nuclear

GOFFSTOWN, N.H. — In their last joint appearance before Tuesday’s high-stakes New Hampshire primary, the five major Democratic presidential candidates Sunday coasted through a generally desultory debate enlivened only by attacks on former Massachusetts Sen. Paul E. Tsongas for his support of nuclear power.

Tsongas, who leads in state polls, repeatedly came under attack for his staunch backing of nuclear power–a controversial position in a state where many Democratic activists have long opposed the Seabrook nuclear power plant. Each of Tsongas’ four rivals said they would decrease the nation’s reliance on nuclear energy.

“We’re not all trying to gang up on you, we’re not trying to say you’re wrong all the time,” Nebraska Sen. Bob Kerrey said to Tsongas at one point. “But on this particular issue I think you are. . . . Nuclear power, it seems to me, is fatally flawed.”

The focus on nuclear power–an issue that until recently has played virtually no role in the campaign–underlined the shift in Tsongas’ position from a long-shot who had been gently patronized to a front-runner worthy of pummeling. But other than the criticism of his energy policy–an issue that has not been high on the list of voter concerns here in recent years–Tsongas ran this last gantlet before the vote virtually unscathed.

Early in the debate, former California Gov. Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown Jr.–who later grilled Tsongas most aggressively on his support for nuclear power–even embraced him as a fellow outsider committed to “the politics of the future” as compared to the three current officeholders in the race.

Brown then mildly distanced himself from Tsongas, saying the former senator “represents a more conservative, business-oriented view of the future.”

In fact, the tone of the debate was strikingly low-key, with all of the candidates focusing more of their fire on President Bush than their rivals. Tsongas took the lead, employing the front-runner strategy used earlier by Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton. At every opportunity Tsongas stressed his agreements with his rivals and his differences with Bush.

In the debate, sponsored by Cable News Network and the League of Women Voters, the candidates were hampered by a format so disjointed and at times unstructured that twice Clinton felt compelled to suggest questions to moderator Bernard Shaw.

After weeks of focusing on the bread-and-butter concerns of voters in this economically ravaged state, the candidates Sunday found themselves exploring international population control, the destruction of the rain forests, utility pricing reform and whether the nation needs a better class of light bulb.

In this alternately esoteric and disengaged atmosphere, the only energy was generated by the issue of nuclear power.

One by one, each of Tsongas’ rivals insisted they would reduce reliance on nuclear power. Harkin declared that a program “of developing solar . . . for the future” would allow the nation to avoid “going to the nuclear option that Paul Tsongas wants to move to.”

Brown said he would move to phase out all nuclear power plants over the next decade.

Clinton said: “I do not favor anything that will accelerate the building of nuclear power plants. If you have major incentives to the utilities to engage in conservation, if you have a major attempt to convert to natural gas wherever you can. . . . I do not think you are going to see a need for new nuclear power plants.”

Tsongas–after characterizing nuclear power as part of “the third tier” of his preferred energy options for the country–argued in response to the persistent jabs that a reduction in reliance on nuclear power would require greater use of fossil fuels, raising the threat of global warming through the greenhouse effect.

“If you take out all of your nuclear power plants by definition, you are going to have more fossil fuel burning and add to the greenhouse effect,” Tsongas said. “I take the position that the threat long term is global warming.”

Though Tsongas forcefully held his ground, he bristled under the attacks–which were among the most pointed he has endured. “If I could, I would like . . . to characterize my positions myself and not have others do it,” he said.

After the debate, aides to the other candidates maintained that Tsongas had been weakened by the focus on an issue. “I don’t think his position has been laid out before as it was here tonight, so I think it will hurt him,” said Frank Greer, Clinton’s media adviser.

Thaleia Schlesinger, Tsongas’ sister, countered: “People understand his position was based on his fear of global warming.”

When not arguing over whether to split atoms for energy, the candidates managed to make some points about the economy. To a greater degree than usual, Tsongas declared that his approach–which relies heavily on increasing capital incentives for business and rejects a tax cut for the middle class–offered struggle as well as reward.

“There are two roads,” he said in closing remarks. “One is easy, one is comfortable, but it is downhill. The other is the road to economic prosperity. . . . That road is steeper and it’s harder, but it’s more noble and it’s more worthy.”

Harkin reiterated his support for cutting the defense budget in half over 10 years to support infrastructure investments and other programs at home. And he took a harsh line on trade issues, promising to stand up to Japan and prevent former government trade negotiators from lobbying for foreign governments. “I’m saying trade has to be a two-way street, not a one-way bridge,” he said.

As he has in recent days, Clinton sought to differentiate himself from Tsongas by emphasizing his experience as chief executive in Arkansas and his plans to reform government. “I think we have to have a more activist government,” he said, “but it also has to be more community-based, less bureaucratic and provide more citizen choice.”

Like Harkin, Kerrey insisted that America needed to get tougher with Japan on trade. But he called for the establishment of “new trading structures so that we can expand trade into the rest of the world, trying to convert . . . old enemies into new customers.”

Tsongas, who has taken the strongest free-trade position, urged voluntary protectionism, saying that as President he would ask Americans to shun Japanese imports if Japan doesn’t open its markets. “If the Japanese are not willing to be reasonable,” he said, “you have to play hardball.”

For most of this encounter, though, hardball was apparently the last thing on the minds of the five Democrats chasing the White House. With Tuesday’s pivotal vote in sight, they seemed less like contenders stepping into the ring than weary fighters embracing at the end of a bruising match.

Times political writer Robert Shogan contributed to this story.

France prepares to host Iran’s foreign minister in Paris for high-stakes talks on nuclear and regional tensions.

France will host Iran’s foreign minister in Paris this week for talks that are set to include stalled nuclear negotiations.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot confirmed on Monday that his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi will arrive on Wednesday for discussions that Paris hopes will nudge Iran back into full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as part of a defunct nuclear deal.

“This will be an opportunity for us to call on Iran to comply with its obligations towards the IAEA and for a swift resumption of cooperation with the agency,” Barrot said ahead of the meeting.

French officials also plan to raise the status of two French nationals who were released from detention in Iran but remain unable to leave the country. Both are currently staying inside the French embassy in Tehran, and Paris has repeatedly pressed for their return.

The Paris meeting comes as Tehran has signalled it sees little urgency in resuming indirect talks with the United States over the future of its nuclear programme.

Earlier this month, Iran declared it was “not in a hurry” to restart negotiations, despite mounting pressure following the return of United Nations sanctions and growing economic strain.

Araghchi reiterated that position in an interview with Al Jazeera, saying Tehran remained open to dialogue if Washington approaches talks “from an equal position based on mutual interest”.

He dismissed reported US conditions – including demands for direct talks, zero enrichment, restrictions on missile capabilities, and curbs on support for regional allies – as “illogical and unfair”.

“It appears they are not in a hurry,” he said. “We are not in a hurry, either.”

Tehran’s top diplomat also argued that regional politics are shifting in Iran’s favour.

Referring to the Israeli prime minister, he said: “I sometimes tell my friends that Mr [Benjamin] Netanyahu is a war criminal who has committed every atrocity, but did something positive in proving to the entire region that Israel is the main enemy, not Iran, and not any other country.”

A planned sixth round of indirect US–Iran nuclear talks collapsed in June after Israel attacked Iranian nuclear sites, triggering a 12-day war that killed more than 1,000 people in Iran and caused billions of dollars in damage.

The two sides reached a ceasefire after the US bombed three Iranian nuclear sites: Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.

US President Donald Trump in 2018 unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a deal between the US, Iran, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and the European Union that saw Tehran curtail its nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.

Iran has since continued to violate provisions of the agreement, arguing that the US withdrawal has nullified the deal. Iranian officials maintain that the country is only developing its nuclear programme for civilian purposes.

UN sanctions against Iran were reimposed in September as part of the 2015 agreement’s “snapback” mechanism.

Russia is framing artificial intelligence as a geopolitical technology on par with nuclear weapons, with Sberbank First Deputy CEO Alexander Vedyakhin warning that only nations capable of building their own large language models will hold real influence in the 21st century. Speaking at Moscow’s flagship AI Journey event, Vedyakhin said Russia considers it a strategic achievement to be among the few countries with home-grown AI and insists the state must rely exclusively on domestic models for sensitive sectors like public services, healthcare, and education. His comments echo President Vladimir Putin’s recent remarks that indigenous AI is essential for Russian sovereignty. While Sberbank and Yandex lead Russia’s push to compete with U.S. and Chinese AI giants, sanctions and limited computing power continue to restrain Moscow’s capability.

Why It Matters

Russia’s framing of AI as a sovereignty-defining technology signals a hardening global divide in the race for digital power. By likening AI to nuclear capability, Moscow is underscoring the strategic leverage it believes advanced models can confer over national security, economic competitiveness, and societal infrastructure. For Western policymakers, the statement highlights how AI is increasingly entwined with geopolitical rivalry, sanctions regimes, and technological self-reliance. For markets, the message is more nuanced: despite the rhetoric, Russia admits it cannot match global leaders in compute or scale, and it warns investors that AI infrastructure spending may not repay itself quickly, raising questions about the economic viability of high-intensity AI development.

Russia’s state institutions, security apparatus, and public-service sectors are central consumers of domestic AI models as Moscow seeks digital autonomy. Sberbank and Yandex are the primary corporate developers, tasked with building national-scale models under sanctions constraints. Western governments and AI firms remain part of the geopolitical backdrop, as Russia’s push for self-sufficiency follows restricted access to advanced chips and cloud hardware. Russian businesses, from healthcare to education providers, will increasingly rely on domestic AI systems while international partners watch how far Russia can expand its capabilities without global supply chains.

What’s Next

Russia aims to expand from one or two national AI systems to several independent models, but its development will remain limited by restricted access to high-performance computing. Moscow will continue steering AI regulation toward data sovereignty, banning foreign models from handling state or sensitive information. As Russia ramps its rhetoric around AI power, expect greater global pressure for technological blocs, digital “non-alignment,” and AI export controls. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s caution about an “AI bubble” hints that its investments will be narrower and more state-directed than those in the U.S. or China, potentially slowing innovation but avoiding the risk of overextension.

With information from Reuters.

Foreign minister says Iran has not been enriching uranium at any of its sites since Israel and the US bombed them.

Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities maintain that the United States and its allies are set on a forceful approach over the country’s nuclear programme, so negotiations appear far off.

The administration of US President Donald Trump has left no room for talks by repeatedly presenting “maximalist demands”, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Sunday at a news conference in Tehran.

“The current approach of the US government in no way shows readiness for an equal and fair negotiation to secure mutual interests,” he said on the sidelines of the state-organised Tehran Dialogue Forum, which diplomats and envoys from across the region attended.

Iranian officials said they have been receiving messages from neighbouring countries that are trying to mediate and keep the peace. A letter from Araghchi was also delivered to Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani on Sunday that deals with Iran, the ceasefire in Gaza and other issues, according to Iranian media.

Araghchi said communication channels remain open with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well. Iran’s envoy to Vienna, where the nuclear watchdog is based, was joined on Friday by counterparts from China and Russia in a meeting with the representatives of the United Nations agency.

“There’s no enrichment right now because our nuclear enrichment facilities have been attacked,” the foreign minister said at the news conference. “Our message is clear: Iran’s right for peaceful use of nuclear energy, including enrichment, is undeniable, and we will continue to exercise it.”

Last week, the latest IAEA confidential report on Iran’s nuclear programme was leaked to Western media, which reported that the UN agency has not been able to verify Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent-enriched uranium since its facilities were bombed and severely damaged by the US and Israel in June.

The IAEA said it needed “long overdue” inspections of seven of the sites targeted during the war, including Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan.

Iran has granted the IAEA access to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant and the Tehran Research Reactor but has said security and safety conditions have not been met for inspections at other facilities as the high-enriched uranium stays buried.

Another resolution?

Iranian officials signalled over the weekend that three European powers – France, the United Kingdom and Germany – which were part of the country’s now-defunct 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, may be mobilising to introduce another Iran-focused resolution to the IAEA’s board.

Iran responded to several previous censure resolutions with escalations in uranium enrichment, and Israel launched its June attacks on Iran a day after the IAEA passed a European-tabled resolution that found Tehran noncompliant with its nuclear safeguards commitments.

Speaking to reporters in Tehran on Sunday, the deputy for international and legal affairs in Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi, said Iran “reserves the right to reconsider its approaches” if a new resolution moves through.

He said the three European countries’ effort was a US-backed move to reinstate UN sanctions against Iran despite strong opposition from China and Russia last month and it “eliminated them from the field of dialogue and diplomacy with Iran”.

“Another resolution will bear no additional pressure on Iran, but the message it will send shows that collaboration and coordination are not important to them,” Gharibabadi said.

Iran’s nuclear programme chief, Mohammad Eslami, also slammed the West and the IAEA, telling reporters on Sunday that the UN agency is being used for political purposes, which “enforces double standards and a law of the jungle that must be stopped”.

“The attacks on Iran’s facilities were unprecedented. It was the first time that nuclear facilities under agency supervision were attacked, which meant a violation of international law, but the IAEA did not condemn the attacks,” Eslami said.

Iran’s military commanders continue to signal defiance as well. Defence Minister Amir Hatami told a meeting of lawmakers on Sunday that armed forces have been “sparing no moment in improving defence capabilities” after the 12-day war with Israel.

Tensions remain high in the region after the war with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on Saturday confirming that it seized a Cyprus-registered tanker that transited through the Strait of Hormuz.

SEOUL, Nov. 14 (UPI) — The United States and South Korea on Friday released a joint fact sheet on a sweeping trade and security agreement that details a $350 billion investment pledge by Seoul and confirms Washington’s approval for its Asian ally to develop nuclear-powered submarines.

The document comes two weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung finalized their trade negotiations on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Gyeongju on Oct. 29.

“With this, the Korea-U.S. trade and security negotiations, which have been one of the greatest variables affecting our economy and security, have finally been concluded,” Lee said in a televised press briefing and Facebook post on Friday.

Lee expressed “gratitude and respect” for Trump’s decision and said both sides “achieved the best possible outcome, based on common sense and reason.”

Under the terms of the deal, Trump’s so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korean goods, including automobiles, will drop from 25% to 15%, returning to the level initially established in July during Lee’s visit to the White House.

In exchange for the lower tariffs, South Korea has pledged to invest $350 billion in the United States, including $150 billion in the U.S. shipbuilding sector and $200 billion for strategic sectors under a memorandum of understanding to be signed by the two countries.

To minimize the impact on South Korea’s foreign exchange market, Seoul’s annual investment cap was set at $20 billion, the fact sheet said.

“The two governments confirmed that Korea’s investments will proceed only within a level our economy can fully sustain and only in commercially viable projects,” Lee said. “The mistrust and concerns of some who were worried this was a ‘de facto grant’ under the guise of investment in projects with difficult returns have been completely dispelled.”

The fact sheet also formalized Washington’s approval for Seoul’s plan to build nuclear-powered submarines, a capability South Korean leaders have pursued for years. Seoul has framed nuclear-powered vessels as essential for tracking North Korean ballistic missile submarines and for expanding its reach across the Indo-Pacific. Officials also see the program as a catalyst for the country’s nuclear energy and naval shipbuilding industries.

The agreement said Washington will work with Seoul to define requirements for the project, “including avenues to source fuel.” Securing enriched uranium for submarine reactors had been a sticking point in the release of the fact sheet, as Seoul has sought revisions to its bilateral nuclear cooperation pact to allow greater flexibility in enrichment and nuclear waste recycling.

Lee called the submarines “a decades-old dream of South Korea and a vital strategic asset for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.”

The agreement comes as Washington and Seoul undertake a broader effort to modernize their security alliance and reshape how the two countries share military responsibilities. The fact sheet noted that South Korea intends to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP “as soon as possible,” and reiterated a commitment to the eventual transition of wartime operational control to Seoul.

Seoul also pledged to spend $25 billion on U.S. military equipment purchases by 2030 and outlined plans to provide comprehensive support for U.S. Forces Korea amounting to $33 billion.

“The South Korea-U.S. alliance has evolved and deepened into a truly future-oriented strategic comprehensive alliance encompassing security, the economy, and cutting-edge technology,” Lee said.

As part of that broader strategic framework, the two governments reaffirmed their shared goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and pledged to work together to implement the joint statement of the 2018 Singapore summit between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The fact sheet called on North Korea to “return to meaningful dialogue and abide by its international obligations, including by abandoning its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.”

North Korea has rejected calls for denuclearization since declaring itself a nuclear-armed state in 2022. In September, Kim signaled a willingness to resume diplomacy with Washington but warned that any discussion of giving up his regime’s nuclear arsenal would be off the table.

Recent imagery indicates that China is progressing with work on a new aircraft carrier, its fourth, which is expected by many sources to introduce nuclear propulsion. A new detail that is now visible of the makings of the ship’s hull structure would appear to directly support this. The development comes just a week after the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first domestically produced carrier, the Fujian. Meanwhile, there are increasing reports that Beijing may also still be working on at least one more conventionally powered carrier, too.

Imagery of the new carrier, commonly referred to as the Type 004, shows the vessel taking shape at Dalian shipyard in China’s Liaoning province. Visible now is what looks to be a reactor containment structure, which would be a key indicator of its propulsion system. Certainly, the structure is broadly similar to that which is found in U.S. nuclear-powered supercarriers, and there is a general consensus that what we can see here is related to the future installation of a nuclear reactor. However, there remains the possibility that this could be some other test ship or potentially a test module. It could also be a case of this feature looking like it exists for one purpose, but it ends up being for another, although that seems less unlikely.

Renderings related to the Type 004 design that have emerged in the past have shown similarities to the U.S. Navy’s Ford class, as well as France’s future New Generation Aircraft Carrier, both of which are nuclear-powered.

In its latest assessment of Chinese military power, the Pentagon doesn’t explicitly mention a nuclear-powered carrier, but does note that China’s “next generation of carriers” will be characterized by “greater endurance,” which “will increase the striking power of a potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond the PRC’s immediate periphery.”

In March of this year, Yuan Huazhi, political commissar for the PLAN, confirmed that construction of a fourth carrier had begun, but declined to answer whether it would be nuclear-powered.

Almost exactly a year ago, evidence emerged that China had constructed a land-based prototype nuclear reactor suitable for a large surface warship. The so-called Dragon Might project is located at a mountain site outside the city of Leshan, in Sichuan province.

The shift to nuclear power for China’s fourth carrier is hugely significant.

Nuclear propulsion will give the Type 004 effectively unlimited range. It will also help meet the power-generation requirements of ever-improving sensors and other mission systems. A nuclear-powered supercarrier would go a long way toward closing the technical gap with the U.S. Navy, and would see China join France as the only other nation operating a nuclear-powered flattop.

Previous satellite imagery confirmed that construction work on the carrier was underway in Dalian before May 2024, when a module, a section of the flight deck, first appeared in satellite imagery.

Apparently evident in the module were trenches for catapult tracks, suggesting that the Type 004 will have two waist catapults, in addition to the two bow catapults. This would match the arrangement of the Nimitz and Ford classes and would add an extra catapult compared with China’s third carrier, the Type 003 Fujian, which has a single catapult in the waist position.

In other respects, too, the Type 004 is expected to be an overall more advanced design than Liaoning and Shandong, which are by now well established with the PLAN fleet, as well as the Fujian.

Like Fujian — and in contrast to the two previous carriers — the Type 004 will be equipped to launch aircraft via catapults. The earlier Shandong and the Liaoning are both short takeoff but arrested recovery, or STOBAR, types with prominent ‘ski jump’ takeoff ramps. Catapults offer numerous advantages, especially when it comes to launching aircraft at higher gross weights, which translates to larger fuel and ordnance loads. They can also generally accommodate a wider array of aircraft types, too. This includes larger and slower designs, like the KJ-600 carrier-based airborne early warning and control aircraft, as well as smaller ones, such as drones.

Like the Fujian, the Type 004 will presumably be equipped with an advanced electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), a type of equipment otherwise only in use with the U.S. Navy.

As well as the aforementioned KJ-600, the Type 004’s air wing will likely include the J-35 stealth fighter, supported by advanced developments of the J-15 multirole fighter, including an electronic warfare variant. The carrier is also likely to embark various drones, such as navalized versions of the GJ-11 uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), plus helicopters.

Intriguingly, however, China is reportedly also working in parallel on another new carrier, this one being conventionally powered.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that, in addition to the Type 004 at Dalian, China is poised to start working on a conventionally powered carrier at Jiangnan in Shanghai. This location would make sense inasmuch as this was the yard that built the Fujian. If these reports are correct, the finished product would likely be an improved Type 003 design.

Via Chaos314159/SDF:

“The latest Sentinel satellite imagery suggests that Jiangnan is cleaning a platform outside the dock, raising questions about whether this indicates the start of construction on the so-called Type 003A aircraft carrier.”

Does anyone know more? 🤨🤔 pic.twitter.com/sCSduadhM0

— @Rupprecht_A (@RupprechtDeino) November 11, 2025

Considering China’s huge shipbuilding capacity, it might well make sense to pursue two distinct new-generation carrier designs. An improved Type 003 — which some observers have begun to dub Type 003A — would offer the advantages of a proven design and lower costs, while the more ambitious Type 004 would be more expensive and higher risk.

The model below depicts a follow-on conventionally powered carrier, with the pennant number CV-19, but the source is unknown, and it may or may not be official. Notably, however, the island superstructure has major similarities with that seen on the large-scale, land-based aircraft carrier test facility in Wuhan.

There’s also an argument that China doesn’t necessarily need nuclear-powered carriers for many of its missions. While a nuclear-powered carrier would be a huge advantage for sustained blue-water operations across the globe, for contingencies closer to home, such as in the Taiwan Strait, and even in the disputed South China Sea, a force of conventionally powered flattops is still highly relevant. Conventionally powered carriers have the added advantage that they can be built more quickly and fielded in greater numbers given a set budget, although they are more dependent on a steady supply train, which can be vulnerable in a time of conflict. For its part, even a nuclear-powered carrier still requires a steady supply of other supplies, including fuel for its air wing and for its escorts.

At the same time, it should be noted that China is also working to introduce a number of very large big-deck amphibious assault ships, referred to as the Type 076. Each will feature at least one electromagnetic catapult that is expected to be primarily used to launch drones, as you can read more about here. Again, these would appear to be tailor-made for missions directed against Taiwan, as well as for power projection in the South China Sea.

Continued construction work on what is increasingly likely to be a nuclear-powered carrier, and the possibility of another type of conventional flattop in the works, highlight China’s high ambitions as a naval power and the resources they are willing to invest to achieve their maritime vision. While these developments are significant, it should also be recalled that, for the time being, the PLAN’s fleet of three conventionally powered carriers is still vastly outmatched by the U.S. Navy’s 11 active nuclear-powered supercarriers. Nevertheless, the gap is growing smaller at what seems like an increasing pace.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium stockpile ‘a matter of serious concern’ after 12-day war with Israel, watchdog says.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not been able to verify Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium since Israel and the United States struck the country’s nuclear sites back in June, according to a new report.

The watchdog circulated a confidential report to member states, claiming it had been unable to carry out “long overdue” inspections of seven of the sites targeted in the so-called 12-day war, including major facilities Fordo and Natanz.

The report, seen by several news agencies, said the watchdog needed to verify “inventories of previously declared nuclear material” to settle concerns over “the possible diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful use”.

While the report criticised Iran’s lack of cooperation, it did say that IAEA inspectors would be visiting the country on Wednesday to conduct inspections at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre site, located some 350km (215 miles) southeast of Tehran

During the war, Israel struck buildings at the Isfahan site, among them a uranium conversion facility. The US also struck Isfahan with missiles.

Iran suspended all cooperation with the IAEA after the war with Israel, but went on to reach an agreement in Cairo at the beginning of September to resume inspections.

But later that same month, the United Nations reimposed crushing sanctions on Iran, drawing an angry response from Tehran and leading the country to halt implementation of the Cairo agreement.

In August, European powers had reimposed the UN sanctions after Iran failed to enter into direct talks with the US and clarify the status of its near weapons-grade uranium stockpile.

‘A matter of serious concern’

The US and Israel claimed they attacked Iran because it was getting too close to being able to produce a nuclear weapon.

Iran says its aims are entirely peaceful, and the IAEA has said it has no credible indication of a coordinated weapons programme there.

Ever since the 12-day war, the agency has been calling on Iran to say what happened to its stock, which is enriched to up to 60 percent purity, a short step from weapons-grade levels of 90 percent.

Iran’s near-bomb-grade uranium stockpile was “a matter of serious concern”, said the report. In theory, the stockpile would be enough to produce about 10 nuclear bombs.

While some enriched uranium will have been destroyed in the attacks, diplomats say much of the stock was likely stored at a deeply buried facility at Isfahan where the entrance tunnels were hit, but damage appears limited.

The agency has so far only inspected some of the 13 nuclear facilities that were “unaffected” by Israeli and US attacks. It said that re-establishing a full picture of stocks would be arduous.

Justice Minister German Galushchenko allegedly took part in the scheme involving state nuclear power firm Energoatom.

Ukraine has suspended Justice Minister German Galushchenko for his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal involving the state-run nuclear power company, Energoatom, during his tenure as the country’s energy minister.

Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko announced on Wednesday that Galushchenko had been suspended from his duties, which will be carried out by Deputy Justice Minister for European Integration Lyudmyla Sugak.

Galushchenko, who served as energy minister for four years before taking over the justice portfolio in July, is accused of profiting from a scheme that laundered money from Energoatom.

Ukraine’s Pravda news outlet reported that anticorruption authorities raided Galushchenko’s offices on Monday.

‘I will defend myself in court’

In a statement, Galushchenko said he had spoken with the prime minister and agreed his suspension is appropriate while he defends his case.

“A political decision must be made, and only then can all the details be sorted out,” said Galushchenko. “I believe that suspension for the duration of the investigation is a civilised and correct scenario. I will defend myself in court and prove my position.”

According to Ukraine’s Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the alleged $100m scheme was orchestrated by businessman Timur Mindich, a close ally of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

SAPO’s investigators say Galushchenko helped Mindich manage illicit financial flows in the energy sector, while contractors working with Energoatom were forced to pay bribes of 10 to 15 percent to avoid losing contracts or facing payment delays.

Accusations of kickbacks in the energy sector are particularly sensitive in Ukraine, much of which is facing lengthy daily blackouts as it fends off massive Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The scandal also highlights a potential challenge to Ukraine’s European Union membership bid, for which eradicating corruption remains a key condition.

Addressing the country on Monday, Zelenskyy urged full cooperation with the anticorruption inquiry and said anyone implicated should be held to account.

Zelenskyy’s comments come just months after he was forced to reverse plans to curb the independence of the country’s key anticorruption watchdogs – SAPO and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine – following widespread protests.

A key aspect of the Trump administration’s Golden Dome missile defense initiative is ensuring America’s ability to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes, the nominee to become the next head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has stressed. This comes amid particular concerns within the halls of the U.S. government about the new deterrence challenges posed by China’s ongoing push to expand the scope and scale of its nuclear capabilities dramatically.

Navy Vice Adm. Richard Correll, who is currently deputy head of STRATCOM, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week about his nomination to lead the command. Ahead of that hearing, he also submitted unclassified written answers to questions from members of the committee.

One of the questions posed to Correll asked how, if confirmed, he would expect to work with the central manager for the Golden Dome initiative, a post currently held by Space Force Gen. Mike Guetlein.

“Per Executive Order 14186, the Golden Dome for America (GDA) Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) is responsible to ‘deliver a next-generation missile defense shield to defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against any foreign aerial attack on the U.S. homeland and guarantees a second-strike capability.’ If confirmed, I look forward to working with the GDA DRPM to ensure missile defense is effective against the developing and increasingly complex missile threats, to guarantee second-strike capability, and to strengthen strategic deterrence,” Correll wrote in response.

In deterrence parlance, a second-strike capability refers to a country’s credible ability to respond in kind to hostile nuclear attacks. This is considered essential to dissuading opponents from thinking they might be able to secure victory through even a massive opening salvo.

Helping to ensure America’s second-strike nuclear deterrent capability, as well as aiding in the defense specifically against enemy “countervalue” attacks, has been central to the plan for Golden Dome, which was originally called Iron Dome, since it was first announced in January. Countervalue nuclear strikes are ones expressly aimed at population centers, as opposed to counterforce strikes directed at military targets.

“Since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and initiated development of limited homeland missile defense, official United States homeland missile defense policy has remained only to stay ahead of rogue-nation threats and accidental or unauthorized missile launches,” President Donald Trump wrote in his executive order on the new missile defense initiative in January. “Over the past 40 years, rather than lessening, the threat from next-generation strategic weapons has become more intense and complex with the development by peer and near-peer adversaries of next-generation delivery systems and their own homeland integrated air and missile defense capabilities.”

How exactly Golden Dome factors into the second strike equation is not entirely clear. The U.S. nuclear triad currently consists of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers, silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and Ohio class nuclear submarines loaded with Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. At present, the Ohio class submarines provide the core of America’s second-strike capability, but are not directly threatened by the kinds of weapons that Golden Dome is meant to shield against while they are out on their regular deterrent patrols.

At the same time, there might be scenarios in which U.S. officials are concerned that the Ohios may no longer be entirely sufficient. A massive first strike that renders the air and ground legs of the triad moot, and also targets ballistic missile submarines still in port, would certainly put immense pressure on deployed submarines to carry out adequate retaliatory strikes with the warheads available to them. If multiple countries are involved, those demands would only be magnified. Threats to the submarines at sea, including ones we may not know about, as well as enemy missile defenses, something China has also been particularly active in developing, would also have to be factored in. Concerns about the potential destruction or compromise of nuclear command and control nodes, including through physical attacks or non-kinetic ones like cyber intrusions, would affect the overall calculus, too. Altogether, ensuring greater survivability of the other legs of the triad, where Golden Dome would be more relevant, might now be viewed as necessary.

Regardless, as noted, concerns about China’s ongoing nuclear build-up and the policy shifts that come along with it have been particularly significant factors in U.S. discussions about missile defense and deterrence in recent years. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) just offered the first public look at elements of all three legs of its still very new strategic nuclear triad at a massive military parade in Beijing in September. In recent years, U.S. officials have been outspoken about massive assessed increases in Chinese nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This includes the construction of vast arrays of nuclear silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), as well as the development and fielding of more and more advanced road-mobile ICBMs. China is now fielding air-launched nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and is growing the size and capabilities of its fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines, as well. Experts have also highlighted how China’s growing nuclear capabilities could point to plans for countervalue targeting.

“China’s ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces has heightened the need for a fully modernized, flexible, full-spectrum strategic deterrence force. China remains focused on developing capabilities to dissuade, deter, or defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region,” Correll wrote in response to a separate question ahead of his confirmation hearing last week. “We should continue to revise our plans and operations including integrating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in all domains across the spectrum of conflict. This will convey to China that the United States will not be deterred from defending our interests or those of our allies and partners, and should deterrence fail, having a combat ready force to achieve the President’s objectives.”

Correll’s written responses also highlighted concerns about Russia’s nuclear modernization efforts and growing nuclear threats presented by North Korea. He also touched on the current U.S. government position that there has been a worrisome increase in coordination between China, Russia, and North Korea, which presents additional challenges that extend beyond nuclear weapons.

“The Russian Federation continues to modernize and diversify its arsenal, further complicating deterrence. Regional actors, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) present additional threats,” he wrote. “More than nuclear, China and Russia maintain strategic non-nuclear capabilities that can cause catastrophic destruction. The major challenge facing USSTRATCOM is not just addressing each of these threat actors individually but addressing them comprehensively should their alignment result in coordinated aggression.”

It is important to stress that significant questions have been raised about the Golden Dome plans, including the feasibility of key elements, such as space-based anti-missile interceptors, and the immense costs expected to be involved. When any new operational Golden Dome capabilities might begin to enter service very much remains to be seen. Guetlein, the officer now in charge of the initiative, has described it as being “on the magnitude of the Manhattan Project,” which produced the very first nuclear weapons. 

There is also the question of whether work on Golden Dome might exacerbate the exact nuclear deterrence imbalances it is supposed to help address. In his written responses to the questions ahead of his confirmation hearing, Correll acknowledged the impact that U.S. missile defense developments over the past two decades have already had on China’s nuclear arsenal and deterrence policies.

“China believes these new capabilities offset existing U.S. and allies missile defense systems,” he wrote. This, in turn, “may affect their nuclear strike calculus, especially if state survival is at risk.”

Russian officials also regularly highlight countering U.S. missile defenses as a key driver behind their country’s efforts to expand and evolve its nuclear arsenal. Just last week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin claimed that new tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon torpedo, both of which are nuclear-powered and intended to be nuclear-armed, had been successfully carried out. The development of both of those weapons has been influenced by a desire to obviate missile defenses.

In terms of global nuclear deterrence policies, there is now the additional wrinkle of the possibility of the United States resuming critical-level weapons testing. Trump announced a still largely unclear shift in U.S. policy in this regard last week. The U.S. Department of Energy has pushed back on the potential for new tests involving the detonation of actual nuclear devices, but Trump has also talked about a need to match work being done by Russia and China. You can read more about the prospect of new full-up U.S. nuclear weapon testing here.

The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is…

— Commentary: Trump Truth Social Posts On X (@TrumpTruthOnX) October 30, 2025

American authorities have accused Russia in the past of violating its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) with very low-yield tests and criticized China for a lack of transparency around its testing activities. Russian authorities say they are now looking into what it would take to resume open critical-level nuclear testing in response to Trump’s comments.

North Korea is the only country to have openly conducted critical-level nuclear tests in the 21st century, and there are fears now it could be gearing up for another one. It should be noted that the United States and other nuclear powers regularly conduct nuclear weapon testing that does not involve critical-level detonations.

For now, as underscored by Correll’s responses to the questions posed ahead of his recent confirmation hearing, concerns about the assuredness of America’s nuclear second-strike capability remain a key factor in the push ahead with Golden Dome.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Nov. 6 (UPI) — President Donald Trump’s calls to ramp up nuclear weapons testing last week have put nuclear watchdogs and world leaders on alert while experts say the United States has little to gain.

In a post on Truth Social on Oct. 29, Trump said he is ordering the Department of Defense to immediately begin testing nuclear weapons “on an equal basis.” What this means remains unclear, though Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in an appearance on FOX News these would not be full-scale explosive tests.

“These are not nuclear explosions,” Wright said. “These are what we call non-critical explosions.”

The comment by Wright echoes the stance Brandon Williams, under secretary of energy for Nuclear Security in the Department of Energy, shared during his Senate confirmation hearing in May. Williams said testing nuclear weapons above the criticality threshold would not be advisable.

According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, the United States possesses more than 5,000 nuclear weapons. It has performed 1,054 explosive nuclear tests, more than any other country.

The type of testing the president is calling for is an important distinction to make, Dylan Spaulding, senior scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, told UPI. The delivery systems of nuclear weapons and the components of the weapons are commonly tested.

Subcritical tests are also performed. These are tests that do not yield a sustained nuclear reaction that would cause an explosion.

“He did mention testing on an equal basis,” Spaulding said. “If that’s the case, in fact the United States already does conduct all the kinds of tests of our nuclear delivery systems and even the components of the weapons themselves that other countries do.”

The United States and most of the rest of the world, aside from North Korea, have refrained from full-scale nuclear weapons testing for more than 30 years. In 1993, the United States signed a unilateral moratorium on explosive testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Breaking from the treaty is likely to open the door to escalation in the form of other countries, including adversaries like China and Russia, openly testing nuclear explosives, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told UPI.

“What if those countries decided that maybe this is a cue for them to test?” Sokolski said. “Would that provoke any of the larger states that signed [the treaty] but didn’t ratify to test?”

The only country to break from the agreement in this treaty is North Korea, conducting six nuclear tests concluding in 2017.

Sokolski argues that the United States has the least to gain by breaking the moratorium and setting off a precedent for open nuclear weapons testing. The United States’ research in the field is extensive, beyond that of any other country. Other countries, such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea stand to benefit the most from more explosive research while the United States would likely gain little more knowledge.”

“I spend a lot of time talking to weapons designers about this. You don’t test for reliability testing generally,” Sokolski said. “That requires 10 to 20 datapoints. That means 10 to 20 tests of each design. That seems kind of wasteful. You don’t design to prove things you’ve already proven.”

“If you’re doing a design that is totally radical, that’s something different, but we’re not,” he continued. “We’re fiddling with yield-to-weight ratios. There are countries like Israel who have tested once, in 1979, one test. Are you telling me their stockpile is unreliable and doesn’t work? If you want to make weapons you can do it very cheaply and quickly without testing.”

Spaulding agrees that full-scale testing is not necessary, adding that scientists continue to analyze data from the repository of the United States’ nuclear weapons testing history.

“We are still learning from those underground tests,” he said. “Other countries don’t have that advantage right now but we would be essentially giving them permission to catch up by returning to testing.

The argument for more live-testing of nuclear weapons capabilities is that it can insure and assure that the stockpile of weapons is reliable.

The United States has the Stockpile Stewardship Program that already tests the reliability and safety of its nuclear weapons. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told UPI the scientific community is “very confident” in the program.

While the United States is one of only nine countries that have not ratified the treaty, it is legally bound as a signatory to not violate the object or purpose of the agreement, Kimball said. He is doubtful that this will deter Trump.

Of the 1,054 explosive nuclear tests performed by the United States, 928 have been conducted at the Nevada Nuclear Site in south-central Nevada about 65 miles outside of Las Vegas. The site is the only candidate for hosting further nuclear testing, according to experts.

The last explosive test was conducted in 1992 before the United States began observing the international moratorium.

Past tests at the site yielded observable health and environmental impacts on residents of the region and beyond.

“Anyone born in ’63 or earlier, they were exposed to some level of strontium 90, which was showing up in the baby teeth of American children in the 50s and 60s,” Kimball said. “It accumulates in the teeth because you drink milk and it gets concentrated in the teeth.”

The United States joined the Soviet Union and United Kingdom in the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in part because of the baby teeth study. The treaty banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

Subjects of the baby teeth study were children in the St. Louis area, more than 1,600 miles from the Nevada nuclear test site.

With the atmospheric testing ban in place, explosive testing was moved underground in deep boreholes. This was meant to limit nuclear fallout, lessening environmental and health implications.

The vertical testing shafts are reinforced to limit geological impacts but the powerful explosions still generate fractures in the earth and the leakage of radionuclides, a hazardous radioactive material.

People who lived downwind of the Nevada test site, known as downwinders, have experienced higher than average rates of cancer.

“These downwinders, in their second generation, they’re still suffering from some of these adverse health effects,” Kimball said. “They are particularly angry. Trump’s announcement is a slap in the face to them as they see it. They want to see all forms of testing, above and below ground, concluded.”

Restarting full-scale testing would be no small task, Sokolski said. What he refers to as a “quick and dirty” test, one that provides an explosion but little in the way of research, would take months and millions of dollars to prepare.

“To get data, depending on how much data, we could be talking about one to two years and much, much more money, maybe approaching a higher order of magnitude, a billion [dollars],” Sokolski said. “Those stumbling blocks are the ones of interest.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has told top Kremlin officials to draft proposals for the possible resumption of nuclear weapons testing, as Moscow responds to President Donald Trump’s order that the United States “immediately” resume its own testing after a decades-long hiatus.

The Russian leader told his Security Council on Wednesday that should the US or any signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) conduct nuclear weapons tests, “Russia would be under obligation to take reciprocal measures”, according to a transcript of the meeting published by the Kremlin.

“In this regard, I instruct the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the special services, and the corresponding civilian agencies to do everything possible to gather additional information on this matter, have it analysed by the Security Council, and submit coordinated proposals on the possible first steps focusing on preparations for nuclear weapons tests,” Putin said.

Moscow has not carried out nuclear weapons tests since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But tensions between the two countries with the world’s largest nuclear arsenals have spiked in recent weeks as Trump’s frustration with Putin grows over Russia’s failure to end its war in Ukraine.

The US leader cancelled a planned summit with Putin in Hungary in October, before imposing sanctions on two major Russian oil firms a day later – the first such measures since Trump returned to the White House in January.

Trump then said on October 30 that he had ordered the Department of Defense to “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing on an “equal basis” with other nuclear-armed powers.

Trump’s decision came days after he criticised Moscow for testing its new Burevestnik missile, which is nuclear-powered and designed to carry a nuclear warhead.

According to the Kremlin transcript, Putin spoke with several senior officials in what appeared to be a semi-choreographed advisory session.

Defence Minister Andrei Belousov told Putin that Washington’s recent actions significantly raise “the level of military threat to Russia”, as he said that it was “imperative to maintain our nuclear forces at a level of readiness sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage”.

Belousov added that Russia’s Arctic testing site at Novaya Zemlya could host nuclear tests at short notice.

Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, also cautioned that if Russia does not “take appropriate measures now, time and opportunities for a timely response to the actions of the United States will be lost”.

Following the meeting, state news agency TASS quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying that Putin had set no specific deadline for officials to draft the requested proposals.

“In order to come to a conclusion about the advisability of beginning preparations for such tests, it will take exactly as much time as it takes for us to fully understand the intentions of the United States of America,” Peskov said.

Russia and the US are by far the biggest nuclear powers globally in terms of the number of warheads they possess.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP) estimates that Moscow currently has 5,459 nuclear warheads, of which 1,600 are actively deployed.

The US has about 5,550 nuclear warheads, according to the CACNP, with about 3,800 of those active. At its peak in the mid-1960s during the Cold War, the US stockpile consisted of more than 31,000 active and inactive nuclear warheads.

China currently lags far behind, but has rapidly expanded its nuclear warhead stockpile to about 600 in recent years, adding about 100 per year since 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

France, Britain, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea comprise the remaining nuclear-armed countries.

The US last exploded a nuclear device in 1992, after former Republican President George HW Bush issued a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing following the collapse of the Soviet Union a year earlier.

Since 1996, the year the CTBT was opened for signatures, only three countries have detonated nuclear devices.

India and Pakistan conducted tests in 1998. North Korea has carried out five explosive tests since 2006 – most recently in 2017 – making it the only country to do so in the 21st century.

Such blasts, regularly staged by nuclear powers during the Cold War, have devastating environmental consequences.

Trump has yet to clarify whether the resumption he ordered last week refers to nuclear-explosive testing or to flight testing of nuclear-capable missiles, which would see the National Nuclear Safety Administration test delivery systems without requiring explosions.

Security analysts say a resumption of nuclear-explosive testing by any of the world’s nuclear powers would be destabilising, as it would likely trigger a similar response by the others.

Andrey Baklitskiy, senior researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said that the Kremlin’s response was a prime example of the “action-reaction cycle”, in which a new nuclear arms race could be triggered.

“No one needs this, but we might get there regardless,” he posted on X.

Russian MOD Belousov suggests Russia should start to prepare for a full-scale nuclear test in response to the US statements. Action-reaction cycle at its best. No one needs this, but we might get there regardless

— Andrey Baklitskiy (@baklitskiy) November 5, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin today ordered his top officials to draft proposals on possible nuclear weapons testing. Putin was reacting to U.S. President Donald Trump’s social media posting last week, stating the U.S. would begin conducting new testing. 

It remains unclear whether Trump was referring to restarting live nuclear detonations or tests on the reliability of warhead delivery systems, like the one conducted today with an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, which already occur regularly. U.S. officials have appeared to clarify, at least to some degree, that Trump’s testing will be limited to delivery systems and the nuclear deterrent apparatus, not detonations. Still, there are questions as to his true intent, which could always change. Regardless, Russian officials “assess that Washington is aiming to prepare and conduct nuclear tests,” according to the official Russian TASS news outlet.

Given Trump’s Truth Social post, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov told Putin that it was “advisable to prepare for full-scale nuclear tests” immediately. He added that Russia’s Arctic testing site at Novaya Zemlya could host such tests at short notice. The site is widely believed to have been used for the recent launch systems test of Russia’s mysterious Burevestnik (also known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile

Belousov offered no further details, so we asked several nuclear weapons experts for their assessments on how quickly Russia could detonate a nuclear device – something it hasn’t done since 1990 – and what it would entail to make it happen. Some responses have been lightly edited for clarity.

Hans
Kristensen — Director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists. Writes the bi-monthly Nuclear Notebook and the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook.

“Short notice is relative. The quickest would be to drive a warhead into an existing tunnel and seal it off. But that wouldn’t give them any new data and probably risk a leak.

So, unless they already have one prepared, if they want to do a new fully instrumented test, I suspect it would involve preparing a tunnel, the device, and rigging all the cables and sensors to record that data. There has been a lot of tunnel-digging at Novaya Zemlya for quite some time for their existing experiments, so presumably a new fully instrumented test would be in addition to that. 

Preparing a new one would probably take several months, possibly six-plus, but difficult to estimate because we don’t know what they already have prepared.“

Jon B. Wolfsthal, Director of Global Risk, American Federation of Scientists.

“Russia also has an active nuclear maintenance program as does the U.S. However, Russia tests near the Arctic Circle at Novaya Zemlya Island. As a result, they can really only – barring a real emergency – test in summer and late fall. So it would take them some time, and at least until next year. 

However, if they want to gain a lot of technically useful data from a test, it may take them longer. Just to conduct a basic test could take less than 12 months. But as I have said, this is what an arms race looks like. Action/reaction cycles. Russia will test if we do. I suspect they will not if we do not. 

I don’t know what Russia would test. It would not have to be a massive bomb to be useful. You generally only need to test the first stage of a thermonuclear device to get useful data. It could be as small as 1 to 5 kilotons or up to 15 to 20, but there is no way for people outside of the Russian scientific community to predict well.”

Daryl G. Kimball has been Executive Director of the Arms Control Association (ACA) and publisher and contributor for the organization’s monthly journal, Arms Control Today, since September 2001.

“The U.S., China, and Russia all have ‘nuclear test readiness’ plans and I would assess that Russia would be able to resume nuclear explosive testing more quickly than the United States. 

I just know it would be less than the optimistic 24-36 months for a full-scale underground contained nuclear test explosions at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Russia would not be encumbered by the same safety and environmental safeguards and domestic political obstacles that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would have to deal with in order to conduct a full-scale multi-kiloton nuclear explosion underground at the former U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada.

But, most importantly, there is no technical, military or political reason why Putin or Trump should order the resumption of nuclear explosive testing, and Defense Minister Belousov’s comments are counterproductive and irresponsible. 

The United States and Russia deploy some 1,700 strategic nuclear warheads and they possess other sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Their arsenals consist of various, well-tested warhead types. The United States conducted more than 1,030 nuclear test explosions and Russia 715, the vast majority of which were to proof-test new warhead designs. Neither side needs to or wants to develop a new warhead, so any new nuclear test explosions would be purely for ‘show,’ which would be extremely irresponsible.“

Ankit
Panda — Expert on nuclear policy, Asia, missiles, & space. Stanton Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Author of ‘Kim Jong Un and the Bomb.’

“We know from both open source and official U.S. assessments that the Russians maintain a relatively high level of test readiness at Novaya Zemlya. They’ve also strongly emphasized the parity principle on the testing issue, so it makes sense that they’d take these steps given Trump’s recent comments. 

They want to be positioned so that if the U.S. tests, they can follow quickly. The specific timeline of Russian readiness is difficult to nail down, but they could test probably without significant instrumentation without much difficulty. I would think weeks if there was sufficient political demand for a rapid demonstration.“

Stephen
Schwartz — Editor/Co-author ‘Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940‘.

“The United States has an enormous advantage in nuclear testing over every other country in the world, partly because we conducted more tests than everyone else combined (1,030, involving 1,149 individual detonations), and because we have a very elaborate and well-funded ($345 billion to date) Stockpile Stewardship program. Since 1996, this has enabled us to ‘test’ our nuclear bombs and warheads via extremely powerful computers, eliminating the need for actual underground tests and providing us with critical insights into our weapons we could not obtain from physical nuclear testing alone.

So given that, and given Trump’s recent out-of-the-blue demand that we resume nuclear testing immediately, it is unfortunately not surprising that Russia is responding the way that it is. In Russia, as in the United States, there are political and military leaders and weapons scientists who have never given up on one day resuming nuclear testing. Russia, like the United States, has long maintained a readiness program to resume nuclear testing. It is an unfortunate escalation of at least rhetoric at this point, sliding the United States and Russia, and perhaps also China and maybe North Korea and other states further down the road toward resuming nuclear testing, which has not happened in decades.

Right now, we and the Russians conduct what are known as subcritical tests, which are tests that do not result in a nuclear yield, but nevertheless provide useful scientific information that can make our weapons more safe and reliable. 

Russia could probably resume underground nuclear testing pretty quickly. Satellite imagery from 2023 and this past July indicates that they’ve been doing some work at the test site to expand the facilities there and potentially make them more ready to resume nuclear testing. I suspect Russia could probably do this faster than the United States. Our testing would take place in Nevada – at least that’s the only test site that we have available right now, and it would probably take on the order of one to three years (for the U.S.) to do a fully instrumented test.

We can’t see inside the [Russian] buildings that have gone up, so we don’t know exactly what’s going on there. But, if I have to guess, and it is only a guess, I would say a matter of several weeks to several months, perhaps [for a Russian test]. But it really depends on what their intentions are. 

If they simply want to blow something up to demonstrate that they’ve returned to doing that kind of testing that can be done fairly quickly if they want to actually have a scientifically and militarily useful test where there’s all sorts of diagnostic equipment and they’re able to measure the results, and determine something about the test other than the fact that it simply went off, that could take more time.

If they’ve been planning and preparing, if they have personnel and equipment there, they could probably do something fairly quickly – on the very short end, potentially a matter of a few weeks to perhaps a few months. It could be longer; it could be a matter of six months. But again, if you only want to send a political message that we are resuming nuclear testing, you can take a nuclear bomb or warhead out of your stockpile and transport it to Novaya Zemlya, stick it in an underground tunnel, seal it off and detonate it.“

We reached out to the White House to see what concern, if any, they have about Putin’s order for proposals on how to resume nuclear testing. We are waiting for a response. The experts we spoke with, however, voiced their own worries.

“As for concerns, Russia’s testing could enable them to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons via computer simulations where now it is hard for them to do so,” explained Wolfsthal. “Russia could close the testing advantage the U.S. now possesses.”

Contact the author: [email protected]

Russia has launched the first of its new Project 08951 class of nuclear-powered submarines, named Khabarovsk, which is intended to be armed with the Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped, ultra-long-endurance torpedo. At this stage, details of the new submarine remain scarce, but its completion, though long delayed, reflects the continued priority Moscow is assigning to strategic weapons systems, including novel ones without direct comparison.

The Khabarovsk was launched in Severodvinsk in Russia’s Arctic North over the weekend, in a ceremony attended by Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, as well as the commander of the Russian Navy, Adm. Alexander Moiseev, and the heads of the United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Sevmash shipyard. Imagery released from the event primarily shows the rear part of the submarine, still out of the water, in the construction hall.

The Khabarovsk is described by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a “nuclear-powered missile cruiser,” a broad category that Russia usually applies to nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). However, there is no indication that the new boat will carry ballistic missiles, with the primary armament of Poseidon torpedoes instead likely to be supplemented by land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles and traditional torpedoes. The Russian military also says the submarine will be equipped with unspecified robotic systems.

The submarine was designed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering and is reported to be based on the hull of the Borei class SSBN. This should reduce the program costs and make it stealthier than many other Russian submarines. The Khabarovsk has a similar-looking stern section to the Borei class, including the pump-jet propulsor, which was partly covered to obscure any details.

The end result, however, is significantly smaller, since the ballistic missile section is removed. The Khabarovsk reportedly has a surfaced displacement of around 10,000 tons, compared to close to 15,000 tons for the Borei class. The Project 08951 is thought to have a length of around 370 feet, while the Borei class is almost 560 feet long.

Most notable, however, is the fact that the Project 08951 class has been designed around the Poseidon torpedo from the outset. It is understood to be able to carry six examples of these weapons, each of which is around 66 feet long, approximately six feet in diameter, and weighs 110 tons.

Last week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said that the country had, for the first time, conducted the first long-range test of a Poseidon torpedo from a submarine, as you can read about here.

“For the first time, we managed not only to launch it with a launch engine from a carrier submarine, but also to launch the nuclear power unit on which this device passed a certain amount of time,” the Russian president claimed.

The Khabarovsk is the second Poseidon-capable submarine that we know of, after the Project 09852 Belgorod, which entered service with the Russian Navy in 2022. However, this boat is a conversion of an existing Oscar II class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN). Once heavily reworked, it added the capacity to carry six Poseidon torpedoes but is also expected to fulfill other roles.

Russia has described the Belgorod as a “research” vessel able to conduct “diverse scientific expeditions and rescue operations in the most remote areas of the world ocean.” In fact, it’s considered to service more as a ‘mother ship’ that can also deploy a variety of deep-sea drones, a deep-diving nuclear-powered minisub, and a submersible nuclear powerplant to power an undersea sensor network.

The Russian Ministry of Defense says the Khabarovsk “is capable of effectively defending Russia’s maritime borders and ensuring the security of its interests in the world’s oceans.”

It would appear, however, that carrying the Poseidon torpedo is its primary purpose.

The Poseidon is a unique weapon that we have described in the past:

“It is assumed that the primary mission of the Poseidon is to strike coastal installations with little to no warning. There have been various reports that it’s armed with an especially ‘dirty’ warhead, which would ensure not only the usual thermonuclear destruction but also spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. There have also been accounts suggesting that it could potentially be detonated further out to sea to create a kind of radioactive tsunami that could bring even more destruction and contamination to a wider coastal area, although the accuracy of these reports is debatable.”

“…with its nuclear propulsion, the weapon should have the ability to cruise around the oceans for extremely long periods before unleashing a surprise attack. This is especially concerning, since it would make it difficult to defend against. Like the Burevestnik [ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile], if perfected, it would provide Russia with a strategic nuclear option that avoids existing missile defense systems.”

It appears that Russia is seeking to deploy Poseidon as a new type of second-strike capability. This capability means that even if a surprise nuclear barrage were to knock out Russia’s nuclear weapons capability, it still has the ability to make the attacker pay dearly via a retaliatory nuclear attack. Second-strike is considered the pinnacle of nuclear deterrent strategies and, in a Russian context, traditionally relies heavily on SSBNs. A more versatile second-strike capability could be more important once the United States fields its planned Golden Dome missile defense system.

U.S. President Donald Trump, the prime architect of Golden Dome, has meanwhile responded to recent Russian tests of the Burevestnik and Poseidon systems. Following on from Putin’s bellicose comments on the Burevestnik test, Trump said: “I don’t think it’s an appropriate thing for Putin to be saying,” reminding the Russian leader that the priority was to bring an end to the war in Ukraine. The U.S. leader then announced that the Department of War is to start testing nuclear weapons “immediately,” though the implications of this remain unclear.

Regardless of how Poseidon might actually be used in an operational scenario, the addition to the Russian fleet of an entirely new category of submarine provides potential adversaries with a notable headache.

Already, much of NATO’s anti-submarine warfare effort goes into tracking and potentially defeating Russian SSBNs and SSGNs, as well as the hunter-killer submarines that are tasked, among other things, with protecting them. With its strategic nuclear weapons, the Project 08951 class could potentially emerge as another leg of Russia’s seaborne nuclear deterrent, but one that is able to launch its weapons from unexpected vectors and at huge distances from potential targets.

In the past, analysts have suggested that Poseidon could have a range of 6,200 miles. Once launched, it is also likely also very difficult to defeat. There have even been some claims that it can reach a speed of up to 100 knots, although this is probably an exaggeration. Even at much reduced speeds, the Poseidon would be hard to intercept and may demand new kinds of methods and technologies to counter it.

The result, depending on how quickly the Khabarovsk enters operational service and how many other boats in this class will be completed, could have a significant disruptive effect on the way that NATO goes about anti-submarine warfare.