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China has ramped up its weapons development programs to a breathtaking degree, introducing waves of new missiles, ground combat systems, and vessels, as well as vastly expanding its nuclear triad. In just the past few months alone, China showed off gobs of new hardware, especially during its Victory Day parade in September. But above all else, Beijing’s developments in the air combat arena have been most stunning to observe. Autonomous combat drones, from relatively small to extremely large, and everything in between, to the emergence of tailless J-XDS and J-36 tactical jets, and ever sub-variations of them, as well as flying a stealth fighter from its new carrier, are among the revelations piling up at an increasing pace.

The status of these weapons programs and how many are real or merely meant to confuse and overwhelm foreign intelligence isn’t clear, but based on historic precedent, the notion that many are decoys isn’t supported. With so much development emerging publicly, and so much more going on clandestinely, along with other developments around an increasingly troubled globe, including from an active war in Ukraine, a critical question must be raised: Is the American intelligence apparatus able to deal with so much foreign technological change at one time?

Not since the height of the Cold War have so many military advancements and individual adversary weapons programs flooded the space. Does the U.S. intelligence community have the raw capacity to adequately deal with this now and sustain it for the foreseeable future?

With the Defense Intelligence Agency declining to comment and the CIA not responding to our queries, we reached out to a number of experts in the field to get their sense of how the U.S. intelligence community (USIC) is able to process and track this growing wave of weapons programs and provide adequate analysis for the White House, Pentagon and Congress. The responses we received vary quite dramatically. This is step one in trying to get a clear answer to this glaring question. We will be following up with more on the topic in the future.

The answers to our question from our experts have been lightly edited for clarity.

Timothy Heath, senior international defense researcher at RAND Corporation:

“China’s largest and growing inventory of modern weapons does pose a challenge to U.S. intelligence collection efforts. U.S. intelligence capabilities are quite sophisticated and can collect considerable data on systems once they are deployed. However, it is more useful to anticipate future weapons or programs in development and this is probably much more difficult for U.S. intelligence to accurately determine due to the secretive nature of Chinese weapons programs. Thus, U.S. intelligence is at some risk of being surprised by the emergence of new weapons systems.

Some types or programs are easier to monitor and predict than others. Warships, for example, are hard to hide and only built in a few locations. This makes it easier for U.S. intelligence to monitor. Missiles, directed energy, and hi-tech systems are smaller and easier to hide, which makes it harder for U.S. intelligence to collect.

Perhaps even more challenging than intelligence collection is the problem of how to counter the weapons. Chinese technology has improved considerably and many of their weapons and equipment systems lag only that of the United States. These are sophisticated and deadly systems and could pose a serious challenge to U.S. military forces on the battlefield. Developing counters to weapons such as hypersonic anti-ship missiles, advanced surface-to-air missiles, and stealth aircraft all require enormous sums of money and new technology. Even still, it is unclear if the U.S. can effectively counter some of these new systems, which raise questions about the ability of U.S. military forces to survive and fight in a conflict near China’s coast.”

Brad Bowman, senior director at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Center on Military & Political Power:

“Beijing revealed a remarkable quantity of weapons in the parade back in September. It is vital that the United States Intelligence Community and the Pentagon understand the capabilities of the systems displayed, distinguishing between systems that are hyped versus those that represent real advancements in capability. That is easier said than done and takes time and serious expertise to accomplish accurately. The importance and difficulty of this task is another reason why we need a large, effective, and well-funded intelligence community to understand our adversaries, their intentions, and their military capabilities – so decision makers can make informed decisions on how to respond.

I am all for efficiency in government, but the effectiveness of our intelligence community is a higher priority than efficiency, particularly in this dangerous geo-strategic moment for Americans.

It is possible that Beijing is happy to inundate the U.S. intelligence community with an enormous quantity of systems and munitions to scrutinize. But a more prudent approach in Washington is to assume that Beijing actually means what it says and is sprinting to develop and field military capabilities that it hopes could conquer Taiwan and defeat the U.S. military in the Pacific.

If Beijing is trying to portray more advanced military capabilities than it actually possesses, it would not be the first country to do so. Then again, we have also seen examples in which Americans were unwisely dismissive of adversary capabilities. We should neither exaggerate nor dismiss what we are seeing from China. We should try to understand the actual capabilities of each system, and then realize that those capabilities can change quickly.

When it comes to adversary parades and static displays, there is always more than one intended audience. Washington is no doubt on the short list of intended audiences, but Beijing is also sending messages to America’s partners, to the Chinese people, and to the PRC’s partners, including the other members of the axis of aggressors – Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Regardless, the split screen between a historic expansion in military capabilities in China and a government shutdown in America could not be more jarring and troubling.”

Zack Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies U.S. strategy in Asia, including alliance dynamics and U.S.-China competition:

“I think the United States is certainly concerned about some of the new systems shown by Beijing, but many experts have expected China to continue developing more advanced uncrewed systems and long-range missiles, so I wouldn’t say that those are huge surprises. 

The United States has a number of intelligence agencies with deep expertise on weapons systems, so although I’m sure they are busy watching these new developments, I doubt that they are overwhelmed. At the end of the day, we’re really only talking about a handful of truly new systems, so the magnitude of the challenge is probably workable, even if it does require a substantial amount of time and attention at DIA and elsewhere.

Christopher Miller, former acting defense secretary from November 2020 to January 2021 during the first Trump administration:

“I don’t think there was concern about the ability to track and analyze Chinese weapons programs. It was a pretty standard collection requirement. Now, how effective they were ……I don’t know how effective they were. I am out of the business now. 

The large number of programs was not a concern. It was a pretty standard collection requirement. The challenge was prioritization because of so many different constituencies pushing their ‘pet rocks.’  But that is simply part of the churn. It was never a crisis issue — just typical process. 

Questions about being adequately resourced was the standard pathology of the IC — ‘they NEVER have enough resources’; the political masters don’t understand the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF)!! ‘Woe is us; etc.’  It was/is their SOP.”

Robert Peters, senior research fellow for strategic deterrence in the Allison Center for National Security:

“How overwhelming, or not, for the USIC are Chinese new weaponry like those seen so far in parade preps and programs, like the long-range bombers, UAVs etc? They are a problem, both the quantity and diversity of systems displayed, but we should not make the Chinese out to be 10 feet tall. It is unclear how many of these systems are real vs. how many are mockups. And even if they are all real, it is unclear how effective these systems are. 

As an example, the U.S. Air Force recently said that the Chinese ‘stealth bomber’ — which looks for all the world like a B-2 Stealth bomber— has no stealth characteristics at all, it simply looks like a stealth bomber.

Further, even if these systems are highly capable, it is unclear how or how well the PLA would employ them. The PLA has not fought in a kinetic conflict since 1979, so they have no real-world experience in combat operations. While they certainly exercise jointly, exercises are far different than battlefield effectiveness. So we should look at what the Chinese are producing with seriousness, but we should not be fatalistic about them. 

Is this affecting the USIC and the military’s ability to get a handle on this? The Chinese military buildup — particularly is numbers of fifth-generation fighters, naval surface combatants, missiles, and nuclear warheads — presents a real challenge for the United States, yes.

The quantity they are able to produce, coupled with their ability to focus their combat power on a specific theater close to home, is the challenge for us. Even if you believe that U.S. military capabilities are qualitatively superior to Chinese capabilities (which, I do believe), the U.S. is a global power. It has aircraft carrier strike groups operating in the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, and the Pacific. It has ground and air forces deployed on six continents. This is because the United States has global commitments. China is able to field an enormous quantity of combat power on the Western Pacific, focus it, and achieve results, even with a qualitatively inferior force, while the U.S. would be pulling forces from around the world during a contingency. 

It will require a significant amount of analysts to track and analyze these forces, but I think we have the manpower to make it happen.”

Once again, this is our first look into this unique facet of the growing military technology race between the U.S. and China. Stay tuned for follow-ups.

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