nationalism

Pete Hegseth, widely considered the least qualified Defense secretary in American history, is hardly anyone’s version of the ideal Christian husband and father.

Only 45 years old, he’s been married three times.

His first marriage — to his high school sweetheart — lasted a mere four years, deteriorating after Hegseth admitted to multiple extramarital affairs.

A couple of years later, he married his second wife, with whom he had three children. During that marriage, he fathered a child with a Fox News producer who eventually became his third wife.

He paid off a woman who accused him of sexual assault (he denies the assault). He routinely passed out drunk at family gatherings and misbehaved in public when inebriated, according to numerous witnesses. His own mother once accused him of being “an abuser of women,” though she later retracted her claims when Hegseth was facing Senate confirmation.

Still, the Senate’s Republican majority, cowed by President Trump, confirmed his appointment. Hegseth has two qualities that Trump prizes above all others. He is blindly loyal to the president, and he looks good on TV.

After his installation, Hegseth proceeded to fire top military brass who happened to be Black or women or both. He has restored the names of Confederate generals to Army bases (Bragg and Benning). His petty “anti-woke” crusade led him to strip the name of the assassinated gay rights leader Harvey Milk, a former Naval officer who served honorably, from a Navy ship. And he has considered doing the same to a ship named in honor of the abolitionist and Civil War hero Harriet Tubman. He has said that women do not belong in combat roles, and has kicked out transgender soldiers, cruelly stripping them of the pensions they earned for their service.

In March, he shared classified information about an impending American airstrike in Yemen on an unsecured Signal group chat that included his wife, on purpose, and the editor of the Atlantic, by accident.

He is, in short, the least serious man ever to lead this nation’s armed forces.

As if all that weren’t dispiriting enough, Hegseth is now in bed (metaphorically) with a crusading Christian nationalist.

Earlier this month, Hegseth made waves when he reposted on social media a CNN interview with Douglas Wilson, the pastor and theocrat who is working hard to turn the clock back on the rights of every American who is not white, Christian and male.

In the interview, Wilson expounded on his patriarchal, misogynistic, authoritarian and homophobic views.

Women, he said, should serve as “chief executive of the home” and should not have the right to vote. (Their men can do that for them.) Gay marriage and gay sex should be outlawed once again. “We know that sodomy is worse than slavery by how God responds to it,” he told CNN’s Pamela Brown. (Slavery is “unbiblical,” he avowed, though he did bizarrely defend it once, writing in 1990 a pamphlet that “slavery produced in the South a genuine affection between the races that we believe we can say has never existed in any nation before the War or since.”)

When a new outpost of his church opened in Washington, D.C ., in July, Hegseth and his family were among the worshippers. CNN described Hegseth’s presence as “a major achievement” for Wilson.

“All of Christ for All of Life,” wrote Hegseth as he endorsed and reposted the interview. That is the motto of Wilson’s expanding universe, which includes his Christ Church in Moscow, Idaho, the center of his Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches, a network of more than 100 churches on four continents, parochial schools, a college, a publishing house and media platforms. “All of Christ for All of Life” is a shorthand for the belief that Christian doctrines should shape every part of life — including government, culture and education.

Wilson is a prolific author of books with titles such as “Her Hand in Marriage,” “Federal Husband,” and “Reforming Marriage.” His book “Fidelity” teaches “what it means to be a one-woman man.” Doubtful it has crossed Hegseth’s desk.

“God hates divorce,” writes Wilson in one of his books.

Given the way sexual pleasure is celebrated in the Old and New Testaments, Wilson has a peculiarly dim view of sex. I mean, how many weddings have been graced with recitations from the Song of Solomon, with its thinly disguised allusions to pleasurable sexual intimacy? (“Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth! For your love is better than wine.”)

Wilson’s world is considerably less sensual.

“A man penetrates, conquers, colonizes, plants,” he writes in “Fidelity.” “A woman receives, surrenders, accepts.” Mutual sexual pleasure seems out of the question: “The sexual act cannot be made into an egalitarian pleasuring party.” Ugh.

There is nothing particularly new here; Wilson’s ideology is just another version of patriarchal figures using religion to fight back against the equality movements of the late 19th and 20th centuries. They are basically the hatemongers of the Westboro Baptist Church dressed up in respectable clothing.

“Some people may conflate Christian nationalism and Christianity because they both use the symbols and language of Christianity, such as a Bible, a cross and worship songs,” says the group Christians Against Christian Nationalism on its website. “But Christian nationalism uses the veneer of Christianity to advance its own aims — to point to a political figure, party or ideology instead of Jesus.”

What you have in people like Hegseth and Wilson are authoritarian men who hide behind their religion to execute the most unchristian of agendas.

God may hate divorce, but from my reading of the Bible, God hates hypocrisy even more.

Bluesky: @rabcarian
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South Asia, a crucible of ancient civilizations and modern rivalries, stands at a perilous crossroads. For over two decades, Michael Kugelman, a leading American foreign policy expert and Director of the South Asia Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, has meticulously charted its volatile course. His insights reveal a region increasingly caught between the existential dread of nuclear arsenals and the explosive forces of populist narratives and fervent nationalism. The recent, harrowing crisis between India and Pakistan in May 2025 – a conflict that saw missile strikes, drone warfare, and an almost immediate breakdown of a US-backed ceasefire – serves as a chilling testament to these escalating dynamics.

Kugelman’s analysis begins with a foundational, yet often overlooked, truth: South Asia’s inherent fragmentation. “This is a region where you have many countries that simply struggle to get along,” he observes, pointing beyond the omnipresent India-Pakistan antagonism to include fraught relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and India’s recurring disputes with its smaller neighbors. Borders, everywhere, are a flashpoint – disputed, porous, or simply volatile.

This chronic discord found its sharpest expression in the May 2025 conflagration. Following a brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” a series of missile strikes deep inside Pakistan. Islamabad retaliated with “Operation Bunyaan al Marsoos,” deploying its own ballistic missiles and engaging in an unprecedented drone duel. Kugelman notes how quickly the Line of Control (LoC), which had enjoyed a four-year truce, ignited. “Once again, now the LoC is extremely tense and particularly significant, given that you’ve got two nuclear states there,” he underscores, highlighting the hair-trigger nature of this enduring fault line.

The ascent of populist and nationalist politics, particularly in India, has fundamentally altered the calculus of nuclear deterrence, making escalation both more probable and profoundly less predictable. Kugelman argues that the current Indian government has shrewdly harnessed a hardline stance on Pakistan for domestic political gain. The 2019 crisis, unfolding on the cusp of Indian elections, saw New Delhi launch airstrikes beyond Pakistan-administered Kashmir for the first time since 1971. “I think that one could argue that the Indian decision to take the steps that it did… was in some ways driven by considerations about politics,” Kugelman explains.

This phenomenon is not unilateral. Domestic political agendas in both nations frequently weaponize cross-border tensions. Even if the strident rhetoric from nationalist media in India is partly performative, “that still has an impact on how the public, the broader public, looks at and perceives Pakistan.” This creates immense public pressure, demanding forceful retaliation for any perceived slight or attack, as demonstrated by the furious public outcry after the Pahalgam incident in May 2025. “There’s going to be significant amounts of pressure from the public on the government in India… it was very clear that India was going to respond with force,” Kugelman states, emphasizing how deeply public sentiment now intertwines with strategic decisions.

Fuelling this volatile public sentiment is a media landscape saturated with jingoism and, often, outright disinformation. While English-language nationalist channels capture global attention, the broader media sphere across South Asia consistently ratchets up hyper-sensationalism during crises. “It can be very dangerous,” Kugelman warns, “Because… the jingoism also encourages and at times propagates disinformation. And, you know, that in and of itself is very dangerous.” He directly connects this trend to recent conflicts, stating, “on the Indian side, so much of the jingoistic media content was accompanied by disinformation. I mean, oftentimes it was synonymous.” In an age where narratives can be manufactured and amplified at warp speed, this weaponized information environment makes rational de-escalation a monumental challenge.

The rise of cyber warfare, hybrid threats, and widespread disinformation campaigns raises critical questions about the efficacy of traditional nuclear doctrines. While governments are undeniably engaging in these new forms of conflict, Kugelman asserts that they do not diminish the paramount importance of maintaining nuclear preparedness. Both India and Pakistan have shown a disturbing willingness to employ conventional force increasingly, pushing closer to the nuclear threshold. “The more that you use, the higher up the escalation ladder you get,” he cautions, “and the higher you get up, you get closer to bumping up against the ceiling.”

Disinformation, by inflaming passions and deepening animosity, can dangerously accelerate this ascent. Kugelman suggests that these new dimensions of warfare, far from supplanting nuclear concerns, in fact amplify them. “One could argue… cyber warfare disinformation can deepen tensions between two countries that are nuclear and raise the risk, further raise the risk of nuclear escalation.” Compounding this is the ongoing internal debate in India regarding its stated No-First-Use (NFU) nuclear policy, with past statements from senior officials hinting at a potential reconsideration – a move that could further erode predictability in an already volatile environment.

China’s expanding military and economic influence casts an undeniable shadow over South Asia’s security dynamics. Despite recent diplomatic efforts between India and China, including a border agreement in late 2024 aimed at easing tensions, the core strategic competition persists. The May 2025 crisis vividly demonstrated the enduring strength of the China-Pakistan alliance, with Pakistan deploying Chinese-made jets against India for the first time in combat. Kugelman emphasizes that China remains Pakistan’s most critical arms supplier, capable of providing weapons systems that no other partner can match, especially as the U.S. continues to restrict Pakistan’s use of American-made weaponry against India.

China’s economic reach, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is region-wide. While Kugelman notes a general slowdown in some BRI projects due to security concerns and economic issues – a trend confirmed by recent reports showing a significant drop in CPEC investment – China’s economic influence remains formidable. “This is really just something consistent that’s been playing out for some time,” he states, highlighting Beijing’s deep, steady penetration into the region, reshaping its strategic calculus.

Amidst these rising pressures, the question of strategic stability looms large. Kugelman offers a cautiously optimistic assessment: “the nuclear deterrent is actually alive and well.” While the May 2025 conflict tested the deterrent in ways not seen since the massive border buildup of 2001-2002, both sides ultimately demonstrated a shared desire to avoid an all-out war. “Neither side wanted an all out war,” he stresses, distinguishing governmental intent from jingoistic public rhetoric. India’s rapid, targeted airstrikes and Pakistan’s contained, albeit forceful, response were, in Kugelman’s view, calibrated moves reflecting a continued respect for the nuclear red line. The fact that India and Pakistan largely managed to negotiate their own ceasefire, rather than relying solely on external mediation, further underscores their grim recognition of the catastrophic stakes.

However, this “alive and well” deterrent is perpetually tested. India’s missile strikes, whether depicted as targeting terrorists or military assets, were unequivocally viewed by Pakistan as a violation of sovereignty. “When it comes to conflict… international normative ideals around respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity… they go out the door,” Kugelman starkly reminds us. The very act of such cross-border retaliation, irrespective of nuclear use, chips away at the foundational principles of statehood and international law, keeping the entire region on tenterhooks.

The path to de-escalation and sustained peace talks remains fraught. The Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline, a vital communication channel even during wars, remains open and was utilized during the recent crisis. Beyond this, however, “the two sides just don’t line up when it comes to the issue of dialogue.” India’s unwavering stance against engaging Pakistan until “cross-border terrorism” ceases, combined with its rejection of discussing Pakistan-administered Kashmir, clashes directly with Pakistan’s insistence on Kashmir as a core issue.

Prime Minister Modi’s early attempt at outreach to then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, followed by a terrorist attack, appears to have instilled a “once bitten, twice shy” caution. And while Pakistan publicly calls for talks, it too has conditions. Adding to this grim calculus is the recurring “spoiler act”—often a terrorist attack—that invariably derails any nascent momentum toward dialogue. While India traditionally rejects third-party mediation for comprehensive talks, the May 2025 crisis saw a quiet but significant role played by external actors, with the UAE in particular thanked by Pakistan’s Prime Minister for its efforts in de-escalation, building on its prior role in brokering the LoC truce. This suggests that limited, targeted mediation for specific de-escalation objectives might be the only viable avenue for external engagement.

In a world increasingly consumed by its own inward-looking concerns, the question of who will fill the potential vacuum in South Asian peace looms large. Kugelman offers a sobering answer: “the region is going to be on its own.” While major powers like the U.S., Russia, and China broadly align in their desire to prevent nuclear escalation—a shared concern often rooted in their own vested interests in regional stability—their capacity and willingness for sustained, comprehensive mediation are limited. China, despite its rivalry with India, has massive investments in Pakistan that it cannot afford to see imperiled. Russia seeks new friends amidst its isolation. The U.S. balances critical interests with both India and Pakistan, making broad intervention fraught.

Yet, amidst this potential vacuum, Kugelman identifies a crucial, if understated, role for regional powers with significant leverage. He points specifically to the Arab Gulf states. “They provide significant amounts of energy exports and other goods,” he explains, giving them economic sway. Furthermore, the UAE’s successful role in brokering the LoC truce demonstrates a capacity for targeted, effective mediation. These nations, though not global superpowers, may be best positioned to “suggest incentives for India and Pakistan to ensure that things don’t get completely out of control.”

South Asia, a region of immense human potential, finds itself perpetually walking a razor’s edge. The interplay of nuclear might, emotionally charged narratives, and aggressive nationalism threatens to pull it closer to the abyss. Michael Kugelman’s sharp analysis reminds us that while the nuclear deterrent may still hold, its resilience is being tested as never before, demanding sustained vigilance and creative diplomatic solutions from within and, perhaps, from unexpected corners of the world.

Among the geopolitical dynamics of the Southeast Asian region, cultural heritage has become a battleground of identity that presents both challenges and opportunities for ASEAN regional solidarity. As a manifestation of national identity inherent in a nation’s collective identity, claims over cultural heritage often trigger diplomatic tensions when they intersect with nationalistic sentiments. The case of the Cambodia-Thailand dispute over Phra Viharn Temple is clear evidence of how cultural heritage can transform a simple conflict into a multidimensional sovereignty issue. But behind its destructive potential, nationalism also holds constructive power that can strengthen ASEAN cultural integration through respect for diversity and diplomacy based on cultural exchange. This article explores the complex role of nationalism in the dynamics of ASEAN cultural cooperation, offering perspectives on how such sentiments can be managed and directed to strengthen the region’s collective identity without compromising the cultural uniqueness of each member state.

Based on cases of conflict related to cultural heritage that have occurred in the ASEAN region, it can be said that nationalist sentiment has a major effect on exacerbating conflict. The reason is, as is known, that cultural heritage itself is the “identity” of a nation that represents the nation, which provides meaning for individuals and groups in understanding the world and their position in it. The presence of this culture also distinguishes it from other nations, which is the point of an identity itself. If the identity is claimed by other parties, of course this becomes a sensitive issue because the identity itself is already an ownership that reflects the characteristics of the nation.

Cultural heritage becomes a national identity, which will build its own pride for a nation. As happens in Indonesia, which consists of various provinces with their respective cultural identities, these differences make people from different cultures unite to represent Indonesia as a nation that has many cultures. This form of pride then creates a sense of “nationalism,” where a nation will love and preserve its identity.

Then what if the cultural heritage that is the identity of this nation is claimed by another party? It will certainly bring up feelings like losing self-identity. This feeling then triggers conflict when a nation fights for its identity in the form of cultural heritage, as in the Cambodia-Thailand dispute over the Phra Viharn Temple claim, where both parties have different views regarding the claimed cultural heritage. Preah Vihear Temple is located on Mount Dangrek, Preah Vihear Province, in the northern part of Cambodia and Sisaket Province in southwestern Thailand, which has led to unclear boundaries between the two countries. Preah Vihear Temple was named a world heritage site in 2007, triggering a territorial dispute over the temple’s claim. This claim issue then shifted into a more serious political issue that threatened national sovereignty with the support of nationalist demonstrations. Thus, nationalist sentiments can be influential in exacerbating conflicts and creating issues that spill over into the realm of politics and sovereignty for the reasons explained earlier.

Is nationalism always an obstacle to cultural cooperation in ASEAN? Not always. There will be a role for nationalism in both directions, either as an obstacle or a driver of cultural cooperation in ASEAN, depending on how the sentiment is “expressed.” If seen from the cases that have occurred, it is true that there are times when nationalism is an obstacle. Where the impact of this conflict affects cultural cooperation, such as the refusal to recognize sovereignty and cultural development, as done by Thailand against Cambodia. It also affects cultural exchange policies, which, as we know, can be a platform for diplomacy between countries. With cases related to nationalism, there can be a feeling of fear of pollution of national culture by foreign influences so that cultural exchanges are limited on the grounds of “protecting” local culture. In ASEAN itself, nationalism affects cultural cooperation, which is a regional vision, which in turn creates competition rather than cultural collaboration.

Considering these things, it is evident that nationalism is an obstacle. However, the role of nationalism as a driver cannot be denied and ignored. The existence of nationalism also plays a role in encouraging cultural cooperation in the ASEAN region, such as strengthening cultural cooperation itself by respecting mutual forms of identity between nations in the ASEAN region. Nationalism also strengthens cultural cooperation through cultural exchanges where the cultures of each country are introduced to each other. Within the ASEAN framework, this cultural exchange is a forum for cultural diplomacy, which is soft power. In addition, each country can also support cultural collaboration so as to create an ASEAN image that supports the preservation of ASEAN culture and identity diversity.

Because of the two-way influence of nationalist sentiment, it proves that it is not always an obstacle. What needs to be done is to have countries and nations turn the sentiment of nationalism into a driver of cultural cooperation in ASEAN, for example, by viewing the sentiment as a cultural interaction rather than a threat that must be limited to foreign cultures or by strengthening ASEAN integration, where its role is to facilitate cultural cooperation in the ASEAN region.