Irans

Protesters blocked a bus carrying Iran’s women’s football team outside a hotel in Australia after five players slipped away to seek asylum duing the Women’s Asian Cup. They say the remaining players could face danger if forced to return to Iran after staying silent during the national anthem.

When a state’s political leadership announces a ceasefire and its military keeps firing, the instinct is to reach for deception as the explanation. In Iran’s case, the more unsettling answer may be structural. The gap between what Iranian presidents say and what Iranian forces do reflects not a coordinated lie but a command architecture deliberately engineered to operate without central direction. In a serious conflict, the consequences of that architecture would be felt well beyond Iran’s borders.

A Command Architecture Designed to Survive Decapitation

In September 2008, IRGC Commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari oversaw a sweeping restructuring that divided the force into thirty-one provincial corps, each empowered to conduct military operations within its zone without requiring authorization from the center. As Michael Connell of the Center for Naval Analyses noted in his analysis for the United States Institute of Peace, the intent was to strengthen unit cohesion and ensure operational continuity under degraded command conditions. He flagged explicitly that the decentralization could produce unintended escalation dynamics, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

That warning deserves serious attention. The IRGC’s Mosaic Defense doctrine was not designed to make Iran more responsive to political leadership in a crisis. It was designed to ensure that military operations could continue regardless of what happened to that leadership. A force structured that way does not stop firing because a president gives a speech.

The Apology That Wasn’t

The internal contradiction becomes clearest when traced through a hypothetical cascade. A president announces a ceasefire and attributes the directive to an Interim Leadership Council. A fellow council member publicly declares that heavy strikes will continue. A hardline cleric addresses the president directly, calling his position untenable. By the time the president’s original statement is reposted, the ceasefire language has been quietly removed.

The IRGC’s own posture in this scenario resolves the ambiguity on structural grounds. It endorses the president’s language, then appends a caveat that renders it inoperative: all US and Israeli military bases and interests across the region remain primary targets. Since every GCC state hosts American forces, that framing preserves full operational freedom while allowing the presidency to project restraint. The contradiction is not incidental. It is the doctrine functioning as designed.

The Theological Dimension

Iran is not simply a military organization. It is a theocratic state whose constitutional legitimacy flows from velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, which vests supreme authority in a single clerical figure whose religious and political mandates are inseparable. Remove that figure, and the system’s legitimating architecture is suspended rather than transferred. The Assembly of Experts is constitutionally mandated to elect a successor, but wartime conditions would disrupt that process at precisely the moment its resolution matters most.

A RAND Corporation analysis prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense identified the IRGC as the institution best positioned to shape any post-Khamenei transition, with the organizational reach and economic weight to determine outcomes that civilian institutions cannot contest. The result, in a decapitation scenario, is a theocratic state operating without its theological anchor and a military operating under pre-delegated authority with no one capable of recalling it.

Durability Without Effect

The Mosaic Defense doctrine would prove, above all, durable. A decentralized force can survive catastrophic leadership losses and sustain operations. But durability is not the same as capability, and sustained fire is not the same as strategic effect.

Iran’s theory of regional attrition, the calculation that sustained strikes against Gulf infrastructure and American basing would fracture GCC cohesion and coerce Arab neighbors toward neutrality, has produced no evidence of working. The GCC bloc has held. Individual member states have coordinated their responses rather than fractured under pressure. The country absorbing the sharpest volume of Iranian strike activity, the UAE, has demonstrated air defense performance that has exceeded even optimistic prewar assessments. Publicly available figures suggest UAE systems have defeated upward of ninety percent of inbound threats, a result that reflects years of sustained investment, deep integration with American and Israeli platforms, and an operational tempo that has stress-tested those systems at genuine scale.

The picture that emerges is not one of Iran winning a war of attrition. It is one of an Iran burning through accessible inventory, losing launch infrastructure faster than it can regenerate, and discovering that the regional architecture it spent years attempting to destabilize has proven considerably more resilient than it calculated.

That resilience carries its own strategic meaning. A weakened force operating under pre-delegated authority, without a supreme leader to set limits, remains dangerous in a narrow tactical sense. But it is operating without a coherent end state, and the environment it faces is not the one it anticipated. The GCC’s collective posture and the demonstrated effectiveness of layered air defense across the Gulf have closed off the strategic outcomes Iran’s doctrine was written to achieve.

The scenario is instructive for what it reveals about the limits of decentralized military design. A force built to keep firing regardless of political direction is also a force that cannot be steered toward an exit. But the Gulf states have demonstrated something of equal importance in response: that resilience, properly built and consistently resourced, can outlast a doctrine designed for chaos, and that the regional order Iran sought to unravel has shown itself capable of absorbing the blow.

U.S. and Israeli authorities have reportedly been considering a special operations ground raid to extract or otherwise neutralize Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. TWZ previously explored this exact scenario, given that this nuclear material is understood to be stored in deep underground bunkers, presenting challenges for attempting to achieve this objective from the air alone. U.S. and Israeli special operations forces have actively trained for these kinds of missions for decades, and Israel has demonstrated its ability and willingness to carry out complex raids on subterranean facilities, but any such operation would still face immense risks and uncertainties.

Multiple outlets have now reported on deliberations within the U.S. and Israeli governments over a ground raid targeting Iran’s enriched uranium stocks this past weekend, citing unnamed sources. It is unclear whether the mission being considered would be carried out by U.S. or Israeli forces, or be conducted jointly by both parties.

“People are going to have to go and get it,” Secretary of State and acting National Security Advisor Marco Rubio said at a congressional briefing back on March 3 in response to a question about securing Iran’s enriched uranium, according to a report from Axios on Saturday.

“We’re going to find out about that. We haven’t talked about it, but it was a total obliteration. They haven’t been able to get to it. And at some point, maybe we will,” President Donald Trump also told reporters on Air Force One on Saturday. “You know, that’d be a great thing, but right now we’re just decimating them. We haven’t gone after it, but it’s something we can do later on. We wouldn’t do it now. Maybe we’d do it later.”

NBC News reported last week that President Trump had “privately expressed serious interest” in sending “a small contingent of U.S. troops that would be used for specific strategic purposes” into Iran.

The U.S. government says that preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon is a core goal of its current operations targeting the country. If the Iranian government were to collapse, and do so suddenly, there would be additional concerns about the proliferation of the country’s nuclear material, including to regional proxies and terrorist groups, as well as other potential buyers on the black market.

What we know about Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile

By its last firm estimate, as of June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that Iran had just over 972 pounds (just under 441 kilograms) of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity. This stockpile has long been a proliferation concern and evidence of Iranian authorities maintaining the option of rapidly pursuing a nuclear weapon even in the absence of an active development program.

It is understood to be a relatively quick process, in technical terms, to get uranium from 60 percent to 90 percent purity, at which point it is considered highly enriched or weapons-grade. Per the IAEA, 92.5 pounds of 60 percent uranium is sufficient to be enriched into enough 90 percent material for one nuclear bomb. Using this metric, Iran’s declared stockpile of enriched uranium is enough for at least 10 bombs.

“In that first meeting, both of the Iranian negotiators said to us directly, with no shame, that they controlled 460 kilograms of 60 percent, and they were aware that that could make 11 nuclear bombs,” Steve Witkoff, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East, who had been leading talks with Iranian officials head of the current conflict, said in an interview with Fox News’ Sean Hannity on March 2. “They have 10,000, roughly, kilograms of fissionable material. That’s broken up into roughly 460 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, another thousand kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium, and the balance is at 3.67 [percent purity].” 

Uranium that is not pure enough for a nuclear weapon could still be fashioned into a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ designed just to spread radioactive contamination across an area. Even if the immediate impacts of the detonation of such a device are minimal, it could cause widespread panic and would require significant effort to clean up. This is a threat that has also often been associated with non-state actors in the past.

Iran’s underground nuclear site at Isfahan has long been understood to be the primary storehouse for its stockpile of enriched uranium. That facility was among those targeted in U.S. strikes last June, dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer. Though access to any uranium there was subsequently curtailed, the U.S. Intelligence Community has more recently assessed that Iranian authorities have regained entry, at least to a degree, according to a report from The New York Times over the weekend.

As an aside, in the weeks leading up to the current conflict, satellite imagery showed Iran taking steps to seal off Isfahan, as well as other key facilities, which would help hamper any potential ground raids. TWZ highlighted similar activity at Iranian nuclear sites ahead of Operation Midnight Hammer.

NEW: High resolution satellite imagery taken yesterday shows the extent to which Iran has covered the tunnel entrances at the Esfahan nuclear complex with soil. The middle and southern entrances are unrecognizable and fully covered in soil. The northernmost tunnel entrance which… pic.twitter.com/baYI2zCuN0

— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) February 9, 2026

NEW: Satellite imagery of the Esfahan nuclear site taken today shows new activity at the tunnel entrances. As of today, Iran has re-buried the middle entrance with soil and is adding more fresh soil to the southernmost entrance. The northernmost entrance, which was reworked after… pic.twitter.com/7ujiku8VRg

— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) January 29, 2026

There are lingering questions about the degree to which Iran may have dispersed its enriched uranium beyond Isfahan. The day before the current conflict erupted, the AP reported that the IAEA had been circulating a report saying that it could not “verify whether Iran has suspended all enrichment-related activities” or the “size of Iran’s uranium stockpile at the affected nuclear facilities,” and was unable to “provide any information on the current size, composition or whereabouts of the stockpile of enriched uranium in Iran.”

“Publicly, U.S. officials have projected confidence that they know where the uranium is stored. Privately, there is said to be less certainty,” according to a report from Bloomberg today.

Options for a ground raid

In terms of the specifics of how a ground raid would neutralize Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, multiple options are reportedly being considered.

“The first question is, where is it? The second question is, how do we get to it and how do we get physical control?” a U.S. official said, according to Axios. “And then, it would be a decision of the president and the Department of War, CIA, as to whether we wanted to physically transport it or dilute it on premises.”

“The mission would likely involve special operators alongside scientists, possibly from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),” Axios‘ report added.

TWZ had outlined exactly these possibilities when discussing the prospect of a ground raid targeting Iran’s nuclear program, and one potentially involving U.S. forces, in the midst of last year’s 12 Day War. As we wrote at that time:

“U.S. special operations units are ideally suited to rapidly and discreetly infiltrate into a target area to extract items of interest from an objective like a nuclear facility in Iran. If the items in question are too large to be moved by the special operations force, depending on what they are, they could then be destroyed in place or secured until a larger follow-on force arrives. Conventional supporting forces and interagency elements offering unique capabilities could accompany special operations forces on initial raids, as well.”

“Special operations forces are also well-positioned to help intercept high-value targets on the move, including nuclear material that might make its way out of Iran, or threaten to do so, as the conflict with Israel continues. This could potentially include operations on land or at sea.”

U.S. special operations forces, especially so-called “tier one” units like the U.S. Army’s Delta Force and the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Team Six, train regularly to conduct exercises centering on counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) scenarios and others involving chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological hazards. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was formally designated the lead entity for the Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission set in 2016. An array of specialized conventional U.S. military units, as well as personnel from other ends of the U.S. government, such as the Department of Energy, are also expected to take part in these operations and are often integrated directly into relevant training events alongside special operations elements. You can read more about all of this here.

Israel has its own long history of spectacular air and ground raids, as well as covert or clandestine intelligence operations, which have often targeted nuclear programs in hostile countries, especially in Iran. Operations of this kind have also been launched against conventional weapons capabilities deemed to present particular threats.

As one particularly spectacular example, in 2024, Israeli forces destroyed an underground ballistic missile factory in Syria, which had been built with Iranian assistance. The raiding party was on the ground for approximately two and a half hours, during which time 660 pounds of explosives were rigged throughout the site. “A planetary mixer, numerous weapons, and intelligence documents,” were also extracted, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). TWZ noted at the time that this operation sent a clear signal to Iran that its underground facilities were not untouchable.

100 Shaldag soldiers raid and dismantle Syrian missile factory in secret operation

There is the potential that Israel might have launched ground raids against Iran’s nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and/or Isfahan unilaterally last year if the U.S. military had not conducted Operation Midnight Hammer. There would have been few, if any other options for Israel to have gone after those underground facilities. This, in turn, raises the possibility that Israeli forces may have prepared more explicitly to execute these operations just in the past year.

Risk and complexities

Executing any special operations raid targeting Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, wherever it might be held, would not be without immense challenges.

For one, there are real questions about what it would take to move nearly 1,000 pounds of enriched uranium out of Iran, even if it is largely located at one site. The material would be even heavier and bulkier when taking into account the secure containers it is likely to be stored in.

Similar questions have been raised about the feasibility of neutralizing the stockpile in place if it is determined to be impractical to move it. Experts and observers have highlighted the immense time and resources that would be required to try to dilute the purity of any nuclear material on-site, processes that typically require industrial machinery under normal conditions.

Unlike conventional weapons, or even other key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, like centrifuges, fissile material cannot simply be blown up to destroy it in place, either.

Having to carry out any such operation, however long it might take, in an active conflict zone and likely under enemy fire, would only add to the complexities of a ground raid. As already noted, Iran looks to have taken steps to physically hamper access to Isfahan and other sites, adding to the time it would take friendly forces to gain entry to their objectives in the first place. Heavy machinery could be required to dig into these facilities.

The longer friendly forces are on the ground, the more time Iran has to put together a response. Airpower can help keep hostile forces at bay, but Iranian security forces could eventually muster significant firepower, including artillery. Keeping nuclear facilities safe from attack has been a top priority for the regime in Tehran, and Iranian security forces will have reaction plans in place.

There is also simply the matter of getting the raiding force to and from the objective. As has been established, we are talking about what would have to be a relatively large contingent, burdened with specialized equipment, along with a typical array of weaponry and other gear.

The U.S. military, specifically, has a very complicated relationship with these kinds of operations, dating back to the failed attempt to rescue hostages being held in the American embassy in Tehran following the revolution that put the current Iranian regime into power in the first place. That operation exposed deficiencies that did lead to the development of new capabilities, as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, and continues to be a key case study in special operations planning today.

We did get to see a demonstration of the U.S. military’s current capability and capacity to launch a major special operations raid in January with Operation Absolute Resolve, which resulted in the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro from the middle of a fortress-like military facility. At the same time, it also showed the immense resources required to ensure the success of a mission like that, with hundreds of aircraft, ships offshore, and an array of other assets involved. The main raiding force consisted of 200 special operators. You can read more about what is known about the extensive preparations for the mission, including having forces specifically poised to destroy three airfields if it looked like Venezuelan Air Force fighters were attempting to scramble, here.

In addition, the Venezuela operation had the benefit of surprise, rather than coming in the middle of already ongoing major combat operations against an enemy that says it is actively prepared to respond to any kind of ground incursion. Iran’s military capabilities and overall capacity have been seriously degraded by U.S. and Israeli strikes in the past week, but significant threats remain, as TWZ regularly stresses.

Even under the most optimal conditions, launching a major special operations raid into Iran amid the ongoing hostilities would be extremely risky.

A question of timing and alternatives

Axios‘ report notably said a special operations raid against Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile “would likely only take place after both countries [the United States and Israel] are confident Iran’s military can no longer mount a serious threat to the forces involved.” This would also align with President Trump’s comments on Saturday.

However, other factors could still influence that decision-making process. As has been made clear, there are already serious questions about where all of Iran’s enriched uranium may be hidden away now. This is compounded by the reports that the Iranians may have regained access to where material was being stored in Isfahan, which could then allow them to move it elsewhere.

Even if persistent surveillance gives a good sense of where the material is being moved, dispersal can only increase the total number of sites that would have to be secured. It would also reduce any guarantees of neutralizing even the majority of the stockpile in one fell swoop.

As mentioned earlier, interdicting nuclear shipments on the move would still require a ground force of some kind to secure the material. Simply kinetically targeting vehicles carrying enriched uranium from the air would not be sufficient and would risk scattering nuclear material in an uncontrolled manner, making such a strike an absolute last resort option.

As pointed out earlier, there could also be a concern that regional proxies, terrorists, or other third parties might attempt to exploit the current conflict to spirit away a portion of Iran’s stockpile from Isfahan or sites for their own nefarious uses. This, in turn, could further drive a demand for action to secure that material on a timetable that does not allow for waiting for ideal conditions to emerge.

In the meantime, the United States and Israel could seek to carry out new strikes to try to seal entrances to underground facilities at Isfahan and other locations. Strikes last week on Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz look to have been intended to do just this. Those sites could then be surveilled to watch for any further attempts on the part of the Iranians to dig them out. Additional action, including more strikes or launching a ground raid, could then be taken, as necessary.

We have prepared an overview slide summarizing the visible damage at the Natanz uranium enrichment site from the recent attack, pulling together multiple images showing before and after satellite images of the two personnel entrances and the sole vehicle entrance with comparable… pic.twitter.com/mMGvOyHgkQ

— Inst for Science (@TheGoodISIS) March 3, 2026

On top of everything else, not being able to definitely find, fix, and secure Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium would make it difficult for the U.S. government to say it has achieved its core objective of preventing the country from building a nuclear weapon. Inversely, doing so could be seen as essential, especially by the Trump administration, for creating the conditions necessary to end the current conflict.

Altogether, it remains to be seen whether or not the United States and Israel decide that mounting a major special operation targeting Iran’s enriched uranium outweighs the risks.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has never held a formal position in government, but his appointment as his late father’s successor amid the US-Israeli war on his country was not unexpected.

Iran’s Assembly of Experts appointed the 56-year-old mid-ranking religious scholar to the position on Sunday, just over a week after his late father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in United States-Israeli strikes.

Khamenei, who has strong ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and his late father’s still-influential office, is seen as a hardliner who will provide continuity in the country.

His appointment, which came after he lost both his father and his wife in strikes, was interpreted as a defiant choice signalling continuity as the Islamic Republic faces the biggest crisis in its 47-year history.

Khamenei received immediate backing from figures in Iran’s political and security establishment, including IRGC leaders, President Masoud Pezeshkian and Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

Outside the country, reactions were mixed:

Oman

Oman was a mediator in recent talks between Iran and the United States, which collapsed when the US and Israel unleashed their war on Iran last month.

Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said on Monday sent a “cable of congratulations” to Khamenei on his appointment as Iran’s new supreme leader, according to the official Oman News Agency.

Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani also congratulated Khamenei on his appointment on Monday.

“We express our confidence in the ability of the new leadership in the Islamic Republic of Iran to manage this sensitive stage, and continue to strengthen the unity of the Iranian people in facing the current challenges,” al-Sudani said in a statement.

He reaffirmed Iraq’s solidarity and support for Iran and “all steps aimed at ending the conflict and rejecting military operations against its sovereignty, in order to preserve the stability of other countries in the region”.

United States

US President Donald Trump had previously dismissed Mojtaba Khamenei as a “lightweight”, and insisted he should have a say in appointing a new Iranian leader, which Tehran rejected.

On Monday, Trump told NBC News, “I think they made a big mistake. I don’t know if it’s going to last. I think they made a mistake.”

Later on Monday, he told CBS News: “I have no message for him.”

Trump said he has someone in mind to lead Iran, but did not elaborate.

Israel

The ⁠Israeli ⁠military has already threatened to kill any replacement for the late Ali Khamenei.

Israel’s Foreign Ministry said Monday that Mojtaba Khamenei was a “tyrant” like his slain father, and would continue what it described as the Iranian “regime’s brutality”.

In a post on X featuring a picture of Mojtaba Khamenei and his father Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, holding guns, the ministry wrote: “Mojtaba Khamenei. Like Father Like Son”.

“Mojtaba Khamenei’s hands are already stained with the bloodshed that defined his father’s rule. Another tyrant to continue the Iranian regime’s brutality,” said the ministry.

Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday pledged “unwavering support” to Iran.

“I would like to reaffirm our unwavering support for Tehran and solidarity with our Iranian friends,” Putin said in a message to Khamenei, adding that “Russia has been and will remain a reliable partner” to Iran.

“At a time when Iran is confronting armed aggression, your tenure in this high position will undoubtedly require great courage and dedication,” the Russian leader said.

China

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told reporters on Monday that Iran’s decision to appoint the younger Khamenei was “based on its constitution”.

“China opposes interference in other countries’ internal affairs under any pretext, and Iran’s sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity should be respected,” he said when asked about the threats against the new leader.

Beijing is a close partner of Tehran and condemned the killing of the former supreme leader, but it has also criticised the Iranian counterstrikes against Gulf states.

Yemen’s Houthis

Yemen’s Houthi rebels on Monday welcomed the appointment of the new supreme leader.

“We congratulate the Islamic Republic of Iran, its leadership and people, on the selection of Sayyid Mojtaba Khamenei as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution at this important and pivotal juncture,” the group said in a statement on Telegram.

It called his selection “a new victory for the Islamic Revolution and a resounding blow to the enemies of the Islamic Republic and the enemies of the nation”.

A new supreme leader in Iran – Mojtaba Khamenei – has replaced his assassinated father.

His selection sends a defiant message to the United States and Israel as they attack the country.

So, who is Iran’s new leader – and what does his appointment mean?

Presenter: Tom McRae

Guests:

Hassan Ahmadian – Associate professor at the University of Tehran

Mehran Kamrava – Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar and director of the Iranian Studies Unit at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies

Alex Vatanka – Senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC

Tehran, Iran – Commanders, politicians and religious authorities in Iran are rallying around the flag and hinting at a prolonged war after Mojtaba Khamenei was selected as supreme leader as the country is under fire from the United States and Israel.

The 88-member Assembly of Experts, made up of religious leaders, approved the second son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as his successor after he was killed on February 28, the first day of the war. The younger Khamenei was tasked with steering the “holy establishment of the Islamic Republic”, state television said overnight into Monday.

The 56-year-old Mojtaba Khamenei has hardly made any public appearances or remarks but is believed to have acted as a powerbroker with deep connections to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His ascension signals continuity for the theocratic establishment that came to power after the 1979 Islamic revolution.

The IRGC, which was originally created to operate in parallel to the country’s regular army to safeguard the establishment but has since turned into a major military and economic force, was among the first to pledge allegiance to the new leader.

It said its forces are prepared to “fully obey and sacrifice for the divine commands” of Khamenei to “maintain the values of the Islamic revolution and safeguard the legacies” of the first two supreme leaders, Ali Khamenei and Ruhollah Khomeini.

The aerospace, ground, naval and other major forces of the IRGC issued separate statements of support.

The Iranian army, the high command of police and the Defence Council also said they were prepared to take orders from Mojtaba Khamenei, and Intelligence Minister Esmaeil Khatib said his selection shows that “Islamic Iran knows no dead ends and always has a bright outlook of victory.”

The powerful 12-member constitutional watchdog known as the Guardian Council called the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei a “balm for the pain” of losing his father while influential seminaries across the country and the heads of government, the judiciary and parliament issued similar statements.

Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, appeared relatively less enthusiastic but emphasised that the process was done legally so he backs it.

“During the recent period, many negative narratives and campaigns were carried out, but the transparent and lawful process undertaken by the Assembly of Experts provided a clear response to those narratives,” he told state media in an apparent reference to media reports that he and some others were opposed to the choice.

Larijani stressed that the office of the supreme leader must be assisted by all as a “symbol of national unity” and expressed hope that during Mojtaba Khamenei’s time, “Iran is aligned with the path of development, economic conditions are improved, and more calm and welfare is provided for the people”.

All who praised the new leader referred to him as “ayatollah”, indicating that his religious standing has been upgraded from the lower rank of hojatoleslam as part of his ascension to the highest political and religious office in the country.

Hardline state-affiliated media and supporters went as far as calling him “imam”, a title used to describe significant religious figures and regularly used by state media to describe his father and Khomeini, the first supreme leader.

State television broadcast images of the news of Khamenei’s selection being announced at important mosques in Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan and other cities across the country.

Mass text messages sent by the state to Iranians invited people to gather at Enghelab (Revolution) Square in downtown Tehran and spots in other cities on Monday afternoon to “renew the covenant with the martyred imam of the Muslim nation and pledge allegiance to the supreme leader selected by the Assembly of Experts”.

Israeli and US warplanes bombed Tehran and Isfahan in the afternoon, two days after sweeping attacks on the capital’s oil reserves and refineries left thick black smoke hanging over the city.

Rocky road ahead

The younger Khamenei faces myriad challenges, most prominently the threat of assassination in the foreseeable future as the US and Israel have promised to keep taking out Iranian leaders.

Some local and Israeli media have claimed he may have been wounded in a strike, but details were unclear. There was no clarity from officials on whether Khamenei is expected to make an appearance anytime soon.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he is unhappy with the selection and will aim to kill the new leader because he wants the US to play a role in deciding Iran’s future leadership.

The younger Khamenei’s ascension suggests more hardline factions in Iran’s establishment retain power and could indicate that the government has little desire to agree to new negotiations with the US in the short term.

The commanders of the IRGC and the army have continued shooting projectiles since his selection with one IRGC commander telling state television that the country is capable of keeping up considerable attacks for at least six months.

US officials have also expressed eagerness to continue the war in pursuit of their objectives, including dismantling Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes and cutting off support to regional allies in the “axis of resistance”.

Its members – including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and armed groups in Iraq – released statements backing Khamenei’s selection.

Khamenei is also leading Iran at a time when the US is trying to curb its oil exports, a key revenue stream, while tightening sanctions that have heavily damaged the Iranian economy.

The Strait of Hormuz is expected to remain a flashpoint area as shipping is disrupted. Iran is also experiencing one of its highest inflation rates in decades at about 70 percent with annual food inflation rates shooting above 100 percent, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran.

The national currency is among the least valuable and most isolated in the world. The government continues to promise that Iran’s population of about 92 million people does not need to worry about shortages of essential goods like food and fuel because contingency plans are in motion.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has pledged allegiance to Mojtaba Khamenei, the country’s newly-elected supreme leader. While some Iranians have celebrated, many are dismayed the 56-year-old cleric, accused of human rights abuses, has ascended to the country’s highest office.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian has apologised for attacking neighbouring countries, in a pre-recorded address released on state television. Within minutes of the statement’s release, an explosion was heard over Doha, as attacks on Gulf nations continue.

The Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West: Qatar brokered nuclear talks, Oman provided back-channel diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran through 2024 and into 2025. Iran attacked them anyway. The idea that the Gulf states have a responsibility, a moral one, to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions because of good neighbourliness is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighbourliness. Iran returned ballistic missiles.

Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, that Iran acted in lawful self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter; that host countries relinquished territorial sovereignty by allowing US military bases on their territory; and that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies the attack on those bases as lawful military objectives. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually skewed, and tactically wrong. Collectively, they add up to a legal argument that, if accepted, would ensure that the Gulf is permanently destabilised, the basic principles of international law are destroyed, and, in a curious twist, the very security threats that Iran is reacting to are reinforced.

The self-defence claim does not meet the required legal threshold

The UN Charter, in Article 51, permits the use of force only in self-defence against an “armed attack”, and this term is not defined by reference to the state invoking it. The International Court of Justice, in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003), has interpreted the requirement of an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter restrictively. The Court distinguished between the most grave forms of the use of force, which qualify as armed attacks triggering the right of self-defence, and less grave uses of force that do not. Accordingly, not every use of force, such as minor incidents or limited military activities, amounts to an armed attack. In this light, the mere presence of foreign military bases in Gulf states, maintained for decades under defence agreements with host governments, would not in itself constitute an armed attack against Iran.

Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, requiring that self-defence be necessary and proportional. Iran has not demonstrated either. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to the policy decisions of the United States is neither necessary, since diplomatic and United Nations avenues are still available, nor proportional, since it imposes military consequences on states that are not a party to any conflict with Iran.

Critically, Article 51 also has a mandatory procedural element, in that any state employing self-defence is immediately required to notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently evaded this requirement in each of its escalatory actions. While this may seem to be a minor element, it is in fact the means by which the international community is able to verify and check self-defence claims. A state that evades this requirement is not employing Article 51. It is exploiting the language of Article 51.

Iran’s reading of Resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion

The provision of Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that an act of aggression includes the “action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State”. Iran could rely on this provision to hold the Gulf states that host United States military bases liable for any act of aggression committed from their territories against Iran. Nevertheless, the mere presence of military bases is not sufficient to hold them to be lawful military objectives; this will depend on their actual contribution to military activities against Iran based on the rules of international humanitarian law.

Thus, such an Iranian reading would be wrong on three distinct legal grounds.

First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. The resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when aggression has taken place, not to confer upon states the unilateral power to punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself, in Article 2, asserts the power of the Security Council to make the determination of what constitutes aggression. The self-application of Article 3(f) of the resolution is therefore bypassed altogether.

Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the active launching of an attack, not the passive hosting of a military base. The legal distinction is fundamental. A state, in signing a defence treaty with another and hosting the latter’s troops on its soil, is engaging in a measure of sovereignty. A state, actively launching, coordinating, or enabling military strikes against a third party, is engaged in a different matter altogether. Iran has not credibly shown this latter case. The presence of US troops or bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and this has not constituted armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.

Third, even if Article 3(f) were applicable, the appropriate course would be to bring the matter to the Security Council, not to launch unilateral military strikes. General Assembly resolutions do not override the Charter. Iran cannot rely upon a non-binding resolution defining terms to override the Chapter VII requirements for the use of force or the clear criteria of Article 51.

Sovereignty cannot be dictated by a neighbour’s strategic preferences

Iran, in invoking the principle of good neighbourliness, asks the Arab Gulf states to deny the United States basing rights. Good neighbourliness is a two-way principle, and it does not allow for interference in the internal affairs of other states, certainly not interference in the decisions of other states simply because they are deemed inconvenient to the interfering state. All UN states possess the inherent right to conclude defence treaties with whomever they choose, and this is so regardless of the opinion of their neighbours.

The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military relationships with Russia and China. Iran arms, finances, trains, and supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been extensively documented in United Nations Panels of Experts reports, as well as other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to the Gulf states, any state that hosts the activities of the IRGC, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies on its soil would be engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran will not accept this principle when it is applied to itself. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the party to whom it would be applied is not a legal principle at all; it is a political tool.

A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests

From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to remove the external balancing architecture of regional neighbours by claiming it to be hostile in nature. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.

Under balance of threat theory, states react to offensive capability, geographic proximity, and aggressive intentions. Iran’s doctrine, in asserting the right to strike any state that hosts forces it perceives as a threat, drives each and every threat variable to maximum levels for each and every state in the region. The obvious consequence, evident in the data, is that the states in the region and external powers are becoming more, rather than less, securely integrated. The Fifth Fleet’s permanent base in Bahrain, the UAE’s negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s deployments of THAADs, and Qatar’s expansion of the Al Udeid base are reactions to Iran’s escalation, not causes of it.

From the perspective of constructivism, the legitimacy of a legal argument is also partly based on the normative credibility of the state that presents the argument. The record of Iran’s compliance with IAEA regulations, including the enrichment of uranium to a purity level of 60 percent or more in 2023–2024, interference with inspections, the removal of monitoring cameras, and the overall violation of the non-proliferation regime, has undermined the credibility of the state significantly. A state that is itself a violator of the legal regime cannot claim the role of a law-abiding state seeking protection under the norms of the legal regime.

Iran’s legal rationale was always theoretically wrong. What has occurred since February 28, 2026, has made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not simply target US military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and undeniable. Ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states in the opening days of the conflict. This marked the first time one actor had simultaneously attacked all six GCC states. Iran escalated its attacks in deliberate stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles were fired against military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles were fired against civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles were fired against the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh was attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights throughout the region. Videos from Bahrain documented an Iranian Shahed drone attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defence. This is the collective punishment of sovereign nations that went to extraordinary lengths to avoid the conflict.

The rationale provided by Iran falls flat when one considers the actions Iran itself took. Its doctrine held that only targets involved in the preparation or launch of an attack against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. Hotels in Palm Jumeirah are not military command centres. An apartment complex in Manama is not a weapons storage facility. By Iran’s own stated legal rationale, none of these targets was legitimate, yet they were attacked. This was not a legal doctrine at all; it was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of war revealed this to be the case.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

WASHINGTON — President Trump said Friday that the United States would accept nothing short of Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” signaling that the possibility of regime change may be emerging as an objective as the expanding war in the Middle East entered its seventh day.

In a post on Truth Social, Trump said negotiations with Iran were off the table and that he wants to have a say on who will be Iran’s next leader once they capitulate.

“After that, and the selection of a GREAT & ACCEPTABLE Leader(s), we, and many of our wonderful and very brave allies and partners, will work tirelessly to bring Iran back from the brink of destruction, making it economically bigger, better, and stronger than ever before,” Trump wrote.

The comments mark one of the clearest indications yet that Trump is contemplating regime change inside Iran even as administration officials have said that is not a goal of the war.

Mojtaba Khamenei — the son of the former leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei — has emerged as a leading candidate to succeed his father. But Trump has said he would be an “unacceptable” choice, and in an interview with Politico, the president said he expects his administration will “work with them to help them make the proper choice.”

The comments come as the war continued to escalate across the region, with Israeli forces carrying out attacks on targets in Tehran and in Beirut and Iranian forces launching missile and drone attacks against Israel and Gulf countries. The Israeli military also said it hit an area in Tehran where it said Iran had secretly moved some nuclear activities to underground bunkers.

As the fighting intensified, the White House paired its policy statement on the war with an unusual online messaging campaign that featured Hollywood movies and video games to promote Trump’s war efforts.

In a 31-second video posted on the official White House account on X, a series of clips featured Russell Crowe in “Gladiator,” Mel Gibson in “Braveheart” and Tom Cruise in “Top Gun” with the caption: “JUSTICE AMERICAN WAY” with an American flag and fire emojis.

Another video montage to market the administration’s efforts in Iran used clips from the video game “Grand Theft Auto” with one of its characters saying: “Oh s—, here we go again.”

The tone of the social media campaign highlights the administration’s effort to frame the conflict in dramatic and patriotic terms as questions grow about its potential human toll.

In an interview with Time, Trump once again acknowledged the possibility of U.S. casualties — not just abroad but at home.

Asked whether Americans should be worried about retaliatory attacks at home, Trump said “I guess.”

“You know, we expect some things,”Trump said. “Like I said, some people will die. When you go to war, some people will die.”

Trump’s response drew swift criticism from congressional Democrats, a majority of whom have tried to rein in Trump’s efforts through legislative action to no avail in the Republican-controlled Congress.

Sen. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was offended by the president’s “I guess” retort to the question of domestic attacks.

“You’ve got to be kidding me. We have totally unserious, completely incompetent people taking us into mindless deadly war,” Murphy said.

Russia and China, Tehran’s two most powerful diplomatic partners, have labelled the US-Israeli war on Iran that has killed more than 1,000 people a clear violation of international law.

President Vladimir Putin called the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Saturday a “cynical violation of all norms of human morals”.

China’s Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Saar, that “force cannot truly solve problems” as he urged all sides to avoid further escalation.

Russia and China jointly requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council.

The reaction reflects the close relationship between Iran, Russia, and China. Moscow and Beijing have signed bilateral deals and expanded coordination through joint naval drills, projecting a united front against what they describe as a US-led international order that has long sought to isolate them.

Yet despite their sharp rhetoric, neither has indicated a willingness to intervene militarily to support Iran.

Russia-Iran: Strategic partners, not military allies

In January 2025, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty covering areas from trade and military cooperation to science, culture, and education.

The agreement deepened defence and intelligence coordination and supported projects such as transport corridors, linking Russia to the Gulf through Iran.

The pair carried out joint military drills in the Indian Ocean as recently as late February, the week before the US and Israel attacked Iran.

However, when the war began, Moscow was not obliged to respond as the treaty did not include a mutual defence clause, meaning it stopped short of forming a formal military alliance.

Andrey Kortunov, the former director general of the Russian International Affairs Council and a member of the Valdai Discussion Club, a Russian foreign policy think tank, told Al Jazeera via videolink from Moscow, that Russia’s 2024 mutual defence treaty with North Korea is an example of a “more binding” agreement on military support.

He said that, under that agreement, Russia would be obliged to join North Korea “in any conflict the country might get involved in”, whereas with Iran, “it just mentioned that both sides agreed to abstain from any hostile actions in case the other side is engaged in conflict”.

Kortunov said Russia is unlikely to take direct military action in support of Iran because the risks would be too high.

He added that Moscow appears to be “prioritising the United States mediation in the conflict with Ukraine”, and noted that Russia has previously taken a similar approach by criticising US actions in places like Venezuela after the US military attack and arrest of its President, Nicolas Maduro, in January.

Although the treaty clearly states that Russia is not obliged to intervene, he said some of his contacts in Tehran have expressed a “degree of frustration”, and there had been an “expectation that Russia should somehow do more than just diplomatic moves in the United Nations Security Council or in other multilateral forums”.

China–Iran ties and their limits

In 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation agreement aimed at expanding ties in areas such as energy, while also drawing Iran into China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Jodie Wen, a postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University in China, who has travelled frequently to Iran, told Al Jazeera that the relationship is widely viewed in Beijing as pragmatic and stable.

“From the political side, we have regular exchange,” she said over the phone from Beijing, adding, “on the economic side, the cooperation is very deep; many enterprises have investments in Iran.”

Yet she stressed that Beijing has long drawn clear limits around the partnership, particularly regarding military involvement.

“The Chinese government always adheres to not interfering in other countries’ issues … I do not think the Chinese government would send weapons to Iran,” she said.

Instead, Beijing’s role is more likely to focus on diplomacy and crisis management.

“I think China is trying its way to talk with the US side and Gulf countries to keep calm,” she said.

That clarity about the relationship, she added, has helped build trust in Tehran.

Even so, she noted the relationship is not symmetrical.

Vessel-tracking service Kpler estimates that 87.2 percent of Iran’s annual crude oil exports go to China, underscoring how economically significant China is for Tehran, while Iran remains a relatively small partner in China’s global trade.

Dylan Loh, an associate professor in the Public Policy and Global Affairs programme at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, told Al Jazeera that he believes China’s role regarding Iran “has evolved into a protective one, accelerating its mediation effort to prevent a regional collapse that would threaten its own regional economic and security interests”.

“I think there will be some assessment of how to lower the political risks and what sorts of options are available; truth be told, this re-think already started after [the US attack on] Venezuela,” he said.

Iran’s Assembly of Experts is now tasked with choosing the next Supreme Leader. It elected Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in 1989.

In Iran’s major turning points, Hassan Rouhani’s name tends to resurface – even when he is no longer at the centre of decision-making. And as the Islamic Republic enters a sensitive transitional phase after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in a joint United States-Israeli strike, the question of which figures might be used to calm the domestic arena or rebalance power inside the system has returned to the forefront.

Rouhani, Iran’s former president (2013–2021), a Muslim leader with a doctorate in law, is not an outsider to the system he once promised to “reform”. He is a product of it: a longtime parliamentarian, a veteran of the national-security apparatus, and a former chief nuclear negotiator who rose to the presidency in 2013 as a pragmatist offering economic relief through diplomacy.

The long road through parliament

Rouhani was born in 1948 in Sorkheh, in Iran’s Semnan province. He received religious training in the Hawza system (Islamic religious seminary), then studied law at the University of Tehran, before earning a PhD in law from Glasgow Caledonian University in 1999.

After the revolution, he built his career through parliament. He was elected to the Majlis (Iran’s legislature) for five consecutive terms between 1980 and 2000, giving him practical political experience and longstanding relationships within the elite.

That background explains part of his later image as a “consensus man” more than an ideological confrontational leader: someone who moves within the rules of the game, not outside them.

A ‘third road’ in Iran’s post-revolution politics

To understand Rouhani’s political brand, it helps to place it in a longer arc of post-1979 ideological currents inside the Islamic Republic – an arc often described in Iranian political writing as a sequence of competing “discourses” that nonetheless remained anchored to the revolution and the system’s religious-constitutional framework.

Iran moved through phases that emphasised different priorities: currents sometimes described as “Islamic left”, “Islamic liberalism”, and a more market-oriented turn under former leader Hashemi Rafsanjani; then a period of “Islamic democracy” and “civil society” associated with Mohammad Khatami; followed by a social-justice-heavy, populist register under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

That’s when Rouhani arrived with the language of e‘tedal –or “moderation”.

Within that framework, “moderation” presents itself as an attempt to balance what supporters call the system’s two pillars: the “Republic” (pragmatism, governance, responsiveness) and the “Islamic” (ideals, clerical authority, revolutionary identity). This balance became central to Rouhani’s pitch in 2013: He promised to reduce external pressure, restart economic growth and lower domestic polarisation without challenging the authority structure that ultimately constrains any elected president in Iran.

The negotiator and president

Between 2003 and 2005, Rouhani led Iran’s delegation in nuclear negotiations with the “European troika” (Britain, France and Germany). He gained a reputation as a “pragmatist” among Western diplomats, while Iranian hardliners accused him of making concessions.

Later, that record became a pillar of his 2013 presidential campaign: a negotiator rather than a confrontationist.

In June that year, Rouhani won the presidency in the first round with more than 50 percent of the vote, avoiding a run-off in an election that saw high turnout.

Rouhani’s signature achievement was the 2015 nuclear agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 – the US, China, Russia, France, United Kingdom and European Union.

Under the deal, the US and its allies lifted the bulk of sanctions imposed on Iran, and allowed Tehran access to more than $100bn in frozen assets. In exchange, Iran agreed to major caps on its nuclear programme.

At home, Rouhani sold the deal as a route to normalise the economy and curb inflation.

2017: A second mandate – and first brush with Trump

In May 2017, Rouhani won a second term with about 57 percent of the vote. Many inside Iran read the result as a bet by the country’s people on continued “opening” and reduced isolation.

But the power equation within Iran did not change. The presidency manages day-to-day governance, but it does not decide alone on the security services, the judiciary, the Revolutionary Guards or the core media architecture.

The diplomatic opening proved short-lived. In 2018, US President Donald Trump, in his first term, withdrew Washington from the JCPOA and reimposed sweeping sanctions, sharply limiting the economic gains Rouhani had promised. The reversal weakened Iran’s pragmatists and reformists, who had invested political capital in defending the agreement as the best available route out of isolation–while giving hardliners new ammunition to argue that negotiations with the US cannot deliver durable relief.

Post-presidential year – and a return from political exile?

Rouhani’s presidency ended in 2021, and with the rise of conservative dominance within Iran’s politics, he appeared to be gradually pushed to the margins. He then became a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts – the body constitutionally empowered to choose the supreme leader.

But in January 2024, the Reuters news agency reported that the Guardian Council barred Rouhani from running again for the Assembly of Experts.

Two years later, after the February 28 strike that killed Khamenei, the country – according to the constitution– entered a temporary arrangement phase until the Assembly of Experts selects a new leader. President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme Court Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei and Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi form the interim leadership council that are in charge until the Assembly of Experts announces its pick for the next Supreme Leader. 

And from the hushed conversations and chatter that have emerged from within Iran’s elite circles over potential candidates for the supreme leader’s role, Rouhani’s name has resurfaced.

That possible return to political life, analysts say, is a testament to what Rouhani represents in Iran’s factional geometry: a governing style that privileges tactical compromise, economic management and controlled engagement – while remaining fundamentally loyal to the Islamic Republic’s constitutional-religious architecture.

As Iran plans Khamenei’s succession, it faces a central question: whether to broaden legitimacy by incorporating pragmatic faces or double down on a security-first posture. Rouhani sits at that crossroads – not the architect of the system, and no longer a principal decision-maker, but a durable indicator of how far Iran’s establishment is willing to bend without breaking.

With Iran’s supreme leader killed and retaliation unfolding, the US and Israel appear to be testing the durability of the Islamic Republic. But Iran’s political system was designed to survive leadership loss and outside pressure. What does Washington misunderstand about Tehran’s structure, and how far is Iran prepared to go?

In this episode: 

• Ali Hashem, Al Jazeera Correspondent

Episode credits:

This episode was produced by Marcos Bartolomé, Sarí el-Khalili, David Enders, and Tamara Khandaker, with Spencer Cline, Catherine Nouhan, Tuleen Barakat, Maya Hamadah, Noor Wazwaz, and our host, Malika Bilal. It was edited by Alexandra Locke. 

Our sound designer is Alex Roldan. Our video editors are Hisham Abu Salah and Mohannad al-Melhemm. Alexandra Locke is The Take’s executive producer.

Connect with us:

@AJEPodcasts on X, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube

We are seeing the total destruction of Iran’s naval capabilities unfold day by day. Earlier this morning, the Pentagon announced that a U.S. Navy submarine had made the first torpedo kill since World War II against an Iranian frigate in the Indian Ocean. Now we are seeing footage of one of Iran’s strangest and most advanced warships, the Shahid Soleimani class IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi (FS313-03), being struck and set ablaze. The ship would later sink, according to the Department of War.

The first ship in her class, the Shahid Soleimani, was commissioned in 2022, and is a very unique vessel indeed. Built for littoral combat, it incorporates a number of interesting features for a ship of its size. This includes a vertical launch system with two cell sizes that is capable of slinging air defense missiles. It also features anti-ship cruise missiles, gun systems, and a large flight deck. Clearly, Shahid Sayyad Shirazi‘s capabilities offered little help to its survival, as the video, shot by a U.S. surveillance aircraft, shows.

In fact, if you look closely at the image at the top of the story, it appears that either a missile is exiting one of the IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi‘s vertical launch cells or it is stuck on its launch rail. We also see an image with smoke streaks surrounding the ship. It isn’t clear if this was it launching weapons at its attackers, or the attacker’s weapons finding their way to the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi.

It’s also worth noting that the IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi‘s first-in-class progenitor is named after the IRGC commander that U.S. forces killed during the first Trump Administration in a strike near the Baghdad airport. This assassination in 2020 went on to largely set the tone between Tehran and Washington during the remainder of Trump’s first and now his second presidency.

We previously noted that at least one of the four Shahid Soleimani class corvettes escaped initial U.S. airstrikes on its home port of Bandar Abbas, Iran’s most important naval base that sits right in the Strait of Hormuz. The ship was at its berth just days before the war kicked off, but was nowhere to be found in subsequent satellite imagery. That vessel very well could have been the one sunk.

Ракетные катамараны Ирана типа Shahid Soleimani, обзор

This class of vessels is the most advanced of Iran’s catamaran warships, which are often configured in a puzzling manner. These ships are active components of the naval arm of the IRGC, nonetheless, and have played a part in close encounters with U.S. Navy warships in the region.

As an update to our prior reporting on the strikes on Bandar Abbas, new satellite imagery we have reviewed appears to show both frigates that were struck in the first attacks now having sunk. The single Kilo class submarine, Iran’s most advanced, which was docked at the base, also appears to have been sunk, and a large scorch mark sits next to where it was tied-up pier-side. U.S. Central Command confirmed it had targeted the “most operational Iranian submarine” in ongoing strikes last night.

Explosions have rung out across Tehran as the war entered its fourth day with the United States and Israel continuing to pound Iran’s capital and numerous other cities and locations after the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Iran continued on Tuesday to retaliate against Israel and throughout the Gulf where nations host US assets.

At least 787 people have been killed in US-Israeli strikes on a minimum of 131 cities across Iran, the Iranian Red Crescent Society said on Tuesday.

Israel’s military said it had “struck and dismantled” the headquarters of Iran’s state radio and television broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), accusing it of “calling for the destruction of the State of Israel and for the use of nuclear weapons”.

In a post on Telegram, IRIB reported explosions near its headquarters in Tehran but said there had been no disruption to its operations.

Tehran’s streets have been largely deserted as people take shelter during the air strikes.

Iranian media also reported explosions in the city of Karaj, just outside Tehran, as well as in the central city of Isfahan.

Iran held a mass funeral on Tuesday for 165 schoolgirls and staff killed on Saturday in what Iran said was a US-Israeli attack on a school in the southern city of Minab.

Members of Nigeria’s Shia Muslim community are mourning Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who was killed by a US-Israeli attack in Tehran. Demonstrators carried his portrait and waved Iranian flags while they dragged American and Israeli flags along the ground.

Tehran’s retaliatory attacks on US assets in the Gulf region continue for a third day as fears of a prolonged conflict rise.

Loud explosions were heard in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and the Qatari capital ‌of Doha for a third consecutive day of ⁠Iranian retaliatory strikes on neighbouring Gulf states in response to ongoing attacks by the United States and ⁠Israel on Iran.

Loud bangs and sirens were also heard in Kuwait early on Monday morning, with a witness quoted by Reuters news agency saying smoke was seen rising from near the US embassy.

Kuwaiti air defences intercepted the majority of the ⁠drones near Rumaithiya and ⁠Salwa neighbourhoods, the state-run Kuwait News Agency reported, quoting the director general of civil defence.

Tehran said it ⁠would target US military assets in the region after the ⁠US-Israeli ⁠strikes on Iran continued for the third day on Monday.

Iran has hit a range of civilian and commercial areas across ‌Gulf cities, widening the conflict’s impact on key regional aviation and trade hubs.

Meanwhile, Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior said it activated air raid alerts and urged residents to head to the nearest safe place.

It said the Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Bridge linking the capital, Manama, to nearby towns was closed and urged “residents to use main roads only when necessary”.

At least one person has been killed in Kuwait, three have been killed in the UAE, and 16 people have been injured in Qatar.

Meanwhile, at least 201 people have been killed in Iran in US-Israeli attacks, with 747 wounded, while at least nine have been killed and 121 wounded in Israel.

Iran ‘attacking American targets’

The US, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued a joint statement on Sunday condemning Iranian attacks across the region and affirming their right to self-defence.

Gulf countries “will take all necessary measures to defend their security and stability and to protect their territories, citizens, and residents, including the option of responding to the aggression”, the statement released after a meeting said.

However, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Sunday stressed that Tehran is not seeking confrontation with its Gulf neighbours, telling Al Jazeera that Tehran has “no problem with the countries on the other side of the Persian Gulf”, referring to the Gulf, which is also known as the Arabian Gulf.

Iran maintains “friendly and good neighbourly relations with all of them”, which it is determined to continue, he added.

“What we are doing is in fact an act of self-defence and retaliation to the American aggression against us,” Araghchi said.

“We are not attacking our brothers in the Persian Gulf, we are not attacking our neighbours, but we are attacking American targets,” he added.

The killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a United States-Israeli air campaign has sent shockwaves through the Middle East, decapitating the leadership of the “axis of resistance” at its most critical moment.

For decades, this network of groups allied with Iran was Tehran’s forward line of defence. But today, with its commander-in-chief dead and its logistical arteries cut, the alliance looks less like a unified war machine and more like a series of isolated islands.

Hassan Ahmadian, a professor at the University of Tehran, warned that the era of strategic patience is over and the Iranian government is now prepared to “burn everything” in response to the attacks.

While Tehran promised to retaliate against the US and Israel “with a force they have never experienced before”, the reaction from its key proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq revealed a deep hesitation driven by local existential threats that may outweigh their ideological loyalty to a fallen leader.

Hezbollah: Walking between raindrops

In Beirut, the response from Hezbollah, long considered the crown jewel among Iran’s regional allies, has been cautiously calibrated.

After Sunday’s announcement of Khamenei’s death, the group issued a statement condemning the attack as the “height of criminality”. However, Al Jazeera correspondent in Beirut Mazen Ibrahim noted that the language used was defensive, not offensive.

“If one dismantles the linguistic structure of the statement, the complexity of Hezbollah’s position becomes clear,” Ibrahim said. “The secretary-general spoke of ‘confronting aggression’, which refers to a defensive posture. … He did not explicitly threaten to attack Israel or launch revenge operations.”

This caution is rooted in a new strategic reality. Since the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria in late 2024, the “land bridge” that supplied Hezbollah has been severed. Ali Akbar Dareini, a Tehran-based researcher, noted that this loss “cut the ground link with Lebanon”, leaving the group physically isolated.

Now with top leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) killed alongside Khamenei, Hezbollah appears paralysed – caught between a battered domestic front in Lebanon and a vacuum of orders from Tehran.

The Houthis: Solidarity meets survival

In Yemen, the Houthis face an even more volatile calculus.

In his first televised address after the strikes on Iran began on Saturday, the group’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, declared his forces “fully prepared for any developments”. Yet his rhetoric notably emphasised that “Iran is strong” and “its response will be decisive,” a phrasing that analysts interpreted as an attempt to deflect the immediate burden of war away from the Houthis.

The Houthis are under immense pressure. While they have successfully disrupted Red Sea shipping and fired missiles at Tel Aviv, they now face a renewed threat at home.

The internationally recognised Yemeni government, having won a power struggle against southern separatists, has sensed a shift in momentum. Defence Minister Taher al-Aqili recently declared: “The index of operations is heading towards the capital, Sanaa,” which the Houthis control. The statement signalled a potential ground offensive to retake Houthi territory.

This places the Houthis in a bind. While Houthi negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam recently met with Iranian official Ali Larijani in Muscat, Oman, to discuss “unity of the arenas”, the reality on the ground is different. Engaging in a war for Iran could leave the Houthis’ home front exposed to government forces backed by regional rivals.

“Expanding the circle of targeting will only result in expanding the circle of confrontation,” the Houthi-affiliated Supreme Political Council warned in a statement that threatened escalation but also implicitly acknowledged the high cost of a wider war.

Iraq: The internal time bomb

Perhaps nowhere is the dilemma more acute than in Iraq, where the lines between the state and the “resistance” are dangerously blurred.

Iran-aligned militias, many of which operate under the state-sanctioned Popular Mobilisation Forces, are now caught in a direct standoff with the US. Tensions have simmered since late 2024 when Ibrahim Al-Sumaidaie, an adviser to Iraq’s prime minister, revealed that Washington had threatened to dismantle these groups by force, a warning that led to his resignation under pressure from militia leaders.

Today, that threat looms larger than ever. Unlike Hezbollah or the Houthis, these groups are technically part of the Iraqi security apparatus. A retaliation from Iraqi soil would not just risk a militia war but also a direct conflict between the US and the Iraqi state.

With the IRGC commanders who once mediated these tensions now dead, the “restraining hand” is gone. Isolated militia leaders may now decide to strike US bases of their own accord, dragging Baghdad into a war the government has desperately tried to avoid.

Resistance without a head

Khamenei’s assassination has essentially shattered the command-and-control structure of the “axis of resistance”.

The network was built on three pillars: the ideological authority of the supreme leader, the logistical coordination of the IRGC and the geographic connection through Syria. Today, all three are broken.

“The most important damage to Iran’s security interests is the severing of the ground link,” Dareini said. With Khamenei gone, the “spiritual link” is also severed.

What remains is a fragmented landscape. In Lebanon, Hezbollah is too exhausted to open a northern front. In Yemen, the Houthis face a potential domestic offensive. In Iraq, militias risk collapsing the state they live in.

When the dust settles in Tehran, the region will face a dangerous unpredictability. The “axis of resistance” is no longer a coordinated army. It is a collection of angry, heavily armed militias, each calculating its own survival in a world where the orders from Tehran have suddenly stopped coming.

Israelis filmed the moment an Iranian missile broke through Israel’s air defence systems to strike a target in West Jerusalem, in retaliation for Israel’s war on Iran.

Iranian state media confirmed that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader since 1989, was killed in a joint US-Israeli air strike. Here’s what we know about him and the key moments that defined his rule.

The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in joint US-Israeli air attacks has caused one of the most significant blows to the country’s leadership since the 1979 Islamic revolution, triggering protests by his supporters.

Khamenei assumed Iran’s supreme leadership in 1989 after the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had led the Islamic revolution against the pro-United States Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said seeking revenge for the killing of Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials is the country’s “duty and legitimate right”.

President Donald Trump has framed the operation as a “liberation” moment, predicting that the removal of the “head” will lead to the swift collapse of the body. However, in Iran, the reality suggests a far more complex situation.

Interviews with insiders, military experts and political sociologists suggest that the decapitation of Iran’s top leadership may not go the way the West envisions. Instead, it risks birthing a “garrison state” – a paranoid, militarised system fighting for its existence with no political red lines left to cross.

The limits of ‘decapitation’

The central premise of the US operation is that Iran is too brittle to survive the death of its supreme leader. In a phone interview with CBS News, Trump claimed he “knows exactly” who is calling the shots in Tehran, adding that “there are some good candidates” to replace the supreme leader. He did not elaborate on his claims.

However, military analysts warn against the assumption that air strikes alone can trigger “regime change”. Michael Mulroy, a former US deputy assistant secretary of defence, told Al Jazeera Arabic that without “boots on the ground” or a fully armed organic uprising, the state’s deep security apparatus can survive simply by maintaining cohesion.

“You cannot facilitate regime change through air strikes alone,” Mulroy said. “If anyone is left alive to speak, the regime is still there.”

This resilience is rooted in Iran’s dual military structure. The government is protected not just by a regular army (Artesh), but also by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a powerful parallel military force constitutionally tasked with protecting the velayat-e faqih system – the principle of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist.

Supporting them is the Basij, a vast paramilitary volunteer militia embedded in every neighbourhood, specifically trained to crush internal dissent and mobilise ideological loyalists.

That cohesion is already being tested.

Hossein Royvaran, a political analyst based in Tehran, confirmed that the strikes wiped out the country’s top security tier, including Khamenei’s adviser and secretary of the newly-formed Supreme Defence Council, Ali Shamkhani.

The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, said the leadership transition will begin on Sunday.

“An interim leadership council will soon be formed. The president, the head of the judiciary and a jurist from the Guardian Council will assume responsibility until the election of the next leader,” said Larijani.

“This council will be established as soon as possible. We are working to form it as early as today,” he said in an interview broadcast by state TV.

The rapid formation of an interim leadership council – comprising the president, judiciary chief, and a Guardian Council religious leader – indicates that the system’s “survival protocols” have been activated.

According to Royvaran, the system is designed to be “institutional, not personal”, capable of functioning on “autopilot” even when the political leadership is severed.

But a Tehran-based analyst said direction of Iran is still unclear as officials try to ‘project stability’.

“Officials here are trying to project stability, emphasising that the situation is under control and that state institutions are functioning effectively,” Abas Aslani, senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies, said.

“Today, [the US-Israeli] air strikes targeted security and military infrastructure in the capital [Tehran] and other cities. There are expectations that such strikes could continue – and possibly intensify – in the coming hours or days,” he told Al Jazeera.

“That prospect of escalation is not something many ordinary Iranians welcome. At the same time, Iranian officials are issuing strong warnings, suggesting they could respond with capabilities that have not previously been used against Israel or the United States.”

From theocracy to nationalist survival

Perhaps the most significant shift in the immediate aftermath is Iran’s pivot from religious legitimacy to survivalist nationalism.

Aware that the death of the supreme leader might sever the spiritual bond with parts of the population, surviving officials are reframing the war not as a defence of the clergy, but as a defence of Iran’s territorial integrity.

Larijani, a conservative heavyweight and key figure in the transition, issued a stark warning that Israel’s ultimate goal is the “partition” of Iran. By raising the spectre of Iran being broken into ethnic statelets, the leadership aims to rally secular Iranians and the opposition against a common external enemy.

This strategy complicates the US hope for a popular uprising.

Saleh al-Mutairi, a political sociologist, notes that the government’s declaration of 40 days of mourning creates a “funeral trap” for the opposition. The streets will likely be filled with millions of mourners, creating a human shield for the government and making it logistically and morally difficult for antigovernment protests to gain momentum in the short term.

The end of ‘strategic patience’

If Iran survives the initial shock, the nation that emerges will likely be fundamentally different: less calculated and probably more violent.

For years, Khamenei championed a doctrine of “strategic patience”, often absorbing blows to avoid all-out war.

Hassan Ahmadian, a professor at the University of Tehran, says the era died with the supreme leader.

“Iran learned a hard lesson from the June 2025 war: Restraint is interpreted as weakness,” Ahmadian told Al Jazeera Arabic. The new calculus in Tehran is likely to be a “scorched earth” policy.

“The decision has been made. If attacked, Iran will burn everything,” Ahmadian added, suggesting that the response will be broader and more painful than anything seen in previous escalations.”

This risks a scenario where field commanders, freed from the political caution of the clerical leadership, lash out with greater ferocity. The assassination has humiliated the security establishment, exposing what Liqaa Maki, a senior researcher at Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, calls a catastrophic intelligence failure.

“The believer is not bitten from the same hole twice, yet Iran has been bitten twice,” Maki said, referring to the pattern of US strikes. This “total exposure” is likely to drive the surviving leadership underground, turning Iran into a hyper-security state that views any internal dissent as foreign collaboration, he said.

While the “head” of Iran has been removed, the “body” – armed with one of the largest missile arsenals in the Middle East – remains, Maki said.