your hands. Are you by any chance handing your decision-making power to bots, which you assume makes your life easy? If yes, then let’s consider a few things before your next chatbot conversation. First, understand the dual system model by Daniel Kahneman. According to that, there are two types of systems in the human brain. System 1 is associated with fast, intuitive, emotional, and automatic thinking. System 2 is associated with analytical, slow, effortful, and deliberate thinking. The majority of the technology that is available for the general masses urges individuals to use system 1, as it does not require much effort. Decision-making needs system 2 and is complex and requires time and effort, though this is something that people tend to avoid at all costs. Machines were built to reduce human effort, and artificial intelligence is there to reduce the decision-making efforts, something that differentiated the individual from the technology or innovation earlier.

Now at the state level, artificial intelligence is being integrated; take the example of the United States National Defense Strategy of 2022, where the inclusion of artificial intelligence in decision-making processes was of prime importance. At the systematic level, unfortunately, until now, there have not been concrete efforts towards establishing rules regarding artificial intelligence, except for the Bletchley Declaration, which was a landmark international agreement on AI safety. Though at the individual level, rather than being careful, people are playing with and handing over their decision-making power. As was reported by the BBC, in an interview, Megan Garcia, the mother of a 14-year-old, said that an AI chatbot encouraged her son to commit suicide. Another case involving a young Ukrainian woman with poor mental health received suicide advice from an AI chatbot. Another report by Vice of a person who committed suicide after having multiple conversations with a chatbot over environmental issues. AI chatbots that run on algorithms have been taken as emotional support beings, which they are not.

They are given different names to grab the attention of the user, such as “your goth friend,” “your possessive girlfriend,” and several others. They are targeting the emotional side, or System 1, of the user, and they have been quite successful in that. Everyone today almost has an AI chatbot with whom they have a conversation at least once a day. According to Chabot’s 2025 statistics, more than 987 million people use AI chatbots today. ChatGPT dominates the AI chatbot market share with 81.85%, using it globally, followed by OpenAI’s GPT-4, Microsoft Co-Pilot, Google Gemini, Claude, and DeepSeek with 11.05%, 3.07%, 2.97%, 1.05%, and 0.01%, respectively. With that, it is becoming dangerous and needs to be handled with more care and caution. The responsibility lies on individuals as much as it lies on the state and the international organizations.

Technology has been advancing for decades, and it has been creating ease and comfort for its users. Artificial intelligence, being one such technology, is beneficial too, but it should be used to enhance the mental capabilities and not hand over one’s control over things. AI is expanding and advancing at an immeasurable speed, and it will not wait for people to wake up and make better decisions for themselves. Social media platforms will not adjust themselves to the needs of the time, as they are markets, and all they care about is what is bought, which is the thing that should be sold. If people are buying the emotional support AI, then there will be multiple chatbots with attention-grabbing titles.

An individual might take it as a joke or play with it for fun, but what they do not realize is that they are providing their personal and sensitive information to a machine whose data can be sabotaged. People nowadays, without realizing, would jump on the ongoing trends without realizing what it will do to their data. The trend of Ghibli-style photos, where photos were being generated to the extent that it led to the melting of OpenAI’s servers, prompted the company to temporarily implement rate limits. In addition to that, it resulted in an intellectual property issue involving Studio Ghibli centers. As it mimicked the iconic style of Studio Ghibli, which has been working for decades, AI stole the art, and there was no genuine accountability. This is how dangerous it gets: stealing someone’s work and then getting away with it without being charged or held accountable. This intellectual property theft by AI resulted in Hollywood writers’ protest, leading to the establishment of the 2023 WGA AI contract. WGA (Writers Guild of America) led to AI not being treated as a writer and prevented it from getting any credit or being considered “literary material.” Where the threat is so imminent, laws are not efficient, control is lost, and profit is being generated, would you really let bots decide what you will do in your life?

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Ungoverned Space and Regional Spillover, Rethinking Afghanistan’s Borders

The Afghanistan crisis is generally spoken of as a crisis of the hour in terms of the Taliban, outside power intervention, or an unsuccessful election season. Such framing is not as profound as the problem. The state and province conquests, bargaining, and coercion united Afghanistan, the state, but not a civic transaction between peoples. Although the significance of an actual national flag was yet to arrive, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtuns, and minorities occupied different regions, related to regional leaders, tribal councils, and local trade routes. The power was not national but local and individual. The contemporary state emerged later, and at the inception of its emergence, it was naturally skewed in a manner that remained to fulfil the definition of politics.

The birth of Ahmad Shah Abdali, recalled as Ahmad Shah Durrani in the middle of the eighteenth century, could be recalled as one of the foundational legends. It was also when the military alliance of one community had become the core of the state’s strength. The shell of a state was built by Ahmad Shah through warfare, and the coalition of Pashtun tribes consolidated the territory and gained more lands, with the foundation of a heterogeneous and broad territory. The logic, however, was not inclusion. It was piety, preference, and blackmail. Peripheral territories like the non-Pashtun were to be ruled as they were expected to submit, pay, or surrender when the center was strong and to ignore when it was weak. That model had never killed with Ahmad Shah. It was a practice that has been emulated by other leaders who have come after and tried to play a stage of unity without building institutions that can be regarded as belonging to all groups.

The trend was established following the demise of Ahmad Shah. Kabul was rarely what it purported to be. Power moved around among leaders, but the leadership was generally stopped at metropolises, armies, and major highways. Large areas were something like semi-autonomous states, which cooperated with the state, fought it, or alternated in each of the seasons. When they say that Afghanistan has never had full rule of its own land, people are not hurting the country; they are saying a structural truth, which is that the center has never had sovereignty and has never received legitimacy on the full map. The actual authority was left to the ethnic groups, strongmen, clerics, and commanders. In that perspective, any change in Kabul became existential to the non-residents of the city, as the state was no competition referee but a prize.

Even the geography and the demography make this worse. Pashtuns have been estimated to be approximately 42 percent, Tajiks approximately 27 percent, and Hazaras and Uzbeks approximately 9 percent, and the rest are made up of Turkmen, Baloch, and others. Two official languages exist: Pashto and Dari, but the status of any language could never be a purely cultural one since it was always a political one. Even the name of the country, Afghanistan, is perceived by most Afghans as a loaded word, and that practice is tied to the Pashtun identity and leadership even when they are being applied as a national one. People are angry because of the gap between the way the label instructs us to feel and the way that people feel. Pleas of togetherness are empty when the name of a state is doubted even in real life.

The south, northeast, and many of the cities are then the Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara distributions, respectively. These areas are not eliminated by violent migration, displacement in war, or careful political manipulation. Rather, the blurring would contribute to some new fault lines, and communities would need to be pushed into the interspace of their neighbors without an established system of solving disagreements without favoritism. The cross-border relationships include the Tajiks and Tajikistan, Uzbeks and Uzbekistan, and Pashtuns and Pakistan, and there is a stable tug-of-war that the neighbors and patrons can make use of. A low external and high center connection is a formula for continued disintegration.

This is the sphere where the aspect of security cannot be neglected. The decades of controversial control and open borders have transformed parts of Afghanistan into an attractive location for militants that occupy uncontrolled space. When the state cannot provide some kind of protection over territory, the armed networks take its position and deliver protection, taxation, ideology, and logistics. These networks do not have a localization. Training, financing, and planning have border-crossing characteristics, subjecting the region to an environment of a shared threat. At that, the question is not only a moral or historical one, but one of expediency: what are the political structures that may be implemented to make sure that Afghanistan will no longer remain a jihadist temptation to armed groups that can break the peace of its neighbors?

The solution is suggested in a provocative manner, and that is the territorial restructuring, a peaceful partitioning of the state along ethnic and regional lines: Uzbek majority areas become Uzbekistan, Tajik majority areas become Tajikistan, Pashtun majority areas become Pakistan, another separate state is established called Hazaras, etc. The appeal is obvious. It will eliminate the sovereignty of a group, a distinct line of power, and smaller political units, which might be more efficient to govern. It also tries to compare borders to lives in stating that when people believe that the state is an extension of them and not the rulers of the state, then stability is achieved.

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Deconstructing Dollar Dominance: Insights for a Multipolar Currency Regime

Authors: Ajay Kumar Mishra and Shraddha Rishi*

At the Davos World Economic Forum, Mark Carney, the prime minister of Canada, shared his thoughts on the hegemonic and subservient world order. When integration turns into a source of subordination, one cannot “live within the lie” of mutual benefit in the midst of a collapsing global order. The trading communities appear to have a hegemonic and subservient relationship as a result of the dollar’s adoption as the world’s reserve currency. Furthermore, the competing global order between the US and China appears to be caving in to Chinese modus operandi without investigating the reasons for US authoritarian dominance, which could result in the acceptance of Chinese domination. The recognition of the US dollar as the worldwide currency and its dominance over oil, one of the most traded commodities, have put the US in leadership of the world trading regime. Furthermore, it appears that China’s monopoly over rare earth elements (REEs) is giving the Chinese yuan the same reserve currency power. Therefore, the globe might witness a change of control from the US to China, thus jeopardizing the world trading system to the whims and fancies of the country holding the reserve currency.

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According to this essay, the dollar’s reserve currency status is the true cause of the world order’s disintegration, which equates to allowing the US to take the only seat at the table. It contends that a multipolar currency is essential for a multipolar world order. This understanding is necessary to prevent the rule of any country based on currency supremacy. Diversifying the currency basket for trade transactions is encouraged. To show how the currency dominance of a reserve currency would rise to currency imperialism, this article looks into the petrodollar problem and the duality of reserve currency and trade deficit to delegitimize the necessity of the dollar as a reserve currency. Any currency in question is subject to the same reasoning. Thus, a multi-currency trading framework is advocated in this article.

Geoeconomics of the Petrodollar Crisis’s Spiral

The dollar controls trade, payments, and reserves. About 96 percent of trade in the Americas, 74 percent in the Asia-Pacific area, and 79 percent in the rest of the world is denominated in the currency. About 60 percent of international and foreign currency claims (mainly loans) and liabilities (mostly deposits) are in US dollars. Its proportion of foreign exchange transactions is roughly 90 percent. Approximately 60% of the world’s official foreign reserves are in US dollars. Furthermore, in Q1 2025, the US dollar’s percentage of global foreign exchange reserves dropped to 53.6%. Additionally, the 50-year security agreement with Saudi Arabia to price oil only in dollars and invest surpluses in U.S. Treasury bonds in exchange for military protection expired in 2024. This could result in a shift toward accepting different currencies, albeit it won’t happen right away. Additionally, countries like Russia, China, and Iran are increasingly using non-dollar currencies for energy trade, aiming to reduce reliance on Western financial networks.

To achieve its geoeconomic goals, US authorities have attempted to preserve the dollar’s reserve currency status in several ways, compensating for economic weaknesses such as a lack of competitiveness in particular. The US appears to be addressing the growing trade deficit by maintaining the dollar as the world’s currency and matching China’s hegemony over rare earth elements. The US’s current dominance over the trade regime is largely due to dollar-based trade. The oil trade in dollars gives the US significant influence to shape geopolitics globally, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as oil holds a premier position in the international trading landscape.One commodity (oil) and one currency (the US dollar) have the power to both destabilise and stabilise the global price system. Its “as good as gold” quality can only be maintained in a world where the dominant currency is no longer associated with gold if it is associated with oil, that is, if wealthy people have faith that oil prices won’t continue to rise relative to the US dollar. The US gains influence over the oil trade by controlling the petro-dollar trade.

The globe is essentially on an “oil-dollar standard” during the post-Bretton Woods system, when currencies are meant to be “floating.” The US is under pressure to control oil sources, which it does through coercion or persuasion, to maintain wealth-holders’ faith in the value of the dollar, without which the global economy will experience severe financial turmoil, particularly given the ongoing US current account deficit. In a nutshell, war is a result of today’s necessity to preserve US financial stability. It does, however, produce a spiral effect. To control a significant oil source for financial stability, the US attacked oil-rich Iraq and, more recently, Venezuela. However, as a result of the opposition this strike provoked, oil prices skyrocketed, increasing the threat to financial stability and the temptation to wage war on other oil-rich nations like Iran. Additionally, the US would experience the same spiral consequences in a much more severe form if it decided to go to war with Iran.

The Reserve Currency and Trade Deficit “Trade-off”

Trade deficit and reserve currency operate in a trade-off scenario wherein a nation whose currency serves as the world’s reserve currency must maintain a trade deficit. It is based on two fundamental ideas. The first is the ‘policy trilemma’ or ‘impossible trinity’ thesis of economists Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming. It contends that an economy cannot sustain unrestricted capital flow, a fixed exchange rate, and an autonomous monetary policy at the same time. The second paradox bears the name of Robert Triffin, an economist. This states that where their money works as the global reserve currency, a nation must run huge trade deficits to meet the demand for reserves. Any candidate for a new global reserve currency position must run significant current account deficits and risk an intolerable loss of economic control.

However, trade imbalances are thought to be self-correcting. A nation’s currency is predicted to lose value when it has a trade imbalance. Exports will then rise, while imports will fall, resulting in a reduction in the trade deficit. However, as the dollar is the world’s reserve currency, this idea does not apply to the US economy. A large portion of a country’s foreign exchange reserves is invested in US government securities. As a result, the dollar is overpriced. A chronic trade deficit results from higher imports and lower exports due to an overpriced dollar. Therefore, the US has a trade deficit not because it imports more goods, but rather because it supplies the world’s reserve currency.

In the face of “unfair” trade and an overpriced currency, how can the US bring manufacturing back and lower the country’s trade deficit? Enter duties on imports. Tariffs will decrease imports and increase their cost, lowering the trade imbalance. By shielding American manufacturers from import competition, they will promote domestic production. However, the US’s return to a more protectionist policy through tariffs has led to increased bilateral commerce in non-dollar currency. For instance, India-Russia oil trade and China’s increasing use of bilateral currency swaps with its trading partners have caused major concern for the US reserve currency supremacy. Moreover, it caused a spiral effect. For example, the reserve currency of the central banks has become less dollarized as a result of the recent US policy of reciprocal tariffs to safeguard trade transactions in dollars. It promotes asking about options for a reserve currency basket and the possibility of de-dollarization. Trump has made no secret about retaining the US dollar’s global supremacy, even threatening the BRICS nations with 100% additional tax should they move forward with a unified currency to “degenerate” and “destroy” the dollar. After all, de-dollarization has the potential to tip the scales against the United States and reduce its capacity to influence international financial markets and the global economy. Furthermore, to protect dollar dominance from the assault of renewable energy, the US withdrawal from India’s solar alliance must be considered.

Economists fear that tariffs go against the concept of economic efficiency. Tariffs, they warn, will imply greater expenses for American consumers, an increase in the inflation rate, and an inefficient manufacturing sector. Moreover, tariffs will encourage nations to undermine the dollar’s standing as a reserve currency by making imports more expensive. It will portend the trading of multiple currencies. Even when Trump managed the inevitability of a trade deficit because of having a reserve currency, the US was still faced with two additional problems: the increasing bilateral trade in member countries’ currencies and China’s control over modern-era gold, ‘rare earth minerals’ critical for key industries. China’s hegemony over REEs and chip production challenges the US dollar’s hegemony.

Conclusion

It reflects that the actual geo-economic strength of the US lies in the acceptability of its currency as a global reserve and its hold over one of the most traded commodities, oil. The rise of China and the evolving structure of international trade are changing the dynamics of this area, even though the US dollar continues to be the most important reserve currency. However, there wouldn’t be any surpluses to invest or deficits to finance if trade were more bilaterally balanced over time, which would lessen the demand for a reserve currency like dollars. The world looks to be headed towards a multi-currency structure for harmonious commercial ties. By encouraging alternate payment methods among trading nations and choosing the currency used for the IMF’s reserve holdings, for instance, it is necessary to end the US monopoly on currency arrangements. The structure can be extended to incorporate trading blocs, where imbalances net out amongst members when aggregated. It suggests a world with several reserve and trade currencies.

This bilateral or multilateral currency autarky might unleash the potential to trade freely as well as to obtain investment capital for emerging economies. Moreover, this strategy is embedded in the evolving industrial structure driven by economic sovereignty. Meanwhile, the US’s capacity to finance its ongoing budget and trade deficits would be impacted by the dollar’s declining value. Dollar interest rates may have to climb, and the currency may depreciate. The role of its capital markets and financial institutions would shrink. It would give more space for the formation of a multipolar currency regime.

*Shraddha Rishi teaches Political Science at Magadh University, Bodhgaya. She has obtained her PhD from the Centre for South Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi.

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China rejects US gunboat diplomacy

China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, viewing the increasing American bases and military buildup in the region as a strategy of containment and undermining Chinese influence. Beijing seeks to achieve regional balance through counter-diplomacy, both economic and security, and sees the American escalation as a threat to global stability, prompting it to strengthen its partnerships to protect its interests in the region. The Chinese perspective on the militarization of the region is that the American strategy in the Middle East is an extension of the policy of deterrence and containment, which extends from the Pacific to broader spheres of influence. China views American bases, such as Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, and other US military bases in Kuwait and the UAE, as an indirect tool to undermine Chinese economic and geopolitical stability. China considers the American military bases in the Middle East as instruments of hegemony and an attempt to contain and diminish its influence. Therefore, Beijing seeks to strengthen its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in the region as a strategic alternative, expanding its influence through its Belt and Road Initiative.

China adopts an approach that opposes the American military presence in the Middle East, prioritizing economic stability to serve its interests. This opposition manifests itself in several ways: supporting parallel security partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, pressuring host countries like the UAE to prevent American expansion, and pursuing civil-military integration in strategic ports. The Egyptian researcher will attempt to identify and present specific examples of China’s rejection of the American military presence in the Middle East, such as China’s obstruction of the UAE’s F-35 deals. Beijing exerted pressure and raised security concerns that led to the stalling of negotiations for the UAE to acquire American F-35 fighter jets, due to Washington’s apprehension about the growing Chinese presence at the UAE’s Khalifa Port. Another example is China’s intensification of joint military exercises with Washington’s and Israel’s adversaries: China has increased its naval and air military exercises with Iran, a direct rival of the American presence in the region, thus posing a strategic challenge to American hegemony. China has also tried to secure oil routes away from Washington’s protection: China seeks to secure its oil interests through independent partnerships in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf ports, reducing the Arab states’ need for American security protection and reinforcing Beijing’s vision of rejecting American “hegemony.” With (China’s criticism of the US “offensive strategy”): Chinese diplomacy criticizes the excessive US presence and instead calls for diplomatic solutions and “civil-military integration” through infrastructure investment, thus undermining traditional US bases. Here, China uses “soft power” and economic investments in ports, such as those in Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, as tools to diminish the strategic importance of US military bases.

The Chinese perspective is that US bases are used to restrict its movement in vital maritime routes and are viewed as tools of deterrence within the context of great power competition. Therefore, China seeks to secure its economic interests by ensuring its oil and gas import routes and protecting its projects, which has led it to strengthen its military presence, including its base in Djibouti, to match its economic influence. With China offering a “developmental and security alternative”: By enhancing its influence through massive investments and security and technology partnerships, such as developing Huawei’s 5G digital infrastructure and China’s defense partnerships with Egypt, Iran, and the Gulf states, to serve as an alternative to direct military presence. Here, China seeks to achieve “absolute security” by protecting its supply chains and projects without directly engaging in managing regional crises in the American manner, preferring instead to project geoeconomic influence.

Here, China adopts a stance rejecting the US militarization of the Middle East, deeming it an “adventure” that threatens stability and pushes the region toward the brink. Beijing instead seeks to enhance its influence through diplomacy and economics, with Chinese efforts aimed at undermining the American military presence and supporting regional stability through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. The most prominent features of China’s rejection of the US militarization of the Middle East are China’s opposition to the “militarization” of the region and China believes that US strategies based on military bases and deterrence, particularly against Iran, increase instability. (China’s focus on finding a diplomatic and economic alternative): China focuses on comprehensive economic partnerships, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and prioritizes diplomacy to resolve conflicts, making it appear as a strategic alternative to the US “gunboat diplomacy.” The US “gunboat diplomacy” is a declared strategy of President Trump to counter Beijing’s influence in the Western Hemisphere. To counter this, China is focusing on partnerships and economic interests. From the Chinese perspective, regional stability ensures secure energy supplies and massive infrastructure investments in the region.

This coincides with China’s exploitation of the American retreat in the region. China seeks to capitalize on the relative decline in American strategic interest to act as a balancing power, without direct involvement in crisis management, but with an increasing role in maintaining regional equilibrium. Conversely, China fears that American policies will lead to its encirclement and the curtailment of its economic influence, prompting it to strengthen its military ties with certain regional actors as a form of indirect response.

Therefore, China rejects the principle of American militarization of the Middle East. China seeks to find alternatives to American hegemony by strengthening its diplomatic and economic presence, especially given the recent escalation of American military activity. Chinese military analyses indicate that the recent American military buildup, including aircraft carriers and air forces in the region, increases the likelihood of widespread regional conflicts. To that end, China promotes the concept of “common security,” directly rejecting American military involvement that puts pressure on China’s traditional allies in the region, such as Iran.

Concerned circles in Beijing view the American militarization of the Middle East as a perpetuation of a “Cold War mentality.” This is evident in China’s rejection of the ongoing military alliances established by Washington, which Beijing considers attempts to contain its rising influence and force regional states into alignment, a situation Beijing describes as “American hypocrisy.” The Chinese alternative to American militarization in the region is centered on its strategy of “development over militarization.” China seeks to market itself as a “peaceful partner” focused on development and infrastructure, capitalizing on the partial American retreat to expand its diplomatic and economic influence. Beijing adopts a policy of “cautious neutrality,” committing to “non-interference” in regional conflicts and avoiding replacing the American role as the region’s policeman militarily, preferring instead to focus on its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific. While fully aware that the militarization of the region impacts China’s energy security, China prefers to address this through diplomacy and economic partnerships rather than direct military presence. China aims to protect its interests by deepening its economic engagement, thereby prompting a gradual US withdrawal, especially as China continues to present itself as a “responsible power” in the Global South.

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Chinese measures to curb Western and American intelligence activities in Beijing

China reacted angrily to the CIA’s public campaign, launched in February 2026, to recruit spies from within the ranks of the Chinese military, vowing to take “all necessary measures” to protect its national security. The Chinese response to the “recruitment video” included an official warning: Foreign Ministry spokesperson “Lin Jian” stated that the attempts by forces hostile to China “will not succeed,” emphasizing that Beijing would resolutely counter foreign infiltration and sabotage operations. In addition to Beijing’s accusation that the United States engaged in blatant political provocation, the Chinese Embassy in Washington described the American recruitment video targeting Chinese military personnel as a “blatant political provocation” and an explicit admission by the United States of its attempts to steal other countries’ secrets. This was especially true given the nature of the video, released by the CIA, which featured Mandarin Chinese and targeted “disillusioned” Chinese military officers, exploiting corruption within the Chinese army and recent purges within the Chinese military leadership. While other foreign intelligence agencies typically maintain contact with sources and agents within both friendly and hostile militaries, observers noted that the 95-second CIA video was “unusually explicit,” as described by Newsweek magazine. This angered China, prompting it to lodge a formal protest through the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

To counter this American intelligence campaign, official Chinese measures to contain Western and American intelligence intensified. Beijing pursued a multi-pronged strategy to tighten the noose on espionage activities, including expanding the Anti-Espionage Law: China amended its laws to broaden the definition of “espionage” to include any data or documents that threaten national security, granting authorities greater powers to search and access electronic devices. (Increasing Public Awareness and “Reporting Hotlines”): The Chinese Ministry of State Security, which acts as China’s intelligence agency, encouraged citizens to report suspicious activities through substantial financial rewards and released educational videos on how to detect “foreign spies” who might be disguised as researchers or diplomats. (Chinese Technological Counter-Response): China used artificial intelligence and simulation tools to mock American recruitment videos, releasing videos that mimicked the same style to highlight “Wall Street corruption” and internal American crises. With (China’s purge of sensitive leaders): Beijing launched a widespread purge within the People’s Liberation Army, targeting high-ranking generals such as “Zhang Youxia” on charges of corruption and leaking sensitive information. With China’s expansion in drafting and enacting counter-sanctions laws: In March 2025, China activated new regulations for its Foreign Counter-Sanctions Law, allowing it to freeze assets and impose visa bans on any foreign individuals or entities that interfere in its internal affairs or threaten its security interests.

This confrontation comes at a time when reports indicate that the CIA is seeking to rebuild its human network in China after most of it was dismantled between 2010 and 2012. China has begun intensifying its internal security measures to counter Western espionage, particularly American espionage, by updating its anti-espionage laws, strengthening cybersecurity, and raising public awareness, targeting the activities of the CIA and Mossad. These efforts include strict data controls, protecting sensitive technology, dismantling spy recruitment networks, and considering Western espionage a direct security threat. Among the most prominent Chinese measures to contain Western and American intelligence activities are the following (updating anti-espionage laws): China has broadened the definition of espionage in its laws to include any documents, data, or materials related to national security, granting authorities wider powers to search and investigate suspects. (Strengthening cybersecurity): Beijing is conducting intensive campaigns to secure sensitive networks and data and is working to protect its digital infrastructure from infiltration, especially after reports indicating widespread cyber operations by Western actors. This is in addition to (Chinese security awareness campaigns): The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) is urging citizens to report any suspicious activities, considering counter-espionage a societal responsibility. It has also published warnings about methods used to recruit spies. Along with Chinese authorities tightening control over foreigners and foreign companies in China, control has been intensified over foreign consultancies and companies that could be used as cover for intelligence activities, with a focus on uncovering foreign spies, whether affiliated with the CIA or any other foreign agency. Along with China’s emphasis on protecting technology and scientific research: Here, Beijing is taking strict measures to protect its technological and industrial secrets from theft, especially in the fields of artificial intelligence and computing, to prevent their exploitation to advance the interests of foreign countries.

This Chinese escalation comes at a time when US intelligence reports have described China as the “greatest overall military and security threat” to the interests of the United States and its allies, further intensifying the intelligence conflict between the two sides. Therefore, China began taking strict and decisive measures to contain Western and American intelligence activities within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These measures include strengthening information security through the Information Support Force, enforcing anti-espionage laws, and increasing internal oversight to ensure the protection of national security and development interests from infiltration and sabotage. The most prominent measures include tightening digital surveillance by enhancing capabilities in electronic espionage, signals intelligence, and cybersecurity to counter any breaches; strengthening internal security by tightening security measures around personnel and sensitive data to prevent recruitment or leaks; and activating the role of the Ministry of State Security domestically. The Chinese intelligence ministry, “MSS,” has become highly effective in combating foreign espionage, particularly American espionage, and in maintaining political security within military and civilian institutions. The Chinese authorities also established the Information Support Force: this force was created to promote the development and implementation of secure network information systems, thereby enhancing the army’s ability to repel infiltrations. With China’s keenness to modernize its anti-espionage laws, it has taken strict measures against infiltration and sabotage activities, pledging to protect China’s national security.

Based on the preceding analysis, we understand that these Chinese security measures are a response to intensive US intelligence efforts to recruit informants within the Chinese military, which has provoked Beijing’s ire and resentment. This is especially true given the sensitive timing for the Chinese military establishment, coming just weeks after another senior officer was implicated in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign within the army. The video released by the CIA showing the recruitment and targeting of Chinese military personnel represents the latest episode in a US intelligence campaign targeting Chinese military personnel on social media. This campaign, which openly targets China, has been described by CIA Director “John Ratcliffe” as the agency’s top intelligence priority amidst what he called a generational competition with Beijing.

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Court OKs Louisiana law requiring Ten Commandments in classrooms

A U.S. appeals court has cleared the way for a Louisiana law requiring poster-sized displays of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms to take effect.

The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals voted 12 to 6 to lift a block that a lower court first placed on the law in 2024. In the opinion released Friday, the court said it was too early to make a judgment call on the constitutionality of the law.

That’s partly because it’s not yet clear how prominently schools may display the religious text, whether teachers will refer to the Ten Commandments during classes or if other texts like the Mayflower Compact or the Declaration of Independence will also be displayed, the majority opinion said.

Without those sorts of details, the panel decided that it did not have enough information to weigh any 1st Amendment issues that might arise from the law. In other words, there aren’t enough facts available to “permit judicial judgment rather than speculation,” the majority wrote in the opinion.

In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge James Ho, an appointee of President Trump, wrote that the law “is not just constitutional — it affirms our nation’s highest and most noble traditions.”

The six judges who voted against the decision wrote a series of dissents, with some arguing that the law exposes children to government-endorsed religion in a place they are required to be, presenting a clear constitutional burden.

Circuit Judge James L. Dennis, an appointee of President Clinton, wrote that the law “is precisely the kind of establishment the Framers anticipated and sought to prevent.”

The ruling is the result of the court’s choice to rehear the case with all judges present after three of them ruled in June that the Louisiana law was unconstitutional. The reversal comes from one of the nation’s most conservative appeals courts, and one that’s known for propelling Republican policies to a similarly conservative U.S. Supreme Court.

Republican Gov. Jeff Landry celebrated the ruling Friday, declaring, “Common sense is making a comeback!”

The ACLU of Louisiana, one of several groups representing plaintiffs, pledged to explore all legal pathways to continue fighting the law.

Arkansas has a similar law that has been challenged in federal court. And a Texas law took effect on Sept. 1, marking the widest reaching attempt in the nation to hang the Ten Commandments in public schools.

Some Texas school districts were barred from posting them after federal judges issued injunctions in two cases challenging the law, but they have already gone up in many classrooms across the state as districts paid to have the posters printed themselves or accepted donations.

The laws are among pushes by Republicans, including Trump, to incorporate religion into public school classrooms. Critics say doing so violates the separation of church and state, while backers say the Ten Commandments are historical and part of the foundation of U.S. law.

Joseph Davis, an attorney representing Louisiana in the case, applauded the court for upholding the nation’s “time-honored tradition of recognizing faith in the public square.”

Families from a variety of religious backgrounds, including Christianity, Judaism and Hinduism, have challenged the laws, as have clergy members and nonreligious families.

The Freedom From Religion Foundation, another group involved in the challenge, called the ruling “extremely disappointing” and said the law will force families “into a game of constitutional whack-a-mole” where they will have to separately challenge each school district’s displays.

Louisiana Atty. Gen. Liz Murrill said after the ruling that she had sent schools several correct examples of the required poster.

In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that a similar Kentucky law violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which says Congress can “make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” The court found that the law had no secular purpose but served a plainly religious purpose.

And in 2005, the Supreme Court held that such displays in a pair of Kentucky courthouses violated the Constitution. At the same time, the court upheld a Ten Commandments marker on the grounds of the Texas state Capitol in Austin.

Schoenbaum and Boone write for the Associated Press.

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Is the world seeking peace outside the UN? Explore the Peace Council Initiative

US President Trump’s announcement of the creation of the so-called “Peace Council,” involving several countries, including Morocco, sparks a deep debate that goes beyond the diplomatic event itself. It addresses the core of the international order established after World War II. The issue isn’t only about establishing a new international body but also raises an implicit question: Is the United Nations still capable of managing global peace and security, or are we entering a phase in which alternatives are being sought?

From this perspective, the Peace Council becomes a political project par excellence, reflecting shifts in the American vision of the role of international institutions and revealing a structural crisis within the United Nations system.

First: The Peace Council… Read for the idea, not the structure.

Internationally and institutionally, the Peace Council cannot be considered a direct alternative to the United Nations. The latter is grounded in an international charter, legal legitimacy, and semi-inclusive membership, whereas the Peace Council remains a selective framework, initially limited in membership, and its legitimacy is based, in particular, on the political will of the countries involved, foremost among them the United States. However, attention to this formal aspect may overlook the substance of the matter. The true value of the Peace Council lies not in its organizational and administrative structure, but in the political message it carries: explicitly questioning the United Nations’ ability to perform its historical function, offering an alternative grounded in effectiveness rather than consensus, and prioritizing alliance over inclusiveness. In other words, we are facing a shift in how international peace is managed, not just a new institutional addition.

Second: Why does the US administration believe that the United Nations has failed? Washington’s view is rooted in the strong belief that the United Nations has faced significant challenges: it has become hostage to the veto powers within the Security Council; it struggles to enforce its strategic decisions in major international conflicts; and it has shifted from being a mechanism for resolution to more of a platform for political battles. This perspective is not merely popular opinion; it is shared by many international relations scholars, who argue that the UN has not evolved sufficiently to address emerging global and regional issues, including unconventional conflicts, the rise of non-state actors, shifting global power dynamics, and a waning collective commitment to international law. In this context, the Peace Council is regarded by the United States as a tool to address what it perceives as a long-standing institutional paralysis.

Third: The Peace Council… Is it truly an alternative or just a parallel path?

When we look at international relations realistically, we usually consider three levels: 1. Legal level: The Peace Council can’t replace the United Nations when it comes to legitimacy grounded in international law. 2. Practical level: The Council aims to fill a real gap in conflict management, especially in cases where the United Nations has struggled to resolve or contain issues. 3. Symbolic and expressive level: This is where the concern grows, as the Council challenges the UN’s exclusive claim to legitimacy in the “peace industry.” In the end, it’s not just about being an alternative or a supporting body. It’s more like a parallel system that could, over time, become a real competitor if it gains more influence and members.

Fourth: The American Dimension… Redefining International Leadership.

The creation of the Peace Council aligns with Trump’s broader perspective on international relations, emphasizing three key points: reducing dependence on multilateral organizations, strengthening alliances, and shifting decision-making authority to major global powers. From this standpoint, the Council is less about promoting peace and more about reshaping America’s influence and alliances, especially in a world where Washington is reluctant to bear the costs of a global order it cannot fully control. This reflects a shift away from seeking international legitimacy toward a focus on “realistic legitimacy,” in which institutions are judged more by their results than by strict adherence to rules.

Fifth: Morocco and the Peace Council… a strategically chosen location

The Kingdom of Morocco’s decision to join the Peace Council should not be seen as a departure from the United Nations, but rather as a strategic move in its diplomatic efforts to diversify its international partnerships. Morocco maintains strong institutional ties with the UN, actively participates in peacekeeping missions, and is also eager to expand its presence in new global initiatives. By joining the Peace Council, Morocco positions itself favorably in discussions on security and stability, gaining an influential role in shaping international approaches to conflict management. This move also helps to reinforce Morocco’s image as a responsible actor that avoids relying solely on a single framework for its diplomatic and security strategies.

Sixth: Is the time of the United Nations over?

The prediction that the United Nations mission is coming to an end may be premature, but it still carries weight. The key point is that the UN is facing a crisis of legitimacy and effectiveness, not one of existence. It continues to exist, but it can no longer handle alone a world marked by multiple power centers, rising complex conflicts, and waning trust in collective action. So, the Peace Council isn’t signaling its demise but rather highlighting the deepening challenges facing the traditional international system.

In the end, the Peace Council put together by the Trump administration isn’t officially replacing the United Nations yet, but it definitely marks a shift—signaling that we’re moving from one phase to another. We’re entering a time when peace and security are handled through selective alliances and initiatives driven by major powers, rather than through large umbrella organizations. The big question is, will this new approach bring about more effective peace, or will it make the world less legitimate and more fragile? The answer won’t be found just in the data but in how this new model actually plays out on the ground.

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Iran Between Resistance and Reintegration: A Geopolitical Turning Point

Almost fifty years after the revolution in 1979 that changed the political landscape of Iran, Iran is at the crossroads of its history, which is defined by economic pressures, social pressure, and the changing geopolitical environment. The Islamic Republic was constructed as a combination of revolutionary ideology, anti-Western response, and promise of social justice. In the present day, although the ideological framework is still maintained, the sustainability of that framework is being strained increasingly by the structural economic pressures of the day, generational shifts, and changing regional hegemony.

On the economic front, Iran is continually constrained by global sanctions and inefficiency in its structure. Withdrawal by the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the reimposition of massive sanctions in 2018 have cut off much of the oil exports of Iranian oil, banking, and foreign investment flows. The country works well under its economic potential despite the fact that Tehran has been able to sustain limited oil sales, especially through discounted sales to China and through surrogate routes. The inflation rate has been above 40 percent during the recent years, the Iranian rial is falling drastically, and unemployment among the youth is also a burning issue. It is the middle and lower classes that are directly impacted by these economic pressures and that pose a legitimacy challenge that cannot be solved only through rhetorical means of revolution.

The internal landscape is a manifestation of long-term frustration. Frequent demonstrations regarding fuel prices, the state of the economy, and social liberation indicate the growing disparity between state discourses of resistance and the realities that the citizens encounter. The newer generation born after the revolution has lost any connection with the revolutionary memory of 1979 and perceives governance less as ideologically symbolic and more based on economic performance and individual opportunity. The policy employed by the state has been based on the repressed handling of dissent, which consists of the limitation of the mobilization of protests and the prevention of the collapse of the system. Although this is a way of maintaining short-term stability, it does not deal with structural issues like brain drain, capital flight, falling purchasing power, and diminished faith in long-term economic potential.

The main political quandary is consequently a legitimacy transformation quandary. In the past, the Islamic Republic gained legitimacy through revolutionary mobilization, religious control, and confrontation with the external hostilities, especially the United States and Israel. Nevertheless, the contemporary politics demands more and more performance-based legitimacy—providing economic growth, stability, and material changes in the quality of life. The conflict between ideological stability and realistic adjustment is the characteristic of the contemporary crossroads of Iran.

Iran is geopolitically a country that exists in the complex web of pressures. The United States is still the main external agent, which affects the Tehran strategic calculations. The policy of Washington is alternating between the engagement of diplomacy and coercion, yet the ultimate goal is the same as it is: avoiding the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons competence and reducing its impact in the region. In Tehran, it will need negotiations that will help soften sanctions and stabilize the economy, but any deal will not collapse under the perception of submission over matters of sovereignty, ballistic missile potential, and relations with the region.

Meanwhile, the nuclear and missile programs in Iran are considered to be existential threats to Israel. The shadow struggle that has been there for a long time, including cyber attacks, precision attacks, espionage, and proxy wars, has heightened strategic mistrust. The intensity of this rivalry is shown by the fact that Israel has been carrying out its operations within Iran and against Iran-related targets in Syria. Any intensification would attract Gulf states and disrupt world energy supply, especially through the Strait of Hormuz, which is a choke point in the oil markets of the world. Even minor confrontations will have a global economic impact, as Iran is strategically placed in the important maritime paths.

The regional policy of Iran has focused on the establishment of strategic depth by alliance and coalition with non-state actors and supportive governments within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. This system becomes a deterrence and leverage factor, making it difficult to engage in a direct military strike on the territory of Iran. Geostrategically, this doctrine of forward defense has enhanced the bargaining power of Iran. But it is likewise causing tension with the other Arab countries and creating the impression of destabilization in the region. The recent diplomatic thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was facilitated by China, shows that both sides noticed that continued confrontation is expensive in terms of both economics and strategy.

Iran is geographically at one of the most strategic points of Eurasia. It connects the Persian Gulf with Central Asia, the Caucasus, and South Asia. The International North-South Transport Corridor is one of the major trade routes that can make Iran a major transit route between India and Russia and Europe. This geo-economic location, in theory, has colossal prospects of being rolled into new multipolar trade systems. Sanctions and political isolation in reality prevent full access to the global markets. The latter can be said to be strategic convergence, as Iran was brought closer to Russia, especially after the war in Ukraine, as a result of Western pressure. But such convergence also subjects Tehran to secondary sanctions and makes it less flexible in its East-West balancing.

Iran—Concerns about the nuclear problem continue to be the major pivot of the external affairs. Tehran maintains that its nuclear program is nonviolent and has indicated that it is free for verification. But the Western governments require more guarantees and wider negotiations, which can feature missile capabilities and regional operations. It is possible that a strictly limited nuclear deal will minimize the risks of immediate proliferation and alleviate the economic pressure, which might make the Iranian internal situation more stable. Nonetheless, such a deal may not help solve any underlying rivalries between the region but could simply freeze the situation unless there are larger regional de-escalation mechanisms. On the other hand, the inability to find any solution will lead to the further worsening of the economy and the possible military clash.

In a more geo-strategically global understanding, the balance of power between the Middle East and the rest of the world will be influenced by the course of Iran. In case Tehran manages to negotiate the lifting of sanctions and turns in the direction of economic integration with the Gulf states, it will be able to shift from the resistance-focused model to the development-oriented state step by step. This would strengthen the stability of the region, safeguard the energy security, and minimize the motivation to intervene. It would also make the regional rivalry be based more on economic rivalry rather than military rivalry, especially in terms of infrastructure rivalry, trade corridor rivalry, and energy market rivalry.

Nevertheless, should the negotiations fail and the confrontation escalate, Iran might apply the asymmetric deterrence further, increasing the range of its missiles and extending proxy bases. That way would strengthen the preemptive stance of Israel and increase the presence of the US military in the Gulf. The escalation would disorient shipping routes, exert more volatility on oil prices, and disintegrate the security infrastructure in the region. To the surrounding Arab nations, which require diversifying and changing their economies, new warfare would destroy investment conditions and long-term strategies.

On the domestic front, economic resilience is what will sustain the strategic position of Iran. The political principle of endurance can only be stretched so far as inflation undermines the wages and the depreciation of currency undermines savings. This needs structural changes: enhancing transparency, welcoming foreign investment, and a non-hydrocarbon economy, and empowering the business sector. Foreign policy victories cannot entirely offset its dissatisfaction at home without economic change.

After all, the crossroads of Iran is not only ideological but also structural. The state has to strike a compromise between sovereignty and economic need, deterrence and diplomacy, and ideological identity and practical governance. Its strategic location means that its decisions will have a far-reaching impact, not only across its frontiers, but also on the energy markets of the world, the great-power politics, and the new security order of the Middle East. The future of Iran becoming a development-oriented regional power with full membership in multipolar networks or being a sanction-bound resistance state under continuous pressure will not only dictate the internal stability of the country but also the geopolitical orientation of a long-time conflict-ridden and strategically divided region.

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‘I visited dismal UK market town and was shocked by what I saw within 10 minutes’

Adam Toms visited a classic British market town and was left shocked shortly after arriving.

Some UK towns can feel like they are in a state of decay, leaving locals feeling their taxes are little better than money down the drain. Many high streets have become ghost towns, with only large chains or resilient independent businesses managing to survive.

Burgess Hill, once renowned for its thriving brick and tile-making industry and an annual St. John’s Sheep Fair, is nestled just north of the affluent coastal city of Brighton in Sussex. However, some locals claim it’s now a town in decline, teetering on the brink of oblivion.

The story they tell is one that will be familiar to many: once a bustling hub with its own market, attracting shoppers from far and wide to its array of local shops, it has since fallen into disrepair. And shortly after arriving in the town and paying for parking, journalist Adam Toms was confronted with what he described as a scene more reminiscent of The Last of Us than a typical English provincial town.

A desolate patch of land, eerily reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s infamous “walk in the wilderness”, was flanked by vacant retail units, their interiors hauntingly empty. Messages left by former staff were scrawled on the doors.

Adam went on to share: “A piece of barren land – which put me in mind of the famous photos of Margaret Thatcher’s ‘walk in the wilderness’ – was surrounded by empty retail units with ghostly, empty interiors. On their doors were messages written by staff who had since moved elsewhere.”

Signs declared “STORE CLOSING. EVERYTHING MUST GO” and “SALE 50%”. Windows had been boarded up after apparently being smashed by local youths, rainwater leaked from pipes, and metal fencing and red plastic barriers cordoned off a particularly dismal passageway.

He continued: “It wasn’t all this bad. Burgess Hill has a number of shops operating in its actual high street, and an amazing Creative Community Hub, which is run by volunteers and puts on skill-sharing activity sessions, including sewing and pottery.”

Run by volunteers, the hub hosts skill-sharing activities such as sewing and pottery. However, the locals he chatted with seemed somewhat embarrassed and disheartened, feeling their hometown was being eclipsed by more prosperous areas like Horsham.

“One woman, Susan Truran, 68, a retired revenue analyst, asked if I was lost when I explained who I was. People added that they have been let down by promises to improve the area,” said Adam.

The latest proposal aims to revamp the shopping district into a contemporary, lively retail and leisure hotspot, while also creating new homes and jobs. Developer New River is collaborating with Mid Sussex District Council on this project.

Planning permission has been granted for 50,000 square feet of fresh retail space, including a 21,000 square foot food store, 172 new residences and a 102-room hotel.

Jo Homan, a volunteer at the creative hub, stressed that Burgess Hill isn’t the only UK town facing challenges. She commented: “It’s pretty much the same everywhere, isn’t it? A lot of towns are like it.”

This is certainly accurate, and numerous other local authorities are pledging to spruce up their areas. Adam said that he has also visited Margate and Weston-super-Mare, where locals spoke of their towns’ urgent need for regeneration.

Folkestone in Kent presented a unique scenario, with businessman Sir Roger De Haan sharing details of his £100million investment that’s rejuvenating the area. And over in Hampshire, locals expressed their disappointment at the current state of Aldershot.

Back in Burgess Hill and Andrew Griffin, 56, an employee at an insurance firm, highlighted to Adam that it has room for growth, being home to major employers like American Express.

Last week, Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer discussed Labour’s Pride in Place plan, announcing that around 40 new areas across England will have the power to decide where up to £20million is invested in their localities: “It is the same story in towns across the country. Youth clubs that have been abandoned, shops boarded up and high streets decimated,” he said.

“We must reverse the devastating decline in our communities and give power, agency and control to the very people who want to improve their community – those who have skin in the game. Through the Pride in Place Programme, communities – backed by the state and fired up by pride – will join the fight for national renewal and a Britain built for all.”

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