Hugo Chavez

Less than 48 hours after the earthquakes of June 24, X (formerly Twitter) users mentioned that a Japanese team did a study on seismic risk in Caracas in the early 21st century. That’s true. In March 2005, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the primary government agency responsible for managing Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), released the report Basic Plan for Disaster Prevention in the Metropolitan District of Caracas in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

The technical report presented a Disaster Prevention Plan as requested by the Venezuelan government. The plan’s goal was to save lives during an earthquake by minimizing asset damage and improving the State’s response capacity.

The study covered only three of the five municipalities that form Metropolitan Caracas: Libertador, Chacao, and Sucre, because the government committed to apply its conclusions to Baruta and El Hatillo. It did not consider what is currently called La Guaira state (Vargas back then).

The Japanese team was headed by Mitsuo Miura (Pacific Consultants International, PCI) and composed of staff members of PCI and OYO International Corporation. They visited Venezuela seven times, from December 2002 to March 2005, when they discussed the results with the Venezuelan officials and conducted field surveys. Upon returning to Japan, the team finished additional studies and prepared this final report.

The diagnosis

The study defined several scenarios to estimate risks, soil displacement, and potential damage. It projected that, in the worst case, a considerable number of buildings in Caracas, depending on their age and type, would collapse, with a high human cost. Only the ones built after 2002 showed high seismic capacity. Twenty years ago, those buildings made up no more than 0.1% of the studied area. 

On the other side, 98,237 buildings were vulnerable. Those built before 1967 (the year of the previous great earthquake in Venezuela) had low seismic capacity, while those built from 1968 to 2001 had a moderate capacity. Of the 1968-1982 buildings, 82% were made of brick and mortar. 

“The project will reduce the number of heavily damaged buildings from around 10,000 to around 1,300, and the number of casualties from around 4,900 to around 400 in the case of a 1967 earthquake.”

The Japanese team evaluated, using Japanese standards, office buildings, homes, bridges and viaducts, and established a range of risks in several seismic scenarios. After surveying the Metro tunnels and stations, they suggested reinforcing columns and structures, as well as adding resistant materials in the gas and water networks, and improving the structure of gas stations to avoid dangerous combustible spills. 

By 2005, shantytowns covered approximately 20% of Caracas’ urban area, and hosted 51.2% of the capital’s population. This study conducted, for the first time, seismic reinforcement tests on four full-scale models of the typical rancho. It demonstrated that the unengineered constructions have low seismic resistance and require reinforcement, as they could not withstand minor loads and showed failures in columns and connections. The bricks did not contribute significant resistance. If those homes were reinforced with beams, their resistance increased by 40% at an additional cost of 5% to 7%. 

The solution

Their plan recommended seven big tasks. To improve safety, reinforce buildings and bridges, control the flux of sediments, and relocate the population living in high-risk areas. To improve response, implement early alert systems and emergency command centers. And to improve coordination, educate the population and stimulate citizen participation. By that time, local technologies made all these projects possible.

“The project”, they assured in the report, “will reduce the number of heavily damaged buildings from around 10,000 to around 1,300, and the number of casualties from around 4,900 to around 400 in the case of a 1967 earthquake.”

There was no plan, no authorities, no clear responsibilities to allow Venezuela’s capital and most populated city to coordinate the response in case of a disaster, the Japanese warned.

When they did the calculations back in 2005, they estimated the plan would cost around 2,800 million dollars (most of them to reinforce all the buildings that could be damaged in an earthquake) and would take 16 years to fully implement. So, if the Chávez and Maduro governments had done their part of the deal, Venezuela would have finished five years ago a seismic prevention and safety strategy in Caracas designed by the experts from a country that knows earthquakes as much as Japan, paying a quarter of the costs estimated for the 2026 earthquakes.

The Japanese team also recommended an early alert system for landslides, to be developed from 2005 to 2007, with a cost of one million dollars. This was meant to protect 19,000 Venezuelans.

The responsibilities

The Venezuelan entities involved in the plan would be the ministries of Public Works and Housing, Transportation, and Planning and Development; the Caracas Metropolitan Mayor’s office; the capital’s five municipalities; and the National Civil Protection and Disaster Management Organization (Protección Civil). 

But by 2005, only a civil protection law from 2001 defined some of the corresponding responsibilities. The capital’s Disaster Prevention Administration was being developed. As the Japanese experts warned in their report, there was no plan, no authorities, no clear responsibilities to allow Venezuela’s capital and most populated city to coordinate the response in case of a disaster.

When Japan’s JICA delivered the report to Hugo Chávez, the area under assessment had 17 firefighter stations, 15 municipal police stations, 17 civil protection stations and two emergency control centers. Since then, the only visible change for the inhabitants is the increase of National Police (PMB) command centers.

On June 24, 2026, three buildings went down in Chacao municipality, and inspections are being made to assess the structural damage of several more. In Libertador municipality, at least two residential towers collapsed in San Bernardino, and there’s important damage across the city. In parts of Petare, in Sucre municipality, where many buildings are ranchos, an undetermined number of lodgings collapsed totally or partially, and basic services are not available in some places.

Many foreign crews came to help, especially in La Guaira. One of them is a new research team with seven JICA specialists that arrived in Caracas four days after the earthquakes to design the support measures Japan would contribute to. On June 30, after a request from the interim government, Japan sent tents, water tanks and purification equipment, and erected two campaign hospitales, one in Caraballeda, in the middle of the disaster zone in La Guaira, and another by the Dr. Domingo Luciani Hospital in Caracas.

Besides this, Miyamoto International, a Japanese organization of disaster prevention engineering, came to assess earthquakes’ impact. The team is headed by the famous engineer Hideki “Kit” Miyamoto, the organization’s founder and director. He said they are talking with the Japanese government and reviewing the previous reports. Maybe they will issue a new body of knowledge like the 2005 investigation by JICA. Let’s hope that, this time, the Japanese expertise will be used.

Elías Jaua is a Venezuelan intellectual, university professor, and politician who served as vice president under Hugo Chávez in addition to several ministerial roles in the  Chávez and Maduro administrations. He currently heads the Center for the Study of Socialist Democracy (CEDES). In this exclusive interview, Jaua discusses Venezuela’s post-January 3 conjuncture, the anti-imperialist struggle to reclaim sovereignty, and the role to be played by Chavismo.

Venezuela’s reality changed on January 3 with the US strikes and kidnapping of President Maduro. How would you describe the current situation? And regarding the US, there is talk of “conditional sovereignty” and “tutelage,” while officials speak of a “cooperation agenda.” What is your take on this?

Sovereignty is a comprehensive concept. You either have it or you don’t. Sovereignty means not depending on anyone. It is the foundation of a republic. A republic means independence from others, something distinct from liberal, individual freedom. Venezuela today is a state under tutelage, overseen by the Donald Trump administration. This was officially declared by Trump and White House officials such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

This is also clearly reflected in oil production, which must be sold primarily to the US, and the proceeds from those exports do not enter directly into Venezuela’s coffers but instead into a US Treasury account. From there, the Venezuelan government will make requests and have certain amounts necessary for the country’s basic functioning disbursed. That is a complete loss of economic sovereignty. We have also seen how reforms to strategic laws, such as those governing hydrocarbons and mining, have been rushed through. Today, there is immense pressure on labor legislation, both from the Venezuelan business community and from transnational capital, which views labor laws as yet another obstacle to attracting investment.

And finally, we have seen that Venezuela’s foreign policy – which was openly supportive of Palestine, Iran, and Cuba – has been significantly toned down. This is another clear sign that Venezuela is no longer an independent state. Its status as a republic is entirely relative.

In light of all this, how do you feel the government and other national political groups should respond?

I view the decision made on January 3 not to respond to the US military attack as a responsible one, because the enemy clearly had military superiority and the capability to control the entire airspace using high-tech means. A response would have resulted in significant destruction of the country’s infrastructure and armed forces, as well as the killing of thousands of civilians. 

Now, four months later, the Venezuelan government and all political forces should clearly denounce to the international community the coercion to which we are being subjected. On the one hand, as a public denunciation, but also to have it formally recorded before international bodies such as the International Commission on Human Rights. What occurred in January were war crimes, a fact supported by United Nations rapporteurs. Next, a complaint should be filed with the International Court of Justice to restore control over national revenues to the Venezuelan state. 

One might argue that this is ineffective at the moment, that international law is irrelevant and international organizations are incapable of acting – and that is true. But the country must establish a legal precedent because these institutions still exist, and as a result they are a source of rights. These complaints set precedents so that the country can, in the future, claim the rights that have been damaged by the occupying power. 

Finally, it is important to reach out to the international community, and above all to the peoples of the world, so that they know there is a nation that refuses to be placed under tutelage and subjected to these conditions, in order to build international solidarity. An internal political stance must also be established, because this attempt to conceal the gravity of the coercion to which the country is being subjected numbs popular consciousness, undermines patriotic morale, and that is contrary to what is expected of the leadership – not only of the government, but of the entire political leadership of the nation.

But what if that triggers another US military attack?

I don’t think a repeat of the January 3 incident is imminent because it would have repercussions in the US domestic political landscape. The political cost for the Trump administration would no longer be zero, as it practically was on January 3, but there would be greater resistance, especially for attacking a country that has simply exercised its rights before international bodies to claim sovereignty over resources and political self-determination. 

Put another way, the option of not denouncing this, of not activating available mechanisms, is to accept and normalize this situation of neocolonialism, and I believe that is a very dangerous path that could even lead to Venezuela’s annexation by the US. I believe there are moments when peoples, nations, and their leaders must take a firm stand for the sake of history. Here it is no longer a matter of defending a party or a political movement, but rather the existence of a nation that was born free. We have a historic responsibility to ensure it remains that way for future generations.

US officials repeat their “three-phase plan,” which ends with a political “transition,” on a daily basis, while the extremist opposition demands immediate elections to seize power at any cost. From your perspective, what is the path forward, and what should the priorities be?

The priority is to regain independence. If we hold elections, that is with candidates for what? For governor of the colony? Anyone who truly wants to hold the presidency of the Republic of Venezuela must first raise their voice in favor of the immediate restoration of the country’s sovereign rights over its resources and revenues and the assertion of political self-determination. 

In any case, I argue that any eventual electoral process should be the result of a national agreement, renationalizing politics and not waiting for a call from the White House one day announcing that there will be elections in six months. That would be very shameful. I believe that Venezuelan political forces would be obligated, as part of that strategy to reclaim and demand the restoration of Venezuela’s sovereignty, to also commit to the international community and the Venezuelan people to seek a political, democratic, and electoral path forward.

In a recent article, you spoke of an inability to manage the internal political conflict, which paved the way for foreign intervention. Could you elaborate on this idea? How has that situation changed since January 3?

Foreign meddling began on the very first day of the Bolivarian Revolution, and there were agents that facilitated it. The first concrete example was the April 11, 2002 coup d’état, with the open participation of the US and Spanish governments, and from that point on, that interference never ceased. But there was always a degree of autonomy that allowed, especially after 2004, for the democratic resolution of the conflict through national agreements. For instance, the recall referendum that ultimately ratified Chávez’s mandate.

But starting in 2014, after the right-wing insurrectionary attempt known as “La Salida” and its failure, the US began to intervene directly by declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” and from that point on, the opposition lost any capacity to make decisions. I was a member of the dialogue delegation in the Dominican Republic in 2018 and saw how an agreement signed by everyone was overturned by a phone call from the US embassy. 

I also believe that later, over the past five years, the Venezuelan government chose to engage in dialogue with the US and bet that the conflict would be resolved directly with Washington. Therefore, everyone put all their eggs in the White House’s basket, and the decision slipped completely out of the control of the country’s internal institutions until the game came to a standstill. And indeed, at the behest of the far-right opposition, Washington intervened and attacked on January 3. That is why I say that reclaiming internal political control in order to resolve the conflict would be an act of dignity and courage on the part of the entire Venezuelan political leadership. Conflict is not going to vanish, because today the calls for a conflict-free Venezuela come alongside a set of measures that deepen it. For example, labor deregulation, social disinvestment, political exclusion, etc.

In recent years, you have analyzed and debated the direction of Chavismo amid sanctions and the implementation of orthodox macroeconomic adjustment policies. Since January 3, we have seen a drastic overhaul of key pillars of the Bolivarian project, such as the Hydrocarbons Law, and critical voices growing louder, including Mario Silva and Luis Britto García. What is the current state of Chavismo, in your opinion?

First of all, the revision and change of course regarding fundamental aspects of Chavismo’s historic program did not begin on January 3 but much earlier. It was formalized starting in 2018 with the Program for Economic Recovery, Growth, and Prosperity, aimed at halting the advance of the transition to socialism and restoring the private sector’s hegemony in managing the economy, with clear consequences for social rights and the fight against social inequality. This was also accompanied by increasingly undemocratic mechanisms, from the political leadership, to impose a change of course in economic and social policy. 

However, a fundamental core of Chavismo’s programmatic unity – the struggle for independence and national sovereignty – remained intact, and that kept Chavismo cohesive despite major differences. Today, I believe Chavismo must be situated within different spheres. There is a Chavismo within the United Socialist Party (PSUV) – no one can dispute that  – but I believe there is a broader, and much larger, Chavismo, with a cultural, political, and symbolic identity rooted in a metanarrative that exists outside the PSUV and the Great Patriotic Pole. That sector currently lacks clear leadership and organizational structure, but it retains its values. It may have circumstantial views of the situation, but essentially it continues to uphold the principles that launched this process: sovereignty, participatory and protagonist democracy, democratic pluralism, freedom, political ethics, debate, speaking the truth, and social equality. It also holds a vision of a multipolar world, in solidarity with international struggles. These were, in essence, the core tenets of Chavismo from its inception and remain relevant for a significant portion of the Venezuelan population that is Chavista or was once Chavista.

You have talked about building national unity at this juncture, but also about upholding Chávez and his legacy. Are these two paths compatible?

This is a difficult and painful reflection because the figure and the project of Hugo Chávez have been burdened with a series of deviations. Practices that run completely contrary to the principles and values he defended, and upon which he built the Chavista project. For example, the case of Víctor Hugo Quero and his mother is deeply outrageous (1). It is a truly shameful incident, yet international news outlets report, “Chavismo admits to the disappearance of a detainee,” “Mother of prisoner killed by Chavismo dies.” Is it Chavismo or just a few individuals responsible? What about the men and women who, for over 25 years, laboriously dreamed, built, and dedicated part of their lives to creating well-being and the common good in their communities, to building a national project called “Chavismo”? It is very unfair because Chavismo, as a movement, is being accused of things it did not do. Chavismo is not this or that leader; it is the men and women who gave up the only thing they had – their time, their effort – to build community, a national project, to plant crops, to learn to read and write or to teach others to read and write, to study, and so on. 

I stand by Chavismo as the men and women who dreamed, who continue to dream, and who have given their all to build a more humane society. For me, that will continue to be Chavismo. And those of us who have held leadership posts in this process must assume their responsibilities for the good and the bad. But it is unethical to blame a popular movement, a popular ideal like Chavismo, for the mistakes, deviations, and vile acts that some leaders may have committed. 

I believe that the call for national unity, to paraphrase [revolutionary communist leader Alfredo] Maneiro, will spring from the most authentic Chavismo, but will transcend it. It will converge with other currents of the left that were not Chavista, with social democratic sectors that broke away from the extremist opposition, and with people who never took a stance on the political conflict the country has experienced in recent decades. It will be the plurality of opinions, of people, of organizations, that will provide the foundation for a necessary movement, which I see as unstoppable and already feel in the streets, in this struggle to regain independence and sovereignty.

Note

(1) Victor Quero died in state custody in July 2025 but his family was not notified. His mother, Carmen Navas, continued to search for him until his death was publicly acknowledged in May 2026 after a judge denied an amnesty request. Navas passed away shortly afterward.