Fighters

As a pariah child in search of Islamic knowledge, Goni Abubakar has no clue what it means to hold a gun and pull the trigger. He is just an almajiri who runs errands for his cleric master in Bama, a town in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria. He learns to recite Quran verses by heart; he is one of the brightest pupils under the cleric’s tutelage. In the beginning, the messages are clear: have faith in Allah, the Prophet Muhammad, and the Day of Judgement. Every pupil carries these heavy words around and keenly believes in them. They say the Quranic verses that match those words by heart: “O you who have believed, fear Allah and believe in His Messenger; He will [then] give you a double portion of His mercy and make for you a light by which you will walk and forgive you; and Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.”

The preaching is pious until peril pierces the heart of the preacher. 

The teacher sells groceries, and Goni doubles as his shop assistant. Detached from his parents as a child, he was now a teen, tending only to the bidding of his mentor. Dozens of children are on this path to seek knowledge, but Goni is the teacher’s delight: fierce, smart, and completely loyal. Their earliest form of education is the Tsangaya, a traditional Quranic education in northern Nigeria, and most of them have not attended any formal secular school before they are thrown under the control of a man they all call “mallam”. The morning and evening classes are held in the shade of a tree and are led by the teacher, who preaches to them the ways of Islam.

Kids like Goni know what it means to grow up in a local community. A child can sing through the neighbourhood, begging anyone there for food and water. Local farmers prosper in peace after months of tilling and cultivating the land. People sleep at night without fear of being raided by assailants or militants. Fear and terror consumed the town when Boko Haram’s strange ideologies spread like wildfire into the communities. Goni’s teacher is among the first to embrace the ideologies propagated by Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf. As his preaching changed, his way of life changed too, beaming terror and extremism infused into the hearts of children under his mentorship.

In 2009, when Boko Haram went underground before re-emerging in 2010, Goni was already a 12-year-old. Too young and naive to ask questions, he and dozens of children followed their tutor to join the insurgent group that would later destabilise Nigeria. Now, in the northeastern region, the Boko Haram insurgency has uprooted over three million people and killed over 350,000, with government authorities failing to rein in the deadly scourge. Armed violence has spread beyond the region’s borders into parts of the northwestern and north-central regions.

Goni would become a grown man, swallowing the rulings of terrorists until he could no longer bear them. He now seeks redemption and reintegration through the state-backed deradicalisation programme. While it appears he has left a life of violence and attacks for good, it’s not that simple. For him and many other men in his shoes, post-Boko Haram life presents some puzzles that test the true efficacy of the deradicalisation scheme.

Are the terrorist deserters genuinely seeking redemption or only trying to survive? For months – between November 2025 and May 2026 – HumAngle probed the complexities of the former insurgents’ lives, documenting their journeys from the past to the present, their struggles to become civilians again, their secret frontline deals with the military, and the fragile peace their reintegration poses to the civilian population.

Snaring the cat

When Goni joined Boko Haram as a teen, his master’s preachings had switched from admonishing children under his watch to have strong faith in their religion to brainwashing them into a life of violence. They embraced it, truly believing that spilling the blood of people who don’t believe in their ideology was the clearest pathway to paradise. Elsewhere in Borno, in the Malam Fatori area, Ali Bukhar also listened to the sermons of Boko Haram’s jihadists. Those sermons summoned the beast in him and took away the best of his humanity. He joined them convinced that true salvation was immersed in the ideology of killing and maiming.

“In the preachings, they’d emphasise that if you died in the cause, you are a martyr. That you are going to paradise straight,” Ali recalls. He joined as an adult in 2014 during the peak of the Boko Haram emergence. About five months after joining the group, he was asked to attend training. His handlers took him to a riverine area and gave him a gun. “They have a specific instructor whose job is solely to train new intakes. You’d train for about four to five months. After the training, they’d return you to the Markaz [Arabic word for headquarters or centre]. And when it is time to go out for a fight, they’d give you guns.”

Suleiman Mohammad tells a slightly different story. He joined Boko Haram in 2013, during the first Baga attack. The militants and the military had been locked in a fierce battle that cost hundreds of civilians their lives and thousands their homes. A retaliatory raid after a military base was attacked in Baga took a bloody turn for mostly civilians, brewing a trust deficit in the operational methods of Nigerian forces in their fight against terrorism. The insurgent group took advantage of the situation to recruit young people into its unholy ways. Suleiman was among hundreds of people brought into the system after the Baga bloody saga and the uprising that followed. He was a herder in Malam Fatori and had grown up through the local Tsangaya education system.

“So after the Baga attack, I was contacted by the fighters who turned out to be from my village,” Suleiman reminisces. “We studied together when we attended Tsangaya and Islamiyya a long time ago. They told me how the other brothers were with them. They told me stories of how they recite the Quran collectively and also wage ‘holy war’ together. Then they invited me to join them. So, we made an appointment to meet at Mairari.”

A week later, the terrorists came as agreed and met with Suleiman’s father in his home. 

“Your son is joining us in the cause of Allah. He’d work for Allah,” the terrorists say. 

“Allah’s cause?” the father wonders. “Jihad is mandatory for all muslims. And since he has agreed to go with you, I have no objections.” 

The terrorists had come with guns and machetes, Suleiman notes, suggesting that his father was made to agree under duress. “That was how I joined them. We had carried out several attacks ever since. From Mairari, Tungushe, and others. In fact, we held Mairari – under Magumeri – captive for quite some time before it was recaptured by the military.”

People joined the Boko Haram insurgency for different reasons. For Goni and his cohorts, it was a case of misguided faith rooted in brainwashing and psychological manipulation. The story is different for many others. The fire of the burning insurgency started from the charismatic oratory and radical sermons by the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, between 2002 and 2009. Since at least 2021, HumAngle has interviewed dozens of defectors who revealed why they joined the deadly group before surrendering to a deradicalisation scheme organised by the government. Mohammed took advantage of the dysfunctions within the Nigerian state to campaign against a secular system of governance and, by extension, democracy.

Testimonies from defectors and custodians of Boko Haram’s history reveal that the post-2009 state repression, especially the actual brutality of the Nigerian military and police against civilians, and the uprising that trailed it, were among the factors that drove young people into insurgency. At the time, “Tura Takai Bango” was the mantra for the agitation, literally meaning “they had been pushed to the wall”. The era and the ugly events that unfolded encapsulate the desperation that leads civilians to affiliate with insurgents. When the state’s counter-insurgency tactics involve collective punishment, the civilian population often finds itself caught in a “double jeopardy” where both the state and the insurgents are viewed as existential threats. 

Isa Alamndiri, one of the victims of the state repression, told HumAngle how he witnessed the summary execution of young people in 2016, in the Marte Local Government Area (LGA), on the grounds that they were shielding terrorists. “They came and gathered all of us in the village. They then separated the elderly and killed all the youths. They shot over 30 youths that day. Their reason was that we were harbouring Boko Haram in our midst,” Isa says. 

Another witness of what many believe pushed youths in the state to the wall, Musa Kurama, recalls that the Nigerian military invaded his village in Meleri, also in Marte, to burn his house, among many others, to the ground, saying that the entire community was a hideout for terrorists. The cycle of violence forced young adults and naive teenagers to take the insurgents’ offer of “protection”, which was a predatory alternative to state-sponsored destruction.

Boko Haram also targeted schools for attacks, deliberately conducting mass kidnappings such as in Chibok and Dapchi to enforce their radical ideology by making secular educational institutions unsafe. This insurgent tactic strategically provides a supply of young captives who were groomed as fighters or forced into “marriages” that facilitate the group’s long-term sustainability. The state’s failure to secure these environments has led to the closure of over 600 schools in the region, creating a lost generation of children who are more susceptible to recruitment because of the absence of alternative futures.

Jihad: ‘Pathway to paradise’

Goni has grown up knowing nothing but violence and bloodshed, and now claims he’s out of the messy circle. He smiles as he speaks, but when he remembers how he joined other terrorists to pillage villages, uproot people from their homes, farmlands, and abduct scores, he furrows his brow. 

“Before we go out, we would prepare. They’d mobilise 100 to 200 fighters, give them arms, and say, ‘We are going out to wage a holy war’.  Then we would charge into military barracks,” he tells HumAngle curtly. “I believe we were deceived by our masters because they don’t practice what they preach and twist religious verses to suit their evil acts and intentions.”

Regardless of how and why they joined, newly recruited insurgents are made to believe that killing and spilling the blood of anyone not following their templates of violence has only one name: jihad. Most defectors we spoke to corroborated this during separate interviews in 2025 and later in 2026.

Experts and scholars in political science, human rights, and peace and conflict studies argue that Boko Haram weaponised the concept of jihad to manipulate its followers into believing keenly in killing and destroying those who disagree with their ideology. In the 2021 issue of the Al-Hikmah Journal on Social Sciences and Education, for example, Issa Muhammad-Jamiu, a researcher at Kogi State University in North Central Nigeria, notes that Boko Haram’s ideology contradicts Islamic injunctions. The most disturbing aspect, he states, is the condemnation of any scholarly verdict that falls short of their view. 

“How could they attribute Islam to the prohibition of Western education, which has become a necessity, if not compulsory, to Muslims in the contemporary world? Do they mean that they are more knowledgeable and more committed to Islam than those Companions and Tabi’un who studied foreign cultures and sciences for the interest of Muslim communities?” Issa ponders.

Two sides of the coin

As Goni speaks, his lips look pale and peeling. He’s been battling typhoid and malaria and is still receiving treatment. He carries a gentle demeanour that betrays the terror he had perpetrated, and wears a blank face wrinkled with emotionlessness. For him, peace is a no-brainer when violence is pervasive.

He quips, throwing on a long, tedious smile when asked what he thinks of the concept of peace. “Peace tastes good,” he says. “Living peacefully among loved ones is greater than any other thing. I was in Njimia before leaving. I had worked in several places, including Gazuwa, my birthplace. What made me leave was recent developments. The conflict between the factions and the injustice. So, I took my weapon and left. I arrived at Konduga, where I was received. They then brought us to Bama and then to Hajj Camp.”

Goni believes that embracing peace simply means walking away from a life of pain, violence, and gnashing of teeth. Dwelling in the forest with terrorists means dining with the devil, he says. His moral postulation and spiritual freedom were destroyed in the terrorist camp. He had access to the Quran and understood its teachings, but every verse he read had to be interpreted in accordance with the sect’s teachings. He had no freedom of thought or understanding of whatever he read from the scripture. He had no meaningful life in the forest, he says, apart from destroying people’s lives.

He and many of the terrorist deserters we spoke to said they experienced pain in its most extreme form. Whenever they sustained gunshot wounds during field battles with the military, they returned to the forest almost dead. They were being treated by their locally-trained doctors, whom many of the ex-combatants described as quacks. Most times, they gave them dangerous, addictive opioids such as Tramadol and Refinol. They became addicted to these drugs to escape their daily ordeals, even after healing from the wounds. 

“They punished us for taking hard drugs they introduced to us in the first place,” Goni complains. “Sometimes a fighter could be killed just because he takes hard drugs. When they knew it was bad, why did they use it to treat us?”

Many terrorists decided to surrender to the military for different reasons. One major cause of mass defections from the terrorist camps was the sudden demise of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram gang leader who took over the mantle of terror from Mohammed Yusuf. There had been cracks within the insurgent group, leading to the rise of the Islamic State for West African Province (ISWAP), which was formed as a rebel group against Shekau’s camp. Another thing that followed the death of Shekau in 2021 was disease and hunger outbreaks. 

The Nigerian military took advantage of Shekau’s death to launch several offensive attacks on the terrorist dens in northeastern Nigeria, destroying their logistics bases. That year, the military said it recorded thousands of defections from terrorists who surrendered to embrace peace. Once they submit themselves to the military after years of committing criminal atrocities, they are subjected to deradicalisation through the Borno Model.

HumAngle interviewed several Boko Haram deserters to examine their understanding of peace after committing grave crimes against the human population in the region. Many of them curiously oversimplified the concept, reducing it to simply switching sides and moving from deadly armed violence to living an average civilian life.

“From my understanding, peace is us leaving the group,” Ali simply says and goes ahead to recount how he joined other fighters to enslave girls for sex after kidnapping them from their homes, schools, and farms. He had been through hell as a former Boko Haram member, and now seeks solace in embracing peace by surrendering to the military. He had been imprisoned by his superiors in the terror camp and asked to surrender his arms, but he refused. “I buried it where they could not see it. I was locked up for three months. When they released me, I went and dug up my gun and left them,” he recalls.

For him and several defectors, returning to the civilian community is an exciting prospect. Despite the horror they inflicted on civilian communities as terrorists, they consider living with ordinary locals again, especially close to their families, as a peaceful reconciliation of their horrible past. “We were ignorant when we did those things in the past. But now we know better,” one of them, Abubakar Saleh, says. He was a Boko Haram commander who led dozens of fighters to dislodge communities, rape women and girls and subjugate civilian communities under terrorist control.

He has now returned to Maiduguri with his family. His wife had just given birth when we spoke to him, and he has settled well into the civilian community. To him, peace is relief from the pain that comes with being a terrorist leader. Although he enjoyed authority as a commanding fighter, his life in the forest was miserable, as he was always on the move to evade military operations and surveillance.

“Life here is better,” he affirms. “It is more comfortable and peaceful. In the forest, there is no rest. You’d hunt daily like a lion. Always changing locations. But here, no attacks.”

For civilian casualties of the terror perpetrated by many of these terrorist deserters, however, peace doesn’t come easily. For years, victims of insurgency in the northeastern region have longed for peace and reparations. Thousands of displaced people not only lost their homes, but also lost hope in ever rebuilding their lives or returning to their settlements. In parts of Borno, especially at the Shuwari displacement site, displaced people feed on the leftovers from former terrorists undergoing the government’s deradicalisation programme, a situation that has created an atmosphere of distrust and inequalities. When the Borno State government began a resettlement scheme for displaced people, they were promised protection and stipends to rebuild their lives. Many of them ended up being re-displaced by terrorists and would not get the opportunity to rebuild their lives.

Ensuring peace and justice in the North East is far more complicated than many terrorist deserters have assumed, says Ndubuisi Ani, a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Security Studies. The transitional justice expert told HumAngle that the defectors’ curious understanding of peace undermines the pains and level of destruction civilians have witnessed at the hands of terrorists. He argues that peace and justice cannot be achieved in tackling violent extremism unless there’s inclusivity, good governance, and stability.

“The state must understand that there are basic needs to be responded to (on the side of victims),” Ndubuisi explains. “A lot of communities need a lot of social contracts on the ground.”

The security expert further explains that any transitional justice scheme by the government must be victim-centred. He advised that the state must go back to its original duty of protecting citizens and ensuring peace and tranquillity in society.

“You’ve not psychologically prepared actors. How do you let the victims understand?” he asked, stating that the government can’t successfully reintegrate terrorist deserters back into society without proper public engagement. “The intent is good, but the approach is the problem.”

Seeking peace and redemption

Like many terrorist deserters, Goni accepts that he has lived a complicated life of violence and horror. This is not the time for regret, he says. It’s a moment to seek forgiveness, to retrace his steps, and perhaps to wash the blood from his own hands. When he arrived at the Hajj Camp in Maiduguri after surrendering to the military and going through the process of deradicalisation, he struggled with the guilt of the atrocities he had committed, and, to prove to the military that he had backed off from a life of bloodshed, he agreed to work in the field with soldiers fighting terrorists. He’s not alone in this. Several former combatants we spoke to said they decided to work as auxiliary operatives to fight alongside the military against Boko Haram, the same sect they once belonged to. Several other defectors noted that when they chose to work with the military – as a way to seek redemption – they were handed rifles, loaded onto the backs of patrol trucks, and sent directly into the marshes and forests they had recently fled.

Asked whether they were coerced into joining the military, Goni laughed before saying the escapade was never mandatory. 

“It is a choice,” he replies. “I may decide not to work with them again.”

It is a hard nut to crack, but the terrorist deserters say the military operatives have learned to work and walk with them.

“They arm us and take us with them. If, for instance, a Commanding Officer is going out for an operation, he’d request a certain amount of “repentants” from the Hajj Camp officials. And the officials would assign like 50 or 100 persons to him, depending on the scale of the operation,” Goni says.

By fighting the same people who recruited him into the monolithic Boko Haram camp as a teen, Goni says, he has freed himself from a lifetime of guilt. During his time with the killers, he recalls asking many of the fighters if they loved what they were doing. Those fighters feel trapped, he says; they’re homesick, but even their families have rejected them. Now that he has freed himself from the shackles of terrorism, he says he begs God for forgiveness. But while he seeks forgiveness for the atrocities he has committed, he would use every knowledge he has about the group to fight them back. That’s his way of seeking redemption.

“They give us food and allowances, and we give them intelligence. We show them the hideouts. Because we know the terrain better than they do. We know their fighting styles,” Goni brags, smiling and looking directly at the reporter. “We know their escape routes. Isn’t this helpful enough? Also, we lead the way. They’d follow behind. We charge in.”

Redemption through revenge

Ali’s life after Boko Haram is even more thrilling: he seeks redemption through revenge. He had fallen for peer pressure to join one of the most brutal terrorist organisations in existence, and his life had since remained terrifying. For years, he was a cog in the Boko Haram machine, serving with vim and vigour. He learned to repair military vehicles in the forest and became renowned as the sect’s mechanic. He would repair heavy military patrol vehicles seized by the insurgents or those stuck in the mud within the forest during ambushes.

Despite his servitude for Boko Haram’s cause, he says, his entire life with the terror group was a lie. He grew to realise that behind the Boko Haram ideology was a hail of deceit and human manipulation. Bamboozled with distorted interpretations of verses from the Quran, Ali recounts how he had joined hundreds of other fighters to trigger plague, tears, and horror in civilian communities in the name of holy war.

“The practice violates the preachings. My biggest reason was that the practice was not what the Prophet truly teaches,” he claims. “The commanders would usually stay behind, leaving a comfortable life, while the foot soldiers are left starving and fighting day and night.”

For Ali, the deal breaker with Boko Haram was during a chaotic raid in the Tungushe town of Borno. He had come under a heavy burst of military gunfire, which tore through his arm, shattering the bone. He had expected that the sect’s medical team would give him some extra care due to his critical condition, but they treated him like disposable property. 

“I was so humiliated by the sect’s medical team, as treatments were handled haphazardly,” he laments. “If it were the commanders, they would treat them swiftly with maximum care. But for fighters, there is usually no medical attention.”

For two straight years, he nursed the pain alone and grew bitter resentment for the sect and its ideologies. He realised he was nothing but a tool for achieving the commanders’ personal hunches and interests. One night, he slipped away, through the scrublands, trudging northward until he found himself around the military garrison in Monguno, where he fell flat on the ground and surrendered.

“After surrendering in Monguno, they took us to Hajj Camp in Maiduguri,” Ali tells HumAngle. “Days later, they brought forward an opportunity where you could help in the fight. You may decide to follow the military during attacks or provide them with intelligence. Whatever you think you can do. So, I said I want to fight. I have a friend who also fights alongside the soldiers. I chose to fight because I have realised that we were deceived by the group.”

Repentance or survival?

Unlike Ali and Goni, repentance has an entirely different meaning for Suleiman: it is an illusion or a political statement made by people in government. Calling him a “repentant Boko Haram” is an insult, he says. To him, that word is a subtle qualifier for a coward. With a cold voice and a sour look, he describes how he worked with ground troops to attack Timbuktu, Sambisa, and other terrorist hideouts.

His case is more of just switching sides than actual repentance. He dreads the term “repentant Boko Haram” and doesn’t hide it. As a terrorist, he lived for violence, pillaging villages and destroying people’s lives and properties. Following the rise of Abu Mushab al-Barnawi, a factional leader of the Boko Haram sect, Suleiman came under his command, joining over 100 fighters under his control. He had fought fiercely against the Nigerian military on many occasions, and he was feared for his precise brutality amid battles.

His cruelty had no bounds, as he had fought against top Nigerian military leaders, as he states, like Captain Bala, Manga, and Abu Ali, leaving scars on the town that are still visible today. He had also raided beyond Nigeria, maiming locals in the Niger Republic, especially in Diffa, Maine-Soroa, and Chabbal.

When factional infighting turned truly brutal, Suleiman chose to be on the safer side. Exhausted by the tireless internal slaughter, he left and surrendered to the military. Now, he does almost the same thing on the other side. The activity is the same, he notes, only the targets are different. 

“I am not comfortable with that name [repentant]. I don’t like it,” Suleiman says. He would frown and then laugh during the interview to convey the complexity of the terror drowning him. “In the forest, I followed someone’s commands. Here too, I am commanded and still branded repentant?”

He wears a worn Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) uniform during the interview with HumAngle, bragging about following soldiers to the battlefield against terrorists in Geidam, Marte, Kala-Bridge and Malam Fatori. Despite his defiance, however, he seems to have taken bullets for the military during counterterrorism raids in northeastern Nigeria. His four fingers are chopped off, and there are scars all over his body. It was during a joint offensive with Chadian forces in northern Monguno. An artillery explosion had torn through the military ranks and killed several soldiers and terrorist deserters fighting by their side. He would follow the forces into the fortified hideouts of Timbuktu and Sambisa, giving on-the-ground intel to navigate the terrain.

“I got this arm scar, and my fingers were chopped off while digging out a planted landmine about five months ago,” he says of another military raid he participated in. “The explosion killed two other ex-combatants and nine soldiers. When the engineer scouted and identified a planted bomb, he refused to dig it out. None of the soldiers did. So they asked me to do it. One of the wires sparked. Then it exploded. It also affected my leg.”

The deradicalisation scheme

The term “repentance”, which Suleiman and several other defectors loathe, is one of the modus operandi of the Operation Safe Corridor, a military-led deradicalisation and reintegration programme across northeastern states. Established in 2016, the programme has witnessed both criticism and appraisal from experts and affected citizens. The quest for transitional justice, following the mass atrocities committed by Boko Haram against the people and the government of Nigeria, pushed authorities to come up with peacebuilding efforts.

The federal government had introduced the judicial approach of mass trials of Boko Haram figures captured on the battlefield, but systemic failures of the legal system derailed the processes. With a conviction rate of less than 10 per cent after conducting mass trials of thousands of fighters between 2017 and 2020, public distrust in the judicial system grew rapidly. These efforts also faced hurdles due to limited resources and circumstantial evidence, as well as a massive backlog of approximately 10,000 suspected fighters awaiting trial. 

Following deficiencies in the judicial and military mechanisms, the government provided non-judicial options, such as the Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) and, later, the Borno Model, a scheme designed to handle the mass defections of thousands of insurgents.

HumAngle reviewed at least two research studies that confirm our on-the-ground reporting on the deficiencies and the public misgivings against the counterinsurgency initiative. The independent studies, one led by Idayat Hassan, then of the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), and the other by Hassan-Taiwo Adebayo of the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), noted a systemic imbalance that seemed to favour the rehabilitation of perpetrators over the survival and justice of their victims. The disparity in the attention given to terrorist deserters also fueled widespread community resentment and birthed a narrative that terrorists are being pampered at the expense of their targets. The security and transitional justice experts also assert that a flawed public appeal and information management have sparked outrage and a trust deficit on the government’s side.

One concern Taiwo’s research raised is the persistent challenges in providing sufficient economic support to Boko Haram deserters once they leave the camps. Several defectors HumAngle interviewed raised the same concern. Although they vowed to live civilian lives again, they claimed their lives in the forest were more prosperous, and they’re now facing economic hurdles after defecting. The former insurgents, now working as assets to the military, also complained of constant failed promises. When they’re called upon for operations against the terrorists, the military would pledge mouth-watering financial gains only to offer them an amount far less than what they had promised.

“Then they’d say they’ll pay us each ₦1 million or ₦1.5 million for every crucial piece of information and operation. But after a successful mission, they’d go back on their words and pay ₦100,000 or below. Whereas we have families to cater for. Wives, children, and parents,” Suleiman recounts, a claim substantiated by other former combatants we interviewed.

Wayward ways

As many defectors struggle to settle into communities, civilians also struggle to embrace them. The reason is not far-fetched: the villagers have grown resentful of former Boko Haram members who have raided their settlements, stripping them of their homes and stable lives, only to come and live next door. The moment they leave the rehabilitation camps, they escape the military’s watchful eyes. Many times, this escape means defectors choose what they do with their lives, including displaying violent tendencies against civilians. The villagers call them “repentants”, but insist their ways are wayward.

Locals, including displaced people, say so-called repentant terrorists re-terrorise them, making them relive the terror they had inflicted on them. During separate interviews, civilian villagers accused security agents of shielding defectors when they commit offences against the people. They say this has triggered a climate of silence within the Maiduguri metropolis, where everyone is scared of speaking ill of a former Boko Haram fighter, even when they’re guilty of wrongdoing. When HumAngle visited the Bama displacement camp in 2025, for instance, we saw dozens of defectors moving around aimlessly with guns and other weapons. Camp officials claimed the armed defectors were protecting displaced persons, but when we requested to speak with them, they denied us access. Displaced persons also refrained from discussing their situation, fearing persecution.

In Shuwari, a peri-urban area just outside Maiduguri town in Borno, a few locals agreed to talk to HumAngle on the condition that their identities would be concealed. Villagers say these defectors incite violence, rob civilians, and harass women. When they complain or try to fight back, they brag about having ruled the forest for years and having the power to do whatever they want within the civilian communities. Displaced people also live side by side at the Shuwari IDP camp with men they believe are responsible for their displacement. Living with them at the camp comes with fear and mistrust, IDPs say.

When Salihu Garba briefly returned to Bama, following the Borno state resettlement programme, threats from former Boko Haram fighters forced him back to the Shuwari IDP camp, he says. While some defectors seem to be living without fighting their neighbours, others, especially those working as assets for the military, move around brandishing rifles, spurring terror, and instilling fear among locals. Simple communal disputes often degenerate into violence. Salihu tells HumAngle that, two months ago, a quarrel spiralled into stabbing a villager. A former insurgent had stepped on bricks laid by a villager to build part of his compound, and that escalated into an exchange of blows and domestic weapons. Both the civilian and the defector were arrested, but the latter returned the next day to stab the former, who was later rushed to the hospital to fight for his life.

Rural criminality also adds to the tension that comes with forcibly reintegrating terrorists into civilian communities, locals say. One repentant terrorist was recently arrested for theft after breaking into shops and stealing six bags of beans. Before being sent to the police cell and later prison, he threatened the shop owner: “I will return and kill you after serving my term.”

For Isah Kamsulum, another resident of Shuwari, the fear is deeply personal. In 2015, he witnessed a man named Ba’ana slaughter fifteen people in Bama. Years later, Ba’ana resurfaced as a repentant, working with soldiers in the community. Isah’s nephew confronted him, enraged that someone who had killed his sibling now lived comfortably among them. Ba’ana killed the nephew. He was arrested, held briefly, then released. Today, he fights alongside the military in Gamboru. Residents say they were never consulted before repentants were resettled among them. “We just saw them,” he complains. “The government brought them out of the forest and kept us here, too. We are all under their control.”

Ibrahim Adam of the Zajeri community in the state says he had an even more concerning experience. Over a year ago, about ten former insurgents got an apartment for themselves within the community. They were at first unarmed, but some of their friends, who worked as auxiliary fighters with the military and were armed, would frequently come visiting them daily. Their presence, especially in large numbers, unsettled the villagers. The former insurgents started asking young women to marry them. One divorcee selling food by the roadside was told she must marry one of them. Scared to the bone, the woman abandoned her trade and fled the area.

Villagers say they have grown alarmed living with the repentants, with Ibrahim recounting that they have witnessed about 30 of them crammed in an apartment, talking recklessly and loudly about their past and bragging about their atrocities before surrendering to the army. The community demanded their eviction, but the landlord refused because he’s afraid. While older repentants in the community maintain some decorum, the younger ones, accompanied by armed companions, remain a source of fear.

For Goni, Ali, and several terrorist deserters HumAngle interviewed, relapsing into terror is not an option. They also said they’re not among the young repentants instilling fears into the civilian community. They say they’ve chosen the path of peace and would never return to a life of violence.

Footage has emerged showing the destruction of a drone by a French Rafale fighter over Latvia earlier today. The engagement underscores how the drone war unleashed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine is increasingly spilling over borders, as well as the growing reality of the drone threat to NATO.

The French Air and Space Force confirmed that its Rafales, currently deployed in neighboring Lithuania, were scrambled in response to the drone incursion. The drone was identified before one of the fighters shot it down over an uninhabited area. The incident was a “demonstration of the French Armed Forces’ commitment to contributing to the security of Europe’s eastern flank,” the service said in a statement on X.

A detachment of French Air and Space Force Rafale jets is currently engaged in the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission from Šiauliai Air Base, Lithuania.

This is not the first time that a NATO fighter has shot down a drone in the Baltic region as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission. On May 19 of this year, a Romanian F-16 shot down a Ukrainian drone over Estonia after it strayed into NATO airspace, reportedly due to Russian electronic warfare interference. Last September, NATO fighters shot down at least three, and likely four, Russian drones, after 19 reported violations of Polish airspace. Polish authorities assessed that the drones “did not veer off course but were deliberately targeted.”

However, this is the first time that an incident of this kind has been captured on camera.

At least two videos are now circulating on social media showing the engagement playing out.

One shows the moment that a Rafale launches an air-to-air missile, leaving a prominent trail of smoke, before detonating seconds later.

Another video, from a different angle, shows the immediate aftermath of the shootdown. Another trail is seen in the background of both videos, but it’s unclear if this is evidence of a previous missile launch, or a contrail from another aircraft that previously transited the airspace at a different altitude.

In a typical Baltic Air Policing configuration, the Rafale is armed with MICA air-to-air missiles. These beyond-visual-range weapons can be fitted with either an active radar seeker or an infrared seeker head, with a mix normally being loaded. The MICA uses a thrust-vectoring motor for improved agility and has a reported maximum range of around 37 miles.

📍 Lituanie | Le succès des vols conjoints commence au sol 🇫🇷🤝🇷🇴
 
➡️ Préparation d’un vol d’entraînement avec des avions de chasse 🇫🇷 et 🇷🇴 :

🔧 Montage d’armements entre mécaniciens des deux pays alliés

💬 Échanges sur les procédures, matériel et méthodes des équipes… pic.twitter.com/LPYygu0P5r

— Armée française – Opérations militaires (@EtatMajorFR) June 6, 2026

The Latvian Armed Forces provided more details of the shootdown, noting that a yellow alert was originally issued for the Ludza, Balvi, and Aluksne districts this morning at 9:20 a.m. local time. This led to NATO fighters being launched.

At 9:40 a.m., this alert level was increased to orange for the Ludza and Rēzekne districts. At this point, it was confirmed that some kind of drone was entering Latvian airspace. A military spokesperson told the Reuters news agency that the drone entered Latvian airspace from Russia.

🟠 Izsludināts gaisa telpas apdraudējums Krāslavas un Ludzas novados, informē Nacionālie bruņotie spēki.

Brīdinājums par iespējamu gaisa telpas apdraudējumu izsludināts Rēzeknes un Balvu novados. pic.twitter.com/PFcMZmhhga

— LTV Panorāma (@ltvpanorama) June 8, 2026

The Latvian Armed Forces warned residents in these areas to “Seek shelter indoors, close windows and doors — follow the two-wall principle.” It added: “If you notice a low-flying, suspicious, or dangerous object, do not approach it and call 112.”

At 10:05 a.m., the Latvian Armed Forces confirmed that NATO fighters were over the Rēzekne district, and a “foreign” drone was shot down over the Berzgale parish.

Berzgale is less than 20 miles from the nearest Russian border, and around 340 miles from the closest Ukrainian border, with Belarus, a close Moscow ally, separating Latvia and Ukraine.

NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission has safeguarded the airspace of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since the three countries joined the alliance in 2004. Because the Baltic states do not maintain fighter fleets capable of continuous air-defense duties, allied nations rotate detachments of combat aircraft to bases in Lithuania and Estonia, where they remain on quick-reaction alert around the clock.

The mission routinely scrambles fighters to identify and intercept Russian military aircraft operating near NATO airspace, particularly flights to and from Russia’s heavily militarized Kaliningrad exclave that often occur without flight plans, radio contact, or active transponders.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO expanded the mission with additional aircraft and operating locations, making Baltic Air Policing one of the alliance’s most visible peacetime deterrence operations on its eastern flank.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the expanding drone war between the two countries has provided another layer of responsibility to the Baltic Air Policing mission.

For most of its history, Baltic Air Policing centered on scrambling fighters to identify Russian bombers, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and transports flying near NATO airspace. The war in Ukraine has seen the increasing proliferation of drones that can travel hundreds or even thousands of miles, creating a new challenge for NATO air defenses.

Since 2022, there have been several incidents, including drones and missile debris entering or crashing in NATO territory, including in Poland and Romania. Late last month, a Russian kamikaze drone strayed into Romanian airspace before striking a residential building, injuring civilians, in what appears to have been the first incident of its kind.

A russian drone carrying explosives, involved in the bombing of infrastructure in Ukraine crashed in Galați, Romania, causing a fire on the roof of a residential apartment building.

Two persons sustained minor injuries and several residents required medical attention, the… pic.twitter.com/P8jzYFrEEp

— Toiu Oana (@oana_toiu) May 29, 2026

We asked NATO for more details of today’s incident, including whether it could confirm reports citing the Latvian military that the drone had entered its airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare. This is a threat that is by now commonplace in the Baltic region.

“While the circumstances surrounding this incident are still under review, jamming is known to occur in this region, and can pose serious safety risks, including to civil aviation,” a spokesperson for the alliance told us.

In recent days, Ukraine has carried out a number of high-profile drone attacks against Russian targets in and around the Baltic region.

In the last week, Ukrainian drones appear to have hit the St. Petersburg oil terminal, the Baltic Fleet base at Kronstadt, and a weapons factory in the Tambov region.

As we observed in our previous reporting, there have been very few confirmed Ukrainian attacks of any kind against the Baltic Fleet. However, satellite and other imagery that emerged in the wake of the recent drone strike reveals extensive damage inflicted on the  Steregushchiy class corvette Boikiy.

Footage of the Russian Navy Baltic Sea Fleet corvette Boikiy burning in its Kronstadt drydock after a Ukrainian drone strike yesterday. pic.twitter.com/9CHz4aLdY8

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 4, 2026

Another satellite image of the Russian corvette Boikiy following yesterday’s Ukrainian strike. What is interesting here is that the active fire was captured before firefighting crews managed to extinguish it. @planet image taken on June 3 at 16:30 local time. It burned for hours. pic.twitter.com/PzcHxoSxGk

— Mark Krutov (@kromark) June 4, 2026

Today’s incident provides visual evidence of advanced NATO fighters used to shoot down drones over alliance territory. While effective on this occasion, this kind of interception can be inefficient due to the mismatch in cost between the drone and missile. It is notable that the French Ministry of Defense has plans to introduce a lower-cost counter-drone capability on the Rafale by the summer. Trials of a pod loaded with 68mm laser-guided rockets have already begun.

Un Rafale équipé de roquettes guidées laser aperçu à Istres. Les essais ont donc enfin démarré. Ici une nacelle Thalès JF12, donc 24 roquettes 68mm au total. Une corde de plus à l’arc du Rafale, la chasse au Shahed est OUVERTE ! pic.twitter.com/6v0xSMkUJ1

— bruno aviation (@Bruno_Aviation) April 16, 2026

As a result, NATO has accelerated work on layered defenses that include short-range ground-based air defenses, electronic warfare, and other counter-drone technologies.

Fighters, however, will always remain a critical last-resort option, especially when a drone poses an immediate threat or when a visual identification is required.

Today’s video not only illustrates the changing face of the Baltic Air Policing mission due to the Russian war in Ukraine, but highlights the growing threat posed by drones and cruise missiles that can cross borders with little warning, whether deliberately or not.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

A timeline has been provided for the arrival of Saab Gripen fighters in Ukraine, with the first jets to be delivered early next year. Significantly, as well as getting another modern Western combat jet, Ukraine expects to receive highly capable Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has announced.

After meeting Zelensky in the city of Uppsala, Sweden today, Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson announced that his country will donate up to 16 Gripen C/Ds to Ukraine. These will be secondhand jets drawn from Swedish stocks, to expedite delivery. Handover of the jets in Ukraine will take place in early 2027, Kristersson added.

According to Swedish officials, the training of Ukrainian pilots and technicians on the Gripen C/D is already underway and will be expanded this fall.

In the longer term, Kristersson confirmed that Ukraine plans to acquire an initial batch of up to 20 of the more advanced Gripen E/F versions. Writing on X today, Swedish Minister for Defense Pål Jonson said that the Gripen E/F would be financed with a $2.9-billion European Union loan. The long-term ambition remains 100-150 Gripen aircraft, he added.

Despite it having a similar outward appearance to the Gripen C/D, the Gripen E (and the two-seat Gripen F version) is regarded as a completely new aircraft type — as you can read about here.

“Ukraine has clearly identified the Gripen aircraft as a priority option for its air force in the long term and intends to purchase the newest version, the Gripen E,” Kristersson said. “Negotiations are ongoing, and we will be able to transfer these aircraft by 2030.”

In a press release, Saab reiterated that it has not yet signed any contract nor received an order relating to the Gripen E/F for Ukraine, meaning this transfer only exists as a statement of intent for now.

According to Saab, “The next steps for the Ukrainian and Swedish authorities will be to complete the negotiations regarding Ukraine’s acquisition of Gripen E/F, which is expected to take place in batches, and Saab will support this process.”

In the meantime, the Swedish government has also announced that it will replace the donated Gripen C/D aircraft in the Swedish Air Force inventory. “Dialogue regarding Sweden’s replacement of the donated capability will be initiated soon,” Saab said.

Last October, as we reported, Kristersson and Zelensky signed a letter of intent (LOI) including a potential export deal covering “likely between 100 and 150 fighter jets,” according to Kristersson. The LOI was signed at Linköping, the site of Saab’s manufacturing facility for the Gripen.

As for second-hand Gripens, Ukraine has repeatedly been linked with a possible transfer of secondhand Swedish Air Force Gripen C/Ds, and Zelensky previously said he would like to see the first of these delivered from 2026.

While the Gripen C/Ds are now set to arrive later than hoped, it remains a big deal for the Ukrainian Air Force. Although the service has already received Western-supplied F-16s and a smaller number of Mirage 2000s, the Ukrainian Air Force still relies heavily on its Soviet-era fighters. The MiG-29, in particular, has been continually adapted to carry new weaponry, both Western-supplied and locally developed, but these are aging jets and the fleet has been steadily reduced by attrition.

Perhaps the most important part of the Gripen transfer will involve the armament for the fighter.

Zelensky specifically mentioned that he expects the Gripen C/Ds to be armed with the Meteor missile.

Swedish Minister for Defense Pål Jonson said that the Gripen C/D “can be delivered with weapons such as IRIS-T, AMRAAM, and the long-range Meteor missile. This is about aircraft, weapons, skills and sustainment.”

Earlier this year, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense confirmed that the Meteor was one of the weapons being lined up for the next Swedish security aid package for Ukraine.

As we have discussed in the past, the Meteor would provide Ukraine with a class of air-to-air weapon that it badly needs to redress the balance against Russian fighter jets.

Undoubtedly, the Meteor is among the most capable air-to-air missiles in operational service anywhere in the world. Thanks to its ramjet propulsion, which can be throttled during different phases of flight, the Meteor is generally considered to be effective against certain types of targets out to around 130 miles.

Meteor

The Meteor also features an active radar seeker for the terminal phase and a two-way datalink that feeds it with in-flight updates as it flies out to its target and provides information to the pilot in the launch aircraft.

While the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) that arms Ukraine’s F-16 fighters also has an active radar seeker, it lacks the range of the Meteor.

The most capable AMRAAM identified as being used by Ukraine is the AIM-120C-8, which is generally assumed to be able to hit targets at a distance of between 75 and 100 miles.

Of course, in practical applications, the range of both the Meteor and AMRAAM is affected by a whole range of factors, above all, the energy and altitude state of the launching aircraft and the target.

However, the Meteor could bring a significant shift to the airpower balance over Ukraine.

Russia has repeatedly exploited the long range of its R-37M air-to-air missile, known to NATO as AA-13 Axehead, typically launching them from jets flying outside the range of the missiles carried by Ukrainian fighters, as well as from most ground-based air defense systems.

With a reported range of 124 miles against certain types of targets, the R-37M flies to its target on a lofted trajectory, controlled by an inertial navigation system with mid-course radio correction, and uses an active radar seeker for its terminal phase attack.

Mainly used by Su-35S Flanker multirole fighters and MiG-31BM Foxhound interceptors, the R-37M is a missile we have examined in detail in the past. It has long been a thorn in the side of Ukrainian Air Force fighter pilots.

As TWZ had previously pointed out, Meteor is the best candidate for Ukraine to try and redress the balance in the air war when faced by the far-reaching R-37M and would finally put Russian aircraft at risk within their own missile ranges.

At the same time, the Meteor would give Ukraine a weapon that can target Russian jets delivering standoff munitions, again from outside the range of Ukrainian air defenses. Zelensky today said the missile “would stop Russian glide bomb attacks,” something that has been a huge problem for Ukrainian air defenses since this class of weapons was introduced.

As we’ve highlighted in detail as far back as April of 2022, aside from its Meteor capability, the Gripen, even in its earlier C/D versions, would be the best fit for Ukraine.

Designed during the Cold War to meet the Soviet threat, the Gripen was engineered for efficiency, durability, and ease of operation under wartime conditions. It was specifically designed to be serviced and rearmed by small teams — often including conscript personnel — while operating from dispersed locations such as roads and improvised airstrips instead of traditional air bases. The aircraft’s entire concept centers on maintaining combat operations in demanding environments, including prolonged cold-weather conditions.

“Gripen was built for a country that may have to fight outnumbered, under pressure and from dispersed bases,” Swedish Minister for Defense Pål Jonson said. “That makes it highly relevant for Ukraine: high readiness, rapid turnaround, modern weapons and the ability to operate under constant threat,” he added.

Overall, the Gripen is particularly compatible with the decentralized and highly mobile style of warfare Ukraine is currently practicing.

At the same time, it should be noted that even with the F-16, the Ukrainian Air Force has developed tactics and equipment to operate these jets from dispersed locations around the country. Even before the current conflict, Ukrainian fighters were training to make use of highways as alternatives to traditional runways.

A video shows vehicles intended to help with distributed operations of Ukrainian F-16s:

Project 61: an ecosystem for F-16s by Come Back Alive Foundation

The capabilities of the Gripen and Meteor would also be enhanced by working in combination with the two Saab 340 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft equipped with Erieye radar that have been donated by Sweden.

Ukraine’s Saab 340 AEW&C can function as an airborne fighter control platform by detecting and tracking Russian targets, prioritizing threats, and directing fighters to intercept them. Through its datalink system, the aircraft can also transmit mid-course guidance updates directly to missiles in flight. As a result, fighter pilots may not even need to activate their own radar when engaging a target. Instead, the missile can be assigned a target before launch, fired, and then continuously guided by updates from the AEW&C aircraft throughout its flight.

The first evidence of the Saab 340 AEW&C being used over Ukraine emerged in March this year, but its activities have remained closely under wraps.

Taken together, the arrival of the Gripen and Meteor missile would represent one of the most significant upgrades yet for the Ukrainian Air Force. Beyond simply adding another Western fighter type, the package would introduce a highly survivable, dispersed-operating combat jet paired with one of the world’s most capable long-range air-to-air missiles and supported by Swedish AEW&C assets.

Even without the Meteor, the Gripen C/D could help Ukraine challenge Russia’s long-standing advantage in beyond-visual-range air combat while fitting naturally into the more decentralized operating model the Ukrainian Air Force has already been forced to adopt throughout the war. At the same time, it will provide valuable experience for crews and serve as a stepping stone for the future Gripen E/F.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Al-Qaeda-linked fighters have set fire to food trucks as they continue to blockade roads around the capital Bamako, cutting off supply routes. Officials and residents warn the blockade is worsening hunger in parts of the country already facing food shortages.

Fighters attack ‘Africa’s Alcatraz’, which detains high-value prisoners, and disrupt crucial supply chains to the capital.

In a new wave of attacks in Mali, an al-Qaeda-linked group has stormed a main prison housing fighters from the armed group and set fire to trucks with food supplies heading to the capital Bamako.

Fighters from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group stormed the Kenieroba Central Prison, a recently built complex dubbed “Africa’s Alcatraz”, located about 60km (37 miles) southwest of Bamako, Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reported on Wednesday.

The detention centre houses 2,500 prisoners, including at least 72 inmates considered “high value” by the Malian state, Haque said, adding that Malian armed forces were repelling the attack.

Among the prisoners are JNIM fighters and a number of people arrested following large-scale attacks last month by the group’s fighters and Tuareg separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).

The fighters attacked several military bases across multiple cities, including areas where senior government officials live, and took control of the northern city of Kidal in a coordinated offensive on April 25 and April 26, which struck at the heart of the West African country’s military government.

One of those attacks killed Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara and his family in their home in Kati, a garrison town near the capital. On Monday, the leader of the country’s military government, Assimi Goita, took on the role of defence minister. At least 23 others were also killed in the attacks.

Since then, “there has been a wave of arrests of former and current military officers, members of civil society, lawyers, members of the political opposition – all accused of colluding with al-Qaeda fighters,” said Haque, who has been reporting for years on and in Mali. He added that fighters linked to the armed group were also arrested.

Security sources told AFP news agency that opposition figures Mountaga Tall, Youssouf Daba Diawara, and Moussa Djire are among those “abducted”.

According to family members and security sources who spoke to the agency, Tall, a lawyer, was taken on May 2 in Bamako by hooded men on charges of plotting with opposition figures in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, to overthrow the military government. Since his arrest, Tall has been questioned at least once for “attempted destabilisation”.

The security sources said Diawara and Djire were suspected of links with, respectively, the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko and Oumar Mariko, two opposition figures in exile. At least two other civilians who are close to Mariko were also arrested following the attacks, a judicial source told AFP, without giving further details.

The military prosecutor’s office said on May 1 that it had “solid evidence” of the “complicity” of certain military personnel, accusing them of helping with the “planning, coordination and execution” of the attacks.

In a report published on Tuesday, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) said there have also been “gravely concerning reports of extrajudicial killings and abductions, allegedly carried out by members of the security forces” following the attacks.

The violence has set off fighting across Mali’s vast desert north, raising the prospect of significant gains by armed groups that have shown an increasing willingness to strike neighbouring countries.

JNIM has called on Malians to rise up against the government and transition to Islamic law. The group has also pledged to besiege Bamako, and on Friday, it had reportedly set up checkpoints around the city of four million.

Haque said the blockade has the potential to cause a humanitarian disaster.

“These are al-Qaeda fighters that have pointed 12.7mm machine guns on their motorbikes, stopping any outgoing or incoming traffic,” the correspondent said. “We have seen on social media these fighters stopping food trucks trying to enter the area. This blockade is not just affecting people living in Bamako; it’s affecting people throughout Mali.”

On May 3, the mayor of Diafarabe village, in the Mopti region, called on the authorities to act before people started dying of hunger, as the village had run out of food.

Northrop Grumman CEO Kathy Warden says she is confident in her company’s ability to deliver next-generation carrier-based fighters to the U.S. Navy if it is picked as the winner of the F/A-XX competition. The U.S. Navy’s top officer said yesterday that the goal was to award the F/A-XX contract by August of this year, but also that one unnamed contractor in the running “really can’t deliver in the timeframe we need it.”

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Daryl Caudle offered his latest comments on F/A-XX yesterday in response to a direct question from TWZ at a roundtable on the sidelines of the Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition. The Pentagon had tried to put the Navy’s future fighter ambitions on hold last year, arguing that the U.S. industrial base did not have sufficient capacity to support work on two sixth-generation combat jets simultaneously. Boeing won the contract to build what is now called the F-47 for the U.S. Air Force in March 2025. Boeing is the only other company known to be in the running now for F/A-XX. Last year, it was reported that Lockheed Martin had been eliminated from the competition.

Late yesterday, Northrop Grumman also released a new computer-generated F/A-XX promotional video, seen below. You can read our analysis of what is seen therein here.

“We do expect the Department [of the Navy] to make an award selection in the third quarter,” Northrop Grumman’s Warden said during a routine earning call today in response to a direct question about Adm. Caudle’s remarks. “We are confident in our ability to deliver our solution to the Navy.”

She did not explicitly confirm or deny that the CNO had been referring to Northrop Grumman when he mentioned a contractor’s inability to meet the Navy’s schedule needs on F/A-XX.

“We and our suppliers are prepared to bring the workforce and infrastructure that’s needed to execute the program, and our track record on B-21 demonstrates that ability to deliver a complex aircraft on schedule,” Warden added. “Regarding the financials, we’d expect upside to the sales and earnings from our current guidance, if we are entrusted to build the F/A-XX, and it would be a top priority for our company to do so.”

Air Force officials, as well as members of Congress, regularly describe the B-21 Raider bomber as a model acquisition program that has been able to keep on schedule and budget despite at least some hurdles along the way. Earlier this year, Northrop Grumman reached an agreement with the Air Force to accelerate B-21 production.

It’s also worth remembering that Northrop Grumman withdrew in 2023 from the Air Force competition that would lead to the F-47. The company framed the decision at the time as a voluntary one.

“I’ll just say that, when I noted we have other opportunities we are pursuing, I won’t disclose at this point exactly what those are until a little more information comes out,” Warden, who was also CEO at that time, said when announcing the withdrawal, which was widely seen as a reference to F/A-XX. “You could assume that if we feel we’re well-positioned, and the government is appropriately balancing risk and reward, as I said that that would be a program we would pursue.”

Former top Air Force officials subsequently said that Northrop Grumman’s bid had been on the verge of getting cut.

As mentioned, industrial base capacity questions have swirled around F/A-XX. The Pentagon had tried to effectively shelve the Navy’s next-generation fighter program in its proposed budget for the 2026 Fiscal Year. At the time, a senior U.S. defense official explicitly said that the decision was “due to our belief that the industrial base can only handle going fast on one program at this time, and the presidential priority to go all in on F-47, and get that program right.”

Congress later intervened to appropriate some $1.69 billion in funding to keep F/A-XX moving ahead in the 2026 Fiscal Year.

“I will tell you, we, Northrop Grumman, are ready to execute F/A-XX,” Tom Jones, President of Northrop Grumman’s Aeronautics Systems sector, had also told TWZ and other outlets in response to a question about industrial base capacity in relation to the program back in December. “We’re looking to try and make sure that the customer community knows that we believe that we’re ready to go and we can execute it.”

Boeing Defense and Space CEO Steve Parker had also pushed back on the assertion that the U.S. industrial base could not support F-47 and F/A-XX at the same time last year. The company’s pitch for the Navy’s program appears to be a navalized adaptation of the F-47.

“The Air Force has got a lot of demand on the system. The Navy’s got a lot of demand,” Adm. Caudle had also said yesterday. “So there was, you know, a check twice, cut once, kind of mentality here on this decision. And now there, I think we’re all on the same page on the reason why the hard look needed to be done. I’m good with it.”

Questions about the overall future of F/A-XX do remain, despite clear support from top Navy leaders like Caudle and Congress. The Navy looks set to request just over $140 million for the program in Fiscal Year 2027. This is a very meager sum, especially for a program of this magnitude. In contrast, the Air Force is seeking $5 billion in additional funding for F-47. Billions of dollars have already been appropriated for the Air Force’s next-generation fighter effort.

The Pentagon and the individual services are rolling out more details about their annual budget proposals today, which could offer more insights into the plans now for F/A-XX in the coming years. Securing the contract to build the Navy’s next-generation fighter is still likely to be an important win for whichever company the service selects in the end.

UPDATE: 4/22/2026 –

The U.S. Navy has issued a statement regarding Adm. Caudle’s comments earlier this week, which is as follows:

“During a question-and-answer session at the Sea-Air-Space Exposition, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle was asked about the Navy’s sixth-generation strike fighter program (F/A-XX). Adm. Caudle emphasized that the Navy’s priority is ensuring through due diligence the selected vendor can deliver the required capability on the timeline needed by the fleet while also considering broader industrial base capacity. Any reference to ‘a specific offeror’ was intended as a general anecdotal comment and was not directed at any vendors currently under consideration.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The Air National Guard is pushing Congress to boost fighter numbers as it seeks to modernize its aging inventory. With the Air Force at large feeling the effects of years of underinvestment in new fighters, and with China presenting a massive pacing challenge, the move is the latest effort to ensure that the service can keep up in terms of numbers and capability.

According to a report from Air & Space Forces Magazine, Air National Guard adjutants general from more than 20 states sent a letter to Congress last week that requests multiyear funding for the acquisition of between 72 and 100 new fighters each year.

These numbers would be a significant hike compared with recent years: not since 1998 has the Air Force bought more than 72 new fighters in a single year.

“The United States Air Force is the oldest, the smallest, and the least ready in its 78-year history,” the letter states. “We must build a fighting force that will win.”

Specifically, the letter urges the minimum annual purchases of the 48 F-35As and 24 F-15EXs, with a preferred goal of 72 F-35As and 36 F-15EXs.

While the letter was signed by Air National Guard leaders, these totals would be expected to furnish units of the Active, Guard, and Reserve components.

By comparison, the Air Force requested funding for 48 F-35As in Fiscal Year 2024, followed by 42 in 2025, 24 in 2026, and 38 in the proposed 2027 budget.

The Fiscal Year 2027 budget request also includes funding for the purchase of 10 F-35Bs and 37 F-35Cs for the Marine Corps and the Navy, which is already a notable uptick in planned acquisitions. At the same time, the F-35 program has faced worrisome delays in work on a new radar, as well as a host of other critical upgrades.

For the F-15EX, budget documents show the service requested 24 aircraft in 2024, 18 in 2025, 21 in 2026, and 24 in 2027.

A sustained annual buy of even 24 F-15EXs would represent an acceleration over current production plans for the Eagle II, after the Fiscal Year 2026 budget request increased the program of record from 98 to 129 aircraft, including funding for 21 jets in a single year. In its latest budget request, the Air Force provides no details about whether there may be any new changes to the planned total fleet size for the F-15EX.

One of those who signed the letter is Brig. Gen. Shannon Smith, head of the Idaho Air National Guard, who told Air & Space Forces Magazine that, “We are burning these jets and the airmen over time to support the joint force to accomplish the president’s goals with Epic Fury in this conflict with Iran.”

On top of the demands of combat operations, Brig. Gen. Smith warned that the Air National Guard fighter fleet is rapidly aging, meaning that “Most of the money will go to keep them flying. In a few years, they’ll be struggling to be flyable, let alone be relevant.”

While plans are in place to replace A-10s and F-15Cs, even older F-35As will need replacement before too long, Smith added. More urgent is the looming requirement to supersede the more numerous F-16s.

In total, the Air National Guard has 24 fighter squadrons, 11 of which have already received new fighters or are planned to. While some Guard F-16 units have transitioned to the F-35, there is no plan in place for the Guard’s remaining 13 Viper squadrons. Taken together, the Guard’s inventory constitutes close to half of all combat-coded F-16s.

In the past, thought has been given to a new light fighter, to balance the more costly and capable F-35 and, now, the F-47, although that would be extremely costly and take years. Another option would be to start buying new F-16 Block 70/72 jets, although the production line is already burdened by multiple export orders.

Even if Congress supports the Air National Guard chiefs’ recommendations and the budget is available, getting new jets on ramps will be far from easy.

As well as boosting capabilities and ‘combat mass,’ new fighters bring other advantages in terms of reduced maintenance demands, easier access to spare parts, longer airframe life, and overall higher availability.

The issue of spare parts is a critical one. Back in 2024, we looked at how, by the Air Force’s own estimates, hundreds of its aircraft are at risk of being left grounded due to a lack of spares, thanks to a $1.5-billion shortfall in its budget request.

However, meeting the aim of 72 to 100 new fighters each year would demand a significant uptake in production capacity, which is already stretched. With that in mind, the Air National Guard projects it could still take 10 to 15 years to re-equip units now flying older fighters.

One option to re-equip Guard and Reserve units would be to cascade fighters down from the Active component, but Air National Guard chiefs warn against this, too, since it only pushes recapitalization with new fighters further down the line.

What is unclear is how the Air Force’s plans for the F-47 sixth-generation fighter might play into this.

In 2023, then-Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall said that the service was working around a future force planning construct that included 200 of the sixth-gen combat jets.

At this point, however, there are still questions about how exactly the F-47 will fit into the Air Force’s future force structure and how many of the jets the service might actually procure. The jet was originally planned as a replacement for the F-22, but that appears to have changed, or is at least in limbo. It is by no means clear how long the F-22 will be around after the F-47 is introduced, but if the F-47 is delayed, it could come at the end of the F-22’s service life. If the Air Force intends to operate the two at the same time, at least for the earlier part of the F-47’s career, but delays in fielding it occur, this could also open up another gap in the combat mass.

Another factor is the service’s emerging plans for fielding its future fleets of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones, which are being designed from the ground up to work in close concert with current and future crewed jets. In the past, the Air Force has signaled that it wants to buy over 1,000 CCAs. However, this number is understood to cover multiple CCA increments, with Increment 1 being procured in numbers between 100 and 150 units, at least to start with.

Ultimately, the CCA effort aims to drastically improve the tactical jet fleet combat mass, which could offset the dwindling fighter force, and active-duty F-35 and F-22 units will get them first. Thereafter, they could be quickly rolled out to fourth-generation jets, too. On the other hand, the CCA concept still has much to prove and is not without risk.

In the background to all this are the concerns within the U.S. military leadership at large about the significant advances being made by the Chinese military and, in this case, its air arms. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force is rapidly expanding and modernizing at a scale that threatens to surpass the United States in both numbers and capability. Warning signs of a massive fighter expansion include an apparent new J-35 factory and the many Chinese CCA programs.

As long as the U.S. government continues to procure aircraft at comparatively slower rates, China has the opportunity to race ahead and is already producing advanced fighters in large quantities, creating a growing imbalance in the Indo-Pacific region.

Clearly, there are very many factors at play, not least budgetary. However, in making their case to Congress, Air National Guard bosses are once again underscoring the continued demand for crewed combat jets within the service, and at the same time, highlighting some of the challenges in keeping the fighter force at the top of its game.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com