Ethiopia

Tigray was the centre of a devastating two-year war that pitted the TPLF against Ethiopia’s federal army.

Ethiopia’s Afar region has accused forces from neighbouring Tigray of crossing into its territory, seizing several villages and attacking civilians, in what it called a breach of the 2022 peace deal that ended the war in northern Ethiopia.

Between 2020 and 2022, Tigray was the centre of a devastating two-year war that pitted the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against Ethiopia’s federal army and left at least 600,000 people dead, according to the African Union.

In a statement released late on Wednesday, Afar authorities said TPLF fighters “entered Afar territory by force today”.

The group, which governs the Tigray region, was accused of “controlling six villages and bombing civilians with mortars”. Officials did not provide details on casualties.

“The TPLF learns nothing from its mistakes,” the Afar administration said, condemning what it described as “acts of terror”.

The conflict earlier this decade also spread into neighbouring Ethiopian regions, including Afar, whose forces fought alongside federal troops.

According to Afar’s latest statement, Tigrayan forces attacked the Megale district in the northwest of the region “with heavy weapons fire on civilian herders”.

The authorities warned that if the TPLF “does not immediately cease its actions, the Afar Regional Administration will assume its defensive duty to protect itself against any external attack”.

The renewed fighting, they said, “openly destroys the Pretoria peace agreement”, referring to the deal signed in November 2022 between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan leaders, which ended two years of bloodshed.

While the fragile peace had largely held, tensions between Addis Ababa and the TPLF have deepened in recent months. The party, which dominated Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018, was officially removed from the country’s list of political parties in May amid internal divisions and growing mistrust from the federal government.

Federal officials have also accused the TPLF of re-establishing ties with neighbouring Eritrea, a country with a long and uneasy history with Ethiopia. Eritrea, once an Italian colony and later an Ethiopian province, fought a bloody independence war before gaining statehood in 1993.

A subsequent border war between the two nations from 1998 to 2000 killed tens of thousands. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he signed a landmark peace deal with Eritrea, but relations have soured again since the end of the Tigray conflict.

In 2019, a Sudanese team of jiu-jitsu athletes set out on an extraordinary quest: to travel by land from Sudan to Kenya, despite having no funding and limited resources, to compete in the LionHeart Nairobi Open.

Together members of the Muqatel Training Center for martial arts travelled across three countries, carrying not just their hopes and dreams, but the spirit of a revolution that reshaped Sudan.

Journey to Kenya is a documentary short about resilience, unity and determination — a powerful reminder that dreams can transcend borders.

A film by Ibrahim “Snoopy” Ahmed, produced by In Deep Visions.

Over the last two decades, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase of foreigntroops in Djibouti, a rise in investments along the Red Sea, and more pronounced engagement in its internal affairs by confirmed and emerging powers all of which showcase the geopolitical appetite for influence in the region. Yet current crises – the war in Sudan, persisting insecurity in Somalia, renewed tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and contentious relations between countries – underscore an uncertain future that could make the volatile region even more prone to external influence. Will local leadership step up to the task of preserving stability through improved regional relations or leave its most pressing issues unresolved?

An analysis by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Mwachofi Singo, and Hallelujah Wondimu published earlier this year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides key insights on the risk posed by the absence of a clear pillar state(s) to push for peace and security within the region which could worsen its vulnerability to competing middle powers.

The three experts on African geopolitics argue that given its history of conflicts and ongoing tensions, the region demands the rise of Ethiopia and Kenya as stronger leaders able to drive reform initiatives aimed at protecting the interests of the Horn of Africa. As such, the two nations offer strong, suitable and strategic advantages for the region despite facing their own internal and regional challenges which they must also attend to.

The CSIS report view Ethiopia’s role as central to transforming the region towards a stable and self-sufficient neighborhood capable of addressing its own tensions, preserving peace and promoting economic development. Whether Ethiopia intends to assume this role, however, rests on the success of its current transition that began since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018 following decades of Tigray dominance over the country. Yet the envisioned reinforcement of the federal structure led by a strong central government has had setbacks in the last few years with the occurrence of the violent war in Tigray and ongoing security concerns over autonomy seeking movements.

This suggests that Ethiopia will inevitably have significant nation building to do to preserve the unity of the country hence the recent inward focus to stabilize domestic tensions. The achievement of the Renaissance Dam stands as good symbol of national harmony that could be replicated across other sectors of society to reinforce inclusion and equity. This image of improved and steady stability in Ethiopia is crucial to consolidate its leadership position in the region.

According to the researchers, Ethiopia’s (re)emergence as a leader in the Horn is also closely linked to its capacity to improve its relations with neighbors which have deteriorated the last few years. They cite the territorial dispute with Sudan, the sudden outreach to Somaliland irritating Somalia and Djibouti or one could add renewed animosity with Eritrea. Ironically, these frictions could lead to Ethiopia’s further rapprochement with external emerging actors eager to increase their influence in the region that will further complicate regional cooperation imperative for stability. This signals a pressing need for the country to reset its relations with its neighbors as the current trajectory could end up being an obstacle towards its economic development. Again, the Grand Renaissance Dam which is already a major component of Ethiopia’s trade policy in the region could be the catalyst needed to reinvigorate diplomatic ties.

While Ethiopia remains focused on its introspection and on pursuing a more bilateral approach to regional diplomacy, Kenya could seize the opportunity to accentuate its leadership position and diplomatic consistency. Kenya’s relatively peaceful independence transition and constant display of neutrality when engaging mediation processes forged its image as a credible leader for the region. The report also highlights a long history of proactive foreign policy by successive Kenyan presidents which emphasized economic development through regional trade integration. However, Kenya’s recent actions with regards to the Sudan conflict and the war in the DRC might alter its reputation and ability to conduct peace initiatives in the region while similar moves may instead translate an incoherent foreign strategy.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine Kenya further jeopardize its stabilizing role as the country’s own development ambitions largely rests on its capacity to promote regional stability crucial to economic trade with its neighbors. This underscores the need for Nairobi to remain committed to its traditional diplomatic playbook to support impartial interventions while preserving its leverage and reputation throughout such processes.

In addition, Kenyan legacy could be further undermined by internal challenges in light of the gen z movement which may be a decisive political factor ahead of the 2027 elections. Latest developments in Morrocco or Madagascar could give a glimpse of the consequences of such social efforts in Kenya. Whether or not Kenyan youth are able to shake the government, political leaders should implement policies responding to the youth socioeconomic concerns as prolong unrests could diminish its global influence capacity so dear to the current administration.

In a rapidly shifting world order where middle powers are keen on exerting their own vision in the Horn of Africa, it becomes imperative for local leadership to assert regional autonomy to solve issues. Stability and improved inter-state relations should then discourage governments from seeking external support when pursuing domestic interests.

Kenya and Ethiopia both retain significant assets to affirm their influence in the Horn despite their own challenges. However, their capacity to assume an independent leading position might be more uncertain. The almost complete monopolization of the conflict resolution processes in Sudan or the DRC by the United States and the Gulf States clearly reveals the consequences of weak regional leadership. Kenya and Ethiopia could instead harmonize their regional policies through platforms such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Ultimately, Kenya and Ethiopia’s ability to intensify their strategic partnerships could lay the foundation for regional autonomy and stability.  

Pilgrims were visiting the Menjar Shenkora Arerti Mariam Church to mark the annual Virgin Mary festival.

Makeshift scaffolding set up at a church in Ethiopia has collapsed, killing at least 36 people and injuring dozens, state media reported.

The incident occurred at about 7:45am [4:45 GMT] on Wednesday in the town of Arerti, in the Amhara region, some 70 kilometres (43 miles) east of the capital, Addis Ababa.

A group of pilgrims were visiting the Menjar Shenkora Arerti Mariam Church to mark the annual Virgin Mary festival when the scaffolding collapsed.

District police chief Ahmed Gebeyehu told state media Fana “the number of dead has reached 36 and could increase more,” according to the AFP news agency.

The number of people injured remains unclear, but some reports suggest they could be as many as 200.

Local official Atnafu Abate told the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation (EBC) that some people remained under the rubble but did not provide details on rescue operations.

Some of the more seriously hurt were taken to hospitals in the capital, he added.

Teshale Tilahun, the local administrator, described the incident as “a tragic loss for the community”.

Images shared on the EBC’s official Facebook page showed tangled wooden poles, with crowds gathering amid the dense debris.

Other pictures appeared to show the outside of the church, where scaffolding had been precariously constructed.

Health and safety regulations are virtually non-existent in Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous nation, and construction accidents are common.

Ethiopia has inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africa’s largest hydro power project. Al Jazeera’s Bernard Smith says the dam is a source of national pride but remains contentious among downstream nations including Egypt and Sudan.

Ethiopia celebrates Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam as Egypt and Sudan express fears over water security.

Ethiopia has inaugurated Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, as the $5bn project continues to sow dismay with downstream neighbours Sudan and Egypt.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has hailed the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as a “shared opportunity” for the region that is expected to generate more than 5,000 megaWatts of power and allow surplus electricity to be exported.

A handful of regional leaders, including Kenya’s President William Ruto and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, attended the festivities in person on Tuesday, which kicked off the night before with lantern displays and drones writing slogans such as “geopolitical rise” and “a leap into the future”.

But Sudan and Egypt – who rely heavily on the Nile for water supplies – have expressed fears that the dam will threaten their water security and even breach international law. Their leaders did not attend the inauguration of the dam.

The Blue Nile, one of the Nile’s two main tributaries, flows north into Sudan and then Egypt. The dam is located just 14km (9 miles) east of the Sudanese border, measuring 1.8km (1.1 miles) wide and 145 metres (0.1 mile) tall.

“I understand their worries, because of course, if you look at Egypt from the sky, you see that the street of life is existent” thanks to the Nile, Pietro Salini, the CEO of Italian company Webuild that constructed the dam, told Al Jazeera. But “regulating the water from this dam will create an additional benefit” to neighbours, he added.

‘Continuous threat to stability’

GERD has spawned regional tension since it was launched in 2011, with years of cooperation talks between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt still stalled.

Last week, Sudan and Egypt released a joint statement calling Ethiopia’s actions “unilateral” and saying the dam posed a “continuous threat to stability”.

Sudan’s Roseires Dam, located about 110km (70 miles) downstream of GERD, faces potential future effects if Ethiopia were to perform large water releases without coordination, reports Al Jazeera’s Mohamed Vall.

“Roseires is the closest, it’s 60 years older, and when constructed was 25 times smaller – and will likely bear the brunt of the fallout if anything goes wrong at the Ethiopian dam,” Vall said.

But GERD may also provide benefits such as regulating the annual flow of the river and reducing potential flooding in villages on the banks of the Nile.

Abdullah Abderrahman, Roseires Dam administration manager, told Al Jazeera that GERD has helped to control overflow at Roseires that “used to be extremely big”.

“Then there is the reduction of the huge amounts of silt and trees that the rainy season used to bring into Roseires, causing its storage capacity to shrink by a third,” Abderrahman added.

Dessalegn Chanie Dagnew, associate professor of water resources at Bahir Dar University in Ethiopia and a member of the Ethiopian parliament, told Al Jazeera the dam’s benefits could eventually reach beyond assuaging flooding and silt.

Rather than creating tension, he said, GERD “will also serve as a project that can really bring about regional integration and cooperation”.

An eerily familiar set of headlines is making the rounds in Ethiopia, troubling many in the fragile, northern Tigray region.

Successive delegations of civil society and religious leaders have, in recent weeks, travelled to the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, for “dialogue”. For some, it is a reminder of the events that played out in the final weeks before Tigray descended into war in November 2020.

That war left 600,000 people dead and some five million displaced. It brought global attention to Ethiopia’s fractured politics and tarnished the reputation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who had won a Nobel Peace Prize for mending long-severed ties with neighbouring Eritrea.

A ceasefire two years later was supposed to end the war; instead, analysts say, another conflict might be looming. This time, it could involve not just the Tigrayan regional authorities, but also Eritrea, and potentially, that country’s own allies. It is not a conflict that the region can withstand, experts fear.

“We are now at a point where we are all frightened at another conflict in Tigray, and with Eritrea,” analyst Abel Abate Demissie of the Chatham House think tank in the United Kingdom told Al Jazeera. “It would be extremely devastating.”

Fractured agreements signed back in November 2022 that ended the war between the regional Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government are at the root of the tensions. However, it is the deepening resentment between neighbours Eritrea and Ethiopia that analysts say is the scariest development this time.

Ethiopia is a key player in East Africa, and war there could derail regional stability as neighbouring Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia deal with ongoing armed conflict. It could also affect Africa’s self-reliance in the aviation sector, as Addis Ababa is one of Africa’s most important air travel hubs.

Peace agreement pushed aside

War broke out in Tigray in November 2020 after Ethiopia’s Abiy accused the TPLF of attacking a command centre of the national army, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF).

For decades, the TPLF dominated the ruling coalition in Addis Ababa in what experts say was an autocratic system. The group was disliked in nearly all 10 regions of Ethiopia, a country where regions form along ethnic lines. Eritrea, which fought a border war with TPLF-dominated Ethiopia in 1998, also had gripes with the party. When Abiy, an Oromo, was elected in 2018, though, he established peaceful ties with Eritrea and set about implementing reforms for a stronger central government. The TPLF, however, saw Abiy’s moves as a threat to its power and sought to overthrow his government.

Addis Ababa, in its military response to the TPLF attack, teamed up with other TPLF-opposed entities, including the Amhara army and allied militias, as well as Eritrean forces. All sides were accused of attacking civilians; however, rights groups also accused the federal government of deliberately blocking aid to Tigrayans and causing a near-famine. The United States called attacks by Amhara militias “ethnic cleansing” while many Tigrayans claim the war was a genocide. Many were forcibly displaced from western Tigray, which the Amhara region claims. Thousands of women were raped.

In November 2022, Addis Ababa and TPLF signed the Pretoria peace agreement. The ceasefire deal mandated that the TPLF disarm and a new government be jointly appointed by both sides. It also mandated that Addis Ababa oversee the safe return of displaced people and that all third-party armies withdraw.

However, a power struggle emerged in the TPLF between the Abiy-appointed Tigray mayor, Getachew Reda, and the TPLF head, Debretsion Gebremichael. It began when Getachew attempted to implement the disarmament clause. Core TPLF members, however, accused him of being a sellout. In March, the TPLF faction aligned with Debretsion staged a coup, seized the Mekelle radio station, and forced Getachew to leave Mekelle for Addis Ababa. The coup was a direct affront to Abiy, analysts say. Although he has since appointed another interim president from Debretsion’s camp, Addis Ababa and TPLF have traded insults and threatened attacks.

“Both sides have downplayed their responsibility,” said Abel of Chatham House, speaking of how both sides appear to have moved away from the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF accuses Addis Ababa of failing to resettle people, with some 1.6 million still displaced, and is threatening to forcibly return them. It also blames the government for revoking its licence as a political party, although the national electoral body says it is because the TPLF has failed to hold a general assembly as it previously mandated.

Addis Ababa, on the other hand, has faulted the TPLF for failing to disarm, and also accuses the party of allying with Eritrea.

In a speech in parliament in July, Abiy urged religious leaders and civil society members to warn TPLF leaders against escalation, because when conflict starts, “it would be too late”.

Getachew, who has been expelled from the TPLF, has formed a new party, the Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party. Analysts say it is possible that the party might be installed in Tigray instead.

Meanwhile, Amhara militias and the TPLF continue to clash. Many young people who joined the TPLF in the 2020 war have defected to form new militias allied with Getachew’s faction and attempted an attack on the TPLF in July.

The problem with Eritrea

Ethiopia’s perpetual entanglement with Eritrea has taken on a different dimension since 2020, with both again at loggerheads.

Cracks appeared in their parley after Abiy’s government agreed to peace with the TPLF. President Isaias Afwerki, who has been Eritrea’s de facto leader since 1994, was reportedly angered as he did not feel sufficiently consulted, even as Eritrean troops are still in Tigray.

A bigger problem, however, is Abiy’s comments since 2023 about landlocked Ethiopia’s “existential” need to access a seaport. Asmara has taken those statements as a threat that Addis Ababa might invade and seize the coastal areas it previously lost after Eritrea fought to secede in 1993. In one comment, Abiy described Ethiopia losing sea access as a “historical mistake”.

Since then, Eritrea has been building up defences, sending military tanks to the border, according to analysts, with Ethiopia doing the same. In February, Eritrea put out calls for conscription into the army. Asmara is also reportedly in cahoots with the TPLF to undermine Abiy, although officials deny this.

Both sides do not really want to go to war and are merely posturing, analyst Abel said. Eritrea would meet in Addis Ababa a formidable enemy, and Ethiopia is not eager to mar its reputation as a growing regional leader where the African Union has its headquarters.

“The problem, though, is it only takes one small act to ignite a war, even if both sides don’t want it,” the analyst said.

In March, Abiy attempted to downplay the tensions while speaking in parliament.

“Our intention is to negotiate based on the principle of give and take,” he said, implying that any port deals would be commercial. “Our plan is not to fight but to work together and grow together.”

It is not only Asmara that has been angered by Abiy’s bid to find a port. Neighbouring Somalia nearly declared war last year after Abiy sealed a port deal with the self-declared state of Somaliland. Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its territory, was furious, but Turkiye, Somalia’s close ally, mediated repairs between the two in December. Before they reconciled, Eritrea held meetings with Somalia, as well as Egypt, which is also angry with Addis Ababa over the Grand Renaissance Dam, which it says will limit its water supply from the Nile.

Can all sides find peace?

Analysts say the work of finding common ground rests mostly with Abiy as Asmara, for one, is not strong on diplomacy, and the TPLF appears more confident with reported Eritrean backing.

The big unknown is whether Abiy is willing and able to restore ties with either the TPLF or Eritrea without either side feeling sidelined. In the background, as well, are the Amhara militias who are still present in disputed western Tigray. Any attempts to remove them could lead to conflict.

In any case, Abiy is already suffering a crisis of legitimacy, analyst Micheal Tsegay Assefa concluded in a brief for the Atlas Institute for International Affairs.

“Regional leaders, particularly from Amhara and Oromia, increasingly question the central government’s capacity to secure peace and manage inter-regional conflicts,” he wrote, due to Addis Ababa’s inability to enforce the peace deal.

Meanwhile, as the sabre-rattling continues, Tigrayans are once again fearing for their lives. The recent tensions have sent scores of people fleeing from the region, with some risking deadly routes to get out of the country altogether.

Researchers say Ethiopian migrants attempting, and dying, to enter Yemen via the Gulf of Aden increasingly appear to be from Tigray, based on the clothing or jewellery found by rescuers during shipwrecks.

Analysts say another war simply must not happen.

“Conflict only needs one side to go rogue,” Abel said. “I really hope that sanity will prevail and all sides will apply wisdom.”

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — The human ancestor fossil known as Lucy left Ethiopia for display in a European museum, Ethiopian national media reported Friday, citing Tourism Minister Selamawit Kassa.

Lucy’s skeleton, which is 40% complete, left Ethiopia on Friday and will be displayed at the Czech National Museum in Prague for approximately two months.

Lucy was recovered in Ethiopia in 1974 from what was an ancient lake near fossilized remains of crocodiles, turtle eggs and crab claws. She was a member of Australopithecus afarensis, an early human species that lived in Africa between about 4 million and 3 million years ago.

This is the second time Lucy has left Ethiopia. The first was in 2013, when she toured the United States.

Lucy’s fragmented bones will be exhibited alongside Selam, the fossil of an Australopithecus baby that is about 100,000 years older than Lucy and was discovered in the same region 25 years later.

“As an iconic specimen, she belongs to the whole world, so sharing her with the rest of humanity is something that everyone would love to see,” said Yohannes Haile-Selassie, director of the Institute of Human Origins at Arizona State University.

While many experts believe Lucy’s trip to Europe presents a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for people in Europe and beyond, there are safety concerns about the transportation of her fragile bones.

“The fragmented bones of Lucy are truly unique and need utmost care. Traveling to Europe has its own risks,” said Gidey Gebreegziabher, an archaeologist and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Warsaw, Poland, “She will also be exposed to different climate conditions, which could potentially have negative impacts on her preservation.”

Even in Ethiopia, the public has only occasionally seen the real Lucy fossil. At the National Museum of Ethiopia, a replica of Lucy is exhibited while the actual remains are stored in a secure vault.

“I’ve seen how she was packed, so I have no worries about anything happening to Lucy anymore,” Yohannes said.

Lucy’s quiet departure on Thursday night also raises questions about transparency as many Ethiopians — who take pride in her — were unaware of her journey to Europe.

“It’s unbelievable! The government appears to be deliberately sidelining its people from the narrative of their own heritage,” Gebreegziabher said.

Bekele Reta, 43, a resident who lives just 164 feet from the museum where Lucy is housed, was unaware of Lucy’s departure until he saw it on social media.

“I learned this morning on Facebook that Lucy has departed for Prague. It’s unfortunate that most Ethiopians only have the opportunity to see her showcased elsewhere.” he said.

Early this year, the director general of the Czech National Museum, Michal Lukeš, in a statement announcing the exhibition of Lucy and Selam, expressed his appreciation of the Ethiopians for agreeing to “lend” the remains.

“These priceless exhibits give us a unique insight into the past and deepen our understanding of humanity’s roots,” said Lukeš.

Birhane writes for the Associated Press. AP writer Evelyne Musambi contributed to this report from Nairobi.

In April 2025, the Human Rights Court in Kenya issued an unprecedented ruling that it has the jurisdiction to hear a case about harmful content on one of Meta’s platforms. The lawsuit was filed in 2022 by Abraham Meareg, the son of an Ethiopian academic who was murdered after he was doxxed and threatened on Facebook, Fisseha Tekle, an Ethiopian human rights activist, who was also doxxed and threatened on Facebook, and Katiba Institute, a Kenyan non-profit that defends constitutionalism. They maintain that Facebook’s algorithm design and its content moderation decisions made in Kenya resulted in harm done to two of the claimants, fuelled the conflict in Ethiopia and led to widespread human rights violations within and outside Kenya.

The content in question falls outside the protected categories of speech under Article 33 of the Constitution of Kenya and includes propaganda for war, incitement to violence, hate speech and advocacy of hatred that constitutes ethnic incitement, vilification of others, incitement to cause harm and discrimination.

Key to the Kenyan case is the question whether Meta, a US-based corporation, can financially benefit from unconstitutional content and whether there is a positive duty on the corporation to take down unconstitutional content that also violates its Community Standards.

In affirming the Kenyan court’s jurisdiction in the case, the judge was emphatic that the Constitution of Kenya allows a Kenyan court to adjudicate over Meta’s acts or omissions regarding content posted on the Facebook platform that may impact the observance of human rights within and outside Kenya.

The Kenyan decision signals a paradigm shift towards platform liability where judges determine liability by solely asking the question: Do platform decisions observe and uphold human rights?

The ultimate goal of the Bill of Rights, a common feature in African constitutions, is to uphold and protect the inherent dignity of all people. Kenya’s Bill of Rights, for example, has as its sole mission to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote social justice and the realisation of the potential of all human beings. The supremacy of the Constitution also guarantees that, should there be safe harbour provisions in the laws of that country, they would not be a sufficient liability shield for platforms if their business decisions do not ultimately uphold human rights.

That a case on algorithm amplification has passed the jurisdiction hearing stage in Kenya is a testament that human rights law and constitutionality offer an opportunity for those who have suffered harm as a result of social media content to seek redress.

Up to this point, the idea that a social media platform can be held accountable for content on its platform has been dissuaded by the blanket immunity offered under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in the US, and to a lesser extent, the principle of non-liability in the European Union, with the necessary exceptions detailed in various laws.

For example, Section 230 was one of the reasons a district judge in California cited in her ruling to dismiss a case filed by Myanmar refugees in a similar claim that Meta had failed to curb hate speech that fuelled the Rohingya genocide.

The aspiration for platform accountability was further dampened by the US Supreme Court decision in Twitter v Taamneh, in which it ruled against plaintiffs who sought to establish that social media platforms carry responsibility for content posted on them.

The immunity offered to platforms has come at a high cost, especially for victims of harm in places where platforms do not have physical offices.

This is why a decision like the one by the Kenyan courts is a welcome development; it restores hope that victims of platform harm have an alternative route to recourse, one that refocuses human rights into the core of the discussion on platform accountability.

The justification for safe harbour provisions like Section 230 has always been to protect “nascent” technologies from being smothered by the multiplicity of suits. However, by now, the dominant social media platforms are neither nascent nor in need of protection. They have both the monetary and technical wherewithal to prioritise people over profits, but choose not to.

As the Kenyan cases cascade through the judicial process, there is cautious optimism that constitutional and human rights law that has taken root in African countries can offer a necessary reprieve for platform arrogance.

Mercy Mutemi represents Fisseha Tekle in the case outlined in the article. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Health facilities juggling rising cases of infant hunger, malaria, in an area that also shelters thousands of refugees.

Rising cases of extreme infant hunger and malaria are overwhelming humanitarian facilities in southwestern Ethiopia as aid cuts force other nutrition and disease prevention programmes to shutter, Doctors Without Borders (known by its French acronym, MSF) has warned.

MSF said on Wednesday it had seen a 55-percent increase compared with last year in child admissions to its feeding centre in the Kule refugee camp in Ethiopia’s Gambella region, with many of the infants coming from camps nearby.

Funding cuts have meant the closure of nutrition services in four of the region’s seven refugee camps, MSF said, “leaving around 80,000 children under the age of five at risk of life-threatening malnutrition”.

Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation with about 130 million people, is grappling with armed clashes in two of its largest regions.

Southwestern Gambella borders South Sudan, itself facing a dramatic uptick in violence and funding cuts to international programmes that form the country’s healthcare backbone.

The region currently shelters just under 400,000 refugees across seven camps, many of them South Sudanese.

80,000 children under five are at risk of life-threatening malnutrition as services are suspended in four refugee camps in Gambella, Ethiopia, following significant aid cuts.

Without urgent support, this crisis will continue to escalate.https://t.co/hlDXRzqpmb

— MSF International (@MSF) August 6, 2025

Patient visits to the Kule camp have risen by almost 60 percent compared with 2024.

“MSF is overwhelmed by the increased patient load, and we fear this number will likely keep rising in the coming months,” said Armand Dirks, MSF’s project coordinator in Gambella.

Nyauahial Puoch travelled roughly eight kilometres (five miles) from another refugee camp to seek treatment for her malnourished 17-month-old daughter.

“Since last year, there has been a big decline. Some of the items we used to get are no longer provided at all,” the NGO quoted her as saying.

While they are given food once a month, Puoch said, “it always runs out before the month ends”.

Funding cuts have also had an impact on disease prevention, notably malaria programmes, with MSF predicting a steep increase in the May-to-October rainy season.

The NGO said in July it had seen an approximately 125-percent rise in the number of malaria patients – almost 24,000 – compared with the previous month, with half of these patients coming from neighbouring refugee camps.

“This poses a serious threat to already vulnerable refugees who face heightened exposure to malaria-infected mosquitoes due to overcrowded living conditions and limited sanitation,” said Birhanu Sahile, MSF’s deputy medical coordinator.

In a couple of weeks, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the biggest hydroelectric dam on the African continent, will be inaugurated. The construction of this dam has taken more than a decade and has cost nearly $5bn. The government and people of Ethiopia mobilised the funds for this national project from their meagre internal resources. No international financing was made available for this project.

While the construction of the dam has received some international media attention, the media coverage has not made clear the Ethiopian perspective. This is a modest attempt to rectify that problem.

The GERD is constructed on the Blue Nile, which Ethiopians call Abay. Abay means “big” or “major” in several Ethiopian languages. Abay is one of the main tributaries of the Nile River. Although many associate the Nile almost exclusively with Egypt, the river traverses 10 other African countries. Among these countries, Ethiopia holds a unique position because 86 percent of the Nile water that reaches Egypt originates from the Ethiopian highlands.

Abay is the biggest river in Ethiopia with a huge potential to boost overall socioeconomic transformation and development. It has been a long-held aspiration of Ethiopians to utilise this resource. The GERD is a national development project that fulfils this dream.

Despite its huge labour force and economic potential, Ethiopia has yet to make headway in its endeavour to industrialise. One critical factor that has held back this effort has been Ethiopia’s lack of energy. According to the latest figures, barely 55 percent of Ethiopians have access to electricity.

There is a huge demand and need for electricity in Ethiopia. Hence, the GERD is seen as our national ticket out of darkness and poverty. Necessity dictates that Ethiopia use this major resource as an instrument to spur growth and prosperity for the benefit of its 130-million-strong population, which is expected to reach 200 million by 2050.

The GERD is expected to generate about 5,150 megawatts of electricity and produce an annual energy output of 15,760 gigawatt hours. This will double Ethiopia’s energy output, which will not only light our homes but also power industries and cities and transform our economy. The GERD would also make it possible to increase our energy exports to neighbouring countries, thereby strengthening regional integration and interconnectedness.

The lower riparian states of the Nile would also derive immense benefit from the GERD because it would prevent flooding, sedimentation and water loss through evaporation. The very purpose of the GERD, which is generating electricity, requires that the water flows to lower riparian countries after hitting the enormous turbines that generate the electricity. The dam does not block or stop the river from flowing. Doing so would make electricity generation impossible and defeat the very purpose for which the dam was built.

So, you might ask, why are some lower riparian countries complaining about the construction of the dam? The reason for their objections emanates not from rational fear or legitimate concern. The objections are the result of an attitude shaped by a colonial-era water-sharing agreement concluded between Britain and Egypt in 1929 and its derivative agreement sealed in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan.

Ethiopia was not a party to any of these treaties. However, some Egyptians contend that the water-sharing formula enshrined in the colonial-era agreement, which excludes the remaining nine African nations from having any share of the Nile, is still valid and should be adhered to by all Nile riparian countries.

From an Ethiopian point of view, this anachronistic argument, often presented as “historic rights over the Nile” is unacceptable. While Britain is entitled to enter into any agreements regarding the River Thames, it does not have the right to dispose of the waters of the Nile or the Abay River. As we all recall, the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser rejected Britain’s claims over the Suez Canal. For much stronger reasons, Ethiopian leaders have consistently rejected arguments based on colonial arrangements in which Ethiopia did not have a say.

The Ethiopian view is that the Nile is a shared natural resource. It should be used in a cooperative framework that would be beneficial for all riparian countries. The developmental aspirations and dreams of all nations are equally legitimate. The needs of some should not be prioritised over the needs of others.

A fair, just and inclusive arrangement that takes into account the realities of the 21st century is needed. Such an arrangement is already in place in the form of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement, which is a contemporary, African-initiated treaty designed to promote sustainable management and equitable use of the Nile. This treaty has already been signed and ratified by Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan.

Egypt should stop yearning for a bygone colonial era and join these Nile riparian countries in their joint effort to promote fair and equitable use of the Nile in a sustainable manner.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Report finds extreme climate events linked to price hikes for rice, corn, cocoa, coffee, potatoes and other food items.

South Korean cabbage, Australian lettuce, Japanese rice, Brazilian coffee and Ghanaian cocoa are among the many foods that have been hit by price hikes following extreme climate events since 2022, a team of international scientists has found.

The research released on Monday cites, among other examples, a 280 percent spike in global cocoa prices in April 2024, following a heatwave in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, and a 300 percent jump in lettuce prices in Australia after floods in 2022.

In the vast majority of cases, the increase in prices came soon after heatwaves, including a 70 percent increase in cabbage prices in South Korea in September 2024, a 48 percent increase in rice prices in Japan in September 2024, and an 81 percent increase in potato prices in India in early 2024.

Other price increases were linked to drought, such as a 2023 drought in Brazil that preceded a 55 percent increase in global coffee prices the following year, and a 2022 drought in Ethiopia that came before overall food prices there increased by 40 percent in 2023.

The research, published by six European research organisations along with the European Central Bank, was released before the United Nations Food Systems Summit, which will be co-hosted by Ethiopia and Italy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from July 27 to July 29.

“Until we get to net zero emissions extreme weather will only get worse, but it’s already damaging crops and pushing up the price of food all over the world,” the report’s lead author, Maximillian Kotz, from the Barcelona Supercomputing Center, said in a press release.

“People are noticing, with rising food prices number two on the list of climate impacts they see in their lives, second only to extreme heat itself,” Kotz added, noting that low-income families are often the most affected when “the price of food shoots up”.

The report comes as the cost of living, including food affordability, has been a key issue for many voters heading to elections around the world in recent years, including in Japan, where the price of rice was on many voters’ minds as they headed to the polls this weekend.

Grocery prices were also key election issues in the United States and the United Kingdom in 2024 and in Argentina in 2023.

“In the UK, climate change added £360 [$482] to the average household food bill across 2022 and 2023 alone,” one of the report’s co-authors, Amber Sawyer, from the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), said in a press release.

“Last year, the UK had its third worst arable harvest on record, and England its second worst, following extreme rainfall that scientists said was made worse by climate change,” she added.

Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), governments have committed to cutting the global emissions that are driving the climate crisis by 2.6 percent from 2019 to 2030.

However, these commitments fall well short of the reductions scientists say are needed to stay within reach of a Paris Agreement target to limit global temperature rises to 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is expected to deliver a landmark advisory opinion on states’ legal obligations to address climate change on Wednesday, in a case brought by Vanuatu and backed by many Global South countries.