nuclear

A key aspect of the Trump administration’s Golden Dome missile defense initiative is ensuring America’s ability to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes, the nominee to become the next head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has stressed. This comes amid particular concerns within the halls of the U.S. government about the new deterrence challenges posed by China’s ongoing push to expand the scope and scale of its nuclear capabilities dramatically.

Navy Vice Adm. Richard Correll, who is currently deputy head of STRATCOM, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week about his nomination to lead the command. Ahead of that hearing, he also submitted unclassified written answers to questions from members of the committee.

One of the questions posed to Correll asked how, if confirmed, he would expect to work with the central manager for the Golden Dome initiative, a post currently held by Space Force Gen. Mike Guetlein.

“Per Executive Order 14186, the Golden Dome for America (GDA) Direct Reporting Program Manager (DRPM) is responsible to ‘deliver a next-generation missile defense shield to defend its citizens and critical infrastructure against any foreign aerial attack on the U.S. homeland and guarantees a second-strike capability.’ If confirmed, I look forward to working with the GDA DRPM to ensure missile defense is effective against the developing and increasingly complex missile threats, to guarantee second-strike capability, and to strengthen strategic deterrence,” Correll wrote in response.

In deterrence parlance, a second-strike capability refers to a country’s credible ability to respond in kind to hostile nuclear attacks. This is considered essential to dissuading opponents from thinking they might be able to secure victory through even a massive opening salvo.

Helping to ensure America’s second-strike nuclear deterrent capability, as well as aiding in the defense specifically against enemy “countervalue” attacks, has been central to the plan for Golden Dome, which was originally called Iron Dome, since it was first announced in January. Countervalue nuclear strikes are ones expressly aimed at population centers, as opposed to counterforce strikes directed at military targets.

“Since the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and initiated development of limited homeland missile defense, official United States homeland missile defense policy has remained only to stay ahead of rogue-nation threats and accidental or unauthorized missile launches,” President Donald Trump wrote in his executive order on the new missile defense initiative in January. “Over the past 40 years, rather than lessening, the threat from next-generation strategic weapons has become more intense and complex with the development by peer and near-peer adversaries of next-generation delivery systems and their own homeland integrated air and missile defense capabilities.”

How exactly Golden Dome factors into the second strike equation is not entirely clear. The U.S. nuclear triad currently consists of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers, silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and Ohio class nuclear submarines loaded with Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles. At present, the Ohio class submarines provide the core of America’s second-strike capability, but are not directly threatened by the kinds of weapons that Golden Dome is meant to shield against while they are out on their regular deterrent patrols.

At the same time, there might be scenarios in which U.S. officials are concerned that the Ohios may no longer be entirely sufficient. A massive first strike that renders the air and ground legs of the triad moot, and also targets ballistic missile submarines still in port, would certainly put immense pressure on deployed submarines to carry out adequate retaliatory strikes with the warheads available to them. If multiple countries are involved, those demands would only be magnified. Threats to the submarines at sea, including ones we may not know about, as well as enemy missile defenses, something China has also been particularly active in developing, would also have to be factored in. Concerns about the potential destruction or compromise of nuclear command and control nodes, including through physical attacks or non-kinetic ones like cyber intrusions, would affect the overall calculus, too. Altogether, ensuring greater survivability of the other legs of the triad, where Golden Dome would be more relevant, might now be viewed as necessary.

Regardless, as noted, concerns about China’s ongoing nuclear build-up and the policy shifts that come along with it have been particularly significant factors in U.S. discussions about missile defense and deterrence in recent years. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) just offered the first public look at elements of all three legs of its still very new strategic nuclear triad at a massive military parade in Beijing in September. In recent years, U.S. officials have been outspoken about massive assessed increases in Chinese nuclear warheads and delivery systems. This includes the construction of vast arrays of nuclear silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), as well as the development and fielding of more and more advanced road-mobile ICBMs. China is now fielding air-launched nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and is growing the size and capabilities of its fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines, as well. Experts have also highlighted how China’s growing nuclear capabilities could point to plans for countervalue targeting.

“China’s ambitious expansion, modernization, and diversification of its nuclear forces has heightened the need for a fully modernized, flexible, full-spectrum strategic deterrence force. China remains focused on developing capabilities to dissuade, deter, or defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region,” Correll wrote in response to a separate question ahead of his confirmation hearing last week. “We should continue to revise our plans and operations including integrating nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in all domains across the spectrum of conflict. This will convey to China that the United States will not be deterred from defending our interests or those of our allies and partners, and should deterrence fail, having a combat ready force to achieve the President’s objectives.”

Correll’s written responses also highlighted concerns about Russia’s nuclear modernization efforts and growing nuclear threats presented by North Korea. He also touched on the current U.S. government position that there has been a worrisome increase in coordination between China, Russia, and North Korea, which presents additional challenges that extend beyond nuclear weapons.

“The Russian Federation continues to modernize and diversify its arsenal, further complicating deterrence. Regional actors, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) present additional threats,” he wrote. “More than nuclear, China and Russia maintain strategic non-nuclear capabilities that can cause catastrophic destruction. The major challenge facing USSTRATCOM is not just addressing each of these threat actors individually but addressing them comprehensively should their alignment result in coordinated aggression.”

It is important to stress that significant questions have been raised about the Golden Dome plans, including the feasibility of key elements, such as space-based anti-missile interceptors, and the immense costs expected to be involved. When any new operational Golden Dome capabilities might begin to enter service very much remains to be seen. Guetlein, the officer now in charge of the initiative, has described it as being “on the magnitude of the Manhattan Project,” which produced the very first nuclear weapons. 

There is also the question of whether work on Golden Dome might exacerbate the exact nuclear deterrence imbalances it is supposed to help address. In his written responses to the questions ahead of his confirmation hearing, Correll acknowledged the impact that U.S. missile defense developments over the past two decades have already had on China’s nuclear arsenal and deterrence policies.

“China believes these new capabilities offset existing U.S. and allies missile defense systems,” he wrote. This, in turn, “may affect their nuclear strike calculus, especially if state survival is at risk.”

Russian officials also regularly highlight countering U.S. missile defenses as a key driver behind their country’s efforts to expand and evolve its nuclear arsenal. Just last week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin claimed that new tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon torpedo, both of which are nuclear-powered and intended to be nuclear-armed, had been successfully carried out. The development of both of those weapons has been influenced by a desire to obviate missile defenses.

In terms of global nuclear deterrence policies, there is now the additional wrinkle of the possibility of the United States resuming critical-level weapons testing. Trump announced a still largely unclear shift in U.S. policy in this regard last week. The U.S. Department of Energy has pushed back on the potential for new tests involving the detonation of actual nuclear devices, but Trump has also talked about a need to match work being done by Russia and China. You can read more about the prospect of new full-up U.S. nuclear weapon testing here.

The United States has more Nuclear Weapons than any other country. This was accomplished, including a complete update and renovation of existing weapons, during my First Term in office. Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is…

— Commentary: Trump Truth Social Posts On X (@TrumpTruthOnX) October 30, 2025

American authorities have accused Russia in the past of violating its obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) with very low-yield tests and criticized China for a lack of transparency around its testing activities. Russian authorities say they are now looking into what it would take to resume open critical-level nuclear testing in response to Trump’s comments.

North Korea is the only country to have openly conducted critical-level nuclear tests in the 21st century, and there are fears now it could be gearing up for another one. It should be noted that the United States and other nuclear powers regularly conduct nuclear weapon testing that does not involve critical-level detonations.

For now, as underscored by Correll’s responses to the questions posed ahead of his recent confirmation hearing, concerns about the assuredness of America’s nuclear second-strike capability remain a key factor in the push ahead with Golden Dome.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Nov. 6 (UPI) — President Donald Trump’s calls to ramp up nuclear weapons testing last week have put nuclear watchdogs and world leaders on alert while experts say the United States has little to gain.

In a post on Truth Social on Oct. 29, Trump said he is ordering the Department of Defense to immediately begin testing nuclear weapons “on an equal basis.” What this means remains unclear, though Energy Secretary Chris Wright said in an appearance on FOX News these would not be full-scale explosive tests.

“These are not nuclear explosions,” Wright said. “These are what we call non-critical explosions.”

The comment by Wright echoes the stance Brandon Williams, under secretary of energy for Nuclear Security in the Department of Energy, shared during his Senate confirmation hearing in May. Williams said testing nuclear weapons above the criticality threshold would not be advisable.

According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, the United States possesses more than 5,000 nuclear weapons. It has performed 1,054 explosive nuclear tests, more than any other country.

The type of testing the president is calling for is an important distinction to make, Dylan Spaulding, senior scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, told UPI. The delivery systems of nuclear weapons and the components of the weapons are commonly tested.

Subcritical tests are also performed. These are tests that do not yield a sustained nuclear reaction that would cause an explosion.

“He did mention testing on an equal basis,” Spaulding said. “If that’s the case, in fact the United States already does conduct all the kinds of tests of our nuclear delivery systems and even the components of the weapons themselves that other countries do.”

The United States and most of the rest of the world, aside from North Korea, have refrained from full-scale nuclear weapons testing for more than 30 years. In 1993, the United States signed a unilateral moratorium on explosive testing under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Breaking from the treaty is likely to open the door to escalation in the form of other countries, including adversaries like China and Russia, openly testing nuclear explosives, Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, told UPI.

“What if those countries decided that maybe this is a cue for them to test?” Sokolski said. “Would that provoke any of the larger states that signed [the treaty] but didn’t ratify to test?”

The only country to break from the agreement in this treaty is North Korea, conducting six nuclear tests concluding in 2017.

Sokolski argues that the United States has the least to gain by breaking the moratorium and setting off a precedent for open nuclear weapons testing. The United States’ research in the field is extensive, beyond that of any other country. Other countries, such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea stand to benefit the most from more explosive research while the United States would likely gain little more knowledge.”

“I spend a lot of time talking to weapons designers about this. You don’t test for reliability testing generally,” Sokolski said. “That requires 10 to 20 datapoints. That means 10 to 20 tests of each design. That seems kind of wasteful. You don’t design to prove things you’ve already proven.”

“If you’re doing a design that is totally radical, that’s something different, but we’re not,” he continued. “We’re fiddling with yield-to-weight ratios. There are countries like Israel who have tested once, in 1979, one test. Are you telling me their stockpile is unreliable and doesn’t work? If you want to make weapons you can do it very cheaply and quickly without testing.”

Spaulding agrees that full-scale testing is not necessary, adding that scientists continue to analyze data from the repository of the United States’ nuclear weapons testing history.

“We are still learning from those underground tests,” he said. “Other countries don’t have that advantage right now but we would be essentially giving them permission to catch up by returning to testing.

The argument for more live-testing of nuclear weapons capabilities is that it can insure and assure that the stockpile of weapons is reliable.

The United States has the Stockpile Stewardship Program that already tests the reliability and safety of its nuclear weapons. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, told UPI the scientific community is “very confident” in the program.

While the United States is one of only nine countries that have not ratified the treaty, it is legally bound as a signatory to not violate the object or purpose of the agreement, Kimball said. He is doubtful that this will deter Trump.

Of the 1,054 explosive nuclear tests performed by the United States, 928 have been conducted at the Nevada Nuclear Site in south-central Nevada about 65 miles outside of Las Vegas. The site is the only candidate for hosting further nuclear testing, according to experts.

The last explosive test was conducted in 1992 before the United States began observing the international moratorium.

Past tests at the site yielded observable health and environmental impacts on residents of the region and beyond.

“Anyone born in ’63 or earlier, they were exposed to some level of strontium 90, which was showing up in the baby teeth of American children in the 50s and 60s,” Kimball said. “It accumulates in the teeth because you drink milk and it gets concentrated in the teeth.”

The United States joined the Soviet Union and United Kingdom in the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in part because of the baby teeth study. The treaty banned nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.

Subjects of the baby teeth study were children in the St. Louis area, more than 1,600 miles from the Nevada nuclear test site.

With the atmospheric testing ban in place, explosive testing was moved underground in deep boreholes. This was meant to limit nuclear fallout, lessening environmental and health implications.

The vertical testing shafts are reinforced to limit geological impacts but the powerful explosions still generate fractures in the earth and the leakage of radionuclides, a hazardous radioactive material.

People who lived downwind of the Nevada test site, known as downwinders, have experienced higher than average rates of cancer.

“These downwinders, in their second generation, they’re still suffering from some of these adverse health effects,” Kimball said. “They are particularly angry. Trump’s announcement is a slap in the face to them as they see it. They want to see all forms of testing, above and below ground, concluded.”

Restarting full-scale testing would be no small task, Sokolski said. What he refers to as a “quick and dirty” test, one that provides an explosion but little in the way of research, would take months and millions of dollars to prepare.

“To get data, depending on how much data, we could be talking about one to two years and much, much more money, maybe approaching a higher order of magnitude, a billion [dollars],” Sokolski said. “Those stumbling blocks are the ones of interest.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin has told top Kremlin officials to draft proposals for the possible resumption of nuclear weapons testing, as Moscow responds to President Donald Trump’s order that the United States “immediately” resume its own testing after a decades-long hiatus.

The Russian leader told his Security Council on Wednesday that should the US or any signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) conduct nuclear weapons tests, “Russia would be under obligation to take reciprocal measures”, according to a transcript of the meeting published by the Kremlin.

“In this regard, I instruct the Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the special services, and the corresponding civilian agencies to do everything possible to gather additional information on this matter, have it analysed by the Security Council, and submit coordinated proposals on the possible first steps focusing on preparations for nuclear weapons tests,” Putin said.

Moscow has not carried out nuclear weapons tests since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But tensions between the two countries with the world’s largest nuclear arsenals have spiked in recent weeks as Trump’s frustration with Putin grows over Russia’s failure to end its war in Ukraine.

The US leader cancelled a planned summit with Putin in Hungary in October, before imposing sanctions on two major Russian oil firms a day later – the first such measures since Trump returned to the White House in January.

Trump then said on October 30 that he had ordered the Department of Defense to “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing on an “equal basis” with other nuclear-armed powers.

Trump’s decision came days after he criticised Moscow for testing its new Burevestnik missile, which is nuclear-powered and designed to carry a nuclear warhead.

According to the Kremlin transcript, Putin spoke with several senior officials in what appeared to be a semi-choreographed advisory session.

Defence Minister Andrei Belousov told Putin that Washington’s recent actions significantly raise “the level of military threat to Russia”, as he said that it was “imperative to maintain our nuclear forces at a level of readiness sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage”.

Belousov added that Russia’s Arctic testing site at Novaya Zemlya could host nuclear tests at short notice.

Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, also cautioned that if Russia does not “take appropriate measures now, time and opportunities for a timely response to the actions of the United States will be lost”.

Following the meeting, state news agency TASS quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying that Putin had set no specific deadline for officials to draft the requested proposals.

“In order to come to a conclusion about the advisability of beginning preparations for such tests, it will take exactly as much time as it takes for us to fully understand the intentions of the United States of America,” Peskov said.

Russia and the US are by far the biggest nuclear powers globally in terms of the number of warheads they possess.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CACNP) estimates that Moscow currently has 5,459 nuclear warheads, of which 1,600 are actively deployed.

The US has about 5,550 nuclear warheads, according to the CACNP, with about 3,800 of those active. At its peak in the mid-1960s during the Cold War, the US stockpile consisted of more than 31,000 active and inactive nuclear warheads.

China currently lags far behind, but has rapidly expanded its nuclear warhead stockpile to about 600 in recent years, adding about 100 per year since 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

France, Britain, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea comprise the remaining nuclear-armed countries.

The US last exploded a nuclear device in 1992, after former Republican President George HW Bush issued a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing following the collapse of the Soviet Union a year earlier.

Since 1996, the year the CTBT was opened for signatures, only three countries have detonated nuclear devices.

India and Pakistan conducted tests in 1998. North Korea has carried out five explosive tests since 2006 – most recently in 2017 – making it the only country to do so in the 21st century.

Such blasts, regularly staged by nuclear powers during the Cold War, have devastating environmental consequences.

Trump has yet to clarify whether the resumption he ordered last week refers to nuclear-explosive testing or to flight testing of nuclear-capable missiles, which would see the National Nuclear Safety Administration test delivery systems without requiring explosions.

Security analysts say a resumption of nuclear-explosive testing by any of the world’s nuclear powers would be destabilising, as it would likely trigger a similar response by the others.

Andrey Baklitskiy, senior researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, said that the Kremlin’s response was a prime example of the “action-reaction cycle”, in which a new nuclear arms race could be triggered.

“No one needs this, but we might get there regardless,” he posted on X.

Russian MOD Belousov suggests Russia should start to prepare for a full-scale nuclear test in response to the US statements. Action-reaction cycle at its best. No one needs this, but we might get there regardless

— Andrey Baklitskiy (@baklitskiy) November 5, 2025

Russian President Vladimir Putin today ordered his top officials to draft proposals on possible nuclear weapons testing. Putin was reacting to U.S. President Donald Trump’s social media posting last week, stating the U.S. would begin conducting new testing. 

It remains unclear whether Trump was referring to restarting live nuclear detonations or tests on the reliability of warhead delivery systems, like the one conducted today with an unarmed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile, which already occur regularly. U.S. officials have appeared to clarify, at least to some degree, that Trump’s testing will be limited to delivery systems and the nuclear deterrent apparatus, not detonations. Still, there are questions as to his true intent, which could always change. Regardless, Russian officials “assess that Washington is aiming to prepare and conduct nuclear tests,” according to the official Russian TASS news outlet.

Given Trump’s Truth Social post, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov told Putin that it was “advisable to prepare for full-scale nuclear tests” immediately. He added that Russia’s Arctic testing site at Novaya Zemlya could host such tests at short notice. The site is widely believed to have been used for the recent launch systems test of Russia’s mysterious Burevestnik (also known to NATO as SSC-X-9 Skyfall) cruise missile

Belousov offered no further details, so we asked several nuclear weapons experts for their assessments on how quickly Russia could detonate a nuclear device – something it hasn’t done since 1990 – and what it would entail to make it happen. Some responses have been lightly edited for clarity.

Hans
Kristensen — Director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists. Writes the bi-monthly Nuclear Notebook and the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook.

“Short notice is relative. The quickest would be to drive a warhead into an existing tunnel and seal it off. But that wouldn’t give them any new data and probably risk a leak.

So, unless they already have one prepared, if they want to do a new fully instrumented test, I suspect it would involve preparing a tunnel, the device, and rigging all the cables and sensors to record that data. There has been a lot of tunnel-digging at Novaya Zemlya for quite some time for their existing experiments, so presumably a new fully instrumented test would be in addition to that. 

Preparing a new one would probably take several months, possibly six-plus, but difficult to estimate because we don’t know what they already have prepared.“

Jon B. Wolfsthal, Director of Global Risk, American Federation of Scientists.

“Russia also has an active nuclear maintenance program as does the U.S. However, Russia tests near the Arctic Circle at Novaya Zemlya Island. As a result, they can really only – barring a real emergency – test in summer and late fall. So it would take them some time, and at least until next year. 

However, if they want to gain a lot of technically useful data from a test, it may take them longer. Just to conduct a basic test could take less than 12 months. But as I have said, this is what an arms race looks like. Action/reaction cycles. Russia will test if we do. I suspect they will not if we do not. 

I don’t know what Russia would test. It would not have to be a massive bomb to be useful. You generally only need to test the first stage of a thermonuclear device to get useful data. It could be as small as 1 to 5 kilotons or up to 15 to 20, but there is no way for people outside of the Russian scientific community to predict well.”

Daryl G. Kimball has been Executive Director of the Arms Control Association (ACA) and publisher and contributor for the organization’s monthly journal, Arms Control Today, since September 2001.

“The U.S., China, and Russia all have ‘nuclear test readiness’ plans and I would assess that Russia would be able to resume nuclear explosive testing more quickly than the United States. 

I just know it would be less than the optimistic 24-36 months for a full-scale underground contained nuclear test explosions at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Russia would not be encumbered by the same safety and environmental safeguards and domestic political obstacles that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) would have to deal with in order to conduct a full-scale multi-kiloton nuclear explosion underground at the former U.S. nuclear test site in Nevada.

But, most importantly, there is no technical, military or political reason why Putin or Trump should order the resumption of nuclear explosive testing, and Defense Minister Belousov’s comments are counterproductive and irresponsible. 

The United States and Russia deploy some 1,700 strategic nuclear warheads and they possess other sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Their arsenals consist of various, well-tested warhead types. The United States conducted more than 1,030 nuclear test explosions and Russia 715, the vast majority of which were to proof-test new warhead designs. Neither side needs to or wants to develop a new warhead, so any new nuclear test explosions would be purely for ‘show,’ which would be extremely irresponsible.“

Ankit
Panda — Expert on nuclear policy, Asia, missiles, & space. Stanton Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Author of ‘Kim Jong Un and the Bomb.’

“We know from both open source and official U.S. assessments that the Russians maintain a relatively high level of test readiness at Novaya Zemlya. They’ve also strongly emphasized the parity principle on the testing issue, so it makes sense that they’d take these steps given Trump’s recent comments. 

They want to be positioned so that if the U.S. tests, they can follow quickly. The specific timeline of Russian readiness is difficult to nail down, but they could test probably without significant instrumentation without much difficulty. I would think weeks if there was sufficient political demand for a rapid demonstration.“

Stephen
Schwartz — Editor/Co-author ‘Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940‘.

“The United States has an enormous advantage in nuclear testing over every other country in the world, partly because we conducted more tests than everyone else combined (1,030, involving 1,149 individual detonations), and because we have a very elaborate and well-funded ($345 billion to date) Stockpile Stewardship program. Since 1996, this has enabled us to ‘test’ our nuclear bombs and warheads via extremely powerful computers, eliminating the need for actual underground tests and providing us with critical insights into our weapons we could not obtain from physical nuclear testing alone.

So given that, and given Trump’s recent out-of-the-blue demand that we resume nuclear testing immediately, it is unfortunately not surprising that Russia is responding the way that it is. In Russia, as in the United States, there are political and military leaders and weapons scientists who have never given up on one day resuming nuclear testing. Russia, like the United States, has long maintained a readiness program to resume nuclear testing. It is an unfortunate escalation of at least rhetoric at this point, sliding the United States and Russia, and perhaps also China and maybe North Korea and other states further down the road toward resuming nuclear testing, which has not happened in decades.

Right now, we and the Russians conduct what are known as subcritical tests, which are tests that do not result in a nuclear yield, but nevertheless provide useful scientific information that can make our weapons more safe and reliable. 

Russia could probably resume underground nuclear testing pretty quickly. Satellite imagery from 2023 and this past July indicates that they’ve been doing some work at the test site to expand the facilities there and potentially make them more ready to resume nuclear testing. I suspect Russia could probably do this faster than the United States. Our testing would take place in Nevada – at least that’s the only test site that we have available right now, and it would probably take on the order of one to three years (for the U.S.) to do a fully instrumented test.

We can’t see inside the [Russian] buildings that have gone up, so we don’t know exactly what’s going on there. But, if I have to guess, and it is only a guess, I would say a matter of several weeks to several months, perhaps [for a Russian test]. But it really depends on what their intentions are. 

If they simply want to blow something up to demonstrate that they’ve returned to doing that kind of testing that can be done fairly quickly if they want to actually have a scientifically and militarily useful test where there’s all sorts of diagnostic equipment and they’re able to measure the results, and determine something about the test other than the fact that it simply went off, that could take more time.

If they’ve been planning and preparing, if they have personnel and equipment there, they could probably do something fairly quickly – on the very short end, potentially a matter of a few weeks to perhaps a few months. It could be longer; it could be a matter of six months. But again, if you only want to send a political message that we are resuming nuclear testing, you can take a nuclear bomb or warhead out of your stockpile and transport it to Novaya Zemlya, stick it in an underground tunnel, seal it off and detonate it.“

We reached out to the White House to see what concern, if any, they have about Putin’s order for proposals on how to resume nuclear testing. We are waiting for a response. The experts we spoke with, however, voiced their own worries.

“As for concerns, Russia’s testing could enable them to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons via computer simulations where now it is hard for them to do so,” explained Wolfsthal. “Russia could close the testing advantage the U.S. now possesses.”

Contact the author: [email protected]

Russia has launched the first of its new Project 08951 class of nuclear-powered submarines, named Khabarovsk, which is intended to be armed with the Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped, ultra-long-endurance torpedo. At this stage, details of the new submarine remain scarce, but its completion, though long delayed, reflects the continued priority Moscow is assigning to strategic weapons systems, including novel ones without direct comparison.

The Khabarovsk was launched in Severodvinsk in Russia’s Arctic North over the weekend, in a ceremony attended by Russian Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov, as well as the commander of the Russian Navy, Adm. Alexander Moiseev, and the heads of the United Shipbuilding Corporation and the Sevmash shipyard. Imagery released from the event primarily shows the rear part of the submarine, still out of the water, in the construction hall.

The Khabarovsk is described by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a “nuclear-powered missile cruiser,” a broad category that Russia usually applies to nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). However, there is no indication that the new boat will carry ballistic missiles, with the primary armament of Poseidon torpedoes instead likely to be supplemented by land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles and traditional torpedoes. The Russian military also says the submarine will be equipped with unspecified robotic systems.

The submarine was designed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering and is reported to be based on the hull of the Borei class SSBN. This should reduce the program costs and make it stealthier than many other Russian submarines. The Khabarovsk has a similar-looking stern section to the Borei class, including the pump-jet propulsor, which was partly covered to obscure any details.

The end result, however, is significantly smaller, since the ballistic missile section is removed. The Khabarovsk reportedly has a surfaced displacement of around 10,000 tons, compared to close to 15,000 tons for the Borei class. The Project 08951 is thought to have a length of around 370 feet, while the Borei class is almost 560 feet long.

Most notable, however, is the fact that the Project 08951 class has been designed around the Poseidon torpedo from the outset. It is understood to be able to carry six examples of these weapons, each of which is around 66 feet long, approximately six feet in diameter, and weighs 110 tons.

Last week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said that the country had, for the first time, conducted the first long-range test of a Poseidon torpedo from a submarine, as you can read about here.

“For the first time, we managed not only to launch it with a launch engine from a carrier submarine, but also to launch the nuclear power unit on which this device passed a certain amount of time,” the Russian president claimed.

The Khabarovsk is the second Poseidon-capable submarine that we know of, after the Project 09852 Belgorod, which entered service with the Russian Navy in 2022. However, this boat is a conversion of an existing Oscar II class nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine (SSGN). Once heavily reworked, it added the capacity to carry six Poseidon torpedoes but is also expected to fulfill other roles.

Russia has described the Belgorod as a “research” vessel able to conduct “diverse scientific expeditions and rescue operations in the most remote areas of the world ocean.” In fact, it’s considered to service more as a ‘mother ship’ that can also deploy a variety of deep-sea drones, a deep-diving nuclear-powered minisub, and a submersible nuclear powerplant to power an undersea sensor network.

The Russian Ministry of Defense says the Khabarovsk “is capable of effectively defending Russia’s maritime borders and ensuring the security of its interests in the world’s oceans.”

It would appear, however, that carrying the Poseidon torpedo is its primary purpose.

The Poseidon is a unique weapon that we have described in the past:

“It is assumed that the primary mission of the Poseidon is to strike coastal installations with little to no warning. There have been various reports that it’s armed with an especially ‘dirty’ warhead, which would ensure not only the usual thermonuclear destruction but also spread radioactive contamination over a wide area. There have also been accounts suggesting that it could potentially be detonated further out to sea to create a kind of radioactive tsunami that could bring even more destruction and contamination to a wider coastal area, although the accuracy of these reports is debatable.”

“…with its nuclear propulsion, the weapon should have the ability to cruise around the oceans for extremely long periods before unleashing a surprise attack. This is especially concerning, since it would make it difficult to defend against. Like the Burevestnik [ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile], if perfected, it would provide Russia with a strategic nuclear option that avoids existing missile defense systems.”

It appears that Russia is seeking to deploy Poseidon as a new type of second-strike capability. This capability means that even if a surprise nuclear barrage were to knock out Russia’s nuclear weapons capability, it still has the ability to make the attacker pay dearly via a retaliatory nuclear attack. Second-strike is considered the pinnacle of nuclear deterrent strategies and, in a Russian context, traditionally relies heavily on SSBNs. A more versatile second-strike capability could be more important once the United States fields its planned Golden Dome missile defense system.

U.S. President Donald Trump, the prime architect of Golden Dome, has meanwhile responded to recent Russian tests of the Burevestnik and Poseidon systems. Following on from Putin’s bellicose comments on the Burevestnik test, Trump said: “I don’t think it’s an appropriate thing for Putin to be saying,” reminding the Russian leader that the priority was to bring an end to the war in Ukraine. The U.S. leader then announced that the Department of War is to start testing nuclear weapons “immediately,” though the implications of this remain unclear.

Regardless of how Poseidon might actually be used in an operational scenario, the addition to the Russian fleet of an entirely new category of submarine provides potential adversaries with a notable headache.

Already, much of NATO’s anti-submarine warfare effort goes into tracking and potentially defeating Russian SSBNs and SSGNs, as well as the hunter-killer submarines that are tasked, among other things, with protecting them. With its strategic nuclear weapons, the Project 08951 class could potentially emerge as another leg of Russia’s seaborne nuclear deterrent, but one that is able to launch its weapons from unexpected vectors and at huge distances from potential targets.

In the past, analysts have suggested that Poseidon could have a range of 6,200 miles. Once launched, it is also likely also very difficult to defeat. There have even been some claims that it can reach a speed of up to 100 knots, although this is probably an exaggeration. Even at much reduced speeds, the Poseidon would be hard to intercept and may demand new kinds of methods and technologies to counter it.

The result, depending on how quickly the Khabarovsk enters operational service and how many other boats in this class will be completed, could have a significant disruptive effect on the way that NATO goes about anti-submarine warfare.