geopolitics

Japan and China are in their most dangerous diplomatic crisis in years as escalating tensions over Taiwan have cancelled earlier hopes of post-pandemic improvement. After COVID-19 restrictions were mostly lifted by 2023, relations between Beijing and Tokyo seemed to slowly improve. However, by late 2025 a series of disputes especially over the so-called “Taiwan Question” have severely deteriorated into their lowest point in years.

The high-stakes diplomatic visit at the October 2025 APEC summit, where Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi immediately followed a stable-ties agreement with President Xi Jinping by meeting Taiwanese officials, only escalated tensions.

Escalation Through Diplomatic and Military Incidents

Sanae Takaichi, declared on November 7, 2025 during a cabinet meeting, that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could justify Japan using military force in the area. China quickly reacted. China’s U.N. ambassador Fu Cong accused Japan of violating international law warning the country of its “self-defense”. Raising such an issue all the way to the United Nations is a rare move we don’t often see in global geopolitics.

In mid-November 2025 China’s coast guard sailed through waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (islands which are administered by Japan but claimed by China) on patrol and Japanese Coast Guard vessels sent in response. Japan also sent out fighter jets, and even announced plans to deploy Japanese missiles on Yonaguni island (just 110 km from Taiwan) as a deterring measure.

China also announced travel advisories urging its citizens to avoid Japan, with large numbers of airlines offering ticket refunds. Meanwhile, Japanese officials warned their nationals in China to be cautious amid a rise in hostilities. Chinese authorities abruptly canceled planned concerts by Japanese bands, and state media halted screening of new Japanese films.

The Roots of Tensions: History, the U.S. and Taiwan

The island of Taiwan is an indispensably strategic asset for both countries: for China, Taiwan is the core of its national unity; for Japan the security of a separate and democratic Taiwan is now explicitly seen in Tokyo as linked to Japan’s own defense.

Japan’s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity on the Taiwan Question, similar to the one upheld by the United States, has been abandoned by P.M. Takaichi. Authorities in Taipei have publicly supported Japan, urging China to show restraint and highlighting how an invasion would draw in allies including Japan and the U.S. .

Invoking Japan’s World War II era atrocities, China claims moral high ground or justify its own territorial aims. For example, Chinese official statements have reminded audiences of Tokyo’s past warcrimes in the region when attacking Japanese policies in the present. Japanese politicians (especially ones from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party) have grown hawkish to these types of statements, any incident easily tying into nationalist sentiment on both sides.

Rapidly expanding its defense capabilities the Japanese 2025 Defense White Paper explicitly names China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and commits to raising defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2026. New submarine fleets and the potential deployment of medium-range missiles on islands like Yonaguni, have developed into a broader security problem. This means that any Chinese blockade or attack on Taiwan would encircle Japan’s supply lines. Therefore to Japan’s leaders, Taiwan’s fate is inseparable from their own national survival. China in turn, claims an eventual military approach to Taiwan as inevitable by 2027.

Economic Dimensions in East Asia

China and Japan remain among each other’s largest economic partners even amid the confrontation. In 2024 China was still Japan’s second-biggest export market (after the US), with roughly $125 billion of Japanese goods sent there, mainly machinery and automobiles. This has been leveraged as a geopolitical tool. China’s Commerce Ministry now warns that Takaichi’s comments have “fundamentally undermined” the political foundation of economic ties.

After the Fukushima nuclear wastewater release in 2023, China imposed a blanket ban on all Japanese seafood imports. (Japan has pointed out that the UN’s nuclear agency found the discharge safe.) In mid-November 2025 China reinstated these seafood bans.

In another economic sector, Chinese tourists make up about a fourth of all visitors to Japan. Japanese travel agencies organising group tours told Reuters they lost ~80% of their remaining bookings for 2025.

U.S. Security and International Alliance Dynamics

U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass offered guarantees for its ally if China will militarily intervene and The State Department similarly declared its full support for Japan, explicitly opposing any unilateral attempts to alter the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait or East China Sea. U.S. President Donald Trump has so far avoided endorsing Takaichi’s statements, at least publicly.

China often accuses Japan of following the U.S. strategy of containment and have opposed Japan’s involvement in The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and its new defense pacts, such as with Australia, and more recently the Philippines. In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia and others aim for neutrality.

Analysts suggest that China unusually strong criticism may reflect a strategic calculation, a hope that Prime Minister Takaichi’s term will be short-lived, just as the short tenures of other post-Abe premiers. For China, such a political victory could be a great geopolitical win in promoting its view on the Taiwan Question.

With information from Reuters, The Diplomat and South China Morning Post.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko recently announced his intention to pay an official visit to Myanmar. Under other circumstances, this visit might have gone unnoticed, but amid the Myanmar crisis, every visit by a foreign leader to Naypyidaw attracts attention. According to Lukashenko, the trip will be part of a larger international tour that will also include Oman, Algeria, and Kyrgyzstan. The two leaders have already met four times in 2025: during Myanmar President Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Minsk in March, during Victory Day celebrations in Moscow in May, during the Eurasian Economic Forum in June, and at the PLA parade in Beijing in September. This is a reciprocal visit intended to strengthen relations between Belarus and Myanmar.

The signing of 18 agreements in various fields is planned, including the mutual waiver of tourist visas, a cooperation agreement between the Myanmar Space Agency and the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, an agreement on mutual legal assistance, and so on. Expect Myanmar opposition media to talk about Belarusian educational programs for Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) officers and the supply of Belarusian UAVs. For now, all of this fits the “pariah in arms” pattern: the familiar cooperation of two regimes suffering from sanctions pressure and accused of human rights violations. But could something more lie behind Lukashenko’s visit? And can Myanmar’s military leadership learn lessons from its Belarusian partner’s strategy? Let’s discuss the less obvious aspects of Myanmar-Belarus relations.

Lukashenko as a mediator in Ukraine and… Myanmar?

Lukashenko is often portrayed as a Russian proxy, but in practice, Belarusian politics is quite complex. A charismatic former collective farm director, Lukashenko came to power in the 1994 presidential election. His victory came amid a wave of nostalgia for the USSR that swept Belarusian society, which was facing the costs of establishing a free market: declining production, rising prices, rampant crime, and a profoundly uncertain future. At the time, the relatively young populist boldly criticized the nomenklatura, which the people had grown tired of.

At the same time, Lukashenko clearly declared himself a supporter of integration with Russia and an opponent of Belarusian pro-Western nationalism. He kept his promises: the population became more socially secure, organized crime groups were defeated, and the trend toward forced “Belarus-ization” was halted (most ethnic Belarusians prefer to communicate in Russian in everyday life and are skeptical of the opposition’s calls to switch to Belarusian).

At the same time, Lukashenko has always staunchly defended the independence of the Belarusian state and has sometimes even clashed with Moscow. In the 2000s, high-profile “energy wars” erupted between Minsk and Moscow. In 2006, after the Russian state-owned company Gazprom revoked preferential terms for oil supplies to Belarus, the outraged Belarusian leadership retaliated: it imposed additional duties on the transit of Russian oil and began pumping oil from the pipeline. Moscow was forced to back down.

In 2010, Russia demanded that Lukashenko pay off its natural gas debts, after which Lukashenko reminded Russia of its own debts. A series of anti-Lukashenko propaganda films was shown on Russian television. The conflict was resolved through mutual debt repayment, but Minsk could claim victory by upholding its strategic autonomy in the post-Soviet space. In his campaign against Gazprom, the Belarusian leader stoked anti-oligarchic sentiment in Russia and, as a result, gained popularity among the left-wing opposition. For a long time, dreams of a merger between Russia and Belarus were popular among this group, with Lukashenko being tipped as the president of the union state. Among older Russians nostalgic for the Soviet era, Lukashenko rivaled Putin in approval ratings.

“Multi-vectorism” has become the hallmark of Belarusian foreign policy. Minsk has responded to the growing tensions between Russia and the EU/USA head-on, maintaining contacts with all stakeholders. During the first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2020, Lukashenko ambitiously positioned Belarus as a neutral “Slavic” platform for Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. A Belarusian diplomatic triumph was the adoption of agreements in Minsk in 2014-2015, involving not only Russia and Ukraine, but also Germany and France. At the same time, despite his Russophile rhetoric, Lukashenko continued to sell diesel fuel (produced from Russian oil!) to the Ukrainian armed forces.

Lukashenko immersed himself in multi-vector diplomacy and overlooked the changing mood of Belarusian society – people were growing tired of the uncontested leader. Conviction that the 2020 presidential election results had been rigged brought people out onto the streets; mass protests engulfed the country, forcing Lukashenko to make temporary concessions, only to later unleash an avalanche of brutal repression on the protesters.

It was at this time, amid the threat of revolution and moral condemnation from the West, that Minsk decided to move closer to Moscow. However, domestically, Belarusian propaganda, in addition to the standard accusations against the US and EU of supporting the opposition, declared the protests a “Russian oligarchs’ plot to overthrow the legitimate president.” Even in a situation where only Moscow could ensure Lukashenko’s continued power, he preferred to retain the freedom to maneuver in his own interests.

Contacts between Washington and Minsk continue, and Trump’s team appears to be closer to mutual understanding with the Belarusians than with the Russians (the Belarusian president personally meets Americans and invariably ends negotiations with a vodka-fueled feast). At the same time, Belarus’s active diplomacy in the post-Soviet space is noteworthy, where Minsk is particularly friendly with Azerbaijan (despite its clashes with Moscow) and the countries of Central Asia. Beijing is also emphatically lenient in its relations with Lukashenko, who emphasizes that, unlike other former Soviet countries, Belarus has retained a reverence for its communist legacy.

The Belarusian multi-vector model for Naypyidaw

Lukashenko arrives in Naypyitaw at a time when the Myanmar government is desperate for international recognition. It’s hard to say whether the Myanmar generals ever considered using their Belarusian partner as a go-between to establish ties with Trump’s team. However, this approach clearly seems preferable to multi-million dollar investments in American lobbying firms, which have so far yielded no results. A new round of talks on Ukraine involving Belarus will take place in December, and Myanmar could very well use this opportunity to use Lukashenko to generate positive interest in the White House.

Beyond the short-term benefits of friendship with Minsk, Myanmar could learn from Belarus the art of multi-vector foreign policy. The configuration of Russian-Belarusian relations is reminiscent of China-Myanmar relations: both Belarus and Myanmar are “small nations” located within the sphere of influence of their larger neighbors, Russia and China, but at the same time striving for strategic autonomy. Chinese infrastructure projects in Myanmar, in particular the oil and natural gas pipeline from Yunnan Province to the port of Kyaukphyu in Rakhine State, designed to provide China with access to the Indian Ocean, can be compared to Russian energy infrastructure in Belarus (the Druzhba pipeline). Minsk can act as a senior mentor to Naypyidaw in defending its energy independence from China.

Stabilizing Myanmar Based on the Belarusian Experience: Pros and Cons

There are vast differences between Myanmar and Belarus – in history, traditions, religion, and ethnic composition. Nevertheless, Naypyidaw could borrow some Belarusian wisdom not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy.

Mass protests in Belarus in 2020 were sparked by obvious vote rigging in favor of Lukashenko. Paradoxically, the 2020 elections in Myanmar were held under the majoritarian system adopted in Belarus and resulted in a constitutional transfer of power in favor of the military due to electoral fraud by the NLD. The political regimes of Myanmar and Belarus have different backgrounds and structures: the populist Lukashenko is more reminiscent of Aung San Suu Kyi, while the Belarusian army lacks independence and is incapable of military coups. But most importantly, Minsk and Naypyidaw are united by common challenges: internal instability fueled from abroad. Significantly, NUG representatives are simultaneously establishing contacts with the Belarusian government-in-exile of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya.

Lukashenko successfully overcame the critical moments of the 2020-2021 crisis and, at the cost of systematic human rights violations—something he had done before, by the way—defeated the opposition. What’s interesting here is not the moral aspect of the issue, but the regime’s survival strategy. Lukashenko alternately used carrots and sticks, and alongside repression, he recruited media opposition figures. A well-known example is that of radical opponent of the regime Roman Protasevich, who, after his unexpected arrest, found common ground with the regime and became its sincere defender. This demonstrates the potential for the Myanmar government to exploit loyal elements of the former NLD and even members of the NUG and PDF who agreed to cooperate with the regime.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that in a number of respects, the Myanmar regime is more lenient than the Belarusian one: several large-scale amnesties for political crimes were carried out by the “junta” without prior agreements with the United States. Lukashenko released several dozen of his opponents with guarantees that sanctions would be lifted; the Myanmar military has released thousands of far more dangerous convicts, guided not only by political expediency but also by the Buddhist ideal of compassion (there is no contradiction here, as Buddhism underlies realpolitik in Myanmar). This ideal is widely accepted by all Burmese, regardless of their views on current politics. Unlike the Belarusians, who underwent the brainwashing of communist atheism in the 20th century and practically lost their national identity, the Burmese have preserved their traditional culture, religion, and language and are able to resist the dual pressures of the West and China.

Conclusion

Learning from the Belarusian experience, Myanmar’s foreign policy is returning to its usual course. Long before independent Belarus appeared on the world map in 1991, Myanmar had already pursued a multi-vector policy. It is significant that even when relations with China’s Maoist regime deteriorated to the lowest point in the 1960s, due to Beijing’s support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Ne Win’s government refrained from entering into anti-Chinese alliances with the United States or the USSR. This was a far-sighted decision. To a certain extent, modern Belarus could become Myanmar’s equivalent of Yugoslavia during the Cold War: both under U Nu’s democratic system and under Ne Win’s military dictatorship, the neutralist diplomacy of Titoism was admired.

While Republican and Democratic representatives repeat stereotypical misconceptions about Myanmar learned from Burmese exiles, the generals are gradually bringing the country out of isolation. The most important thing for the Myanmar people to remember is that their nation, the heir to ancient Buddhist kingdoms, has never been and never will be in the service of external powers: the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians, or anyone else. Lukashenko’s visit provides an opportunity to creatively develop the potential of Myanmar diplomacy.

In the world’s most fragile states, war is no longer merely a political tragedy, it is an economic opportunity for those positioned to profit. From the mountains of northern Myanmar to the gold fields of Sudan, a common pattern has emerged: when governance collapses, external powers rush in to secure the minerals, metals, and strategic commodities that the global economy demands. These regions become places where human suffering and environmental destruction become collateral for uninterrupted flows of resources. Two cases stand out in late 2025, Myanmar’s rare earth boom, fueled by Chinese demand, and Sudan’s gold boom, powered by the United Arab Emirates, together reveal a disturbing truth about the global marketplace; world’s green and gold transitions are being built atop the ruins of countries trapped in conflict.

Myanmar: The Human Cost of a Resource Rush

In early 2025, a young man named Sian traveled deep into the mountains of Shan State, Myanmar, desperate for work in a country where the formal economy has collapsed and nearly half the population lives on less than two dollars a day. He was lured by rumors of wages unheard of in today’s Myanmar, $1,400 a month at new rare-earth mining sites run by Chinese companies in territory controlled by the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the most powerful of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups. After hours riding a motorbike through dense forest, he arrived at a mine and was hired for a daily pay of about $21. His job was brutal: drilling boreholes and installing pipes for in-situ leaching, a method that involves pumping acidic solutions directly into mountainsides to dissolve and extract elements like dysprosium and terbium, metals that are vital for electric vehicles, wind turbines, advanced radar systems, and nearly every technology central to the green-energy revolution.

The process leaves behind poisoned rivers, contaminated soil, landslides, respiratory diseases, and entire villages unlivable. Researchers and civil society organizations have documented extensive damage: deforestation, chemically burned waterways, collapsed hillsides, and workers buried in mud after heavy rainfall liquefies the weakened terrain. “The toxic effects of rare-earth mining are devastating,” says political geographer Jasnea Sarma. “These communities endure the harm so that others may benefit.”

Yet the industry is thriving. China has cracked down on domestic rare-earth extraction due to environmental damage, but it has not reduced its demand. As a result, the extraction simply shifted across the border into Myanmar, where environmental regulations are weak, labor is cheap, and local armed groups, desperate for revenue, grant Chinese firms access in exchange for payments or profit-sharing.

Satellite imagery analyzed by Myanmar Witness and the Stimson Center shows hundreds of rare-earth mining sites exploding across Shan State, particularly in areas controlled by the UWSA and other China-aligned ethnic armies. Chinese customs data confirms the trend: between 2017 and 2024, roughly two-thirds of China’s rare-earth imports came from Myanmar. In effect, Myanmar has become the hidden engine of the world’s tech economy and its most toxic dumping ground.

For villagers, this boom is a slow-moving catastrophe. People report respiratory ailments, skin rashes from chemical exposure, and contaminated water sources. The deadliest risks are landslides triggered by aggressive deforestation and chemical injection into the hillsides. A 2024 study of rare-earth mining areas in Kachin State found extreme levels of ammonia, radioactive elements, and dissolved heavy metals in local waterways, conditions researchers describe as “entirely unsuitable for human consumption or agriculture.”

What makes Myanmar particularly vulnerable is not just poverty or geography, but political breakdown. Since the 2021 military coup shattered national governance, armed groups have expanded their autonomy, Chinese companies have expanded their presence, and Myanmar’s natural resources have been strip-mined with almost no oversight. In this vacuum, the global economy finds a steady supply of strategic minerals at the lowest possible cost, while local communities absorb the full environmental and human toll

How the UAE is Cashing In on Sudan’s War

If Myanmar reveals how civil wars feed the green-energy transition, Sudan reveals how they feed the financial one. Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a brutal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Amid mass displacement, ethnic cleansing in Darfur, widespread starvation, and one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, another story has quietly unfolded: the UAE’s deepening role as the central hub for Sudan’s conflict gold.

Sudan is Africa’s third-largest gold producer, and gold has become the lifeblood of the RSF’s war machine. Investigations by the UN, Global Witness, and multiple governments show that the UAE has been the primary destination for Sudanese gold for years, even as the war intensified. Much of this gold is smuggled out of conflict zones in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile, which are areas where the RSF maintains control through massacres and forced displacement. Once the gold reaches Dubai, it is refined, laundered through opaque supply chains, and sold into global markets.

The UAE denies wrongdoing, but the pattern is unmistakable. Gold shipments spike when fighting escalates. The RSF’s ability to sustain operations depends heavily on gold revenues. And the UAE’s own global gold-trading infrastructure, built on lax regulations, low taxes, and discreet financial systems, makes it the ideal partner for armed groups seeking to convert looted resources into weapons and cash.

Sudan mirrors Myanmar in a darker way: where Myanmar supplies the materials for the world’s green future, Sudan supplies the materials for its financial present, stabilizing gold markets, supporting global luxury demand, and solidifying the UAE’s status as an international trading powerhouse. In both cases, the profits flow outward, while the devastation remains local.

Foreign Wars as a Business Model

The parallels between Myanmar and Sudan reveal a broader pattern of 21st-century extraction economics. War and political collapse weaken regulation, eliminate oversight, and create desperate labor pools. Armed groups become local gatekeepers, selling access to mines or smuggling routes. Foreign corporations and governments capitalize on the chaos to secure strategic resources cheaply.

In Myanmar, ethnic armed groups benefit from mining revenues while China secures rare earths vital for its technology sector. In Sudan, the RSF funds its military operations through gold smuggling while the UAE strengthens its global commodities market.

This model is not new. But the urgency of the green transition and the volatility of global commodity markets have made it more aggressive than ever. The world wants cheap inputs for clean energy, financial reserves, and technological superiority. Conflict zones deliver them, evidently at enormous human cost.

The Moral Cost of The Green and Gold Transitions

The stories of Sian in Shan State and the civilians trapped in Sudan’s war zones expose a deeper contradiction at the heart of global development. The world says it wants sustainable energy and ethical supply chains. Yet the materials needed for these transitions are often sourced from places where sustainability and ethics are impossible.

Myanmar, Sudan, Congo, Bolivia, and other resource-rich conflict states are the hidden foundation of modern life in first world countries. Their suffering directly creates the conveniences and technologies that wealthier countries take for granted.

Until the international community demands transparency, enforces sanctions on conflict-linked commodities, and insists that the green future not be contradictorily built on burned earth, Myanmar and Sudan will remain cautionary tales and examples of what happens when the world’s hunger for resources meets its willingness to ignore suffering.

Ahead of flawed elections according to informed sources, New Delhi is engaged in high-level negotiations with the Myanmar military regime to establish new security measures, including cooperation of security firm. This measure aims to protect the security of Sittwe Port and ensure the rapid advancement of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway. These discussions could pave the way for further collaboration between India and the junta, providing India with a strategic foothold in the region to counter China’s long-standing influence.

India’s strategic ambitions in Myanmar currently focus on critical mineral resources and regional connectivity. Although India publicly supports the military’s election plans, the reality is that it has no choice but to engage with resistance organizations, as all of its strategic projects fall within territories controlled by these groups. Restricted by China’s rare earth policies, India has been actively seeking alternatives.

According to a Reuters report, India may agree to collaborate with the United States to extract rare earth minerals from Kachin State for processing before exporting them to the U.S. It is reported that India has already made contact with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to explore and collect rare earth samples from the region and discuss the feasibility of establishing transport routes. In Dawki, Meghalaya, trucks line up beside a clear river, waiting for customs clearance. Hundreds of kilometers to the east, workers are laying tracks and pouring concrete for roads that may one day connect to Myanmar and beyond.

If India’s northeast is to become a true gateway to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia, India and the U.S. must jointly develop a practical framework—an interconnected network integrating roads, railways, waterways, and fiber optics—to link “Act East” initiatives with the broader Indo-Pacific. Complex Challenges For India, the primary and most formidable challenge is to complete and remove bottlenecks from key cross-border transit corridors: the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (from Moreh to Mae Sot via Myanmar) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which connects Mizoram to the sea at Sittwe, then continues inland via river and road.

However, progress on these ambitious Indian strategic projects in Myanmar has been slow. The Modi government has shown signs of impatience, beginning limited engagement with ethnic armed organizations. Although the KIA controls key rare earth deposits in Kachin State, the region’s rugged terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure pose immense logistical challenges.

Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner has remarked that attempting to extract Myanmar’s rare earths under China’s watch, given the difficult topography and poor logistics, seems “completely insane.” The India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, proposed as early as 2002, has progressed sluggishly. To date, only 70% of the highway has been completed. While the Indian and Thai sections were finished in 2023, progress reports on the Myanmar portion remain consistently delayed.

However, local sources reveal that Indian contractors have already begun construction in parts of Sagaing Region, operating under the protection of resistance forces and with tacit approval from the military. As for the Kaladan Project, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhawma stated on Wednesday that the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) is expected to be completed by 2027. The project will link southern Mizoram through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal. He added that the Indian central government is taking steps to extend the railway line to Hmawngbuchhuah in Lawngtlai district, Mizoram’s southernmost point on the border with Myanmar.

The Key Factor: The Upcoming Election According to the military’s Global New Light of Myanmar, India will send teams to monitor the war-ravaged Myanmar election scheduled for December. With parties opposing the military excluded or boycotting the poll, Western governments and human rights organizations view the election as an attempt by the military to consolidate control by paving the way for proxy rule.

India’s current push to secure its interests in Myanmar through security firms not only aims to advance U.S.-Myanmar relations and secure junta support to propel project implementation but also to gain a first-mover advantage and avoid post-election disruptions. It also serves to divert attention from India’s new arrangements in Myanmar amid the election focus. Should India cooperate with a U.S.-linked security firm, it would undoubtedly enhance its resilience to Myanmar’s conflict risks, further solidify the U.S.-India alliance, and boost coordinated efforts to address China’s challenges. However, this approach also carries the risk of provoking domestic backlash within Myanmar. 

In November 2025 a public disagreement between Beijing and Tokyo over Taiwan exposed how the island’s fate now reaches far beyond Taipei, shaping trade, military planning and regional alliances across East Asia and further beyond.

The Taiwan question has recently re-emerged as a tension point between China and Japan. This raises broader questions about East Asian security. Beijing affirms its “One China policy”, treating Taiwan as a breakaway province to be “reunified” by force if necessary and reacts sharply to any foreign involvement. Avoiding rhetoric that might provoke its eastern neighbor until now, the consensus in Tokyo is shifting as many senior Japanese officials say a Chinese assault on Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival could justify a military response. None of this is new, but the tone is.

China’s Firm Position on Taipei

Beijing’s stance remains absolute: it is Chinese territory, and any formal push or support from foreign actors for its independence is intolerable. Officials frame reunification as inevitable and non-negotiable, part of what state discourse calls the “national rejuvenation” of China. In recent months this posture has been accompanied by more visible coercion: maritime patrols in the South China Sea, large-scale exercises around the island and targeted economic measures against partners perceived to have crossed this line.

Any country that appears to undercut China’s claim through military cooperation with Taipei, public statements of support, or strengthened security ties risks a Chinese response. From Beijing’s point of view, fully controlling the region would extend China’s reach beyond its coast by securing sea lanes and projection space for the People’s Liberation Army. Politically, it would close a chapter Beijing sees as a Cold War remnant after a century of perceived humiliation.

Japan’s Stakes in Taiwan

Tokyo’s formal policy remains rooted in the One China framework as it does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state and officially supports a peaceful cross-Strait resolution. Security considerations and proximity to Taiwan have forced Japanese leaders into increasing their attention to the island in recent years. Hard-line conservative Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s public remarks this month, that a Chinese assault on Taiwan which threatens Japanese survival could trigger a full military response, marked a break with decades of deliberate ambiguity.

It is likely that pending targets have been moved forward and planning for collective self-defence has become more explicit, while defence cooperation with partners particularly the United States under U.S. President Donald Trump has grown more visible. Taipei sits near Japan’s western islands; Yonaguni, the closest island of the Okinawa prefecture is roughly 100 km from Taiwan’s eastern coast and the sea lanes that run here carry a large share of Japan’s energy imports. The presence of substantial U.S. forces in Japan ties Tokyo’s security to Washington’s responses, making it politically and militarily difficult for Tokyo to ignore developments in the Strait.

Reactions, Responses and Confrontation

Responding with strong diplomatic protests and a suite of retaliatory measures to Prime Minister Takaichi’s parliamentary remarks on November 7, Chinese commerce authorities re-imposed bans on Japanese seafood and warned consumers against Japanese products urging its citizens to avoid travel to Japan. Diplomatically, China demanded a retraction and summoned Japan’s ambassador in Beijing to issue a formal protest. This was widely seen as an unusually public move given the recent history of cautious diplomacy in the area.

Japan has issued strong protests over the consul’s remarks and dispatched a senior envoy to Beijing to calm the situation but the talks produced little immediate de-escalation. Japanese fighters were set on high alert after a surveillance drone was detected between Taiwan and Yonaguni, underlining how geographically close this theatre is to Japanese territory. Such moves are not isolated acts but are part of a larger pattern meant to act as a “show of strength” while stopping short of starting a full-scale war.

Why This Small Island is Significant to Both Countries

For Beijing, the island is a core territorial claim bolstered by narratives about sovereignty and historical rectification. Losing the island, or allowing it to consolidate international backing as a separate political entity, would be depicted by Chinese leaders as an unacceptable erosion of national integrity. Its location is also a matter of strategy: full control over the island would make it harder for outside powers to operate in China’s seas.

For Tokyo, the calculus is concrete and immediate. Taiwan’s proximity means that military operations in the straits could quickly affect Japanese airspace and waters. Japanese industry is also deeply integrated with Taiwanese firms notably in fields such as semiconductors and electronics, so instability would hit the stock markets and raise costs for manufacturers.

Possible Future Scenarios and Regional Impact

The stand-off could begin a prolonged period of low-level confrontation. Both Beijing and Tokyo could double down: China sustaining pressure through patrols and economic sanctions, Japan strengthening its military capabilities and aligning more tightly with the United States and other western partners.

This doesn’t mean that there is no time for pragmatic de-escalation from both sides.  Recognising the mutual costs of prolonged hostility, Tokyo could clarify that its statements were contextual and not a call to aggressive action, while Beijing could temper sanctions once its political point has been made. Diplomacy behind closed doors might restore exchanges and trade, though the underlying policy differences between the two countries would remain unresolved. Therefore, such an outcome would buy more time but not resolve the underlying causes of these issues.

A third way would be one where a deeper realignment could take place. Japan might accelerate defence modernisation and legal reforms to make collective defence more actionable. On its part, China could respond by heavily investing and intensifying military presence in its south or seeking closer security ties with partners that counterbalance U.S. influence.

In the worst case, simple miscalculations could lead to direct clashes for example between Chinese forces operating near Taiwan and Japanese ships or aircraft which could rapidly draw in the United States given treaty commitments and strategic interests.

While full-scale war remains unlikely for now, we can never be 100% sure as the simple probability increases more and more with these incidents that have developed recently.

Implications for the Rest of The World

No matter if the situation escalates further or not, the United States will undoubtebly remain a central factor to any such issue. Washington’s alliance with Tokyo and its historically ambiguous but substantial support for Taipei mean that any serious incident will have trans-Pacific repercussions.

Neighbouring states like South Korea, ASEAN members, Australia, India, etc. would be forced into a difficult diplomatic calculation, by balancing economic ties with Beijing against security concerns and relations with Washington and Tokyo. Economically, prolonged instability would disrupt semiconductor production, shipping routes and regional investment, with global consequences.

Most analysts agree that this issue has shifted from a regional diplomatic concern to a great security risk for the larger world. In the near term, careful diplomacy from both sides may limit the damage, but the issues at hand suggest this will most likely be a long term gap in East Asian security. How both sides manage politics and deterrence will determine whether the next phase is a steady containment or a dangerous step toward direct military confrontation.

With information from Reuters.

Asian and global stock markets started the week cautiously as investors navigated geopolitical tensions and a packed week of corporate earnings and U.S. economic releases. A deepening dispute between China and Japan weighed on Tokyo shares, while market participants prepared for key data, including Thursday’s delayed U.S. September jobs report and Nvidia’s earnings due Wednesday after market close.

Expectations for a U.S. interest rate cut in December have fallen below 50%, following recent signals from policymakers. This shift has increased pressure on technology stocks, which are highly sensitive to interest rate changes.

Asia Markets and Geopolitics

Japan’s Nikkei fell 0.2%, with tourism and retail stocks hit hard after China advised its citizens against visiting the country. Major declines included Isetan Mitsukoshi, Muji parent Ryohin Keikaku, and Shiseido, each down around 10%.

In Australia, BHP dropped 0.6% after a UK court found the company liable for a dam collapse in Brazil, leaving the overall index relatively flat. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng and China’s CSI300 indexes each fell roughly 1%.

Japan’s economy contracted for the first time in six quarters, partly due to U.S. tariffs, while a reported $110 billion stimulus plan influenced bond markets, pushing 20-year yields to a 26-year high. Analysts caution that shaky fiscal credibility could further pressure the yen, drawing parallels to Britain’s recent market turmoil following uncertainty over tax hikes.

U.S. Data and Treasury Yields

The U.S. Treasury 10-year yield held steady at 4.163% in Asia trading, following a slight rise on Friday. Wall Street indexes ended last week mixed, with a modest drop for the S&P 500 and small gains for the Nasdaq.

Thursday’s U.S. September jobs report is expected to be closely watched, although private-sector surveys have already indicated a slowdown. Analysts note that the headline data may be too stale to significantly shift market expectations, with CPI data remaining the key factor for Fed policy.

Corporate Earnings Spotlight

Investor attention this week is also on U.S. corporate earnings. Retail giants Home Depot, Target, and Walmart are reporting results, but all eyes are on Nvidia. The chipmaker’s stock has soared roughly 1,000% since the launch of ChatGPT in November 2022, including a year-to-date gain of over 40%, making it the first company to surpass a $5 trillion market valuation last month.

Nvidia’s earnings are widely seen as a litmus test for technology stocks and the broader market rally.

Commodities and FX

The U.S. dollar held slightly higher, keeping the euro below $1.16 and strengthening against other major currencies. Gold stabilized at $4,060 an ounce after Friday losses, while Brent crude slipped 1% to $63.78 as Russian supply resumed at a previously disrupted hub.

Bitcoin, often a barometer for tech stocks, rebounded slightly from its largest weekly drop since March, trading at $95,000 after losing more than 10% last week.

Outlook

Markets are entering a pivotal week where U.S. labor data and corporate earnings particularly from Nvidia could influence stock sentiment and interest rate expectations. Geopolitical tensions in Asia add another layer of uncertainty, keeping investors cautious and highlighting the interlinked nature of global markets.

With information from Reuters.