espionage

PARIS — Laurent Vinatier, a French political scholar serving a three-year sentence in Russia and facing new charges of espionage, has been freed in a prisoner swap with France, officials said Thursday.

French President Emmanuel Macron said on X that Vinatier is “free and back in France,” expressing “relief” and “gratitude” to diplomatic staff for their efforts to win his release.

In exchange, Russian basketball player Daniil Kasatkin, jailed in France and whose extradition was demanded by the United States, was released and returned to Russia on Thursday, Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, said in a statement.

Russian state news agency Tass released what it said was FSB footage showing Vinatier in a black track suit and winter jacket being informed about his release, to which he said “Thank you” in Russian, being driven in a car and boarding a plane after Kasatkin descended from it. It wasn’t immediately clear when the video was filmed.

Vinatier was arrested in Moscow in June 2024. Russian authorities accused him of failing to register as a “foreign agent” while collecting information about Russia’s “military and military-technical activities” that could be used to the detriment of national security. A court convicted him and sentenced him to a three-year prison term.

Last year, Vinatier was also charged with espionage, according to the FSB — a criminal offense punishable by 10 to 20 years in prison in Russia.

The scholar has been pardoned by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the security agency said.

France’s Foreign Ministry said that Vinatier was being welcomed at the Quai d’Orsay alongside his parents by Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot.

The ministry said that Barrot informed ambassadors of Vinatier’s release “at the moment of the president’s tweet,” during a closed-door address. Barrot would post publicly “after his meeting with Laurent Vinatier and his family,” the ministry said.

Putin has promised to look into Vinatier’s case after a French journalist asked him during his annual news conference on Dec. 19 whether Vinatier’s family could hope for a presidential pardon or his release in a prisoner exchange. The Russian president said at the time that he knew “nothing” about it.

Several days later, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that Russia had made “an offer to the French” about Vinatier.

Vinatier is an advisor for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, a Switzerland-based nongovernmental organization, which said in June 2024 that it was doing “everything possible to assist” him.

The charges that he was convicted on relate to a law that requires anyone collecting information on military issues to register with authorities as a foreign agent.

Human rights activists have criticized the law and other recent legislation as part of a Kremlin crackdown on independent media and political activists intended to stifle criticism of the war in Ukraine.

In recent years, Russia has arrested a number of foreigners — mainly Americans — on various criminal charges and then released them in prisoner swaps with the United States and other Western nations.

The largest exchange since the Cold War took place in August 2024, when Moscow freed journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, fellow American Paul Whelan, and Russian dissidents in a multinational deal that set two dozen people free.

Kasatkin, the Russian basketball player freed in Thursday’s swap, had been held since late June after his arrest at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport at the request of U.S. judicial authorities and was held in extradition custody at Fresnes prison while French courts reviewed the U.S. request.

Kasatkin’s lawyer, Frédéric Belot, told the Associated Press that the player had been detained last June at the request of the United States for alleged involvement in computer fraud. Belot said that Kasatkin was accused of having acted as a negotiator for a team of hackers. According to the lawyer, Kasatkin had purchased a second-hand computer that hadn’t been reset.

“We believe that this computer was used remotely by these hackers without his knowledge,” Belot said. “He is a basketball player and knows nothing about computer science. We consider him completely innocent.”

Belot, who represents both Vinatier and Kasatkin, added that the French researcher is “totally innocent of the espionage acts that were alleged against him.”

Corbet, Adamson and Petrequin write for the Associated Press.

Dec. 16 (Asia Today) — “Decade of the Spy” was a label used by U.S. media in the 1980s, when major espionage cases involving the former Soviet Union were uncovered year after year. In 2025, the phrase has resurfaced in a different context: most information is now digital, physical distance matters less, and the security environment has shifted toward a broader “all-against-all” competition.

Against that backdrop, South Korea is pushing amendments to Article 98 of the Criminal Act, commonly referred to as the Espionage Act. Enacted in 1953, the law has historically been applied primarily to North Korea, even as alleged espionage activity linked to other countriesh as increased. The proposed revision would allow espionage acts carried out on behalf of any foreign country to be prosecuted under the same statute.

But practitioners argue that changing the law is not enough. Bae Jeong-seok, an adjunct professor at Sungkyunkwan University’s Graduate School of National Strategy and a former National Intelligence Service counterespionage bureau chief with more than 30 years of experience, said revising the law is “normalization,” not a full upgrade of counterintelligence capacity.

In an interview with Asia Today on Dec. 8, Bae said counterespionage should be treated not only as a criminal matter but as a national security function that requires long-term operations and can carry diplomatic value.

-What structural limitations existed for counterespionage activities under the current legal framework?

“Today’s intelligence environment is not like the Cold War, when you mainly focused on one adversary. It involves many state actors. But in South Korea, activity linked to foreign intelligence services other than North Korea often could not be charged as espionage. It was handled under separate laws protecting military secrets or industrial technology. In counterintelligence, the core is recruiting sources and running counter-operations, including using double agents, to gather more information. If everything is treated only as a standard criminal case, it limits intelligence work that needs time and flexibility.”

-How does this revised espionage bill compare to major advanced nations?

“This is not ‘toughening’ the law so much as bringing South Korea in line with what many advanced countries already have. But legal tools to deal with influence operations are still limited. Efforts to shape public opinion, cultivate media ties, or influence policymaking can be hard to prosecute under traditional espionage charges. A separate reporting-based system like the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires disclosure of certain activities performed on behalf of foreign principals, is also needed.”

-What will change with this amendment?

“It can help deter and disrupt foreign intelligence activity. If recruiting agents or providing information to a foreign intelligence service is itself treated as espionage, authorities can investigate earlier and more directly. That reduces the risk of South Korean citizens being recruited. It also gives counterintelligence more room to run long-term operations instead of moving immediately to prosecution in every case.”

-What aspects of the amendment require further refinement?

“The most important point is allowing strategic decision-making. Counterespionage should not be limited to catching spies and quickly building a prosecution. It requires understanding how networks operate over time, then recruiting and turning sources. In some cases, captured agents can also be used as leverage in security and diplomatic channels. Without that kind of approach, you fall behind in modern intelligence competition.”

-Beyond legal amendments, what direction should counterespionage personnel, technology, and organizational culture take?

“Police are expanding counterespionage efforts, but the main responsibility should remain with the NIS, which has the specialized experience. Police, which have investigative authority, can focus on arrests and prosecution. Coordination between the two needs to improve. Over the long term, South Korea should consider a dedicated counterintelligence body. This work requires continuity, and the typical government job-rotation system is not well suited to long-term operations.”

– Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

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