Indonesia

Kazakhstan and Kosovo have also pledged to participate, while Egypt and Jordan will provide training for police officers.

Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania have pledged to send troops to Gaza, the commander of a newly created International Stabilization Force (ISF) has said during a meeting of United States President Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace.

US Army General Jasper Jeffers, who has been appointed as the head of a future Gaza stabilisation force by Trump’s board, said on Thursday that the Indonesian contingent to the mission has “accepted the position of deputy commander”.

“With these first steps, we will help bring the security that Gaza needs,” Jeffers said during a meeting of the board in Washington, DC.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, who was among several world leaders participating in the meeting, said his country would contribute up to 8,000 personnel to the planned force “to make this peace work” in the war-torn Palestinian territory, where Israel’s genocide has killed at least 72,000 people.

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said his country will also send an unspecified number of troops, including medical units, to Gaza, while Morocco’s Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita said that his country is ready to deploy police officers to Gaza.

Albania, whose prime minister recently made a two-day official visit to Israel, has also said it will contribute troops, while neighbouring countries Egypt and Jordan have said they will participate by training police officers.

Indonesia, which was one of the first countries to commit to sending troops, has sought to reassure potential critics that its participation is intended to ensure international law is upheld in Gaza, amid Israel’s genocidal onslaught.

‘Indonesian troops will not be involved in combat operations’

Indonesia’s foreign minister met with both United Nations chief Antonio Guterres and Palestinian ambassador to the UN Riyad Mansour in New York on Wednesday, in advance of President Subianto’s participation in the Board of Peace meeting.

“Indonesia’s mandate [on troop deployment] is humanitarian in nature with a focus on protecting civilians, humanitarian and health assistance, reconstruction as well as training and strengthening the capacity of the Palestinian Police,” Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a recent statement, according to the Jakarta Post newspaper.

“Indonesian troops will not be involved in combat operations or any action leading to direct confrontation with any armed group,” the ministry said, responding to questions raised over its future role in Gaza by Amnesty International.

The head of Amnesty International Indonesia, Usman Hamid, has voiced concerns that Indonesia risked violating international law through its participation in the Board of Peace and the planned stabilisation force for Gaza.

Hamid warned that Indonesia’s deployment of troops to Gaza “means putting Indonesia at risk of participating in a mechanism that will strengthen violations of International Humanitarian Law”.

“The Peace Council does not include members from the most disadvantaged Palestinians, but instead includes members from Israel, which has for nearly eight decades carried out an illegal occupation and apartheid against the Palestinian people, even committing genocide in Gaza,” Hamid wrote last week in an open letter to the speaker of the People’s Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia.

Palestinians have also voiced concerns that Trump’s Board of Peace will only further entrench Israel’s illegal occupation of the Gaza Strip, as Israeli forces continue to carve out more “buffer zones” and restrict the entry of food and other aid, months into a so-called “ceasefire” with Hamas, during which almost 600 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks.

The Gaza stabilisation force differs from other peacekeeping forces deployed by multilateral organisations such as the UN or the African Union.

In neighbouring Lebanon, more than 10,000 peacekeepers from 47 countries continue to participate in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was created in 1978.

Indonesia, along with Italy, is one of the largest contributors of troops to UNIFIL, which has repeatedly come under fire from Israeli forces, despite a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah.

President Prabowo Subianto’s government said on February 10 that Indonesia is preparing to deploy up to 8,000 troops to a proposed multinational Gaza stabilisation force under Donald Trump’s so-called Board of Peace (BoP). The troop proposal forms part of Jakarta’s broader decision to participate in the BoP framework, an initiative conceived and driven by Trump. Together, these steps signal a significant shift in Indonesia’s longstanding foreign policy posture. At a time of intensifying geopolitical volatility, Jakarta appears to be committing itself to a project shaped around a single, deeply polarising political figure. The decision raises a fundamental question: is Indonesia advancing its national interests and diplomatic credibility, or allowing its foreign policy direction to be shaped by an external agenda?

Geopolitics is not a theatre for symbolic proximity to power but a disciplined calculation of national interest and sovereign credibility. Indonesia’s decision to engage with the BoP appears less like a carefully calibrated strategic choice and more like a reactive impulse that risks weakening the philosophical foundations of its diplomacy, built over decades. Indonesia’s international influence has historically rested on strategic equidistance rather than personal alignment with controversial leaders.

There is a growing sense that Jakarta risks acting out of geopolitical urgency. Yet the initiative Indonesia has chosen to support is led by a figure known for transactional diplomacy and disregard for international consensus. The implications extend well beyond Middle East peace initiatives. What is at stake is Indonesia’s reputation as an independent stabilising actor in global diplomacy.

If Indonesia proceeds with troop deployment under the BoP framework, the risks become even more acute. Gaza is not a conventional peacekeeping theatre. It is one of the most volatile and politically contested conflict environments in the world, where humanitarian imperatives and hard security objectives frequently collide. Deploying thousands of troops into such an arena without an inclusive multilateral mandate risks drawing Indonesia into a conflict environment where neutrality would be difficult to sustain.

The erosion of the ‘Free and Active’ doctrine

The most serious concern is the gradual erosion of Indonesia’s “Free and Active” foreign policy doctrine, the intellectual backbone of its diplomacy since the Djuanda Declaration and the Bandung Conference. Indonesia has historically positioned itself as a mediator rather than a follower of personalised diplomatic agendas.

By participating in an institution closely identified with Donald Trump, Jakarta risks legitimising unilateral approaches that often conflict with established international norms. “Free” diplomacy implies independence, and “active” diplomacy implies engagement driven by national priorities rather than external pressure.

Indonesia also risks being reduced to a symbolic endorsement of a United States-centred foreign policy outlook. If Jakarta drifts too far into this orbit, its leverage with other major actors, including China, Russia and ASEAN partners, could weaken. Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia has depended on its credibility as a neutral stabilising force. That credibility may erode if it is seen as participating in great-power security agendas.

Indonesia’s respected record in United Nations peacekeeping has historically rested on internationally recognised neutrality under UN command structures. Participation in a BoP framework, which sits outside established multilateral systems, risks shifting Indonesia from neutral arbiter to participant in a political security architecture shaped beyond globally recognised peacekeeping norms.

More troubling is the precedent this sets. If foreign policy principles become negotiable in exchange for economic or strategic promises, Indonesia risks undermining the coherence of its diplomatic identity. Its constitutional commitment to promoting global peace and social justice depends on preserving policy independence.

The Palestine paradox

Indonesia’s participation in the BoP also creates a visible moral and constitutional tension. The Indonesian constitution explicitly rejects all forms of colonialism and emphasises international justice. Participation in an initiative led by the architect of policies historically skewed in Israel’s favour creates a contradiction that is difficult to reconcile.

Trump’s record in the region remains controversial. His decision to relocate the US embassy to Jerusalem altered decades of diplomatic consensus and drew widespread criticism across the Muslim world. For Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation and a consistent supporter of Palestinian statehood, association with this framework carries significant political sensitivity.

If the Board of Peace advances regional normalisation without firm guarantees of Palestinian sovereignty, Indonesia risks being linked to a process widely perceived as externally imposed. This would conflict with domestic public sentiment and weaken Indonesia’s moral leadership in forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations.

The troop deployment dimension deepens these concerns. The Gaza conflict landscape extends beyond Israeli and Palestinian actors to include broader regional power networks, including the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. Indonesian forces could be perceived by militant groups as extensions of Western-backed security arrangements, increasing the risk that peacekeeping troops become operational targets.

Strategic and economic trade-offs

Deploying 8,000 personnel overseas is not a marginal decision. For Indonesia, it represents a full brigade likely composed of some of its most capable units. At a time of rising tensions in the North Natuna Sea and intensifying Indo-Pacific competition, diverting elite forces to the Middle East risks diluting focus on core national defence priorities and stretching military readiness across distant theatres.

The financial dimension is equally significant. Sustaining thousands of troops in a devastated and heavily militarised enclave would require extensive logistical infrastructure. Even when operations receive international support, hidden costs often revert to national budgets. At a moment when Indonesia’s domestic economy requires stimulus and its defence sector seeks modernisation, allocating substantial resources to an expeditionary mission with uncertain strategic returns warrants serious parliamentary scrutiny.

Diplomatic engagement must deliver tangible dividends to the public, not impose new burdens on an already stretched state budget. Without clearly defined security or economic benefits, troop deployment risks appear as an expensive geopolitical gamble. Indonesia could find itself dependent on security arrangements shaped by shifting US domestic political priorities, creating commitments that may prove unreliable over time.

The absence of robust public debate surrounding this decision is equally concerning. Large-scale overseas military commitments require democratic oversight. Without transparency, foreign policy risks becoming an elite-driven exercise detached from national consensus.

Reputational risk and strategic myopia

Indonesia’s close association with an initiative so strongly linked to Donald Trump introduces long-term reputational risk. US politics remains deeply polarised. If future administrations distance themselves from Trump-era initiatives, Indonesia could face diplomatic exposure through no necessity of its own.

Foreign policy frameworks built around highly personalised leadership often prove unstable. Indonesia’s diplomatic partnerships have traditionally been grounded in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and ASEAN, which provide durability precisely because they are not tied to individual leaders.

If the Board of Peace becomes politically contested or evolves into a coercive security instrument, Indonesia may struggle to disengage without reputational damage. Participation, therefore, concentrates diplomatic risk rather than diversifying it.

In a rapidly multipolar world, Indonesia does not require shortcuts to global influence. Its credibility has historically been built on independence, balance and principled diplomacy. The central question is whether Indonesia will preserve that tradition or compromise it in pursuit of geopolitical visibility and proximity to power. Indonesia deserves a far more independent role than that.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Indonesia, once in line to be the first export operator of the F-15EX Eagle II multirole fighter, has abandoned its plans to buy the Boeing-made jets. The deal had been in stasis for the last two years.

Speaking to reporters at the Singapore Airshow, Bernd Peters, vice president of business development and strategy for Boeing Defense, Space and Security, confirmed that the F-15EX for Indonesia “is no longer an active campaign for the Boeing company.”

The reason for the turnaround is unclear; Boeing deferred questions on this matter to the governments of Indonesia and the United States, which were working on the program under the Foreign Military Sales process.

TWZ has contacted Boeing for further details.

Back in February of 2022, the U.S. State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Indonesia of an F-15EX derivative known as the F-15ID, as you can read more about here.

By August of 2023, it appeared as if this was a done deal when Jakarta formally committed to buying up to 24 of the jets from Boeing. By now, the Indonesian version had been renamed F-15IND. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) for the purchase of the jets was signed in St. Louis, Missouri, the location of the F-15 production facility. Among those in attendance was Indonesia’s Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, who had a tour of the F-15 production line.

“We are pleased to announce our commitment to procure the critical F-15EX fighter capability for Indonesia,” Subianto said. He added: “This state-of-the-art fighter will protect and secure our nation with its advanced capabilities.”

It’s unclear if Jakarta will instead buy another fighter type instead of the F-15.

However, it’s notable that the U.S. State Department’s approval for the F-15 deal came only hours after Indonesia’s announcement that it would be buying 42 of France’s Dassault Rafale multirole fighters. Deliveries of these are now underway.

At the time, we surmised that Washington may have been making a last-ditch effort to persuade Indonesia to opt for a mixed fleet of F-15 and Rafale jets. That bid now seems to have collapsed entirely, although we don’t yet know why. The overall cost of the F-15 deal was never made clear, but this, or production timelines, could have been sticking points.

Even without F-15s, the Indonesian Air Force is building one of the most modern and capable fighter fleets in Southeast Asia.

Aside from the Rafales, the Indonesian Air Force operates a mix of U.S. and Russian fighters.

The Viper fleet consists of around eight survivors from the 12 F-16A/B Block 15OCU fighters delivered beginning in 1989, plus 23 upgraded F-16C/Ds.

In terms of Russian-made equipment, Indonesia fields several different versions of the Sukhoi Flanker. These comprise five single-seat Su-27SKs and a pair of two-seat Su-30MKs, deliveries of which started in 2003, plus nine two-seat Su-30MK2s, the first of which was handed over in 2008. Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sanctions on Russia have likely made it far trickier to support them.

Looking further ahead, Indonesia has long been expected to buy 50 examples of the KF-21 new-generation fighter that the country is developing jointly with South Korea. Indonesia’s PT DI is an industry partner in the KF-21 alongside Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI), with a 20 percent share of the project. In the past, however, Jakarta has failed to make payments to secure its stake in the program, and its long-term commitment to the program has repeatedly been questioned.

(공식) KF-21 보라매 최초비행(220719)

A firm commitment to the KF-21 could also have spelled the end of the F-15 acquisition.

Buying both Rafales and KF-21s, as well as supporting older jets, involves enormous costs, not just in terms of upfront expenses, but also in terms of training and support.

At one point, Indonesia planned to buy Su-35s, which would have seen Russia receive half its payments in the form of exports of palm oil, rubber, and other commodities. Other big-ticket arms deals have seen Indonesia rely on loan payments, reflecting the precarious defense budget situation.

For Boeing, today’s news comes as a blow, although it will be tempered by the fact that, late last year, Israel signed a contract for 25 new F-15IA aircraft. These will be the first new Eagles that the country has acquired since 1999, and these jets will also be based on the F-15EX.

Meanwhile, the company says it’s still committed to working with Indonesia on existing programs like the country’s AH-64 Apache fleet.

“We feel the F-15 will continue to have a very bright future in the region,” Boeing’s Bernd Peters said.

Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region, Boeing last month received a $2.8-billion award for upgrades to South Korea’s F-15K Slam Eagle fleet, with work expected to be completed in 2037. You can read more about this program here.

Returning to the F-15EX, under the Fiscal Year 2026 budget proposal, the U.S. Air Force’s program of record is now set to grow from 98 to 129 aircraft, with the addition of at least one more squadron, which will be converting from the A-10. It seems quite possible that further growth of the program could occur. Originally, the Air Force had a minimum number of 144 jets to replace the F-15C/D force. Some of the Eagle units have switched to other platforms since then, but units that fly A-10s, F-16s, and even F-15Es could end up getting F-15EX if the service chooses to go such a route.

Beyond that, Poland has emerged as another potential export customer for the F-15EX.

Boeing is currently intent on ramping up F-15EX production to 24 aircraft annually. Between August and November of last year, deliveries were suspended due to production delays. The 16th F-15EX was delivered to the Air Force in December.

Whatever happens in terms of foreign sales, the future of the F-15EX with the U.S. Air Force looks increasingly bright.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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