economics

During the past several years, war scenarios and analyses issuing from Washington have hewed to a familiar but deceptively reassuring image of the future: one of an “absoluteness of reliance on technological superiority, precision initial strikes, and the illusion of a ‘quick victory’ as some sort of magic solution to crises like a Chinese attack on Taiwan.” This is arguably decisive and reassuring on the surface but is, on closer and realistic examination, a dangerous fantasy rather than a practical operational scenario. Not only is it wholly incompatible with the military, industrial, and political situation in which the United States currently finds itself, but it also conceals the danger of involving the world in a nuclear escalation and a prolonged conflict, which the United States cannot afford.

In reality, U.S. military strategists are faced with an insoluble dilemma: Insisting on the “quick victory” doctrine raises the chances of a preemptive nuclear response from Beijing to certainty. If they start preparing for a long, grinding war, the more important question becomes: Is the U.S., in terms of industry, military capability, and political will, even capable of it? The realistic answer is no—at least not on the scale that many American decision-makers imagine.

Most Pentagon war plans, accordingly, emphasize cyberattacks and long-range strikes against China’s command structures, communication hubs, logistical networks, and missile bases. Ideally, this would leave China paralyzed within days, with a collapsed will to fight. In the real world, this can backfire: hitting essential Chinese systems, the leadership in Beijing—operating under unprecedented isolation and pressure—might revert to “escalation vertically,” that is, the early use of nuclear weapons to sustain their deterrent.

China’s nuclear arsenal, though still smaller than that of the US, is growing rapidly. By 2040, estimates suggest, China could possess some 600 operational warheads, compared with the United States’s stockpile of about 3,700. This growing disparity could be driving Beijing toward a more perilous posture—one in which it resorts to using nuclear weapons before that option disappears. Most Chinese missile systems are dual-use, meaning they can be equipped with either conventional or nuclear warheads. A U.S. strike against DF-21 or DF-26 launchers might thus be viewed as an attack on the survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent and could invite a nuclear response.

This is far from theoretical. Recent Pentagon war games have set off alarms. In many of the simulations, U.S. anti-ship missile stocks are depleted in just days; long-range munitions, in two weeks. Even scenarios in which Taiwan, supported by the U.S. and Japan, resists Chinese aggression depict victories at a devastating cost: dozens of ships sunk, hundreds of aircraft destroyed, and thousands of U.S. casualties—numbers that the American public and policymakers could scarcely accept.

For a global power, effective strategy must correspond with the country’s real industrial, financial, and societal capacity. In recent decades, the U.S. has drastically reduced its military production capabilities while increasing dependence on foreign supply chains. The war in Ukraine has given a glimpse of how even modest arms support for allies can deplete critical stockpiles quickly. Imagine the strain should the U.S. fight a full-scale war with the world’s second-largest economy thousands of miles from its shores.

The problem goes far beyond military planning and munitions shortages. Domestically, the U.S. does not have political and social consensus with regard to defending Taiwan. In contrast with the Cold War era, when the Soviet threat unified the American public, today Americans feel much less that their vital interests in East Asia are at stake. In such a context, how could the public accept tens of thousands of casualties and astronomical costs to defend a small island?
It is during any protracted conflict that national will plays as important a role as weapons and technology. Without political unity, industrial capacity, and societal tolerance, technological superiority means nothing. Washington will continue to remain enmeshed in the same fantasy that has brought empires low: that technology and military power can somehow substitute for strategic judgment.

A way out of this deadlock is quite evident, but the political will is lacking. Firstly, the U.S. should recognize that technological superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic dominance. Secondly, if it is serious about defending Taiwan, it needs to start rebuilding industrial capacity now, expand munitions production lines, and level with its people about what war would really look and feel like. Thirdly, diplomacy and sustainable deterrence must be reinstated—not through threats or arms races, but through dialogue, crisis management, and reduction of the risk of miscalculation between Washington and Beijing.

If the U.S. keeps on fantasizing about a quick and cost-free victory, then it will not only face defeat on the battlefield but also push the world to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. The ability to engage in war depends not only on the number of missiles and ships but also on political wisdom, economic capability, and a clear-eyed view of reality—three things the U.S. plainly lacks in its confrontation with China. It is time for Washington to wake up from its comforting illusions of power and face reality in terms of true strength—before it is too late.

As typhoon Tino (Kalmaegi, internationally) left over 200 Filipinos dead while affecting nearly 2 million people, President Marcos Jr declared “a state of national calamity.”

After the super typhoon Uwan (Fung-Wong) will add to the devastation, mass protests against huge flood control corruption are expected in the country.

In 2022, the Marcos Jr government pledged it would build on the legacy of the Duterte years and make Filipinos more prosperous and more secure. Critics claim both objectives have failed.

Billions of dollars lost to corruption                      

On July 27, Senator Panfilo Lacson warned that half of the 2 trillion pesos ($17 billion) allocated to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for flood control projects may have been lost to corruption in the past 15 years.

And yet, almost in parallel, President Marcos Jr stated his administration had implemented over 5,500 flood control projects and announced new plans amounting to more than $10 billion over the next 13 years.

Ever since then, Manila’s political class has been swept by allegations on corruption, mismanagement, and irregularities in government-funded flood management projects. In August, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee launched a high-profile investigation into the irregularities, focusing on the “ghost” projects, license renting schemes and contractor monopolies.

Corruption has long been pervasive in Philippine politics, economy and society. In the Corruption Perception Index, the country has consistently scored among the worst in the region. Even in peacetime, it is at par with the civil war-torn Sierra Leone and oil-cursed Angola.

In the era of former President Duterte, corruption fight was spotlighted. Now it thrives again. According to surveys, 81% of Filipinos believe corruption has worsened since martial law was declared 53 years ago. It is compounding misguided economic policies.

Rising trade deficits, slowing investment                            

In the Duterte era, exports were led by electronics, with significant growth in tourism and business process outsourcing. Those times are now gone.

In the Duterte era, the effort was to attract multinationals, particularly Chinese firms, to serve as anchor companies that would foster Philippine suppliers. But due to the government’s geopolitics, Chinese – and increasingly Western – multinationals see too much economic and geopolitical risk in the country. And so, the investments that could have come to the Philippines have gone to Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand in the region.

Recently, even US Investment Climate Statement for the Philippines highlighted persistent corruption, a slow and opaque bureaucracy, and poor infrastructure as major disincentives to investors.

Lagging tourism                             

In Southeast Asia, Chinese tourism has played a vital role in the post-pandemic recovery. Before the pandemic, Chinese tourists accounted for 40-60% of the regional total.

Subsequently, regional recovery was fueled by Chinese tourism. The only exception? The Philippines.

In 2019, Chinese tourist arrivals in the country soared to over 1.7 million. As of September 2025, the Philippines has reported less than 204,000 Chinese arrivals for the year, a figure that is far, far below the government target. The country was banking on a 2-million visitors from China.

The sharp decline is attributed to geopolitical tensions, the suspension of the e-visa program, even safety concerns.

Even if the 2025 total would climb closer to 300,000, that would be just 15-20% of the 2019 level. It’s a catastrophic missed opportunity.

Sources: Trade deficits: Author, Philippine Statistics Authority; Tourism: Author, National Statistical Coordination Board Philippines; Exchange rate: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

BPO outsourcing at risk               

Digital economy is a major component of the GDP. But in the absence of domestic ICT anchor firms, the sector is at the mercy of Western offshoring. And that spells huge trouble at a time, when the West prioritizes trade wars, as evidenced by Manila’s costly losses in US tariff wars.

Meanwhile, geopolitics has alienated investments by Chinese ICT giants, which could have catalyzed ICT ecosystems in the country.

And there’s worse ahead. The Philippine outsourcing sector is a $30 billion industry that accounts for 7% of the Philippines’ GDP and commands 15% of the global market. Yet, one-third of its jobs in the Philippines are at risk from artificial intelligence (AI), with those in the BPO sector most vulnerable. Sadly, college-educated, young, urban, female, and well-paid workers in the services sector will be most exposed.

In addition to AI, US protectionist initiatives could perfect the jobs devastation in the Philippine outsourcing industry. Introduced in July, the bipartisan “Keep Call Centers in America Act” proposes to penalize US companies that offshore a significant portion of their call center jobs. The recent Halting International Relocation of Employment Act (HIRE Act) aims to curb outsourcing by imposing a 25% excise tax on payments to foreign workers.

If these realities kick in, US vulture capitalists can be expected to target and short the Philippines, which could compound challenges, as in the past.

Economic growth, missed opportunities                             

In early 2024, US news agency Bloomberg asked President Marcos Jr whether the Philippines could achieve an 8% growth rate. “Why not?” the president replied. “Yes, I think it is, I think it is doable.”

Yet, at the time, GDP year-on-year growth decelerated to barely 5.2%.

Have things got better? No.

In 2025, the government’s target was reduced to 5.5-6.5%. Just weeks ago, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) downgraded the Philippine growth projection to 5.4% this year. More recently, economic growth slowed to just 4.0% in the third quarter – the slowest since early 2021, when the COVID-19 pandemic caused a contraction.

Unsurprisingly, critics claim the incumbent economic policies have failed. Here’s a thought experiment about the extent of that failure. During the Duterte era, Philippine GDP increased from $329 billion to $404 billion, despite the pandemic plunge. On the back of that performance, IMF expected Philippine GDP to climb close to $640 billion by 2028.

Current IMF estimates suggest that by 2028, Philippine GDP would be less than $560 billion. So, the government is set to underperform by $80 billion.

That’s the cost of missed opportunities – although the final cost could prove higher.

Source: Author, data from IMF

Over the past two decades, Russia’s economic influence in Africa—and specifically in Nigeria—has been limited, largely due to a lack of structured financial support from Russian policy banks and state-backed investment mechanisms. While Russian companies have demonstrated readiness to invest and compete with global players, they consistently cite insufficient government financial guarantees as a key constraint.

Unlike China, India, Japan, and the United States—which have provided billions in concessionary loans and credit lines to support African infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and SMEs—Russia has struggled to translate diplomatic goodwill into substantial economic projects. For example, Nigeria’s trade with Russia accounts for barely 1% of total trade volume, while China and the U.S. dominate at over 15% and 10%, respectively, in the last decade. This disparity highlights the challenges Russia faces in converting agreements into actionable investment.

Lessons from Nigeria’s Past

The limited impact of Russian economic diplomacy echoes Nigeria’s own history of unfulfilled agreements during former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration. Over the past 20 years, ambitious energy, transport, and industrial initiatives signed with foreign partners—including Russia—often stalled or produced minimal results. In many cases, projects were approved in principle, but funding shortfalls, bureaucratic hurdles, and weak follow-through left them unimplemented. Nothing monumental emerged from these agreements, underscoring the importance of financial backing and sustained commitment.

China as a Model

Policy experts point to China’s systematic approach to African investments as a blueprint for Russia. Chinese state policy banks underwrite projects, de-risk investments, and provide financing often secured by African sovereign guarantees. This approach has enabled Chinese companies to execute large-scale infrastructure efficiently, expanding their presence across sectors while simultaneously investing in human capital.

Egyptian Professor Mohamed Chtatou at the International University of Rabat and Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco, argues, “Russia could replicate such mechanisms to ensure companies operate with financial backing and risk mitigation, rather than relying solely on bilateral agreements or political connections.”

Russia’s Current Footprint in Africa

Russia’s economic engagement in Africa is heavily tied to natural resources and military equipment. In Zimbabwe, platinum rights and diamond projects were exchanged for fuel or fighter jets. Nearly half of Russian arms exports to Africa are concentrated in countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Large-scale initiatives, such as the planned $10 billion nuclear plant in Zambia, have stalled due to a lack of Russian financial commitment, despite completed feasibility studies. Similar delays have affected nuclear projects in South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt.

Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matviyenko and Senator Igor Morozov have emphasized parliamentary diplomacy and the creation of new financial instruments, such as investment funds under the Russian Export Center, to provide structured support for businesses and enhance trade cooperation. These measures are designed to address historical gaps in financing and ensure that agreements lead to tangible outcomes.

Opportunities and Challenges

Analysts highlight a fundamental challenge: Russia’s limited incentives in Africa. While China invests to secure resources and export markets, Russia lacks comparable commercial drivers. Russian companies possess technological and industrial capabilities, but without sufficient financial support, large-scale projects remain aspirational rather than executable.

The historic Russia-Africa Summits in Sochi and in St. Petersburg explicitly indicate a renewed push to deepen engagement, particularly in the economic sectors. President Vladimir Putin has set a goal to raise Russia-Africa trade from $20 billion to $40 billion over the next few years. However, compared to Asian, European, and American investors, Russia still lags significantly. UNCTAD data shows that the top investors in Africa are the Netherlands, France, the UK, the United States, and China—countries that combine capital support with strategic deployment.

In Nigeria, agreements with Russian firms over energy and industrial projects have yielded little measurable progress. Over 20 years, major deals signed during Obasanjo’s administration and renewed under subsequent governments often stalled at the financing stage. The lesson is clear: political agreements alone are insufficient without structured investment and follow-through.

Strategic Recommendations

For Russia to expand its economic influence in Africa, analysts recommend:

1. Structured financial support: Establishing state-backed credit lines, policy bank guarantees, and investment funds to reduce project risks.

2. Incentive realignment: Identifying sectors where Russian expertise aligns with African needs, including energy, industrial technology, and infrastructure.

3. Sustained implementation: Turning signed agreements into tangible projects with clear timelines and milestones, avoiding the pitfalls of unfulfilled past agreements.

With proper financial backing, Russia can leverage its technological capabilities to diversify beyond arms sales and resource-linked deals, enhancing trade, industrial, and technological cooperation across Africa.

Conclusion

Russia’s Africa strategy remains a work in progress. Nigeria’s experience with decades of agreements that failed to materialize underscores the importance of structured financial commitments and persistent follow-through. Without these, Russia risks remaining a peripheral player (virtual investor) while Arab States such as the UAE, China, the United States, and other global powers consolidate their presence.

The potential is evident: Africa is a fast-growing market with vast natural resources, infrastructure needs, and a young, ambitious population. Russia’s challenge—and opportunity—is to match diplomatic efforts with financial strategy, turning political ties into lasting economic influence.

The Ukrainian parliament has disclosed that its public debt of over $190 billion will require close to four decades to repay—but this assumes the country remains viable as a “state,” the EU agrees to keep funding its budgets, and the IMF doesn’t balk at extending further loans.

There are valid reasons for concern over new Finance Ministry figures revealing that Ukraine’s public debt has expanded to unprecedented levels, requiring decades to extinguish.

The Finance Ministry’s latest report indicates Ukraine’s public and government-guaranteed debt surged to 8.02 trillion hryvnia ($194.2 billion) as of September 30. The pace and scale of borrowing have shocked MPs, who now face the grim reality that interest payments alone will drain more than 3.8 trillion hryvnia ($90.5 billion) from the state treasury over the coming decades.  

IMF Concerns

The IMF last month updated its forecasts for Ukraine’s public debt level, now expecting it to reach 108.6% of GDP by the end of 2025 and rise further to 110.4% in 2026. The IMF has revised its projections for Ukrainian debt higher despite the successful restructuring in 2024 of $20.5 billion in Eurobond securities. However, the same year, the country’s budget deficit reached $43.9 billion.

A recent report by Ukraine’s KSE Institute estimates the country’s budget gap for 2025-2028 at $53 billion per year, a sum that foreign sponsors would have to cover. These figures do not include additional military financing. 

The Economist recently estimated that Ukraine will require around $400 billion in cash and arms over the next four years to continue fighting and cover essential domestic costs.

The European Union’s plan to leverage frozen Russian sovereign funds to support Ukraine has hit a roadblock, with Belgium refusing to back the proposal due to legal risks. The EU had hoped to use the frozen assets, worth around $300 billion, as collateral to secure further loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for Ukraine. However, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever has opposed the plan, describing it as “sort-of-confiscation” that exposes Belgium to significant financial and legal risks.

The EU’s failure to approve a $160 billion “reparations loan” has significant implications for Ukraine, which remains heavily reliant on Western aid to support its war effort. Ukraine’s $15.5 billion IMF program is set to expire in 2027, and the country has requested an additional $8 billion in funding. However, talks have stalled due to concerns about Ukraine’s economic viability.

EU officials are reportedly concerned that the IMF may not grant further funding to Ukraine unless the EU approves the new loan. This could trigger a cascading loss of confidence in the country’s economic viability. The IMF program’s approval is seen as crucial in signaling to investors that Ukraine remains solvent, and its rejection could have far-reaching consequences for the country’s economy.

Keeping Ukraine afloat financially is largely expected to fall to the EU given decreased American involvement. However, such a prospect has faced internal opposition. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stated that “there’s no one else left willing to pick up the tab.” Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico voiced equal opposition to Brussels’ plan to continue financing Kiev’s war. And just this week, the new Czech Republic President Andrej Babiš made good on his campaign promise to advocate against more funds and arms being transferred to Ukraine.

Orbán, a longtime critic of aid to Ukraine, criticized Brussels for seeking new funding through frozen Russian assets and fresh loans, rejecting the plan as not Hungary’s responsibility.  

A Failed State?

It is worth noting that a case can be made that Ukraine was not a thriving state prior to February 2022.

After his 2019 election, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy assumed the leadership of a state suffering from economic malaise, low natality, and high rates of graft and corruption. Ukraine’s population, after peaking at 52 million in 1993, had already fallen to 45.5 million by 2013—it is 32 million today, with UN estimates concluding that it would fall by a further 20% by 2050. More than 28 million now reside outside the country.

Widespread emigration has plagued Ukraine, which was suffering from extensive brain drain well before the war. Emigration and population decline are parts of a vicious cycle—citizens leave countries due to political instability or low economic prospects, which tends to exacerbate the problems.

In addition to a declining birthrate and negative net migration, Ukraine’s economy has floundered since the nation achieved independence in 1991. Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe—before the war, its GDP per capita was comparable to that of Iraq, and unemployment was about 10 percent. Ukraine’s economy is the second-most corrupt in Europe. This corruption and lack of opportunity fueled Ukraine’s pre-war emigration and poverty.

The invasion and subsequent Russian military strikes have severely degraded Ukraine’s already weak economy. Infrastructure has been devastated, with an estimated $176 billion in damage. Power systems, roads, and other critical assets have been left in ruins. Ukrainian agricultural production, which made up 41 percent of Ukraine’s exports, has fallen by a third. Finally, Russian minefields and artillery attacks have also left much of eastern Ukraine inundated with unexploded ordnance, the effects of which will continue to be felt for decades.

Moreover, many of the 6.9 million refugees and 3.7 million internally displaced persons are either unable to contribute to the country’s war effort or dependent on state resources for survival. Many who fled will likely not return; a significant number of refugees have effectively assimilated within host communities in Germany and Poland—many have built lives in other countries. Those least likely to return are individuals with high education and key skills, fostering the flight of valuable human resources.

Even if the EU continues to fund Ukraine, its difficulties will only increase. With Russia already controlling 20% of Ukraine’s territory and continuing to gain ground, the most it can hope to achieve is a stalemate until peace terms are mutually agreed upon. Continuing to resist the Russian onslaught could take years, which would further damage and depopulate eastern Ukraine. Moreover, its economy would continue to be strangled by the displacement of workers, infrastructure damage, and investor fatigue and uncertainty. Protracted warfare may achieve political and moral objectives, but the loss of wartime unity and foreign aid, combined with the high cost of rebuilding and resettling ($524 billion), is likely to create further political instability. Even in peace, Ukraine’s future is bleak.

Western leaders should be well aware of the consequences that protracted warfare can have on a state—their experiences in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan all resulted in massive human costs and the destruction of economic and governmental institutions. Regardless of what happens at the peace table, Europe, the UK (and under Trump, to a lesser extent, the U.S.) will be forced to reckon with the specter of both a failed state dependent on foreign aid as well as a protracted migrant crisis, which Europe already faces with the Middle East and North Africa. The crisis is building, and it soon could be at the West’s doorstep.

Meta anticipated earning about 10% of its total annual revenue, or $16 billion, from advertising for scams and banned items, according to internal documents reviewed by Reuters. The documents reveal that for at least three years, the company failed to stop a significant number of ads exposing its billions of users on Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to fraudulent schemes, illegal casinos, and banned medical products. On average, around 15 billion “higher risk” scam ads, showing clear signs of fraud, were displayed daily on these platforms. Meta reportedly generates about $7 billion annually from these scam ads.

Many of these ads were linked to marketers flagged by Meta’s internal systems. However, the company only bans advertisers if fraud is at least 95% certain according to its systems. If less certain but still suspect, Meta imposes higher ad rates as a penalty instead of outright banning them. This approach aims to deter dubious advertisers without fully eliminating them. The company’s ad-personalization system also ensures that users who click on scam ads see more of them based on their interests.

The documents create an image of Meta grappling with the extent of abuse on its platforms while hesitating to take stronger actions that could impact its revenue. The acceptance of revenue from suspicious sources highlights a lack of oversight in the advertising industry, as noted by fraud expert Sandeep Abraham. Meta’s spokesperson, Andy Stone, counters that the documents provide a biased view and argues that the actual share of revenue from scam ads would be lower than estimated. He claimed the plan aimed to validate investments in combating fraud.

Stone mentioned that Meta has significantly reduced user reports of scam ads globally and removed millions of scam ad content in recent efforts. The company aims for major reductions in scam ads in the upcoming year. Despite this, internal research indicates that Meta’s platforms are central to the global fraud economy, with one presentation estimating they contribute to a third of all successful fraud in the U. S. Competitors were noted to have better systems to combat fraud.

As regulators step up pressure for stronger consumer protections, the documents reveal the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating Meta for financial scam ads. In Britain, regulators identified Meta as the source of over half of the payment-related scam losses in 2023. The company has acknowledged that addressing illicit advertising may hurt its revenue.

Meta is investing heavily in technology and has plans for extensive capital expenditures in AI. CEO Mark Zuckerberg reassured investors that their advertising revenue can support these projects. The internal documents suggest a careful consideration of the financial impact of increasing measures against scam ads, indicating that while the company intends to reduce illicit revenue, it is wary of the potential business implications.

Despite planning to diminish scam ads’ revenue share, Meta is bracing for regulatory fines, estimating penalties that could reach up to $1 billion. However, these fines are viewed as comparatively minor against the income from scam ads, which already generates significant revenue. The leadership’s strategy shows a tendency to react to regulatory pressure rather than implementing proactive measures to vet advertisers effectively. Stone disputed claims that Meta’s policy is to act only under regulatory threat.

Meta has set limits on how much revenue it can afford to lose from actions against suspect advertisers. In early 2025, a document revealed that the team reviewing questionable ads was restricted to a loss of no more than 0.15% of company revenue, which equated to around $135 million from Meta’s total of $90 billion in the same period. A manager noted that this revenue cap included both scam ads and harmless ads that might be mistakenly blocked, indicating strict financial boundaries in their approach.

Under increasing pressure to manage scams more effectively, Meta’s executives proposed a moderate strategy to CEO Mark Zuckerberg in October 2024. Instead of a drastic approach, they suggested targeting countries where they anticipated regulatory action. Their goal was to reduce the revenue lost to scams, illegal gambling, and prohibited goods from approximately 10.1% in 2024 to 7.3% by the end of 2025, with further reductions planned for subsequent years.

A surge in online fraud was noted in 2022, when Meta uncovered a network of accounts pretending to be U. S. military members trying to scam Facebook users. Other scams, such as sextortion, were also rising. Yet, at that time, Meta invested little in automated systems to detect such scams and categorized them as a low-priority issue. Internal documents showed efforts were mainly focused on fraudsters impersonating celebrities, which threatened to alienate advertisers and users alike. However, layoffs at Meta affected the enforcement team, as many working on advertiser rights were let go, and resources shifted heavily toward virtual reality and AI projects.

Despite layoffs, Meta claimed to have increased its staff handling scam advertising. However, data from 2023 revealed that Meta was ignoring about 96% of valid scam reports filed by users, suggesting a significant gap in their response to customer concerns. The safety staff aimed to improve this by reducing the number of dismissed reports to no more than 75% in the future.

Instances of user frustration were evident, such as a recruiter for the Royal Canadian Air Force who lost access to her account after being hacked. Despite multiple reports to Meta, her account remained active, even sharing false cryptocurrency investment opportunities that defrauded her connections. Reports indicated that she had many people flag her account, but it took about a month before Meta finally removed it.

Meta refers to scams that do not involve paid ads as “organic,” which include free classified ads, fake dating profiles, and fraudulent medical claims. A report from December 2024 stated that users face approximately 22 billion organic scam attempts each day, alongside 15 billion scam ads, highlighting the company’s ongoing struggle to manage fraud effectively. Internal documents suggest that Meta’s efforts to police fraud are not capturing much of the scam activity occurring across its platforms.

In Singapore, police shared a list of 146 scams targeting local users, but Meta staff found that only 23% of these scams broke the platform’s policies. The remaining 77% went against the spirit of the rules but not the exact wording. Examples of unchecked scams included fake offers on designer clothes, false concert tickets, and job ads pretending to be from major tech firms. In one case, Meta discovered scam ads claiming to belong to the Canadian prime minister, yet the existing rules wouldn’t flag the account.

Even when advertisers are found to be scamming, the rules can be lenient. Small advertisers need to be flagged for scams eight times before being blocked, while larger ones can have over 500 complaints without being shut down. Some scams generated significant revenue; for example, four removed ads were linked to $67 million monthly.

An employee initiated reports highlighting the “Scammiest Scammer” each week to raise awareness, but some flagged accounts remained active for months. Meta tried to deter scammers by charging them more in ad auctions, labeling this practice “penalty bids. ” Advertisers suspected of fraud would have to bid higher amounts, thus reducing competition for legitimate advertisers. Meta aimed to decrease scam ads from this approach, which showed some success, resulting in fewer scam reports and a slight dip in overall ad revenue.

With information from Reuters

The U.S. Supreme Court’s skeptical questioning of former President Donald Trump’s global tariffs has fueled speculation that his trade measures may be struck down, potentially upending the already fragile trade landscape.

The case centers on Trump’s use of the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose sweeping tariffs on imports. The law grants presidents broad authority to regulate trade during national emergencies but makes no mention of tariffs, raising constitutional questions about the limits of executive power.

During oral arguments on Wednesday, justices across the ideological spectrum except Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas appeared doubtful that Trump had legal authority to levy such blanket global tariffs.

Trade experts now warn that if the court invalidates Trump’s tariff policy, it could trigger a new wave of economic uncertainty, as the administration is expected to pivot quickly to other trade laws to reimpose duties.

Why It Matters

The outcome of this case could reshape U.S. trade policy for years. Businesses have paid over $100 billion in IEEPA-related tariffs since 2025, and a ruling against Trump could open a complex refund battle or force the White House to seek alternative legal pathways for its protectionist agenda.

Corporate leaders, already weary of erratic trade shifts, say a ruling either way offers little stability. “Even if it goes against IEEPA, the uncertainty still continues,” said David Young of the Conference Board, who briefed dozens of CEOs after the hearing.

Trump Administration: Faces potential legal defeat but can pivot to Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act of 1962) or Section 122 (Trade Act of 1974), both of which allow temporary or national security-based tariffs.

U.S. Supreme Court: Balancing presidential powers with statutory limits on trade actions.

Businesses & Importers: Risk being caught in regulatory limbo over refunds and future duties.

Federal Reserve: Monitoring potential economic fallout from prolonged trade instability.

Refunds Could Get “Messy”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett raised concerns about how refund claims would be handled if the tariffs are ruled illegal, calling it “a mess” for courts to manage.
Lawyer Neal Katyal, representing five small businesses challenging the tariffs, said only those firms would automatically receive refunds, while others must file administrative protests a process that could take up to a year.

Customs lawyer Joseph Spraragen added that if the court orders refunds, the Customs and Border Protection’s automated system could process them, but he warned, “The administration is not going to be eager to just roll over and give refunds.”

Economic and Policy Repercussions

Analysts expect the administration to rely on alternative statutes if IEEPA tariffs are overturned. However, implementing new duties under those laws could be slow and bureaucratic, potentially delaying trade certainty until 2026.

Natixis economist Christopher Hodge said such a ruling would be only a “temporary setback” for Trump’s trade agenda, predicting renewed tariff rounds or trade negotiations in the coming year.

Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Governor Stephen Miran warned the uncertainty could act as a drag on economic growth, though it might also prompt looser monetary policy if trade instability dampens business confidence.

What’s Next

A Supreme Court ruling is expected in early 2026, leaving companies in limbo over the future of U.S. tariff policy.
If Trump’s powers under IEEPA are curtailed, analysts expect a new wave of trade maneuvers potentially invoking national security provisions to maintain his “America First” economic approach, prolonging the climate of global trade unpredictability.

With information from Reuters.

The draft proposals for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan were approved during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2025. The final plan is expected to be adopted by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2026.

   China’s Five-Year Plans have been key strengths of China’s medium- to long-term economic and social development framework since the 1950s. Specifically, it has demonstrated strategic foresight, coordinated planning, and consistent implementation. The key strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan are its focus on high-quality development, particularly by achieving stringent climate targets such as peaking carbon emissions before 2030, while relying on strict monitoring mechanisms and advanced technologies. The plan also promotes innovation and digital transformation, focuses on integrated economic and military development, and leverages investment in research and development.

•  The strengths of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, compared to previous five-year plans, are:

1)       Focus on quality development:

Compared to previous plans that focused on quantitative growth, the 15th Five-Year Plan focuses on quality, innovation, and sustainability rather than simply increasing productivity.

2) Integrated economic and military development:

The new plan systematically integrates scientific and technological innovations across the military and civilian sectors, enhancing national capabilities in a comprehensive manner.

3) Shifting towards a green economy:

The plan features new mechanisms for monitoring and managing carbon emissions, representing a significant shift from previous plans that were less focused on environmental issues.

4)       Investment in Research and Development:

The plan continues to boost investment in research, development, and innovation, a core strength that has enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements.

5) Balanced Development:

The plan seeks to achieve balanced development by supporting resource-rich regions, helping to reduce development gaps between different regions.

6) Investment Opportunities:

The plan opens new horizons for investors in areas such as carbon trading, offsets, and carbon asset management services, boosting national economic development.

Based on our understanding of the previous analysis, China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) includes goals for economic and social development, focusing on technological self-reliance, high-quality development, and a real economy. The plan aims to be a crucial link towards achieving socialist modernization by 2035.

All eyes are on Beijing as the Communist Party of China (CPC) convenes to outline the next five years. These meetings take place amidst heightened trade tensions with Washington and mounting domestic challenges. This fourth plenary session of the CPC Central Committee, known as the “Fourth Plenum,” is a pivotal political event in the country, shaping future policies. The four-day closed-door meeting aims to finalize China’s new Five-Year Plan for 2026-2030, an economic and political roadmap outlining the priorities of the world’s second-largest economy for the coming years. Approximately 370 members of the Central Committee, led by “Xi Jinping,” are participating in the meeting, with expectations of changes in some leadership positions, although details of these changes may not be revealed for several days or weeks. The full details of the plan are expected to be announced during the annual session of the National People’s Congress in March 2026.  Perhaps the most important things for the Chinese leadership at the moment are stability, legitimacy, and continued support. Therefore, it is crucial that they demonstrate their ability to improve the quality of life, as this is the cornerstone of their legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people.

 Many objectives of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) have come to fruition. The assessment of the key economic and social development achievements under the 14th Five-Year Plan, according to my view, is very positive, especially since they have global impacts in many aspects, such as economic growth, new quality productive forces, high-level opening-up, green transition, technological innovation, international cooperation, cultural and academic exchange, etc.

  As China’s 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025) draws to a close, the country has achieved a number of notable accomplishments, including fostering a resilient economy and making tangible strides in technology, manufacturing, economic reform, sustainability, and innovation. The country’s strategic plan has supported the country’s high-quality development, contributing to national progress across various sectors in China. China’s five-year plans are strategic guidance documents that chart the country’s development path over five years and form the overall framework for national planning. China will continue its 15th five-year plan in its opening-up and reform process to achieve more balanced and comprehensive development.

 China’s 15th Five-Year Plan will cover the period from 2026 to 2030. Planning began in December 2023. The plan aims to achieve General Secretary Xi Jinping’s goal of doubling the size of the economy between 2020 and 2035. The recommendations of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) outlined several actionable plans and programs for the national economic and social development of the People’s Republic of China. These plans focus on innovation-driven growth, low-carbon development, and urban-rural integration while deepening social inclusion and addressing the problem of population aging.

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held in Beijing from October 20 to 23, 2025. A total of 168 members and 147 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the plenary session. Members of the Standing Committee of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and responsible comrades from relevant departments attended as observers. Some comrades from grassroots units and a number of experts and scholars who were delegates to the 20th CPC National Congress also attended as observers. The plenary session was presided over by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and “Xi Jinping”, General Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered an important speech. The plenary session heard and discussed a work report delivered by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, in his capacity as General Secretary of the CPC, commissioned by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, and approved, after consideration, the “Proposals of the CPC Central Committee on Compiling the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development.” President Xi Jinping made explanations to the plenary session on the draft of the “Proposals.”

 The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China will be held from October 20 to 23, 2025, to discuss proposals for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for China’s Economic and Social Development. China has achieved significant achievements during the 14th Five-Year Plan, both domestically and internationally. In the new plan, it will continue its pursuit of high-quality development and strengthen international cooperation to achieve a more prosperous shared future.

The 14th Five-Year Plan focuses on achieving high-quality development, encompassing key areas such as scientific and technological innovation, the green economy, improving living standards, and balanced regional development. China’s achievements during this period were not limited to domestic matters but rather extended their impact to the entire world.

  This year, 2025, marks the conclusion of the implementation of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). Chinese authorities recently reviewed the most significant achievements made during this period, a development that received widespread attention from the international community. China’s achievements in innovation during the 14th Five-Year Plan represent a global model of scientific and technological self-reliance. Not only did it increase spending on research and development, but it also succeeded in transforming knowledge into a sustainable, productive, and economic force. This reflects a strategic vision that has made China a leader in the fields of artificial intelligence, clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and modern communications. Giant Chinese companies, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Xiaomi, and BYD, have become symbols of this transformation. They have not only succeeded in building global brands but also established integrated innovation systems that blend scientific research with practical application.

 China’s five-year plans have always been an effective tool for driving progress across all sectors. According to my analysis as an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics and the policies of the ruling Communist Party of China, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is described as “diverse, innovative, and open.” I expect China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan to continue prioritizing technological innovation, artificial intelligence, social welfare, scientific research, the digital economy, and carbon reduction. China’s development model is unique, with its sole goal of ensuring the prosperity of the Chinese people, under the motto “from the people, for the people.” Taking effective measures and prioritizing the protection and improvement of citizens’ livelihoods have been key factors behind China’s rapid development. This Chinese development model has become an inspiring example by transforming human capital into an engine of growth.

  Based on the previous analysis, perhaps what most caught my attention during China’s 14th Five-Year Plan is the significant Chinese focus on the innovation sector at the forefront. Over the past five years, the country’s total investment in research and development (R&D) has reached record levels. By 2024, China’s R&D spending will have increased by about 50 percent, or 1.2 trillion yuan, since the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020), according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission.

During its 3rd grandiose summit in Luanda that brought together a distinguished panel of leaders, including the ministers of transport from Zimbabwe and Rwanda, the secretary-general of the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), the director of strategies at Morocco’s Ministry of Transport and Logistics, the CEOs of Ethiopian Airlines and TAAG Angola Airlines, as well as representatives from the World Bank Group and the European Commission (EC), the African Union finally earmarked $30 billion for aviation infrastructure.

In his opening address, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, President of the Republic of Angola and Chairperson of the African Union (AU), stressed that Africa must invest between $130 billion and $170 billion annually to lay the foundation for sustainable growth. “We must move from words to action,” President Lourenço urged. “This summit represents a decisive step toward mobilizing the resources needed to enhance connectivity and integration across our continent.”

The ambitious investment plan strategically aims at modernizing the continent’s aviation infrastructure under the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM), according to summit reports. Lerato D. Mataboge, African Union Commissioner for Infrastructure and Energy, during the high-level session on Financing and Modernizing African Civil Aviation Infrastructure to Promote Integrated Continental Airspace and Enable Free Movement Under SAATM, emphasized aviation’s pivotal role as both an engine of integration and a cornerstone of Africa’s economic transformation.

“Aviation is not merely a mode of transport,” Mataboge stated, speaking at the session. “It is a strategic engine of continental integration and a core enabler of Agenda 2063 and the AfCFTA. The Single African Air Transport Market will only succeed if we build the modern, safe, and efficient infrastructure that Africa’s growth demands.”

Citing findings from a Continental Aviation Infrastructure Gap Analysis conducted with AFCAC, ICAO, and the World Bank, Mataboge revealed that Africa needs between $25 and $30 billion over the next decade to close critical aviation infrastructure gaps. Passenger traffic is projected to triple from 160 million in 2024 to nearly 500 million by 2050, intensifying the urgency for investment.

Key funding requirements include US$10 billion for airport and aerodrome infrastructure and $8 billion for modernizing communication, navigation, and meteorological systems. The AU’s strategy aims to mobilize $10 billion in catalytic public finance to attract an additional $20 billion in private and institutional investment. Through partnerships with Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and AUDA-NEPAD, the AU is aligning investment priorities with SAATM and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

The modernization plan integrates cutting-edge technologies such as Airport Collaborative Decision-Making (A-CDM) and System-Wide Information Management (SWIM) to enable seamless continental airspace. It also incorporates renewable energy solutions at airports to attract green financing and advance sustainability goals.

“As we modernize African skies, we are doing so sustainably,” Mataboge added. “Every project we prepare is designed to meet global green standards, reduce fuel consumption and CO₂ emissions, and make African aviation an attractive asset class for the world’s growing pool of climate-focused capital.”

Mataboge reaffirmed the AU’s commitment to ensuring that a modern, efficient, and sustainable aviation network drives Africa’s economic integration, connectivity, and global competitiveness. The AU’s officials reaffirmed their focus on Africa’s most strategic priorities, including building aviation infrastructure, digital data systems, and data interoperability. The discussion underscored the importance of collaborative efforts in building a better aviation sector across Africa.

Deals and Dollars: Concrete Commitments 

The summit moved beyond dialogue to secure tangible commitments, marked by the signing of three key Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs):

– A partnership between the African Social Security Association and AUDA-NEPAD to channel African pension funds into continental infrastructure.

– An MOU with Qatar Airways establishing a $500 million endowment for renewable energy and climate-aligned industrialization.

– The establishment of the Angola Export and Trade Facility to promote regional cooperation and trade.

Ms. Nardos Bekele-Thomas, CEO of AUDA-NEPAD, reported significant progress since the previous summit in Dakar, Senegal. She announced that the AU, alongside African financial institutions, has already raised $1.5 billion to execute high-impact cross-border projects.

“The lesson from Dakar is clear: we can no longer treat financing as a fragmented market of scattered deals. We must transform it into a unified strategy,” Bekele-Thomas stated. She detailed new financial instruments, including the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa’s Project Development Fund, which has achieved a first close of $118 million and is managed by Africa50.

In his contribution, African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf emphasized that Africa is entering a new phase of self-determination, one in which the continent must take ownership of financing, planning, and implementing its own development. He underscored that infrastructure investment is not merely technical but deeply political and strategic, vital to Africa’s economic sovereignty, competitiveness, and unity. Highlighting progress made under the PIDA framework, he called for an African-driven ecosystem for development financing through domestic resource mobilization, stronger private sector participation, and greater access to climate funds.

Echoing the urgency of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, framed infrastructure investment as a deeply political and strategic imperative for Africa’s economic sovereignty. “We are shifting from a logic of assistance to a logic of alliance, where partners align their engagement with priorities defined by Africa itself,” he declared. He concluded with a powerful vision: “What we are building here are not merely roads and bridges. We are building an Africa that is connected, confident, and sovereign.”

There were special sessions designed to facilitate in-depth due diligence and accelerate projects toward financial close. The summit for Africa’s infrastructure development stands as a definitive moment, signaling Africa’s unified resolve to finance its own destiny and build the interconnected, prosperous future its people deserve.