After the U.S.–Russia summit between President Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Budapest this October, diplomatic attention swiftly shifted eastward to a region where Trump once scripted some of his most dramatic foreign policy moments. In Washington, Seoul, and even Pyongyang, speculation is mounting about the possible revival of a U.S.–North Korea summit.
According to Reuters, some American officials have begun preliminary discussions on the feasibility of such a meeting, while South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young noted that “there is no reason to rule out that possibility.” Though no official confirmation has been made, the very reemergence of this idea signals a subtle but notable shift in Trump’s diplomatic playbook.
Although there has been no official confirmation, the idea of a US-North Korea summit being brought back to the table reflects a notable shift in the diplomatic direction of the Trump 2.0 administration. After making initial strides in Gaza and Ukraine, Washington appears to be shifting its pivot to Northeast Asia, a region that was a symbol of Trump’s diplomatic breakthrough in his first term in 2018.
Trump’s diplomatic instinct
Diplomacy under Trump has always been intensely personal. His style relies less on institutions or multilateral mechanisms and more on leader-to-leader engagement, what some in Washington describe as “summit diplomacy.”
For Trump, a renewed meeting with Kim Jong Un could serve two political purposes. First, it would remind the world that it is Trump, not Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin, who remains at the center of managing the world’s flashpoints. Second, it would demonstrate his unique ability to “talk to the untouchables,” those seen as beyond the reach of traditional diplomacy.
Trump doesn’t necessarily need an agreement to declare victory. What he needs is a story, one that projects confidence, leadership, and America’s capacity to command global attention. The Korean Peninsula remains the perfect stage for that story to unfold.
America’s strategic calculus
Beyond the spectacle, Washington’s calculus is deeply strategic. Trump’s contemplation of reopening dialogue with Kim is less about denuclearization per se and more about repositioning U.S. influence within two intersecting triangles of power: U.S.–China–Russia and U.S.–Japan–South Korea.
By reaching out directly to Kim, Trump could dilute the dual leverage that Moscow and Beijing currently exert over Pyongyang. Both powers have increasingly treated North Korea as a tactical card in their broader geopolitical standoff with the United States. A Trump–Kim channel could, at least temporarily, limit that dependency, allowing Washington to reassert itself as an independent broker on the Peninsula.
At the same time, reviving engagement with Pyongyang could help reboot the stalled trilateral coordination between Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul. For the U.S., this is not only about deterring the North but also about reaffirming its leadership at a time when East Asia’s security architecture is under strain from renewed great-power rivalry.
Pyongyang’s position: bargaining from strength
From Pyongyang’s perspective, the motivation to reopen a “high-level dialogue” is equally clear. Negotiating with Washington offers a path, however narrow, toward easing economic isolation or securing limited political concessions.
A statement from North Korea’s Foreign Ministry in October 2025 captured this tone of calibrated openness. “There is no reason to avoid dialogue with the United States, as long as it proceeds with mutual respect.” Behind this carefully crafted language lies a familiar tactic: engage only when leverage is high.
Unlike in 2019, Pyongyang is no longer fully isolated. Its deepening military cooperation with Russia, particularly since the escalation of the Ukraine conflict, has yielded tangible benefits, from battlefield experience to access to advanced military technology. Meanwhile, China continues to view North Korea as an indispensable strategic buffer in its rivalry with the United States.
Most importantly, North Korea’s nuclear deterrence capability has grown substantially. The October 11 military parade unveiled the new Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile, symbolizing both technological progress and political confidence. The reactivation of the Yongbyon nuclear complex further signals that Pyongyang now approaches negotiations not from weakness, but from perceived strength.
As Pyongyang frames these moves as “necessary deterrence measures,” they also function as a form of crisis manufacturing, a deliberate escalation designed to increase bargaining value. For Trump, whose instincts favor transactional, hard-nosed diplomacy, this is a game he believes he can play and win.
Yet, the road to a new U.S.–North Korea summit remains fraught with risks. Washington harbors no illusion about the prospects of full denuclearization, while Pyongyang remains unwilling to trade its strategic assets for what it sees as reversible or symbolic commitments.
The question for Trump 2.0 is no longer whether to meet or not to meet Kim Jong Un, but rather, why meet, and what follows afterward?
If Trump manages to sustain dialogue with both Putin and Kim, he could reposition the United States as a balancer in an international order increasingly defined by overlapping rivalries rather than clear blocs. But if his efforts falter, Washington risks ceding ground to Moscow and Beijing, both of which are expanding their influence through direct engagement with Pyongyang.
A new kind of summit
If another Trump–Kim summit materializes in the coming months, it will not be a replay of Singapore 2018 or Hanoi 2019. This time, the performance will likely be more pragmatic, less idealistic, and perhaps even more calculated. Both leaders now understand the limits of what diplomacy can achieve and also the power of what a meeting alone can symbolize.
In a region where every gesture carries strategic weight, even the act of “showing up” becomes a message in itself. For Trump, that message would be simple but powerful: that the U.S. still holds the initiative, not through coercion, but through presence.
And for Kim Jong Un, it would reaffirm that Pyongyang, once again, cannot be ignored.
Whether or not the summit happens, Trump’s renewed focus on the Korean Peninsula reveals something deeper about his worldview. In an era where global power is contested on multiple fronts, symbolic diplomacy—the art of turning visibility into leverage—has become a strategic tool in its own right.
The question is not whether Trump and Kim can achieve a breakthrough. It is whether both can once again use each other to tell the stories they need: one of restored American dominance and one of North Korean resilience.
Either way, the stage is set. The spotlight, once more, is on the Peninsula.
