opinion

Over the last two decades, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase of foreigntroops in Djibouti, a rise in investments along the Red Sea, and more pronounced engagement in its internal affairs by confirmed and emerging powers all of which showcase the geopolitical appetite for influence in the region. Yet current crises – the war in Sudan, persisting insecurity in Somalia, renewed tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and contentious relations between countries – underscore an uncertain future that could make the volatile region even more prone to external influence. Will local leadership step up to the task of preserving stability through improved regional relations or leave its most pressing issues unresolved?

An analysis by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Mwachofi Singo, and Hallelujah Wondimu published earlier this year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides key insights on the risk posed by the absence of a clear pillar state(s) to push for peace and security within the region which could worsen its vulnerability to competing middle powers.

The three experts on African geopolitics argue that given its history of conflicts and ongoing tensions, the region demands the rise of Ethiopia and Kenya as stronger leaders able to drive reform initiatives aimed at protecting the interests of the Horn of Africa. As such, the two nations offer strong, suitable and strategic advantages for the region despite facing their own internal and regional challenges which they must also attend to.

The CSIS report view Ethiopia’s role as central to transforming the region towards a stable and self-sufficient neighborhood capable of addressing its own tensions, preserving peace and promoting economic development. Whether Ethiopia intends to assume this role, however, rests on the success of its current transition that began since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018 following decades of Tigray dominance over the country. Yet the envisioned reinforcement of the federal structure led by a strong central government has had setbacks in the last few years with the occurrence of the violent war in Tigray and ongoing security concerns over autonomy seeking movements.

This suggests that Ethiopia will inevitably have significant nation building to do to preserve the unity of the country hence the recent inward focus to stabilize domestic tensions. The achievement of the Renaissance Dam stands as good symbol of national harmony that could be replicated across other sectors of society to reinforce inclusion and equity. This image of improved and steady stability in Ethiopia is crucial to consolidate its leadership position in the region.

According to the researchers, Ethiopia’s (re)emergence as a leader in the Horn is also closely linked to its capacity to improve its relations with neighbors which have deteriorated the last few years. They cite the territorial dispute with Sudan, the sudden outreach to Somaliland irritating Somalia and Djibouti or one could add renewed animosity with Eritrea. Ironically, these frictions could lead to Ethiopia’s further rapprochement with external emerging actors eager to increase their influence in the region that will further complicate regional cooperation imperative for stability. This signals a pressing need for the country to reset its relations with its neighbors as the current trajectory could end up being an obstacle towards its economic development. Again, the Grand Renaissance Dam which is already a major component of Ethiopia’s trade policy in the region could be the catalyst needed to reinvigorate diplomatic ties.

While Ethiopia remains focused on its introspection and on pursuing a more bilateral approach to regional diplomacy, Kenya could seize the opportunity to accentuate its leadership position and diplomatic consistency. Kenya’s relatively peaceful independence transition and constant display of neutrality when engaging mediation processes forged its image as a credible leader for the region. The report also highlights a long history of proactive foreign policy by successive Kenyan presidents which emphasized economic development through regional trade integration. However, Kenya’s recent actions with regards to the Sudan conflict and the war in the DRC might alter its reputation and ability to conduct peace initiatives in the region while similar moves may instead translate an incoherent foreign strategy.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine Kenya further jeopardize its stabilizing role as the country’s own development ambitions largely rests on its capacity to promote regional stability crucial to economic trade with its neighbors. This underscores the need for Nairobi to remain committed to its traditional diplomatic playbook to support impartial interventions while preserving its leverage and reputation throughout such processes.

In addition, Kenyan legacy could be further undermined by internal challenges in light of the gen z movement which may be a decisive political factor ahead of the 2027 elections. Latest developments in Morrocco or Madagascar could give a glimpse of the consequences of such social efforts in Kenya. Whether or not Kenyan youth are able to shake the government, political leaders should implement policies responding to the youth socioeconomic concerns as prolong unrests could diminish its global influence capacity so dear to the current administration.

In a rapidly shifting world order where middle powers are keen on exerting their own vision in the Horn of Africa, it becomes imperative for local leadership to assert regional autonomy to solve issues. Stability and improved inter-state relations should then discourage governments from seeking external support when pursuing domestic interests.

Kenya and Ethiopia both retain significant assets to affirm their influence in the Horn despite their own challenges. However, their capacity to assume an independent leading position might be more uncertain. The almost complete monopolization of the conflict resolution processes in Sudan or the DRC by the United States and the Gulf States clearly reveals the consequences of weak regional leadership. Kenya and Ethiopia could instead harmonize their regional policies through platforms such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Ultimately, Kenya and Ethiopia’s ability to intensify their strategic partnerships could lay the foundation for regional autonomy and stability.  

This November marks 108 years since the Balfour Declaration, a promise written in London by men who had never walked the soil of Palestine. Authored by Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary at the time and signed on 2 November 1917, it became the seed of a new state and the undoing of another people. For the Jewish world, it offered recognition after centuries of exile. For Palestinians, it marked the beginning of erasure.

To fully grasp its significance and the controversies surrounding it, it is essential to understand three key concepts that underpin the narrative: Zionism, antisemitism, and Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism. These terms not only illuminate the motivations behind the declaration but also help to elucidate the subsequent century of strife in the region.

Zionism: A Response to Antisemitism in the Quest for a Jewish Homeland

The Balfour Declaration did not emerge from nowhere. It came from fear, exile, and the slow death of faith in Europe’s conscience. In 1882, Leon Pinsker, a Jewish physician, wrote Auto-Emancipation after watching mobs tear through Jewish towns in Russia. Houses burned. Families fled. The pogroms of 1881 ended any illusion that Jews could ever belong in Europe. Pinsker saw what others refused to see: no law, no revolution, no education could protect a people the world had already decided to keep apart.

Safety would come only through self-determination, through land rather than tolerance. A generation later, Theodor Herzl carried that truth into politics through the Dreyfus Affair, when a Jewish French officer was condemned for a crime he did not commit, stripping away Europe’s mask of enlightenment. Even in Paris, the supposed capital of reason, antisemitism ruled the crowd. Watching from Vienna, Herzl understood what Pinsker had already warned: emancipation without equality is another form of captivity. Herzl built what Pinsker imagined. He turned despair into movement, organisation, and speech. Through the Zionist Congresses, he tried to make safety tangible. He pleaded with ministers and kings, searched for land across the globe that could hold both memory and survival. He even wrote to the Ottoman Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, for a homeland in Palestine. He refused.

Still, Herzl kept going. For him, it was not about conquest but about the right to live without permission. By 1917, when Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, Europe’s so-called “Jewish question”, a term used in European discourse to discuss the integration, segregation, or expulsion of Jews, had already revealed the sickness at its core. To Jews, it was a plea for existence. To the imperial powers, it was a strategy, another chance to extend control into the Ottoman world. One side sought a home. The other saw an opportunity. Between them, a promise was made that would change the fate of a land neither side fully understood.

Orientalism and Imperial Hubris

The Balfour Declaration was not only a promise; it was an act of power. Edward Said’s idea of Orientalism helps us see it for what it was, a colonial document disguised as moral duty. Britain spoke of creating a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine, yet never paused to ask what that meant for those already living there. In its language, Palestine became an empty space waiting to be claimed, not a land of families, farmers, and memory.

The indigenous Arab population was reduced to a single phrase, “non-Jewish communities,” stripped of name, voice, and history. They were spoken about, not spoken to. It turned people into categories, presence into absence. That is the logic of Orientalism: to see the East not as a living world, but as material to be moulded by Western power and imagination. It is a way of thinking that empties lands of their people and people of their history.

British Strategic Interests and French Complicity

The arrogance that engineered the Balfour Declaration was rooted in Britain’s hunger for power. Behind its moral language lay a simple aim: control. The declaration was issued in the chaos of the First World War, when the British imperial power was fighting not only for victory but for territory. Palestine, with its trade routes and proximity to the Suez Canal, became part of a larger chessboard. The British saw the region not as a motherland for its people but as a prize to be managed.

Diplomacy and Dispossession

The Sykes-Picot treaty had already shown the pattern. Britain and France distributed the Arab world in secret, drawing borders that cut through language and kinship. These lines were not meant to unite but to divide and rule. The Balfour Declaration followed the same logic. It decided the fate of a land without asking its people. In London, it was called diplomacy. In Palestine, it became dispossession. For European Jews, it brought a fragile hope after generations of fear. They saw it as recognition, a long-awaited right to safety and belonging. For Palestinians, the same words felt like a sentence. Their land was discussed in foreign rooms, their future sealed in other people’s languages. What gave one people deliverance took away another’s birthplace. From that moment came a century of struggle. Two people, bound to the same soil, were caught in a story written by the colonial power.

Empire’s Shadow

The promise made to the Zionists through the Balfour Declaration exposed a truth that the imperial power could never admit. Western powers spoke of liberty while deciding who was human enough to deserve it. Their idea of freedom had borders. Beyond Europe, it turned into permission: granted, withdrawn, and traded according to interest. In that imagination, Palestine was stripped of its reality. It ceased to be a land of people and became a metaphor, a stage on which Europe could perform its moral ambitions. The men who wrote the declaration did not see villages, harvests, or prayer calls at dawn. They saw space, something to be promised, parcelled, and redeemed through the colonial idea of moral duty. The Balfour Declaration was more than policy. It was philosophy turned into power, the belief that history could be rewritten without the consent of those who lived it.

The Paradox of Liberation

The result was a century of grief, exile, and resistance that still shapes the region’s every breath. Theodor Herzl’s dream began in anguish. He wanted a shelter for Jews who had none, safety after centuries of persecution. His longing was human and urgent. But like many who lived under colonial rule, he saw the world through its gaze. In The Jewish State, Herzl wrote of building a homeland that would stand as a frontier of civilisation in what he saw as a backward East. This idea mirrored the Orientalist belief that the East was lesser, waiting to be corrected by the West. Herzl used that language to win Europe’s approval, presenting Zionism as a cause aligned with the imperial project. It revealed a deeper paradox: a movement born from the search for safety, adopting the very logic that had long denied it to others. The legacy of that choice lives on. Liberation cannot grow from someone else’s domination, and no people can find peace by inheriting the instruments of colonial power.

Revisiting Said’s Themes

Edward Said’s ideas on Orientalism help reveal what lay beneath the Balfour Declaration. He showed how the colonial system justified itself by turning the East into an object of control, stripping people of voice and history so that their land could be claimed in the name of development. The declaration was one such act. It spoke the language of promise but was written in the logic of empire. Palestine and its people disappeared behind the visions of those who believed they understood the region better than those who lived in it. Through that document, Britain set two peoples on a path of collision. What began as a political statement became a century of exile, fear, and mistrust. For Palestinians, the realisation of Balfour’s promise led to the Nakba of 1948, when hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes, their lives suspended between memory and survival. That wound never closed. Today’s war in Gaza is not separate from that history. It is its continuation.

Conclusion

The legacy of the Balfour Declaration shows how imperial power reshapes entire worlds. It reminds us how Western ambitions, guided by power and wrapped in Orientalist myths about “the East,” can alter the fate of nations for generations. To confront what followed, one must begin with understanding, not slogans. Real peace requires more than diplomacy; it needs a philosophical honesty about history itself. The prejudices that shaped a century of Western policy, the habit of deciding for others, of seeing one people’s freedom as another’s threat, must be broken

Peace will only come when we step out of Balfour’s shadow. Each home destroyed leaves its trace; each life taken leaves a silence that others now carry. The wound belongs to both. Peace is not a ceremony. It is a choice made in the smallest moments: to see, to stay, to listen. When that choice is shared, the land may grow still. Not with conquest, but with recognition.

The draft proposals for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan were approved during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2025. The final plan is expected to be adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026.

   China’s Five-Year Plans have been key strengths of China’s medium- to long-term economic and social development framework since the 1950s. Specifically, it has demonstrated strategic foresight, coordinated planning, and consistent implementation. The key strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan are its focus on high-quality development, particularly by achieving stringent climate targets such as peaking carbon emissions before 2030, while relying on strict monitoring mechanisms and advanced technologies. The plan also promotes innovation and digital transformation, focuses on integrated economic and military development, and leverages investment in research and development.

•  The strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, compared to previous five-year plans, are:

1)       Focus on quality development:

Compared to previous plans that focused on quantitative growth, the 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on quality, innovation, and sustainability rather than simply increasing productivity.

2) Integrated economic and military development:

The new plan systematically integrates scientific and technological innovations across the military and civilian sectors, enhancing national capabilities in a comprehensive manner.

3) Shifting towards a green economy:

The plan features new mechanisms for monitoring and managing carbon emissions, representing a significant shift from previous plans that were less focused on environmental issues.

4)       Investment in Research and Development:

The plan continues to boost investment in research, development, and innovation, a core strength that has enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements.

5) Balanced Development:

The plan seeks to achieve balanced development by supporting resource-rich regions, helping to reduce development gaps between different regions.

6) Investment Opportunities:

The plan opens new horizons for investors in areas such as carbon trading, offsets, and carbon asset management services, boosting national economic development.

Based on our understanding of the previous analysis, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) includes goals for economic and social development, focusing on technological self-reliance, high-quality development, and a real economy. The plan aims to be a crucial link towards achieving socialist modernization by 2035.

The novel “Violet Project” aims to test whether success in politics is achieved through ethical values ​​or pragmatic approaches. The project is the product of a philosophical debate between three old friends—idealist academic Dr. Thomas Wan, morally committed businessman John Mendoza, and results-oriented car salesman Christopher Hamilton—who meet after many years at an Orlando restaurant. The tension between Hamilton’s assertion that “in politics, all means are justified” and Mendoza’s belief that “ethical values ​​pay off in the long run” will be tested through an unusual social experiment devised by Wan.

Dr. Wan chooses two of his former students from the University of Central Florida, James Frank and Gary Metros, to implement the project. These two young people are polar opposites in character. Ambitious, unruly, and down-to-earth James Frank is offered a campaign in Crystal Lake, Illinois, where he challenges ethical boundaries. Meanwhile, honest, introverted, and idealistic Gary Metros is asked to run for office in Southaven, Mississippi, adhering to ethical principles. Both accept the offer in exchange for a lucrative salary and a potential $150,000 prize.

James Frank’s Crystal Lake Adventure: The Triumph of Pragmatism

James takes quite ambitious steps as he launches his campaign. First, he brings on former mayor Roy Jimenez, who struggles with alcoholism, as an advisor. Roy’s sordid political experience will prove an invaluable resource for James. With the addition of seasoned strategist Michael Benson, a campaign driven by dirty tactics under the guise of “honesty” despite Crystal Lake’s calm and uneventful demeanor is waged.

James’s team employs various manipulation tactics throughout the election process. After Roy discovers that incumbent mayor George William has a secret relationship with a Ukrainian immigrant and aids illegal immigrants, he blackmails him into withdrawing his candidacy and directing his supporters to James. Furthermore, other independent candidates, Brian Harris and Aaron Rivera, are manipulated with money and personal accounts to James’s advantage, forcing them to withdraw just before the election.

James faces a difficult time in a televised debate due to his inexperience. Despite being outmatched by his rivals (Warren Collins and George William), thanks to the team’s backroom operations, he wins the Crystal Lake mayoral election with 6,179 votes. This victory is presented as proof that pragmatic approaches to politics can work in the short term.

Gary Metros’s Southaven Adventure: Constructive Change with Ethical Values

Gary, however, pursues a completely different strategy. He works with a professional team consisting of sociologist Dr. Lawrence Travis and urban planner Dr. Nelson Vincent. They act in accordance with Travis’s philosophy of “reviving social happiness and unity by creating a common ideal and enemy.”

Gary’s campaign in Southaven quickly evolved into a comprehensive socio-economic development project. First, he took steps to reduce unemployment by establishing a startup center. Then, he strengthened the city’s sense of belonging by establishing the New Southaven sports club and encouraging residents to attend matches frequently. His campaign, which is driven by public engagement, transparency, and positive promises, established him as a trusted leader in the eyes of Southaven voters.

Gary’s uncompromising approach to ethical values ​​led him to achieve long-term and sustainable success, and he won the Southaven mayoral election with 12,127 votes. This victory demonstrates that adhering to ethical values ​​in politics can also lead to success eventually.

Final Meeting and Project Evaluation

After both candidates are successful, they meet with the project’s funders at a luxurious restaurant in Orlando. Dr. Thomas Wan explains the criteria established at the project’s inception: the winner will be the one receiving the most votes and will receive a $150,000 prize.

James Frank is declared the official winner because he received a higher percentage of votes than Gary Metros. This result supports Christopher Hamilton’s thesis that “the end justifies the means.” However, Wan also emphasizes that both young men performed exceptionally well.

The novel’s finale presents a profound moral question. While James’s victory is based on blackmail, manipulation, and dirty tactics, Gary’s victory is based on a model that is sustainable, strengthens society, and leaves a more solid legacy in the long term. “Project Violet” demonstrates that short-term gain in politics can be achieved through pragmatism, but true lasting success and social trust can be built through ethical values.

Both young politicians have begun their new careers, but which of them will truly be considered successful will be revealed later in their political careers. The novel concludes by inviting the reader to consider the true meaning of “winning.”

All eyes are on Beijing as the Communist Party of China (CPC) convenes to outline the next five years. These meetings take place amidst heightened trade tensions with Washington and mounting domestic challenges. This fourth plenary session of the CPC Central Committee, known as the “Fourth Plenum,” is a pivotal political event in the country, shaping future policies. The four-day closed-door meeting aims to finalize China’s new Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, an economic and political roadmap outlining the priorities of the world’s second-largest economy for the coming years. Approximately 370 members of the Central Committee, led by “Xi Jinping,” are participating in the meeting, with expectations of changes in some leadership positions, although details of these changes may not be revealed for several days or weeks. The full details of the plan are expected to be announced during the annual session of the National People’s Congress in March 2026.  Perhaps the most important things for the Chinese leadership at the moment are stability, legitimacy, and continued support. Therefore, it is crucial that they demonstrate their ability to improve the quality of life, as this is the cornerstone of their legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

 Many objectives of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) have come to fruition. The assessment of the key economic and social development achievements under the 14th Five-Year Plan, according to my view, is very positive, especially since they have global impacts in many aspects, such as economic growth, new quality productive forces, high-level opening-up, green transition, technological innovation, international cooperation, cultural and academic exchange, etc.

  As China’s 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025) draws to a close, the country has achieved a number of notable accomplishments, including fostering a resilient economy and making tangible strides in technology, manufacturing, economic reform, sustainability, and innovation. The country’s strategic plan has supported the country’s high-quality development, contributing to national progress across various sectors in China. China’s five-year plans are strategic guidance documents that chart the country’s development path over five years and form the overall framework for national planning. China will continue its 15th five-year plan in its opening-up and reform process to achieve more balanced and comprehensive development.

 China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will cover the period from 2026 to 2030. Planning began in December 2023. The plan aims to achieve General Secretary Xi Jinping’s goal of doubling the size of the economy between 2020 and 2035. The recommendations of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlined several actionable plans and programs for the national economic and social development of the People’s Republic of China. These plans focus on innovation-driven growth, low-carbon development, and urban-rural integration while deepening social inclusion and addressing the problem of population aging.

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing from October 20 to 23, 2025. A total of 168 members and 147 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the plenary session. Members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and responsible comrades from relevant departments attended as observers. Some comrades from grassroots units and a number of experts and scholars who were delegates to the 20th CPC National Congress also attended as observers. The plenary session was presided over by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and “Xi Jinping”, General Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered an important speech. The plenary session heard and discussed a work report delivered by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPC, commissioned by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and approved, after consideration, the “Proposals of the CPC Central Committee on Compiling the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development.” President Xi Jinping made explanations to the plenary session on the draft of the “Proposals.”

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will be held from October 20 to 23, 2025, to discuss proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for China’s Economic and Social Development. China has achieved significant achievements during the 14th Five-Year Plan, both domestically and internationally. In the new plan, it will continue its pursuit of high-quality development and strengthen international cooperation to achieve a more prosperous shared future.

The 14th Five-Year Plan focuses on achieving high-quality development, encompassing key areas such as scientific and technological innovation, the green economy, improving living standards, and balanced regional development. China’s achievements during this period were not limited to domestic matters but rather extended their impact to the entire world.

  This year, 2025, marks the conclusion of the implementation of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Chinese authorities recently reviewed the most significant achievements made during this period, a development that received widespread attention from the international community. China’s achievements in innovation during the 14th Five-Year Plan represent a global model of scientific and technological self-reliance. Not only did it increase spending on research and development, but it also succeeded in transforming knowledge into a sustainable, productive, and economic force. This reflects a strategic vision that has made China a leader in the fields of artificial intelligence, clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and modern communications. Giant Chinese companies, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Xiaomi, and BYD, have become symbols of this transformation. They have not only succeeded in building global brands but also established integrated innovation systems that blend scientific research with practical application.

 China’s five-year plans have always been an effective tool for driving progress across all sectors. According to my analysis as an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is described as “diverse, innovative, and open.” I expect China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan to continue prioritizing technological innovation, artificial intelligence, social welfare, scientific research, the digital economy, and carbon reduction. China’s development model is unique, with its sole goal of ensuring the prosperity of the Chinese people, under the motto “from the people, for the people.” Taking effective measures and prioritizing the protection and improvement of citizens’ livelihoods have been key factors behind China’s rapid development. This Chinese development model has become an inspiring example by transforming human capital into an engine of growth.

  Based on the previous analysis, perhaps what most caught my attention during China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is the significant Chinese focus on the innovation sector at the forefront. Over the past five years, the country’s total investment in research and development (R&D) has reached record levels. By 2024, China’s R&D spending will have increased by about 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, since the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission.

During its 3rd grandiose summit in Luanda that brought together a distinguished panel of leaders, including the ministers of transport from Zimbabwe and Rwanda, the secretary-general of the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), the director of strategies at Morocco’s Ministry of Transport and Logistics, the CEOs of Ethiopian Airlines and TAAG Angola Airlines, as well as representatives from the World Bank Group and the European Commission (EC), the African Union finally earmarked $30 billion for aviation infrastructure.

In his opening address, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the African Union (AU), stressed that Africa must invest between $130 billion and $170 billion annually to lay the foundation for sustainable growth. “We must move from words to action,” President Lourenço urged. “This summit represents a decisive step toward mobilizing the resources needed to enhance connectivity and integration across our continent.”

The ambitious investment plan strategically aims at modernizing the continent’s aviation infrastructure under the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), according to summit reports. Lerato D. Mataboge, African Union Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, during the high-level session on Financing and Modernizing African Civil Aviation Infrastructure to Promote Integrated Continental Airspace and Enable Free Movement Under SAATM, emphasized aviation’s pivotal role as both an engine of integration and a cornerstone of Africa’s economic transformation.

“Aviation is not merely a mode of transport,” Mataboge stated, speaking at the session. “It is a strategic engine of continental integration and a core enabler of Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA. The Single African Air Transport Market will only succeed if we build the modern, safe, and efficient infrastructure that Africa’s growth demands.”

Citing findings from a Continental Aviation Infrastructure Gap Analysis conducted with AFCAC, ICAO, and the World Bank, Mataboge revealed that Africa needs between $25 and $30 billion over the next decade to close critical aviation infrastructure gaps. Passenger traffic is projected to triple from 160 million in 2024 to nearly 500 million by 2050, intensifying the urgency for investment.

Key funding requirements include US$10 billion for airport and aerodrome infrastructure and $8 billion for modernizing communication, navigation, and meteorological systems. The AU’s strategy aims to mobilize $10 billion in catalytic public finance to attract an additional $20 billion in private and institutional investment. Through partnerships with Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and AUDA-NEPAD, the AU is aligning investment priorities with SAATM and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

The modernization plan integrates cutting-edge technologies such as Airport Collaborative Decision-Making (A-CDM) and System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) to enable seamless continental airspace. It also incorporates renewable energy solutions at airports to attract green financing and advance sustainability goals.

“As we modernize African skies, we are doing so sustainably,” Mataboge added. “Every project we prepare is designed to meet global green standards, reduce fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions, and make African aviation an attractive asset class for the world’s growing pool of climate-focused capital.”

Mataboge reaffirmed the AU’s commitment to ensuring that a modern, efficient, and sustainable aviation network drives Africa’s economic integration, connectivity, and global competitiveness. The AU’s officials reaffirmed their focus on Africa’s most strategic priorities, including building aviation infrastructure, digital data systems, and data interoperability. The discussion underscored the importance of collaborative efforts in building a better aviation sector across Africa.

Deals and Dollars: Concrete Commitments 

The summit moved beyond dialogue to secure tangible commitments, marked by the signing of three key Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs):

– A partnership between the African Social Security Association and AUDA-NEPAD to channel African pension funds into continental infrastructure.

– An MOU with Qatar Airways establishing a $500 million endowment for renewable energy and climate-aligned industrialization.

– The establishment of the Angola Export and Trade Facility to promote regional cooperation and trade.

Ms. Nardos Bekele-Thomas, CEO of AUDA-NEPAD, reported significant progress since the previous summit in Dakar, Senegal. She announced that the AU, alongside African financial institutions, has already raised $1.5 billion to execute high-impact cross-border projects.

“The lesson from Dakar is clear: we can no longer treat financing as a fragmented market of scattered deals. We must transform it into a unified strategy,” Bekele-Thomas stated. She detailed new financial instruments, including the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa’s Project Development Fund, which has achieved a first close of $118 million and is managed by Africa50.

In his contribution, African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf emphasized that Africa is entering a new phase of self-determination, one in which the continent must take ownership of financing, planning, and implementing its own development. He underscored that infrastructure investment is not merely technical but deeply political and strategic, vital to Africa’s economic sovereignty, competitiveness, and unity. Highlighting progress made under the PIDA framework, he called for an African-driven ecosystem for development financing through domestic resource mobilization, stronger private sector participation, and greater access to climate funds.

Echoing the urgency of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, framed infrastructure investment as a deeply political and strategic imperative for Africa’s economic sovereignty. “We are shifting from a logic of assistance to a logic of alliance, where partners align their engagement with priorities defined by Africa itself,” he declared. He concluded with a powerful vision: “What we are building here are not merely roads and bridges. We are building an Africa that is connected, confident, and sovereign.”

There were special sessions designed to facilitate in-depth due diligence and accelerate projects toward financial close. The summit for Africa’s infrastructure development stands as a definitive moment, signaling Africa’s unified resolve to finance its own destiny and build the interconnected, prosperous future its people deserve.

Latin America’s political landscape has seen sweeping shifts in recent years. On one hand, a so-called “second Pink Tide” has returned left-of-centre governments to power in key countries – Lula in Brazil, Petro in Colombia, and the broad left in Mexico – inspiring hopes of renewed democracy and social reform. On the other hand, strongman leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele (a populist outsider not usually labelled “leftist”) and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro (an entrenched Chavista) have consolidated control in ways critics call authoritarian. The question looms: are these developments evidence that the region is sliding back toward autocracy, cloaked in progressive rhetoric? Or are they legitimate shifts reflecting popular will and necessary reform? Recent trends in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, and Venezuela, show serious democratic backsliding, populist leadership styles, and the uses (and abuses) of leftist language to consolidate power rather than give it back to the people.

Brazil: Lula’s Left Turn and the Security State

Brazil’s democracy was violently tested in early 2023 when Jair Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidential palace. The crisis – and the swift legal response by institutions – helped vindicate Brazil’s checks and balances. When former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) won the 2022 election, many Brazilians breathed a sigh of relief as they felt and agreed that a second Bolsonaro term would have propelled Brazil further into autocracy, whereas Lula’s coalition blocked that outcome. Polls showed Brazilians rallying to defend democracy after the Jan. 8 insurrection, and Lula himself has repeatedly proclaimed Brazil a “champion of democracy” on the world stage. Under Lula, Brazil has indeed reversed some of Bolsonaro’s more extreme policies, especially on the environment and social welfare, and the Supreme Court remains independent and active.

At the same time, Brazil still grapples with brutal crime and controversial security policies. In October 2025 a massive police raid in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas – involving roughly 2,500 officers – killed at least 119 people (115 suspected traffickers and 4 officers). Human rights groups denounced the operation as a massacre, reporting that many of the victims were killed execution-style. President Lula’s justice minister stated that Lula was horrified by the death toll and had not authorised the raid, which took place without federal approval. Rights investigators noted that in 2024, approximately 700 people were killed in police actions in Rio—nearly two per day, even before this incident. The episode underscored the persistence of militarised and largely unaccountable security practices, rooted in decades of mano dura policing. Lula’s administration, however, has publicly condemned the use of excessive force and pledged to pursue meaningful reforms in public security policy.

In short, Brazil’s picture is mixed. Bolsonarismo (Bolsonaro’s movement) still holds sway in many state capitals, and violence remains high. But Lula’s presidency so far shows more emphasis on rebuilding institutions and fighting inequality than on authoritarian control. Brazil’s democracy has shown resilience: after the coup attempt, support for democracy actually peaked among the public. Lula himself has publicly affirmed free speech and criticised right-wing attacks, reversing some of Bolsonaro’s polarising rhetoric. Thus, we can view Brazil as democratic, albeit fragile. The major ongoing concerns are police brutality and crime – which are treated as security policy issues more than political power grabs by the president.

However, although Lula’s third term has been marked by a renewed emphasis on social justice, labour rights, and environmental protection, it has also been coupled with a discourse that often frames politics as a moral battle between the people and entrenched elites. This populist tone has reinforced his image as a defender of ordinary Brazilians while simultaneously deepening political polarisation and straining institutional checks and balances. His leadership style tends to concentrate moral and political authority around his persona, blending pragmatic governance with an appeal to popular sentiment. Even though Lula continues to operate within democratic frameworks, this personalisation of power highlights the persistent tension between populist mobilisation and institutional restraint in Brazil’s fragile democracy.

Mexico: Welfare Reforms and Power Consolidation

Mexico’s case is more worrisome. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO, 2018–2024), a self-declared leftist populist, implemented a dramatic concentration of power. By 2024 his ruling Morena party controlled the presidency, both houses of Congress, and most state governorships. His government pushed through constitutional amendments that bolstered the executive and weakened independent checks. By the end of his term, his party had achieved full control of the executive branch, both chambers of Congress, and most subnational states, and it overhauled the judiciary and strengthened the military through reforms aimed at executive aggrandisement and weakening checks and balances. In plain terms, AMLO used his majority to rewrite rules in his favour.

AMLO’s populist rhetoric was central to this process. He constantly framed his campaign as a fight against corrupt “elites” and the “old” political order. Slogans like “Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres” (For the good of all, first the poor) became rallying cries.  On the surface, that populist welfare agenda – pensions for seniors, higher minimum wage, social programmes – delivered what could be perceived as real results. Poverty fell sharply: by 2024 over 13.4 million fewer Mexicans lived below the poverty line, a historic 26% drop. These benefits helped AMLO maintain high approval from his base. Yet a closer look reveals a more complex picture. Independent analyses show that much of this reduction is linked to temporary cash transfers and post-pandemic economic recovery rather than structural improvements in wages, education, or healthcare. Inequality and informality remain deeply entrenched, and millions continue to rely on precarious, low-paid work. Moreover, Mexico’s social spending has not been matched by investments in institutional capacity or transparency, raising concerns that short-term welfare gains may mask longer-term fragility. In this sense,  López Obrador’s populist social model contrasted starkly with its narrative of transformation: it has lifted incomes in the immediate term but done little to strengthen the foundations of sustainable, equitable development.

Also the same rhetoric that promised to empower the poor also justified undermining institutions. AMLO’s blend of social policy with authoritarian tactics created a downward trend in freedoms. He openly clashed with autonomous agencies and critical media, called judges “traitors,” and even moved to punish an independent Supreme Court justice. AMLO began implementing his unique brand of populist governance, combining a redistributive fiscal policy with democratic backsliding and power consolidation. In 2024’s Freedom Index, Mexico plummeted from “mostly free” to “low freedom,” reflecting accelerated erosion of press freedom, judicial independence, and checks on the executive.

For example, AMLO mused about revoking autonomy of the election commission (INE) and packed federal courts with loyalists. He oversaw a lawsuit that temporarily replaced the anti-monopoly commissioner (though this was later reversed). Controversial judicial reforms were rammed through Congress with MORENA’s (National Regeneration Movement) supermajority. In the name of fighting corruption, AMLO and his party sidestepped democratic norms. By the time he left office, many prominent dissidents had been labelled enemies of the people, and civil-society watchdogs reported increasing self-censorship under fear of government reprisals.

Legitimate reforms vs. power grabs: Of course, AMLO’s administration did achieve significant social gains. His policies tripled the minimum wage and expanded social pensions for the elderly and students. From the left’s point of view, these are overdue redresses of inequality after decades of neoliberal policy. Nevertheless, one can also say that AMLO pursued these at the expense of Mexico’s democracy.

AMLO’s successor, Claudia Sheinbaum has largely extended the populist and centralising model of her predecessor. Her government has expanded the same welfare policies – including pensions for the elderly, youth scholarships, and agricultural subsidies – which continue to secure her strong approval ratings. At the same time, she has pursued a more nationalist economic strategy, favouring the state over private or renewable investment, a move seen by many as ideologically driven rather than economically sound.

Her administration’s approach to governance has reinforced concerns about democratic backsliding. Within months of taking power, her party used its congressional majority to pass a sweeping judicial reform allowing for the election of nearly all judges, a measure widely interpreted as undermining judicial independence. She also oversaw the dismantling of Mexico’s autonomous transparency and regulatory agencies, institutions originally created to prevent executive overreach after decades of one-party rule. Her rhetoric, while measured compared to López Obrador’s, has nonetheless targeted independent electoral and judicial authorities as acting against the popular will. Violence against journalists and judicial pressure on the press have continued under her watch, suggesting a continuity of the authoritarian tendencies embedded in her predecessor’s style of governance. In effect, Sheinbaum has presented herself as the guardian of López Obrador’s so-called “Fourth Transformation”, but her actions increasingly blur the line between social reform and the consolidation of political control.

Meanwhile, MORENA, the ruling party, has evolved into a hegemonic political force that increasingly mirrors the old Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Having consolidated control over the presidency, Congress, and most governorships, MORENA now dominates the national political landscape with little meaningful opposition. Its supermajority has enabled constitutional changes that weaken autonomous regulators and reconfigure the judiciary in its favour. Efforts to overhaul the electoral system – including proposals to curtail proportional representation and cut funding for opposition parties – further tilt the playing field towards one-party dominance. The party’s control of state resources and vast social programmes has also revived the clientelism and political patronage once characteristic of PRI rule. Many regional elites and former PRI figures have joined MORENA’s ranks, expanding its reach through local alliances and personal networks. This combination of electoral dominance, state control, and populist legitimacy has left few institutional counterweights to its power. In practice, Mexico’s political system is sliding back towards the PRI-style arrangement it once fought to overcome: a single dominant party using popular mandates and social welfare to entrench its hold over the state while constraining the mechanisms of democratic accountability.

Colombia: Peace Agenda and Institutional Pushback

Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro (in office since August 2022), is the country’s first-ever leftist head of state. He campaigned on ending historical violence and inequality, reaching a definitive peace with guerrilla groups, and “transforming” Colombian society. To that end, Petro has pursued ambitious reforms – agrarian, labor, climate, and constitutional – some of which have hit roadblocks in Congress and the courts.

One flashpoint has been his call for a constitutional rewrite. Petro announced he would ask voters (via the 2026 legislative elections ballot) whether to convene a national constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. He argues that traditional institutions (Congress and the courts) repeatedly blocked key reforms – for instance, an environmental tax and a gender law were struck down as unconstitutional – and that only a direct mandate could implement his agenda. In his own words, he has framed the move as carrying out “the people’s mandate for peace and justice”, implicitly casting political opposition as elitist roadblocks. Arguably, under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, a referendum on reform first requires legislation from Congress; the president alone cannot unilaterally change the constitution. Indeed, Petro’s coalition lost its majority in the Senate after the 2024 elections, and even has a minority in the House. That means he cannot force through a referendum law on his own.

Petro’s gambit is a stress test of Colombia’s institutions. Although Petro is popular with part of the electorate, and the checks and balances in the country have been holding– Congress and the Constitutional Court can still block overreach. Petro’s approval ratings hover around 37%, giving savvy opponents incentive to organise rallies or boycotts if he tries an end-run around Congress. Moreover, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has so far signalled it will strictly enforce procedural requirements before any reform, and it would likely strike down any effort to allow immediate presidential reelection (which the constitution currently bans). In fact, observers have flagged concern that Petro might push to permit his own re-election, raising alarm among civil society and international partners.

Thus far Petro has not succeeded in weakening institutions as Bolsonaro did in Brazil or Maduro in Venezuela. To the contrary, Colombia’s court and electoral tribunal have acted independently, even prosecuting members of Petro’s coalition for campaign irregularities. The country’s strong judicial branch remains a bulwark. That said, the tone of politics has become extremely polarised and personal. After a recent assassination of a presidential candidate (son of former President Uribe), the campaign trail saw shrill accusations: Petro’s supporters often label their opponents “far-right extremists,” while his critics call him a “communist” or worse. This combustible rhetoric – on all sides – could jeopardise stability.

Colombia today embodies both promise and peril. Petro has introduced progressive initiatives (such as a new climate ministry and child allowances) that appeal to many, but he also openly questions the role of old elites and considers dramatic institutional change. His proposals have not yet realised an authoritarian shift, but they have tested the separation of powers. The situation is dynamic: if Petro tries to override constraints, Colombia’s existing democratic guardrails (courts, Congress, watchdogs) will likely react strongly. The key question will be whether Colombia can channel legitimate popular demands through its institutions without them buckling under pressure.

El Salvador: The Bukele Model of “Punitive Populism”

El Salvador stands apart. President Nayib Bukele (in power since 2019, re-elected 2024) defies easy ideological labelling– he was not from the traditional leftist bloc – but his governance style has strong authoritarian features. His rise was fuelled by a promise to crush the country’s notorious gangs, and indeed El Salvador’s homicide rate plummeted under his rule. Bukele has remade a nation that was once the world’s murder capital. According to  figures, over 81,000 alleged gang members have been jailed since 2022 – about one in 57 Salvadorans – and Bukele enjoys sky-high approval ratings (around 90%) from citizens tired of crime. These results have been touted as proof that his “iron fist” strategy of mass arrests and harsh prison sentences (the world’s largest incarceration rate) has worked. In this sense, Bukele’s firm grip on security is seen by many supporters as a legitimate reform: a state that delivers safety, even at the cost of civil liberties.

However, the democratic trade-offs have been extreme. Since 2022, Bukele has ruled largely by decree under a perpetual state of emergency, suspending key constitutional rights (due process, privacy, freedom of assembly). Criminal suspects – including minors – are arrested en masse without warrants and often held in overcrowded prisons. The president has openly interfered in the judiciary: his pro-government legislators dismissed all members of the Supreme Court and Attorney General’s office in 2021–22, replacing them with loyalists. This allowed Bukele to evade the constitutional prohibition on immediate presidential re-election and secure a second term in 2024. Even ordinary political opposition has been effectively pulverised, party leaders disqualified, judges threatened, and dissenters harassed or driven into exile.

Human-rights groups accuse Bukele’s security forces of torture and disappearances of innocent people swept up in the dragnet. A 2024 Latinobarómetro survey found that 61% of Salvadorans fear negative consequences for speaking out against the regime – despite the fact that Bukele’s formal approval remains high. Many critics now call him a “social-media-savvy strongman” or “millennial caudillo”, suggesting he leads by personal charisma and social-media influence.

On the other hand, his defenders argue Bukele has simply done what past governments could not: restore order and invest in infrastructure (like child-care and tech initiatives) that were ignored for years. Indeed, El Salvador under Bukele has attracted foreign investment (notably in Bitcoin ventures) and even hosted international events like Miss Universe, as if to signal normalcy. But  Bukele has built his legitimacy on the back of extraordinary measures that sideline democracy. Bukele’s popularity may export a brand of ‘punitive populism’ that leads other heads of state to restrict constitutional rights, and when (not if) public opinion turns, the country may find itself with no peaceful outlet for change. In other words, El Salvador’s example shows how quickly a welfare-and-security-oriented leader can morph into an authoritarian ruler once key institutions are neutered.

Venezuela: Consolidated Authoritarianism

Venezuela is the clearest example of democracy overtaken by authoritarianism. Over the past quarter-century, Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro have steadily dismantled democratic institutions, replacing them with a one-party state. Today Venezuela is widely recognised as a full electoral dictatorship, not an anomaly but a case study in how leftist populism can yield outright autocracy. The 2024 presidential election was the latest illustration: overwhelming evidence suggests the opposition actually won by a landslide, yet the regime hid the true vote counts, declared Maduro the winner with a suspicious 51% share, and reinstalled him for a third term. Venezuela’s leaders purposefully steered Venezuela toward authoritarianism. It is now a fully consolidated electoral dictatorship

Since then, Maduro’s government has stamped out virtually all resistance. Leading opposition figures have been harassed, jailed, or exiled. Opposition candidate María Corina Machado – who reportedly won twice as many votes as Maduro was banned by the Supreme Court from even running. New laws passed in late 2024 further chill dissent: for example, the “Simón Bolívar” sanctions law criminalises criticism of the state, and an “Anti-NGO” law gives authorities broad power to shut down civil-society groups if they receive foreign funds. All justice in Venezuela is now rubber-stamped by Maduro’s hand-picked judges.

Any pretense of pluralism has vanished. State media and pro-government mobs drown out or beat up remaining critics. Despite dire economic collapse and mass exodus (millions of Venezuelans have fled hunger and repression), Maduro governs with an iron grip. In short, Venezuela today is an example of ideological rhetoric (Chavismo, Bolivarian Revolution) entirely subsumed by power. It also serves as a caution: the veneer of elections and redistributive slogans can sometimes hide total dictatorship. (In Venezuela’s case, the “leftist” regime never even bothered to disguise its authoritarian turn.)

Legitimacy, Rhetoric, and Checks

Throughout these cases, a common theme emerges: populist rhetoric vs institutional reality. Leftist or progressive leaders often claim to champion the poor and marginalised – a message that resonates in societies scarred by inequality. Yet in practice, that rhetoric sometimes becomes a justification for concentrating power. AMLO spoke of a “fourth transformation” of Mexico to overcome the “old regime,” and applied that mission to reshape institutions. Petro invokes “the will of the people” to override what he calls elite obstruction. Lula’s Brazil has been less about overthrowing elites and more about undoing his predecessor’s policies. And Bukele promises safety so absolute that he deems dissent a luxury Salvadorans cannot afford.

Of course, leftist governments do enact genuine reforms. The region has seen expansions of social programmes, pensions, healthcare, and education in many countries. In a sense, voters rewarded candidates like Lula, Petro, and AMLO precisely because they promised change and delivered temporary benefits (scholarships, pensions, workers’ pay raises, etc.). But even well-meaning reforms can backfire if the manner of governing ignores constitutional limits.

Where was the line crossed from policy to autocracy? The answer varies. In Venezuela, it was crossed long ago. In El Salvador, it was in 2020 when the Supreme Court was neutered. In Mexico and Colombia, it might yet be crossed if current trends continue. Notably, independent institutions have played the decisive role. Brazil’s judiciary and congress checked Bolsonaro and remain intact under Lula; Colombia’s still-revolutionary courts have so far blocked Petro’s more radical ideas;  under Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico’s courts remain constrained by the constitutional limits that formally prevent presidential re-election, yet her administration’s actions have significantly weakened judicial independence. By politicising judicial appointments and curbing the autonomy of oversight bodies, her government has consolidated influence over the very institutions meant to act as checks on executive authority. In practice, Mexico’s judiciary is now more vulnerable to political pressure than at any time since the end of PRI dominance, reflecting a growing concentration of power within the presidency and the ruling party. In contrast, Venezuela’s courts have no independence at all, and El Salvador’s were replaced wholesale.

This suggests that Latin America has not uniformly fallen back into classic authoritarianism under “leftist” governments. Instead, populist leaders of varying ideologies have tested democratic boundaries, and outcomes differ by country. Where institutions remained strong, they provided a buffer. Where institutions were undermined, democracy withered.

The Future of Democracy in Latin America

So what does the future hold? After a brief blip of improvement, democracy metrics in Latin America appear to be declining again. In 2023, a composite index actually rose slightly, driven by gains in Colombia (Free status by Freedom House) and Brazil. But by 2024 the region was “re-autocratising”, with rule-of-law slipping in Mexico and Peru, and older warning signs re-emerging across the continent.

Key factors will influence the coming years. On one hand, many Latin Americans remain hungry for security, equity, and an end to corruption – needs that populist leaders address. If such leaders deliver results (as Bukele did on crime), public tolerance for illiberal methods may persist. On the other hand, the region has a relatively robust civil society, and voters in countries like Brazil and Colombia have shown willingness to hold leaders accountable.

Balance is crucial. In well-functioning democracies, major changes do not require emergency decrees or friendly courts; they require compromise and open debate. The examples of Mexico and El Salvador show how quickly democratic norms can erode when populist leaders wield their mandate without restraint.

Ultimately, Latin America’s record is not hopeless, but neither is it fully reassuring. The early 2020s have demonstrated that both left-wing and right-wing populisms can strain democracy. Are we returning to authoritarianism under a leftist facade? – has no single answer. In countries like Venezuela, the answer is emphatically yes. In others, it is a warning under construction: Mexico and El Salvador caution us, Colombia is at a crossroads, and Brazil’s experience suggests that institutions can still provide meaningful checks on executive power, but their resilience is not guaranteed. The recent police raid in Rio de Janeiro, serves as a stark test for Lula’s commitment to reforming Brazil’s militarised public-security apparatus. How his government responds to this and similar incidents will be a critical measure of whether Brazil’s democratic institutions can withstand pressure from both public opinion and entrenched security structures, or whether longstanding legacies of unchecked police power will continue to erode accountability.

For the future of the region, the lesson is that rhetoric alone cannot safeguard democracy. Even popular leaders must respect independent judiciaries, free press, and electoral integrity. If those pillars are allowed to crumble, Latin America’s democratic gains will fade. The coming years will test whether each country’s citizens insist on true democratic practice or allow the allure of strong leadership to override constitutional limits.

Political Landscape & Key Contenders

Tanzania’s ruling Party of the Revolution (CCM) has dominated the country’s politics ever since its independence over 60 years ago. Incumbent President Samia Suluhu Hassan, Africa’s first female head of state, is widely expected to cruise to victory on October 29th.

In January 2025 CCM confirmed Hassan as its presidential candidate. In practice, the race is uncompetitive: Hassan’s two main competitors have been barred from standing. Tundu Lissu, charismatic opposition leader and 2015/2020 candidate of the opposition Chadema party, as well as Luhaga Mpina of ACT-Wazalendo, were both disqualified. With Hassan all but certain to win, 16 minor-party candidates who barely campaigned will fill the remainder of the ballot.

Vice-President under the late John Magufuli, Hassan reversed some of his hardline measures early on, by reopening political space and rejoining international vaccine efforts. She focused on completing mega infrastructure projects (such as roads, railways, and power) and has generally been credited with steady economic growth. Even with this, what remains undeniable is that her administration has returned Tanzania to an authoritarian style of government later in her term.

The Election Campaign Environment & Democratic Integrity

The campaign season took place under very tight restrictions and accusations of bias, with Chadema and ACT-Wazalendo effectively excluded, CCM ran largely unopposed nationally. State authorities reportedly attacked critics and journalists, by giving pro-CCM coverage nearly 24/7 while enforcing regulations to silence dissent.

For example, internet and social media were also tightly controlled: in the week before the vote Tanzania effectively banned “X” (formerly Twitter) for ordinary users, and on election day a nationwide internet blackout was reported.

For many Tanzanians and international observervers the process couldn’t be seen as anything but undemocratic. State security forces were omnipresent at rallies and polling stations; any public protests were swiftly banned. When small crowds gathered outside campaign events they were dispersed with force, and police warned that posting “inciting” political content online could lead to arrest.

Key Challenges and Threats

The election day triggered unrest in several major cities. Hundreds of young protesters took to the streets sometimes clashing violently with police. In Dar es Salaam and Mwanza demonstrators set buses and police posts on fire and security forces responded with tear gas and gunfire. Human-rights monitors reported that at least five civilians were killed (with some reports saying up to ten).

With dozens of unexplained disappearances of opposition figures and journalists in recent years, Hassan’s administration ordered an investigation into alleged abductions last year, but no official results were released. Prominent Chadema members remain on trial for “treason,” and several smaller opposition candidates were arrested in the final days just before the election. Combining these practices with the low turnout in urban areas especially among youth, suggests further loss of faith in the Tanzanian political system. All together, these threats mean that even a smooth tally would not resolve underlying tensions.

Regional & International Outlook

Regional bodies, such as observers from the African Union, the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) were present during the vote. The AU dispatched a 72-member mission led by former Botswana President Masisi and Nigeria’s ex-foreign minister Onyeama. In practice these delegations will issue preliminary statements after the vote and full reports in the coming weeks.

However, international reactions have been mixed. Most western observers have voiced sharp criticism: a statement by European Parliament members called Tanzania’s election “neither free nor fair,” and urged its global partners to defend democracy. While the U.S. and EU members’ embassies had previously expressed concern about the campaign environment, neither imposed sanctions.

By contrast, major developing powers have maintained a low profile. China and Russia, both deeply engaged economically in Tanzanian infrastructure and mining projects, have largely stuck to their policy of non-interference.

Signing a $1.4 billion deal with China for railway work and a $1.2 billion uranium mining agreement with a Russian firm this year, neither Beijing nor Moscow publicly commented on the vote, focusing instead on stable relations and continued investment. African neighbors similarly avoided direct criticism; the emphasis has been on observing procedure rather than questioning the outcome.

Future Scenarios & Implications

In the short term, this will bring continuity of policy: infrastructure projects under construction can proceed, and Tanzania’s economy, is likely to keep growing moderately, especially by investment from China and Russia, which see Tanzania as a strategic hub.. By sidelining credible opposition, the government sacrifices long-term political accountability and invites heavier criticism from human-rights NGOs.

Meanwhile, some youth activists have threatened further protests, declaring that Tanzanians are shifting into active citizens. Should street violence or international pressure grow, the election’s aftermath will set the tone for Tanzania’s next chapter. A smoothly managed outcome could cement CCM rule for years, but if the polls are viewed as a coerced victory it may instead erode trust in government and fuel future crises. Tanzania’s 2025 election shows how fragile stability without competition is. Unless the political space reopens, the country risks trading short-term order for long-term disillusionment.

No one anticipated last Sunday midterm election result in Argentina. Not even the executive, that faced a dire situation on the way to the election. Unexpectedly, Donald Trump himself came to President Milei’s rescue and the election´s results surprised everyone in the Argentine political spectrum.

The political campaign couldn´t be worse for the incumbent. First, in early September it lost a provincial election in key Buenos Aires province (home to 40% of Argentines). Second, Milei’s sister and top political advisor was accused of bribery. Third, his top candidate for national lawmaker at, again, the crucial Buenos Aires province had to step down amid accusations of being funded by a suspected narcotrafficker. Fourth, even though Milei has been very successful in slashing inflation, from over 200% annually to around 20%, this came with a hefty price. He cut subsidies to poor families and utilities, increase interest rates and open the economy to imports. According to the World Bank, economic activity plummeted a 1.7% in Milei’s first year in office while projections for 2025 economic growth hover around 3% to 4%. Finally, the Argentine peso faced strong devaluation pressures for several weeks prior the election that dried good part of Central Bank´s reserves.

It was at this point that Trump stepped in. He gave a 20bn US$ bailout that kept the peso´s devaluation under control during the crucial days previous to the election. He even offered to increase the economic assistance to 40bn depending on the elections’ result. Trump defied internal criticism, both from Democrats and Republicans for giving money to record high foreign debt defaulter Argentina.  

Astonishingly, the election’s result couldn´t be better for the government. It won at the national level with over 40% of the votes while the Peronist got 35%. It won in all but 8 of the 24 provinces, including Peronist stronghold, Buenos Aires province. It has greatly increased the president´s party congressional power, giving him the chance to defend his presidential decrees and vetoes and even advancing crucial legislation with the help of allies. Key among Milei´s projects is the reform of the 1974 labour law. This law repeatedly resisted reform attempts by pro market administrations in the past and has been blamed for Argentina´s far from successful private sector performance.

At the same time, the election has weakened the Peronists presidential aspirations since this voting could not produce a clear leader in their political arc. The same goes for other opposition candidates with presidential ambitions. In sum, this election has infused new life to the Milei administration and gave him the chance to pursue his agenda with renewed strength.

The other big winner is Donald Trump. He has successfully influenced an election in one of Latin America’s largest country. From here on, Argentina’s alliance with the US will only deepened. In the mind of those who voted Milei for president and were now doubting whether to cast their ballots for him again, the US support acted as a huge catalyst in making up their minds. The group of those seeking a profound alliance with the US in Argentina (traditionally an anti-American country, as Latino Barometer polls has shown across the years) has only grew.

Nevertheless, one important pitfall lies ahead: Argentina’s relations with China. China is currently Argentina’s major trading partner while the US ranks fourth after Brazil and the EU. Former Brazilian president and Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro faced the same situation: he tried at first to sever its economic ties with Beijing, only to find massive opposition from exporters at home. Will political affinity trump (no pun intended!) trade interests? The Argentine case will act as a litmus test of the future of the relationship between the US, Latin America and China.

Relations between Egypt and China have proven their ability to keep pace with international and regional transformations. China is one of Egypt’s major trading partners, with annual trade volume exceeding billions of dollars. Recent years have witnessed an increase in Chinese investments in Egypt, particularly in the fields of infrastructure, industry, and energy, with a focus on mega-projects such as the New Administrative Capital and the Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in the Suez Canal Corridor, among others. The two countries also pursue compatible policies in terms of working for peace throughout the world and advocating for the establishment of a multipolar system.

  We find that Chinese investments in Egypt play a significant role in many areas, most notably technology transfer to Egypt, particularly in sectors where China excels, such as renewable energy, the electric car industry, and all types of appliances. Chinese investments in Egypt also provide significant job opportunities and help Egypt implement its import substitution strategy by producing more products that help reduce Egypt’s import bill with Chinese assistance and support. As of May 2025, the number of Chinese companies operating in Egypt reached approximately 2,800, with total investments exceeding $8 billion. These Chinese investments are characterized by their diversity and geographical spread in Egypt, from the Suez Canal to the New Administrative Capital.  Cooperation between Egypt and China has extended to the fields of technology and artificial intelligence, with Chinese companies present in the Egyptian market, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, and ZTE. A $300 million investment fund has been established with the Tsinghua University of Artificial Intelligence and Semiconductor Technology, in addition to fiber optics and outsourcing projects.

Chinese projects contribute significantly to Egypt’s domestic growth by attracting billions of dollars in Chinese investments in various sectors, such as industry, construction, and infrastructure, along with technology transfer and industrial localization. Chinese companies in Egypt are also working to establish industrial complexes and develop mega projects, such as the iconic tower in the New Administrative Capital, and establish industrial zones in the Suez Canal and Ain Sokhna regions, contributing to job creation and added value for the Egyptian economy. Chinese development projects also contribute to the development of energy and electricity infrastructure, the training of Egyptian personnel, and the export of products to African and European markets. The win-win principle that governs the Chinese model of international dealings is a principle that suits Egypt, its leadership, and its people.

 The most prominent contributions of Chinese projects to Egypt’s domestic growth are attracting Chinese investments to Egypt, which amount to billions of dollars. China also contributes to localizing industries and transferring technology to Egypt, where technology and knowledge are transferred from China to Egypt, in addition to establishing Chinese factories to produce various products, such as automobiles, steel, textiles, and others. China also plays a significant role in developing Egypt’s infrastructure, with Chinese companies contributing to the construction of major infrastructure projects, such as the development of power plants and the expansion of their distribution networks, as well as the construction of modern roads and towers. Chinese projects in Cairo thus create job opportunities and provide significant export opportunities, as these Chinese projects provide thousands of job opportunities for Egyptian workers. Egypt is a strategic gateway for China to export its products to Africa and Europe, thanks to its distinguished strategic geographic location. In addition, China plays a significant role in developing Egypt’s economic sectors, as these Chinese projects focus on vital sectors such as industry, construction, tourism, advanced technology, and manufacturing, which supports overall economic growth in Egypt.  This enhances Egypt’s benefits from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, as Egypt’s accession to the Belt and Road Initiative enhances economic cooperation with China and facilitates the flow of Chinese investments into Egypt.

Chinese investments in Egypt received a significant boost under President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi”. Egypt became an active member of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Egypt joined the BRICS bloc and the New Development Bank. Chinese projects have subsequently become important, yielding positive returns and impacting Egyptian citizens. The most prominent of these are major Chinese projects in Cairo, such as the financial and business district in the New Administrative Capital, the electric train, renewable energy projects, and textile factories, among others. These are all Chinese projects that Egyptian citizens are already aware of and following. These Chinese investments in Egypt create new job opportunities and open the door for Chinese products to enter African and Arab markets, benefiting both sides.

 Egyptian-Chinese cooperation is an ideal model for cooperation between the Global South, and Southern issues have been a major focus of the political leadership of both Egypt and China. Chinese and Egyptian Presidents Xi Jinping and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi have repeatedly emphasized the importance of solidarity among the countries of the South to confront common challenges. Egypt’s accession to the BRICS grouping, and previously to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as a partner country reflects its commitment to expressing the views of the countries of the South and promoting their interests. Meanwhile, China has presented its own vision on the issues of the South, evident in the numerous initiatives and ideas it has put forward, including the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and Global Governance, all of which are closely linked to the development goals of the countries of the South. This is also reflected in the vision of Chinese President Xi Jinping for “building a community with a shared future for humanity.”

 China’s cooperation with Egypt reflects a new Chinese vision for South-South cooperation, based on equality and non-interference. It reflects Beijing’s commitment to advancing cooperation toward strategic horizons that transcend traditional interests and build alliances capable of influencing the future of the international system. Egypt’s strong support and backing of President “Abdel Fattah El-Sisi” for the Global Governance Initiative launched by Chinese President “Xi Jinping” in early September 2025, with the aim of enhancing joint global cooperation to increase capacity to address common challenges and narrow the development gap between the countries of the North and the South, complements China’s and Egypt’s categorical rejection of the (Cold War mentality, protectionism, unipolarity, and hegemonic policies) pursued by the United States toward the world. 

 China’s massive military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II demonstrated Egypt’s strong support for China’s strength and its determination to maintain peace and development in the world. The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, held in Tianjin, China, also highlighted the strong political will of China and its ruling Communist Party to contribute to reforming and improving the global governance system. The Tianjin Summit is the largest, most fruitful, and most successful summit in the history of the SCO to date. Through it, China and President “Xi Jinping” championed the principles of global governance, adhering to mutual benefit and win-win outcomes, openness and inclusiveness, justice and fairness, and pragmatism and efficiency in order to achieve justice and advance policies of cooperation among developing countries of the Global South in the face of American and Western hegemonic policies. 

 This year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, a matter of particular interest to political circles in Egypt and China, as they play an increasing role in maintaining world peace and promoting international justice. In this context, Egypt and China have achieved fruitful results in comprehensive cooperation and advancing cooperation within the developing global South. Currently, the Egyptian and Chinese sides are working jointly to advance and ensure the success of China’s Global Governance Initiative, which will deliver tangible benefits to the two peoples and to the peoples of the region. This will make Sino-Egyptian relations a model for building a “community of shared destiny, mutual benefit, and shared prosperity,” in accordance with the vision of Chinese President Xi Jinping.

   Accordingly, we understand that the Chinese partnership with Egypt embodies the principles of global governance. The convergence between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Egypt’s Vision 2030 enhances opportunities for development cooperation between the two parties and confirms the two countries’ commitment to dialogue and consultation and the rejection of hegemony and interference, in line with the principles of global governance. This, in particular, reinforces the principle of the rule of international law within the United Nations and in all international forums in order to support developing countries of the Global South, far removed from the policies of exclusion, hegemony, and the Cold War mentality that Washington currently pursues in its dealings with the world.

The New Reactor Economy

In the twenty-first century, nuclear energy has re-emerged not only as a source of electricity but also as an instrument of geopolitical endurance. Among all global reactor exporters, Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporationremains exceptionally resilient. Despite sanctions and fractured supply chains, Rosatom today is involved in the construction of thirty to forty reactor units worldwide, including in Egypt’s El-Dabaa, Bangladesh’s Rooppur, and Turkey’s Akkuyu.

Yet beneath the story of uranium and concrete lies a subtler revolution: the rise of digital-twin technology. A digital twin is a virtual, data-driven replica of a reactor that mirrors every process in real time using sensors, analytics, and artificial intelligence (AI). It enables engineers to simulate performance, anticipate faults, and fine-tune safety systems remotely.

In doing so, Rosatom is no longer merely exporting atomic hardware; it is exporting data architectures and predictive-analytics ecosystems that tether partner nations to Russian digital infrastructures for decades. The company has consolidated these capabilities under its Unified Digital Platform, linking design, construction, and operation through cloud-based modelling and AI-driven monitoring (Rosatom Newsletter, 2025).

This digitalization marks a turning point in nuclear diplomacy: power now flows through algorithms and data, not only through megawatts and materials.

From Hardware Exports to Data Dependencies

Since 2020, Rosatom’s subsidiaries, notably Atomenergomash and Rusatom Service, have begun integrating digital lifecycle systems across their international reactor portfolio. The company’s engineering arm, ASE, has developed what it calls Multi-D IMS, a digital configuration-management platform that creates detailed virtual models of nuclear facilities during design and construction. These models enable real-time collaboration, fault prediction, and workflow optimization across sites, forming the foundation of Rosatom’s emerging digital-twin ecosystem.

Rosatom’s own communications describe these tools as part of a broader Unified Digital Platform, which connects design, manufacturing, and operation through cloud-based modelling and AI-driven analytics. While official statements do not identify specific plants using these systems, Rosatom notes that its “digital infrastructure and twin technologies” are being offered to international partners within its reactor export programs.

This architecture creates a durable maintenance corridor between Moscow and client operators.  Even after physical construction ends, the flow of digital data and software updates ensures that Russian engineers remain integral to plant performance.  In practice, the information layer itself becomes a channel of long-term engagement and influence.

Comparable Western vendors, EDF, Westinghouse, and GE Hitachi, are also pursuing digital-twin technologies. Yet Rosatom’s approach is uniquely state-integrated, aligning with Russia’s national strategy of digital sovereignty and self-sufficient AI infrastructure. The result is a hybrid of engineering innovation and strategic design: a system that embeds Russian digital standards within the nuclear industries of its partners.

For many developing economies, the offer is pragmatic: a single vendor providing financing, turnkey construction, and continuous digital assistance.  But this convenience introduces a subtler dependence, one not of uranium supply or credit, but of algorithmic reliance and data governance.

Kudankulam: India’s Quiet Test Bed

Nowhere is this shift more visible than in southern India. The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP), jointly operated by India’s Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Rosatom, is the first operational complex of VVER-1000 reactors in the Global South.

Originally a hardware partnership signed in 1988, Kudankulam is evolving into a digital interface. In 2020, Rosatom’s fuel subsidiary TVEL supplied India with next-generation TVS-2M fuel assemblies, extending reactor cycles from twelve to eighteen months, a shift managed through digital modelling and predictive maintenance.

Rosatom’s 2024 annual report outlines plans to connect Kudankulam’s operational analytics to its Unified Digital Nuclear Industry Platform, integrating India into the same digital ecosystem that supports Turkey’s and Egypt’s projects.

For India, this offers substantial advantages, higher capacity factors, enhanced safety diagnostics, and exposure to emerging global standards in nuclear AI. Yet it also entwines India’s civilian nuclear operations with Russian data protocols and remote diagnostic tools. Kudankulam thus becomes not only a reactor but also a node in Rosatom’s global digital web, where megawatts are managed by code as much as by turbines.

This duality defines the future of strategic cooperation: efficiency through integration, balanced against data-driven interdependence.

Algorithmic Sovereignty and Strategic Autonomy

Digital integration introduces a new vocabulary of power. Terms once reserved for information technology, data sovereignty, algorithmic control, and cybersecurity now shape energy diplomacy. For countries like India, which prize autonomy, these are practical concerns.

In 2019, a cyber incident at Kudankulam briefly demonstrated how vulnerable nuclear infrastructure can be when administrative networks intersect with global data flows. Although operational systems were unaffected, the episode exposed the need for stronger digital-governance frameworks in critical energy sectors.

Another question concerns ownership of reactor data. Predictive-maintenance algorithms rely on vast datasets, coolant temperatures, pressure levels, and sensor diagnostics gathered continuously during operation. If these datasets are processed on Rosatom’s proprietary cloud, who controls their reuse or replication? India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) mandates localization for sensitive data, yet nuclear information exists in a legal grey zone, governed more by bilateral contracts than explicit national legislation.

For Russia, digitalization ensures resilience under sanctions. Cloud-based engineering assistance allows specialists in Moscow to monitor reactors abroad even when travel or logistics are constrained. For partners, it delivers cost-efficient expertise, yet it also embeds an asymmetry; operational sovereignty becomes mediated by foreign algorithms.

Rosatom’s approach reflects Moscow’s broader strategy of technological statecraft, using digital ecosystems to sustain global reach despite economic isolation. The outcome is a new form of dependence: not energy insecurity but informational dependency.

Atoms → Algorithms: The Next Frontier of Energy Diplomacy

Rosatom’s digital transformation parallels wider trends in global technology politics. China’s Digital Silk Road, the U.S.-EU “trusted-tech” frameworks, and Russia’s own push for a “Digital Atom Belt” all reveal how infrastructure and information are converging.

India occupies a delicate middle ground. Collaboration with Rosatom at Kudankulam grants access to advanced analytics, but New Delhi also explores partnerships with Western firms on small modular reactors and new fuel cycles. Balancing these engagements will require clear rules on digital interoperability, data governance, and cyber assurance.

India already has the institutions to do so. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) verifies reactor-control software domestically, while CERT-IN supervises cyber-critical infrastructure. Extending such oversight to digital-twin and predictive-maintenance platforms can preserve sovereignty while encouraging innovation.

For Russia, meanwhile, digital twins are both export products and diplomatic instruments. By embedding AI-based support systems in every reactor project, Rosatom ensures long-term relevance. Even if hardware exports slow, its role as a digital-lifecycle provider guarantees enduring engagement. In that sense, Rosatom’s most influential reactor export may no longer be physical; it is virtual.

Conclusion: The Politics of Invisible Power

The shift from atoms to algorithms defines the next frontier of nuclear diplomacy. During the Cold War, power was measured in reactors built or megawatts produced. Today, it is determined by who controls the data that sustains those reactors.

For partner nations, digital twins promise transparency, efficiency, and safety. For exporting powers, they offer a quiet form of leverage that persists beyond physical construction. As India pursues self-reliance through Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat, it must treat data infrastructure with the same strategic weight as fuel supply chains.

The aim should not be isolation from partners like Russia but reciprocal digital governance, shared access protocols, transparent algorithmic audits, and domestic data custody. Rosatom’s digital twin diplomacy exemplifies a future where technological cooperation and strategic caution must coexist.

The next great non-proliferation challenge may not concern uranium enrichment but data enrichment: who holds it, who protects it, and who decides how it is used?

Authors: Marin Ekstrom and Wilder Alejandro Sánchez

Uzbekistan has recently commenced construction of a new airport in Tashkent, valued at $2.5 billion, as a symbol of the country’s reinvention. The project, slated to begin operations in 2029, aims to serve as Central Asia’s key aviation hub by supporting more than 40 take-offs and landings per hour and serving 20 million passengers annually. Economists predict that increased air traffic at the airport could generate $27 billion in annual revenue and create thousands of new jobs.

To achieve this ambitious goal, Tokyo and Seoul will be critical partners: Japan’s Sojitz Corporation, which has extensive experience in the aviation sector, has agreed to invest millions of dollars and share technical expertise. As for South Korea, the Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) signed a $24.5 million consulting contract to provide operational and service support for the development of the new Tashkent airport.

Investment Incoming

While the Tashkent airport is one of the most recent and buzzworthy examples of Uzbek cooperation with Japan and South Korea, it is hardly the only area of engagement. With a projected 6.2% economic growth rate for 2025, Uzbekistan is on track to become one of the five fast-growing economies in Europe and Central Asia, making it a highly attractive market for trade and investment. In July 2025, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) announced a three-year initiative to fund and implement $3.7 billion in projects across the energy, petrochemical, textile, and infrastructure sectors. Sojitz also agreed to expand its cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, including the Syrdarya II power generation facility. Mining is another lucrative sector, with the Japanese corporation Itochu investing heavily in Uzbek uranium mining operations.

Similarly, South Korea is playing a vital role in financing Uzbekistan’s infrastructure projects, including supplying high-speed trains for its electrified transport networks and providing over $12 million to promote sustainable resource extraction methods and supply equipment and training for Uzbek engineers. Another notable project is a South Korean-funded $150 million medical center in Tashkent.

High-Level Diplomacy

The two East Asian governments have also increased intergovernmental engagement with Uzbekistan in recent years. Visits and engagement between policymakers in Tashkent and Tokyo are relatively common: this year alone, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya visited Tashkent in June, while then-Minister of Justice Keisuke Suzuki visited in May. While the new Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, has yet to fully formulate her foreign policy strategy, it is hoped that she will continue Tokyo’s engagement with Uzbekistan.

Then-South Korean President Yun Suk Yeol visited Tashkent in June 2024, while President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and current President Lee Jae Myung spoke by phone in July. They pledged to strengthen the “special strategic partnership” and expand “multifaceted cooperation,” noting that Korean companies have invested over US$8 billion in the Uzbek economy.

Japan and South Korea have proven to be invaluable official development assistance (ODA) providers. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo’s primary international aid organ, along with other Japanese NGOs, have worked extensively on infrastructure and human capital development in Uzbekistan. While Japanese ODA to Central Asia is of lower priority compared to Southeast Asia, Tokyo has consistently remained a top donor to Uzbekistan and the rest of the region. South Korea- which famously transformed from a major aid recipient to a prominent aid donor – has currently designated Uzbekistan as a “priority partner country” in terms of its ODA allocation. South Korean development assistance increased tenfold from 2006 and 2019, concentrating on social infrastructure and public service projects. Given the current instability of the global humanitarian and international development sector, it is difficult to say with certainty which current and future projects involving Japan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan will be pursued.  Nevertheless, ODA from Japan and South Korea has clearly had, and will continue to have, a positive lasting impact in Uzbekistan. 

The Other Pillar: People-To-People Interactions

People-to-people relations, facilitated through tourism and educational opportunities, can serve as additional pillars to strengthen interstate relations. Tourism among the three countries is surging, as Uzbekistan has noted increased tourist traffic from Japan and South Korea and vice versa. Initiatives like “Cool Japan” and “the Korean Wave” have transformed the two East Asian nations into soft power titans, while Uzbekistan is emphasizing strategies such as its Silk Road mystique to boost its soft power and tourism potential. If construction of the new airport stays on track, by the end of the decade, Japanese and South Korean tourists will arrive at a state-of-the-art facility their governments helped build.

Studying abroad is a significant phenomenon in Uzbekistan, ranking fifth globally in 2021 in terms of the number of students studying abroad. Japan offers numerous scholarships, language programs, and exchange programs designed for Uzbek students to study there. South Korea is an even more popular destination, with an estimated 5,000 Uzbek students studying in Korean universities. While comparatively fewer Japanese and South Korean students study in Uzbekistan, exchanges among the three countries can only strengthen their long-term ties.

Finally, Uzbekistan contributes to South Korea’s academic community and workforce: nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens were living in South Korea as of June 2025, comprising the fifth largest foreign-born population in the country.

The Big Picture

Japan and South Korea have also robustly engaged with Uzbekistan through regional forums. Japan spearheaded the “C5+1” framework, which organizes the five Central Asian republics into a regional unit interacting with an extra-regional actor, with its 2004 “Central Asia + Japan” dialogue. Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union adopted this model for their own engagements with the Central Asian states. The Japan-centered C5+1 has continued, with the most recent summit being held in Astana in 2025. South Korea has helped organize a series of Central Asia-Republic of Korea Cooperation Forums and was set to host the first Central Asia-Korea summit in Seoul in 2025. The arrest of deposed President Yoon Suk Yeol earlier this year, however, has delayed those plans. South Korea announced a “K-Silk Road” initiative in June 2024, an ambitious project encompassing such areas as natural resource extraction, development aid, and cultural exchanges- though the arrest of Yoon has also halted progress on these objectives.

As a corollary to this analysis, it is worth noting two recent developments involving Central Asian engagement with  the Global Powers of China and the US, which often overshadow Japan and South Korea’s efforts in the region. A Chinese company reportedly plans to invest as much as US$500 million in Uzbekistan’s Andijan region to construct a hydroelectric power plant and modernize existing energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, US Ambassador-at-Large for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau visited Tashkent in late October as part of a regional tour. 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of the US-Central Asia C5+1 format, and US members of Congress have requested the Trump administration to organize a presidential summit to celebrate this achievement.

The point here is that the Global Powers will continue to engage Tashkent, and matching dollar-for-dollar  investment to compete with them is unrealistic. That being said, Tokyo and Seoul are not necessarily positioning themselves to act like Global Powers in the region. Japanese engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia has been characterized by a flexible, piecemeal approach that targets key issues while forgoing rigid diplomatic protocol like geopolitical alliances or treaty obligations. In addition, Japan values “quality over quantity” regarding its projects: while it may not be as flashy or large-scale compared to its Global Power counterparts, Japan aims for long-term sustainability and success. South Korea, for its part, appears to be adopting a similar mode of engagement with Uzbekistan and Central Asia. Being involved in strategic projects, like a significant involvement in Tashkent’s new airport, will help Tokyo and Seoul continue to have a high-profile and visible presence in Uzbekistan’s development projects.

Conclusions

Since President Mirziyoyev took power in 2016, he has sought to create a “New Uzbekistan” characterized by economic dynamism and global integration. Tashkent’s relations with Global Powers like China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union have been extensively analyzed. However, two other countries that have developed their own special and successful partnerships with Uzbekistan are Japan and South Korea.

As the New Uzbekistan gains momentum, Tashkent must rely on international partnerships to sustain development and enhance its international prestige. Given the country’s history of subjugation under empires and global powers, Uzbekistan’s involvement with nations like Japan and South Korea offers an intriguing alternative: robust engagement with less risk of domination. In turn, these East Asian nations can expand their regional influence to offset rival powers, most notably China, and gain access to new markets and resources. The collaboration between these three countries thus offers mutual benefits for all parties.

*Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. He covers geopolitical, defense, and trade issues in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Western Hemisphere. He has co-authored a report on water security issues in Central Asia, published by the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and given presentations on environmental issues that affect the region.

NASHVILLE — A federal judge in Tennessee on Monday warned of possible sanctions against top Trump administration officials if they continue to make inflammatory statements about Kilmar Abrego Garcia that could prejudice his coming trial.

U.S. District Judge Waverly Crenshaw filed an order late on Monday instructing local prosecutors in Nashville to provide a copy of his opinion to all Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security employees, including Atty. Gen. Pam Bondi and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem.

“Government employees have made extrajudicial statements that are troubling, especially where many of them are exaggerated if not simply inaccurate,” Crenshaw writes.

He lists a number of examples of prohibited statements as outlined in the local rules for the U.S. District Court of Middle Tennessee. They include any statements about the “character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party” and “any opinion as to the accused’s guilt or innocence.”

“DOJ and DHS employees who fail to comply with the requirement to refrain from making any statement that ‘will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing’ this criminal prosecution may be subject to sanctions,” his order reads.

Earlier this year, Abrego Garcia’s mistaken deportation to El Salvador, where he was held in a notoriously brutal prison despite having no criminal record, helped galvanize opposition to President Trump’s immigration crackdown. Facing mounting public pressure and a court order, the Trump administration brought him back to the U.S. in June, but only after issuing an arrest warrant on human smuggling charges in Tennessee. Abrego Garcia has pleaded not guilty to those charges and asked Crenshaw to dismiss them.

Meanwhile, Trump administration officials have waged a relentless public relations campaign against Abrego Garcia, repeatedly referring to him as a member of the MS-13 gang and even implicating him in a murder. Crenshaw’s opinion cites statements from several top officials, including Bondi and Noem, as potentially damaging to Abrego Garcia’s right to a fair trial. He also admonishes Abrego Garcia’s defense attorneys for publicly disclosing details of plea agreement negotiations.

Abrego Garcia has an American wife and child and has lived in Maryland for years, but he immigrated to the U.S. illegally from El Salvador as a teenager. In 2019, an immigration judge granted him protection from being deported back to his home country, finding he had a well-founded fear of violence there from a gang that targeted his family.

Since his return to the U.S. in June, Immigration and Customs Enforcement has announced plans to deport him to a series of African countries, most recently Liberia.

Loller writes for the Associated Press.

The world is closely watching the potential meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping, which could take place at the APEC summit at the end of October, as well as the formal state visit in January of next year. Undoubtedly, the top priority for both the U.S. and China is to ease tensions, with Washington even more eager than Beijing to achieve a “truce.” This is because Beijing imposed large-scale countermeasures against Washington in October, in retaliation for the various sanctions the U.S. has levied on China since August. China’s countermeasures caught the U.S. off guard and left it struggling to respond.

China’s strict restrictions on rare earth exports have shocked the West, particularly the automotive and semiconductor industries. On the other hand, China’s halt to soybean purchases from the U.S. has frustrated Trump’s most loyal supporters. Washington’s initial reaction was one of anger, with threats of retaliation, but within days, its tone softened. This signals that Beijing has struck at the opponent’s sore spot, while Washington lacks effective tools to fight back.

“You have no cards to play.” Trump’s famous rebuke to Zelenskyy has gone global and will undoubtedly go down in history. Embarrassingly, Trump now finds himself in a similar predicament with Beijing: nearly “out of cards.” To demonstrate that he still has some in hand, Trump has finally pulled Taiwan out of his pocket.

On October 20, in an interview with Bloomberg, Trump listed Taiwan as one of the four top priorities in U.S.-China negotiations—alongside rare earths, soybeans, and fentanyl—and stated, “We’ll get along very well with China.”

According to a report in The Guardian, Trump explicitly said that China “doesn’t want” to invade Taiwan and predicted that “nothing will happen.” He described Taiwan as “an apple in China’s eyes,” emphasizing that “America is the strongest military power in the world by far” and “no one dares to mess with us.” In a buddying tone, he added, “I love my relationship with President Xi. We have a great relationship, and that on the Taiwan issue, “we’ll get along very well.”

In the following days, Trump repeatedly made similar statements in the media. However, on October 26, during an interview aboard his plane en route to Asia, he refused to discuss the Taiwan issue and warned that if China invades Taiwan, “it would be very dangerous for China.”

Trump’s rhetoric follows a very simple logic, as is well known: he fabricates bargaining chips out of thin air, uses soft language to lure the opponent to the negotiating table, then employs tough rhetoric to hint at his confidence in making the opponent yield, while refusing to reveal his hand in advance.

In mid-October, the RAND Corporation—a think tank closely tied to the U.S. military—released a report titled Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry, urging Washington to abandon zero-sum thinking and instead adopt a “step-back” approach to stabilize U.S.-China relations and avoid military conflict. On the Taiwan front, the report suggests that the U.S. should encourage Taiwan and China to create shared interests and emotional bonds that gradually lay the groundwork for reunification. This proposal has been interpreted in Taiwan as “gradual unification,” drawing widespread attention and viewed as a signal of the U.S. abandoning Taiwan.

However, rather than “the U.S. abandoning Taiwan,” the RAND report is more accurately a “delaying tactic,” aiming to prolong the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through a “step-back” strategy, thereby securing U.S. strategic interests in the First Island Chain for the next 5-10 years.

The realist tone of the RAND report is becoming the mainstream view in the U.S. For instance, Time magazine recently published an article that enraged Taiwan’s ruling party: The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader. The piece argues that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s reckless emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty is dragging the U.S. into the risk of military conflict with China. Furthermore, it stresses that Taiwan is a core interest for China but merely a non-treaty ally for the U.S.— America has no reason to get embroiled in war for Taiwan’s sake and should instead invest resources in treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

In other words, the restraint-oriented thinking in the U.S. that advocates “focusing on the big picture” is gradually gaining the upper hand. Such arguments often come from individuals and organizations familiar with U.S. military capabilities. Simply put, this rhetoric merely underscores a fact: the U.S. military has low odds of winning a war against China, and it’s not worth risking for a non-treaty ally.

Of course, hawkish thinking in the U.S. remains resilient. In contrast to the restrainers, hawks believe that losing Taiwan would severely damage U.S. credibility in East Asia, and from a long-term perspective, the U.S. would suffer more harm than good, thus stressing that “Taiwan is not for sale” and advocating continuing arms sales to Taiwan, even shifting from “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic clarity” policy.

But we know Trump doesn’t think that far ahead. Before he leaves office, Taiwan must be “cashed in” to feed this narcissist’s ego. In other words, the one inevitably waving the “Taiwan is for sale” sign is Trump.

In fact, for the West, Taiwan is rapidly depreciating because its most valuable asset—the semiconductor industry—is being hollowed out by the U.S. Taiwan’s vice president recently admitted that not only TSMC but also the ruling party has decided to replicate an identical semiconductor supply chain cluster in the U.S.

Taiwan’s authorities explain this investment plan as “avoiding over-reliance on the single Chinese market,” but those familiar with the semiconductor industry know that Taiwan has always relied on the U.S. market, not China—especially for high-end chips. Relocating the industry to the U.S. will only increase corporate costs, raise chip prices, and introduce even more unpredictable risks.

Rare earths are one such unpredictable risk. Semiconductor manufacturing requires rare earths, albeit in small proportions, but without them, chips cannot be produced. If Beijing wants to keep the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, it could completely ban rare earth exports to the U.S. while continuing normal supplies to Taiwan. Even if the U.S. tries to use Taiwan as a rare earth transshipment hub, that’s impossible, as China’s export controls can precisely calculate buyers’ demand volumes, eliminating any transshipment possibilities.

A more fundamental approach would be to ban rare earth exports to both Taiwan and the U.S., driving Taiwan’s value to rock bottom and preventing Trump from demanding too high a price.

In line with Trump’s style, consolidating proxies across the First Island Chain to form a military deterrence against China is undoubtedly another chip in his hand, but this card no longer works on China. Throughout this year, Beijing has repeatedly flexed its military muscles to signal to the U.S. that China cannot be contained. The U.S. military’s front line has effectively retreated to Guam, and Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea all know that the U.S. is pulling back. Without their backer, they dare not confront China.

The key point is that China understands the U.S.’s strategic goal is to stabilize U.S.-China relations, not to break ties. Therefore, only by doubling down on countermeasures against the U.S. can China achieve a stable state of “competition without rupture,” and facts have proven that a hardline strategy leads to a “TACO” outcome. Beijing has no reason or room to concede, especially on the Taiwan issue.

China is testing various tools to offset Western sanctions, leaving the entire West shrouded in fear and anger over rare earth cutoffs, yet powerless to retaliate. This proves that countermeasures to fully offset Western sanctions are nearly complete. If there’s any vulnerability, it’s the financial defense line, which is not yet fully prepared. This explains why China is actively promoting the internationalization of the renminbi and continuing to reduce its holdings of U.S. debt.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), replaced its party chairman in October with someone determined to change its U.S. policy. Due to the ruling party’s declining popularity, the KMT is poised to win majority voter support in next year’s elections and those in 2028. The new chairman opposes U.S. directives—demanding that Taiwan raise defense spending to 5% of GDP—and extends a peace olive branch to Beijing, potentially leading to dramatic changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations, a development unfavorable to Washington.

Admittedly, the KMT’s new chairman may neither be able nor willing to convince the Taiwanese people to unify with mainland China, but she could reverse the status quo where Taiwan’s major parties are all pro-U.S. Her support from over half the party members stems from two public opinion bases: first, acknowledging oneself as Chinese; second, opposing the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan. According to polls, 4 million KMT supporters accept Chinese identity, and over half (more than 9 million) of all voters, regardless of party, oppose the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan.

While Taiwanese public opinion is divided, most Taiwanese people oppose the Trump administration’s plundering of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and also oppose war across the strait—this is the main reason for the ruling party’s sagging approval ratings.

A “distrust of America” sentiment pervades Taiwanese society, along with dissatisfaction toward the anti-China president, prompting Beijing to establish “Taiwan Restoration Day” (October 25) to evoke Taiwanese people’s historical memory of China’s recovery of Taiwan after World War II. This aims to maximize nationalism to offset separatism and reduce Taiwanese resistance to unification. At the same time, Beijing uses this move to send a clear signal to the U.S. and neighboring countries: China is determined to resolve the Taiwan issue and is working to remove all obstacles.

Beijing now holds a strong hand; even the U.S.’s “Taiwan card” has become a card China can counter with. In line with Xi Jinping’s decision-making style, he will concede when unprepared, but once fully ready, he will strike suddenly, catching the opponent off guard.

Trump should be very aware that his current position is precarious, making it hard to reverse Beijing’s advantageous stance. Even the “chip card” is no longer effective. Thus, aside from selling Taiwan, he has no other good options—and this is the situation most feared by Taiwan’s elites: the window for “maintaining the status quo” is closing.

However, the sentiments of Taiwan’s elites are also shifting with the situation. Due to the KMT’s policy pivot, more and more Taiwanese elites may pragmatically reassess Taiwan’s future in the coming years, as KMT supporters lead the way, turning back to demand that elites devise countermeasures to change cross-strait relations and foster peace.

When U.S. hawks emphasize “Taiwan is not for sale,” it ironically highlights America’s intent to sell Taiwan. Yet, if this can lead to a peaceful resolution, the trend should be welcomed rather than doubted. After all, there are no winners in war, and those sacrificed are often innocent civilians.

Taiwan is for sale—the buyer is only one. The fear is that Trump might overprice it, backfiring and once again squandering his chance at a Nobel Peace Prize.

In the southwestern corner of Pakistan, where the Arabian Sea meets the rugged Makran coast, Gwadar Port stands as one of the most ambitious and strategically important infrastructure projects in South Asia. Once a quiet fishing village, Gwadar is rapidly evolving into a global trade hub under the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The port’s transformation is not just about maritime logistics; it represents a broader economic vision linking China, Pakistan, and a wider network of countries stretching across the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia.

At the heart of this transformation lies China’s investment in Gwadar’s deep-water port facilities. Strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly 20% of the world’s oil passes, Gwadar gives China direct access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the long and vulnerable sea route through the Malacca Strait. This geographic advantage is key to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering the country a shorter and more secure trade path to the Middle East and Africa. For Pakistan, Gwadar is both an economic lifeline and a symbol of modernization, promising to uplift the impoverished Balochistan province through new industries, employment opportunities, and infrastructure development.

The China-Gwadar-Africa trade corridor, projected to create around 25,000 jobs and contribute up to 30% of Gwadar’s district GDP by 2027, underscores the scale of ambition behind CPEC. The port’s free zone expansion is already attracting manufacturing, logistics, and technology firms that view Gwadar as a cost-effective alternative to congested Middle Eastern ports. Chinese companies, through 2025 agreements with the Gwadar Port Authority, are investing in industrial parks, real estate developments, and energy projects aimed at turning the port into a self-sustaining economic ecosystem. These projects extend far beyond shipping; they’re setting the stage for an integrated trade hub that could reshape the economic geography of the region.

Infrastructure connectivity remains the backbone of Gwadar’s development. The construction of new highways, railway links, and power plants ensures that the port is not an isolated enclave but a vital node in the global supply chain. The planned rail corridor connecting Gwadar to Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang province will cut transport time for goods significantly, allowing trade between western China and the Arabian Sea in under a week. Complementary projects, like the Gwadar International Airport, desalination plants, and solar energy stations, are also underway to support the city’s growing economic and population base. Together, these developments represent a holistic approach to urban and industrial planning that aligns with Pakistan’s long-term economic diversification goals.

The Gwadar Free Zone, now entering its second phase of expansion, is perhaps the clearest indicator of the port’s economic potential. Modeled after successful trade zones in Dubai and Singapore, the zone is expected to house over 400 companies from sectors ranging from petrochemicals and logistics to tourism and high-tech manufacturing. The fiscal incentives, tax exemptions, streamlined customs procedures, and energy subsidies are designed to attract both local and foreign investors. As Chinese and Pakistani firms collaborate on industrial and commercial ventures, the zone is emerging as a microcosm of regional economic integration.

Sustainability, often overlooked in large infrastructure projects, is also beginning to shape Gwadar’s future. One of the more innovative developments is the introduction of solar-powered fishing boats, designed to replace diesel-run vessels that pollute the coastline. Supported by Chinese firms and local cooperatives, these boats aim to improve the livelihoods of local fishermen while reducing carbon emissions. Such projects demonstrate how economic growth and environmental responsibility can coexist when supported by technology and policy alignment.

That said, Gwadar’s journey is not without challenges. Security concerns in Balochistan, bureaucratic delays, and local dissatisfaction over land use and employment distribution continue to shadow its progress. Critics argue that without more inclusive development, ensuring that the people of Gwadar directly benefit from the port’s success, the city risks becoming an enclave that serves external interests more than local ones. Transparency in agreements, fair labor practices, and reinvestment in local education and healthcare will be crucial to maintaining social stability and long-term sustainability.

From a broader geopolitical perspective, Gwadar’s rise introduces new dynamics into the Indian Ocean trade landscape. It competes indirectly with regional ports like Chabahar in Iran (developed with Indian support) and Dubai’s Jebel Ali, both seeking to maintain their relevance in global shipping routes. For China, Gwadar enhances its strategic footprint in the Arabian Sea, complementing its investments in East Africa’s ports like Mombasa and Djibouti. For Pakistan, it’s a chance to transform from a transit economy into a trading powerhouse, leveraging its geography rather than being constrained by it.

The real measure of Gwadar’s success will depend on how effectively it integrates with surrounding economies and global trade networks. If managed wisely, the port could help rebalance Pakistan’s trade profile, attract foreign investment, and serve as a catalyst for industrial modernization. But its development must remain inclusive, transparent, and environmentally responsible to ensure that the benefits of CPEC reach beyond the port’s fences and into the lives of ordinary Pakistanis.

In essence, Gwadar Port is not merely a logistical project; it’s a statement of intent. It reflects Pakistan’s aspirations to join the ranks of regional trade powers and China’s ambition to secure diversified trade routes. As CPEC matures, Gwadar’s success will likely be judged not only by the volume of goods passing through its docks but also by the depth of prosperity it generates across borders and communities.

Recommendations

• Prioritize local employment and vocational training to ensure Baloch communities benefit directly.
• Strengthen environmental management through renewable energy initiatives and waste control.
• Enhance port security and digital surveillance for safe and efficient operations.
• Encourage public-private partnerships to diversify investment beyond China.
• Fast-track railway and power infrastructure to improve trade connectivity.
• Implement transparent governance and community engagement programs.
• Promote sustainable fisheries and ecotourism to complement trade growth.
• Align Gwadar’s development with Pakistan’s national logistics policy for long-term coherence.
• Foster maritime innovation through research centers and green port technologies.

In recent months, a series of videos surfaced on Donald Trump’s social-media platform, showing what appeared to be drone footage of small vessels exploding somewhere in the Caribbean. The clips were accompanied by triumphant statements from the former president, who claimed that U.S. forces had struck “drug boats” operated by Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua cartel as they ferried narcotics toward the American coastline. Within hours of the first announcement, officials confirmed that “multiple interdictions” had taken place, that several suspected traffickers were dead, and that survivors were in custody.

For Washington, the operation was presented as a new frontier in counter-narcotics self-defense. For much of Latin America, it looked alarmingly like extrajudicial warfare. Colombia’s president protested that one of the destroyed boats had been Colombian, carrying his own citizens. Caracas called the attacks “acts of piracy.” And legal scholars, both in the United States and abroad, began to question not only the strikes’ legitimacy under international law but also who, exactly, had carried them out.

The Law of the Sea Meets the War on Drugs

The United States is not a signatory to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, yet successive administrations have claimed to act “in a manner consistent” with its provisions. Under that framework, ships on the high seas enjoy freedom of navigation. Interference is allowed only in narrow cases such as piracy, slavery, or “hot pursuit” when a vessel flees territorial waters after violating a state’s laws. The deliberate destruction of a boat on the open ocean—without proof of an immediate threat—sits uneasily within those boundaries.

“Force can be used to stop a boat,” observed Luke Moffett of Queen’s University Belfast, “but it must be reasonable and necessary in self-defense where there is an immediate threat of serious injury or loss of life.” Nothing in the public record suggests the crews of these vessels fired upon U.S. assets. The claim of self-defense, therefore, stretches maritime law close to breaking point.

International law’s broader prohibition on the use of force, codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is equally uncompromising. Only an armed attack, or an imminent threat of one, allows a state to respond with force in self-defense. Trump’s officials insist that Tren de Aragua constitutes a transnational terrorist organization waging “irregular warfare” against the United States. Yet, as Michael Becker of Trinity College Dublin argues, “Labelling traffickers ‘narco-terrorists’ does not transform them into lawful military targets. The United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with Venezuela or with this criminal organization.”

Nonetheless, a leaked memorandum reportedly informed Congress that the administration had determined the U.S. to be in a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels—a remarkable claim that effectively militarizes the war on drugs. If accurate, it would mean Washington has unilaterally extended the legal geography of war to the Caribbean, with traffickers recast as enemy combatants rather than criminals.

Domestic Authority and the Elastic Presidency

The constitutional footing for these operations is no clearer. The power to declare war resides with Congress, but Article II designates the president commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Since 2001, successive presidents have leaned on the Authorization for Use of Military Force—passed in the wake of 9/11—to justify counter-terror operations across the globe. That statute, intended to target al-Qaeda and its affiliates, has been stretched from Yemen to the Sahel. Extending it to Venezuelan cartels represents another act of legal contortion.

Rumen Cholakov, a constitutional scholar at King’s College London, suggests that rebranding cartels as “narco-terrorists” may be a deliberate attempt to fold them into the AUMF’s reach. But it remains uncertain whether Congress ever envisaged such an interpretation. Nor has the White House explained whether the War Powers Resolution’s requirement of prior consultation with lawmakers was honored before the first missile struck.

The Pentagon, asked to disclose its legal rationale, declined. The opacity has fuelled speculation that the operations were not conducted solely by uniformed military forces at all, but by an entirely different arm of the American state—one that operates in deeper shadows.

The “Third Option”: Covert Power and the CIA’s Ground Branch

In October, Trump confirmed that he had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to “conduct covert operations in Venezuela.” The statement was brief, but within the intelligence world it carried enormous significance. For decades, the CIA’s Special Activities Center—once known as the Special Activities Division—has been Washington’s chosen instrument for deniable action. Its paramilitary component, the Ground Branch, recruits largely from elite special-operations units and specializes in missions that the U.S. government cannot publicly own: sabotage, targeted strikes, and the training of proxy forces.

These operations fall under Title 50 of the U.S. Code, which governs intelligence activities rather than military ones. By law, the president must issue a classified “finding” declaring that the action is necessary to advance foreign-policy objectives and must notify congressional intelligence leaders. Crucially, Title 50 operations are designed so that “the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

That distinction—between covert and merely secret—sets Title 50 apart from the military’s Title 10 authority. Traditional special-operations forces under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operate as uniformed combatants in overt or clandestine missions authorized under defense law. Their actions are governed by the law of armed conflict, subject to military oversight, and, at least in theory, open to public accountability. CIA paramilitaries, by contrast, function outside those rules. They wear no uniforms, deny official affiliation, and are overseen not by the Pentagon but by the White House and select members of Congress.

Since 9/11, the line separating the two worlds has blurred. Joint task forces have fused intelligence officers and military commandos under hybrid authorities, allowing presidents to act quickly and quietly without triggering the political friction of formal war powers. The “drug boat” strikes appear to be the latest iteration of that model: part counter-narcotics, part counter-terrorism, and part covert action.

A Legal Twilight Zone

If CIA paramilitary officers were indeed involved, the implications are profound. A covert maritime campaign authorized under Title 50 would have required a presidential finding and congressional notification, but those documents remain classified. Conducting lethal operations at sea through the intelligence apparatus—rather than under military or law-enforcement authority—creates a twilight zone of accountability.

The law of armed conflict applies only when a genuine armed conflict exists; human rights law governs peacetime use of force. Covert paramilitary strikes sit uneasily between the two. They may infringe the sovereignty of other states without ever triggering a formal act of war, and they obscure responsibility by design. Survivors of the October strike—a Colombian and an Ecuadorian now detained by U.S. authorities—exist in a legal limbo, neither civilian nor combatant.

Mary Ellen O’Connell, professor at Notre Dame Law School, calls the rationale “utterly unconvincing.” No credible facts, she argues, justify treating these actions as lawful self-defense. “The only relevant law for peace is international law—that is, the law of treaties, human rights, and statehood.”

The Price of Secrecy

Covert action was conceived as a tool for influence and sabotage during the Cold War, not as an instrument of maritime interdiction. Applying it to counter-narcotics missions risks collapsing the boundary between espionage and war. Oversight mechanisms designed for covert influence operations struggle to accommodate lethal paramilitary campaigns. Only a handful of legislators—the so-called “Gang of Eight”—receive full briefings, and judicial review is virtually nonexistent. In practice, the president’s signature on a secret finding becomes the sole check on executive power.

The “drug boat” operations thus reveal how the United States’ shadow-war architecture has evolved since 9/11. The Special Activities Center, once reserved for coups and clandestine support to insurgents, now appears to function as an offshore strike arm for missions the military cannot legally or politically conduct. The public framing—protecting Americans from narcotics smuggling—masks a far broader assertion of authority: the right to employ lethal force anywhere, against anyone, without declaration or disclosure.

War Without War

Trump’s supporters hail the strikes as decisive. His critics see a dangerous precedent—a campaign that bypasses Congress, ignores international law, and blurs the line between defense and vigilantism. The tension runs deeper than partisanship. It touches the central question of modern U.S. power: who decides when America is at war?

The CIA’s motto for its paramilitary wing, Tertia Optio—the “third option”—was meant to describe a choice between diplomacy and open war. Yet as that option expands into an instrument of regular policy, it threatens to eclipse both. When covert action becomes a substitute for law, secrecy replaces accountability, and deniability becomes the new face of sovereignty.

Whether these “drug boats” carried cocaine or simply unlucky sailors may never be known. What is certain is that the legal boundaries of America’s global operations are eroding at sea. The United States may claim it is defending itself; international law may call it aggression. In that unresolved space—the realm of the third option—the world’s most powerful democracy is waging a war it will not name.

In the context of the US-China competition and the post-COVID-19 global economic recession reshaping the international order, Vietnam has emerged as a stable and dynamic bright spot in Southeast Asia. The concept of “the era of the Vietnamese nation’s rise,” first mentioned by General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam at the 10th Central Conference of the 13th tenure, reflects the aspiration to enter a new stage of development from “renovation” to “rise.” In fact, over the past year, Vietnam has achieved a growth rate of about 5.5-6%, higher than the average of many other countries in the region. Record FDI inflows, led by technology projects of technology companies Samsung, Apple, and Intel, as the expanding “China+1” trend helps Vietnam become an important link in the global supply chain. Inflation is maintained at 3-4%, and exports and domestic consumption recover strongly, while digital transformation, green development, and the semiconductor industry are considered new growth pillars.

One of the important milestones of the year is the program of reorganizing and merging administrative units, helping to streamline the apparatus and improve the efficiency of state administration. The reduction of nearly 30% of commune-level units and more than 10% of district-level units not only saves budget costs but is also considered a step forward in institutional quality towards a professional administration.

In foreign affairs, Vietnam has shown an increasingly confident role as a middle power expanding its strategic space. The upgrade of relations with the United States to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership puts Hanoi among the few countries that maintain special relations with both Washington and Beijing. Relations with Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia continue to be strengthened, while cooperation channels and mechanisms for controlling maritime disputes with China are maintained stably.

Multilaterally, Vietnam has shown a more proactive role in ASEAN and actively participated in global initiatives on climate and energy. Its image as a trustworthy, constructive, and balanced country has been reinforced, helping Vietnam to enhance its position in the reshaping regional structure.

However, despite many positive results, Vietnam’s growth still relies heavily on capital flows from the FDI sector, while domestic enterprises lack competitiveness. Labor productivity growth is slow, the efficiency of state-owned enterprises is still low, and institutional reforms have not created breakthroughs. These are barriers that put Vietnam at risk of being stuck in the “middle-income trap.”

On the social front, Vietnam faces challenges of climate change, development disparities, and rapid population aging. The Mekong Delta is being severely impacted by rising sea levels and saltwater intrusion. These pressures require more inclusive and sustainable development policies.

Politically, the anti-corruption campaign continues to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and national leadership. However, fear of accountability and slow decision-making are hampering the effectiveness of administrative unit mergers. Vietnam still needs extensive institutional reforms to promote transparency, innovation, and accountability to the people as the foundation for modern state governance.

In the coming time, Vietnam’s “rising” prospects in the period 2025-2030 depend on the ability to take advantage of opportunities from the wave of global supply chain shifts. The shift of supply chains away from China, along with trade agreements such as CPTPP, EVFTA, and RCEP, significantly expands the economic space. The young population base and expanding middle class give Vietnam the potential to maintain strong growth momentum in the coming decade.

However, opportunities always come with risks. Over-reliance on FDI can lead to the situation of the “FDI dependency trap.” Therefore, strong investment priority should be given to supporting industries, education, and science and technology as key factors to enhance self-reliance and domestic value.

On the foreign front, Hanoi will need to continue to maintain a delicate balance between the great powers. Deepening ties with the US and the West in technology and energy must go hand in hand with maintaining stable relations with China, its largest trading partner and strategic challenge. The East Sea, maritime security, and strategic supply chains will continue to be a test of Vietnam’s diplomatic mettle of “multilateralization and diversification.”

In conclusion, Vietnam’s “Era of Rising Power” can only be realized if the country turns its current momentum into long-term competitiveness. This requires institutional reform, productivity enhancement, and a shift to an inclusive growth model. If successful, Vietnam can position itself as a dynamic middle-class economy and contribute to the formation of a more balanced regional order in the coming decade.

The past year has shown that Vietnam is at a pivotal moment with great potential but also full of challenges. The “era of rising up” is therefore not just a political slogan but a real test of Vietnam’s leadership, reform, and integration capacity in a turbulent world.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a speech delivered on October 23rd, launched family support initiatives aimed at boosting Russia’s population. Essentially, the initiatives are not new ideas, but reiterating them demonstrates the Kremlin’s unprecedented and renewed commitment to the earlier promises of reversing population decline within the framework of creating investment opportunities and working for economic growth.

Putin, attending the first meeting of the Council for the Implementation of State Demographic and Family Policy, made several points, including the following:

– outlined concretely comprehensive steps and created conditions that enable the birth of as many children as possible in Russia. A family with three or more children should be considered as a minimum standard. At the same time, it is also essential to encourage students in the system of higher education to combine studies with family life.

– suggested, without delay, providing financial support for families as an underlying factor for strengthening the demographic policy. It is necessary to work on incentives such as maternity capital, preferential loans, flat-rate benefits for low-income families, and low-interest mortgages.

– trashed side, in absolute terms, migration to replace the native population, which often sacrifices national identity and culture, and, importantly, could cause internal political instability.

– advocated strongly for addressing the demographic challenge by supporting large family traditions and preserving genuine Russian family values.

It is important to regularly analyze the effectiveness of the measures in the sphere of family policy, improving the system of social support to make it as transparent as possible, understandable, and convenient for families with children. This approach guarantees the future, preserves the ethno-cultural balance in Russian society, and strengthens Russia’s sovereignty.

Demographic complexities and implications

There are several complications in Russia’s demography policy, although officials and demographers keep analyzing family support measures currently in effect and identifying and scaling up the most effective of them. At least, for the past decade, Russia’s approach has simply not been working perfectly well as expected. Accurate statistics and population surveys reflecting the realities are needed for correct managerial decisions.

There is a constant temptation to use maternity capital to resolve various other issues. Naturally, families with children always face many of them; they are endless. Considerable efforts have been taken to raise the level of population, but with little results. Russia’s population figures are seriously staggering, with researchers and demographers pegging it at approximately 142 million. 

In the first place, Russia has a relatively high death rate, influenced by health issues and lifestyle factors. In the second place, the birth rate has been declining over the years, contributing to a natural decrease in population. Third, emigration, especially among young professionals and specialists, is due to a lust for better economic and living conditions outside the Russian Federation.  

Moscow, the capital city of Russia, is currently under reconstruction. Alternatively, the city periphery (outskirts), the new micro-region where residential apartment blocks are undergoing construction, needs serious migrant labor. Moscow city mayor Sergey Sobyanin reiterated that the municipal administration needed 250,000 (a quarter of a million) to work on the construction sites (fields). In addition, many are required for tidying up the city. Sobyanin complained that there was a shortage of labor. St. Petersburg, the second largest city, and other major cities are constantly complaining and stuck with new construction projects.

On one hand, Putin, in his October 23rd speech, indicated categorically his opposition to raising population by naturalizing citizens from the Central Asian republics. On the other hand, Putin, during the second Russia–Central Asia Summit, held in Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, considered aspects of agreements encompassing migration of Central Asian citizens to Russia as a logical continuation of the close partnership within the framework of regional collaboration. 

Regrettably, legalizing 1.5 million (the majority from former Soviet republics) and transferring them to the Arctic and Far East regions to boost employment and systematically engage this labor in the production spheres is extremely hard for the Russian government. A well-coordinated and controlled ‘immigration’ could be one of the surest ways to allow population growth and comprehensive sustainable development and economic growth. 

Russia’s Logical Decision

In Putin’s candid views: “Different countries respond to this demographic challenge in various ways, including encouraging uncontrolled and even chaotic migration to replace the native population.” As a result, nations often sacrifice national identity, culture, and internal political stability.

Therefore, Russia opposes migrants replacing the native population, as contained in the speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin. It was explicitly made clear that offsetting falling birth rates with immigration is destructive to internal stability and national identity. There stands the only option: Russia will support family values as the foundation of its society, rather than following in the footsteps of countries that try to solve demographic issues by replacing their native populations with “chaotic migration,” according to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The United States has imposed multiple sanctions on Chinese companies for assisting the Russian military-industrial complex in its war against Ukraine. The US Department of Commerce and the Treasury alleged that several Chinese companies evaded US sanctions by selling sensitive technology needed by Russia to manufacture military weapons. One of these Chinese companies subject to US sanctions and its military dealings with Russia is “Sino Electronics Chinese Company,” which is considered as a part of a network of companies that has allegedly sent shipments worth approximately $200 million to Russia since the Chinese company was placed on the US sanctions list in September 2022. The shipments sent by the “Chinese Sino Network” to Russia included several microchips, cameras, and navigation equipment, technologies critical to Russian weapons used in its war with Ukraine, according to US accusations against Beijing.

 These measures include broad US sanctions in 2024 and 2025 targeting entities in China and several other countries that support Russia’s war efforts. In October 2024, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two Chinese drone companies, accusing them of participating in the production and supply of long-range attack drones to the Russian Air Force. Immediately following, in May 2024, US sanctions targeted Chinese companies and companies in several other countries for allegedly supplying electronic components and chemicals used in the manufacture of Russian weapons and missiles. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen also warned that “the United States will take action against any Chinese companies that assist Russia in its efforts to obtain military supplies.” As a result of these US sanctions, Chinese banks have become more cautious in dealing with Russia, leading to a slowdown in trade between the two countries during 2024.

  Since July 2025, the United States has threatened to impose secondary sanctions on any entity that continues to cooperate with Russia in an attempt to isolate Moscow by striking its cross-border trade networks, particularly with China. Secondary sanctions target third parties that deal with the directly sanctioned country, Russia in particular.  The sanctions are not imposed because of the actions of the third party, but rather because of its economic ties to the sanctioned entity. Washington uses these sanctions to deter any entity that might indirectly contribute to supporting the sanctioned regime or helping it circumvent sanctions. In 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese bank for allegedly conducting financial transactions with North Korea, even though the bank itself had not previously been subject to any sanctions.

 A series of US sanctions on China have been imposed, alleging its military cooperation with Russia in its war against Ukraine. In July 2025, US intelligence reports alleged that Chinese companies were shipping engines to the Russian arms company IEMZ Kupol by mislabeling them to evade sanctions.

The US Department of Commerce expanded its blacklist of Chinese companies and state-owned entities, alleging their cooperation with Russia and supporting it in its war against Ukraine. The US Department of Commerce added several Chinese companies to the US blacklist, including Shanghai Fudan Microelectronics, which was added to the US list of banned Chinese companies for supplying technology to the Russian military sector. Washington also imposed controls on the Chinese export sector, expanding export control restrictions to include Chinese companies that are 50% or more state-owned, as well as entities on the US blacklist. 

 Here, China has rejected all US accusations regarding its dealings with Russian military companies in its war against Ukraine. Beijing has repeatedly denied US accusations of providing military support to Russia. China has also taken several countermeasures, such as imposing sanctions on US companies, in a move to escalate trade tensions between the two countries. Regarding China’s response to US sanctions, China has publicly rejected all these accusations. At the same time, these US sanctions have raised concerns among Chinese banks and companies about secondary sanctions, which may indicate that these US measures are having an impact on trade relations between China and Russia.

 As for China’s official response to the US sanctions imposed on it for its dealings with Russia, the Chinese Foreign Ministry confirmed in an official statement that the United States, by demanding that countries stop purchasing Russian oil, is participating in threatening and undermining international trade.  In response to Trump’s threats regarding the purchase of Russian oil, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement that “China will take decisive countermeasures if its legitimate rights and interests are harmed, and that China opposes the United States using Beijing as a pretext to impose illegal unilateral sanctions on the Russian side.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry also stressed that “China has lodged a protest with Britain regarding the inclusion of Chinese companies on the sanctions list against Russia. Cooperation between Russian and Chinese companies should not be subject to interference or influence.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry also commented on the British sanctions imposed on it for allegedly dealing with Russian companies and entities, saying that “Beijing will take necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests.”

 China has categorically rejected all unilateral US sanctions against it, and the punitive tariffs imposed by Trump have angered Beijing. However, unlike Europe or other countries, China has shown confidence, with official Chinese authorities declaring that “it will fight to the end.” An official statement issued by China on October 13, 2025, stated that “threatening to impose high tariffs is not the right way to negotiate with China. The United States must adjust its position.” Beijing has already responded by imposing counter-tariffs and restrictions on US exports, including rare earths.

 As for the nature of the sanctions directed against Russia in 2025, these new US sanctions focus on indirectly strangling the Russian economy by pressuring countries and companies that deal with Moscow in strategic sectors such as energy, metals, and technology. In July 2025, US President Donald Trump announced a 50-day deadline for reaching a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine; otherwise, tariffs of up to 100% would be imposed on countries importing Russian oil or gas. Meanwhile, the US Congress is discussing a bill that would impose tariffs of up to 500% on Russian exports, including secondary sanctions on financing or transporting entities.  Trump warned that all companies dealing with Russia, especially Chinese companies, entities, and institutions, particularly those operating in the technology and metals sectors, could be barred from entering the US market or using the international financial system.

  Finally, regarding the impact of these unilateral US sanctions on China and other countries for allegedly dealing with Russian companies, I believe these US threats will not go unchallenged, as they could undermine confidence in the global economic system and raise questions about who has the right to punish whom and under what international legitimacy? Applying this to Russia, we find that Moscow is linked to extensive trade networks with major economies in strategic sectors such as energy, minerals, and food. These Russian entanglements with global economies make attempts to isolate Moscow a test not only of Washington’s ability but also of the ability of the entire global system to bear the cost of confrontation.

Pakistan’s diplomatic playbook for 2025 is shifting noticeably toward trade, sustainability, and the projection of soft power. Gone are the days when foreign policy revolved solely around security concerns or aid dependency. The country’s recent economic and diplomatic maneuvers suggest a clear intent to rebrand itself as a credible, reform-driven partner focused on growth, responsibility, and engagement. From seafood export approvals by the US to partnerships with France and major development financing commitments, Pakistan’s narrative is evolving, and for once, it’s a story of initiative rather than reaction.

The US government’s decision to extend Pakistan’s seafood export approval until 2029 is a quiet but significant achievement. The deal, worth roughly $600 million annually, underscores two critical things: the growing confidence in Pakistan’s sustainability standards and the country’s ability to meet global compliance norms. For years, Pakistani exporters have faced barriers due to outdated infrastructure and quality control issues. Now, improved regulations and environmental monitoring seem to be paying off. This approval not only secures a steady stream of revenue but also signals that Pakistani industries are capable of aligning with Western ecological and safety benchmarks, something that can serve as a model for other export sectors.

In a similar spirit, the Punjab government’s recent memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with France mark another leap toward deepening provincial and international trade ties. France’s interest in Pakistan’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) reveals confidence in the country’s industrial potential. For Punjab, the partnership could attract sustainable technologies, investment in renewable energy, and expertise in urban development. It also decentralizes diplomacy, shifting some of the engagement from federal corridors to proactive provincial actors, an approach that could make economic cooperation nimbler and more region-specific.

At the macro level, multilateral institutions are showing renewed faith in Pakistan’s economic reforms. The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) have jointly pledged a staggering $40 billion for development and private sector growth. This isn’t charity; it’s a bet on Pakistan’s capacity to absorb and utilize global capital effectively. The World Bank’s concessional loans, particularly targeting education and climate resilience, fit neatly into Pakistan’s national development goals. Meanwhile, the IFC’s $20 billion allocation to the private sector and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) speaks to an evolving understanding that long-term economic health depends on entrepreneurial vitality rather than government-led expansion alone.

Domestically, the banking sector is mirroring this new wave of confidence. The Bank of Punjab, for instance, has reported record profits, reflecting a resilient financial system despite broader global headwinds. A profitable and stable banking environment is a prerequisite for sustained trade diplomacy; it assures foreign investors that local institutions are capable of managing large inflows and transactions transparently. When financial institutions thrive alongside industrial and export sectors, it sends a reassuring message to international partners that Pakistan’s growth is not a temporary surge but a maturing cycle.

But economic diplomacy alone doesn’t build soft power. What sets Pakistan’s recent approach apart is the coupling of trade initiatives with cultural and environmental diplomacy. The government’s efforts to promote interfaith harmony, expand cultural exchanges, and invest in green infrastructure reflect a broader understanding of influence in the modern era. Soft power, after all, isn’t about dominance; it’s about attraction. Pakistan’s reforestation programs, ecotourism initiatives, and partnerships in climate resilience not only improve its environmental record but also enhance its moral credibility on the global stage. These projects project a vision of Pakistan as a responsible global citizen, one that contributes to shared planetary goals rather than merely negotiating for its own interests.

Tourism, too, plays a key role in this narrative. The revival of heritage sites, promotion of religious tourism for Sikh and Buddhist pilgrims, and international film collaborations are creating a gentler, more relatable image of Pakistan abroad. These cultural bridges complement trade diplomacy by humanizing the country in the eyes of investors and tourists alike. They help replace outdated stereotypes with more nuanced perceptions of a nation that’s young, creative, and striving for balance between tradition and modernity.

This pivot toward soft power and trade diplomacy is not accidental; it’s strategic. Pakistan seems to recognize that credibility in global markets depends not just on economic incentives but on the consistency of reform and image. The focus on sustainability and governance reforms aims to reduce dependency on loans and shift toward mutually beneficial trade partnerships. In doing so, Pakistan positions itself not as a passive recipient of aid but as a contributor to global growth.

Critically, these moves also reflect a certain self-awareness. The emphasis on sustainability, whether in fisheries, industry, or climate policy, acknowledges that the old model of extractive growth is no longer viable. Similarly, engaging institutions like the World Bank and IFC shows that Pakistan understands the importance of credibility and transparency in attracting international capital. Trade diplomacy, when backed by responsible domestic governance and inclusive growth, becomes more than an economic tactic; it turns into a long-term strategy for stability and respect.

That said, this strategy will need to be carefully managed. The challenge isn’t just to secure deals but to ensure they deliver equitable benefits. For instance, trade approvals and foreign investments must be accompanied by support for small exporters, labor reforms, and environmental safeguards. Otherwise, the benefits will stay concentrated among elites, undermining the very soft power Pakistan seeks to build. Likewise, diplomatic capital must not be squandered on short-term optics or domestic political point-scoring. Consistency, patience, and institutional continuity will determine whether this new vision can endure.

In many ways, Pakistan’s 2025 diplomacy embodies a pragmatic realism. It doesn’t reject global partnerships or rely excessively on one bloc. Instead, it seeks balance between East and West, between economic pragmatism and moral purpose. By intertwining trade with culture, sustainability, and finance, the country is sketching the contours of a diplomacy that’s as much about persuasion as negotiation. And in a fragmented world increasingly defined by narratives rather than alliances, that’s a powerful pivot.

Recommendations

·       Establish specialized trade diplomacy desks in embassies to promote sectoral exports, green investment, and SME partnerships.

·       Strengthen provincial economic offices abroad to attract investors in key sectors like textiles, agri-tech, and renewable energy.

·       Implement domestic policies for export diversification and improve digital trade facilitation to empower smaller producers.

·       Expand cultural diplomacy programs, including art, film, sports, and education exchanges, to enhance people-to-people connections and global goodwill.

·       Ensure policy consistency and transparency across all levels of government to solidify Pakistan’s reputation as a credible, reform-driven partner in global trade and diplomacy.