Interceptor

Lockheed Martin has unveiled the PAC-3 Adapted Capability Effector (ACE), a lower-cost interceptor for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system. By leveraging the existing PAC-3 fire-control architecture and Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), the company says the new interceptor will cost less than half as much as the in-production PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) while providing a high-volume option for defeating aircraft, cruise missiles, and shorter-range ballistic missile threats. Based on the ballpark figure provided by Lockheed Martin, a single PAC-3 ACE missile would cost around $2.5 million, compared to roughly $5 million for the PAC-3 MSE. The announcement comes as Patriot missile stocks are under immense pressure globally and after the U.S. Army made its hunt for lower cost interceptors official.

“American and allied warfighters need a solution that is battle-tested and budget-smart, and PAC-3 ACE delivers exactly that by building on the unrivaled performance of the PAC-3 MSE,” said Tim Cahill, president, Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. “As we look to partner with our allies, we can further enhance resiliency and ensure our forces can swiftly counter emerging threats today and tomorrow.”

Lockheed Martin said the PAC-3 ACE is designed to provide allied forces with a “rapidly fielded complement to existing Patriot interceptors.” The company plans to work with U.S. and European industrial partners on development and production, with the goal of expanding manufacturing capacity and strengthening the resilience of the transatlantic defense industrial base. The idea of the new missile as a complementary effector is especially noteworthy, indicating that the PAC-3 MSE would be reserved for the most challenging or high-risk threats, while the PAC-3 ACE can be used for everything else.

Other than the price point, it’s unclear to what degree the PAC-3 ACE missile differs from the PAC-3 MSE. A rendering released by Lockheed Martin — seen at the top of this story — appears to show a shorter, more compact interceptor. Coupled with the substantially lower cost, the new missile will offer a more degraded capability set than the MSE. This could include shorter range, lower ceiling, and a reduced ability to engage the most advanced threats Patriot batteries face. Notably missing in the rendering is the PAC-3 MSE Attitude Control Section — the ring of tiny rocket motors that wraps around its forward section — that gives it enhanced agility. Sacrificing exactly this kind of feature could lower costs in exchange for capability. In addition, the new missile may not feature the PAC-3 MSE’s “Lethality Enhancer” warhead, for instance, and could just provide a strictly hit-to-kill capability or some other warhead solution to save on cost. Using a less advanced seeker is also highly probable. We have reached out to the company for additional details.

It is notable, however, that the ability to engage short-range ballistic missiles, at least to a degree, is inherited from the PAC-3 MSE.

PAC-3 Missile: How The System Works

Patriot’s ability to engage short-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase has never been more important, particularly in light of the ongoing conflict with Iran, the war in Ukraine, and the continuing spread of those weapons worldwide. A lower-cost interceptor that can perform that mission for at least some threat profiles would help make missile defense more sustainable in future conflicts.

Overall, the concept behind the PAC-3 ACE suggests that Lockheed Martin is looking to offer a missile that’s closer to the PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI), which is no longer in production.

We do know that the PAC-3 ACE will leverage existing Patriot weapon system hardware, including the PAC-3 fire-control system and the IBCS. These measures should ensure that the process of developing, testing, and deploying the new missile can be accelerated considerably. Essentially, PAC-3 ACE will provide existing PAC-3 operators with a new common interceptor that can slot straight into the air defense system.

Northrop Grumman Integrated Air Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) Flight Test

Northrop Grumman’s IBCS was designed from the start with a modular, open-systems approach to make it easier to integrate new systems and functionality as time goes on. You can read more about IBCS in detail in this past TWZ feature.

Having access to a significantly cheaper alternative to the PAC-3 MSE effector, while maintaining many of its capabilities in terms of the kinds of threats it can target, is a big deal.

A cheaper effector means the cost-per-kill against man target types can be significantly lower. It also helps increase magazine depth, with operators able to buy larger stocks of missiles, addressing a problem that has been encountered in war zones, in particular Ukraine, where Patriot effectors have been expended at such a rate that the supplies have gotten close to being totally exhausted. Recent operations have reinforced the importance of maintaining sufficient inventories of interceptors and other high-demand munitions to meet both operational and strategic requirements — for example, a future high-intensity conflict against China. Under a contract with the Pentagon inked in January, Lockheed is already committed to boosting annual production of the PAC-3 MSE to 2,000, an increase from roughly 600.

When it comes to the cost of the PAC-3 MSE, each interceptor comes with a price tag of approximately $5.3 million, according to the Army’s latest proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year. In the past, a single missile cost around $4 million.

Just as critical as cost is speed and scalability of production. PAC-3 ACE has been adapted with this in mind, and drawing upon production facilities outside the United States will also help. Having plentiful supplies of Patriot missiles will only become more critical once they are introduced by the U.S. Navy as well as the Army. The Navy is now working to integrate PAC-3 MSE into the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), adding a valuable new anti-air interceptor to its sea-based arsenal, but also further increasing demand that the PAC-3 ACE could help meet.

Back in May, TWZ reported on how the U.S. Army’s Low Cost Interceptor (LCI) initiative was looking for proposals for a new effector for the Patriot with a unit cost under $1 million. This amounts to about a fifth of the price of a single PAC-3 MSE missile.

As we described at the time:

As a supplement to existing interceptors, a lower-cost alternative would improve Patriot’s cost-per-intercept ratio, especially against lower-tier threats like drones and cruise missiles. The design could also be easier to produce at scale, helping address increasingly worrisome strains on stockpiles and supply chains. These are issues TWZ has been calling attention to for years now, and that have been magnified by Patriot’s heavy use during the latest conflict with Iran.

Like the PAC-3 ACE, the U.S. Army said it was looking for a missile that can be integrated into existing M903 trailer-based launchers and leverage the service’s IBCS network. The M903 is already capable of accommodating newer PAC-3 series interceptors, including the MSE variant, as well as older PAC-2 types that remain in use.

As we noted at the time, the goal of acquiring an anti-air interceptor capable of engaging everything from lower-tier air-breathing threats to SRBMs, at no more than $1 million per missile, is ambitious.

The LCI initiative is also consistent with broader Pentagon efforts to expand access to lower-cost munitions through open-architecture designs and by leveraging new, non-traditional industry partners. LCI calls for Army ownership of the intellectual property, reducing vendor lock-in and enabling future competitions for complete rounds and key subcomponents.

The Army has already stated that the LCI missile and missile subsystem competition is intended to result in multiple awards that can lead to multiple different yet affordable missile interceptor solutions. PAC-3 ACE could be part of that equation for the U.S. Army if the higher price point is deemed acceptable, but clearly the concept will have considerable value for any of the more than a dozen Patriot operators, especially those facing the reality of limited magazine depth in conflict situations. Having a lower-cost effector available could also open the PAC-3 up to additional markets, too.

Even if PAC-3 ACE falls short of the Army’s ambitious sub-$1 million interceptor target, it underscores a reality that has become impossible to ignore. The era of relying exclusively on premium, very high-cost interceptors is giving way to a more layered approach, where lower-cost missiles can absorb a significant share of engagements against cruise missiles, drones, and other less demanding targets. If Lockheed Martin can deliver on its roughly half-price Patriot missile offering while still providing highly relevant capabilities, PAC-3 ACE could become an important addition to the growing effort to make high-end air defense more sustainable in prolonged conflicts.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

X-Bow Systems, a company that made its name making solid rocket motors and small space-launch vehicles, has unveiled a new low-cost drone interceptor, named Buckler. The interceptor promises high-speed and a unit cost of less than $100,000, a price point that has only been approached by drone-like systems, not modern supersonic missiles.

The Buckler — named after a small shield of the Medieval and Renaissance eras — is designed to defeat Group 3 drones. As we have explained before, under the U.S. military categorization system, Group 3 is a very broad middle tier of drones that covers designs that weigh anywhere from 56 to 1,320 pounds and can fly at up to 18,000 feet, at speeds of 250 knots or less.

Iran’s now-infamous Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, variants and derivatives of which are now in service in Russia and with several Iranian-backed proxies, falls into the Group 3 category.

While optimized for bringing down drones, the Buckler can also engage other aerial threats, including subsonic cruise missiles, under certain conditions. This is especially relevant as newer Shahed-derived designs, and many other long-range one-way attack munitions, increasingly blur the line between drones and low-end cruise missiles through the adoption of jet propulsion and higher-altitude flight profiles. Then there is the emerging group of low-cost cruise missiles being adopted in the United States and potential adversaries, as well as existing, more advanced types. Low-flying aircraft and helicopters would also likely be on the menu for this missile, even as a secondary capability.

The high speed of the missile also means that a single Buckler battery can engage targets more rapidly and respond faster over a given range. It also makes it possible for follow-up shots to be taken if an effector misses within a given timeframe.

The Buckler is one of the growing number of responses to the increasing threat of drone-and-missile barrages, which are exposing the limits of legacy air defense models. In conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, most notably, costly surface-to-air missile effectors are routinely expended, in significant quantities, against far cheaper incoming threats.

For years now, TWZ has been calling attention to the U.S. military’s concerning short-range air defense (SHORAD) gap, especially as drone threats have continued to expand and evolve.

“This is our answer to the call from the U.S. and its allies: affordable capability at scale,” X-Bow Systems’ CEO Jason Hundley told Axios.

“You can’t win a war of attrition trading million-dollar interceptors against thousand-dollar threats,” Hundley added.

The company is relying upon its own solid-rocket motor and propellant, allied with an airframe that’s also made in-house, which it says will bring down costs.

X-Bow Systems recently notched a successful flight test for the Buckler, the company says, demonstrating its propulsion system and flight characteristics after completing motor static-fire and igniter testing.

According to Axios, the Pentagon has also requested a briefing on the interceptor.

X-Bow is entering one of the fastest-growing segments of the defense industry. The company is already well established as a producer of solid rocket motors and, last year, secured a $105 million investment from Lockheed Martin to expand production and provide propulsion systems and related services.

The startup will now be hoping that the Buckler’s eye-catching price point of less than $100,000 per copy will set it apart among drone interceptors.

By way of comparison, the combat-proven Raytheon Coyote, in its Block 2 configuration, also primarily intended for the counter-drone mission, has a unit price of around $100,000, based on past reports. AeroVironment’s Freedom Eagle-1 (FE-1), which the U.S. Army picked last year to provide an additional layer of defense against longer-range one-way attack drones and other similarly sized uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), has a target unit cost of between $150,000 and $200,000. These are also notably slower and less responsive systems than the Buckler.

Freedom Eagle (FE-1) Next Gen C-UAS Missile

Toward the higher end of the scale, the cost of a Stinger short-range surface-to-air missile has historically been put at between $100,000 and $120,000, but reports in recent years have said that current-generation versions, including ones optimized for use against drones, can run up to $400,000.

In terms of more exquisite SHORAD solutions, the U.S. Army’s Enduring Shield is presently configured to fire AIM-9X Sidewinders, each of which has a price tag around $500,000. 

As for the kinds of threats that these effectors are intended to destroy, Shahed-type drones are typically understood to have a unit cost range measured in tens of thousands of dollars.

The Buckler is also intended to bring benefits in terms of speed and scalability of production. This should ensure that production facilities are able to ramp up quickly and, in response to demand, be able to increase the output accordingly. Applying the vertical integration approach, the company says it can address the “industrial-base bottleneck defense leaders cite as the top constraint on scaling interceptors.”

As demand for advanced missile propulsion accelerates, traditional production can’t keep up. Discover how X-Bow is delivering scalable, rapid solutions for urgent national security needs. #TechThisOut with @waltmac pic.twitter.com/nzSbikCz7X

— X-Bow Systems (@XBowSystems) May 7, 2026

Whether Buckler can deliver on its promised combination of performance, affordability, and production scale remains to be seen. But with militaries around the world urgently seeking cheaper ways to counter drones and cruise missiles that are appearing in greater numbers, X-Bow is entering the market at a particularly opportune moment.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

A novel kind of drone-based air defense system has been shown for the first time by German weapon manufacturer Diehl Defence. The Cobra 600, which has not previously been seen in public, combines a jet-powered drone platform with a missile rail armed with one of the company’s IRIS-T missiles, a weapon already used in short-range air defense systems and air-to-air applications. The new system immediately recalls recent Russian developments, which add short-range air defense missiles to its versions of the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, known locally as the Geran.

Cobra 600 is being presented at the ILA Berlin airshow, taking place this week in the German capital. The Cobra 600 is also known as the Airborne Launching and Attack System (AirLAS), and the program was launched last year.

The concept behind the Cobra 600 is that of a ‘missile taxi,’ in which the drone platform carries the IRIS-T missile over a considerable distance. All the while, the drone is meshed with a ground-based air defense system. Typically, this would be one of Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM or IRIS-T SLS systems. Of these, the IRIS-T SLS employs the same missile as the air-to-air variant — and therefore the same missile as the Cobra 600. The physical interface between the drone and the missile is a standard pylon as used on the Eurofighter jet.

As for the drone platform, this is provided by another German firm, the Polaris Raumflugzeuge aerospace start-up. It has a similar kind of efficient delta planform as the Shahed-136, with a modified flying-wing-like design. On the wingtips are mounted endplate vertical stabilizers. As displayed, the drone is powered by a pair of JetCat-P1000-PRO micro turbojet engines, each of which provides a maximum thrust of 20 pounds. However, the drone has intake ports for another two engines. It’s not clear if these are only intended to be fitted if heavier payloads are being carried, but it’s certainly a possibility. Concept artwork released by Polaris, as seen at the top of this story, shows a four-engine configuration, with the turbojets buried in the airframe and fed by much longer intakes, helping to shield them from detection.

Polaris Raumflugzeuge has already built a variety of drones in the same configuration, and the company eventually aims to scale this up to produce a spaceplane.

Drawing on its design heritage, the Cobra 600 drone has retractable wheeled tricycle landing gear, meaning that it can be reused in some scenarios. The drone therefore takes off and lands from runways, although it is also able to operate from suitable shorter airstrips, such as stretches of highway. It’s also intended to be cheap enough that commanders will also be willing to risk losing it in combat, or after it runs out of fuel.

The concept of operations has the Cobra 600 serving as an adjunct to a ground-based air defense system, extending its range considerably.

With the missile fitted, the Cobra 600 has a range of around 250 miles. This compares to around 25 miles for the ground-launched missile used in the IRIS-T SLM, or approximately eight miles for the missile used in the IRIS-T SLS.

As such, the Cobra 600 has the potential to turn the ground-based IRIS-T into something a little closer to a long-range surface-to-air missile, in terms of the distance it can cover. Of course, this is only true in terms of absolute range, with the speed and maneuverability of the drone being far inferior to a long-range missile. Unless the target is nearby, or the Cobra 600 has been pre-positioned based on known target vectors, the reaction time it offers is strictly limited. The missile itself is also able to tackle a more limited range of potential targets than a dedicated long-range surface-to-air missile, some of which offer an anti-ballistic missile capability, for example.

On the other hand, the Cobra 600 offers the distinct advantage of being able to loiter in a given area, waiting for threats to emerge, or to perform combat air patrols to screen certain sectors. It is best viewed as a forward-positioned additional launcher for the ground-based IRIS-T, and is also entirely reliant upon that system (or a similar one) for its effectiveness. At the same time, leveraging existing ground-based air defense systems as a force multiplier is a clear advantage. Another possible operational scenario would involve setting the Cobra 600s up as interceptors on a runway, sitting ready for launch on a runway to defend against lower-end threats.

In its current form, the Cobra 600 has no onboard sensors to detect targets other than the imaging infrared seeker head that’s integral to the standard IRIS-T missile.

In an operational scenario, a target for the Cobra 600 would be detected and identified by the ground-based air defense system to which it is ‘tethered.’ Connected via datalink, the ground-based system would vector the drone to the appropriate location. Using its own seeker, the IRIS-T would lock onto the target and be commanded to launch by the operator of the ground-based system. Of course, this presupposes that the datalink is not compromised by hostile interference or due to line-of-sight limitations, although SATCOM capability, like Starlink, would help keep redundant control over the drone beyond line-of-sight.

At this point, the mode of engagement is not dissimilar to the ground-based IRIS-T SLS, which features a lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) capability. This means it can fire missiles without first establishing the weapon’s lock on the target. After receiving target information in the form of three-dimensional coordinates, the missile uses inertial guidance during the initial stage of flight. Upon reaching the designated engagement altitude, its imaging infrared seeker activates and begins searching the predicted target area.

Diehl Experts | Ulrike Bartel | IRIS-T system | Diehl Defence

Another conceivable option would be to add some kind of sensor, such as an infrared camera, to the Cobra 600 drone platform, meaning that a ‘person in the loop’ could establish that the missile had locked onto the correct target.

A further option could be to ‘uncage’ the missile seeker and let it search across its field of view only when the Cobra 600 is in a designated ‘kill box,’ within which it would have authority to engage any target it acquires, reactively, and autonomously. Issues such as this clearly need to be addressed, based on combat requirements and ethical concerns.

As well as operating the Cobra 600 in conjunction with the IRIS-T SLM/SLS, it could also be integrated with other ground-based air defenses. According to Polaris, it could also be embedded with aircraft or in a maritime environment.

The Cobra 600 has already completed its first flight tests, with a dummy IRIS-T missile fitted. Currently, the development effort is mainly funded by the company, but there has also been investment from at least one interested nation.

With the IRIS-T SLM/SLS combat-proven in Ukraine, experiences from this conflict have almost certainly helped inform the development of the Cobra 600.

The war in Ukraine also provides an interesting parallel to the Cobra 600, in Russia’s missile-armed adaptations of its Shahed/Geran drones.

Russian developments have seen the fielding of these drones carrying either a single R-60 air-to-air missile, a much older and less capable equivalent to the IRIS-T, or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

According to Ukrainian accounts, as well as the rail-mounted missile on the top, these drones are equipped with a camera and a radio-frequency modem.

Russian forces are mounting Igla MANPADS on Shahed drones to target Ukrainian helicopters that intercept them. The drones carry a camera and radio modem, and the missile is launched remotely by an operator in Russian territory. pic.twitter.com/T5TKPHyhVu

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 4, 2026

However, the concept of operations for the missile-armed Russian drones is very different. While it gives the drones a means to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, it works more as a deterrent than as a genuinely useful tactical application. As we have noted in the past, the difficulty in obtaining a high degree of situational awareness and the limited agility of the drone raises questions about the effectiveness of these solutions. On the other hand, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, which could potentially be used to operate the missile.

Considerably larger than the Shahed-136 design, the Cobra 600 will provide a higher performance delta overall. It is also jet-powered, and, with up to four engines, this would give more impressive response times and maneuverability than the Russian system.

It should be noted that there are other previous precedents for arming drones with air-to-air missiles. In at least one instance from 2002, a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Stinger heat-seeking anti-air missile at an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter that was trying to shoot it down, which can be seen in the video below.

Dogfight between MQ-1 Predator drone and Mig-25 Foxbat.mp4

The fast pace of development of the Cobra 600 reflects a growing need for ground-based air defenses more generally, after decades of neglect. There is also a need for less-expensive, less-exquisite solutions in this area, something that the Cobra 600 also addresses, with a price point that is significantly lower than a long-range surface-to-air missile (although with the various disadvantages outlined above). At the same time, the Cobra 600 may well end up being used against even lower-cost drones, for which the IRIS-T is still a very expensive solution.

The Cobra 600 reflects a broader shift in air defense thinking driven by the lessons of recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East, where persistent drone threats, as well as cruise missiles, have exposed the limitations of traditional ground-based air defense architectures.

By combining the endurance and flexibility of a drone with the proven, off-the-shelf IRIS-T interceptor, the Cobra 600 offers a potentially cost-effective way to extend defensive coverage over greater distances and to put ‘shooters’ into contested areas that crewed systems would not be able to venture. While some questions remain about how the Cobra 600 would be integrated with existing operational doctrine, the concept highlights the growing demand for innovative, layered, and resilient air defenses as militaries seek to counter increasingly varied and numerous aerial threats.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The U.S. Army is pressing defense contractors to come up with proposals for a new interceptor for the Patriot surface-to-air missile system with a unit cost under $1 million. This is far cheaper — about a fifth of the price — than what the Army is paying for current-generation Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors now.

As a supplement to existing interceptors, a lower-cost alternative would improve Patriot’s cost-per-intercept ratio, especially against lower-tier threats like drones and cruise missiles. The design could also be easier to produce at scale, helping address increasingly worrisome strains on stockpiles and supply chains. These are issues TWZ has been calling attention to for years now, and that have been magnified by Patriot’s heavy use during the latest conflict with Iran.

Last Friday, the Army’s Capability Program Executive (CPE) for Defensive Fires quietly put out a call for information about prospective new low-cost interceptor designs for Patriot.

“We are running a very aggressive Low Cost Interceptor (LCI) missile and missile sub-system competition,” Army Maj. Gen. Frank Lozano, the Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires (PAE Fires), wrote in a post on LinkedIn yesterday, calling attention to the contracting notice. “We will be holding an Industry Day in DC in the very near future. We are looking to generate the greatest amount of interest and participation across the entirety of the missile technology industrial base as possible! This effort is intended to result in multiple awards that can lead to multiple different capable yet affordable missile interceptor solutions!”

The contracting notice itself breaks the $1 million unit price target into four component groups, each of which the Army wants to cost no more than $250,000. These are: Low-Cost Interceptor All-Up Round (AUR) and Fire Control, Low-Cost Rocket Motor, Low-Cost Seeker, and Fire Control and Flight Guidance Implementation. The Army is also seeking information about a potential contractor to serve as the central integrator for all of those “best of breed” elements, which could come from different sources.

When it comes to the complete missile, or AUR, and associated fire control system elements, the Army wants to integrate the missiles into existing M903 trailer-based launchers and leverage the service’s new Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) network. The M903 is already capable of accommodating newer PAC-3 series interceptors, including the MSE variant, as well as older PAC-2 types that remain in inventory.

Northrop Grumman’s IBCS was designed from the outset with a modular, open-systems approach to make it easier to integrate new systems and functionality as time goes on. You can read more about IBCS in detail in this past TWZ feature.

Northrop Grumman Integrated Air Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) Flight Test

“The Government seeks a component-level solid rocket motor (SRM) capable of meeting the rigorous kinetic and kinematic requirements necessary for an AMD interceptor and capable of being integrated as part of a MOSA AMD interceptor,” according to the contracting notice. “The Government seeks a component-level seeker capable of threat acquisition, tracking, and terminal guidance in support of AMD missions against the stated threat sets within contested and degraded environments (e.g., active electronic warfare, harsh weather, cluttered terrain, etc.).”

“The Government seeks a component-level fire control and flight guidance implementation capable of providing engageability options to the IBCS and providing post-launch management of interceptor flight and communications messaging,” the contracting notice adds.

Overall, the new low-cost interceptors are intended to “serve as supplementals to the Integrated Fires Air and Missile Defense mission against Air Breathing Threats (ABT), Cruise Missiles, Close-Range Ballistic Missiles (CRBM), and Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM),” per the notice. SRBMs are typically defined as ballistic missiles with maximum ranges under 620 miles. The U.S. military also uses the term CRBM to categorize ballistic threats that can hit targets out to no more than 186 miles.

The Patriot system currently has the ability to engage all of the threats listed above, but that capability comes at a cost. The unit price of each PAC-3 MSE interceptor has risen to approximately $5.3 million, according to the Army’s latest proposed budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year. This is up from a historical average of around $4 million for each one of these missiles. These are also exquisite munitions that take years of lead time to produce, something we will come back to later on.

In 2024, the Army announced that it had axed plans for a new interceptor for Patriot, previously called Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI), in large part due to projected costs.

“So, right now, the Army has decided that we are not going to move forward on what we were calling a Lower Tier Future Interceptor,” then-Brig. Gen. Lozano said in a live interview with Defense News‘ Jen Judson from the floor of the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual conference that year. “That was going to be a very expensive endeavor. … Interceptors in that family or class of interceptors are very capable, but also very expensive.”

There had been subsequent signs that a follow-on of some kind to LTFI was in the works. “This year we’re starting a new interceptor program that will have longer range [and] higher altitudes,” Army Lt. Col. Steven Moebes, Product Manager for Lower Tier Interceptors, told Secretary Pete Hegseth during a show-and-tell at the service’s Redstone Arsenal last December, at which media outlets were also present.

War Sec. Pete Hegseth Visits The New Site For U.S. Space Command Headquarters In Huntsville, Alabama

“We want to see if we can bring, from scratch, an interceptor that we can own the IP [intellectual property] for, then go find contract manufacturing,” Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll also told reporters at the Pentagon just earlier this month, according to The Wall Street Journal.

Driscoll reportedly indicated at that time that the total price point the service was aiming for was $250,000. As mentioned, we now know that this is the cost target for each of the four elements that would combine to form an interceptor costing $1 million or less.

A goal to acquire an anti-air interceptor that is capable of engaging everything from lower-tier air-breathing threats to SRBMs, but does not cost more than $1 million, is still ambitious. It is also in line with Pentagon-wide initiatives to expand the acquisition of lower-cost munitions, including by leveraging new, non-traditional industry partners well beyond established prime defense contractors, and open-architecture approaches. Secretary Driscoll’s mention of Army ownership of the IP also highlights another important aspect of these initiatives, which is aimed at preventing vendor lock, and allows for new competitions to be readily run for AURs and subcomponents.

To reiterate, the new low-cost interceptor is intended to be a supplement to existing options for the Patriot system. At the same time, not all threats require something like a PAC-3 MSE. So, as noted, adding a new relatively cheap alternative to the mix would offer benefits in terms of cost-per-intercept ratio. The price associated with using the system to knock down lower-tier threats, particularly long-range kamikaze drones with unit prices measured in tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, has become a major talking point in the past decade. Patriot also offers an important layer of defense against shorter-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phases of their flight, which present real threats, as underscored by the latest conflict with Iran, and are increasingly proliferating. As such, being able to provide lower-end terminal ballistic missile defense at a reduced cost point will also be increasingly valuable going forward.

A new, but still capable interceptor for Patriot that is relatively cheap compared to existing types like the PAC-3 MSE could be beneficial when it comes to stockpile management and supply chains, especially if it is also faster to produce at scale. The recent conflict with Iran and other crises in the Middle East in recent years, along with support to allies and partners, particularly Ukraine, have underscored the need for new steps to ensure sufficient numbers of anti-intercepts and other critical munitions remain in U.S. inventory.

Though the Pentagon has insisted that America’s arsenal is still sufficiently stocked to address current and future contingencies, U.S. officials have openly called attention to the potential impacts of high expenditure rates and the importance of diversifying the industrial base that supplies these weapons. The up-front need for a large stockpile of anti-air and other munitions, and the ability to refill it rapidly, not on a timeline measured in years, would only be even pronounced in any future high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific.

When it comes to Patriot, there is a separate, but directly related issue of overall capacity. The Army’s Patriot force continues to be inadequate to meet existing demands, let alone what would be required in a future major conflict against an adversary like the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The Army has been working to expand the total size of its Patriot force, as well as improve the capabilities of the system through the addition of new radars and other functionality. The Pentagon has also reached deals with the PAC-3 MSE’s prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, to ramp up production of those interceptors. The service is now looking toward new containerized launchers for the Patriot system, which could be carried by future uncrewed trucks, as well.

The PATRIOT Missile in Action

However, many of these developments are still likely years away from fully materializing and are subject to their own supply chain limitations. The Navy is now working to integrate PAC-3 MSE into the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS), adding a valuable new anti-air interceptor to its sea-based arsenal, but also further increasing demand. Growing U.S. demand around the Patriot, overall, including as a result of heavy use of the system in the latest conflict with Iran, has had second-order impacts on other customers globally.

Altogether, a new lower-cost interceptor for the Patriot system could be an important, if not increasingly essential, addition to the Army’s arsenal. At the same time, whether the service can meet its goal of finding a missile that meets its significant requirements, but still costs less than $1 million, remains to be seen.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Hours after hunkering down during Russia’s most intense Shahed-136 drone barrage of the war, the head of the country’s defense technology incubator spoke with us about the interceptor drones his country developed to defend against them.

Some of these small munitions cost about $1,000 a piece and can reach speeds of nearly 200 miles per hour. Some also have AI-assisted guidance. They have proven to be a far cheaper alternative to effectors like Patriot interceptors – costing more than $5 million a piece – and even far less advanced missiles for downing Shaheds, which have caused widespread destruction across Ukraine for years. In an hour-long interview, Brave1 CEO Andrii Hrytseniuk talked about how Ukraine developed Shahed interceptors, their effectiveness and the growing interest from the U.S. – which produced its own drone-killing interceptor that Ukraine has used – and other allies. He also spoke about Ukraine’s burgeoning uncrewed ground vehicle industry, which we will discuss in the second part of this interview.

Some of the questions and answers have been lightly edited for clarity.

In total, we have more than 150 Ukrainian companies who are producing interceptors. And these are interceptors of different architecture. Some are small rocket type first-person view (FPV) drones. In some cases, they resemble small planes. In some cases, they resemble big planes. Some of them are X wings, like a combination between FPV and fixed wing. We use different varieties in different regions and different conditions. 

Q: How do you determine which interceptors are right for the job?

A: As an example, in case the Shaheds are coming from the Black Sea, where we have Odessa and other cities on the coast, small interceptors are used only in the last kilometers. The planes are used like loitering munitions, flying for hours and when they find a Shahed, they destroy it.

We need some interceptors that are capable of flying for hours and for hundreds of kilometers. For some, we need just a small diameter zone of protection.

Q: Given the success you’ve had with interceptor drones, have the U.S. and allies in the Gulf reached out, considering the death and destruction caused by Shahed drones launched by Iran?

You can see video of one of those attacks below.

A: I am permanently discussing and we are involved in discussion of interceptors and the potential of interceptors. And of course, it’s one of the top priorities for all countries to build the capability to use interceptors.

Ukraine is able to produce more than 2,000 interceptors per day, and this is not a maximum per day, more than 2,000. And for us, this is not a threshold, not a limit. In the case of export contracts and procurements, we can do much more than 2,000 per day. As an example, during the terroristic attack of Russia, they used more than 1,300 Shaheds and this was just during the last 24 hours. So of course, we need to have a huge number of interceptors.

Q:  Did you use more than 1,000 interceptors to defend against them?

A: I will not share details of how many Shaheds were destroyed by interceptors or other types of weapons, but in total, we were able to hit 97% of all Shaheds. This is the public information from our air defense command.

The following video shows some of the aftermath of the recent Russian Shahed barrage.

Search and rescue operations are ongoing in Kyiv following a Russian strike on a residential apartment building.

As of now, five people have been killed by Russia, and more than 10 people remain missing.

Around 40 people were injured in the attack, while 28 have been rescued… pic.twitter.com/n7z2mB42lu

— MFA of Ukraine 🇺🇦 (@MFA_Ukraine) May 14, 2026

Q: So when the U.S. and allies ask for help, what do you tell them and what is the current status of exports? The last time I wrote about this issue, the law prevented exports.

A: Brave1 works with Ukrainian and international companies to build and test solutions. We are not deeply involved in export questions. So I cannot comment here, because I’m not aware of the current status.

Q: The U.S. sent its own interceptor drones, the Merops system, to Ukraine in 2024. It proved so effective that it was sent to the Middle East to protect U.S. assets during the now-paused war against Iran. How much, if anything, did Ukraine learn from it?

A: Most successful defense manufacturers learned from our military and Brave1 – both Ukrainian manufacturers, and Merops. Without the direct input of the Ukrainian military and experts, Merops would never have become such a high-performing system, as it is now.

Q: What can you tell me about the relationship between Ukraine and the U.S. and allies as a result of what’s taking place in the Middle East?

A: It’s extremely interesting, and a lot of questions are coming to us, and we are sharing our experience.

Q: Have you had direct conversations with the U.S. military?

A: We are working with the majority of our allied countries. We have calls, sessions, conferences where we are sharing our experience, and the results of Brave1 transforming and improving the Ukrainian defense industry. Everyone is interested. This is the magic that it’s possible to do in such a short period of time. Right now, in Brave1, we have more than 2,300 different Ukrainian companies that are building weapons. And when the war started, it was a majority of state run companies and a very small number of private companies, and right now there is a huge list of companies.

Ukraine’s $2,000 Drone Is Destroying Russia’s $50,000 Shaheds. And Everyone Wants It

Q: You told me that Ukraine has a wide variety of interceptor drones, from the small ones to the bigger ones. How many different kinds of interceptors do the U.S. and allies need to defend against what Iran was launching?

A: I believe that the minimum is 10.

Q: 10? Why?

A: It takes 10 different types of architecture. For us, it’s important to have more different products, because it creates competition between Ukrainian companies, and they are much quicker, building new innovations, and they run faster to get ahead of the competitors – of their rivals. Also, it’s important to have not only interceptors. Interceptors themselves do nothing. This is the combination of variety of technologies, radars, permanent control system, the navigation systems, the systems for remote control, because the soldiers operating them should be not on the front line. They need to be in shelters. So this is the variety of different sub technologies, and as a whole, this is the segment of drone-based aerial defense.

Q: Wild Hornets, for instance, claims its Sting interceptor can be operated by soldiers from 2,000 kilometers away. How common is that?

A: Right now our pilots are able to manage interceptors from any place in the world.

Wild Hornets 2,000 Km

Q: Could pilots at the Tampa, Florida headquarters of U.S. Central Command, which oversees American military efforts in the Middle East, operate interceptor drones?

A: Let’s imagine I’m sending my pilot to the U.S. on a business trip and something happens, and my pilot will be needed to manage interceptors. He will be able to do it from New York or California.

Q: Getting back to the 10 different kinds of interceptor drones the U.S. and allies need. What different kinds? What are the differences?

A: Interceptors against ISR drones. Interceptors against Shahed heavyweight kamikaze drones. Interceptors against decoys. Interceptors that are capable of flying extremely high. Interceptors that are capable of increasing their speed to catch jet kamikazes. Interceptors that can throttle very quickly. Interceptors that have a long flight time and can fly a long distance. So there are a variety of different interceptors.

Q: How do you use AI?

A: We have a very responsible attitude about the ethical aspects of AI. Human-in-the-loop sometimes is used, but mostly we use human-on-the-loop where it’s a synchronous usage of human to arm, disarm, to cancel decisions, but not the human-in-the-loop where we need to wait for the human decisions, because speed of decisions should be taken into account. The effective hitting of Shahed drones is much higher when the human is not in the loop, but on the loop.

Q: Has Ukraine learned any lessons watching the U.S. and its allies defend against Iranian Shahed drones?

A: That’s the best question from all my interviews, for the last period of time. I can tell this subjectively from myself, not a representative of Brave1 or the country. One of the main lessons is that you should never be sure that you are secure enough and your technologies are perfect, because you don’t know what is in the pocket of your enemy. And you always need to be ready for the worst case scenario and permanently improve the level of readiness to counteract or react to absolutely non-predictable different things. And the speed of your reaction is crucial.

You can see one such Iranian Shahed attack on U.S. forces in the following video.

Video footage filmed by an American servicemember of an Iranian one-way attack drone, likely a Shahed-136, nearly impacting a radar tower at a U.S. military base in the Middle East earlier this week, possibly located at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. pic.twitter.com/zsPyuFXK1c

— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) March 8, 2026

Q: Is there anything in particular you’ve seen about the performance of Iranian drones against the U.S., Israel, the UAE and other countries that surprises you and that you need to develop new ways to defeat them?

A: No. As you know, there is a strong cooperation between Russia and Iran, and Iranian technologies appear to have been used on the battlefield by Russia, and I’m sure vice versa as well.

Q: Have you seen anything different about how Iran is using these drones?

A: I didn’t see anything different. The things that I saw were the same, but I’m not a military expert. We are focusing on technologies.

You can see Iran’s Shahed drone attack on the U.S. Navy’s facility in Bahrain on the opening day of the war below.

Q: What about Ukrainian companies? How closely are they watching this conflict, and when they talk to you, are they saying anything about what they’ve learned and can use to improve Ukrainian weapons?

A: Everyone would like to help. And because we see that Ukraine, this is the only country who knows – and proven for years – how to defend itself against Russian new technologies. And of course, for us, it’s very painful to see because we have this experience. We know what to do, but all these tens of millions [of] people are facing these problems, but we could help.

Q: In March, President Donald Trump said: ‘We don’t need their help in drone defense. We know more about drones than anybody. We have the best drones in the world, actually.’ What do you think about that?

A: I cannot comment.

Q: Would you say there was a difference in the level of interest from the U.S. and allies at the beginning of the war to now? 

A: Of course, absolutely different interest. Previously, it was almost zero interest. And right now, this is number one topic.

Q: What advice would you give to the U.S. about defeating Shaheds?

A: Number one is, do not believe that you have plenty of time, a lot of time for preparation. The time is gone. The second one is cost matters. And the expenses for defense should be less than the expenses of your enemy to attack you. Number three is permanently focus on asymmetrical solutions.

Q: Like what?

A: When Ukraine didn’t have enough air defense missiles, we invented interceptors (drones). When we had a lack of 155mm ammunition, we invented FPV drones. When we had a lack of helicopters, we invented drone bombers. We had a lack of naval fleet, so we invented naval drones. 

And we see that such tremendous change of new technologies on the battlefield posed a lot of different new innovations everywhere, and we are the Ukrainian government cluster that analyzes all military ideas of different industry players. We see that every month the number of ideas is increasing, nothing. This is just opening new doors to a new era of new technologies.

Q: Have interceptor drones been able to replace those fired by high-end systems like the Patriot air defense system and others?

A: No. It’s not about replacement. Interceptors will never replace Patriot. Patriot is a great technology, the best in the world missiles for protection against ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles. But of course, it absolutely doesn’t make any sense to use it against Shaheds. It’s extremely expensive, extremely it is overkill.

In our next installment, Hrytseniuk talks about how Ukraine plans to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky’s directive to produce 50,000 uncrewed ground vehicles this year.

Contact the author: howard@TWZ.com