NATOs

NATO’s leaders agreed this week to invest 5 percent of their countries’ gross domestic product (GDP) on “core defence requirements as well as defence and security-related spending by 2035”. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte called it a “quantum leap” in spending that would guarantee “freedom and security” for the military alliance’s one billion people. It certainly is historic in terms of military escalation, but will it deliver security – and if so, for whom?

The headline demand for 5 percent GDP spending has been so loud, it’s easy to forget that for a long time, many NATO members considered the previous 2 percent goal either unachievable or unimportant. NATO first committed to its 2 percent GDP goal in 2002, but by 2021, only six of its members had achieved it. Yet three years later, 23 members had met the goal and all 32 are expected to comply by the end of 2025.

This week, NATO has committed to more than doubling its spending to 5 percent of GDP. This will be partly met through creative accounting and reflects a desire to trumpet a big number to satisfy a petulant President Trump. The 5 percent headline includes 1.5 percent spent on military-related infrastructure, which could be broadly defined to include civilian expenditure. Even so, it reflects a huge escalation of military expenditure over the next decade from an already very high level.

Last year, NATO spent $1.5 trillion on the military – more than half of global military spending. If members comply with the core 3.5 percent target by 2030, that would mean a total of $13.4 trillion in military expenditure. It’s an impossible figure to grasp, but if you stacked it in one-dollar bills, you could make almost four piles that reach the moon. It could also be distributed as a one-off cash bonus of $1,674 to every person on the planet.

In reality, the money will be diverted – most of all from social and environmental spending – even though 30 percent of Europeans report difficulty in making ends meet and climate scientists warn that we have two years left to keep temperature increases below the international target of 1.5 degrees Celsius (34.7 degrees Fahrenheit).

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, who fought for a partial exemption from the 5 percent goal, was the most honest about this costly trade-off: “If we had accepted 5 percent, Spain would have to spend by 2035 an extra 300 billion euros on defence. Where would it come from? From cuts in health and education.”

Social and environmental spending is already on the chopping block. In February, the United Kingdom announced it would reduce its aid budget to 0.3 percent of GDP to pay for military spending increases – a year after it won an election committing to increase foreign aid. Belgium, the Netherlands and France followed suit, announcing aid cuts of 25 to 37 percent. The United States, under Trump, has decimated its overseas aid and climate programmes and reduced healthcare funding while proposing a record $1 trillion expenditure on the Pentagon.

Europe is falling far behind on its own environmental and social goals, with its primary funding vehicle, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), expiring in 2026. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) concludes that most European NATO members will be unable to meet the 3.5 percent NATO target without cutting budgets, raising taxes or changing fiscal rules.

NATO’s spending spree will not only divert money – it will worsen the climate crisis. As one of the world’s biggest carbon polluters, it is investing in more gas-guzzling jets, tanks and missiles. Military emissions are notoriously hard to track due to limited data, but one report estimates that 3.5 percent of GDP spending would lead to 2,330 million metric tonnes of greenhouse gases by 2030 – roughly the same as the combined annual emissions of Brazil and Japan.

NATO’s justification is that increased investment is needed to confront the threats of “Russia” and “terrorism”. Yet there is no rationale behind the 5 percent target or details on why threats to NATO have so drastically increased. Nor is there self-examination on how NATO’s actions partly set the stage for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia has increased military spending, but it still spends 10 times less than NATO. Nor could it catch up militarily with NATO’s 32-strong alliance, given its economy: $2 trillion in 2024 (nominal GDP), compared with $26 trillion for non-US NATO countries and $29 trillion for the US alone. As for “terrorism”, the idea that NATO’s increased spending could deter it ignores the failures of the “War on Terror”, where NATO interventions in Afghanistan and Libya prompted instability and fighter recruitment.

The security NATO seems most concerned with is that of its arms firms. Long before Trump’s pressure, arms firms have pushed for higher European military spending through lobbying groups like the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). They have successfully made military security an overriding European Union objective, winning ever more public money for research and industry support. Now they are reaping the rewards with booming revenues and profits. Before the NATO summit, BlackRock released an investment report celebrating the arms industry as a “dynamic growth industry” and a “mega force” that will drive investment trends in the coming years.

NATO’s idea of security diverts money from social needs, worsens the climate crisis, rewards arms firms profiting from global conflict, and chooses war over diplomacy. Its bellicose stance in The Hague this week makes it one of the greatest threats to global security – even to life on this planet. It is up to the peoples of NATO countries to reject this deadly path and reclaim security based on cooperation, justice and peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Spanish PM Pedro Sanchez warns the spending hike would undermine EU efforts to build its own security and defence base.

Spain has reportedly asked to opt out of NATO’s proposed defence spending target of 5 percent of GDP, risking disruption to a key agreement expected at next week’s alliance summit.

In a letter addressed to NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on Thursday, Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez urged the alliance to adopt a more flexible framework, according to media reports.

The letter, seen by the Reuters and Associated Press news agencies, called for either the target to remain optional or for Spain to be exempt entirely.

“Committing to a 5% target would not only be unreasonable, but also counterproductive,” Sanchez wrote, warning that it would undermine efforts by the European Union to build its own security and defence base. “As a sovereign Ally, we choose not to.”

Sanchez insisted Madrid does not intend to block the outcome of the upcoming summit. But any agreement on increased defence spending must be approved unanimously by all 32 NATO members, giving Spain leverage to delay or water down the deal.

Spain currently spends approximately 1.28 percent of its GDP on defence, the lowest among NATO members, according to alliance estimates. While Sanchez has pledged to accelerate the country’s path to NATO’s current 2 percent goal, he argues that going beyond that risks harming the welfare state and compromising Spain’s broader policy vision.

NATO’s push for higher spending follows calls by US President Donald Trump and others to share the burden more fairly across the alliance. Rutte has suggested a new formula that allocates 3.5 percent of GDP to core military spending and an additional 1.5 percent to broader security needs.

Pressure to increase defence spending

The United States, NATO’s largest military contributor and Ukraine’s main backer since Russia’s 2022 invasion, is estimated to have spent 3.38 percent of its GDP on defence in 2024. Trump has repeatedly claimed European allies are not pulling their weight, and has threatened to withhold support for those who fall short.

Sanchez, however, said rushing to meet a 5 percent target would force EU states to buy military equipment from outside the bloc, damaging the continent’s attempts to bolster self-sufficiency in defence.

The proposal also faces resistance from Spain’s political left. The left-leaning Sumar party, part of Sanchez’s coalition, opposes the move, while Podemos, not in government but often a key parliamentary ally, has also rejected it.

“If the government needs parliamentary support to approve spending, it will have a very difficult time in the current situation,” said Josa Miguel Calvillo, a professor of international relations at the Complutense University of Madrid, speaking to Reuters.

Italy has also raised concerns, reportedly seeking to shift the proposed deadline for the new target from 2032 to 2035 and drop the requirement to increase spending by 0.2 percent annually.

One senior European official told Reuters that Spain’s rejection complicates talks but said discussions are ongoing. “It doesn’t look good, indeed, but we are not over yet. Spain has demonstrated to be a steadfast ally so far.”

With the recent pivot in US foreign policy regarding Europe and NATO, it has become clear that NATO’s European members need to ramp up spending on defense, and the time of relying on the US for defense in Europe is over. Many would argue that it’s well overdue, with Trump saying that NATO members should boost their defense spending to 5% of their GDP versus the traditional 2% target set by NATO. This target for NATO members was first set at the 2006 Riga summit; however, that target was reaffirmed and made more concrete in the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge at their summit in Wales, with only four members hitting the target that year. In 2024, those numbers were up, with NATO estimating 22 out of 32 would hit the target that year, so it’s clear defense spending in Europe is on the up. The Secretary-General of NATO, Mark Rutte, said, “We will need more time to consult amongst Allies what exactly the new level should be. But it is considerably more than 2%,” when asked about higher spending targets.

Inevitably, it will come down to the middle powers of NATO—France, Germany, Poland, and the UK—to step up to the plate and take over the leadership roles. Ultimately, this shift in responsibility will largely shape the alliance and Europe for years to come. But is this realistic, and what hurdles will the middle powers overcome to get there?

The US is the glue that holds NATO together.

Since NATO’s inception, the US has acted as the glue that keeps the alliance together, and it is evident from recent events just how crucial that role is. And it’s significantly more than just manpower/firepower, as you may expect.

The middle powers of NATO face a series of challenges ahead in their effort to step up and take over that role from the US. One of these challenges is the fact that the US plays a monumental role in the hierarchy of NATO’s various operational commands, with the US holding a lot of key roles within that structure that NATO, without the US, would not be able to operate certainly anywhere near as efficiently as it is currently run.

 The US also has an integral part to play in NATO’s capability for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), with most of the capability that NATO has being US-supplied and run. An example of this occurred during Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011): the US provided an estimated 75% of ISR assets, enabling NATO to carry out precision strikes and monitor Gaddafi regime movements.

All of this is said without even touching the subject of the US’s missile defense and general man/firepower capabilities, with the European nations currently not having an equivalent.

Defense spending and capabilities

The only way the middle powers will be able to step into the US’s shoes and fill the role Washington has traditionally played is through an increase in defense spending, resulting in a significant boost to their military capabilities. However, this necessity presents several challenges of its own, so what does the current situation look like, and how will it develop?

France has consistently maintained a capable military and spent a good amount of their GDP on defense. Fluctuations in their defense budget have meant they’ve fallen short of the 2% goal set by NATO in previous years.

President Macron announced plans in early 2023 to vastly increase military spending, pledging to spend 413 billion euros on defense in 2024-2030, an increase of 118 billion euros compared to the previous period.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we have seen a vast increase in defense budgets across NATO, none perhaps more noticeable than in Germany, with Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanting to inject 100 billion euros into the German military (Bundeswehr) to increase military capability and readiness. With the German Federal Minister of Defence, Boris Pistorius, pledging to make the German military “the backbone of deterrence and collective defense in Europe.”

It would seem this shift in defense policy is here to stay, with both German parliaments recently voting in favor of another boost to military spending.

Nevertheless, it’s not all plain sailing for Germany. With recent recruitment numbers falling short of their targets, the Bundeswehr still faces personnel shortages. It’s clear that the intention is there, but there are still many practical challenges for them to overcome.

Poland has quickly become a key player within NATO, from having a humble military at the time of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russian forces to boasting the third-largest military within NATO, only behind that of the US and Turkey. Their armed forces have undergone a significant modernization program at this time, too.

This rapid modernization has meant Poland has fast become one of the leading defense powers within NATO, playing a crucial role in securing their eastern flank; they have also become one of NATO’s highest spenders on defense, spending an impressive 4.12% of their GDP.

The UK has consistently hit the 2% target set by NATO and, for the past four years, has even slightly exceeded this, with projects such as the Challenger 3 and the Boxer armored vehicle receiving around £5 billion in funding.

As with Germany, this isn’t without its challenges. The UK has faced significant setbacks in recruitment, with it being reported in November 2024 that the British armed forces had “consistently fallen short of recruitment targets over the past five years,” with some saying that the armed forces were losing 300 people a month more than they were recruiting.

It is also worth mentioning that France and the UK both possess nuclear capabilities, although the UK’s Trident missile system is US-supplied and maintained. Meanwhile, the French “Force de dissuasion” is fully independent.

Whilst it is undoubtable that the middle powers and Europe as a whole are taking defense spending a lot more seriously, and, for the first time since the Cold War, it is being seen as a priority, there is still a long way to go before NATO without the US taking a primary role could even be considered comparable to the NATO we have known up until now.

No natural leader

Other issues the middle powers face when trying to take over these roles are cooperation, coordination of efforts, and political and military leadership. To put it simply, NATO risks lacking unified leadership without the US. There is no obvious alternative to U.S. leadership within NATO. This means the alliance’s future leadership will depend entirely on the ability of European members to cooperate. Historically, however, that cooperation has been difficult. Europe is often divided by differing political ideologies, national interests, and unresolved disputes between member states. Countries frequently prioritize their own agendas, making it hard to reach collective decisions. A key example of this is the long-standing tension between Turkey and Greece—both NATO members, yet frequently at odds due to their history of conflict and territorial disputes. There is also the issue of the European Union and NATO often failing to cooperate, causing frequent internal strife on key issues such as the situation with Turkey and Cyprus.

Nevertheless, there are recent examples of political cohesion, such as the UK stating it would back the potential incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz in sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine come across more as a patchwork than cohesive leadership. Most of the middle powers appear to focus on strengthening their own national capabilities rather than fostering cohesion and building multinational capacity. The result is a fragmented and disorganized approach—unsurprising, given that NATO is fundamentally an alliance of countries with a long history of rivalry and conflict. However, one should never underestimate the power of an external threat in uniting nations and giving them a common enemy, and Russia certainly seems to be doing just that.

NATO going forward

What does all this mean going forward? Across the board, especially amongst the middle powers of NATO, the intention to take a more active role in defense is there. Generally, NATO isn’t in a terrible position, and the desire for collective defense amongst member states has become paramount.

That said, the alliance still faces significant challenges ahead, especially when it comes to leadership; the US has long been the force that bridged the gap where the European members fell short. The US shifting its focus away from Europe has undoubtedly had a profound effect. It was perhaps not until this happened that it became clear just how much NATO relied on Washington for political direction, and whilst it is entirely possible for the middle powers to collectively take over that role, presently, that reality seems distant. Reaching that reality will be far from an overnight process. With Europe’s attention firmly focused on the war in Ukraine, many argue that the clock is already ticking, bringing the prospect of a conflict with Russia closer to reality.