Iraq

At a highly sensitive juncture, and amid increasing talk regarding the possibility of a third round of regional escalation, Iraqis are confronted with a fateful question: Is there someone seeking to make Iraq a part of this conflict – not merely a venue from which messages are dispatched or through which pressure is managed, but rather one of its open arenas?

There can be no avoiding the question, as the answer is linked to Iraqi blood, state sovereignty, the future of the economy, and Iraq’s standing among its brethren, neighbors, and the world. The matter is no longer a limited security issue; rather, it is a question of statehood, destiny, and direction, as well as a question of Iraq’s ability to protect itself from being dragged into what it does not want.

Repeated attempts to use Iraqi territory to target fraternal and neighboring Arab countries – the latest of which was the announced targeting of Saudi Arabia, preceded by the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan – reveal that we are facing a systematic trajectory rather than an isolated incident. If not decisively resolved, this trajectory could transform into a de facto policy.

Should the state succumb to the blackmail of forces acting outside its authority, it loses not only its security decision-making power but the very meaning of statehood itself. Iraq must not remain a conduit for messages, a proxy mailbox for others, a negotiating card in their conflicts, or an arena pushed forward during every regional escalation.

The problem is no longer about issuing a statement after each incident or settling for a reassuring narrative that does not prevent the recurrence of danger. The deeper problem is the existence of a repeating pattern that consumes Iraq’s political and moral capital, leaving the government to face the consequences of actions that do not reflect its own decisions. The longer a decisive resolution is delayed, the more a dangerous perception takes root abroad that the Iraqi state alone does not control its security decisions. This is an unfair image of Iraq and harmful to its interests, but it cannot be corrected by words alone.

Sovereignty is not safeguarded through slogans; rather, it is maintained by the state’s capacity to serve as the sole authority for force and decision-making. Consequently, restricting weapons to state control is neither a stance against any faction nor a detraction from anyone’s sacrifices. Instead, it is a prerequisite for the survival of the state and the protection of everyone. A state that does not hold exclusive authority over the decisions of war and peace can neither demand that others respect its borders, reassure its citizens, nor build stable relations with its neighborhood. It is in the interest of all forces, above all others, for the state to be strong, because a weak state protects no one; instead, it leaves everyone exposed.

Today, under highly sensitive circumstances, the Iraqi government is working to reconnect Iraq with its Arab, regional, and international surroundings, and to sincerely leverage available support and openness to serve the interests of Iraqis. These efforts deserve support – not because they are the efforts of a specific government, but because they represent the trajectory of a state. However, there are those, both internally and externally, who do not want Iraq to move past the logic of conflict and axes, and who seek to undermine any attempt to solidify its position as a balanced, secure partner state that is capable of speaking for itself, rather than for others.

The truth is that the Arabs, despite all the complexities that have affected the relationship, have not turned their backs on Iraq; rather, they have continued to view it as a pivotal country indispensable to regional stability. Throughout the difficult years, there remained an Arab readiness to embrace Iraq and restore it to its natural position, out of belief in its role, presence, and civilized and political depth. The problem has never been an Arab desire to break ties with Iraq; rather, it lay in Iraq’s ability to present itself as a state with a single decision-making authority – not a country where decisions are contested between the government and factions, the constitution and weapons, and national interest and wills that do not emanate from Iraqi state institutions. It is unfortunate that opportunities for openness and trust are squandered due to practices that reflect neither the will of Iraqis nor the interest of their state.

The risk of slipping today is greater than some believe. Every uncalculated action could drag Iraq into a confrontation it does not want, and every use of its territory outside state decisions could push it an additional step toward isolation. Isolation is neither heroism, an interest, nor a viable option in a world where countries thrive on economy, partnerships, investment, and trust. Every armed message launched outside the state is met with a message of concern from the investor, the partner, and the fraternal state, and every new disruption reflects on the market, labor, energy, banks, and Iraq’s image in the world. Iraq needs projects, energy, job opportunities, education, infrastructure, and openness – not more anxiety, armed messages, and alignments that deplete it.

We must be candid with our people: statements are no longer enough. Neither the domestic public is convinced by statements, nor is the outside world reassured by them. What preserves Iraq’s standing is action: a professional investigation, fair accountability, real control, and a clear decision that no entity, regardless of its title, can place the country in war, isolation, or economic loss. Backing the government along this path is a national duty, because it is a support for the state, its right to protect sovereignty, preserve relations, and build the future.

Iraq is subordinate to no one, an enemy to no one, and an arena for no one. It is a great homeland, and the decision of war and peace within it belongs to the Iraqis and their state alone. This is the hour of the state, the hour of reason, and the hour to say clearly: Iraq first.

BERLIN: Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi said on Tuesday that he discussed selling oil to Europe during visits to France and Germany, as Baghdad seeks to diversify its export routes and reduce its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

During a press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin, Zaidi said “we want to expand and diversify our export routes”.

He added that “Iraq cannot remain hostage to a single corridor” as recent events have demonstrated, referring to the Strait of Hormuz, which has been blockaded by Iran during the Middle East war.

Zaidi said that he had discussed oil exports to Europe with Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, whom he met in Paris on Monday.

Crude oil sales account for nearly 90 percent of Iraq’s revenue but its exports have been hurt by the outbreak of the Middle East war between Iran and the United States.

Before the war began in February, Iraq produced around four million barrels per day, and exported an average of 3.4 million bpd, mostly via Hormuz.

Most of its oil exports go to East Asia, with China and India its largest buyers.

Due to the disruption, Iraq began exporting crude using tanker trucks through Syria, as well as through a pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, although these routes can handle only a fraction of its usual sea-bound trade.

Zaidi said that Baghdad could “double its oil exports through the Mediterranean” to supply markets in Europe and the United States.

Zaidi, who hopes to increase Iraq’s oil production to 10 million barrels per day, said that “a large share, or nearly half, can go to European countries and the West”.

He said that Iraq and Germany were expected to reach “an understanding on the export of crude oil” while Baghdad would purchase German technology and equipment.

Merz said that the main focus for Iraqi-German cooperation is the economy.

“Many German companies are now active in Iraq. They are developing new solutions, for example for energy supply,” he said, adding that “the best example is an agreement on Iraq’s electricity supply, which we will sign today”.

Merz also expressed his concerns after Yemen’s Houthis cemented their control over the Bab al-Mandab waterway at the entrance to the Red Sea, a vital route for Saudi oil exports.

“This further exacerbates the situation on the energy markets, and also affects Germany,” he said.

PARIS: France and Iraq on Monday called for a “diversification of export routes” for oil and gas in the Middle East in response to the instability generated by the conflict between the United States and Iran, following talks in Paris.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Iraq’s Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi stressed the importance of “regional interconnections” and export route diversification to “ensure regional energy security”, in a joint statement.

Zaidi visited the Elysee Paris on his first trip to Europe since taking office in May and is also expected in Berlin on Tuesday.

The visit comes as the situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate, with the Iran-backed Houthi rebels cementing their hold on the Bab Al-Mandab strait on Friday, adding to the crisis of Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and driving oil prices up.

On Monday, French energy giant TotalEnergies signed a memorandum of understanding with Iraq on liquefied natural gas supplies and agreed to discuss further energy projects.

TotalEnergies chief Patrick Pouyanne “affirmed the company’s readiness to cooperate with Iraq in the oil and energy sectors”, noting the company planned to increase its investments in Iraq to $16 billion from $12 billion, during a meeting with Zaidi.

The two countries, which in recent years have been involved in the fight against the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group, also agreed to deepen defence cooperation.

They signed a strategic roadmap on the acquisition of French military equipment as Iraq seeks to modernise its armed forces and strengthen its sovereignty capabilities.

French drone company Harmattan AI separately signed a letter of intent with Iraq’s defence ministry concerning autonomous air-defence systems.

Several other agreements were signed in areas including development assistance, education, civil aviation and electricity infrastructure.

Tehran, Iran – Another attempt to clinch a deal between Iran and Oman to restore some traffic to the Strait of Hormuz has been set back by a lack of regional consensus on the future of the waterway.

Officials from Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations – minus objecting Bahrain – were scheduled to meet in Oman’s port city of Salalah on Monday to confer on new temporary routes in the Strait of Hormuz amid Tehran’s ongoing hot-and-cold war with the United States.

On Sunday night, the region’s officials announced the postponement of the meeting, without giving a new date. None of the stakeholders gave any indication that the postponement was directly linked to recent Houthi and Iraqi militia attacks on Saudi Arabia.

However, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Saudi objection was the reason for the postponement, without providing further details.

US media outlets Axios and CNN reported that Saudi Arabia had submitted amendments to the Iran-Oman proposal for Hormuz because it had concerns that the wording would establish a new status quo which would be unacceptable to Riyadh.

It comes days after Saudi Arabia shut down its critical East-West oil pipeline – the kingdom’s key route for energy exports – after drone attacks in the area originating from Iraq. US President Donald Trump said these attacks were likely conducted at Tehran’s behest.

Saudi Arabia has also faced repeated attacks by the Houthis, who took control of Yemen’s Red Sea coast over the weekend.

Hours after the Salalah meeting was postponed, the Saudi civil defence issued alerts for Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran in southern and western parts of the kingdom. The Houthis claimed to have fired dozens of ballistic missiles and drones at military facilities in Khamis Mushait, in retaliation for air strikes across Yemen, which it blames on Saudi Arabia.

What comes next?

Iran has said it will engage with the US on the future of the Strait of Hormuz and ending the war only if there are tangible moves to lift Washington’s naval blockade on the country and return to the June memorandum of understanding.

With continued disruptions to the passage of vessels through the strait, Iran has signalled that it intends to continue pursuing the bilateral agreement with Oman over Hormuz, which it said was finalised last month.

“In consultation with Oman, in the next step, we will make a decision on how to announce or register the agreement,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei told reporters during a weekly news conference on Monday.

When the two countries initially advanced the bilateral deal, Trump threatened to bomb Oman if it “gets in the way” of US talks with Iran.

Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera that Tehran wants to use its leverage over Hormuz for regional legitimacy – and ultimately to pressure the US.

“The broader the regional buy-in, the harder it becomes for the US to dismiss the arrangement as an Iranian diktat,” he told Al Jazeera.

GCC states, suffering from a sharp decrease in energy receipts, want ships moving and their economies insulated from a war they neither started nor can end. But Vaez said Washington is unlikely to lift the blockade on Iran even if the region blesses the arrangement between Muscat and Tehran.

“[The US] will find it much harder to sustain a policy that its own partners increasingly see as perpetuating the crisis,” Vaez said

Temporary entry and exit

The Omani-Iranian planned agreement envisions temporary entry and exit routes for commercial vessels in the strait, with Tehran repeatedly stating that this would not mean that the Strait of Hormuz has reopened.

Iran and Oman are the only two countries with territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. The proposed inbound corridor reportedly goes through Iranian waters, while the outbound corridor mostly passes through Omani waters, with small parts still in Iranian territory.

During Monday’s scheduled meeting, Iran and Oman were supposed to share precise maps and discuss the details of the routes with GCC members Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, and Iraq, which is outside the bloc. The deal could reportedly include voluntary tolls to fund navigation, environmental protection and search-and-rescue operations.

Bahrain, which has borne the brunt of Iranian attacks since the US-Israel war on Iran started at the end of February, said it would not participate in the forum since it would amount to “appeasement”. The Tasnim news outlet, affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), claimed Israel pushed Bahrain to refuse participation.

How does Yemen fit in this picture?

The latest diplomatic movement comes after days of explosive developments in Yemen, when the Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, essentially took control of the Bab al-Mandeb strait and the Red Sea after a lightning offensive against government forces.

Thomas Juneau, assistant professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa, said the Houthi advances represent a significant gain for Iran. Its Yemeni allies’ position in the Red Sea offers Iran an important new bargaining chip in future negotiations with the US.

“The Houthis are not a simple arm of Iranian foreign policy. They operate largely based on their own interests, and do not take and execute Iranian commands,” he told Al Jazeera. “But Houthi and Iranian interests are largely, if not always fully, aligned. They cooperate closely on the basis of those shared interests.”

Juneau sees the ability for Iran and the Houthis to potentially partially block traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb – two of the world’s most crucial maritime bottlenecks – would give them tremendous influence over the global economy, and thus the US.

The Houthis are trying to seize the opportunity to “institutionalise the de facto reality of their veto on maritime traffic” in the southern Red Sea and replicate partial Iranian success in doing the same in the Strait of Hormuz, Juneau said.

Iran has stressed that their allies’ gains in the Red Sea cannot be separated from the Saudi-led blockade and attacks on Houthi areas in Yemen since 2015.

“We know very well that continued war between Islamic countries in the region only has one winner, and that winner is no one but the Zionist regime, which is after persisting tensions and conflict in our region and between Islamic countries,” Iranian spokesperson Baghaei said.

Saudi Arabia has closed a critical oil pipeline after it was attacked by drones launched from Iraq, as conflict in the Middle East widens.

Iraq said it had fired a military commander and launched an investigation after admitting the drone attack on its neighbour’s East-West pipeline had originated in one of its provinces bordering Iran.

The 1,200km (745 mile) pipeline has helped Saudi Arabia – the world’s largest crude oil exporter – bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

The incident comes amid a major advance by the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, putting more pressure on global oil shipping routes as the US-Iran war stretches into its seventh month.

Riyadh on Friday said it had shut the pipeline as a precaution, as satellite images of scorched ground and smoke near the site emerged.

The foreign ministry said the attack resulted in some injuries and damage, which was still being assessed.

The pipeline has been moving 4% to 5% of global oil supply, news agency Reuters has reported, citing ship tracking companies and analysts.

Saudi Arabia has chosen not to retaliate at this stage, its foreign ministry says, following a call from Iraq’s prime minister.

It said the kingdom would “support the efforts of the Iraqi government” to “prevent attacks” launched from the country against neighbouring states.

“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia affirms that it reserves its right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its sovereignty and security, protect its facilities, and ensure the safety of its citizens and residents,” the statement added.

The Iraqi prime minister’s office in its own statement said the operations commander in the Maysan governorate – a province which borders Iran – had been removed from his post following confirmation the drone attack had been launched from that region.

BAGHDAD: Iraq ordered the closure of ​the Shalamcheh border crossing between Iraq and Iran as a precautionary measure ‌after ‌the ​latest ‌drone ⁠attacks ​on Saudi Arabia, two ⁠security sources told Reuters on Saturday.

The sources said ⁠a wide-scale ‌operation ‌was ​underway ‌to pursue perpetrators ‌of the attack on Saudi Arabia.

Riyadh said ‌on Friday its vital East-West pipeline ⁠was attacked ⁠by drones that were launched from Iraq.

Iraq’s ruling coalition has been forced to abandon plans to create deputy prime minister posts amid disputes over bringing weapons under state control, while sources say political factions are moving to recalculate their shares of the remaining vacant ministries.

Since parliament has approved Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government on May 15, 2026, giving the green light to 14 out of 23 ministers, political disputes have prevented appointments to nine portfolios, most notably the interior and defense ministries.

A more complicated dispute involved attempts by forces within the Coordination Framework to create four deputy prime minister posts. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq was among the leading proponents, with its leader, Qais al-Khazali, putting forward his brother Laith al-Khazali for one of the positions.

Reliable sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq had sought the post after formally agreeing to the plan to bring weapons under state control, but US objections blocked the appointment.

The sources described a “test of strength” between al-Zaidi and Coordination Framework forces because of the overlap between completing the Cabinet and the weapons issue. Scrapping the deputy prime minister posts, they said, opens the door to bargaining and forces all sides to recalculate the points assigned to ministries.

Observers believe efforts to complete the Cabinet began to falter as some political forces backed away from the weapons plan.

Al-Zaidi had made bringing arms under state control a key pillar of his government program. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and other factions later joined the proposed settlement in hopes of easing international pressure.

Sources said the Coordination Framework’s latest meeting exposed sharp divisions between leaders opposed to creating deputy PM posts and others insisting on them, preventing the coalition from issuing a statement afterward.

Al-Zaidi has held a series of meetings with Coordination Framework leaders in recent days in an effort to reach agreement on completing his Cabinet, particularly after his government marked its first 100 days.

Figures close to the prime minister’s office said he urged ruling coalition leaders to continue supporting the government in resolving outstanding issues, including bringing weapons under state control, combating corruption and filling Cabinet vacancies, regardless of disputes over deputy prime minister posts.

Under Iraq’s informal power-sharing system, ministries are distributed among election-winning political forces according to points based on each party’s number of parliamentary seats.

Legal and legislative affairs researcher Saif al-Saadi told Asharq Al-Awsat that scrapping the deputy PM posts would increase the value of the remaining portfolios, with sovereign ministries potentially worth 15 to 20 points and service ministries 10 to 12.

Al-Saadi expected two or three ministries to be filled, while the rest could remain under acting ministers because of domestic and external factors. He said the United States opposes militia-linked figures taking senior government posts, while competition among Shiite political forces is delaying agreement on candidates for the vacant portfolios.

US says its forces ‘successfully’ completed a wave of strikes against Iranian targets, accusing the IRGC of attempted attacks on shipping and US service members.

Six months into the war on Iran, the largest US oil companies have posted their biggest profits since 2022, selling less oil at far higher prices. But the conflict is also putting their longstanding Gulf investments at risk, exposing the industry’s uneasy balance between wartime gains and mounting geopolitical vulnerability for investors worldwide.

Since the war began on February 28, Brent crude has risen about 22 percent, from $72 to $88 a barrel.

The Strait of Hormuz – through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas was shipped before the war – remains largely closed to commercial traffic, though Iran and Oman agreed last week on a temporary maritime route. Iran says the strait will not fully reopen until the United States fulfils its commitments under a lapsed interim peace deal, leaving longer-term security and management arrangements unresolved.

In the absence of a lasting resolution, the disruption is likely to continue supporting higher energy prices and creating windfalls for producers, despite placing energy companies’ regional assets and future projects at greater risk.

Rahul Choudhary, vice president of Upstream Research at Rystad Energy, an independent energy research company, said the conflict has already reduced the amount of oil and gas US energy firms are drawing from the Gulf region.

“Overall we expect US companies’ share of gas supplies [from the region] to fall by around 40 percent this year compared to last year [and] the share of oil supplies to drop by 30-35 percent,” he told Al Jazeera.

While higher commodity prices have helped offset the immediate financial impact, Choudhary said prolonged disruption is likely to delay major projects and weigh on the future growth plans of US oil and gas companies with a presence in the region.

Who has profited?

The surge in the oil price since early March, when Iran first closed the Strait of Hormuz, has delivered a windfall for oil companies, but gains have been tempered by challenges in the Gulf.

Chevron has limited exposure to Arab Gulf supply disruptions, with the region accounting for just 5 percent of its total global output. The group reported its highest quarterly profit in six years of $12bn in adjusted earnings on July 31.

ExxonMobil, by contrast, has been far more exposed to disruption in the Middle East, with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on US-linked infrastructure in the region affecting its operations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which together account for 20 percent of its global equity upstream supply, according to Choudhary.

“We already saw in H1 [the first half of] 2026, the company’s upstream earnings dropped by around $1.3bn compared to H1 2025, due to lower upstream volumes from the Middle East. However, the shortfall was covered well by higher commodity prices,” Choudhary said.

The contrast highlights a broader divide between those US energy companies which have benefitted from tighter global supply – and the corresponding rise in the oil price – and those with assets, partnerships or operations in the Gulf at greater risk of disruption caused by recent attacks on energy facilities.

Where are US energy companies exposed in the Gulf?

The Gulf’s energy sector is dominated by state-owned giants such as Saudi Aramco, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and QatarEnergy.

Although these national oil and gas companies retain control over the region’s reserves and core infrastructure, US energy firms have carved out strategic positions across the region.

US companies generate revenue through stakes in production assets, joint ventures, production agreements, refining and petrochemical projects, as well as through long-term contracts to provide equipment, engineering and operational expertise.

ExxonMobil has some of the largest US commercial interests in the Gulf.

The company has been a major partner in Qatar’s LNG sector for decades, holding stakes in several QatarEnergy LNG joint ventures linked to the expansion of the North Field. The field is the Qatari section of the North Field-South Pars structure, the world’s largest natural gas field, which Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. ExxonMobil also holds an interest in the UAE’s Upper Zakum offshore oilfield alongside ADNOC.

Similarly, ConocoPhillips joined the North Field East (NFE) and North Field South (NFS) expansion projects with QatarEnergy in 2022 to increase export capacity at Ras Laffan.

The US group, Occidental Petroleum, has become one of the largest foreign producers in Oman, operating the Mukhaizna heavy oilfield, the country’s biggest producing oilfield. It also holds interests in UAE gas and pipeline projects.

Chevron maintains a smaller but strategically important Gulf footprint. Through Saudi Arabian Chevron, the company operates oil assets in the Saudi-Kuwait Partitioned Zone, including the Wafra field. In July, it said it was exploring potential routes to move Iraqi crude to Mediterranean export terminals, which could reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

Where have attacks on energy facilities taken place?

According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a US-registered independent conflict monitor, Iran and Iran-backed groups in the region have carried out at least 172 attacks on nonmilitary infrastructure across the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries since the US and Israel launched their war on February 28.

Energy infrastructure has been hit hardest, with oil and gas facilities, along with power plants and desalination plants, accounting for nearly half (48 percent) of all strikes on nonmilitary targets.

The UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain have suffered the highest number of successful strikes, with the majority aimed at oil and gas facilities.

Among the sites that have been struck are Kuwait’s Mina Abdullah and Mina al-Ahmadi refineries, the Bahrain Petroleum Company oil refinery, and ADNOC’s al-Ruwais Industrial City and the Habshan gas complex.

There have also been several strikes on Saudi Aramco facilities, most recently a drone strike on July 27 on the Abqaiq processing complex, one of the most critical nodes in Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, processing more than seven million barrels of oil per day.

Nasser Khdour, Middle East assistant research manager at ACLED, said: “Oil and gas facilities, power plants and water desalination plants are likely to remain key targets for Iran because disruption to these sectors can increase economic pressure on Gulf states, while disruption to global energy supplies increases prices and pressure on the US during periods of escalation.”

In March, a drone attack close to the Saudi Aramco-ExxonMobil SAMREF refinery in Yanbu disrupted oil loading at the city’s Red Sea port. While the attack had only minimal operational impact, it highlighted the vulnerability of US-linked energy assets in the region.

Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG export hub, which hosts major joint ventures between QatarEnergy, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, also came under repeated attack in March, at one point forcing the plant to halt production entirely. In June, an explosion as a result of a “technical malfunction” on Qatar’s Barzan gas project, where ExxonMobil holds a stake, killed at least 13 people.

“In terms of gas assets being impacted, major blows have been [dealt to] companies [that are] part of LNG projects in Qatar: ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,” Choudhary said.

He added that ExxonMobil’s share of LNG supply from Qatar is expected to fall significantly this year to about four million tonnes compared with 13 million tonnes last year, while ConocoPhillips has also experienced reduced volumes to one million tonnes this year compared with 2.5 million tonnes last year.

The attacks on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure could have longer-term consequences. Damage to LNG trains at Ras Laffan could take years to repair, according to QatarEnergy, while delays to Qatar’s North Field expansion projects could push back planned supply growth.

“The attack on LNG trains 4 and 6 at Rasgas damaged roughly 13 million tonnes of capacity, which will take anywhere between three to five years to come back online with a total repair cost estimate of around $3bn,” said Choudhary.

He added that the second most impacted gas project has been the Shah gas project in the UAE, in which Occidental Petroleum has a 40-percent stake and where drone attacks in March caused a fire at the gas plant that halted operations.

The conflict has also affected ExxonMobil’s oil interests in the UAE, Choudhary said. Production from Upper Zakum, where ExxonMobil has a 28 percent stake, was reduced between March and May when export routes were disrupted, limiting the ability to move offshore crude.

Beyond the UAE, the most significant impact on US companies’ oilfield operations played out in Iraq. A drone attack hit the Sarsang oilfield in March, followed by an explosion at one of its storage facilities in April, together causing damage to the field.

Looking ahead, Choudhary said higher prices could support cash flows, but prolonged conflict risks could threaten future growth. ExxonMobil’s $10bn Upper Zakum and Qatar LNG expansions could face delays, while ConocoPhillips remains exposed through investments in higher-risk markets, including its planned 42-percent stake in BP’s Kirkuk operations in Iraq.

“For companies like Chevron and Occidental Petroleum, whose presence are in less volatile countries like Israel and Oman respectively, the impact of escalations will not be as severe, as we have not seen significant disruption in these countries,” said Choudhary.

US oilfield service companies in the Gulf

Oilfield service giants, including US firms SLB (formerly Schlumberger), Halliburton and Baker Hughes, provide drilling technologies, equipment and operational expertise across the Gulf, supporting Saudi Aramco, ADNOC and QatarEnergy.

For oilfield service companies, the outlook is mixed, according to Chinmayi Teggi, energy research analyst at Rystad Energy, a research group. While higher oil prices and energy security concerns could lift demand over time, near-term margins remain under pressure from higher logistical costs, supply-chain disruptions and delayed projects.

“For the Big Three (SLB, Baker Hughes and Halliburton), the conflict continues to weigh on regional revenues,” Teggi told Al Jazeera, adding that second-quarter Middle East revenues were down 8-10 percent compared with the previous year across the three companies, while higher oil prices meant revenues were higher in other geographies.

However, a recovery in suspended operations and production could help drive growth into 2027.

For US companies, therefore, the Gulf remains both an opportunity and a risk.

“The impact on US companies will depend on the extent of exposure and countries in which these companies are present,” Choudhary said.

Their investments have secured US access to some of the world’s most important oil and LNG projects, but the conflict has exposed the risk of operating in a region where energy infrastructure has become increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical conflict.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly warned Iran against restricting access to the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the waterway must remain open to global commerce.

But for companies with billions of dollars invested across the Gulf, the challenge isn’t just about keeping shipments moving – it is ensuring the infrastructure remains secure, they say.

BEIRUT — Iran’s economy, already strained by high inflation, years of Western sanctions and a war that has sharply reduced oil revenue, is poised for more instability as the Trump administration tries to coerce other countries into ending all financial dealings with the Islamic Republic.

A decision by the United Arab Emirates to suspend trade relations with Iran last week kick-started the White House’s latest attempt to isolate Tehran into submission. Iran entered the war with its foreign commerce concentrated among a relatively small group of countries, leaving it with fewer places to turn now.

The success of the U.S. strategy largely will hinge on China, the main buyer of Iranian oil and its top trading partner. Russia, a fellow target of sweeping U.S.-led sanctions, has a military conflict and economic crisis of its own and probably can’t offer longtime ally Iran much hard financial support.

Regional partners like Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq maintain important relationships with both Iran and the U.S., giving them reason to avoid exposure to the secondary sanctions that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said awaited nations that did not cut economic ties with Iran.

“Those who stand with the United States will reap the rewards of our partnership,” Bessent said Monday while outlining the plan he called “Operation Economic Outcast.” “Those who tether themselves to the Iranian regime should expect to share in the isolation.”

The Emirates will be hard for Iran to replace as a conduit for foreign goods and payments

Despite Western sanctions, Iran in 2024 exchanged $125 billion worth of goods globally, according to Trade Data Monitor, a private firm. Iran is not a member of the World Trade Organization.

The bulk of its declared international trade, though, was with a handful of partners. The UAE, China and Turkey supplied nearly three-quarters of Iran’s merchandise imports. Four countries — China, Iraq, the UAE and Turkey — accounted for more than two-thirds of its non-oil exports.

On the supply side, the UAE held outsized importance. It was Iran’s biggest source of imported items and a gateway to financial channels that helped Iranian businesses make and receive international payments. Both roles kept Iran connected to the global economy.

As a reexport hub, the UAE processed shipments from foreign suppliers reluctant to deal directly with Iranian customers.

“From Iran’s perspective, the UAE can be replaced, but the Iranians are openly saying it’s not going to happen overnight,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

China has deep economic ties to Iran but depends less on the relationship

Beijing has economic interests in the Persian Gulf beyond Iran, and so far has avoided getting drawn into the conflict the U.S. and Israel initiated. China buys the overwhelming majority of Iran’s crude through opaque trading networks that bypass sanctions.

Its manufacturing clout and stranglehold on critical mineral supplies nonetheless give Beijing more room than Iran’s other partners to resist U.S. pressure, said David Lubin, a senior research fellow at Chatham House. Aggressive action against major Chinese banks and businesses could revive trade tensions as Chinese leader Xi Jinping prepares to meet with President Trump in Washington next month.

“I don’t see China playing ball by any means,” Lubin said.

China is both Iran’s largest reported export market and a supplier of essential parts and products, according to WTO and United Nations data.

During the Obama administration, Beijing did agree to reduce energy imports from Iran, said Atlantic Council fellow Daniel Fried, a former U.S. ambassador to Poland.

“We will want the Chinese to go a lot farther than they have gone in the past,” Fried said. “But it’s a lot harder now.”

China has experience helping an ally survive sanctions: It has long been North Korea’s economic lifeline and main diplomatic backer. Experts say China has avoided fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to help its impoverished neighbor stay afloat.

Expanding bilateral trade would create problems for Iran’s neighbors

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who has been his country’s lead negotiator over the last six months, was in Iraq the day of the UAE’s trade suspension. A purpose of his visit, he said, was “speeding up efforts to expand joint cooperation among all countries in the region, without foreign interference.”

The U.S. dollar’s preeminence in international trade and finance, however, means none of Iran’s trading partners would antagonize Washington lightly, Vatanka said. “We’re still at a point where if the U.S. wants to hurt you, it will matter,” he said.

Underscoring potential consequences, Turkey settled a years-long U.S. dispute in July over the role of a state-owned bank in helping Iran evade sanctions through an oil-for-gold scheme. Trump also moved to lift sanctions on its fellow NATO member stemming from Turkey’s purchase of a sophisticated Russian missile system.

“I really don’t think Turkey would like to become the next country helping Iran to evade sanctions right now,” said Riccardo Gasco, an analyst at the IstanPol think tank in Istanbul.

Iran is a vital import source for Iraq and retains influence there through allied political factions and armed groups. Baghdad has sought closer economic and security ties with Washington. Since it invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. has significant control over the nation’s foreign currency reserves because they are housed in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York.

Oman, a frequent intermediary between Washington and Tehran, has found its balancing act suddenly precarious. Trump threatened Oman last week over its ongoing negotiations with Iran on the future management of the Strait of Hormuz.

One easy route for goods slipping past sanctions on Iran would be ports like Gwadar near the Persian Gulf in Pakistan, said Peter Harrell, a visiting scholar at Georgetown University.

“Ship an intermodal container of drone parts to one of the ports in western Pakistan and unload it onto a truck and have it driven across the border into Iran,” he said.

While Pakistan, a key ally and economic partner of China in the region, wants to increase trade with Iran, it faces competing pressures. It is serving as a key mediator between Tehran and Washington and has deep security ties with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s longtime regional rival.

Caspian Sea trade route alternatives unlikely to grow quickly

With the Strait of Hormuz mostly blocked and Russia’s war with Ukraine endangering ships on the Black Sea, Iran has sought to develop a “road of life” on the Caspian Sea, said Nikita Smagin, an independent analyst and a former Russian state news agency correspondent in Tehran.

Russia reportedly sent drones to Iran this year, repaying Tehran’s favor after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also rerouted exports to Iran via Caspian Sea ports like Astrakhan. Agricultural products make up 80% of Russia and Iran’s reported trade.

“Both economies are exporting natural resources and have little to offer each other,” Smagin said.

The other countries that border the Caspian — Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan — probably won’t rush to join in, said Umud Shokri, a fellow at George Mason University.

Yet Russia and Iran are already in an “axis of the sanctioned,” said Mark Galeotti, executive director of the Mayak Intelligence firm. For decades the pair have collaborated to thwart trade restrictions, and increasing bilateral trade in both “strategic goods” and contraband like military technology, microchips and Gucci handbags could be a next step.

“Pomegranates and tomatoes only go so far,” he said.

Chehayeb and McNeil write for the Associated Press. McNeil reported from Brussels. AP writers Amir Vahdat in Tehran and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report.

Trump says all mines have been cleared from Strait of Hormuz’s international waters and that Tehran received warnings that ships laying new mines will be ‘destroyed’.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announces new sanctions on Tehran to sever financial support for the regime, urging US allies to support the measures.

Fox News co-host Emily Compagno is jumping from the network’s daytime chatfest “Outnumbered” to join “The Five,” the most-watched program on cable news.

The conservative-leaning news network announced Monday that Compagno will fill the seat vacated last year by Jeanine Pirro, who left “The Five” in May to join the Trump administration as interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia before her Senate confirmation three months later.

Compagno will be on daily starting Sept. 8 alongside fellow co-hosts Greg Gutfeld, Dana Perino and Jesse Watters. Jessica Tarlov and Harold Ford Jr. rotate their appearances in the lone liberal seat on the program.

“Emily is a highly accomplished host whose energy and talent have made her a standout across FOX News Media, and we are thrilled to officially welcome her to the show,” Fox News Media Chief Executive Suzanne Scott said in a statement.

Compagno’s chair on “Outnumbered” will have guest co-hosts after she departs the program.

“The Five” has been a ratings juggernaut for Fox News in recent years, scoring audience levels that rival live viewing for hit broadcast network shows. In the second quarter of this year, “The Five” averaged 3.6 million viewers according to Nielsen, capturing more than 64% of the cable news viewing audience in the 5 p.m. Eastern hour.

Before joining Fox News as a contributor in 2018, Compagno practiced law in criminal defense and civil litigation and later served as a federal managing attorney and Acting Director at the Social Security Administration.

She also served as a Senior Judge Judicial Extern for the late Hon. John T. Noonan at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

A native of the San Francisco Bay Area, Compagno served as captain of the cheerleading squad for the NFL’s Raiders when they played in her hometown before moving to Las Vegas. She served as an ambassador for the league overseas, visiting U.S. troops in Iraq and Kuwait on a USO tour.

She is also the author of “Under His Wings: How Faith on the Front Lines Has Protected American Troops,” which was released on the network’s publishing imprint FOX News Books and debuted at No. 1 on the New York Times bestseller list.

Omani and Iranian foreign ministers hold a call as Washington prepares economic sanctions amid ongoing shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has called for an end to the months-long war with the United States, stating that Tehran holds a position of strength as diplomatic talks remain stalled.

“It is better that we bring the war to an end now as we are in a position of power and dignity,” Pezeshkian said in a meeting with doctors on Friday. “The whole world acknowledges our victory and emphasises that America has attacked our schools, hospitals and infrastructure in violation of all regulations and is hated around the world.”

Pezeshkian – whose authority as president is ultimately subordinate to Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei – also defended the June memorandum of understanding agreed with Washington against hardline domestic critics in parliament, who accused his administration of giving concessions to the US.

“They cannot find even a single clause in this agreement that indicates capitulation. All the commitments concern the other side,” he said.

However, days after the memorandum of understanding expired, Iran’s military leadership has warned that the country remains ready to strike back against any new threats.

“With preparedness across land, sea, air, air defence and cyberspace, Iran’s armed forces will respond to the enemy’s new threats with crushing, punishing and devastating responses,” Major-General Ali Abdollahi, chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, was quoted as saying by Iranian media.

Strait of Hormuz

Meanwhile, Omani and Iranian foreign ministers discussed in a phone call on Friday ways to create suitable conditions for resuming dialogue and negotiations, as well as developments affecting navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to Oman’s state news agency.

Tehran continues to keep the key waterway partially shut while Washington persists with a naval counterblockade. Reports in US media indicate the US navy has been organising and protecting secret convoys of tankers through the southern sector of the strait, enabling between five and 10 million barrels a day of oil to be exported.

In Washington, President Donald Trump expressed scepticism over Tehran’s willingness to negotiate, telling reporters when asked if US military options with Iran were limited: “It just means that we’re seeing what happens.”

“We have total control of that entire region having to do with the Strait of Hormuz, and that means well into it, the land areas. So, they would love to make a deal, but they’re not ready to make the right deal, in my opinion,” Trump added.

He has also warned of economic consequences against any country that provides “any type of lifeline to Iran”.

The comments came as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent warned that Washington would “collapse” the Iranian government with a sanctions campaign.

Bessent will hold a news conference at the Department of the Treasury on Monday, where he is expected to outline planned sanctions against Iran, marking a shift by the Trump administration towards economic rather than military pressure as the war nears the six-month mark.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has already condemned the US plan, accusing Washington of “economic terrorism” and stating that “the instigators of these sanctions are deserving of trial and punishment”.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian also criticised the US measures, stating that “sanctions and pressure will not help resolve the issue” and urging all parties to “take responsible measures and resolve the problem through political and diplomatic means”.

For years, the day in Kulak ended when the generator powered down. Like thousands of villages across Iraq, this small farming community in the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region lived to the faltering rhythm of an erratic power supply: a few hours of electricity, then the water pumps stopped, refrigerators warmed and children put down their books.

Today, Kulak runs on the sun. Solar panels harness its energy, batteries store the excess and residents have power 24/7. The change is visible beyond the homes: water pumps keep running, and cold storage gives farmers more control over when they sell their harvest.

This is the part of the energy transition the global climate conversation too often overlooks. Solar hardware is cheap; the world has learned how to install it. What matters is what comes after the panels go up: building the local capacity to keep the systems running and using reliable power to support farms, livelihoods and communities.

The energy transition will not be won in conference halls. It will be won, or lost, in places like Kulak.

Iraq’s rural energy crisis

Iraq’s energy story is usually told as a paradox. It is one of the world’s great oil producers, yet rural communities still endure daily power cuts. Summers now regularly push past 50 degrees, and the United Nations ranks Iraq among the nations most vulnerable to climate change. Drought has emptied farmland. Heat has made whole regions harder to live in. Rural families face a quiet, grinding choice between staying on land that can no longer sustain them or joining the drift towards overcrowded cities.

These pressures do not respect provincial boundaries. They are shared across Iraq, from the marshes of the south to the mountains of the north. They demand responses that work for the whole country.

For remote communities, decentralised power should not simply be treated as a stopgap while they wait for the grid. It can be part of the long-term answer.

Beyond electrification

Kulak is one of five villages in the Kurdistan region electrified through a solar initiative that pairs new infrastructure with local training and agricultural development. Residents are trained to operate and maintain their own systems, while research is under way into how reliable power can support local production.

Energy is treated not as a gift to be received but as an asset to be managed. That means looking beyond electricity itself to what it can enable: cold storage that allows farmers to hold their harvest for better prices, irrigation that no longer depends on diesel and processing that adds value before crops ever leave the village.

That distinction matters, because the graveyard of development is full of well-intentioned infrastructure. Anyone who has worked in this field has seen the solar array gathering dust because no one was trained to fix an inverter, or the water project abandoned when the foreign NGO moved on.

Sustainability is not a slogan; it is a design choice. Building local capability into a project from day one is the difference between a photo opportunity and a future.

Building the transition from the ground up

There is a broader argument here for the climate movement.

The energy transition is overwhelmingly narrated from the top down: through COP plenaries, G7 communiques and the financing pledges of wealthy nations, many of them unmet. Yet for hundreds of millions of people in the Global South, the transition will arrive, if it arrives at all, through decentralised solutions built close to the ground.

Rural Iraq will not wait decades for grid expansion to reach every valley. It does not have to. Distributed solar suits these communities better than centralised generation ever did, while local institutions can move at a speed that multilateral programmes rarely match.

There is also a quieter point about who gets to act on climate.

The prevailing image of climate action in the Middle East is the megaproject: vast desert solar farms, futuristic cities and sovereign wealth funds. Those have their place. But electrifying farming villages one by one represents a different kind of ambition, one rooted in the belief that Iraqis themselves, in all their diversity, can build the country’s energy future rather than wait for it to be delivered.

Local involvement matters particularly in places where reliable electricity is tied not only to household comfort but to whether farms can irrigate crops, preserve produce and remain economically viable.

Iraq has thousands of rural communities, and scaling this model will require partners, patient financing and supportive policy at every level of government. The agricultural research is promising but young.

On my last visit to Kulak, I was struck less by the panels than by what surrounded them: the cold store, the working pumps, the sense of a community planning for next season rather than next month.

The lights staying on is the least of it. What has really been switched on is the future tense.

If Iraq’s energy transformation is built like this across the whole country, village by village and from the ground up, it will be more durable than anything imposed from above. That means investing not only in the systems themselves, but in the people who will maintain them and the farms, businesses and livelihoods that reliable power can support.

The world’s climate diplomats could do worse than pay attention.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent says Washington will impose its ‘toughest sanctions in history’ to ‘collapse’ Iran’s government, warning of consequences for countries that maintain economic ties with Tehran.

US president says Iran should ‘put up the white flag of surrender’ as the two nations’ MoU expired on Monday.