Egypt

The upcoming official visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Egypt, scheduled for August 30 to September 3, 2026, coincides with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit. The visit will address economic and technological cooperation, as well as regional and international issues, and marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Egypt and China. The visit aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries and expand Beijing’s economic and political influence in the Middle East amidst escalating regional and international tensions, while also bolstering China’s role in the Global South.

As an Egyptian academic specializing in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can analyze and summarize the significance of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo and his meeting with his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and its importance to China’s influence in the Middle East and the Global South through the following points:

– First: What does China hope to achieve with Xi Jinping’s visit to Egypt at this particular time?

This visit of President Xi Jinping to Cairo (the first by a Chinese president to Cairo in nearly a decade) coincides with the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. It carries several key objectives, including political and international dimensions related to Chinese coordination with Egypt on Middle Eastern issues. The visit comes at a sensitive time, as the region is experiencing tensions linked to the conflict between Iran and the United States and its repercussions on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets. Beijing also seeks to strengthen its strategic balance and reaffirm its diplomatic presence as an international power that supports diplomatic solutions and cooperates with pivotal countries like Egypt to achieve stability. This follows President Xi Jinping’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.  President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo also carries several economic and trade dimensions, such as expanding the economic partnership and capitalizing on the significant increase in trade between the two countries to deepen cooperation. Furthermore, China will support infrastructure and energy projects in Egypt by boosting Chinese investments in Cairo, including renewable energy sectors such as wind turbine manufacturing plants, transportation deals, and electric trains, in addition to extending currency swap agreements between the two central banks.

The visit also aims to discuss the technological and artificial intelligence file in China’s relations with Cairo, particularly major technological offers, most notably the offer from the Chinese company Huawei to build data and artificial intelligence centers in Egypt. This project is viewed with apprehension by intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles in Washington, which are attempting to offer Cairo alternatives from major American technology companies such as Microsoft, Nvidia, and AMD.

– Second: Does the visit carry political messages that extend beyond bilateral relations, especially regarding the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit carries major strategic political messages that transcend the framework of bilateral cooperation. It aims to reshape the international order and build a multipolar world, starting with the Global South. The visit also carries messages that go beyond bilateral relations, pushing for a Global South leadership role. Beijing seeks to garner African and Arab support to assert its position as a major power, offering an alternative to Western and American competition and influence. China also aims to promote multilateralism by urging countries in the region to adopt common positions that support international stability and security, moving away from the unilateral polarization of the United States. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping’s visit signals China’s desire to secure its economic interests. Chinese actions are focused on ensuring the security of maritime routes and the stability of energy and trade markets within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative. Here, President Xi’s visit to Cairo coincides with the launch of the second iteration of the massive joint air exercises, Eagles of Civilization, in August 2026 at Egyptian air bases. These exercises, which follow the first iteration in May 2025, will involve advanced fighter jets from both sides. This sends political and strategic messages to Washington and Tel Aviv about the new military partnership between Egypt and China, the diversification of arms sources, and the independence of Egyptian military and political decision-making in diversifying its partnerships.

Furthermore, the Chinese president’s visit to Cairo carries support for Egypt’s regional role in the Middle East and Africa, reaffirming the pivotal role of Egypt. Choosing Egypt as a starting point reflects Beijing’s understanding of its geopolitical importance as a key link between the Arab world and the African continent and its commitment to addressing regional repercussions. China is also demonstrating its readiness to cooperate with its African and Arab partners to contain the economic crises resulting from conflicts in the Middle East.  In addition to China’s anticipated plan to expand alliances by strengthening the integration of Chinese development projects with major economic blocs such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, this visit also aims to coordinate common positions on de-escalation and maintaining peace and security in the Middle East and to discuss regional conflicts, particularly in the wake of the Gaza and Iran wars.

– Third: What economic files could witness new agreements or steps between Cairo and Beijing?

Economic relations between Cairo and Beijing are increasingly moving towards signing new agreements and taking new steps focused on strengthening joint investments and supporting financial stability. The most prominent joint economic and investment files between Egypt and China are based on supporting financial partnership and currency diversification. This involves renewing and strengthening local currency swap agreements between the Central Bank of Egypt and its Chinese counterpart to facilitate trade and support monetary stability, independent of international currencies. Economic cooperation and currency swaps will be among the top economic priorities of the visit through monitoring the surge in trade and extending the local currency swap agreement to enhance economic partnership within the BRICS framework.

Furthermore, there is a shared Chinese-Egyptian desire to localize industry and technology in Cairo by attracting substantial Chinese investments in electric vehicle manufacturing, new and renewable energy sectors, and advanced technology industries. With the expansion of Chinese projects in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, through the expansion of Chinese industrial and logistical projects within the Suez Canal Corridor, a major value-added production base is being established. China is also supporting Egypt in achieving food security and agricultural development by preparing joint Egyptian-Chinese alliances targeting large-scale agricultural land reclamation projects to enhance food security. This is happening concurrently with Chinese support for infrastructure and smart cities in Egypt through cooperation in urban development projects and modern smart cities.

– Fourth: Can China strengthen Egypt’s role as a key hub for its projects in the Middle East and Africa?

Yes, China is already strengthening Egypt’s role as a key and central hub for its strategic projects in the Middle East and Africa. The pillars of Chinese strategic cooperation with Egypt are based on China’s projects and investments within the Belt and Road Initiative. China considers Egypt a strategic gateway and a vital corridor for the maritime and land Silk Road, given the Suez Canal’s role as a global trade artery.  With the diversification of Chinese partnerships and investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, given the concentration of major industrial projects by Chinese companies in the zone, such as the China-Egypt Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone (TEDA). China aims to access African markets through Egypt. Chinese companies utilize Egyptian land and ports as a joint manufacturing base and a launchpad for exporting products and services to markets across Africa and the Middle East. China also seeks to achieve developmental and security integration with Egypt, aligning its five-year development plans with Egypt’s Vision 2030. This is further evidenced by the development of joint military cooperation and air exercises between Egypt and China, such as the Eagles of Civilization exercises between the Egyptian and Chinese air forces, the first iteration of which took place in May 2025 and the second in August 2026.

Beijing also seeks to disseminate artificial intelligence and innovation technologies through Egypt to the African continent, the Middle East, and the Global South.  Especially since Egypt hosts a number of Chinese companies across various sectors, particularly technology, such as Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, ZTE, Midea, and Haier. Furthermore, a $300 million investment fund has been established with Tsinghua University in China, focusing on artificial intelligence and semiconductor design.

– Fifth: To what extent can the Egyptian-Chinese partnership affect the balance of American influence in the region?

The Egyptian-Chinese partnership significantly impacts American influence in the Middle East by diversifying China’s economic and political alliances in the region. However, it does not eliminate the strategic alliances between the United States and several countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states. The partnership between Egypt and China is based on the economic and financial dimension, including major Chinese investments in Egypt. China is pouring billions of dollars into infrastructure projects and the Suez Canal region. China also supports Egypt’s bid to join the BRICS group, led by China and Russia, to reduce its dependence on the dollar and the Western and American financial system. Furthermore, China is keen to closely integrate its Belt and Road Initiative projects with the Egyptian economy. The partnership between Egypt and China also rests on the diplomatic and strategic dimension as well as the diversification of alliances. Egypt pursues a balanced foreign policy that is not limited to a single ally.  Here, the partnership with China grants Egypt greater freedom of movement and a wider margin to maneuver, free from American political conditions and pressures, particularly in the areas of armament and military deals. This creates a delicate balance for Egypt, as it refuses to fully align itself with one power against another, maintaining its security partnership with Washington alongside its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Beijing does not view Egypt merely as an economic partner, but rather as a strategic gateway and a pivotal pillar of its geopolitical influence in the Middle East and Africa, countering American penetration. This approach stems from China’s desire to fill the political and military vacuums resulting from the decline or fluctuation of the Western and American presence in the region. To this end, China leverages Cairo’s historical and political weight as a platform to expand its diplomatic influence and build partnerships with other countries in Africa and the Arab world. China’s support for Egypt’s membership in the BRICS bloc has provided Beijing with a strong regional ally, bolstering its vision for reshaping the global financial system into a multipolar order in the face of the United States’ unilateral hegemony in the region. This is especially significant given that Egypt represents a crucial land and sea crossroads for China’s Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Silk Road, considering the strategic and vital importance of the Suez Canal.

– Sixth: Does Beijing want Egypt merely as an economic partner, or does it see it as a strategic gateway for its influence in the Middle East and Africa?

Beijing views Egypt as a major strategic gateway for its influence, not just an ordinary economic partner. The relationship combines commercial interests with broad geopolitical ties. The economic dimension is based on the importance of the Suez Canal. China considers the Suez Canal a key artery for its trade with Europe and the rest of the world, and it is investing heavily to connect Egyptian ports and roads to its major commercial projects related to its Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to China’s role as a major logistics hub in the Suez Canal Economic Zone, numerous Chinese companies have established factories there to export goods. This is further compounded by Egypt’s strategic and political importance, as well as its sensitive geographical location, which is crucial to China’s interests. Egypt’s position at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe serves China’s regional influence. This coincided with China’s support for Egypt’s formal accession to the BRICS group, a move fully backed by China to bolster both countries’ political and economic weight globally.

Beijing also focuses on the growing security and military dimension of its relationship with Cairo to secure investments and international maritime routes. Chinese ambitions extend beyond simply selling goods; it seeks a greater role in protecting its interests and citizens by strengthening military cooperation with Cairo and diversifying defense partnerships with countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South through Egypt. Beijing sees the growing military cooperation and arms sales to Egypt and the region as an opportunity to undermine Western and American military influence and to forge closer ties with the Egyptian army, one of the largest armies on the African continent. This is the true objective of China in transforming Egypt into a political and military hub that guarantees Beijing’s vital interests in the Middle East, Africa, and the Global South.

Accordingly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Cairo comes at a time when Beijing seeks to strengthen its engagement in the Middle East and expand its relations with developing countries and the Global South, coinciding with escalating competition with the United States for economic and technological influence. Xi’s visit to Cairo also carries significance that transcends bilateral relations, given the ongoing repercussions of a potential US war with Iran and the instability in global energy markets. Therefore, China seeks to leverage Egypt’s pivotal role in achieving regional stability, mitigating crises, and protecting its interests in the Middle East and Africa.

While many tourists flock to Cairo and Giza to see the Pyramids, there’s one perfect spot for history buffs that goes unnoticed

Drifting 2,000 feet above the ground in cloudless skies, I can hardly fathom that the only thing keeping me from plummeting to the ground is a balloon full of hot air and an engine spurting fire.

But here I am, in a hot air balloon rising high above the Valley of the Queens in Luxor, Egypt. It’s one of the most breathtaking things I’ve ever seen – 20 or so other balloons bobbing around us as we take in the ancient temples and ruins dotting the land below us.

Our pilot reaches around his flight contraption to point out the Temple of Hatshepsut. There’s lush green vegetation, too, and people as small as ants working on uncovering more historical sites less than a mile beneath our basket.

I honestly thought I’d be more scared than this, but aside from a slightly bumpy landing – thankfully away from any farmers’ fields in the vicinity – the balloon ride is smooth and offers an incredible view of the landscape.

I arrived in Luxor after three nights spent in the tourist haven of Marsa Alam, on the coast of the nearby Red Sea. Switching the ocean for the River Nile – with our hotel, the Sonesta St. George, located right on the riverbank and accessible by boat – isn’t a hardship at all, and the buildings surrounding me are simply stunning.

A few hours’ drive from Marsa, holidaymakers who travel with TUI can access Luxor for a day excursion or longer. It’s 100% worth the early start and winding coach journey through the nearby desert to reach the historic city, founded in 3000 BC.

Stepping into the hustle and bustle of Luxor, I can imagine exactly what people like Agatha Christie and Howard Carter must have felt doing the same all those years ago.

Along with our incredible hot air balloon trip, I’m whisked away to the Valley of the Kings for a closer look at the ancient tombs, including the one which holds Tutankhamun’s mummy, still meticulously preserved after all those centuries.

Uncovered in 1922, the tomb had been covered in a mountain of rubble from excavations happening higher up on the hill, leaving archaeologists baffled until they finally found its location.

Honestly, I’m not sure why so many more tourists opt for Cairo and Giza over this. Of course, Luxor doesn’t have any pyramids of its own, but there are plenty of sphinxes, statues and incredible temples which offer access to the public.

Seeing the bright colours of the tombs – reds and blues and yellows – and the ancient hieroglyphs still etched into walls and columns is truly surreal. Along with the famous Valley of the Kings, we visit Karnak Temple – which Agatha Christie famously named her Nile steamer after – and Luxor Temple, along with Hatshepsut Temple.

Our guide points out the “first ever spreadsheet”, made so many centuries before the release of Microsoft Excel, and used to count up the food offerings made to the gods when the temples were still in use.

We’re shown the endless line of sphinx statues in various states of disrepair, lining a huge corridor which bridges the temples of Karnak and Luxor together. ‘Sphinx Alley’, as it is so aptly named, was used for the annual Opet Festival, which would see the Ancient Egyptians carry statues of their gods in a parade between the two temples.

All the while, though, I’m certainly not missing out on the metropolitan feel Luxor has to offer. A trip to the local bazaar plunges me right into the heart of the city’s merchant district, and I’m at once surrounded by a gaggle of stall owners attempting to sell me jewellery, T-shirts and Egyptian perfumes.

There’s time to stop for a delicious meal at the historic Winter Palace hotel’s 1886 restaurant, where jackets and ties for men aren’t optional and “smart” clothing is recommended for ladies. It’s the same hotel frequented by big names such as Howard Carter, Tony Blair and Lord Carnarvon.

It’s worth it solely for the hotel’s opulence, however. Artwork lines the corridors, while huge windows look out onto the sweeping gardens, where live music tinkles gently by an impressive fountain.

My hotel itself, the Sonesta St. George, blends traditional Egyptian architecture with modern luxury. Some of the rooms have their own saunas tucked away in the bathrooms, and the property boasts a heated swimming pool overlooking the Nile.

TUI offers all-inclusive packages and bounteous excursions in Luxor, so it’s not somewhere I’d describe as a hidden gem when so many UK tourists choose Cairo as an entry point. But a little deeper into the country you’ll find so much incredible history – though don’t bank on seeing any pyramids.

Book the holiday

TUI offers seven-night holidays to Marsa Alam, Egypt staying at the 5T Jaz Elite Amara on an all-inclusive basis from £990 per person. Book at tui.co.uk or on the TUI app.

Egypt’s response to Ethiopia’s new Nile dam plans is centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, rather than trying to stop construction outright. However, the experience of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has exposed the limits of Cairo’s influence.

The revival of three proposed Blue Nile hydropower projects – Karadobi, Mandaya and Beko Abo – will test whether Egypt can turn more than a decade of opposition into practical leverage over how Ethiopia develops the river.

The projects have been discussed for years. A 2024 academic study drawing on Nile Basin Initiative-sponsored work listed all three among proposed Blue Nile projects and noted that Karadobi and Beko Abo were considered alternatives in one potential three-dam configuration.

What is new is Ethiopia’s reported move to advance them. In March, the country’s Water and Energy Ministry announced plans for the projects, according to subsequent reporting. Their combined generating potential has been reported at about 5,700 megawatts, although the figures and specifications could change because the projects remain at the planning stage.

The announcement came months after Ethiopia inaugurated the GERD in September 2025, despite years of objections from Egypt.

Why does Ethiopia want more dams?

For Ethiopia, developing the Blue Nile is closely tied to electricity generation, economic growth and energy security. Addis Ababa argues that expanding hydropower is essential for a country where millions of people have historically lacked reliable access to electricity.

The three projects fit into that wider strategy. However, their eventual impact on Egypt and Sudan will depend on what Ethiopia builds and how the facilities are operated.

Ezekiel Gebissa, an Ethiopian professor at Kettering University in the United States, told Al Jazeera that the consequences would depend on the scale and purpose of the projects. “Smaller dams could generate electricity for local communities without significantly reducing the volume of water reaching downstream countries,” he said, while projects linked to large-scale irrigation could have greater implications for Egypt and Sudan.

The impact will depend on various factors, including reservoir size, filling schedules, water releases and operating rules. A dam designed mainly for electricity generation would have different consequences from one linked to large-scale irrigation.

For now, the projects represent a potential new source of tension rather than proof that they will reduce the water reaching Egypt.

Why is Egypt concerned?

For Egypt, the Nile is the country’s main source of freshwater. Any major change upstream is viewed through the lens of national security.

Cairo’s concern is not Ethiopia generating electricity. It is what happens when water is stored and managed upstream, particularly during periods of drought. Egypt has therefore pushed for rules covering dam operations, drought management, water releases and information sharing.

Last September, Egypt again raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council, arguing that Ethiopia’s inauguration and operation of the GERD violated its international obligations and called for a binding agreement. Those were Egypt’s stated legal and political positions, not findings by the council.

The dispute reflects two different priorities. Ethiopia views the Blue Nile as a resource for development, while Egypt seeks guarantees over the water flows on which it depends.

What did the GERD change?

The GERD demonstrated both the reach and the limits of Egypt’s diplomatic strategy.

Ethiopia inaugurated the dam on September 9, 2025, after years of negotiations with Egypt and Sudan failed to produce the binding agreement Cairo wanted. The nearly $5bn project, funded largely by Ethiopia itself, has an installed generating capacity of about 5,150 megawatts and is now a major part of Ethiopia’s electricity system.

For Egypt, the lesson was clear: diplomatic pressure could raise international attention but could not prevent Ethiopia from completing the project.

The focus has therefore shifted. Instead of trying to stop a single dam, Cairo is now seeking a role in how existing and future projects are designed, filled and operated.

Sudan’s role

Sudan remains central to Egypt’s approach because it lies between Ethiopia and Egypt and is directly affected by developments on the Blue Nile.

However, Khartoum is not simply aligned with Cairo.

Sudan could benefit from more predictable river flows and Ethiopian electricity, while also seeking greater transparency, information sharing and safeguards around upstream projects.

Mekki Elmograbi, a Sudanese governance expert, said transparency from Ethiopia was the starting point for cooperation. “Ethiopia must share more information with Sudan and Egypt; transparency is the first step toward cooperation,” he told Al Jazeera. “Who knows whether the new projects are good or bad for Sudan if there is not enough information?”

Elmograbi said Sudan should seek cooperation with both Ethiopia and Egypt to ensure major projects do not harm its interests. But Sudan’s ability to play a larger diplomatic role is constrained by its ongoing war.

While Sudan shares some concerns with Egypt, it also has its own relationship with Ethiopia and its own priorities, including access to electricity and effective management of the river.

What leverage does Egypt have?

Egypt’s strategy has centred on diplomacy, international pressure and cooperation with Sudan, aimed at pushing Ethiopia towards greater transparency and negotiated rules.

The experience of the GERD shows that Cairo’s strongest tools are political and diplomatic rather than coercive. Egypt can raise international attention, seek support from regional partners and push for agreements on issues such as data sharing, drought management and dam operations.

The challenge is that these tools are unlikely to give Egypt the ability to stop Ethiopia from pursuing new hydropower projects or to control decisions made in Addis Ababa.

Horn of Africa analyst, Abdiwahab Sheikh, told Al Jazeera that Egypt has “meaningful but limited leverage” over Ethiopia. He said Cairo’s strongest tools are diplomacy, alliances, international law and coordination with Sudan, while economic pressure is weaker and military coercion carries significant risks.

The three Blue Nile projects will test whether Egypt can convert diplomatic pressure into practical influence. For Sheikh, the path forward lies in negotiated rules rather than confrontation.

“A practical arrangement is possible if Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan accept transparent information exchange, advance notification, adaptive dam-management rules and mechanisms for addressing droughts and downstream impacts.”

Fifteen years since the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya began, and with civil strife leading to the downfall of what was once one of Africa’s wealthiest countries, several actors are seeking to end the civil war and reunite the country.

Among them are the US, which has commercial interests in Libya’s oil fields. Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are also pushing for a return to “One Libya”, after more than a decade of fighting between two rival authorities for control of the country.

Here’s what we know:

What happened 15 years ago?

The Libyan uprising erupted during the Arab Spring, when thousands of people in the port city of Benghazi took to the streets to protest against Gaddafi’s more than four decades of absolute power.

Violence against the demonstrations pushed the protesters into an armed rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule, with a civil war starting between the two sides.

A United Nations Security Council resolution authorised an international military intervention force – led by NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France – to enforce a no-fly zone and ensure the protection of civilians in Libya. This bombing campaign pushed back Gaddafi’s forces from Benghazi and aided the rebels in seizing territory.

Gaddafi was eventually captured and killed in October 2011, 42 years after he first seized power in a military coup that overthrew King Idris.

How is Libya divided?

Following Gaddafi’s death, a power vacuum emerged, with multiple groups – and their allied militias – competing for power.

Control of the country is now split between two rival administrations: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dheibah, and the eastern, Tobruk-based administration backed by Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA).

The GNU is recognised by the UN and other countries, and officially has authority in the capital and western Libya.

Under Gaddafi, Haftar was exiled in the US for two decades where he holds citizenship.

His forces control vast resource-rich lands in the east, including the strategic port city of Benghazi, reportedly with the backing of Russia.

The UN began formal mediation efforts in 2020 under the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). This roadmap advocates for a three-track strategy that includes unifying the two rival administrations, presidential and parliamentary elections, and hosting national dialogue meetings.

The US was a key mediator behind the scenes, and in May 2021, appointed Ambassador Richard Norlan as Special Envoy to Libya, to lead high-level talks between the two sides.

What is the US’s new plan?

Under Massad Boulous, US President Donald Trump’s African and Middle Eastern affairs adviser, and father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, Washington is intensifying efforts to reunite the country. But this can only be achieved if both sides agree to form a single government.

According to leaked details, Trump’s initiative centres on the promise that if the rival governments cooperate, the US would encourage American investment in Libya’s sizable oil fields. This comes as the Libyan Central Bank, which is attempting to finance both authorities, sounds the alarm over the dire economic situation.

While Tripoli has international legitimacy, Haftar’s forces control the oilfields and terminals.

The US is also proposing a power-sharing deal that would see Dheibah continue to lead the government while Haftar’s son and LNA army chief, 35-year-old Saddam Haftar, serves as president.

There are obvious opportunities for US energy companies and economic and political incentives for European countries in a unified and stable Libya.

They include stopping irregular migration from Libya and other North African countries to the EU.

Some criticise the US-led plan as lacking input from the Libyan people. The deal, some say, could entrench the power of political dynasties, which might be best for long-term stability in Libya.

What have the results been?

There are signs that Haftar’s camp, at least, is on board with the US plan. Saddam Haftar, whose father, Khalifa, was based in Virginia until 2011, reportedly met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in DC in July.

Experts attribute the ongoing mediation efforts to the unified national budget of 2026, signed in April – the first in more than a decade.

However, there are still no talks or signs of a unified government forming.

What is Turkiye’s role?

Turkiye, which earlier deployed troops to support the GNU, has also made efforts to mediate between the two sides and is pushing a ‘One Libya’ policy.

Last month, Foreign Affairs Minister, Hakan Fidan, met with Saddam Haftar in Ankara. Earlier this month, Fidan travelled to both Tripoli and Benghazi for high-level talks with Dheibah and Khalifa Haftar.

What has Egypt done?

The Egyptian government has traditionally cooperated with Haftar’s Tobruk government, which is just across the border.

On Wednesday, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Khalifa Haftar in Cairo and discussed unification talks.

Earlier this month, Dheibah visited Cairo, while Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad travelled to Tripoli.

What is Qatar’s stance?

Qatar has largely backed the UN mediation channels in Libya: the UNSMIL and the UN roadmap for peace.

While it has good relations with the GNU, Qatar seeks stabilisation efforts led by Libyan parties and elections.

In April, Qatar and other states welcomed the unified budget for 2026. A statement issued by Qatar, Egypt, France, Germany and several others called for all parties in Libya to follow the UN roadmap to “advance a Libyan-led political process leading to unified governance and national elections.”

Senior Hamas officials, including the movement’s political bureau chief Khalil al-Hayya, held talks with US envoy Jared Kushner in Egypt to discuss disarmament and the future administration of the Gaza Strip, according to Hamas sources cited by Asharq on Sunday.

The sources said the meeting took place in El Alamein with the participation of senior officials from Egypt, Qatar and Turkey, which have been involved in mediation efforts over Gaza.

According to the report, the Hamas delegation discussed its position on a proposed roadmap for Gaza and expressed its commitment to provisions concerning the inventory and storage of weapons and the transfer of governing authority in the Strip.

The sources also said Hamas expressed readiness to participate in Palestinian elections and operate as a political party within the Palestinian political system.

READ: Kushner accuses Netanyahu of obstructing US Gaza plan

Kushner reportedly stressed that eliminating security threats originating from Gaza and ensuring that the territory is free of weapons were fundamental requirements for advancing the proposed political process.

Hamas, in turn, sought guarantees regarding implementation of the agreement, including a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, a comprehensive ceasefire, and assurances that the implementation process would not be delayed or obstructed.

The Hamas delegation also called for the rapid transfer of administrative responsibilities in Gaza to a Palestinian national committee or technocratic government, alongside the start of recovery and reconstruction efforts.

According to the report, mediators had informed Hamas beforehand that Kushner wanted to meet the movement’s leadership before traveling to Israel for talks with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Hamas reportedly viewed the meeting as an opportunity to present its position directly and address outstanding disagreements over implementation of the proposed Gaza roadmap.

READ: El Sisi stresses need to resolve regional crises to preserve stability in meeting with Kushner

The Egyptian forward, who joined the Turkish club on a free transfer, came off the bench early in the second half.

Ex-Liverpool star Mohamed Salah made his competitive ⁠debut for ⁠Trabzonspor on Saturday, coming off the bench in their Turkish Super Lig opener as Kasimpasa rallied from a goal down to secure a 1-1 draw.

Trabzonspor took the ⁠lead in the first half through Noah Saviolo before Kasimpasa’s Adrian Benedyczak levelled from the penalty spot in the second half.

Salah, who joined ‌Trabzonspor on a free transfer after nine seasons at Liverpool, was introduced in the 58th minute shortly after Kasimpasa scored the equaliser.

The Egypt forward, deployed on the right wing, helped create a number of ⁠openings for the visitors ⁠but Trabzonspor were unable to find a winner.

“It’s a sad start today,” Trabzonspor coach Fatih Tekke said.

“It was a game we had to ⁠be victorious in, but we couldn’t succeed.”

“Thursday is really ⁠important; we play a ⁠match in Europe, and the opponent is far better than us,” Tekke added, referring to Trabzonspor’s Europa League playoff with Hungarian side Ferencvaros on August 20.

Trabzonspor, seven-time Turkish champions, finished third ‌in the Super Lig last season and won the Turkish Cup.

Earlier this month, Salah, 34, signed a two-year contract with Trabzonspor, shortly after guiding Egypt to a historic last-16 run at the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Widely known as the “Egyptian King” among his fans, Salah established himself as a Premier League great with Liverpool, winning two league titles and the Champions League among eight major honours at the Anfield club.

The forward is considered among the greatest players of all time and the best from the African continent in recent years.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Egypt could join the joint defence agreement recently signed by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing Cairo’s accession as “possible” and the pact as open to further members.

Speaking to Al Jazeera in an exclusive interview for Al Muqabala (The Interview), which will air on Sunday evening on Al Jazeera Arabic, Erdogan said the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement commits signatories to taking unified steps should any one of them come under external attack.

“This agreement has sent an important message to the world,” Erdogan said, adding that Egypt’s participation was among the options for its future expansion.

The deal, also known as the Mecca Pact, was signed in the holy city last Friday by Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif. It stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three would be treated as an attack against them all, a collective-deterrence provision that analysts have compared to NATO’s Article 5. However, officials in Islamabad have cautioned against interpreting it as a NATO equivalent or as being directed at any single country.

Erdogan spoke on a range of regional issues, including tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the wars in Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

The Turkish leader said reopening the strait was a priority for Ankara, arguing that its continued closure served no one’s interests. He credited Qatar with playing an important role in mediation efforts to halt fighting in the region.

Syria, Gaza and Lebanon

Erdogan pledged that Turkiye would not leave its neighbours to face regional turmoil alone, singling out Syria, Gaza and Lebanon.

He said Ankara would do everything in its power to support stability in Syria, noting his plans to visit the country, and that Syria’s Kurds would have “a share of peace and stability”. Turkiye would also continue to strengthen ties with Kurdish communities and safeguard their rights across the region, he added.

Concerning Gaza, Erdogan said Turkiye “cannot leave Gaza alone” and would do whatever was necessary to support it. He said Hamas was meeting its commitments in good faith, while Israel continued its war.

Turning to Lebanon, the Turkish president said continued Israeli attacks were a source of serious concern for Ankara. He said he had raised the need to end the war on Lebanon with the US president during Donald Trump’s recent visit to Turkiye, stressing Washington’s role in bringing the fighting to a close.

Erdogan said Turkiye would continue to support Sudan and described his relations with the head of its Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as good. He said Ankara’s relations with Libya were stable and that Turkiye would not abandon it.

On Europe, Erdogan said the European Union did not appear willing to admit Turkiye, adding that membership was no longer a priority for Ankara and that Europe would be “the loser” as a result.

He also said he had received a promise from Trump regarding F-35 fighter jets and was waiting for it to be honoured.

Turkiye was removed from the multinational F-35 programme in 2019 after taking delivery of the Russian-made S-400 air defence system, which Washington argued could compromise the stealth jet’s technology. Standing beside Erdogan during the NATO summit in Ankara last month, Trump said his administration would lift the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Turkiye in December 2020 over the S-400 purchase, and said a return to the F-35 programme was “something certainly we’d consider”.

Any sale, however, still faces resistance in Congress and a 2020 law bars the Pentagon from transferring F-35s to Turkiye for as long as it retains the S-400 system.

The deaths on board the Egyptian-owned Tihamah mark first shipping deaths linked to Houthis since the US-Israel war on Iran began.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government has accused the Houthi rebel group of killing at least six people and wounding 10 others in a double-tap strike on a cargo vessel in the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

The attack on the Egyptian-owned Tihamah on Tuesday marks the first shipping deaths linked to the Iran-aligned Houthis since the United States and Israel launched the war on Iran on February 28.

Yemen’s Transport Ministry said three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national were killed after the Houthis fired three ballistic missiles at the commercial ship, sparking a fire and causing “significant damage” to the vessel.

Yemen’s coastguard said in a separate statement that the Houthis fired another missile at the ship as rescue personnel were evacuating the dead and wounded.

“The attack struck the site of the rescue operation and resulted in deaths and injuries among the forces participating in the response operation,” the coastguard said.

At least two troops were killed in the second strike.

Ten people were wounded in total, including seven crew members, it added.

Houthi-Saudi truce unravels

Yemen’s Foreign Ministry condemned the attack and called on the international community “to move from condemnation to effective and decisive action” against the Houthis.

There was no official comment from the Houthis.

But the Houthi-run news agency Saba reported that the ‌group had attacked a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in Bab al-Mandeb. It did not name the ship, and there was no immediate Saudi response to the report.

In a separate incident on Tuesday, the US military said it fired on a ship attempting to break its blockade of Iranian ports in the Gulf of Oman. The US Central Command said a Navy helicopter fired two Hellfire missiles at the Panama-flagged Vela Nova cargo vessel, but did not say if any crew members were wounded.

The escalation in Yemen follows the collapse of a years-long truce in the country’s civil war between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government.

The breakdown of the United Nations-backed 2022 truce followed a Saudi air strike on the runway of Sanaa airport on July 13, preventing the landing of an Iranian flight carrying a high-ranking Houthi delegation.

The Houthis then attacked the Abha airport in southwestern Saudi Arabia and announced a blockade on Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. They have also attacked Saudi vessels as well as oil facilities in the kingdom, adding further disruption to the global economy.

The Saudi-led coalition, in turn, has struck Houthi-controlled Hodeidah and Kamaran, Yemen’s largest island in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have also launched attacks on government-held areas in Yemen, including the port city of al-Makha (Mocha) on the Red Sea and the central city of Marib, killing dozens of troops and civilians.

Yemen’s internationally recognised government on Tuesday said the Houthis launched 10 missiles and four drones during a series of further attacks on sites on the country’s western coast.

The Houthis said they had launched ballistic missile and drone attacks “targeting Saudi military buildups, weapons depots and command posts” in al-Makha and the central Marib province.

The UN has called for restraint, saying the renewed hostilities risk “drawing the country into a broader regional confrontation, with devastating consequences for its people”.

Turkiye wants to expand its newly formed defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to include more countries, says Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, citing President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan told state news agency Anadolu, according to a report published on Saturday.

Turkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on Friday signed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement, in what analysts say could be a step towards a new security architecture in the region.

So who could join the pact next, and what would an expanded alliance mean for regional security?

What does the pact do?

The Mecca defence pact builds on a previous agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan a year ago.

Regional officials have suggested that the pact could eventually expand to include other countries, strengthening its role as a mechanism for collective security and deterrence.

The pact’s central feature is a NATO-like stipulation that an attack on any one of the three states would be treated as an attack on all of them although the details have yet to be fleshed out.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said the allies will decide through consultations what degree, form and format of support they would ask for in the event of an attack but no country would be considered a threat as long as a member state is not attacked.

Turkish and Saudi officials have stressed that the pact is not meant to supplant any other strategic alliances or relationships while Turkiye, which is a member of NATO, has said the agreement does not target any country, including Iran.

Which countries could join next?

Egypt is the only country whose potential membership has been publicly raised by an official from one of the pact’s signatory countries.

Fidan described Egypt as a “natural partner” and said he expects Cairo to formally join once “technical issues” are ironed out.

“I believe that at the next stage, Egypt will also be among us in the alliance,” Fidan said. “We already act towards one another as if we were alliance members.”

Ali Bakir, professor of international relations, security and defence at Qatar University, said Egypt’s inclusion would “significantly increase the pact’s political weight, regional influence and operational effectiveness” if it materialises.

What might stand in the way of Egypt’s membership?

Egypt already has a solid working relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkiye, with which it is part of a group called the R4, which consults on regional issues. Egypt has also recently developed stronger military ties with Turkiye despite previous tensions over the Egyptian military’s 2013 overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, the conflict in Libya and the discovery of gasfields in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But analysts said Cairo may be wary of the potential military obligations that could come with a binding defence treaty with states whose interests do not always align with its own as well as the implications for its existing peace treaties.

“Egypt may join only if the language protects its aid relationship with Washington, doesn’t undermine existing alliances and peace treaties, and maintains its own freedom to decide when and where it fights,” Karim Elgendy, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera.

“If the pact stays a political framework with room to calibrate each response, Cairo can live with it and may eventually sign. If it hardens into an obligation that could pull Egyptian forces into someone else’s war, the answer is likely to be negative,” Elgendy said.

Technical issues holding Egypt back could be both “legal and operational”, Elgendy added. “On the legal side, Egypt needs to know exactly what it is committing to defend, and it will want assurances so that a signature never reads as a commitment against Israel or as taking Ankara’s side in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.

For Bakir, Cairo’s decision will come down to how it weighs the benefits of membership against the diplomatic complications.  Egypt’s decision on whether to join the pact will hinge on the level of “strategic value” it believes it brings as well as its ability to “manage relations with countries whose interests” contrast with or even “actively oppose” the alliance, he said.

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, told Al Jazeera that while Egypt broadly shares the trilateral pact’s security concerns, it “does not share its underpinning threat perception” and may be resistant to “security commitments”.

“Cairo’s preference is to be part of overlapping regional security arrangements that are narrow in scope and are issue-related … rather than being entangled in defence commitments with elevated risks/cost,” Aboudouh said.

He added that Egypt may still opt to join the pact in the future but it would be a “complex decision”.

Which other countries could join?

Several officials have suggested other Gulf countries could eventually join the alliance.

In a post on X, former Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani expressed hope that all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would “take the initiative to join” the pact. In addition to Saudi Arabia, the GCC includes Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

Fidan also spoke about the alliance bringing in more regional countries, saying some nations, which he did not name, had already expressed interest. “Under our president’s vision, we should not remain limited to three countries. We should grow and, if necessary, bring all countries under this umbrella,” Fidan said.

Among the Gulf states, Elgendy said, “the names to watch first are Qatar and Kuwait.”

Both countries are “close to all three signatories” and “have the strongest motive to buy extra insurance” after feeling “exposed” during the United States-Israel war on Iran and by Israel’s strike on Doha in September, he said.

Bakir similarly identified Qatar as the “most natural” Gulf state to opt in with Kuwait another possible candidate. He also said Azerbaijan, Syria and Jordan could also join “relatively quickly”.

Elgendy expressed scepticism about the pact transforming into a broader bloc. “This looks like a coalition of the willing that will grow on a case-by-case basis, shaped by each capital’s own risk calculus,” he said.

Egyptian football star Mohamed Salah has been greeted by hundreds of fans upon arriving in Istanbul wearing Trabzonspor’s burgundy-and-blue kit ahead of his expected move to the Turkish Super Lig club.

Egypt has moved from rhetorical backing of Sudan’s army to active enabler of its war effort, with a covert drone hub on Egyptian soil symbolising how Cairo has tied its regional strategy to the survival of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Since fighting erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, Egypt has framed its stance as defence of Sudan’s “unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity” and of its “national institutions, particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces.” Officially, President Abdel Fattah al‑Sisi repeats pledges of “non‑interference,” presenting Egypt’s role as limited to mediation, humanitarian aid and hosting Sudanese refugees.

In practice, that line has steadily eroded. Years of joint drills, intelligence sharing and arms ties since 2019 created deep interoperability between the two militaries, well before the civil war began. Egyptian troops captured by the RSF at Merowe airbase in April 2023 were explained away as being on pre‑scheduled exercises, a narrative few regional observers accepted.

The New York Times investigation into East Oweinat in Egypt’s Western Desert crystallises this shift from backstage support to direct operational involvement. Satellite imagery, flight records and videos show a once‑civil agricultural airstrip expanded since 2018 with a second runway, new hangars and satellite links, and by 2025 hosting Turkish Akinci combat drones.

According to U.S. and European officials cited in that reporting, those drones have for at least six months flown strike missions into Sudan, hitting RSF targets up to hundreds of miles inside the country, including convoys on supply routes from Libya and Chad. The drones and their munitions match Turkish systems, but are based on Egyptian territory and shield Sudan’s military assets from RSF retaliation, blurring whether Cairo is merely hosting or also directing the campaign.

For Cairo, East Oweinat offers plausible deniability: operations are embedded in a desert reclamation project far from public scrutiny, yet close enough to Sudan’s border to project sustained air power. For Sudan’s army, it is a lifeline in a war where the RSF has excelled at capturing bases and shooting down drones; at least several Akinci units have reportedly been lost to RSF fire in recent months.

RSF statements and battlefield evidence further illuminate the depth of Egyptian support. In January 2026 the RSF published what it called “irrefutable” proof of Egypt’s direct role, citing captured Egyptian‑made ammunition, armoured vehicles and testimonies from detained SAF‑aligned commanders who described arms, training and medical support routed from Egypt.

Egypt’s wager on the SAF is rooted in hard security and regime‑survival logic. Egyptian strategists see Sudan’s collapse as an existential threat, evoking fears of refugee flows and arms smuggling on a porous southern frontier. Control of the Nile is still more fundamental: since the 2019 fall of Omar al‑Bashir, Cairo has tightened security and military coordination with Khartoum to present a united front against Ethiopia’s GERD and protect its historic water share.

There is also an ideological affinity. General Abdel Fattah al‑Burhan is a career officer with long‑standing ties to Egyptian commanders, and his military rule mirrors Sisi’s own path from barracks to presidency. Backing the SAF fits a long‑standing Egyptian instinct to side with Sudan’s regular army “whoever is in charge of it,” and more broadly to prefer strong central militaries over unruly civilian transitions in the Arab world. The SAF’s reliance upon Muslim Brotherhood–aligned militias and ideologues, including the glorification of early militant figures such as Bara Bin Malik, against the backdrop of Washington’s formal designation of key Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist organisations, should be unsettling to Cairo.

Yet by 2026, Egypt’s bet looks increasingly brittle. The war has killed tens of thousands, displaced more than 14 million and pushed parts of Sudan close to famine, while neither side has secured decisive control. Burhan’s legitimacy is deeply disputed: he led the 2021 coup that derailed a fragile civilian‑military transition, and many of the forces that drove the 2018–19 uprising see him as the continuation of military dominance, not a route to elections.

Cairo’s categorical rejection of “parallel entities” and alternative governments in exile is presented as a defence of Sudanese unity, but in effect delegitimises broad civilian coalitions trying to organise outside the SAF–RSF binary. By equating Sudan’s “national institutions” with the current military leadership, Egypt narrows the field of acceptable interlocutors to a junta whose territorial control and popular backing are both eroding.

At the same time, Egypt seeks recognition as a mediator, through formats like the Quad and by hosting conferences of Sudanese civil and political actors in Cairo. That posture sits uneasily with explicit promises not to be “lax or late in supporting the legitimate Sudanese government” under Burhan, and with mounting evidence of Egyptian‑based air operations in the conflict. The covert base in the desert, and the drones that rise from its runways toward Sudanese skies, have become emblematic of a policy that claims non‑interference while in practice helping to lock Sudan into a devastating, externalised war.

Netanyahu and board director Maldenov meet amid tensions over Gaza disarmament roadmap and recent Israeli attacks.

The US-led Board of Peace has said that an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will only take place after the disarmament of Hamas is complete, following a meeting between the body’s director, Nickolay Mladenov, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The meeting on Monday in West Jerusalem came as Israeli politicians signalled their displeasure with the deal, announced by US President Donald Trump last Thursday.

“Contrary to inaccurate reports, we note that the withdrawal of the [Israeli military] beyond the Yellow Line will take place only once decommissioning is complete, as Hamas committed to the mediators,” the Board of Peace, established by Trump in January to oversee the administration of Gaza after Israel’s genocidal war, said. “This applies to light weapons, heavy weapons, and the tunnels alike.”

The “Yellow Line” is the term used to refer to the demarcation line behind which Israeli forces continue to base themselves in Gaza.

“The goal is clear and is not in question: the complete decommissioning of weapons in the Strip and the transition away from rule by the gun to civilian governance,” the Board of Peace added in a social media post after the meeting.

For its part, Hamas has insisted that the deal will not be implemented unless Israel implements its part of the agreement.

During the talks, Mladenov urged Netanyahu to stop attacks on Gaza, two people familiar with the meeting told The Associated Press news agency. Israel has steadfastly refused to do so, despite an October 2025 “ceasefire”, since which it has killed more than 1,200 Palestinians, including more than 36 after the disarmament deal was announced.

Israel has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians in Gaza since its genocidal war began in October 2023.

Before the meeting, Netanyahu’s office said that the version of the agreement made public “does not reflect Israel’s positions”, and that its concerns had been shared with the US.

Members of the Israeli prime minister’s far-right government have already signalled that they want to backtrack on the deal.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said the agreement was “completely different” to the one the Israeli government had approved, and demanded a new vote “immediately”.

Israel has repeatedly flouted agreements and has been accused of being unwilling to make concessions during negotiations. The latest reversal comes despite a push from Trump to secure a deal, but months ahead of an Israeli election in which the government is under pressure from its base to demonstrate it has achieved total victory in Gaza.

Mladenov criticised the strikes over the weekend, without directly naming Israel. “Achieving a lasting peace is hard but achievable if everyone makes their best efforts,” he wrote.

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkiye, which mediated the disarmament deal, issued a joint statement condemning Israel’s targeting of civilians and healthcare facilities as a “flagrant violation of international law”.

Hamas said it and other Palestinian factions remained committed to the completion of the second phase of the ceasefire, and were awaiting a clear, official response from Mladenov and the mediators.

A magnitude 5.4 earthquake struck Egypt, north of Suez early on Monday, startling a content creator during a livestream. Tremors were felt as far as Gaza, prompting residents to evacuate homes and hotels. No casualties were reported.

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military think tanks are closely monitoring the movements of the current Egyptian Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, and tracking the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense. PLA websites are officially monitoring the activities and movements of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, particularly the important air event for China: the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition (EIAS 2026), especially as the Egyptian Air Force and Ministry of Defense prepare to launch the second edition of the exhibition (EIAS 2026) at El Alamein International Airport from September 8 to 10, 2026.

As an Egyptian expert specializing primarily in Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, I can deconstruct, analyze, and evaluate the perspective of Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles regarding the role and actions of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense and its minister, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, as follows:

– First: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers are closely monitoring and analyzing the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in hosting the El Alamein International Aerospace Exhibition.

This event is considered regionally significant for China, serving as a platform to connect defense and space organizations in Africa and the Middle East. This edition has garnered considerable international and Chinese interest, particularly from leading figures in the Chinese arms and defense industries, who are showcasing their latest aircraft and drones.  China’s interest in the inaugural El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in 2024 was marked by significant historical participation: the Chinese Air Force performed spectacular air displays, their first official air show outside of China. This first-ever air show featured Chinese aircraft performing unique aerobatic maneuvers in the skies above El Alamein, a first for China. Furthermore, the exhibition served to strengthen Chinese-Egyptian military cooperation. China’s interest in the Egyptian air show reflected the strength of bilateral military relations and the two countries’ desire to bolster their aviation and defense sectors. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its affiliated military research and analysis centers focused on evaluating and analyzing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s activities in hosting the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. The Egyptian Air Force also announced the launch of the second edition of the exhibition, aiming to explore avenues for joint military cooperation and advanced military technologies between Egypt and China.

–             Second: The Role of the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security in Monitoring the Activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to Secure Chinese Belt and Road Initiative Projects and Protect Chinese Strategic Interests

The Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (the Counter-Espionage and Infiltration Bureau) is concerned with the activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense in securing Chinese Belt and Road Initiative projects and protecting China’s growing strategic interests in the region from foreign intelligence penetrations. The dimensions of Chinese security and intelligence interest are focused on protecting vital waterways, particularly securing navigation in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which are essential maritime arteries for China’s Maritime and Military Silk Road. Furthermore, the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security seeks to secure major Chinese investments through intelligence oversight of joint Chinese logistical and economic projects, such as the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the TEDA projects. With close monitoring by Chinese intelligence circles, specifically the role of the Chinese Ninth Bureau in countering external threats, the activities of rival intelligence agencies targeting Chinese military technologies or economic presence in North Africa are being tracked and neutralized.

Therefore, think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been paying close attention to the Egyptian defense minister’s foreign trips aimed at strengthening Egyptian military partnerships with countries around the world. This is of profound significance and military importance to China and the PLA, given its connection to China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the military cover for trade. Beijing relies on developing military coordination with Cairo and advanced arms deals, such as air defense systems, to ensure a stable regional environment that protects its long-term investments. This is achieved through a comprehensive strategic partnership between Egypt and China, transforming their cooperation from traditional trade to security and defense integration, thus guaranteeing the safe flow of global trade through Egypt. Therefore, the Chinese military has shown keen interest in tracking the movements of Egyptian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher around the world, particularly his important official visit to Turkey in July 2026 and his meeting with the Turkish Defense Minister to sign a letter of intent for defense cooperation and the expansion of joint exercises. This is in addition to his on-site monitoring of the development and training of personnel at the Military Academy and other educational institutions affiliated with the Armed Forces, which intelligence and military circles in Beijing are keen to monitor closely.

– Third: The interest of Chinese military platforms and websites in covering news and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense through official and semi-official military and news portals affiliated with the Chinese government that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs

In this context, several Chinese military platforms and websites specialize exclusively in covering news about the Egyptian Ministry of Defense or Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher individually. However, his strategic movements are also followed through official and semi-official Chinese government military and news outlets that focus on defense and Middle Eastern affairs. The most prominent of these Chinese websites and platforms include the China People’s Liberation Army Online (cn/China.81 Military Online). This is the official website of the Chinese armed forces, focusing on official meetings and joint cooperation. Also included is the website of the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, which is known as mod.gov.cn. This covers military diplomacy and protocols between Egypt and China. Additionally, there is (Xinhua Military). This is the official news arm that translates and publishes extensive reports on the restructuring of military leadership and the strategic moves of the Egyptian Minister of Defense, Ashraf Salem Zaher. And the Guancha Platform, which is militarily known as Guancha.cn. This is a leading Chinese analytical website that focuses on international military and geopolitical affairs. It analyzes Egyptian arms deals and military cooperation with regional and international powers, particularly China. Chinese media coverage of news from the Egyptian army and the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition in Egypt demonstrates broad strategic interest through Chinese military platforms such as the People’s Liberation Army Online (China Military Online) and the website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. This coverage focuses on joint military cooperation, modern Egyptian military technologies, and potential areas of military cooperation between Egypt and China during the El Alamein International Air and Space Exhibition. This is especially significant given the participation of major Chinese military companies in the second edition of the exhibition, companies operating in the fields of defense, armaments, space technology, and commercial aviation. Therefore, specialized Chinese military platforms and agencies highlight displays of modern aircraft and drones, trends in military technological development in Egypt, and areas of mutual military benefit between Egypt and China.

Here, Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles, represented by the Ninth Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and all the aforementioned Chinese military sites, are monitoring all Egyptian military and field movements and activities. This includes, most notably, the movements of Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production (who assumed his position in February 2026). His recent intensive activities and initiatives aimed at enhancing combat readiness and strengthening Egyptian-international military cooperation, particularly with China and the People’s Liberation Army, are of particular interest. Among the most prominent movements and activities of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, which have been the focus of analysis and evaluation by Chinese military circles, are the Egyptian defense minister’s field and diplomatic activities, including his official visit to Turkey in July 2026 at the head of a high-level Egyptian military delegation to discuss joint defense cooperation with the Turkish side. In addition to the interest, analysis, and evaluation by Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles of the significance of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters and their analysis of its connection to maintaining the security and stability of Chinese investments and opening new footholds and ports, especially in the Horn of Africa region, which is sensitive to Chinese logistical interests, relevant circles in Beijing are also monitoring the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo to discuss regional conditions and security in Africa, linking this to Chinese interests from a Chinese perspective.

– Fourth: The interest of intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing in the recent Egyptian military activity in Africa and the significance of inviting and receiving African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s headquarters, from a precise geopolitical perspective as a strategic pillar serving vital Chinese interests

Intelligence, military, and security circles in Beijing view Egypt’s recent military activity in Africa as a strategic pillar directly serving vital Chinese interests. Beijing analyzes the invitation and reception of African defense ministers at the Egyptian Ministry of Defense headquarters, headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of Defense and Military Production, Lieutenant General Ashraf Salem Zaher, from a precise geopolitical perspective that links regional security to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This analysis considers the connection between Egyptian activity in East Africa and the Horn of Africa and Chinese logistics efforts to secure vital maritime routes for China’s interests. Beijing believes that strengthening Egyptian military influence in the sensitive Horn of Africa region acts as a safeguard for maritime traffic in the Red Sea leading to the Suez Canal, the main artery of China’s Maritime Silk Road, in addition to its importance for protecting China’s ports. Here, Chinese defense circles welcome any efforts to stabilize the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, thus protecting Beijing’s logistics base in Djibouti and opening up prospects for securing new Chinese ports and investments. These investments depend on the stability that Cairo, as a regional power center, can contribute to establishing.

– Fifth: Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt to promote calm and stability in the Great Lakes and Nile Basin region, which is crucial to Chinese logistical interests.

Beijing’s interpretation of the reception of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s defense minister in Egypt is that relevant circles in Beijing followed with great interest the Egyptian side’s reception of the deputy prime minister and minister of defense of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Guy Kabombo Mwadiyamvita, to discuss regional security conditions. Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles analyze this in order to secure Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, given that China has massive investments worth billions of dollars in the minerals and cobalt sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing believes that security and stability in Congo, which Egypt supports through African Union institutions and bilateral cooperation, protects vital supply chains for Chinese technology industries from the risks posed by rebel groups. Furthermore, the Chinese Ninth Bureau and Chinese think tanks and military intelligence affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army analyze that strategic coordination in the Nile Basin region is essential for China’s interests and investments. Beijing considers the Egyptian-Congolese consensus to enhance calm and stability in the Great Lakes region and the Nile Basin, thus reducing the likelihood of armed conflicts that could threaten construction and infrastructure projects implemented by Chinese companies in those countries.

– Sixth: Chinese military circles are closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to secure the Chinese Maritime and Military Silk Road.

In addition to closely monitoring Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s meetings with the leaders of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense, Chinese military circles are following the security situation and developments in the armed forces’ modernization plans, given the particular importance of these matters to China in safeguarding its interests. Chinese military and strategic circles are keen to follow these meetings due to Egypt’s pivotal role in the stability of the Middle East and its crucial importance to China’s economic interests and investments in the Maritime and Military Silk Road. The dimensions of Chinese interest in President al-Sisi’s role lie in his coordination with the Egyptian military establishment to protect Chinese investments and secure major infrastructure projects and the Chinese economic zone northwest of the Suez Canal. This strengthens the Chinese military partnership with Egypt, paving the way for further defense cooperation agreements, increased military partnership and joint exercises, and the diversification of Chinese arms sources for Cairo. This serves to maintain China’s regional security and to monitor the security situation and its impact on global trade and maritime navigation routes.

– Seventh: Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises and the Badr 2026 tactical project.

Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises. They pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile-firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. Chinese officials also observe the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions. Furthermore, Chinese circles evaluate the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s Badr 2026 tactical project, especially the main phase of the Badr tactical exercise, which involved live ammunition and was conducted by (units of the Egyptian Third Field Army). This evaluation assesses the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital waterways and axes of importance to China. Chinese military analyses and assessments focus on monitoring and observing the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s training, military, and educational activities, such as nighttime missile firing exercises, and they pay particular attention to the final stage of the nighttime missile firing exercise conducted by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces, attended by the Chief of Staff and commanders of the main branches. With the Chinese interest in the Egyptian Military Science Day, the activities of the Military Technical College’s Science Day, and the conclusion of its scientific and engineering competitions, Chinese circles are also evaluating the Egyptian Ministry of Defense’s tactical project (Badr 2026), particularly the main phase of the Badr tactical project, which involved live-fire exercises conducted by units of the Egyptian Third Field Army. This evaluation aims to assess the Egyptian army’s strength in defending the security and stability of vital corridors and axes of importance to China. Chinese military circles and analysts are closely following the training and educational activities of the Egyptian Armed Forces, specifically the Badr 2026 tactical project with live ammunition conducted by the Egyptian Third Field Army, night air defense firing exercises, and the scientific activities of the Military Technical College. This is all part of assessing the Egyptian army’s readiness to protect vital axes. Furthermore, relevant circles in Beijing are keen to conduct further monitoring and evaluation of Egyptian military field training activities within the framework of the Badr 2026 tactical project to accurately assess the main phase with live ammunition conducted by units of the Third Field Army in support of the Air Force and to penetrate defenses.  With the interest of Chinese military think tanks and research centers affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army in the (nighttime missile firing) exercises in Egypt, they observed the efficiency and capabilities of the Egyptian air defense forces in operating effectively at night under cover of defense and in the presence of Egyptian military leaders.

With the Chinese military circles monitoring the graduation ceremony of the Egyptian Military Academy and the graduation ceremonies of new classes of students from the Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies and understanding and studying the impact of these events on China through the desire of Chinese intelligence, military, political, and strategic circles to develop military curricula in Egypt and Africa. This reflects the Chinese interest in Egyptian military education and scientific research and the Egyptian Military Science Day through the monitoring of the activities of the Egyptian Military Technical College’s Science Day and engineering competitions, and following the conclusion of the scientific and engineering competitions and linking them to the technological development of the combat capabilities of Egyptian military academies and institutions, and understanding what is lacking in these activities in order to fill it in the future through military educational partnerships with Egypt and its Ministry of Defense.

With close monitoring by Chinese defense and security circles of the joint Golden Eagle exercises between Egypt and Turkey, given their importance to China’s military and maritime Silk Road and to protecting Chinese interests in maintaining the security of the region and its vital waterways necessary for global supply chains. The focus and attention of think tanks affiliated with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have also been on Egypt. The With You initiative is primarily an Egyptian military initiative concerned with coordinating the Martyrs’ Recognition Fund of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense to disburse the first phase of the presidential initiative to care for the children of martyrs and wounded veterans. Chinese circles are interested in this Egyptian presidential initiative to understand its implementation mechanism, in coordination with the Egyptian Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Social Solidarity, and in cooperation with the Central Bank of Egypt and Misr Life Insurance Company. China is seeking to understand the Egyptian system and its operational and implementation mechanisms regarding all presidential initiatives.

– Eighth: Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt, understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy, in order to assess Egyptian military and elite human resources and build an accurate Chinese database to understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt.

Furthermore, Chinese military bodies and departments are monitoring the mechanisms for developing military education in Egypt and understanding and analyzing the system for preparing and qualifying students at the Egyptian Military Academy in order to share their expertise with the Egyptian military. They are also monitoring announcements of new admissions to the Military Academy and graduates of technological colleges to understand the total number of individuals with military backgrounds in Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to transfer its expertise in military education curricula and leadership and elite training to Egypt and its military academies. An analytical reading of China’s monitoring of the Egyptian military education system reveals profound strategic dimensions that extend beyond mere routine observation for the Chinese. This Chinese interest in the Egyptian military education system can be broken down as Beijing’s focus on monitoring Egyptian military and elite human resources. By monitoring the admission requirements and announcements for the Egyptian Military Academy and Egyptian military technology colleges, Beijing aims to build a precise database and understand the size and number of elites with military and technological backgrounds in Egypt. This contributes to anticipating the future leadership structure of the Egyptian state and helps Chinese intelligence, military, defense, and security circles assess the combat and administrative efficiency of Egyptian military elites. Here, the Chinese side seeks to analyze the preparation and qualification curricula for students in Egyptian military academies to determine the development of Egyptian training doctrine and its adaptation to modern warfare and smart systems. This facilitates the evaluation of the most prominent military partner in the Middle East and Africa region. This can be considered a gateway for transferring Chinese military-diplomatic expertise to Egypt, reflecting China’s future desire to introduce its leadership and elite training methodologies. This is part of China’s persistent effort to enhance its strategic influence (soft power) in Egypt and build long-term ideological and tactical alignment between the Egyptian and Chinese militaries through sharing its advanced military doctrine.

    Accordingly, we understand the extent of Beijing’s interest in the role of the Egyptian Ministry of Defense within its strategy to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This includes securing vital economic interests and maritime routes for China, such as the Suez Canal, and developing mutual military and arms cooperation with Cairo. This stems from China’s keenness to coordinate with Cairo, given its central position in global trade and regional security. This helps diversify Chinese military partnerships with the Egyptian military establishment and its Ministry of Defense, as Beijing presents itself as a reliable strategic military alternative in the Middle East.

THE most beautiful buildings in the entire world have been named and one surprising estate from the UK has made the list.

However, if you want to visit the pretty British attraction book to go as soon as possible is set to close for a multi-million pound revamp.

The Barbican in London has taken second place to India‘s grand Taj Mahal as Time Out’s 26 ‘most beautiful buildings’ to see in 2026.

The free-to-visit landmark attracts over a million visitors each year and is set to undergo a huge upgrade to save it falling into disrepair.

At the estimated cost of £231million, The Barbican will upgrade its indoor rainforest in its Conservatory which is home to 1,500 species of plant.

Also included in the plans is to protect Barbican’s brutalist foyers and lakeside terrace.

PARK UP

Epic UK holiday parks with waterparks, theme parks & Spoons pubs from £3pp a night

HOL YES

Cheapest summer for holidays in YEARS – with August breaks still on sale for £188pp

Outside in the courtyard, the pond will be revamped to stop water leaking onto the Metropolitan Line below – there will be new fountains and seating outside too.

The visitor destination is already free to visit, and this will continue once the revamp is complete.

The refurbishment project is set to start in 2028 when it will close until 2029.

The Barbican was pipped to the post by the Taj Mahal, a picture-perfect landmark in India built in the 1600s – it’s not hard to see why it got top spot.

Coming in third place was the Hallgrímskirkja in Iceland which is a church standing at 244 feet.

Not only is it a place of worship, but it has an observation tower where visitors can get incredible city views.

In Europe, other honourable mentions go to the Sagrada Familia in Spain which is very near completion after 140 years.

The outside of Gaudi’s basilica was completed in February, but there is some work still to do before it’s officially finished.

The Twist in Norway came in twelfth position and is a spectacular art gallery that is also used as a bridge.

It’s part of the Kistefos Sculpture Park and sits across the Ranselva River.

Another UK building did make the list coming in at number 21 – and it’s the Maggie’s Centre at St James’s Hospital in London.

The publication described it as having “mushroom-shaped forms grow from the floors to form the tiered roofs, and the stems are deep enough to contain loos and lifts.

“The space is decorated with mostly natural materials – think cork-topped tables, resin floors and cascading potted plants.”

Some more classic monuments and structures on the list include The Pyramids of Giza in Egypt, the Pantheon in Italy and Ad-Dayr in Petra, Jordan.

Colombia‘s impressive Santuario de Las Lajas comes in at number 19.

The enormous basilica sits on a bridge over the Guáitara River – it has been a pilgrimage destination since the eighteenth century and now gets up to 900,000 visitors each year.

Here’s the full list of Time Out’s ‘world’s 26 most beautiful buildings to see in 2026’…

1. Taj Mahal, India
2. The Barbican Estate, UK
3. Hallgrímskirkja, Iceland
4. Sagrada Familia, Spain
5. Museum SAN, South Korea
6. The Pyramids of Giza, Egypt
7. Fallingwater, USA
8. Ad-Dayr (The Monastery), Petra, Jordan
9. Fondation Louis Vuitton, France
10. Trinity College Library, Ireland
11. Great Mosque of Djenné, Mali
12. The Twist, Norway
13. Nasir Ol Molk Mosque, Iran
14. Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban, Bangladesh
15. Pantheon, Italy
16. Palmenhaus at Schönbrunn Palace, Austria
17. Bát Tràng Ceramic Community House, Vietnam
18. Museum at Eldridge Street, USA
19. Santuario de Las Lajas, Colombia
20. Museum of Old and New Art (MONA), Australia
21. Maggie’s Centre (St James’s Hospital), UK
22. Baháʼí Temple of South America, Chile
23. Futuna Chapel, New Zealand
24. National Holocaust Monument, Canada
25. Komera Leadership Centre, Rwanda
26. Enryaku-ji, Japan

IF you’re jetting off to any beautiful Red Sea resorts this summer check your passport before travelling.

Unlike countries in the EU, Egypt requires more time left on your passport and it’s catching Brits out with some missing out on their holidays altogether.

There are two very important requirements to get into Egypt for Brits.

The first is that your passport must have an ‘expiry date’ at least six months after the date you arrive.

The second is that it must have at least one blank page to be stamped.

Most countries only require three months left on a passport after the date of arrival, so it’s not surprising that some Brits are being caught out.

COAST EFFECTIVE

Best UK family theme & waterparks with cheap stays from just £3pp a night

DIVE IN

Mega waterpark hotels with EVERYTHING you ever wanted & all inclusive from £189pp

One woman recently missed out on a £6,500 holiday to Egypt.

Victoria Vigors was headed on a two-week ‘holiday of a lifetime’ with her family but was stopped before boarding.

Her nine-year-old daughter Roxie’s passport was being scanned and is was then they discovered Roxie’s passport did not have the required period of validity remaining for travel to Egypt.

Roxie’s passport technically expired on January 4, 2027, but with Egypt requiring at least six months left on them, it meant it wasn’t valid.

Talking to creatorzine.com, Victoria said: “I wasn’t aware of the rules. For people like me who don’t always travel and it’s the first time with my children, I didn’t know.

“I would have thought when I put her passport details in to check in that would tell me it wasn’t valid.”

Victoria added: “That would be a simple system to install so save this agony and heartbreak.”

The family are now trying to get an emergency passport to try and enjoy the last few days of the trip they’ve paid for, as they were unable to get a refund.

Also check visa requirements into the country as they vary depending on the location.

For example if you are staying for less than 15 days at a resort in Sharm El Sheikh, you don’t need a visa.

However, if you’re heading to Hurghada you’ll need a visa which you can apply for online or on arrival.

If you apply online, e-visa applications must be submitted a minimum of seven days.

Another country to be aware of the entry rules is Turkey which needs at least 150 days left on passports from the date of arrival.

If you find your passport is technically out of date shortly before your holidays, then you can look at getting a fast-track renewal.

Before travelling this summer, here are all the new rules you need to be aware of, from eGates and passports to visas and power banks.

United States President Donald Trump agreed to a 30-year nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia on Wednesday that would see Washington transfer nuclear technology to the Gulf kingdom.

This has drawn concerns that if the deal comes to fruition, it could spark a nuclear arms race across the Middle East amid reports that Riyadh would be able to enrich its own uranium, a necessary step in acquiring nuclear weapons.

US officials have stressed the proposed deal would serve civilian nuclear purposes, although exact details of the agreement have not been made public.

It has now been tabled in the US Congress for a review, but is expected to survive resistance from Democrats.

Here’s why some are concerned about the agreement:

Could this spur a nuclear arms race in the region?

Analysts have raised concerns about whether the proposed deal could lead to Saudi Arabia seeking to develop military-grade uranium, which the US Energy Department has not yet confirmed.

Some analysts have warned this could open the door to spurring an arms race with other regional powers.

Saudi Arabia has long voiced its intention to use nuclear energy for power generation, but in 2018, de facto leader Mohammad bin Salman told CBS that Riyadh would “without a doubt” develop a nuclear weapon if Iran did the same.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted on Thursday that the deal would not lead to nuclear proliferation, as US contractors would handle the project, allowing Washington to monitor it. US nuclear reactor designer Westinghouse is believed to be a major contractor.

Former Israeli Defence Minister Avigdor Liberman said in a post on X on Wednesday that Israel must oppose the deal with “all our might.”

“We must all understand that Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme will end in nuclear weapons and lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East,” he posted.

Israel, which developed a nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, has long sought to stop Arab countries and other regional countries from gaining their own nuclear weapons.

Is there a risk of nuclear reactors being attacked in strikes?

Some others have also raised concerns over possible nuclear leaks amid the tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, for example, has seen some of its outer facilities hit in the US and Israel’s war on Iran. Iran too has hit the perimeter of the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah nuclear power plant in a drone strike.

None of these strikes hit the nuclear plants’ reactors, but analysts say allowing more such facilities in the Middle East when tensions are so high is a mistake.

Damage to a reactor’s core could release highly radioactive gases, causing immediate catastrophic damage within a 20- to 30-kilometre (12- to 18-mile) radius.

Nuclear accidents at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear plant in 2011 and Chornobyl in Ukraine in the former Soviet Union in 1986 are cautionary stories.

Could Saudi Arabia have access to sensitive material?

That’s unclear for now.

Highly enriched uranium and spent nuclear reactor fuel are key components of nuclear bombs.

According to US media, the agreement includes a clause providing for a “black box” uranium enrichment facility that would be situated in Saudi Arabia but run by US companies.

A joint study by the two countries, set to last two years, will determine whether such a facility is needed, or if Saudi Arabia should import commercial-grade low-enriched uranium.

“That’s really the concern,” Matthew Kroenig, a fellow with the Atlantic Council, told Al Jazeera, saying there’s been no such arrangement anywhere else in the world.

“What does the US really mean by a ‘black box’? So will the US bring its engineers there full time, forever? Realistically, the Saudis will be involved, they will learn the tech, and they could kick out the US in the future,” Kroenig said.

Washington could be seeking to model Moscow’s agreement with Turkiye and Egypt, where Russian contractors manage active nuclear power plants, including the needed uranium and the highly radioactive spent fuel from the reactors.

The difference, Kroenig pointed out, is that Russia does not enrich the uranium in those cases.

On the other hand, the UAE, which runs a civilian nuclear programme that has been held up as a gold standard for non-proliferation, imports all of its low-enriched uranium from France, the United Kingdom and Russia among other countries.

Kroenig suggested that the US could be using the two-year study as a negotiating tactic, noting that the same claims of impact studies have been used to stall South Korea’s requests to enrich its own uranium.

“The deal doesn’t immediately speak about uranium enrichment, so my hope is that this is a negotiating tactic and that after two years the US will say ‘oh no, this doesn’t make sense right now’”, he said.

A MUM was left devastated after her family were forced to miss a “holiday of a lifetime” because of a common passport mistake.

Victoria Vigors, from Kent, had spent £6,500 on a two-week holiday to Egypt with her whole family.

However, the 41-year-old was left horrified after they arrived at London Gatwick, only to be stopped at the gate along with her 15-year-old son Riley and nine-year-old daughter Roxie.

When staff scanned their boarding passes at the gate, they discovered Roxie’s passport did not have the required period of validity remaining for travel to Egypt.

This was because her passport technically expired on January 4, 2027, but with Egypt requiring at least six months left on them, it meant it wasn’t valid.

Victoria told creatorzine.com: “My stomach dropped and I felt like i’d been kicked in the stomach.”

PASS IT ON

Turkey passport rule Brits need to know about or risk being BANNED from flight

CLUED UP

ALL of the new rules you need to be aware of when travelling this summer

“The kids crumpled and I burst into tears. I begged the staff but there was nothing they could do.

“We had to be escorted back to get our luggage off the flight – It was so embarrassing.”

She said not only were the kids devastated, but that Roxie thought it was her fault.

She continued: “I wasn’t aware of the rules. For people like me who don’t always travel and it’s the first time with my children, I wasn’t to know.

“I would have thought when I put her passport details in to check in that would tell me it wasn’t valid.

“That would be a simple system to install so save this agony and heartbreak.”

The family are now trying to get an emergency passport to try and enjoy the last few days of the trip they’ve paid for, as they were unable to get a refund.

She added: “I’d been saving up for two years.

“We were incredibly excited as we’d never had a two-week holiday abroad together or been to a resort like this.

“It was going to be the holiday of a lifetime.”

An EasyJet spokesperson said: “Unfortunately Ms Vigors and her daughter were unable to fly as her daughter’s passport did not meet passport validity rules.

“We remind customers during booking, check-in and by email before they travel to ensure they are aware of the travel documentation requirements for their trip, and it is customers’ responsibility to ensure they have valid documentation for travel.”

It’s not the only country with strict rules, as Turkey requires Brits to have at least 150 days left, which is around five months.

So we’ve explained two other passport rules you need to be aware of this summer.

This beach is a marvel of engineering that is totally free to cross.

The world’s widest bridge is a Guinness World Record holder that cost billions of pounds to build. The Rod El Farag Axis Bridge, also known as the Tahya Misr Bridge is a cable-stayed bridge that spans the Nile River through Cairo, Egypt.

The bridge has a whopping width of 67.3 metres, making it the widest bridge in the world. It has six lanes in each direction and is also a big tourist attraction. Pedestrian visitors to the bridge can cross it using the walkway which offers panoramic views out over the Nile.

This walkway is interspersed with glass panels so that it feels as if you are hovering above the rushing river below.

As it is a public road, you can cross it free of charge and enjoy the spectacular views out over Cairo.

The construction of the bridge was implemented by the Armed Forces Engineering Authority (AFEA) in cooperation with a number of national companies.

It took four years, finishing in 2019.

According to Ihab Alphar, the chairman of the AFEA, the basic cost of the project reached an eye-watering £7.43billion.

The bridge is 540 metres long, with 92 metre high suspension towers and has seven different entry and exit ramps.

In order to build the bridge, 4,000 workers, including engineers, technicians and labourers, worked tirelessly to finish the project.

Chief executive officer and chairman of Arab Contractors Company, Mohsen Salah, said: “The engineering crews responsible for the implementation of the bridge faced many difficulties that were overcome with Egyptian engineering innovations.”

He said one of the major issues faced in building the bridge was moving 226.8 tonnes of metal beams to the assembly area.

During the peak of construction, there were 200 cranes deployed at the site to get the bridge up and running.

Builders also had to construct two custom ferry boats that were strong enough to move 544.3 tonnes of equipment to assembly zones

Victoria Vigors’ holiday of a lifetime was left in tatters at the airport

A family’s dream holiday costing £6,500 was left in tatters after they were turned away at the boarding gate. Victoria Vigors, 41, arrived at Gatwick Airport ready for their all-inclusive two-week break to Hurghada, Egypt.

Victoria, who was with children Riley, 15, and Roxie, nine, checked in online for their easyJet flight. But problems emerged when staff scanned their boarding passes at the gate and noticed Roxie’s passport didn’t meet Egypt’s entry requirements for remaining validity.

“My stomach dropped, and I felt like I’d been kicked in the stomach,” Victoria, from Kent, told creatorzine.com.

“The kids crumpled and I burst into tears. I begged the staff but there was nothing they could do. We had to be escorted back to get our luggage off the flight. It was so embarrassing.

“The kids were devastated, Roxie kept saying it was her fault and we were so disappointed. It was a really bad day.”

Victoria had saved up for two years for the trip, which she described as the “holiday of a lifetime”. The 41-year-old said it would have been their first two-week trip abroad together, and their first time staying at an all-inclusive resort.

Roxie’s passport expires on January 4, 2027. However, Victoria said she hadn’t realised that could still prevent travel. UK government foreign travel advice states British passport holders must have at least six months’ validity remaining from the date they arrive in Egypt.

Because Roxie’s passport did not meet that threshold, Victoria said the airline refused to let them board. She said she hadn’t known the rules and believed everything was in order.

“I wasn’t aware of the rules. I was given her passport the day before we flew by her dad. In my head, it was six months anyway, so I didn’t think there’d be an issue. For people like me who don’t always travel and it’s the first time with my children, I wasn’t to know.

“I would have thought when I put her passport details in to check in that would tell me it wasn’t valid. That would be a simple system to install so save this agony and heartbreak. It’s crazy.”

Victoria said the family is now trying to secure an emergency passport in the hope they can still get away for at least the final days of the trip, after being told they can’t get a refund.

“I’d been saving up for two years. We were incredibly excited as we’d never had a two-week holiday abroad together or been to a resort like this. It was going to be the holiday of a lifetime.”

During a match, fans of Palestinian club Shabab Al-Khaleel raised a banner thanking Egypt coach Hossam Hassan for his support for the Palestinian cause. Hassan raised the Palestinian flag after Egypt’s national team defeated Australia in the World Cup round of 16.

DEIR AL BALAH, Gaza Strip — An Israeli strike on Gaza just before the kickoff of the Egypt-Argentina World Cup match killed a top Palestinian aid official who helped organize public screenings of the game across the enclave, according to local health officials.

The blast turned what was supposed to be a moment of celebration — the live screening of a potential Argentina upset by an Arab team — into a reminder of how the near-daily Israeli strikes across Gaza are continuing to kill civilians despite a truce reached in October.

The bomb hit a car in the Sabra neighborhood of Gaza City at dusk Tuesday, killing passersby Mohamed al-Wahidi, an official at the Egyptian Committee in Gaza, 10-year-old boy Hamza al-Deri and his 8-year-old brother, Fari. Ahmed Daghmush, 33, the driver of the car, was also killed. That’s according to Dr. Mohamed Abu Selmiya, the director of Shifa Hospital, which received the four bodies.

The Israeli military said al-Wahidi, who helped organize the soccer screenings, was not a target of the strike. It said the strike was aiming for a Hamas militant, and it was checking if Daghmush was the target.

Daghmush is a taxi driver not known to be affiliated with any militant group, Abu Selmiya said.

An Israeli strike hit the same street half an hour earlier, causing no casualties.

The committee for which al-Wahidi worked is the relief arm of the Egyptian government, which provides food, shelters and other assistance to Palestinians in Gaza. The committee organized the initiative to put up screens across Gaza to watch soccer matches, it said.

Many in the Palestinian diaspora live across the border in Egypt, which was a key mediator of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.

Team Egypt’s Gaza fanbase has only grown since the start of the tournament, as coach Hossam Hassan has spotlighted the plight of the Palestinian people in press briefings and on the pitch. He dedicated his team’s victory over Australia on Friday to both Egyptians and Palestinians and waved a Palestinian flag on the pitch.

In a Monday briefing before the match against Argentina, Hassan urged the world to do more for the Palestinian people.

“I urge you, I urge all media officers, all athletes worldwide, regardless of their identities, maybe we can convey a collective message that is as follows, let the Palestinian people be, let them exist, let them live a life of their own,” he said.

Israel’s military says its strikes target militants and it regrets harm to civilians. At least 1,084 people, including 258 children, have been killed since the truce took effect in October. Five Israeli soldiers have been killed in that time.

The Palestinian death toll from the Israel-Hamas war stands at 73,110, according to the Gaza Health Ministry, which is part of the Hamas-led government and is staffed by medical professionals who maintain detailed records viewed as generally reliable by United Nations agencies and independent experts. It does not distinguish between civilians and militants but says women and children make up around half of all fatalities.

The war began when Hamas-led militants attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, killing around 1,200 people and taking 251 others hostage.

Shurafa, Magdy and Frankel write for the Associated Press. Magdy reported from Cairo and Frankel from Jerusalem.