Modern

The loss of three U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles to apparent friendly fire over Kuwait earlier today underscores an enduring reality of conflict: despite advances in technology, high levels of training, and the most carefully prepared plans, casualties inflicted by the same side are always a hazard. Indeed, these are not the first blue-on-blue incidents involving U.S. and allied combat aircraft in the various campaigns since the end of the Cold War. Two of those, in particular, both dating from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, appear eerily similar to the incident over Kuwait today.

While we are still awaiting detailed information as to what happened over Kuwait today, U.S. Central Command has confirmed that the six crew members involved are all safe. You can meanwhile get up to date with what we know about the incident in our report here.

In light of that, we now look back at the previous, high-profile friendly-fire incidents in which the U.S. military has been involved in recent decades.

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks, 1994

In terms of overall loss of life, the costliest fratricide incident involving U.S. military aircraft since the end of the Cold War was the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S. Air Force F-15 Eagle fighters of two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq, in which 26 individuals died.

On that date, the two Black Hawks and their crews were assigned to Operation Provide Comfort, a multinational relief effort to aid Kurdish refugees in southern Turkey following the 1991 Gulf War. The helicopters were transporting U.S., British, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish representatives; and a U.S. political advisor in northern Iraq. Operating over Turkey was a U.S. Air Force E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, to offer airborne threat warning and control for the Provide Comfort aircraft, including the Black Hawks. Despite this, the pilots of two U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters patrolling the area misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi Mi-25 Hind helicopters (export versions of the Mi-24) and shot them down.

A subsequent investigation into the incident revealed that, despite the AWACS crew being aware that the Black Hawks were in the area, the two F-15 pilots were not. The Eagle pilots received two radar contacts (indicating helicopters) and stated that they attempted unsuccessfully to identify them by electronic means. They twice reported their unsuccessful attempts to the AWACS, but were still not informed of the presence of the friendly Black Hawks. The F-15 pilots attempted a visual identification, making a single pass each of the helicopters, but this was later deemed insufficient for a positive ID. Instead, the lead pilot misidentified the helicopters as hostile Hinds. The pilot’s confusion was compounded by the fact that the UH-60s were carrying fuel tanks on their external pylons, making them look more like Hinds, with their characteristic stub-wing weapons stations.

The F-15C flight lead fired a single missile and shot down the trailing Black Hawk helicopter. At the lead pilot’s direction, the F-15 wingman also fired a single missile and shot down the lead helicopter. All 26 individuals aboard the two Black Hawks were killed.

After the investigation, which described a catalog of failures, both human and technical, the two F-15 pilots were disqualified from aviation service for three years. Similar punishments were faced by three members of the AWACS crew.

U.K. Royal Air Force Tornado GR4A, 2003

The pilot and navigator of this Tornado reconnaissance jet were both killed when they were targeted by a U.S. Army Patriot air defense missile during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Flying as part of a package of Coalition aircraft, the Tornado was returning to Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait on March 22, 2003, when the Patriot battery wrongly identified it as an Iraqi anti-radiation missile. The suspected hostile track was interrogated by the identification friend or foe (IFF) system, but there was no response. The Patriot crew launched the missile, and the Tornado began self-defense actions.

Both Tornado crew members were killed instantly when the missile hit their aircraft.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense’s investigation into the incident concluded that a number of issues had contributed. Some of these related to the Patriot system and included the threat classification criteria, rules of engagement, firing doctrine, crew training, IFF procedures, and the nature of autonomous battery operation. The Tornado’s IFF serviceability was a contributing factor, and investigators also found issues with aircraft routing and airspace control measures, as well as overall orders and instructions.

U.S. Navy F/A-18C Hornet, 2003

The F/A-18C flown by Lt. Nathan Dennis White of Strike Fighter Squadron 195 was another victim of a Patriot missile during the war in Iraq in 2003.

According to U.S. Central Command, on April 2, 2003, Lt. White was flying one of two Navy F/A-18s near Karbala in central Iraq, which were heading back to their aircraft carrier, the USS Kitty Hawk. As in the Tornado incident the previous month, a Patriot missile battery mistakenly identified the Hornet as an Iraqi missile. The notification was passed on to the Information Coordination Center, responsible for coordinating air defense. The center mistakenly designated the flight path of the Navy jet as a missile track.

Seconds later, a second Patriot battery located closer to the front line also detected the F/A-18C and also mistook it for an Iraqi missile. The second battery concluded that it was being targeted by the missile. The air defense batteries were reportedly both assigned to defend the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, which was driving north near Karbala and about 50 miles from the Iraqi capital.

Since the erroneous reports aligned, the operators at the two Patriot batteries and at the command center became “increasingly confident that they were all detecting the same hostile missile, that their detection was accurate, and that this missile was a direct threat to U.S. forces,” according to a summary of the report into the incident.

The command center ordered that two Patriot missiles be launched, shooting down the F/A-18C and killing Lt. White.

The personnel involved did not face punishment. “It was determined … that no disciplinary action was warranted,” said Marine Capt. Kelly Frushour, a spokeswoman for Central Command.

U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet, 2024

Most recently, a U.S. Navy F/A-18F belonging to Strike Fighter Squadron 11 was involved in a friendly-fire incident with a U.S. Navy Ticonderoga class cruiser in the Red Sea on December 22, 2024.

As we detailed in our previous coverage of the incident, the F/A-18F was returning to the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, after conducting a refueling mission. The Carrier Strike Group had been busy fending off a sustained Houthi drone and missile attack in the run-up to the incident. Indeed, a series of errors and misjudgements meant that the Super Hornet had been identified by the warship as a Houthi anti-ship cruise missile, like others fired at the strike group.

“After successfully returning from its initial mission, an F/A-18F launched again to provide air defense support from OWAs and ASCMs [one-way attack drones and anti-ship cruise missiles] that were inbound to the force,” a U.S. official told TWZ at the time. “They were shot down while recovery of remaining aircraft was underway.”

The F/A-18F was downed by a Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) from the cruiser USS Gettysburg. Both crew members ejected from their jet and were recovered. Initial reports indicated that one of the crew members had minor injuries.

A myriad of issues, some systemic, contributed to the shootdown and the near miss, as we discussed once the report into the incident was published. How all these factors combined to cause the friendly-fire incident is something we previously examined in a study about the stresses the Red Sea deployments were putting on Navy surface combatants’ Combat Information Center (CIC), the nerve center and tactical brain of those vessels.

During the same operation in the Red Sea, Gettysburg also almost shot down another Super Hornet, too.

What all these incidents have in common is the fact that the complexities of aerial warfare make this an unpredictable and hazardous business, especially when split-second decisions have to be made. The proliferation of varied threats, as well as the fact that U.S. forces may have to fight alongside allies using different weapons, doctrines, and operating procedures, only adds to the challenge.

In all of these cases, the incidents occurred in high-threat environments with multiple layers of hazards, some of which can be very hard to detect and categorize, and which increasingly arrive simultaneously. As well as more traditional threats, like cruise and ballistic missiles, and aircraft, these increasingly include (and are enhanced by) electronic warfare and other emerging threats.

It is a sometimes-cruel irony that, while U.S. and allied forces are optimized to suppress and destroy hostile threats, this sometimes makes the positive identification of non-threat assets harder. Moreover, while technology, such as enhanced IFF and datalink systems, aims to decrease the chances of a blue-on-blue incident, these systems don’t always work as advertised, especially in a coalition environment.

Even the close-to-reality nature of combat exercises provides a risk of friendly fire. A case in point that we have looked at in the past involved the shootdown of a U.S. Navy A-6E Intruder on June 4, 1996, during the Rim of the Pacific maneuvers, or RIMPAC. The strike jet was flying off the Forrestal class aircraft carrier USS Independence when it was accidentally shot down by a Mark 15 Phalanx close-in weapons system, or CIWS, aboard the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) Asagiri class destroyer Yugiri.

A much more confused situation exists over the battlefields in the Ukraine war. Here, a much more diverse collection of air defense assets is at work, of both Soviet and Western origin. An even greater potential for blue-on-blue exists since many of the same (or very similar) air defense systems and combat aircraft are facing off against each other. Aircraft missions are also regularly flown much closer to the ground, and in proximity to ground forces, meaning the reaction times are even more limited. Both Russia and Ukraine have experienced friendly-fire incidents, bringing down fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and drones. In one of the most prominent such incidents, it was claimed that one of the first F-16s delivered to Ukraine was shot down by a Patriot missile due to a lack of coordination between the units.

President Trump, speaking for well over an hour, shattered the record on Tuesday for the length of a State of the Union address.

Speaking for about 100 minutes, the nation’s leader touched upon a broad range of domestic and international topics, bragged about his accomplishments and awarded the nation’s highest honors to a pilot who participated in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, a 100-year-old Korean War veteran, and a 32-year-old goalie for the gold-medal-winning Olympic men’s hockey team.

The previous record-holder was President Clinton, famously known for his Southern-twang verbosity. He spoke for nearly 90 minutes during his final State of the Union address in 2000.

The address is prescribed by the Constitution and calls for the president to apprise Congress about the state of the union. Over time the address has become a vehicle for presidents to address the nation’s residents, claim legislative victories and foreshadow upcoming policy goals.

Just over a century ago, President Harding’s and President Coolidge’s addresses were aired on the radio. In 1947, President Truman’s address was the first to be broadcast on television. As viewership grew, the annual speech has taken on greater gravity, leading to notable and controversial moments in American politics.

Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) famously shouted “You lie!” during President Obama’s 2009 address to Congress when he spoke about healthcare policy. Then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) created a viral moment when she tore apart a copy of Trump’s text after he delivered the State of the Union in 2020.

On Tuesday night, Rep. Al Green, a Democrat from Louisiana, was escorted out of the chamber after he held a small sign that read: “BLACK PEOPLE AREN’T APES.”

What looks to be a new 155mm naval gun has been installed on a Chinese weapons trials ship. This is larger than any gun currently found on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warships. The weapon could offer a boost in naval gunfire support capability to aid in future amphibious operations, as well as additional firepower for use against enemy ships and aerial threats, including possibly incoming missiles.

A picture showing what appears to be a Type 910 test vessel with a very large caliber gun mounted in a turret on the bow began circulating online yesterday, but it is unknown when exactly it was taken. The location is readily identifiable as Liaoning Shipyard, also known as Dalian Liaoning South Shipyard. This yard, which is situated adjacent to the PLAN’s Lushun Naval Base, has been involved in other advanced naval developments in the past, including the testing of a stealthy Chinese corvette or light frigate.

Though it is a relatively low-quality image, what is visible of the weapon and its turret aligns with what has emerged in the past year or so about a new 155mm naval gun under development in China.

Specific details about the 155mm gun remain limited, but a picture of a data plate that previously appeared online indicates that it weighs 21,800 kilograms (roughly 48,060 pounds) and is capable of firing guided projectiles. There have also been reports that the Inner Mongolia Northern Heavy Industries Group division of the state-run China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) has been responsible for the design. NORINCO is a heavy industrial conglomerate involved in a wide variety of military and commercial enterprises, including the development and production of ground-based 155mm howitzers and other large caliber guns.

The largest caliber gun in active PLAN service today is a single-barrel 130mm (roughly 5-inch) type known variously as the H/PJ-38 and the H/PJ-45. The design was reverse-engineered from the Soviet-era AK-130, a twin-barrel weapon. The H/PJ-38 / H/PJ-45 first appeared on the Type 052D destroyer in the early 2000s and is also now found on newer Type 055 destroyers.

Though the maximum range of the H/PJ-38 / H/PJ-45 is unclear, the AK-130 is said to have a maximum range of around 14 miles (23 kilometers). One would expect, then, that the new 155mm naval gun would have greater reach.

The larger 155mm caliber could also open the door to more novel ammunition types in line with other developments globally. The U.S. Army, for instance, has been actively pursuing ramjet-powered 155mm rounds for ground-based howitzers in recent years. The Army, as well as the U.S. Navy, have also been supporting work on a 155mm gun-launched glide munition from General Atomics called the Long Range Maneuvering Projectile (LRMP). Hypervelocity projectiles that could be fired from howitzers on the ground and naval guns on ships, and be used to engage land, sea, and aerial targets, have been another area of active development in the United States.

Long-Range Maneuvering Projectile

Other known 155mm naval gun developments elsewhere in the world have historically focused primarily on meeting requirements for naval gunfire support for amphibious operations. China has uniquely relevant needs to be able to bombard targets ashore, especially in the context of any future intervention against Taiwan, as well as operations in the hotly contested South China Sea and other littorals it may seek to control.

The PLAN has been making other major investments in recent years to expand its amphibious warfare capabilities, overall. This has included the construction of the new supersized Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan, as well as the continued expansion of its fleet of smaller Type 075s. China has also been acquiring a fleet of barges with jack-up legs that could be used to establish temporary piers after beachheads are secured.

Chinese PLA Navy’s First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” Conducts First Sea Trial

1/x New lengthy & detailed footage (2nd & 3rd videos) of the 🇨🇳Chinese Shuiqiao-type landing barges (self-propelled amphibious landing platform utility vessels) during some trials with civilian cars
(via wb/齐天的孙猴子) pic.twitter.com/ajphn4m0mu

— Jesus Roman (@jesusfroman) June 15, 2025

A long-range naval gun capable of firing hypervelocity projectiles, as well as other ammunition types, could offer new cost and flexibility advantages over missiles in certain scenarios against other types of targets, as well. The U.S. military has previously demonstrated the ability of a 155mm howitzer to down incoming subsonic cruise missiles when firing hypervelocity rounds that could cost $100,000 or less when produced at scale.

At the same time, the reach of any gun is still likely to be relatively short in the context of modern naval warfare, which is dominated today by missiles, another area where the PLAN has been making major investments. As such, there are still questions about the utility of a new longer-ranged gun in any naval context, given what it might take to get a ship armed with one within range of relevant targets. TWZ explored exactly these issues in detail when U.S. President Donald Trump made his first comments about plans for a new class of “battleships” for the U.S. Navy last year.

This is all reflective of a larger debate over the value, or lack thereof, of naval gunfire support globally. This played a notably central role in the development of the Zumwalt class stealth destroyers for the U.S. Navy. A pair of 155mm guns that would sit fully concealed with their turrets when not in use, and that would fire long-range guided rounds, was central to the original Zumwalt design. The Navy subsequently balked at the cost of the Long-Range Land Attack Projectiles (LRLAP), the unit price of which was pegged at approximately $800,000. That, in turn, threw the future of the guns into limbo. The U.S. Navy is now refitting its Zumwalt class ships with new vertical launch system cells for hypersonic missiles in place of the guns.

BAE Systems – 155mm Advanced Gun System (AGS) Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) [480p]

The Trump class “battleship” design that has now emerged does feature an electromagnetic railgun, as well as multiple 5-inch guns, but also various types of missiles and laser directed energy weapons. The U.S. Navy had shelved previous work on railguns in the early 2020s, despite having seen promising progress, due to significant technological impediments.

China has also been developing railguns for naval use. A prototype design mounted in a large turret emerged on a PLAN ship in 2018, but the current status of that program is unclear. It is possible that Chinese work now on a traditional 155mm naval gun could be, at least in part, a hedge against issues with the railgun effort.

Other countries are also pursuing railguns for naval use, with Japan notably having now conducted multiple at-sea tests of a prototype design, as you can read more about here.

How the development of the new Chinese 155mm naval gun proceeds is still to be seen, but the project does look to be advancing now toward at least initial at-sea testing.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com