negotiations

Turkish club Trabzonspor say they have begun negotiations to sign Mohamed Salah.

The 34-year-old Egypt forward left Liverpool at the end of last season and is in talks to join as a free agent.

In a statement, Trabzonspor said Salah will arrive in Istanbul on Wednesday.

“The player is planned to reach Trabzon in the evening of the same day,” it said.

“The time and other details regarding the welcome program in Trabzon will be shared with the public through our club’s official communication channels during the day.”

Nicknamed the Black Sea Storm, Trabzonspor have won seven league titles, six of which came between 1976 and 1984.

In 2022, they claimed their most recent league success, ending a 38-year wait.

Based in the north-eastern city of Trabzon, they are one of only six teams to have won the Turkish Super Lig.

Salah joined Liverpool from Roma in June 2017 and won numerous honours with the club during a nine-year spell.

He helped the Reds to win two Premier League titles, the Champions League, the Club World Cup, Uefa Super Cup, FA Cup and two EFL Cups, as well as the Community Shield.

During his time in England, the Egyptian won the Premier League Golden Boot on four occasions and was named the Professional Footballers’ Association player of the year three times – in 2018, 2022 and 2025.

In the process, he scored 257 goals and provided 120 assists from 442 appearances for Liverpool.

Salah was part of the Egypt side that reached the 2026 World Cup last 16 before losing 3-2 to eventual finalists Argentina.

Aug. 2 (UPI) — President Donald Trump said Sunday night that negotiations with Iran toward ending the war will resume Monday, about a month after formal talks between the two unraveled and preceded a return to open conflict.

Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One en route to Washington after spending a weekend at his Bedminster, N.J., golf club, Trump said talks with Iran will begin Monday afternoon, claiming, as he has repeatedly throughout the war, that Iran wants “to make a deal.”

“We’ll see if it’s true,” he said. “I’d love to do that. Save a lot of lives. Save a lot of unnecessary power, to be honest with you.”

Trump had called off what he advertised as a massive attack on Iran over the weekend, stating it was at the request of allies and Tehran, which he said had agreed to “the parameters of a deal.”

Aboard his plane, he identified Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as the nations that had asked him to hold off.

“It would have been a massive attack. We were all set to go. But when the allies ask to call it off, you go to sort of say, ‘well, let’s see,'” he said. “And the reason they asked they think there’s a deal.”

Trump has long sought a deal with Iran to constrain its nuclear program, going back to his first administration when in 2018 he unilaterally pulled the United States from an Obama-era multinational accord in order to fashion a new one, and imposed sanctions on Tehran to force it to the negotiating table.

In late February, the United States and Israel attacked Iran with the aims of destroying its remaining nuclear capabilities and inciting regime change, instead igniting the five-month-long war, during which Tehran has laid military claims to the vital Strait of Hormuz.

An April cease-fire created conditions for a memorandum of understanding to be signed in mid-June that was to lay the foundation for ending the war. Amid negotiations on implementing the MOU, disagreements arose over its stance on the vital energy route, which led to a resumption in fighting last month.

Monday’s negotiations would be the first publicly acknowledged since early last month. Trump said the discussions will concern the Strait of Hormuz and led into nuclear talks.

He said that the three allies believe “a deal is imminent.”

Trump called off the attack after speaking with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman over the phone. Trump said Sunday that bin Salman warned him that the consequences of the attack would be unpredictable.

“I mean, will they be flooded with people pouring into their country,” he said. “A lot of bad things can happen.”

Trump said it would have been “the biggest attack since World War II” and “disastrous” for Iran.

The United States is seeking to restore freedom of navigation through the strait, while Iran is trying to maintain some form of control over commercial vessels that pass through it.

According to the nonpartisan, Washington-based Institute for the Study of War, Iranian negotiators may be willing to make what it called “limited compromises” with the United States over Tehran’s control of the strait, though what those concessions may be were not entirely clear.

Iran’s foreign minister says negotiations with Oman on the Strait of Hormuz are entering their “final stages”, as Tehran insists the vital waterway will never return to its pre-war status.

In a post on Telegram on Sunday, Abbas Araghchi said that in a report he presented to the cabinet, he described the negotiations between Tehran and Muscat as “on the way to being finalised”.

Foreign Ministry spokesman, Esmail Baghaei, said that Tehran and Muscat were close to reaching a deal on a new maritime route through Hormuz, separate from existing corridors.

“We are now going to reach an understanding on a route acceptable to both sides – neither the northern route nor the southern route – but one that respects the sovereign rights of both sides and safeguards our national interests and security,” Baghaei said in an interview with state television.

Muscat did not immediately comment on the matter.

Both Iran’s and Oman’s territorial waters border the Strait of Hormuz, the key waterway through which about 20 percent of global oil consumption is normally shipped.

Details of the new route were not immediately clear, but Iran has effectively maintained control over the strait since the outbreak of war. On February 28 , the US and Israel launched strikes aimed at destroying Iran’s missile programme, preventing a nuclear weapon and cutting off support for allied armed groups.

A June ceasefire collapsed within weeks in a dispute over shipping routes through Hormuz and fighting reignited in July.

Baghaei earlier said “an understanding between Iran and Oman on a new route has nothing to do with whether the Strait of Hormuz is reopened or remains closed”. He blamed the US for the closure and accused Washington of breaching its commitments, according to Iran’s Fars news outlet.

“The strait was closed because of the United States’ breach of its commitments, its naval blockade of Iran and all the hostile measures that the United States has taken against the Islamic Republic of Iran during this period,” he said.

Hassam Ghashghavi, spokesman for the Iranian parliament’s national security commission, said on Sunday that mediators were trying to revive the June memorandum of understanding with the US, and were aware that Hormuz remained the central issue, Iranian news outlet SNN reported.

Ghashghavi said it was possible that an Iranian delegation would travel to Muscat again as part of ongoing diplomacy. “This is the nature of diplomacy and this exchange of views continues regularly,” he said.

Two-sided messaging

The comments come after US President Donald Trump said early on Sunday that the US and Israel had agreed to halt new attacks on Iran, provided a deal to end the months-long conflict is reached “rapidly”.

Trump posted on Truth Social that the US was “locked and loaded and ready to go against the Islamic Republic of Iran”, but Tehran and other Middle Eastern countries asked him to hold off on new attacks.

“Based on this request, I have agreed, for the future benefit of the WORLD and, likewise, the survival of a successful and prosperous Iran, to cancel the attack, subject to being able to rapidly make a DEAL.”

Trump said the deal “would include the Immediate, Complete, and Total OPENING OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT, and an end to Iran’s nuclear threat”.

“The Country of Israel joins me in this commitment. Get to work, everybody, and get it DONE,” he wrote.

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, (MBS) spoke to Trump by phone on Saturday, urging him to “prioritise dialogue” and “reduce escalation”, the Saudi Press Agency reported.

US news website Axios reported that MBS expressed concern over Trump’s plans for large, new attacks against Iran and reportedly urged him to refrain.

“We know that, in a larger context, Iran is habituated to dancing to the same old tune, as it is receiving this oscillating rhetoric from the US president about the possibility of another round of confrontation on the one hand, [while also hearing] statements about these talks going well and that a potential deal is within reach,” said Al Jazeera’s Tohid Asadi, reporting from Tehran.

“In that regard, we know that the Iranian side, at the same time, is responding with the same two-sided message, saying that the road for diplomacy is open on the one hand, [while also maintaining] full preparation for another round,” he added.

Dinorah Figuera was allowed to return from exile thanks to her participation in this initiative. The same happens with some members of the opposition delegation

On August 1, representatives of Venezuela’s two rival legislatures sit down together under Washington’s supervision in the most concrete attempt to negotiate again since the Barbados talks of 2023. 

The talks, framed by Washington as the start of a transition, are driven by the Department of State and pair two delegations of ten. On one side sits the current National Assembly controlled by chavismo, led by its president Jorge Rodríguez. On the other is the Comisión Delegada of the National Assembly elected in 2015 — the last legislature the US and many other countries recognized as democratically legitimate. 

According to Dinorah Figuera, president of the Delegate Commission, the primary objective is laying out the institutional groundwork for a political transition: renovating Venezuela’s key state bodies, establishing a new National Electoral Council (CNE) capable of holding elections with credible guarantees, and extending to the Supreme Tribunal’s electoral and constitutional chambers. Figuera has said she hopes to deliver a transition proposal by December 2026, conveniently timed for the Trump administration to show a foreign-policy success just after the US midterm legislative election in November.

Figuera and Jorge Rodríguez first met on June 18, along with U.S. Chargé d’Affaires John Barrett, hours after Figuera returned to Caracas after years in exile. Those contacts were interrupted by the June 24 earthquakes, seeming as though the political track would freeze indefinitely behind the humanitarian emergency, especially as Delcy Rodríguez said on July 13 that the government had “no head” to think about elections while managing the disaster. 

The roots of Dinorah Figuera, the opposition’s co-chair, lie on the left. She belonged to the labor party La Causa R in the 1990s (then an important force in the rising Venezuelan Left) and served as deputy secretary of the Libertador municipality in Caracas under Aristóbulo Istúriz, who later jumped onto the chavista wagon. She eventually joined Primero Justicia and was re-elected as a lawmaker in 2015 before being forced into exile in 2018. Shortly after she led protests denouncing the death of party colleague Fernando Albán under SEBIN custody —a PJ councilman, key aide to Julio Borges and the godfather of Figuera’s daughter— she was threatened by the intelligence services and took shelter in the French Embassy of Caracas for 10 days before fleeing to Spain and receiving political asylum. 

Sources close to Primero Justicia describe Figuera as a principled politician willing to serve without seeking personal or financial gain from her sacrifices. She maintained a very low profile in this role until the State Department elevated her visibility several weeks ago.

While exiled in Spain, and following the collapse of the interinato, Figuera succeeded Juan Guaidó as the figure managing Venezuela’s overseas assets in the US via the 2015 National Assembly’s Comisión Delegada (recognized by Washington as Venezuela’s sole democratically elected institution until this year). Sources close to Primero Justicia describe Figuera as a principled politician willing to serve without seeking personal or financial gain from her sacrifices. She maintained a very low profile in this role until the State Department elevated her visibility several weeks ago. Figuera and US representatives have been undertaking preparatory meetings in Madrid for over two weeks, coordinated by Mauricio Claver-Carone, Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s principal interlocutor on Venezuela.

Figuera has called herself “an instrument” of the reinstitutionalization process. She acknowledges Edmundo González Urrutia as president-elect and María Corina Machado as the opposition’s leader, yet notes she holds “a different vision.” She is, in the role the State Department has cast for her, what Edmundo González was to Machado in 2024: a figure admitted by chavista institutions because she isn’t a threat, and little enough ambition to follow guidelines from influential people in the opposition alliance.

Jorge Rodríguez, her counterpart, is chavismo’s veteran negotiator and the brother of acting president Delcy Rodríguez. He led the government’s delegation in the Mexico talks of 2021–2022 and signed the 2023 Barbados Agreement on Maduro’s behalf. Before that, he was Chávez’s vice president, communications minister, and president of the CNE in 2005–2006. 

Up until yesterday, the opposition’s full roster was not yet public. The opposition’s ten were revealed in stages and through extraofficial communications. In June, El Pitazo confirmed six names: Dinorah Figuera, Juan Miguel Matheus, Ramón López, Jorge Millán, Marco Aurelio Quiñones and Sergio Vergara. The remaining four were disclosed on July 29th: Elimar Díaz, Julio César Moreno, Macario González and Desiré Barboza.

Six are from Primero Justicia: Figuera, constitutional lawyer Juan Miguel Matheus, engineer Ramón López, Caracas legislator Jorge Millán, and recent additions Elimar Díaz and Julio César Moreno. 

Four are from Voluntad Popular, Leopoldo López’s party: Marco Aurelio Quiñones; Táchira legislator Sergio Vergara; and late additions Macario González and Desiré Barboza. Nearly all have spent recent years in exile, or in González’ case, in detention. Several are returning only now, under the process’s complicit US security guarantee. 

For most of the last two years, Primero Justicia has effectively been two parties. After Henrique Capriles chose to participate in the 2025 regional and legislative elections, the party’s official leadership, aligned with Machado’s abstentionist line, expelled him, Tomás Guanipa, and others for legitimizing what it called a fraud. Both Tomás Guanipa and Capriles were elected members of the NA that Rodríguez presides over. What remained of Primero Justicia, keeping the party’s name and recognition, was the abstentionist wing, led by Juan Pablo Guanipa, with Julio Borges as coordinator and María Beatriz Martínez as president. 

The delegation Washington seated is drawn substantially from the faction of Primero Justicia most doctrinally opposed to negotiating an electoral path with chavismo. The party has tried to hold both positions: in its July 27 statement it backed the dialogue as a route toward free elections while, in the same breath, ratifying its support for Machado. 

Who’s Who?

Juan Miguel Matheus (PJ, Carabobo) is a lawyer with a PhD in constitutional and parliamentary law behind the Estatuto que rige la Transición a la Democracia, the legal framework that underpinned Guaidó’s 2019 interim presidency. Elected for Carabobo in 2015, he was among the sharpest critics of the 2017 Constituent Assembly, calling it fraudulent. He is in exile in Austin and coordinates PJ’s board of directors. 

Ramón López (PJ, Distrito Capital) is an engineer and the former vice president of Venezuela’s Colegio de Ingenieros. López sat in the 2015 Assembly and the Parlasur, Mercosur’s parliament. Exiled in Spain after being threatened by Diosdado & Co., he became PJ’s international spokesperson. He flew back to Caracas alongside Figuera on June 18 for the meetings that launched the process..

Jorge Millán (PJ, Distrito Capital) is an industrial engineer and administrator. Millán is PJ’s Caracas coordinator and one of the opposition’s longtime specialists on the collapse of the national electric system. In 2019, the Constituent Assembly ordered his prosecution on charges including treason and instigation to insurrection. When Maduro issued him a pardon in 2020, Millán rejected it, arguing he had committed no crime and that Maduro had no legitimacy to pardon anyone. 

Elimar Díaz (PJ, Zulia) is the delegation’s youngest member. Díaz began in Manuel Rosales’s Un Nuevo Tiempo before moving to Primero Justicia, where she is now national political coordinator and PJ’s political vice-president in Zulia.

Julio César Moreno (PJ, Falcón) has the thinnest public record of the ten. Moreno was elected to the 2015 Assembly for Falcón and is counted among Primero Justicia’s delegates.

Marco Aurelio Quiñones (VP, Anzoátegui) was elected for Anzoátegui in 2015. In his early career, he was close to Capriles and Borges in Primero Justicia and then crossed to Voluntad Popular in late 2016, becoming a close ally of Guaidó. In December 2024 the exiled Assembly swore him in as second vice president, filling the seat left by Auristela Vásquez’s resignation and making him the highest-ranking officer of the 2015 legislature at the table after Figuera.

Sergio Vergara (VP, Táchira) is a founding member of Voluntad Popular alongside Leopoldo López and Daniel Ceballos. He was elected for Táchira in 2015 with nearly 76% of his circuit’s vote. He served as acting mayor of San Cristóbal after Ceballos was jailed in 2014, and has been in exile since 2019, when the SEBIN raided his home in connection with the Roberto Marrero case. He is also among the signatories of the document tied to the failed Jordan Goudreau incursion, asking for a military foreign intervention.

Macario González (VP, Lara) is a veteran Lara politician and former mayor of Barquisimeto’s Iribarren municipality. González was detained by the SEBIN in September 2025 as he left a university in Barquisimeto, held incommunicado, in what Voluntad Popular denounced as a forced disappearance for what he says was 68 days without charge, judicial hearing, or explanation. He was released near midnight on November 19, 2025, hours after the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted him precautionary measures. He has publicly held Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello politically responsible for his detention.

Capriles, now sitting in the Rodríguez-controlled national assembly, cautioned that a negotiation excluding Machado “will be condemned to fail.” 

Desiré Barboza (VP, Zulia) was an alternate deputy for Zulia in the 2015 Assembly and is Voluntad Popular’s regional coordinator there. Like most of the delegation, she has built her recent political life in exile and within the structures of the 2015 legislature.

On the ‘chavista’ side, only Jorge Rodríguez has been named to the time of writing. While the opposition’s ten were leaked or rumored until confirmed, the radio silence from those representing the current national assembly clashes awkwardly with Diosdado Cabello’s boasts of chavista unity. Francisco Arias Cárdenas, 1992 coup veteran and former Zulia governor, urged Rodríguez’s delegation to consult the PSUV’s base and submit any agreement to the Venezuelan public, warning that dialogue must not become a matter of simply following Washington’s instructions. 

The positions around the table

Primero Justicia and Un Nuevo Tiempo have called August 1 a “historic opportunity,” with PJ setting conditions: free, fair elections and the restoration of popular sovereignty. Voluntad Popular was the first to back the US initiative outright. But Acción Democrática’s Henry Ramos Allup has warned against any process that sidelines the coalition and Machado. Capriles, now sitting in the Rodríguez-controlled national assembly, cautioned that a negotiation excluding Machado “will be condemned to fail.” 

Machado and González stated their own position on July 26, claiming they will neither participate in nor obstruct the process, having taken no part in its “design, construction and functioning,” and will judge it by concrete, verifiable results: institutional recovery, the release of political prisoners, guarantees without exclusions, a presidential electoral calendar, and respect for popular sovereignty. 

We know from statements issued by the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, the 2026 National Assembly, and the State Department that August 1 was set as the launching date of a roadmap leading to a political transition in Venezuela.

The incentives for the various actors to accelerate or delay this political negotiation process are clear. The Venezuelan interim government (as the State Department statement refers to it) will have an interest in delaying the process as much as possible to prolong its time in power and preserve the current state of affairs. For the 2015 National Assembly Delegated Commission, it offers a window of opportunity to gain relevance and demonstrate its ability to accelerate the agenda that Dinorah Figuera announced before any other actor. The Trump administration will want this process to proceed at a pace that does not jeopardize its control of the country until the elections (and perhaps even after). It is in María Corina Machado’s best interest for the situation to develop in a way that allows her to gain control and create the conditions for her to be the opposition candidate in the upcoming presidential elections.

Other, less prominent actors will try to influence the process. We have already seen AD leader Henry Ramos Allup trying to position himself, for example, to defend Machado’s participation, as did Henrique Capriles, and other voices will surely emerge along those lines in the coming days. Those aspiring to a new National Assembly and new elections for governorships and mayoralties will certainly also try to influence the process.

But let’s turn to the most relevant conversation, with just under two weeks until August 1: what could be the institutional path to achieving this political transition through free elections?

A new National Electoral Council (CNE)

Since the elections are administered by the National Electoral Council, it would seem that the first step should be, precisely, to elect a new CNE board.

Choosing a reliable one could be the first challenge. What has been offered previously is insufficient: a majority of three or four people close to or allied with the government and one or two “independents” or those close to the opposition. A board is needed that complies with Article 296 of the Constitution, composed of “five people not affiliated with political organizations.”

This CNE must begin with an essential task: the purging and updating of the Permanent Electoral Registry. It is crucial that Venezuelans abroad be allowed to vote and that the necessary logistical and diplomatic conditions be established to make this possible.

A new Supreme Court

Under the Venezuelan constitutional system, the decisions of the CNE can be subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ). Directly by the Electoral Chamber. Indirectly by the Constitutional Chamber.

Therefore, the appointment of new justices to both the Electoral Chamber and the Constitutional Chamber is necessary at the outset of this process. Article 263 of the Constitution clearly outlines the requirements for becoming a Supreme Court Justice. In May of this year, the Supreme Court Law was amended to increase the number of justices from 20 to 32. The Constitutional Chamber (the most important chamber) is composed of seven justices. This increase means that 12 new justices must be elected. Furthermore, a significant number of the current 20 justices are of retirement age.

This, as with the CNE, is debated and decided in the National Assembly, whose majority is controlled by Jorge Rodríguez. It would have to be a decision by chavismo, or the result of a political rupture, for the political rights of the non-government-controlled population to be considered both when electing CNE board members and when appointing Supreme Court justices. This relates to the next point.

Restoring civil and political rights

For several years, Venezuela’s main political parties and actors were subjected to confiscation and persecution through various administrative measures, such as those issued by the Comptroller General of the Republic to disqualify candidates, and even judicial measures to replace the boards of directors of opposition parties like COPEI, Primero Justicia, and Acción Democrática. It is essential to compile a report detailing all these measures and establish an action plan to reverse them, allowing political parties and leaders to operate and return to Venezuela.

Then, reforms must be made to those laws and administrative regulations that, long before January 3rd, restricted freedom of expression and the conditions for holding elections, such as the Constitutional Law Against Hatred, the Simón Bolívar Law, and the Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic. The same must be done with respect to the resolutions of the CNE that have restricted political and civic participation in the electoral processes. Furthermore, cases where it has been argued that the 2026 Amnesty Law is inapplicable, such as that of María Corina Machado, must be reviewed.

Given that the incentives of the actors in this process are not and will not be aligned, as shown above, it is crucial to immediately establish timelines for the phases of the process, beginning August 1. This will allow us to gauge the level of commitment among the parties to move forward with the transition.

There are certainly conditions attached to this process that are not public, and that will shape its phases and pace. However, we must begin a public conversation about ideas for addressing this crucial phase of political life starting August 1.

US Secretary of State says Iranian control over Strait of Hormuz sets ‘dangerous precedent’, as attacks continue.

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio says his country is willing to negotiate an end to the war on Iran but accuses Tehran of not being “serious” about talks.

“The United States remains open and willing to engage in positive and constructive negotiations and discussions, provided that the commitments made are honoured,” Rubio said about Iran at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Manila on Wednesday.

“The problem we’re having right now is that they’re not serious about talks. If they’re serious, we’re serious. If they’re not, then we will do what’s necessary to protect our interests and also the interests of our allies,” he added in the Philippine capital.

This comes as the US launched attacks against Iran for an eleventh consecutive night, with explosions heard in several parts of the country.

As the war continues to disrupt two of the world’s most important routes for the transport of energy, Rubio stressed that he was against Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

“If we create a precedent in the Middle East where a nation state can decide that they are going to control an international waterway, charge a toll, and if you don’t pay them blow up your ships, we have created a very dangerous precedent, which will repeat itself in other parts of the world, including in this region,” he said.

“At its core, it’s very simple. Iran demands the right, which they do not have under any existing legal mechanism, to control the transit of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz,” he said.

“There is a fundamental principle about freedom of navigation that is threatened,” he added. “That cannot be allowed to happen.”

Rubio also discussed the US’s relationship with ASEAN member states, saying it is a matter of national interest for Washington and that the security and prosperity of the US and Southeast Asia are closely interconnected.

“I believe very much that the future and the story of the 21st century will be written in this region and by how events unfold here,” he said.

On Tuesday, US President Donald Trump renewed his threats to, again, attack Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz “pretty soon”. Iran promised it would retaliate.

Iran’s Khatam Al-Anbiya military command said in a statement on Tuesday that it would “consider it as an expansion of war in the region” if such an attack were carried out. The statement said it could lead to strikes on “all the interests of America, its allies and supporters”.

Fifty people have been killed and 500 wounded in the recent US attacks on Iran, a health ministry official said.

July 1 (UPI) — Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner and their Iranian counterparts are planning to meet with Qatari negotiators Wednesday for ongoing peace talks.

On Tuesday, Witkoff and Kushner met with the prime minister of Qatar, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani. They are scheduled to meet with him again today.

Iran and Qatar have said that there will be no direct, high-level meetings between United States and Iranian officials and that all discussions will be through Qatari intermediaries, The New York Times reported. Today’s negotiations will be about the cease-fire agreement and getting it implemented, a spokesperson told The Times.

Iran’s negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, in an interview with Iran’s state media Tuesday, laid out the most important provisions of the memorandum of understanding signed on June 17.

Ghalibaf said the most important prerequisite provisions to Iranian negotiators were Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11, CNN reported.

Article 1 demands an end to all fighting, including in Lebanon. Israel and Lebanon signed a cease-fire agreement on Saturday, but Hezbollah hasn’t agreed to it.

Article 4 says that the United States must lift its naval blockade and Iran must allow shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Navy is no longer blocking the strait but it still has a presence there. Article 5 says that Iran will allow passage through the strait with no tolls for 60 days.

The next two articles are about Iranian money and oil sales. Article 10 says the U.S. will allow waivers for Iran to sell its oil, which has happened – at least for 60 days. And Article 11 says that the United States will make frozen Iranian assets available, which is unclear. The United States has said that Iran must fulfill its commitments first.

Traffic through the strait is picking up, with 34 ships passing through on Tuesday, CNN said, though that’s far from pre-war levels, which saw about 100 per day.

US Vice President JD Vance has touted significant progress in talks with Iran over its nuclear programme and Israel’s war on Lebanon, while refusing to commit to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory. He said Trump is trying to bring ‘permanent peace’ to a region that’s been ‘a basket case for a long time’.

In an exclusive interview, Professor and political analyst Mahjoub Zweiri breaks down what intentions behind US-Iran talks will result in.

Ukraine has officially opened the first phase of membership talks with the European Union on Monday. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the opportunity and said it sent a clear message that “Europe’s progress cannot be stopped.”