opinion

In an era where nearly all activity has shifted to the digital space, terrorism has also evolved. Terrorists no longer need territory to establish training camps, ideological teachers, or secret meetings in the middle of the night. All they need now is an internet connection, a social media account, and closed, hard-to-trace chat rooms. This is the new face of terrorism: invisible, borderless, and infiltrating our daily lives through the small screens in our hands. This phenomenon creates a threat that is far more difficult to address than the conventional forms of terrorism that have historically been the primary focus of states.

This transformation of terrorism is no longer an academic prediction, but it is already happening. ISIS is the most obvious example. When its physical territory collapsed in 2019, analysts expected the group to slowly fade away. In fact, they have emerged even more dangerously through the digital world. By utilizing social media, Telegram, dark forums, and professionally polished propaganda videos, ISIS has succeeded in establishing a “virtual caliphate” with followers spread across the globe. In Indonesia, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) even noted that the majority of radicalization of terrorists over the past decade has occurred online. This means that violent narratives are now spreading faster than the state can control them.

This phenomenon raises a far more serious problem: terrorism no longer takes the form of large groups easily targeted by security forces but rather individuals or small groups inspired online. This is known as lone wolf terrorism. Many perpetrators have never met their network leaders, never entered a training cell, or even left their homes. They learn to make bombs through anonymous PDFs, discuss discussions in encrypted groups, and gain legitimacy through calls to digital jihad. The most obvious examples come from lone wolf attacks in Europe and America, including those radicalized simply by watching YouTube videos or following propaganda accounts on social media.

Indonesia is no exception. The 2021 suicide bombing at Makassar Cathedral Church is one of the most prominent examples of how digital radicalization works. The perpetrators were known to actively consume extremist content online and interact in groups affiliated with Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). They never underwent organized physical training. The entire recruitment process, indoctrination, and even action direction were conducted digitally. This is a new form of terrorism that is much more difficult to map, spreads much faster, and is far more dangerous.

Even more worrying, technological advances such as artificial intelligence (AI) are giving terrorists new tools that never existed before. Deepfakes, for example, allow someone to create videos of religious figures calling for jihad that appear “authentic.” AI-based disinformation can also amplify conspiracy theories and encourage easily triggered individuals to commit violence. Cybersecurity experts have even warned that in the next few years, AI-based terrorism could produce forms of attack never imagined in previous eras, including automated attack scripts, measured psychological manipulation, and personalized propaganda—something impossible to do manually.

The problem is, state strategies both in Indonesia and many other countries are still lagging behind. Our counterterrorism policies still focus on physical threats: arrests, network dismantling, weapons confiscation, and headquarters raids. These are certainly important, but not enough. States often fail to understand that today’s radicalization doesn’t occur in small mosques or secret training camps but rather through social media algorithms that unwittingly push extremist content to vulnerable users. Digital regulation has also moved much slower than the technological innovations exploited by extremist groups.

State weakness is also evident in the limited ability of law enforcement to track encrypted communications. Apps like Telegram, Discord, and WhatsApp have end-to-end encryption systems that make messages unreadable to third parties. Meanwhile, terrorist groups are quickly shifting their activities to the most difficult platforms to monitor. Without comparable technological capabilities, states will always be left behind. Ironically, the majority of national security budgets are still focused on conventional strategies, even though the greatest threats now emerge from the digital space.

This situation demands a comprehensive change in approach for the state. Anti-terrorism strategies in the digital age must combine security policies with a deep understanding of the technology ecosystem. First, modern cyber surveillance capabilities are needed, not in the sense of violating public privacy, but rather in the sense of enhancing collaboration between governments, social media platforms, and digital service providers. Technology companies like Meta, Google, and TikTok must become strategic partners in efforts to remove extremist content and prevent algorithms from spreading radical material.

Second, the state must strengthen international cooperation. Digital terrorism knows no borders. Attacks in Indonesia could be initiated from Syria, the Southern Philippines, or Europe. Cooperation with Interpol, ASEAN Counter-Terrorism, and other global institutions is crucial for tracking transnational networks that utilize the internet for propaganda and coordination.

Third, deradicalization must also adapt. The old approach, which relied solely on face-to-face counseling, is no longer sufficient. Digital deradicalization through counter-narratives, moderate influencers, and creative content targeting young people is imperative. Extremist narratives must be countered in the same place where they thrive: social media.

Fourth, digital literacy must be part of the national security strategy. Many individuals are exposed to radicalization not because they are ideologically extreme, but because they cannot distinguish credible information from propaganda. Teaching the public to recognize misinformation, conspiracy theories, and radical content is the most fundamental form of defense in this era.

And lastly, the state must raise awareness that terrorism today no longer originates in physical spaces but in the digital spaces we use every day. This threat may be invisible, but its impact is very real. If the state does not immediately update its security strategy and adapt to changes in the digital world, the radicalization of the younger generation will not only be difficult to prevent, it will also continue to increase unnoticed.

Terrorism in the digital age is a new battlefield that no longer relies on guns and bombs but rather on narratives, algorithms, and propaganda that spread in seconds. We have only two choices: adapt or be left behind. Amid rapid technological change, national security can only be assured if the state moves faster than the ever-changing threats. Otherwise, we will continue to be surprised by attacks that actually started long before the perpetrator hit the “upload” button.

The way humans refuse to reflect is most ironic. Everyone immediately blamed the heavens for the events of November 2025, when massive floods swept across Sumatra (Indonesia), submerged southern Thailand, and turned Malaysian roads into rivers. It was as if humans were passive victims swept away by something beyond their control, and rain was the sole factor.  This elegant narrative is perpetuated to shield us from guilt and responsibility, making us reluctant to acknowledge that these ‘natural’ disasters have actually been engineered by human choices and negligence over a long period of time. The greatest tragedy lies in the audacity to ignore the damage we have wrought upon ourselves, not the water falling from the sky.

What happened at the end of November was not just extreme weather. Reuters stated that heavy rains were the main cause of flooding and landslides, which are estimated to have killed at least 129 people in Southeast Asia before and after 25 November 2025.  However, blaming the rain as the sole cause is like blaming a match when your entire house is on fire, even though you were the one who spilled the petrol (Reuters, 2025). The rain is not the problem. Rain is a common climatic event. What is unusual is how vulnerable our countries are to something that should have been anticipated.

For years, Green Theory has reminded us that environmental damage is the result of development and political and economic practices that prioritize growth over sustainability. Theoretically, disasters are political rather than natural occurrences. According to this viewpoint, structural power disparities and policy decisions that favor capital accumulation are the main causes of society’s susceptibility to natural disasters. And what happened in November 2025 shows that current politics prioritizes short-term profits, land exploitation, and dependence on destructive industries over maintaining the ecological balance that enables human life.

For example, flooding in Sumatra is caused by the loss of millions of hectares of forest over the past twenty years. The loss of forests has eliminated the absorption and soil retention systems that previously functioned as a ‘natural brake’ on water flow. FAO data shows that Indonesia’s deforestation rate has been one of the fastest in the world for years and that the damage has not disappeared without a trace (FAO, 2023). When the roots are gone, the soil and water lose their bond. Disaster becomes inevitable when the rains fall.

The same pattern was found in cases in Thailand and Malaysia.  Development that destroyed hillsides, settlements that crept up into landslide-prone areas, and concretization that eliminated absorption spaces have made these areas an inevitable ecological hazard. There were no truly ‘sudden’ floods and landslides that struck southern Thailand in the same week reported by AP News (AP News, 2025).  What remained suddenly was our realization that the rain was testing the consequences of years of neglect.

Ironically, politicians, mainstream media, and most of the public are more comfortable blaming the heavens.  Although terms such as ‘extreme rainfall,’ ‘climate anomalies,’ and ‘unpredictable weather’ are meteorologically accurate, they are also ethically and politically misleading. Blaming the weather is an elegant way to avoid more uncomfortable questions: who cut down the forests? Who issued the plantation and mining permits? Who built cities without drainage systems? Who turned a blind eye to disorderly spatial planning? And who chose not to learn from the same tragedies of last year, the year before, and the year before that?

Green Theory emphasizes that states and markets often collaborate to cause environmental/ecological damage while covering up their political activities with stories of ‘unpredictable nature.’ The disaster that occurred in November 2025 provided an important lesson that these stories are not only misleading but also dangerous.  To avoid responsibility, attention is shifted from human actors to an abstract entity called ‘the weather.’ It transforms meteorological chaos into structural chaos.  Thus, the sky becomes the most convenient scapegoat for all parties who benefit from the current situation.

We often forget that rain has been with us throughout human history.  It is not the sky that has changed; rather, it is the earth beneath our feet that has been altered, divided, and sold without consideration for its ecological limits. The IPCC has repeatedly warned that although climate change increases rainfall in certain areas, its effects are highly dependent on land use, ecosystem health, and human-controlled environmental carrying capacity (IPCC, 2023).  In other words, rain may be natural, but its disasters are not.

 According to a UNEP report, modern disaster risk consists of a combination of hazards and vulnerability, and it is vulnerability that is most often created by humans (UNEP, 2022).  We are the ones who cut down forests, destroy riverbanks, and build cities without considering hydrological logic. We are responsible for turning floodplains into residential areas.  Yet we blame the rain for being the culprit simply because the water returns to its source.

This is why November 2025 is not just a date of disaster; it is a date of remembrance. A reminder that we live in an age where environmental damage is caused by human activity, not the weather. A reminder that contemporary disasters are the result of poor decisions.  And our hands will remain clean in the story we write as long as we continue to point to the sky, but the ground beneath us will continue to crumble.

 If we want to break out of this cycle, we must stop pointing to the sky and start dismantling the political, economic, and vested interests that make communities vulnerable every time it rains. Disasters must be seen as a reflection of failed environmental governance, not as ‘inevitable’ natural events. This necessitates the establishment of political accountability mechanisms for officials who disregard ecological warnings, independent environmental audits for significant projects, and strict spatial planning reform. We must also understand that change will not come from the heavens; it must come from the very people who have been destroying, if they are finally willing to reform themselves.

The rain will continue to be blamed until that day.  And humans will continue to try to save their own reputations by pointing upwards so that they do not see the damage happening beneath their feet.  However, the sky is never to blame, as will be clearly recorded in history.  The rain simply falls.  It is humans who cause the destruction.  This is the greatest irony of modern civilization: the more power humans feel they have, the more they enjoy washing their hands of the consequences of that power. Humans who destroy mountains for quick profits from mining, build cities without adequate drainage, and pour concrete into rivers, and then feign surprise when everything comes back to haunt them. Rain is merely the trigger; humans prepare the ingredients for the explosion.

It is not the weather that must change, but our morals.  No technical mitigation can replace a political culture that continues to trade forests for capital, mortgaging the future for growth charts, or romanticizing ‘development’ that never produces anything but risk.  We can keep praying for favorable weather, but those prayers will only echo in the void as long as the Earth is treated as a victim.  Because we are the ones who need to live on Earth.  Earth is the source of our life.  And as long as people continue to deny that, disasters will become timely consequences, not mere warnings.

The Houthi attack on merchant ships in the Red Sea shows that asymmetric strategies have become one of the most disruptive forces in international security, often more effective than conventional state military power. The operations of these non-state groups not only disrupt global trade routes but also expose fundamental weaknesses in the international maritime security architecture. This phenomenon marks a major shift in the character of modern conflict: war is no longer the monopoly of states, and non-state actors are now capable of altering global strategic calculations at a much lower cost. This article argues that the Houthi operations reflect the failure of the traditional security paradigm and underscore the urgency of understanding irregular threats as a determining factor in contemporary geopolitical dynamics.

The Houthis’ success is rooted in the use of asymmetric strategies that combine low cost, high flexibility, and significant strategic impact. Unlike 20th-century insurgencies that relied on guerrilla tactics, the Houthis have increased the scale of the threat by utilizing kamikaze drones, ballistic missiles, and inexpensive surveillance systems. They direct these low-cost weapons at commercial vessels worth billions of dollars. When a single drone damages or threatens a merchant ship, dozens of global companies are forced to reroute, increase logistics costs, and face widespread economic risks. Asymmetric strategies work by avoiding the opponent’s main strengths and attacking points that render those strengths irrelevant. This is what is happening in the Red Sea: the superiority of modern warships is useless when the threat comes from small drones that are difficult to track and cheap to replace (Baylis and Wirtz, 2016).

The limitations of the navies of major countries in responding to these attacks highlight problems in traditional defense doctrine. The United States and Britain have deployed advanced combat fleets, but Houthi attacks continue and hit strategic targets. Major powers designed defense systems to deal with interstate threats, not irregular attacks from irregular actors who have no diplomatic obligations and do not submit to international norms. Modern insurgencies thrive by exploiting institutional gaps and the unpreparedness of states to respond to rapidly changing conflict dynamics. The Houthis are a case in point: they operate in a grey area that is not accounted for in conventional defense frameworks (Kilcullen, 2009).

The Houthis’ strategic strength stems not only from their military capabilities but also from their ability to exploit global economic interdependence. The Suez–Red Sea route is one of the world’s logistics hubs. When this region is disrupted, the consequences immediately affect the global energy market, European and Asian supply chains, and logistics costs for almost all sectors of international trade. Houthi attacks, although physically limited, have a huge psychological effect. When an attack occurs, dozens of international companies immediately review their navigation routes. This fear has a much greater economic impact than the physical damage to the ships that are targeted. In a strategic context, the Houthis have understood that creating uncertainty is a very cheap and very effective strategic weapon.

Moreover, Houthi operations are not merely military actions but part of broader geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East. They function as non-state actors and instruments in regional competition, particularly between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. With technological and logistical support from patron states such as Iran, the Houthis play a role in a larger regional strategy. This blurs the line between state and non-state actor strategies. Attacks on merchant ships are an effective way to put pressure on major countries without the political risks that usually accompany direct military action.

The involvement of non-state actors in the architecture of modern conflict reveals that the conventional concept of international security is no longer adequate. The doctrine of global maritime security was designed on the assumption that the main threat comes from rival states. However, the greatest threats today come from groups that do not have official navies, do not hold sovereign territory, and are not accountable to the international community. While states remain fixated on traditional threats, groups such as the Houthis are able to move quickly, flexibly, and effectively, exploiting every available opportunity. This is why international stability is increasingly vulnerable, even as the military power of major states continues to advance technologically.

The Red Sea crisis highlights the need for a major paradigm shift in global security strategy. Countries can no longer rely on interstate deterrence as the main pillar. A new model is needed that combines counter-drones, supply chain security, regional diplomacy, and conflict stabilization policies on land. Without a multidimensional approach, countries will continue to be stuck in short-term reactions rather than long-term strategies.

Ultimately, the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are not merely a disruption to international trade but a warning that the global security order is undergoing a fundamental repositioning. The arguments in this paper show that asymmetric strategies have eroded state dominance and revealed the unpreparedness of international security structures to deal with irregular threats. If states fail to update their paradigms, the future of global stability will increasingly be determined by actors who have no international obligations, are not subject to the norms of war, and are able to maximize their power at minimal cost. The world is entering a new era of strategy, and the Red Sea is proof that state dominance is no longer the mainstay of contemporary warfare.

Amid heightened Japan-China tensions, US President Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Chinese President Xi Jinping. While Trump termed it a positive development, stating he would visit China in April 2026, China claimed that it categorically made it clear that “Taiwan’s return to China was an ‘integral part of the postwar international order.” While it has been reported that Trump requested a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, the details of the conversation between the two haven’t been made public yet.

Trump’s claim of “extremely strong” US-China relations has once again seized global attention. Earlier, last month, just ahead of his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Busan, South Korea, Trump boldly announced on Truth Social, “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!”

Unsurprisingly, the statement sparked widespread discussion, directly invoking China and seemingly reviving the long-dormant G2 concept, an idea previously floated by former President Barack Obama.

This apparent attempt to resurrect the “G2” notion, which envisions shared global leadership between the US and China, marks a notable rhetorical shift and is surprising given that Trump has been hawkish on China even during his first term as the president. By invoking it, Washington has brought back a concept dismissed as a faulty trade-off, given the persistent and often adversarial nature of US-China relations. Media analyses suggest that this move reflects a growing recognition within the US of China’s rising power and an uneasy acknowledgement of its near-equal status on the world stage. The renewed attention signals an implicit acceptance within American policy circles of China’s expanding international influence and the shifting balance of global power.

For China, however, the idea holds little appeal. First, China continues to present itself as a developing country, aspiring to lead the Global South and, eventually, to achieve broader global influence. Unlike the West, China sees strategic value in retaining the support of developing nations to bolster its legitimacy. While it aims to surpass the US militarily, economically, and technologically, it is unlikely to embrace a bilateral framework implying formalized co-governance of the world. Second, the ideological, strategic, and global ambitions gap between China and the US remains vast, limiting the feasibility of any institutionalized G2 arrangement. Third, if such a framework were ever to exist, it would likely involve broader coalitions of nations with differing ideologies, capacities, and priorities, rather than a US-China duopoly. In this light, the G2 concept appears even less plausible for China in 2025 than it did in the 2000s.

While much commentary has focused on how this discourse may be interpreted in China, the implications extend far beyond the bilateral relationship. Washington’s allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific are closely observing these developments. For many in the region, stability in US-China relations is desirable, as it would help mitigate the risks of confrontation, economic disruption, regional instability, and global upheavals. Yet Trump’s rhetoric has also generated unease among America’s regional partners regarding Washington’s long-term strategic intentions.

Concerns are growing that a return to the G2 framework could signal a weakening of US commitment to the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of security and regional order. While sustained engagement with China is widely accepted as necessary, framing the relationship as one of shared global governance may alarm America’s allies and partners, especially the Quad countries, the Philippines, and Taiwan. For these countries, any suggestion of a US-China condominium raises doubts about the credibility of the US’s status as a security guarantor and its assurances of collective defense and regional stability.

From the US perspective, reviving the G2 discourse may appear advantageous to smooth the way for a rare earth materials deal with China or to ease bilateral tensions. But fundamental differences and rivalry cannot be erased: China’s ultimate goal is to overtake the US. In all likelihood, China will view G2 rhetoric skeptically, interpreting it as a sign of US weakness and declining influence in the Indo-Pacific.

The Xi-Trump phone call and China’s reiteration of the Taiwan claim put pressure on Trump’s G2 plan. How Trump would manage ties with Japan and Taiwan while building relations with China is an issue worthy of international attention.

Trump’s episodic and erratic approach to China and the region risks eroding the trust the US has painstakingly built with its partners. There is little chance that countries such as India, Japan, or the Philippines would accept a bipolar world dominated solely by the US and China. Rather than serving as a stabilizer, the G2 concept is more likely to be seen as an attempt to divide the world into two poles once again, or worse, as a signal that the US is content with a bipolar world rather than a genuinely multipolar order.

Even if the G2 never materializes, the rhetoric has already strengthened China’s position while placing the US in a strategic bind. In effect, it is a win-win for China but a lose-lose for America. There are limitations to America First not only for the region but also for America itself and its foreign policy. The Trump administration’s path would do well to seriously consider the perspectives of its allies and partners, rather than advancing a strategy that ultimately benefits China.

Strictly Come Dancing 2025 is flying by, and another star will be shown leaving the BBC series on Sunday night, filmed on Saturday, but the leak has already revealed who left

Another star has left Strictly Come Dancing 2025, and the result has left fans “absolutely devastated”.

While the result has not been confirmed by the BBC and doesn’t air until Sunday night, as per usual a leak has given the game away. With the results show filmed on the Saturday night after the live show, each week the booted off celebrity gets revealed online hours before the BBC announce it.

This week is no different, and the Strictly mole has revealed all – with the result dividing fans. As usual, Mirror has chosen not to state the name given, but fans have reacted to the supposed result online.

Taking to social media fans confessed they were “absolutely devastated” and some didn’t see it coming. Others even went as far as to say they wanted a second opinion, while some were “not surprised”.

One fan said: “Holy – that I was NOT expecting. absolutely the correct decision though.” Another said: “I can’t believe it!!!!! I’m absolutely devastated.”

READ MORE: Strictly Come Dancing RECAP: Instant Dance causes chaos as fans fear for one starREAD MORE: New Strictly Come Dancing host ‘revealed’ as top presenter seen on set

A third fan said: “I am gutted with this elimination,” while one fan said: “Not the biggest surprise after this evening’s show, but overall they have been lovely to watch.” Another added: “Absolutely the right decision.”

One fan didn’t believe it to the point they wanted a “second opinion”. “I’m sorry, I want a second opinion here. I don’t believe for one minute they would save the person in question between those two,” they claimed.

It comes a week on from La Voix leaving the show due to an injury. Initially only missing out on one week, the drag artist sadly had to quit the show altogether meaning an elimination was cancelled.

After sustaining a food injury, La Voix and pro dance partner Aljaz had hoped she would recover and continue their Strictly journey, but sadly this was not to be. She broke down in tears as she spoke out about her sudden exit.

The star said: “This has been the most extraordinary experience of my entire life. What I loved most, don’t hate me, it’s not the dancing but it’s just being welcomed by everyone.

“I came into the show as a minority, as a redhead, and you’ve embraced me wonderfully. I cannot thank you enough, it’s been amazing.” La Voix added: “I’m just so lucky. What you see on that dancefloor is a fraction of the love and the passion this man has for dance.

“You have made me carry on when I’ve questioned myself, made me laugh on the toughest day and when I thought I couldn’t do something, you never gave up on me. Not once. I am leaving this show more confident, and that’s because of you.”

Meanwhile, fans were left fearing fellow celebrity contestant Alex Kingston would be next to withdraw, after an injury. After claims she had sustained a rib injury, Alex spoke out to assure fans she was going nowhere, and had no plans to quit the series.

Strictly Come Dancing continues next Saturday on BBC One. * Follow Mirror Celebs and TV on TikTok , Snapchat , Instagram , Twitter , Facebook , YouTube and Threads .

Introduction: The Ambition at the Crossroads

Mexico currently faces an unparalleled economic juncture. Global geopolitical dynamics, driven by nearshoring and the imperative to diversify supply chains, have positioned the country for a development opportunity that far exceeds simple assembly manufacturing. The potential to build high-value ecosystems in artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor fabrication—the foundational pillars of the modern global economy—could fundamentally redefine Mexico’s standing in international trade.

But, this critical ambition is currently being stalled by a single, deeply rooted structural factor in the national infrastructure: the capacity, quality, and, above all, the reliability of the National Transmission Grid (RNT) operated by the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). The power grid, therefore, is not merely an operational prerequisite; it has transformed into the primary strategic constraint jeopardizing Mexico’s technological sovereignty and its potential qualitative economic leap.

I. The Tensions of Demand: World-Class Requirements

The AI and semiconductor fabrication (FAB) industries impose energy demands that Mexico’s legacy infrastructure is struggling to meet. These sectors not only consume power on a massive scale but also require it with a precision and resilience that approaches technical perfection.

A. The Exponentials of AI and Data Centers

The core engine of AI is the data center. These facilities, especially those dedicated to training massive models using Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), require a constant power flow comparable to that of entire cities. Large hyperscale data centers can demand between 100 MW and 300 MW of installed capacity, and the aggregate demand from this sector in Mexico is projected to multiply tenfold in the near future.

This demand possesses one non-negotiable quality: 24/7 availability. AI operations cannot tolerate interruptions. A micro-power cut is more than just an economic loss; it represents the possibility of compromising the integrity of critical data or nullifying the progress of computation processes that have required weeks of execution—an unviable vulnerability for the industry.

B. The Precision Mandate of Semiconductors

Semiconductor manufacturing plants are arguably the industrial environments most sensitive to power quality. In the fabrication of microchips, where tolerances are measured in nanometers, a micro-unit of voltage fluctuation or an interruption lasting mere milliseconds can prove catastrophic. Such an event can instantaneously ruin entire batches of silicon wafers valued in the millions of dollars.

Therefore, the key to attracting advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities (FABs, typically requiring between 50 MW and 150 MW each) does not lie solely in guaranteeing the volume of energy but in certifying a power quality that the CFE, given constraints in transmission and distribution, struggles to consistently assure within the most desirable industrial hubs. The promise of availability must, by necessity, be a world-class guarantee.

II. The CFE Infrastructure: From Support to Barrier

The National Electric System (SEN) operates under a structural pressure that positions it as the decisive bottleneck. This barrier manifests across three critical dimensions that undermine the confidence of high-technology investors.

A. Saturation of Transmission and Distribution

Mexico’s fundamental problem is not a lack of total generation capacity but the systemic inability to move that power efficiently, a responsibility that falls squarely on the RNT. This infrastructure, much of which is aging or designed for industrial patterns of a past century, has simply failed to evolve at the pace required by nearshoring.

The consequence is severe congestion in substations and distribution lines, particularly in the vital industrial corridors of the north and center (such as Nuevo León, Coahuila, and the Bajío region). This congestion translates into something tangible and costly: industrial park developers face wait times exceeding a year just to obtain connection feasibility. This delay has led to a troubling phenomenon: the proliferation of “Dark Buildings”—industrial warehouses completely finished and ready for operation but lacking physical access to electrical power.

B. Reliability, Risk, and the Unacceptable Interruption

Recent waves of blackouts and recurrent service interruptions demonstrate that the SEN is consistently operating at its operational limit. Obsolescence in the generation fleet and deficiencies in transmission elevate the risk of system failures.

For any corporation managing mission-critical computing processes or high-value production lines like FABs, this level of risk is unacceptable. A multi-billion-dollar investment cannot depend on a grid that offers systemic uncertainty. Compounding this is regulatory volatility, where the perceived prioritization of fossil fuel generation over renewable energy dissuades global investors who seek clarity, stable long-term pricing, and a predictable framework for operation.

C. The Sustainability Imperative (ESG Factor)

Leaders in the technology industry (from Google and Amazon to major chip manufacturers) have adopted rigorous corporate commitments regarding sustainability and governance (ESG), including net-zero carbon goals or the use of 100% clean energy.

To establish AI or semiconductor operations in Mexico, these investors require contractual guarantees that a substantial portion of their consumption will be sourced from renewables. The difficulty imposed on the interconnection of private wind or solar energy projects to the RNT, coupled with the CFE’s reliance on generation based on natural gas and fuel oil, creates a sustainability impediment that automatically excludes Mexico from the list of viable destinations for many of these investments.

III. The Strategic Cost: Sovereignty and Dependency

If the electric infrastructure issue is not addressed with a decisive, long-term state vision, the cost to Mexico will be dual and profound:

Firstly, it will result in the loss of the value-added nearshoring opportunity. High-demand and high-precision firms will simply divert their investments to markets that offer solid power grids and transparent regulatory frameworks, such as the United States (driven by the CHIPS Act) or established Asian ecosystems.

Secondly, it will perpetuate technological dependence. Without the necessary energy infrastructure to host, power, and train large-scale AI models, and without the capacity to manufacture advanced components, Mexico will be relegated to being merely a consumer and assembler of technologies designed and produced elsewhere. This outcome has a direct, negative impact on national technological sovereignty and the capacity of Mexican research centers to compete at the global frontier of knowledge.

Conclusion: From Bottleneck to Catalyst

The CFE grid represents the single most fundamental challenge to Mexico’s digital ascension. While recent investments in transmission grid modernization signal a positive step, the sheer scale of the challenge necessitates a true paradigm shift that transcends institutional inertia.

To transform this bottleneck into a powerful catalyst, Mexico must execute a strategic course of action centered on efficiency and openness:

Agile Regulatory Reform: It is imperative to simplify procedures and drastically reduce the timelines for connection and feasibility studies for high-demand industrial projects.

Focalized Transmission Investment: The reinforcement of the RNT must be specifically prioritized in the industrial corridors that are the heart of nearshoring and the potential base for technological ecosystems.

Facilitating Clean Energy Integration: Creating mechanisms that not only permit but actively promote the interconnection of private renewable energy projects to meet the ESG demand and the volume required by technological leaders.

Deployment of Smart Grids: The massive adoption of AI-based technologies for distribution optimization, loss reduction, and ensuring resilient voltage quality is essential for the mission-critical needs of the AI and semiconductor industries.

Mexico’s technological future hinges upon the resolution of the CFE dilemma. It is the key that, when turned, will either open or definitively close the door to high-technology development.

There is truly no safe place for women when patriarchy is normalized as a culture and violence is silenced as a family matter in their own country. A United Nations (UN) report shows that every 10 minutes, a woman is murdered by her own partner or family member. These facts and figures reflect a structural crisis that is still being ignored by many countries. This issue is no longer just about criminality; rather, it indicates a failure in security governance, a failure of protection policies for women, and ultimately, a state failure to break the cycle of gender-based violence. Viewing this phenomenon, it can be assessed that femicide must be understood as a national and international strategic issue that requires a systemic state response, not just symbolic campaigns like the use of the Purple Profile Picture (PFP) that recently became popular in South Africa. Therefore, the author will highlight an analysis of three arguments, namely the failure of the legal structure, the need for a structured prevention strategy, and the cultural normalization that allows violence against women to persist.

Failure of the Legal Structure Due to Half-Hearted Enforcement

Femicide does not, in fact, occur suddenly without warning signs. Global research has shown a consistent pattern: threats, injuries, social isolation, and even domestic violence reports that are not followed up on. This is further reinforced by the fact that in many cases, the victim had already shown these patterns, but there was no system for cross-sector reporting, and the state only responds after a life has been lost. This is the major loophole that keeps femicide repeating in the same pattern. This crisis reflects the weakness and failure of a country’s law that cannot serve as a shield of protection for its citizens, especially women. In Mexico, for instance, femicide is recognized as a separate category of crime, but weak legal implementation keeps the number of women murdered there persistently high. Slow court proceedings, police lacking gender sensitivity, and a culture of impunity reduce legal protection to mere text without meaningful power.

A similar situation is also felt in South Africa, which is a country notorious for gender-based violence, even holding the highest rate on the continent. Although the country launched the Purple Profile Picture (PFP) Campaign as a symbolic form of solidarity in response to femicide, the use of this symbol cannot replace the urgency of improving the legal system and structure that often fails to save women before it is too late. Without structural reform that prioritizes women’s safety, the law will continue to lag behind the escalating violence. UN data proves that 60% of femicides are committed by someone close to the victim; therefore, law enforcement must be directed not just at punishing perpetrators but at saving women before the risk turns into death.

The Need for Systemic, Not Just Symbolic, Prevention Strategies

The viral campaign in several countries, particularly South Africa, the Purple Profile Picture (PFP), certainly plays a role in building public awareness, and that is important. However, a symbol alone cannot replace the state’s strategies or policies. Therefore, what we need is systemic prevention that works before the victim is murdered, not just solidarity after the tragedy has occurred. This systemic prevention can begin with the provision of integrated public services. The state needs to provide responsive emergency hotlines, safe and adequate shelters, and even 24-hour specialized gender police units operating with high standards of care regarding this issue.

Many femicide cases originate from threats that are ignored by the public and authorities. If initial violence reports were handled decisively and with a risk-based mechanism, the potential for murder could be curtailed. Good examples are seen in several countries, such as Oslo, which has begun using risk-based policing algorithms based on previous police reports. The result is that preventive intervention can be carried out before fatal violence occurs. Furthermore, the education and health systems should also be involved. Teachers, health workers, and social workers need to be trained to recognize the signs of femicide risk, which can then be disseminated for systemic prevention efforts.

The Still-Rooted Normalization of Patriarchal Culture

However, regardless of the forms of systemic prevention that can be implemented as mentioned above, no policy will be effective if the source of the problem remains entrenched. That root is the culture that still places women as the party who must accept, bear the blame, remain silent for the family’s sake, or forgive violence that is considered “normal.” This is the main structural root that makes femicide difficult to eradicate. Patriarchy works not only through institutions but also through social norms that regulate daily behavior, such as who is allowed to speak, who is trusted, and who is considered worthy of being saved.

In Indonesian society itself, pressure from family to “save face” often makes it difficult for women to leave dangerous relationships. In South Africa, the legacy of violence, economic inequality, and aggressive masculinity norms play a major role in the high rate of women’s murder. Meanwhile, Mexico faces a deeply rooted culture of “machismo,” complicating efforts to change social norms. When violence is considered a private matter, the state loses the social legitimacy to intervene.

Considering this crucial situation, cultural change cannot be achieved with short-term campaigns. It requires knowledge and awareness about gender from an early age, the involvement of men in anti-violence movements, and the state’s courage to push for curricula and public policies that challenge harmful patriarchal norms. The state must participate in grassroots communities, such as through women’s organizations, local advocacy institutions, and community groups, because cultural change can only happen if the community becomes the agent of change itself.

The three arguments above show that femicide is a structural failure rooted in a weak legal system, minimal systemic prevention, and the cultural normalization of patriarchy that allows violence against women to be considered commonplace. When a state chooses to respond to violence with symbolism without a tangible strategy, women’s lives will continue to be victims. If one woman is still being murdered every 10 minutes, the world is not yet safe for women, and the state has not fulfilled its obligation to ensure the security of its citizens, especially women. Femicide is not a calamity but a strategic failure that can and must be stopped. The state can only save women if it dares to move beyond visual campaigns towards firm policies, a strong prevention system, and sustainable cultural transformation. Women must no longer die in silence while the state merely watches from afar.

ASEAN is attempting to secure a foothold in the global semiconductor and electric-vehicle battery industries. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have each announced concrete industrial commitments that signal an ambition to move deeper into high-value manufacturing. These efforts carry strategic implications because semiconductors, power electronics, and batteries are essential inputs for artificial intelligence, renewable energy systems, and modern defense industries. The region now faces a growing set of geopolitical and engineering pressures that directly affect planned projects, cost structures, and national industrial strategies.

This piece documents the most significant national developments in 2024 and 2025, outlines precise vulnerabilities, and provides realistic mitigation measures for decision makers.

Strategic Context

In October 2025 China announced additional controls on rare-earth exports and related processing technologies. This decision briefly tightened the market for rare earth magnets and separated oxides that are crucial for EV motors and semiconductor equipment. Although Beijing later delayed parts of the policy’s implementation, the message was clear. Critical inputs can be restricted with little warning.

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have continued to adjust export controls on chip-making equipment. Any further tightening directly affects the cost and feasibility of new packaging and test facilities across ASEAN. The strategic environment surrounding high technology has therefore become volatile and has placed pressure on firms hoping to expand into advanced electronics production.

Malaysia: Penang’s Advanced Packaging Ambitions

Malaysia is pursuing one of the most aggressive semiconductor upgrade strategies in Southeast Asia. Penang’s “Silicon Island” project and the new Green Tech Park represent a deliberate shift from assembly to higher-value packaging and design. Approved semiconductor-related investments reportedly exceeded RM 70 billion between January 2024 and June 2025. Investments include Infineon’s silicon carbide expansion and Carsem’s advanced packaging facilities for AI-related chips.

Advanced packaging and testing lines in Malaysia’s semiconductor clusters still depend on specialized lithography subsystems, ultra-high-purity precursor chemicals, and precision metrology equipment. These imports are increasingly vulnerable because Malaysia’s new export-control regime now requires notifications for high-performance AI chips and equipment, creating possible bottlenecks and compliance burdens. For example, Malaysia’s July 2025 directive made exporters notify authorities at least 30 days in advance when shipping U.S.-origin high-performance AI chips, signaling that regulatory headwinds may also apply upstream in tool and component supply chains. Without expedited import lanes, delays in receiving critical equipment would postpone factory commissioning in locations such as Penang, driving up capital costs through extended financing periods.

The Malaysian government must fast-track customs and import lanes for critical equipment, co-finance spare-parts pools for fabs, and invest in infrastructure near semiconductor clusters such as high-quality water, power reliability, and waste treatment. In parallel, public-private training centers should train large numbers of precision-manufacturing engineers.

Indonesia: Nickel Dominance and Downstream Battery Production

Indonesia has used its dominant nickel reserves to pull in major EV battery investments. The flagship project is the nearly USD 6 billion joint venture between Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. (CATL) and Indonesia Battery Corporation in West Java. According to a June 2025 Reuters report, the facility is scheduled to begin operations by late 2026 with a starting capacity of 6.9 GWh, with an expansion path toward 15 GWh or more. This scale demonstrates Indonesia’s ambition to anchor the region’s battery ecosystem, but it also highlights the limits of upstream advantage.

Despite controlling the raw material, Indonesia’s battery value chain is not yet integrated. The CATL–IBC project will still depend heavily on imported precursor chemicals, cathode active materials, and high-precision manufacturing equipment. Reuters noted that while Indonesia has rapidly expanded nickel processing, the country has not built the full suite of midstream capabilities required for stable cell production. Critical reagents and machinery remain tied to suppliers in China, South Korea, and Japan.

This dependency introduces substantial strategic risk. A February 2025 C4ADS report found that Chinese companies control roughly 75 percent of Indonesia’s nickel-refining capacity. That concentration means that although production occurs on Indonesian soil, operational control, technology flows, and strategic decisions often originate in external corporate or policy environments. Any shift in Chinese domestic policy, export priorities, or commercial strategy could ripple through Indonesia’s downstream battery plans and disrupt cell production timelines.

Given these vulnerabilities, Indonesia must accelerate the development of domestic precursor and cathode material facilities to reduce exposure to foreign suppliers. Battery-plant construction should also be sequenced with upgrades to grid capacity, wastewater management, and environmental controls, since these engineering systems remain bottlenecks in several industrial zones. Finally, manufacturers should design production lines with modularity so they can switch battery chemistries if global markets or reagent availability changes.

Thailand: Converting an Automotive Giant into an EV Hub

Thailand is moving quickly to convert its dominant automotive industry into an electric-vehicle hub. The Board of Investment’s EV 3.5 package, announced in 2025, offers tax incentives, consumer subsidies, and import-duty relief through 2027 for manufacturers that commit to local production. This policy has already shifted investment patterns. BYD opened a USD 490 million plant in Rayong in mid-2025 with capacity for 150,000 EVs annually, marking one of the largest EV manufacturing commitments in Southeast Asia. Domestic EV registrations also surged to roughly 70,000 units in 2024, up from fewer than 10,000 in 2021.

Despite these gains, Thailand’s EV ecosystem remains dependent on imported battery cells, semiconductor components, and rare-earth magnets. ASEAN Briefing’s September 2025 assessment found that Thailand still lacks mid-stream capabilities such as cathode production, electrolyte processing, and advanced battery-testing facilities. This dependence exposes the sector to the same vulnerabilities faced by regional semiconductor clusters.

These components also move through logistics systems designed for traditional automotive supply chains. Laem Chabang Port remains optimized for bulk auto parts rather than high-value lithium-ion cells. EV assemblers reported delays in 2025 due to congestion and manual customs checks on sensitive components during peak export periods. Even minor slowdowns disrupt just-in-time assembly and raise operational costs.

To protect its emerging EV advantage, Thailand must expand bonded logistics zones for battery components, accelerate port digitization, and cooperate with ASEAN partners to harmonize battery standards. Without these measures, Thailand’s EV ambitions will remain vulnerable to supply-chain friction and regulatory fragmentation.

Regional Risk Map

1. Material-concentration risk. China’s export controls on rare earths and magnets create leverage points. ASEAN must map critical-element dependencies and invest in regional recycling and stockpiles.
2. Equipment-and-technology risk. Restrictive export regimes on chip-making tools raise project execution risk. ASEAN governments should establish pooled spare-parts procurement, trusted procurement corridors, and diplomatic waiver channels.
3. Infrastructure-and-skills risk. All three countries face co-investment requirements in power, water, waste, and vocational training aligned with advanced manufacturing. ASEAN-level funding mechanisms and mutual recognition of professional certifications would reduce friction.

ASEAN stands at a pivotal moment. The opportunities to capture semiconductor back-end, EV battery manufacturing, and higher-value electronics are real. Malaysia’s move into advanced packaging, Indonesia’s downstream battery strategy, and Thailand’s EV pivot are promising. They are also fragile. Each depends on imported tools, materials, and specialized skills that can be disrupted by geopolitical shifts.

The region’s success will depend on how quickly leaders can reduce those vulnerabilities through strategic infrastructure investment, targeted industrial policy, regional standardization, and coordinated risk management. Without these measures, factories across ASEAN will remain profitable in calm markets but exposed during periods of geopolitical tension.

Can a significant and historic presence in Nicaea in commemoration of the 1700th anniversary of the first Ecumenical Council reshape the framework of global Christian dialogue? Pope Leo XIV stands on ground where the first common statement of Christian belief was formed seventeen centuries ago in the context of the first Ecumenical Council. The lake near Nicaea reflects a city marked by long memory. The visit does not seek public spectacle. It seeks depth.

Nicaea holds a rare form of significance. It represents a moment before fragmentation. A point where Christian leaders gathered to agree on the foundations of faith. The Creed shaped in this city became the common reference for churches that later followed separate paths. Modern reporting treats the return to this location as an event that reaches far beyond history.

Catholic analysts describe the entire journey as a platform for structured engagement in regions facing humanitarian risk. Diplomats notice that the visit creates three layers of meaning. The first is theological. The Creed continues to stand as the most stable reference point in the Christian world. It belongs to all. It excludes none. By returning to this shared foundation, the Pope frames dialogue on a level where long-standing differences do not erase the possibility of cooperation. Nicaea becomes neutral ground shaped by memory, not by competition.

The second layer concerns Turkey. The host country receives two ecclesiastical authorities with global reach. This presence allows Ankara to present a profile of stability and controlled engagement. The Turkish state seeks to gain diplomatic value by precisely managing an event of global religious interest. The visit shows that Turkey can provide a calm setting for high-level dialogue. This matters in a region where tensions remain visible and where regional trust is often fragile.

The third layer concerns the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The presence of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Nicaea reflects continuity. The Ecumenical Patriarchate appears as an institution that maintains a steady link to the origins of Christian identity. The visit confirms that this link remains relevant for contemporary diplomacy. The Ecumenical Patriarchate gains space to articulate its role in matters that extend beyond the inner life of the Church. It operates as a voice that connects historical experience with public responsibility.

The papal journey signals a shift in diplomatic rhythm. States often work inside short cycles, shaped by elections, immediate pressures, and shifting alliances. Religious institutions work with longer horizons. Their strength lies in stability and consistent representation. This contrast produces space for initiatives that require patience. Current challenges in Lebanon, instability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the need to support minority communities demand actors who maintain firm positions without rapid fluctuations. A coordinated presence in Nicaea offers such a foundation.

The significance of the visit grows through its simplicity. A prayer beside the lake, a joint statement, and the act of walking together inside the historic city produce a stable message. Cooperation becomes visible without exaggeration. The region gains a moment of calm narrative. Christian communities observe two ancient institutions approaching each other with clarity and restraint. This image contributes to a sense of balance in an environment shaped by uncertainty.

Nicaea becomes a diplomatic space in its own right. It is not an arena of negotiation. It is a site that offers shared memory with no tension. Modern diplomacy often searches for locations that can support conversation without pressure. Nicaea provides this naturally. The city stands outside polarized debates. It holds symbolic value without imposing a political agenda. A papal visit strengthens this character and gives Nicaea renewed relevance in discussions about stability and cooperation.

The effects of this visit may unfold gradually. Joint humanitarian initiatives could gain stronger coordination. Churches may open structured channels for supporting communities under stress in Lebanon, Jordan, and other regions of the Middle East. Dialogue among Christian bodies can develop with greater consistency. States in the Eastern Mediterranean may engage with these institutions in more formal ways. All these possibilities gain substance because the visit gives clear institutional legitimacy to a shared framework.

The return to Nicaea does not promise rapid or dramatic transformation. It shapes a foundation for patient diplomacy. The city provides steady ground in a world where constant crises weaken attention spans. Nicaea speaks through continuity. The visit reminds the international community that institutions with long historical roots can offer stable guidance in periods of instability. This is not nostalgia. It is recognition that durable structures can support fragile societies.

In this sense, Nicaea gains a renewed voice. The city becomes a reference point for future cooperation. The Papal presence demonstrates that sacred geography can still influence public life. The visit marks a shift toward long-range planning where values and institutions act together. It suggests that global dialogue benefits from places where memory and responsibility meet without conflict.

Nicaea does not present solutions. It provides a framework where solutions become possible. For contemporary diplomacy, this may be its greatest contribution. A quiet moment becomes a stable foundation. A historic city becomes a modern point of connection. And a visit shaped by restraint becomes a clear signal that cooperation can grow from shared origins, even in a complex and fragmented world.

Japan and China are in their most dangerous diplomatic crisis in years as escalating tensions over Taiwan have cancelled earlier hopes of post-pandemic improvement. After COVID-19 restrictions were mostly lifted by 2023, relations between Beijing and Tokyo seemed to slowly improve. However, by late 2025 a series of disputes especially over the so-called “Taiwan Question” have severely deteriorated into their lowest point in years.

The high-stakes diplomatic visit at the October 2025 APEC summit, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi immediately followed a stable-ties agreement with President Xi Jinping by meeting Taiwanese officials, only escalated tensions.

Escalation Through Diplomatic and Military Incidents

Sanae Takaichi, declared on November 7, 2025 during a cabinet meeting, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify Japan using military force in the area. China quickly reacted. China’s U.N. ambassador Fu Cong accused Japan of violating international law warning the country of its “self-defense”. Raising such an issue all the way to the United Nations is a rare move we don’t often see in global geopolitics.

In mid-November 2025 China’s coast guard sailed through waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (islands which are administered by Japan but claimed by China) on patrol and Japanese Coast Guard vessels sent in response. Japan also sent out fighter jets, and even announced plans to deploy Japanese missiles on Yonaguni island (just 110 km from Taiwan) as a deterring measure.

China also announced travel advisories urging its citizens to avoid Japan, with large numbers of airlines offering ticket refunds. Meanwhile, Japanese officials warned their nationals in China to be cautious amid a rise in hostilities. Chinese authorities abruptly canceled planned concerts by Japanese bands, and state media halted screening of new Japanese films.

The Roots of Tensions: History, the U.S. and Taiwan

The island of Taiwan is an indispensably strategic asset for both countries: for China, Taiwan is the core of its national unity; for Japan the security of a separate and democratic Taiwan is now explicitly seen in Tokyo as linked to Japan’s own defense.

Japan’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan Question, similar to the one upheld by the United States, has been abandoned by P.M. Takaichi. Authorities in Taipei have publicly supported Japan, urging China to show restraint and highlighting how an invasion would draw in allies including Japan and the U.S. .

Invoking Japan’s World War II era atrocities, China claims moral high ground or justify its own territorial aims. For example, Chinese official statements have reminded audiences of Tokyo’s past warcrimes in the region when attacking Japanese policies in the present. Japanese politicians (especially ones from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) have grown hawkish to these types of statements, any incident easily tying into nationalist sentiment on both sides.

Rapidly expanding its defense capabilities the Japanese 2025 Defense White Paper explicitly names China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and commits to raising defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2026. New submarine fleets and the potential deployment of medium-range missiles on islands like Yonaguni, have developed into a broader security problem. This means that any Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan would encircle Japan’s supply lines. Therefore to Japan’s leaders, Taiwan’s fate is inseparable from their own national survival. China in turn, claims an eventual military approach to Taiwan as inevitable by 2027.

Economic Dimensions in East Asia

China and Japan remain among each other’s largest economic partners even amid the confrontation. In 2024 China was still Japan’s second-biggest export market (after the US), with roughly $125 billion of Japanese goods sent there, mainly machinery and automobiles. This has been leveraged as a geopolitical tool. China’s Commerce Ministry now warns that Takaichi’s comments have “fundamentally undermined” the political foundation of economic ties.

After the Fukushima nuclear wastewater release in 2023, China imposed a blanket ban on all Japanese seafood imports. (Japan has pointed out that the UN’s nuclear agency found the discharge safe.) In mid-November 2025 China reinstated these seafood bans.

In another economic sector, Chinese tourists make up about a fourth of all visitors to Japan. Japanese travel agencies organising group tours told Reuters they lost ~80% of their remaining bookings for 2025.

U.S. Security and International Alliance Dynamics

U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass offered guarantees for its ally if China will militarily intervene and The State Department similarly declared its full support for Japan, explicitly opposing any unilateral attempts to alter the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait or East China Sea. U.S. President Donald Trump has so far avoided endorsing Takaichi’s statements, at least publicly.

China often accuses Japan of following the U.S. strategy of containment and have opposed Japan’s involvement in The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its new defense pacts, such as with Australia, and more recently the Philippines. In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia and others aim for neutrality.

Analysts suggest that China unusually strong criticism may reflect a strategic calculation, a hope that Prime Minister Takaichi’s term will be short-lived, just as the short tenures of other post-Abe premiers. For China, such a political victory could be a great geopolitical win in promoting its view on the Taiwan Question.

With information from Reuters, The Diplomat and South China Morning Post.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently announced his intention to pay an official visit to Myanmar. Under other circumstances, this visit might have gone unnoticed, but amid the Myanmar crisis, every visit by a foreign leader to Naypyidaw attracts attention. According to Lukashenko, the trip will be part of a larger international tour that will also include Oman, Algeria, and Kyrgyzstan. The two leaders have already met four times in 2025: during Myanmar President Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Minsk in March, during Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May, during the Eurasian Economic Forum in June, and at the PLA parade in Beijing in September. This is a reciprocal visit intended to strengthen relations between Belarus and Myanmar.

The signing of 18 agreements in various fields is planned, including the mutual waiver of tourist visas, a cooperation agreement between the Myanmar Space Agency and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, an agreement on mutual legal assistance, and so on. Expect Myanmar opposition media to talk about Belarusian educational programs for Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) officers and the supply of Belarusian UAVs. For now, all of this fits the “pariah in arms” pattern: the familiar cooperation of two regimes suffering from sanctions pressure and accused of human rights violations. But could something more lie behind Lukashenko’s visit? And can Myanmar’s military leadership learn lessons from its Belarusian partner’s strategy? Let’s discuss the less obvious aspects of Myanmar-Belarus relations.

Lukashenko as a mediator in Ukraine and… Myanmar?

Lukashenko is often portrayed as a Russian proxy, but in practice, Belarusian politics is quite complex. A charismatic former collective farm director, Lukashenko came to power in the 1994 presidential election. His victory came amid a wave of nostalgia for the USSR that swept Belarusian society, which was facing the costs of establishing a free market: declining production, rising prices, rampant crime, and a profoundly uncertain future. At the time, the relatively young populist boldly criticized the nomenklatura, which the people had grown tired of.

At the same time, Lukashenko clearly declared himself a supporter of integration with Russia and an opponent of Belarusian pro-Western nationalism. He kept his promises: the population became more socially secure, organized crime groups were defeated, and the trend toward forced “Belarus-ization” was halted (most ethnic Belarusians prefer to communicate in Russian in everyday life and are skeptical of the opposition’s calls to switch to Belarusian).

At the same time, Lukashenko has always staunchly defended the independence of the Belarusian state and has sometimes even clashed with Moscow. In the 2000s, high-profile “energy wars” erupted between Minsk and Moscow. In 2006, after the Russian state-owned company Gazprom revoked preferential terms for oil supplies to Belarus, the outraged Belarusian leadership retaliated: it imposed additional duties on the transit of Russian oil and began pumping oil from the pipeline. Moscow was forced to back down.

In 2010, Russia demanded that Lukashenko pay off its natural gas debts, after which Lukashenko reminded Russia of its own debts. A series of anti-Lukashenko propaganda films was shown on Russian television. The conflict was resolved through mutual debt repayment, but Minsk could claim victory by upholding its strategic autonomy in the post-Soviet space. In his campaign against Gazprom, the Belarusian leader stoked anti-oligarchic sentiment in Russia and, as a result, gained popularity among the left-wing opposition. For a long time, dreams of a merger between Russia and Belarus were popular among this group, with Lukashenko being tipped as the president of the union state. Among older Russians nostalgic for the Soviet era, Lukashenko rivaled Putin in approval ratings.

“Multi-vectorism” has become the hallmark of Belarusian foreign policy. Minsk has responded to the growing tensions between Russia and the EU/USA head-on, maintaining contacts with all stakeholders. During the first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2020, Lukashenko ambitiously positioned Belarus as a neutral “Slavic” platform for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. A Belarusian diplomatic triumph was the adoption of agreements in Minsk in 2014-2015, involving not only Russia and Ukraine, but also Germany and France. At the same time, despite his Russophile rhetoric, Lukashenko continued to sell diesel fuel (produced from Russian oil!) to the Ukrainian armed forces.

Lukashenko immersed himself in multi-vector diplomacy and overlooked the changing mood of Belarusian society – people were growing tired of the uncontested leader. Conviction that the 2020 presidential election results had been rigged brought people out onto the streets; mass protests engulfed the country, forcing Lukashenko to make temporary concessions, only to later unleash an avalanche of brutal repression on the protesters.

It was at this time, amid the threat of revolution and moral condemnation from the West, that Minsk decided to move closer to Moscow. However, domestically, Belarusian propaganda, in addition to the standard accusations against the US and EU of supporting the opposition, declared the protests a “Russian oligarchs’ plot to overthrow the legitimate president.” Even in a situation where only Moscow could ensure Lukashenko’s continued power, he preferred to retain the freedom to maneuver in his own interests.

Contacts between Washington and Minsk continue, and Trump’s team appears to be closer to mutual understanding with the Belarusians than with the Russians (the Belarusian president personally meets Americans and invariably ends negotiations with a vodka-fueled feast). At the same time, Belarus’s active diplomacy in the post-Soviet space is noteworthy, where Minsk is particularly friendly with Azerbaijan (despite its clashes with Moscow) and the countries of Central Asia. Beijing is also emphatically lenient in its relations with Lukashenko, who emphasizes that, unlike other former Soviet countries, Belarus has retained a reverence for its communist legacy.

The Belarusian multi-vector model for Naypyidaw

Lukashenko arrives in Naypyitaw at a time when the Myanmar government is desperate for international recognition. It’s hard to say whether the Myanmar generals ever considered using their Belarusian partner as a go-between to establish ties with Trump’s team. However, this approach clearly seems preferable to multi-million dollar investments in American lobbying firms, which have so far yielded no results. A new round of talks on Ukraine involving Belarus will take place in December, and Myanmar could very well use this opportunity to use Lukashenko to generate positive interest in the White House.

Beyond the short-term benefits of friendship with Minsk, Myanmar could learn from Belarus the art of multi-vector foreign policy. The configuration of Russian-Belarusian relations is reminiscent of China-Myanmar relations: both Belarus and Myanmar are “small nations” located within the sphere of influence of their larger neighbors, Russia and China, but at the same time striving for strategic autonomy. Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar, in particular the oil and natural gas pipeline from Yunnan Province to the port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State, designed to provide China with access to the Indian Ocean, can be compared to Russian energy infrastructure in Belarus (the Druzhba pipeline). Minsk can act as a senior mentor to Naypyidaw in defending its energy independence from China.

Stabilizing Myanmar Based on the Belarusian Experience: Pros and Cons

There are vast differences between Myanmar and Belarus – in history, traditions, religion, and ethnic composition. Nevertheless, Naypyidaw could borrow some Belarusian wisdom not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy.

Mass protests in Belarus in 2020 were sparked by obvious vote rigging in favor of Lukashenko. Paradoxically, the 2020 elections in Myanmar were held under the majoritarian system adopted in Belarus and resulted in a constitutional transfer of power in favor of the military due to electoral fraud by the NLD. The political regimes of Myanmar and Belarus have different backgrounds and structures: the populist Lukashenko is more reminiscent of Aung San Suu Kyi, while the Belarusian army lacks independence and is incapable of military coups. But most importantly, Minsk and Naypyidaw are united by common challenges: internal instability fueled from abroad. Significantly, NUG representatives are simultaneously establishing contacts with the Belarusian government-in-exile of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

Lukashenko successfully overcame the critical moments of the 2020-2021 crisis and, at the cost of systematic human rights violations—something he had done before, by the way—defeated the opposition. What’s interesting here is not the moral aspect of the issue, but the regime’s survival strategy. Lukashenko alternately used carrots and sticks, and alongside repression, he recruited media opposition figures. A well-known example is that of radical opponent of the regime Roman Protasevich, who, after his unexpected arrest, found common ground with the regime and became its sincere defender. This demonstrates the potential for the Myanmar government to exploit loyal elements of the former NLD and even members of the NUG and PDF who agreed to cooperate with the regime.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that in a number of respects, the Myanmar regime is more lenient than the Belarusian one: several large-scale amnesties for political crimes were carried out by the “junta” without prior agreements with the United States. Lukashenko released several dozen of his opponents with guarantees that sanctions would be lifted; the Myanmar military has released thousands of far more dangerous convicts, guided not only by political expediency but also by the Buddhist ideal of compassion (there is no contradiction here, as Buddhism underlies realpolitik in Myanmar). This ideal is widely accepted by all Burmese, regardless of their views on current politics. Unlike the Belarusians, who underwent the brainwashing of communist atheism in the 20th century and practically lost their national identity, the Burmese have preserved their traditional culture, religion, and language and are able to resist the dual pressures of the West and China.

Conclusion

Learning from the Belarusian experience, Myanmar’s foreign policy is returning to its usual course. Long before independent Belarus appeared on the world map in 1991, Myanmar had already pursued a multi-vector policy. It is significant that even when relations with China’s Maoist regime deteriorated to the lowest point in the 1960s, due to Beijing’s support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Ne Win’s government refrained from entering into anti-Chinese alliances with the United States or the USSR. This was a far-sighted decision. To a certain extent, modern Belarus could become Myanmar’s equivalent of Yugoslavia during the Cold War: both under U Nu’s democratic system and under Ne Win’s military dictatorship, the neutralist diplomacy of Titoism was admired.

While Republican and Democratic representatives repeat stereotypical misconceptions about Myanmar learned from Burmese exiles, the generals are gradually bringing the country out of isolation. The most important thing for the Myanmar people to remember is that their nation, the heir to ancient Buddhist kingdoms, has never been and never will be in the service of external powers: the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians, or anyone else. Lukashenko’s visit provides an opportunity to creatively develop the potential of Myanmar diplomacy.

In the world’s most fragile states, war is no longer merely a political tragedy, it is an economic opportunity for those positioned to profit. From the mountains of northern Myanmar to the gold fields of Sudan, a common pattern has emerged: when governance collapses, external powers rush in to secure the minerals, metals, and strategic commodities that the global economy demands. These regions become places where human suffering and environmental destruction become collateral for uninterrupted flows of resources. Two cases stand out in late 2025, Myanmar’s rare earth boom, fueled by Chinese demand, and Sudan’s gold boom, powered by the United Arab Emirates, together reveal a disturbing truth about the global marketplace; world’s green and gold transitions are being built atop the ruins of countries trapped in conflict.

Myanmar: The Human Cost of a Resource Rush

In early 2025, a young man named Sian traveled deep into the mountains of Shan State, Myanmar, desperate for work in a country where the formal economy has collapsed and nearly half the population lives on less than two dollars a day. He was lured by rumors of wages unheard of in today’s Myanmar, $1,400 a month at new rare-earth mining sites run by Chinese companies in territory controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the most powerful of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. After hours riding a motorbike through dense forest, he arrived at a mine and was hired for a daily pay of about $21. His job was brutal: drilling boreholes and installing pipes for in-situ leaching, a method that involves pumping acidic solutions directly into mountainsides to dissolve and extract elements like dysprosium and terbium, metals that are vital for electric vehicles, wind turbines, advanced radar systems, and nearly every technology central to the green-energy revolution.

The process leaves behind poisoned rivers, contaminated soil, landslides, respiratory diseases, and entire villages unlivable. Researchers and civil society organizations have documented extensive damage: deforestation, chemically burned waterways, collapsed hillsides, and workers buried in mud after heavy rainfall liquefies the weakened terrain. “The toxic effects of rare-earth mining are devastating,” says political geographer Jasnea Sarma. “These communities endure the harm so that others may benefit.”

Yet the industry is thriving. China has cracked down on domestic rare-earth extraction due to environmental damage, but it has not reduced its demand. As a result, the extraction simply shifted across the border into Myanmar, where environmental regulations are weak, labor is cheap, and local armed groups, desperate for revenue, grant Chinese firms access in exchange for payments or profit-sharing.

Satellite imagery analyzed by Myanmar Witness and the Stimson Center shows hundreds of rare-earth mining sites exploding across Shan State, particularly in areas controlled by the UWSA and other China-aligned ethnic armies. Chinese customs data confirms the trend: between 2017 and 2024, roughly two-thirds of China’s rare-earth imports came from Myanmar. In effect, Myanmar has become the hidden engine of the world’s tech economy and its most toxic dumping ground.

For villagers, this boom is a slow-moving catastrophe. People report respiratory ailments, skin rashes from chemical exposure, and contaminated water sources. The deadliest risks are landslides triggered by aggressive deforestation and chemical injection into the hillsides. A 2024 study of rare-earth mining areas in Kachin State found extreme levels of ammonia, radioactive elements, and dissolved heavy metals in local waterways, conditions researchers describe as “entirely unsuitable for human consumption or agriculture.”

What makes Myanmar particularly vulnerable is not just poverty or geography, but political breakdown. Since the 2021 military coup shattered national governance, armed groups have expanded their autonomy, Chinese companies have expanded their presence, and Myanmar’s natural resources have been strip-mined with almost no oversight. In this vacuum, the global economy finds a steady supply of strategic minerals at the lowest possible cost, while local communities absorb the full environmental and human toll

How the UAE is Cashing In on Sudan’s War

If Myanmar reveals how civil wars feed the green-energy transition, Sudan reveals how they feed the financial one. Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a brutal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Amid mass displacement, ethnic cleansing in Darfur, widespread starvation, and one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, another story has quietly unfolded: the UAE’s deepening role as the central hub for Sudan’s conflict gold.

Sudan is Africa’s third-largest gold producer, and gold has become the lifeblood of the RSF’s war machine. Investigations by the UN, Global Witness, and multiple governments show that the UAE has been the primary destination for Sudanese gold for years, even as the war intensified. Much of this gold is smuggled out of conflict zones in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, which are areas where the RSF maintains control through massacres and forced displacement. Once the gold reaches Dubai, it is refined, laundered through opaque supply chains, and sold into global markets.

The UAE denies wrongdoing, but the pattern is unmistakable. Gold shipments spike when fighting escalates. The RSF’s ability to sustain operations depends heavily on gold revenues. And the UAE’s own global gold-trading infrastructure, built on lax regulations, low taxes, and discreet financial systems, makes it the ideal partner for armed groups seeking to convert looted resources into weapons and cash.

Sudan mirrors Myanmar in a darker way: where Myanmar supplies the materials for the world’s green future, Sudan supplies the materials for its financial present, stabilizing gold markets, supporting global luxury demand, and solidifying the UAE’s status as an international trading powerhouse. In both cases, the profits flow outward, while the devastation remains local.

Foreign Wars as a Business Model

The parallels between Myanmar and Sudan reveal a broader pattern of 21st-century extraction economics. War and political collapse weaken regulation, eliminate oversight, and create desperate labor pools. Armed groups become local gatekeepers, selling access to mines or smuggling routes. Foreign corporations and governments capitalize on the chaos to secure strategic resources cheaply.

In Myanmar, ethnic armed groups benefit from mining revenues while China secures rare earths vital for its technology sector. In Sudan, the RSF funds its military operations through gold smuggling while the UAE strengthens its global commodities market.

This model is not new. But the urgency of the green transition and the volatility of global commodity markets have made it more aggressive than ever. The world wants cheap inputs for clean energy, financial reserves, and technological superiority. Conflict zones deliver them, evidently at enormous human cost.

The Moral Cost of The Green and Gold Transitions

The stories of Sian in Shan State and the civilians trapped in Sudan’s war zones expose a deeper contradiction at the heart of global development. The world says it wants sustainable energy and ethical supply chains. Yet the materials needed for these transitions are often sourced from places where sustainability and ethics are impossible.

Myanmar, Sudan, Congo, Bolivia, and other resource-rich conflict states are the hidden foundation of modern life in first world countries. Their suffering directly creates the conveniences and technologies that wealthier countries take for granted.

Until the international community demands transparency, enforces sanctions on conflict-linked commodities, and insists that the green future not be contradictorily built on burned earth, Myanmar and Sudan will remain cautionary tales and examples of what happens when the world’s hunger for resources meets its willingness to ignore suffering.

The 7th African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) summit in Luanda, Angola, signaled support for Africa’s development in the coming years. Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço hosted the summit on 24-25 November 2025. The unique discussions between African and European leaders and the various partnering organizations underlined invaluable guarantees to undertake opportunities for strengthening long-term economic, cultural, and political ties in the continent.

Chairperson of the AU Commission, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, at the 7th AU-EU summit in Luanda, underscored that Africa brings not only vast resources to this partnership but also demographic dynamism, technological ambition, and a vibrant generation of innovators. Europe can contribute capital, technology, and institutional cooperation. By aligning these strengths around shared priorities that include digital transformation and youth empowerment, both continents can shape a more prosperous future.

According to Mahmoud Youssouf, Africa is emerging as a global growth powerhouse and therefore calls for balanced trade partnerships and stronger multilateralism with members of the European Union.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who chaired the G20 Leaders’ Summit, the first to be convened on African soil since the African Union became a permanent member of the G20, highlighted economic growth and job creation while stressing the importance of stronger economic ties and regional integration with European partners.

In their speeches at the Summit, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen and President of the European Council António Costa shared the development visions for the African continent and the financial mechanisms reaffirming commitment to the Joint Vision for 2030 and the AU’s Agenda 2063. These are implemented under the framework of the EU’s Global Gateway.

Shaping the future for Africa and Europe

The AU and EU adopted a joint declaration that reinforces cooperation in significant thematic areas, including peace, security, sustainable development, and regional integration. It also outlines an institutional structure and funding mechanisms for key actionable areas within a long-term framework for cooperation.

In the adopted document, the EU reassured its support for Africa’s development priorities, determined to advance partnership and to unlock new opportunities, and looked forward to an ambitious post-Agenda 2030 framework.

Leveraging public and private funds to stimulate investments and improving investment and business climate across the continents remain key and reaffirm commitment to ensuring the transformative impact of these investments. It identified financial institutions, in particular the European Investment Bank (EIB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and public development banks, agencies, and similar bodies for providing finance.

The EU guarantees to continue supporting African countries to develop, industrialize, diversify exports, and integrate into regional markets. It will also accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

In terms of investing in education, research, science, technology, and skills development as a basis for driving scientific discoveries and innovative solutions, the EU acknowledged the importance of the youth as drivers for sustainable development and committed to supporting their empowerment and active participation. Therefore, the EU promised partnerships between universities and research organizations to foster mutual understanding and excellence.

Cooperation on Peace, Security, and Governance

There has been long-standing AU-EU cooperation on peace, security, and governance, including conflict prevention, peace mediation, and stabilization, premised on African-led solutions. Both the AU and EU agreed on a commitment to further strengthening dialogue and cooperation, including through the annual consultations between the AU Peace and Security Council and EU Political and Security Committee as well as the annual AU-EU Human Rights Dialogue.

Acting under a UN mandate, the EU pledged sustainable financing for AU-led Peace Support Operations. The document recognizes the African Union Peace and Security Council’s and the European Union Political and Security Committee’s contribution to the maintenance of peace, security, and stability in both continents and in promoting effective governance, and we welcome the AU’s efforts to silence the guns in Africa in line with Aspiration 4 of the AU Agenda 2063.

Stronger Commitment to Multilateralism

Both the AU and EU agreed to work towards more converging positions in multilateral fora to ensure an effective multilateral system with the UN at its core, based on international law and true to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

The Summit welcomed the contributions from the meetings of the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa. It encourages continued engagement of all relevant stakeholders in advancing the partnership. It finally registered joint commitment to international order based on international law and effective multilateralism grounded in international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

The African Union and the European Union expressed profound gratitude to the President of the Republic of Angola, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, and to the Angolan Government and people for the warm reception, hospitality, and excellent organization of the 7th AU-EU Summit.

US and China have long competed to become world powers, particularly in the technology sector. Since 2022, the US has systematically restricted the supply of high-performance NVIDIA chips to China. In today’s world, competition for power is no longer achieved through traditional means, such as military power. The US uses chips (semiconductors) as an instrument of political pressure. This policy is not just about economic or trade value, but has become part of technological statecraft designed to counter China’s military potential and its use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Semiconductors as a Provision of Power

The US policy of restricting high-end semiconductors to China shows a paradigm shift, chips (semiconductors) are not only industrial commodities, but have shifted to become a tool for achieving power. Export controls on high-performance chips and components that enable their production have been implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These steps show that the US is restructuring the geopolitical arena of technology.

AI today relies heavily on chips that can process vast amounts of data. The US restricts the export of high-end chips, such as the NVIDIA H100 and A100. A country’s AI development capacity could be severely compromised without access to these chips. The H100 is more than just a technological component; it serves as a strategic enabler that determines a country’s ability to maintain military dominance.

NVIDIA and the Security Logic Behind Export Control

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on 2023 announcement expanded export oversight, not only targeting on specific chip models but also on component values, most notably in frontier algorithm development. The NVIDIA A100 and H100 are highly advanced datacenter and AI chips. The guidelines are particularly high for training complex AI models on supercomputers, even for military applications or demanding research.

To prevent misuse, the US government has implemented licensing requirements for chips like the A100 and H100 chips, which have put chips like the A300 and H800, made by NVIDIA, under increased scrutiny, despite being categorized as “weak service” chips. Export restrictions stem from concerns that NVIDIA GPUs could be used by China in training AI models related to the US military, not only to slow China’s technological progress but also to safeguard its own national interests.

The US understands very well that high-performance chips are “brain machines” that can accelerate the development of military superiority, intelligence analysis, and even autonomous systems. So it is very clear that limiting the capacity of computing and high-performance hardware is the way to go. To delay a rival’s capabilities without resorting to direct military confrontation. This is a concrete manifestation of the shift in the “battlefield” taking place in the technological and regulatory arenas.

Vulnerable Supply Chains and Dependence on Taiwan

In chip control, the US must recognize that there are undeniable realities. NVIDIA’s chip production goes through a fabrication process that is almost entirely carried out in Taiwan, a country that lies in the geopolitical conflict between Washington and Beijing. The Congressional Research Service (2024) shows that approximately 90% of global advanced semiconductor chip production is based in Taiwan, manufactured by the leading Taiwanese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC). This creates a structural dependency that poses serious risks to US economic and technological security.

If semiconductor production were concentrated in a single region, it would create vulnerabilities that could destabilize the global technological system. Therefore, any tensions in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt US access to the computing infrastructure it maintains. Export restrictions are just one step in a much more complex strategy, requiring the US to diversify production locations and ensure that the chip supply chain is not concentrated in a single region.

Effectiveness and Adaptation Room for China

NVIDIA’s chip restrictions were intended to curb the pace of AI modernization in China, but China was still able to optimize the model’s efficiency. This demonstrates that limiting hardware performance doesn’t always equate to limiting innovation. On the other hand, unofficial market entities have emerged, allowing NVIDIA GPUs to remain accessible through third parties. This adaptation demonstrates that hardware control has limitations, especially when demand remains high and global distribution networks are not always transparent.

Looking at its overall effectiveness, US policy has been effective in slowing China’s computing capabilities, but it hasn’t stopped its strategic potential. Instead, it’s encouraging China to be self-sufficient in strengthening its technological foundation, even though the quality of local chips hasn’t yet matched NVIDA’s standards. In other words, restricting NVIDIA’s chip exports isn’t meant to end competition, but rather to transform it into a race toward technological independence. The policy’s effectiveness will only last as long as China finds a way to adapt, while China is working to fill that gap.

Policy Directions with Greater Strategic Opportunities

The effectiveness of the compute policy is based on a governance architecture that holds every allied country accountable to the same standards. Without a disciplined framework, export controls on China are merely an illusion that is easily penetrated by gaps in different economic and regulatory interests. By creating strategic alignment, which forces every democratic country to reduce the fragmentation of interests, it can open up greater policy opportunities to emerge. Many developing countries see this semiconductor race as a competition for dominance, not as an effort to maintain security.

In other words, a successful computing policy is not one that simply limits China’s space, but one that manages technological gaps without creating competing computing blocs. The geopolitical challenge is maintaining superiority without forcing the world into two technological divides that would be difficult to control. The US strategy to secure a leading position in future technologies requires flexibility in responding to global dynamics.

A Future Determined by Computational Capacity

The debate over NVIDIA chips demonstrates the growing integration of political and technological power. US policy aims not only to restrain the flow of strategic goods but also to build a new computing-based power architecture. However, this policy also presents challenges, including dependence on Taiwan, China’s flexibility, and economic pressure on US chip companies.

In a global world that continues to move toward an AI-driven economy, the future will be determined by who can manage geopolitical risks, understand supply chain dynamics, and design visionary policies. Ultimately, GPU regulation is no longer simply a matter of export control; it demonstrates how countries navigate a power struggle now measured in microchips.

In a time of great shifts, it is of note that the global development financial system is also at a crossroads and in need of reform for reform. From the articles listed below, I observe four developing themes, whether explicitly or implicitly mentioned. I will describe them below and conclude that these are the four main realities that the new development financial system would need to be shaped around.

First, we see the emergence of a new class of “middle class” emerging markets with a greater stake in the multilateral system, greater global economic connections, a greater desire for agency and voice in engaging with the Global North, and a greater ability to navigate the myriad cross-border economic systems that have evolved in the past 60 years. Let’s broadly generalize these as middle-income countries, including ASEAN, countries in Latin America, Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and perhaps parts of Africa. For these countries, Alldo Januardy aptly comments: “The Global South is no longer waiting to be included. It is building something of its own—shaped by necessity, grounded in local priorities, and driven by the hard lessons of dependency.” Perhaps it is these countries that are most able and well-suited to take advantage of decentralized funding models with greater autonomy and choice. Financial innovations relevant for these groups of countries include multilateral regional development banks (Setser) or programs of public-private financing (Mundy) and require financial liberalization for them to have more access to existing global capital markets. These countries have the foundations of economic activity and are ready to access a more diverse array of funding mechanisms to fund a more diverse array of activities.

Second, we also note a bifurcation in what used to be lumped together as emerging markets. For poor countries vulnerable to debt, especially if they are also vulnerable to climate change and conflict, we observe a slide backwards in their internal economic capacity. These countries have not been able to withstand the pressures of COVID on their own and in some cases have fallen into distress. Further, it seems that the recent shocks may have so stressed their systems that their rates of growth have been dampened in the medium to longer term. These countries need access to immediate financing and fundamental support. IMF President Kristalina Georgieva says that these countries need $440bn in additional financing over 5 years to prevent further crises. Furthermore, these countries face difficulties as funding for the IMF and WB by developed countries retreats. Ms. Georgieva suggests further contribution to the IMF’s PRGT facility, leveraging up the World Bank balance sheet. Personally, I think targeted support of the type described by The Economist in “The Demise of Foreign Aid Offers an Opportunity”—wherein capital is deployed in targeted areas and projects where governments and UN agencies have coordinating power in relation to global crises like climate change and where there exist positive spillover effects—is more relevant. On the other hand, Makhtar Diop described a new securitization model of combining various EM loans and selling them at a higher credit rating. For these assets, I think such an approach is misguided and risks landing existing asset managers with toxic assets in the future. Many of these countries do not have the economic nor governance capacity to participate in financial markets as a normal member.

Third, China has become the largest bilateral creditor to many developing countries with a different model of lending driven by different priorities. Speaking from knowledge derived outside of this class, its early expansion into the Belt and Road Policy more than a decade ago was driven by an opportunity to offload pressure from the accumulation of massive FX reserves and internal spare capacity in primary and infrastructure industries. Now, those priorities have transitioned to a more transactional, targeted approach targeting specific sectors. Furthermore, Chinese creditors often took on projects that would qualify for participation of traditional Paris Club lenders. All that is to say, there is quite a gap between the Chinese and traditional Paris Club lenders that needs to be bridged. Efforts to do this are already underway through the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments. The US desires China to become a “responsible creditor” on its own terms (Crebo-Rediker), which China does not desire to do as it has its own model and priorities. A more cohesive global consensus on global lending will require China’s participation and hence the ability of China and the US-led Paris Club to come to some sort of agreement.

Finally, all these realities are underpinned by the backdrop of the globalization, economic development, and innovation of the last 70 years in the Pax Americana. Economic models and industries are now more numerous and diverse than ever before, with many variations of interlinkages, creating a complex and intricate web of economic relationships. Furthermore, within the financial system itself, technologies like electronic trading, online retail participation, new financial products, and blockchain have made capital more transmutable than ever before. It is no surprise that we are at an exciting crossroad and in need of reform. In fact, the Bretton Woods model has done remarkably well to facilitate and accommodate the changes up to this point! I am inspired by the amount of work that has gone into creating this system and hope that the global community will again find its way forward.

Recently, former National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) director general Karl Kendrick Chua said that the Philippines is standing at a “critical juncture” that could determine whether the country finally attains sustained high growth or once again falls into a cycle of lost opportunities.

Speaking during a Makati Business Club briefing, Chua, who now serves as a managing director at Ayala Corp., noted that depending on the policy crafted, the results have been varied. “You have years where the critical juncture led to economic recession or depression. There are years where it led to economic growth,” he added.

The current economic position of the Philippines is the effect of several critical junctures where policy choices either accelerated or derailed long-term development. For example, Chua noted that if the country had avoided the 1983 debt crisis and the 1997–2003 fiscal crisis, per capita income today could have matched or even exceeded Thailand’s. “These crises wiped out decades of growth,” Chua said.

To understand the magnitudes involved, it is instructive to go beyond these remarks. So, let’s take a closer look at these past losses and the more recent ones.

Debt, fiscal and corruption crises            

Starting in 1983, the debt crisis penalized the Philippine GDP for a decade.

Let’s assume that the economic trends that had prevailed prior to the crisis would have prevailed without a crisis. In this view, it was only after the early 1990s, that the Philippines GDP first got to level where it had first been 10 years before. In economic terms, the debt crisis was a lost decade.

Adding the cumulative losses, it cost the economy over $152 billion.

What about the fiscal crisis?

Starting in the mid-1990s, this crisis penalized the GDP until 2011. Again, let’s assume that the economic trend that had prevailed before the fiscal crisis would have prevailed without a crisis. In this view, it was only in the early 2010s that the Philippines GDP got to the level where it had first been almost two decades before.

Adding the cumulative losses, it cost the economy over $630 billion – over four times more than the prior crisis.

Although flood-control corruption is an old challenge, the present crisis associated with it – assuming the critics are right – moved to a new level after 2022. In that case, assuming the present trends prevail, it could penalize the GDP by more than $191 billion by 2028.

Notice that in the case of the debt and fiscal crises, we have historical economic data that allows us to test counterfactuals. Whereas in the case of the flood-control corruption, we are comparing economic performances in the Duterte years (2016-2022) and in the projected Marcos Jr. years (2022-28), in order to assess the economic value of missed opportunities.

The Costs of Three Crises. GDP, current prices; in billions of U.S. dollars. Source: IMF/WEO, author

Losses of almost $1 trillion in four decades        

In a current project, I am examining the economic development of most world economies from the 19^th century up to 2050. The kind of losses that the Philippines has suffered are typical to conflict-prone nations, but somewhat unique in countries that should benefit from peacetime conditions.

The lost opportunities and economic value associated with these crises indicate that in the past 45 years or so, the Philippine GDP has under-performed far more often than it has engaged in more optimal growth.

That translates to missed opportunities of massive magnitude, in light of the size of the economy. All things considered, these losses could amount to more than $970 billion.

Overcoming misguided and self-interested economic policies that serve the few at the expense of the many is vital in a nation, where poverty and food security is the nightmare of every second household.

Pressing need for development and smart diplomacy

According to public surveys, the national priority issues are topped by the need to control the rise in prices of basic goods and services (48%) and fighting corruption (31%). Other major concerns are also domestic featuring affordable food (31%), improving wages (27%), and reducing poverty (23%).

These are all pressing domestic, bread-and-butter issues. And yet, although foreign policy issues represent a fraction in popular national priorities, much of the country’s policy attention and resources have been allocated to precisely such priorities.

Of course, the country should insist on its national interest, but that interest should be defined by the needs of the many, not by the priorities of the few. And that should mean focus on inflation control, corruption, food security, rising wages and poverty reduction.

Most Southeast Asian nations have elevated their economic fortunes by accelerated economic development and smart regional diplomacy. There is no reason why the Philippines couldn’t or shouldn’t do the same.

Most Filipinos would certainly agree.

*Author’s note: The original version was published by The Manila Times on November 24, 2025

When South Africa opens the 2025 G20 Summit on November 22nd in Cape Town, the meeting will not simply be another high-level diplomatic gathering. It will be a test of what global leadership looks like in an era defined by debt crises, climate shocks, and geopolitical fragmentation. It will also be a summit shaped as much by who is present as by who is absent.

For the first time since leaders began to regularly attend the G20, the United States is not expected to attend at the presidential level. That absence will hang heavily over a summit built around three themes that South Africa has placed at the core of its G20 hosting: solidarity, equality, and sustainability. This is not symbolic branding. These are principles that directly challenge the structure and priorities of the current international system and America’s decision not to participate will only magnify their political weight.

South Africa’s Vision for a More Equal Order

South Africa has been clear about what it wants this G20 to represent. The country’s diplomats have framed the summit as an opportunity to “rebalance global governance” and restore trust between advanced economies and the Global South. That begins with solidarity, not as a moral appeal but as a practical necessity in a world where the gaps in competition are tightening across virtually every sector.

South African officials have emphasized that the world is too interconnected, through supply chains, energy markets, debt exposures, and climate shocks, for any nation to pursue growth alone. Solidarity, in their framing, means shared responsibility for global risks and shared input into global rules.

Expect to see debt restructuring as a key component of the weekend. Dozens of low and middle-income countries are approaching insolvency. Many see the G20 as the only venue capable of compelling creditors, including China, Western banks, and the IMF to negotiate jointly. South Africa intends to push for more predictable mechanisms, faster timelines, and deeper reductions of overall debt.

The theme of equality is expected to be even more pointed. Pretoria has argued that the international financial system remains structurally biased. Voting power at the IMF does not reflect modern economic reality. Climate finance packages distribute risk upward and accountability downward. Supply chain standards reflect the priorities of wealthy states far more than those of producing states.

South Africa wants this summit to pressure advanced economies to move beyond incrementalism and to recognize developing nations as cooperators, not beneficiaries, of global economic design.

Sustainability as an Economic Imperative

As noted in the central theme of the summit, sustainability is the key talking point of the weekend. South Africa is expected to focus on climate adaptation financing, food security resilience, renewable infrastructure gaps, green industrialization, and the economic displacement climate change is already causing.

Pretoria’s message is blunt: sustainability is not the environmental chapter of the global economy, it is the global economy. The safeguards nations build today will determine whether their populations can withstand the shocks of the coming decade.

The Symbolism of America’s Absence

While the summit’s themes are forward-looking, the headlines thus far are dominated by one glaring issue; The United States is boycotting the event, and not sending a single delegate.

This absence is certainly meant to be received as a bold statement. In a moment when most of the global agenda is being rewritten around solidarity, shared burdens, debt relief, and climate vulnerability, the United States is choosing not to stand at the table.

Many delegations will read this as confirmation of what they already suspected: that the U.S. is prioritizing bilateral leverage and transactional deals over multilateral governance. In other words, America is choosing power over partnership.

That decision will have ripple effects. If Washington is not present to influence the language of solidarity or the scope of sustainability targets, other powers will be. The U.S. forfeits not only visibility, but the ability to shape norms that will define the next phase of global cooperation. The strongman tactic will prove less effective as the world continues to accelerate towards a multipolar world, as opposed to a unipolar order where D.C. stands above the rest.

China and India Eager to Fill the Vacuum

China is expected to enter the summit with a confident posture, despite Xi Jinping not attending. Beijing has spent the past several years positioning itself as the Global South’s premier development partner. A G20 centered around equality and solidarity aligns perfectly with China’s messaging: that it represents a more inclusive, less conditional model of global cooperation. This message will be even more prominent with an absentee America. To capitalize on the overall theme of moving away from Western dominated structures, it would be reasonable to assume that many lending systems denominated in the Yuan will be discussed on the sidelines.

India, meanwhile, will frame itself as the democratic partner of choice for developing economies. Expect New Delhi to emphasize supply chain diversification, digital equality, and climate-resilient infrastructure. India will also push for greater representation of Global South nations in multilateral institutions, a message that will resonate strongly in Africa and Southeast Asia.

Europe Attempts to Lead

European leaders will arrive prepared to engage deeply on sustainability and climate finance, but without Washington their influence will be limited. Europe cannot match America’s financial firepower nor China’s development machinery.

While Europeans tend to embrace the rhetoric of solidarity, they remain cautious about large-scale debt forgiveness, new climate financing mandates, and reforms that would dilute their institutional voting power. That tension prevents Europe from presenting itself as the natural successor to U.S. leadership, but rather an extension of it in the eyes of many developing nations.

A Summit That Signals a Changing Global Order

If South Africa succeeds in shaping the weekend around solidarity, equality, and sustainability, the summit could represent the most significant shift in G20 philosophy since its creation.

Tomorrow’s G20 will not be remembered for dramatic breakthroughs. It will be remembered for something subtler but more consequential; a turning point in global governance where the United States stepped back and the rest of the world showed it could step forward.

Ahead of flawed elections according to informed sources, New Delhi is engaged in high-level negotiations with the Myanmar military regime to establish new security measures, including cooperation of security firm. This measure aims to protect the security of Sittwe Port and ensure the rapid advancement of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. These discussions could pave the way for further collaboration between India and the junta, providing India with a strategic foothold in the region to counter China’s long-standing influence.

India’s strategic ambitions in Myanmar currently focus on critical mineral resources and regional connectivity. Although India publicly supports the military’s election plans, the reality is that it has no choice but to engage with resistance organizations, as all of its strategic projects fall within territories controlled by these groups. Restricted by China’s rare earth policies, India has been actively seeking alternatives.

According to a Reuters report, India may agree to collaborate with the United States to extract rare earth minerals from Kachin State for processing before exporting them to the U.S. It is reported that India has already made contact with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to explore and collect rare earth samples from the region and discuss the feasibility of establishing transport routes. In Dawki, Meghalaya, trucks line up beside a clear river, waiting for customs clearance. Hundreds of kilometers to the east, workers are laying tracks and pouring concrete for roads that may one day connect to Myanmar and beyond.

If India’s northeast is to become a true gateway to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, India and the U.S. must jointly develop a practical framework—an interconnected network integrating roads, railways, waterways, and fiber optics—to link “Act East” initiatives with the broader Indo-Pacific. Complex Challenges For India, the primary and most formidable challenge is to complete and remove bottlenecks from key cross-border transit corridors: the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (from Moreh to Mae Sot via Myanmar) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which connects Mizoram to the sea at Sittwe, then continues inland via river and road.

However, progress on these ambitious Indian strategic projects in Myanmar has been slow. The Modi government has shown signs of impatience, beginning limited engagement with ethnic armed organizations. Although the KIA controls key rare earth deposits in Kachin State, the region’s rugged terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure pose immense logistical challenges.

Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner has remarked that attempting to extract Myanmar’s rare earths under China’s watch, given the difficult topography and poor logistics, seems “completely insane.” The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, proposed as early as 2002, has progressed sluggishly. To date, only 70% of the highway has been completed. While the Indian and Thai sections were finished in 2023, progress reports on the Myanmar portion remain consistently delayed.

However, local sources reveal that Indian contractors have already begun construction in parts of Sagaing Region, operating under the protection of resistance forces and with tacit approval from the military. As for the Kaladan Project, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhawma stated on Wednesday that the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) is expected to be completed by 2027. The project will link southern Mizoram through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal. He added that the Indian central government is taking steps to extend the railway line to Hmawngbuchhuah in Lawngtlai district, Mizoram’s southernmost point on the border with Myanmar.

The Key Factor: The Upcoming Election According to the military’s Global New Light of Myanmar, India will send teams to monitor the war-ravaged Myanmar election scheduled for December. With parties opposing the military excluded or boycotting the poll, Western governments and human rights organizations view the election as an attempt by the military to consolidate control by paving the way for proxy rule.

India’s current push to secure its interests in Myanmar through security firms not only aims to advance U.S.-Myanmar relations and secure junta support to propel project implementation but also to gain a first-mover advantage and avoid post-election disruptions. It also serves to divert attention from India’s new arrangements in Myanmar amid the election focus. Should India cooperate with a U.S.-linked security firm, it would undoubtedly enhance its resilience to Myanmar’s conflict risks, further solidify the U.S.-India alliance, and boost coordinated efforts to address China’s challenges. However, this approach also carries the risk of provoking domestic backlash within Myanmar. 

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Because of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements in the Diet regarding the Taiwan issue, the already fragile China–Japan relationship has deteriorated rapidly. China has issued travel and study-abroad warnings for Japan, effectively halted imports of Japanese seafood, sent coast guard vessels into the “territorial waters” of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and had three warships transit the Osumi Strait in southern Japan.

At the same time, Beijing took the unusual step of announcing in advance that Premier Li Qiang would not meet the Japanese prime minister at the G20 summit. In just ten days, China launched a strong, multi-domain counterattack—political, diplomatic, economic, and military—with no signs of de-escalation.

If Prime Minister Takaichi does not retract her remarks, Beijing is likely to escalate even further and drag the United States into the dispute.

What actually happened? Is China overreacting? How far will Beijing take this confrontation?

Let us revisit the origin of the incident. In response to questioning in the Diet, Prime Minister Takaichi stated, “If China blockades Taiwan using warships and employing force, then no matter how you look at it, this could become a survival-threatening crisis for Japan.”

Pressed by the opposition, she added, “If China imposes a maritime blockade on Taiwan and U.S. forces intervening in that blockade come under armed attack, a crisis could arise.”

International media paid no attention to Takaichi’s clarification and focused only on the headline question: Will Japan send troops if military conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait? Accordingly, France’s Le Monde, Britain’s The Guardian, and the Associated Press all ran titles implying that Japan would dispatch forces if Taiwan were subjected to military action.

Japanese scholars have since written articles in U.S. media explaining that “Japanese military intervention in a Taiwan contingency” presupposes that U.S. forces have already intervened, and only then could Japan exercise the right of collective self-defense. Yet the Japanese government has not actively clarified this prerequisite on the international stage, drawing sharp criticism from well-known Japanese commentator Hiroyuki Nishimura for dereliction of duty.

Nishimura’s criticism exposes a widespread misunderstanding: even if the United States militarily intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, as long as Japanese territory is not under armed threat, Tokyo is legally barred from exercising collective self-defense. In other words, under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, the United States is obligated to defend Japan, but Japan has no treaty obligation to send troops to support U.S. forces in a war that does not concern Japan.

Therefore, the mitigating explanations offered by Japanese scholars on Takaichi’s behalf do not hold water. The Japanese government’s failure to clarify the issue in international media is naturally out of fear of offending Washington. It remains unclear whether President Trump fully understands the “asymmetric” nature of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, and Tokyo has no desire to remind this shrewd deal-making president that when American soldiers are dying on the battlefield, Japan actually has no treaty obligation to send troops.

Unless, of course, the reason for U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait is explicitly “to protect Japan.” Political rhetoric is one thing; the law is another. The fact remains that neither the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty nor Japan’s domestic legislation imposes any legal obligation on Japan to exercise collective self-defense when its ally, the United States, comes under attack.

Another fact: the Philippines is in exactly the same position as Japan. Unless U.S. forces become involved in order to protect the Philippines or Philippine territory is affected by the war, Manila has no obligation to send combat troops to assist the U.S.—it can only provide logistical and base support.

Of course, if the United States does intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, it will inevitably claim it is to protect Japan (and the Philippines). But the authority to make that determination lies with Tokyo and Manila, both of which retain a certain right to stay out of the fight. This is precisely why U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby earlier this year demanded that Japan and Australia state clearly what actions they would take to support the United States in the event of a Taiwan contingency. That demand makes it crystal clear that America’s mutual defense treaties do not obligate allies to unconditionally fight alongside U.S. forces.

In short: when their own security is at stake, allies will send troops; otherwise, they will at most offer logistics and bases—no allied soldiers will go to the front lines.

This explains Beijing’s fierce reaction. Even if Takaichi did not mean Japan would intervene unilaterally in the Taiwan Strait, her remarks effectively expanded the “applicability scenarios” of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. If such moves are not checked, they will only encourage the Philippines, Australia, and other anti-China neighbors to follow suit—using the same logic to blackmail or bleed China.

This is not an overreaction, nor is it making a mountain out of a molehill. Beyond realpolitik necessity, the Chinese people have not forgotten Japan’s history of invading China—especially in this 80th anniversary year of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. If Beijing were to let the matter slide, it would face intense domestic backlash.

Therefore, unless Takaichi retracts her remarks, China–Japan relations will continue to worsen, eventually leading to a situation where “Taiwan is fine, but Japan is in crisis.”

Takaichi may well have intentionally provoked Beijing in order to shore up LDP support, rally Japanese nationalism, loosen the “three non-nuclear principles,” and expand conventional military capabilities. But the backlash has likely been far greater than she anticipated. The key still lies in America’s attitude.

Although the U.S. ambassador to Japan publicly expressed support for Tokyo and criticized Beijing, Washington’s overall response has been relatively muted—Trump has zero interest in letting Japan torpedo his scheduled China trip next April.

On the other hand, Beijing may well conclude that Washington is deliberately allowing Japan to interfere in China’s internal affairs in order to gain negotiating leverage. That would only reduce China’s inhibitions about sanctioning Japan and could lead it to directly challenge the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pushing the situation to the brink of losing control and forcing the U.S. to rein in Japan.

China has many tools to test the treaty—economic and trade measures, cultural exchanges, diplomacy, and even military options are all on the table. The disputed uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands, whose sovereignty remains unresolved, are both historical issues left over from World War II. Although both fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, Washington has never recognized Japanese sovereignty over them.

Regarding the Ryukyus, Beijing can wage a protracted legal battle, continually emphasizing that the Potsdam Declaration never returned the islands to Japan. Regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing could move directly to military control—land on the islands, demolish Japanese facilities, raise the Chinese flag, and expel foreign vessels—forcing the United States to get involved.

If Beijing is pushed to the point of letting the situation spiral, its price to Washington will be high: it may include, but is not limited to, demanding that the U.S. block Japan from abandoning the three non-nuclear principles, block Japan’s “normalization” (turning the Self-Defense Forces into a full-fledged military), force Japan to pay tangible and intangible reparations for its invasion of China, or even force Takaichi to step down.

Would Trump risk a second Chinese rare-earth embargo over an uninhabited island whose sovereignty does not belong to Japan? The answer is obvious.

Beijing’s current Taiwan strategy has shifted from “opposing independence” to “advancing unification.” Part of that strategy is to make neighboring countries acknowledge—through actual state behavior, not just words—that the Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair. Japan is the poster child for neighboring hypocrisy—talking peace while acting otherwise. It will be shown no mercy for breaking the promises of diplomatic normalization; Beijing is determined to make a chicken of Japan to scare the monkey.

From this perspective, Prime Minister Takaichi may have thought she could achieve a classic boomerang effect (using the Taiwan issue for domestic political gain by first exporting strong rhetoric abroad). Instead, Beijing has been handed a rare opportunity to use Japan as a target and demonstrate to the world how it will reduce obstacles to unification.

The United States wants to avoid direct confrontation with China and prefers to let proxies stand on the front line so it can reap the benefits while remaining in the rear. On the surface this creates trouble for Beijing, but in reality it also creates endless headaches for Washington—because China will not limit itself to dealing with the proxies; it will drag the United States into the fight.

This is the new tactical phase in U.S.–China competition following the Busan meeting, testing the one-year truce both sides agreed to. Whether proxies are an advantage or a liability for Washington depends entirely on how Beijing chooses to handle the dispute—and Tokyo makes the ideal canary in the coal mine.