economics

This year, in the US-China trade war and the grand military parade, China demonstrated economic and military strength that forced the United States to back down. However, Beijing merely displayed its power; various parties discovered that this giant does not know how to wield it.

The US paused its economic attacks on China, but the Dutch government directly “took control of” a Chinese-owned company in the Netherlands—Nexperia—through public authority. The EU expanded anti-dumping measures against China, with France as the main driver behind anti-China economic policies.

The US publicly acknowledged that China’s rising military power in the Western Pacific can no longer be suppressed and adjusted its global strategy to focus on the Western Hemisphere. Yet Japan shifted the Taiwan issue from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, adopting a more confrontational posture and challenging China’s bottom line. Regional countries, in various ways, have called for “peace” in the Taiwan Strait—support that amounts to nothing less than opposing China’s unification and indirectly endorsing Japan’s position. Meanwhile, the Philippines, mired in internal chaos, continued to provoke China in the South China Sea.

Since China has the capability to confront the US, it should have the ability to punish Europe, Japan, and the Philippines for their unfriendliness toward China. But Beijing did not do so. When facing challenges from these parties, it only issued symbolic verbal protests or took measures that failed to eradicate the problems—putting on a full defensive posture but lacking concrete and effective actions. As a result, events often started with thunderous noise but ended with little rain, fizzling out in the end.

From Beijing’s appeasement toward Europe, Japan, and the Philippines, all parties have reason to believe that China is a giant that doesn’t know how to use its own power. This presents a strategic opportunity for the weak to overcome the strong—especially now, as the US contracts its global strategy and distances itself from its allies. Maximizing benefits from China’s side is the rational choice.

For example, with Japan: Beijing responded to Tokyo’s intervention in the Taiwan issue with high-intensity verbal criticism, but its actions were inconsistent with its words. Although it revisited the “enemy state clauses” at the UN, raised the postwar Ryukyu sovereignty issue, and even conducted joint military exercises with Russia 600 kilometers from Tokyo, these actions were far less intense than the rhetoric. Even the verbal criticism cooled down after a month.

The US maintained a low profile on the China-Japan dispute, adopted a cool attitude toward Tokyo, and even indirectly expressed condemnation—likely the main reason Beijing de-escalated. This shows that China’s original intent in handling the incident was to force the US to “decouple” from Japan on the Taiwan issue and isolate Tokyo, which maintains close ties with Taipei.

Influenced by official attitudes, the Chinese people once again mistook official rhetoric for commitments, believing Beijing would go to war if necessary to eradicate Japan’s interference in internal affairs. After all, unresolved deep-seated hatred—akin to a sea of blood—remains between China and Japan. Moreover, this year marks the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, with various events held throughout the year to engrave in memory the national humiliation of Japan’s invasion of China.

But after Trump indirectly criticized Japan for provoking unnecessary disputes, Beijing seemed satisfied and stepped down gracefully. Although the dispute has not ended and continues to develop, like its handling of Philippine provocations, China has placed disputes with neighbors into long-term games, effectively shelving the issues—and causing the Chinese people renewed frustration.

After this three-way interaction, the asymmetry between Beijing’s words and actions has likely become deeply ingrained. In the future, it will be much harder for Beijing to mobilize the 1.4 billion people’s shared enmity.

The key point: In this dispute, who—China, Japan, or the US—gained the greatest substantive strategic benefits? So far, it’s hard to say who won the first round. China appeared to come out looking the best, preserving the most face, yet Japan also gained, and the US obtained leverage for future talks with China.

In the first round of this dispute, China strategically established the legitimacy of denying Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan issue, narrowing Tokyo’s diplomatic space for anti-China actions via Taiwan. Japan’s right wing advanced toward national normalization, hollowing out its peace constitution to cope with US strategic contraction; additionally, the Liberal Democratic Party regained public support. The US demonstrated its influence in East Asia—even after “withdrawing” its military to the second island chain—and raised its bargaining chips at the US-China negotiation table.

However, from a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan gains nothing worth the loss: the Ryukyu Islands will become a burden rather than an outer defense wall. The two major powers, China and the US, will orderly redraw their spheres of influence in East Asia; the US will gain a dignified pretext for abandoning Taiwan, while China will recover Taiwan at a lower cost.

Conversely, beyond the asymmetry between words and actions, there is also asymmetry between actions and strength. Beijing’s greatest loss is that the international community—especially its neighbors and Europe—has seen through China’s essence of appearing fierce but being timid inwardly. They have once again discovered that antagonizing China brings no adverse consequences; on the contrary, it can yield unexpected benefits—provided they give China the face it needs to achieve strategic gains.

For example, Vietnam: After the China-Japan dispute cooled, a Vietnamese warship transited the Taiwan Strait under the pretext of freedom of navigation without prior notification to China, signaling it is not a vassal of Beijing and aligning with Washington’s position.

Vietnam is a major beneficiary of the US-China confrontation, with massive Chinese goods rerouted through Vietnam to the US; transit trade has skyrocketed its economic growth. Thus, it firmly believes maximizing benefits lies in a neutral stance between China and the US. However, from a supply chain perspective, China is the supplier and the US the customer—the latter slightly more important. Factoring in China-Vietnam South China Sea disputes and China’s habitual concessions versus the lethal US carrot-and-stick approach, Vietnam naturally leans more pro-US.

Additionally, during the China-Japan dispute, Singapore’s prime minister publicly sympathized with Japan, while Thailand and Vietnam jointly called for peace in the Taiwan Strait—showing Southeast Asian nations, like Japan, hope to maintain the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait and oppose military conflict in the region, which is equivalent to opposing China’s recovery of Taiwan. Of course, Northeast Asia’s South Korea holds the same view; some countries publicly state it due to internal and US factors, while others choose silence.

China’s neighboring countries all see the fact that the Philippines’ intense anti-China stance has gone unpunished. Despite deep internal political turmoil, Manila can still spare efforts to provoke China in the South China Sea—clearly a profitable path. Neighbors conclude: If China can concede on core interests, what can’t it concede?

On the other side of the globe, Europe has noticed this phenomenon too. The Dutch government rashly took over a Chinese enterprise, severely damaging China’s interests and prestige; Beijing’s response started strong but ended weakly—mainly to avoid impacting China-EU trade, even amid decoupling risks everywhere. No wonder Britain subsequently sanctioned two Chinese companies on suspicion of cyberattacks, unafraid of angering Beijing just before Prime Minister Starmer’s planned January visit to China.

In short, whether on the regional Taiwan issue or extraterritorial China-EU economic issues, China faces a broken windows effect. Although from a grand strategic view, all related events remain controllable for Beijing, appeasement only invites more trouble. It’s not impossible that China will eventually be unable to suppress public indignation and be forced to suddenly take tough measures—like at the end of the pandemic, when people took to the streets and Beijing immediately lifted lockdowns, rendering all prior lockdown justifications untenable overnight.

Indeed, China currently appears as a giant that doesn’t know how to use its power. But when a rabbit is cornered, it bites. When Beijing is forced to align actions with strength, the intensity will be astonishing; then, China will want more than just face.

There’s a saying: Attack is the best defense. But with its long history, this nation views offense and defense more comprehensively. The Chinese believe that when weak, attack is the best defense; when holding an advantage, defense is the best attack. As long as the opponent’s offense can be controlled within acceptable limits, persistent defense inflicts less damage than the opponent’s self-exhaustion in stamina. Conversely, when at a disadvantage, a full assault is needed to reverse it.

In other words, China doesn’t fail to know how to use power; it deems using power uneconomical. This explains why the West walks a path of decline while China continues rising—the latter accumulates power, and the former overdraws it.

President Trump is shrewd and pragmatic; he knows cornering China awakens the giant, so he eased US-China relations. But simultaneously, the US doesn’t mind—and even quietly encourages—its allies to provoke China, while positioning itself as a mediator to benefit. This is a reasonable tactic and the most effective offensive against China.

Xi Jinping once said China has great patience—implying that if patience is exhausted, the world will see a completely different China, one that uses power without regard for cost.

The Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2025 identified eight key tasks for China’s economic work in 2026. Several of these areas particularly interest me as a China expert. Among the most important tasks for China’s economic work in 2026 is promoting a policy of supporting service exports through various measures to boost household income, raise basic pensions, and remove restrictions in the consumer sector. What struck me most during the Central Economic Conference meetings in Beijing in December 2025 was its emphasis on China’s continued opening up. This will provide tremendous global growth opportunities by expanding trade and investment, especially in the technology and renewable energy sectors, deepening integration into global value chains, and increasing demand for resources. This will drive the global economy in conjunction with China and create new partnerships, focusing on “high-quality development” and “high-level opening up” as fundamental pillars for mutual benefit and to stimulate innovation within the Chinese economy.

–            Main Tasks of the Beijing Economic Conference in December 2025

1)       Providing a huge market and investment opportunities: By increasingly encouraging the opening of its doors to foreign companies, China will create diverse opportunities in various sectors such as technology, innovation, and services.

2)       Making the Chinese economy an engine of global growth: The recovery and growth of the global economy depend heavily on China’s contribution, which accounts for a large share of the global economy.

3) Expanding free trade: China strongly supports free trade and the signing of regional agreements, reducing barriers and promoting trade exchanges.

4) Expanding the wheel of Chinese overseas investment: By significantly deepening the contribution of Chinese direct investment abroad to the economic development of other countries.

5)       Promoting innovation-led development in China to accelerate the development of new growth engines in 2026: This will bring significant benefits to foreign consumers and investors.  The meeting approved a package of policies aimed at strengthening the role of companies in innovation and implementing a new round of measures to develop high-quality key industrial chains, deepening and expanding fields such as artificial intelligence, which will bring more innovation opportunities to the world.

– Sectors in which China will expand in the future:

A) Innovation and Technology: China is a leader in fields such as artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and agricultural technology, driving global innovation.

B) Advanced Manufacturing: China’s rapid transition to high-quality development focuses on industrial upgrading and technological innovation, creating new products and services.

C)     Promoting Globalization: China opposes protectionism and supports inclusive economic globalization, creating a more interconnected and integrated global economy.

D)     Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind: The ultimate goal of China’s economic growth is to achieve common development and improve livelihoods for all, promoting win-win international cooperation.

–             Areas of China’s contribution to global development and the global economy in 2026, through:

1)       Product supply: As the “world’s factory,” with a focus on advanced technology.

2)       Demand stimulation: China’s enormous demand for commodities, energy, and raw materials supports other economies.

3)       Knowledge and technology transfer: Through investments and joint ventures.

4)       Support for sustainable development: By focusing on clean energy and green sectors.

   Accordingly, we understand that the main tasks for 2026, identified during the Central Economic Conference in Beijing in December 2026, are comprehensive and diverse. Chief among them is building a strong domestic market in China, reflecting a future strategic direction for the Chinese economy. This will promote sustainable development, support high-quality growth, foster innovation-led development, and uphold openness to the outside world. This means providing broader development opportunities for foreign investment and achieving growth that is synchronized with the development of the Chinese economy.

The recent decision by the United States Navy (USN) to cancel the Constellation-class frigate program after eight years of development and billions of dollars in investment represents a significant setback in US naval modernization drive. The Constellation-class was meant to become a modern, multi-mission combat vessel capable of relieving operational pressure from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and narrowing the growing numerical advantage of the China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Instead, continuous design changes, and subsequent delays changed what was supposed to be an easy-to-construct warship platform into a costly and significantly delayed project. After failure of several major projects like Zumwalt destroyer and Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate project has degraded Washington’s efforts to sustain the naval balance of power against rapidly expanding naval fleet of PLAN.

The Constellation-class project was a product of USN’s urgent need to fill the gap left behind Oliver Hazard Perry-class (OHP) frigates which were phased out from USN services in 2015. The OHPs, despite lack of built-in vertical launch system (VLS), were regarded for their reliability, and versatility in missions ranging from open-ocean escorting to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW). The retired hulls of OHPs were purchased by navies of several US allies including Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Egypt, Pakistan, Spain, Taiwan, and Turkiye. Their withdrawal from USN created a capability void that the Littoral LCS program – comprising of Freedom class and Independent class vessels – was expected to fill. However the LCS encountered numerous mechanical failures in hulls and propulsion system, cost overruns, and capability gaps that rendered it unsuitable for missions in contested naval environments.

As USN halted further procurement and early retirement of LCS, it attempted to follow a new approach, i.e., opt for a proven design tailored to meet USN requirements. Franco-Italian FREMM frigate design was chosen as the baseline for a modern, affordable American Constellation-class frigate. At initial stage, it appeared a sound idea. The FREMM platform had already proven itself in European naval forces, and the USN specific variant was modified to carry 32 Mk-41 VLS cells capable of firing SM-series interceptors and even Tomahawk cruise missiles, alongside Naval Strike Missiles. This program committed to be a potent yet affordable and rapid addition in USN fleet while retaining 85 percent commonality with original design. But as USN continued to impose new requirements, complications in construction, and alteration in designing began to inhibit the efficiency of the program. Constellation-class frigate undertook major size increment than parent FREMM design, stretching from 466 feet to nearly 500 and increasing to over 7,200 tons. Instead of leveraging a proven design, USN trapped itself with a pseudo-original design which now shared mere 15 percent commonality with the original design. By 2024, the first frigate was already three years behind schedule, and the program’s cost enlarged well beyond initial estimations. Faced with increasing costs, long delays, and design complications, the USN eventually axed the Constellation-class frigate program too, leaving behind a significant gap in USN surface fleet which this frigate was supposed to fill.

USN now wants a new frigate class structured on proven American design by 2028. Reportedly, the design of US Coast Guard (USCG) Legend Class cutter will be used as baseline to develop a USN specific variant. These 4,600 tons class ships are capable of conducting blue water operations and support 57mm deck gun, Phalanx CIWS, and flight deck with hanger to support rotary wing operations.  Its USN specific frigate version can accommodate a 16-cell Mk-41 VLS module, 8x Harpoon/NSM cruise missiles in canisters, RIM-116 Sea RAM, and torpedo tubes. Using an American proven design for mass producing USN specific frigate of relatively smaller size and low tonnage will allow USN to produce and commission larger number of hulls in relatively less time. But on flip side, this new frigate class will be far less capable than recently cancelled Constellation-class as they are unlikely to carry Aegis CMS, and will have significantly less range, endurance, and weapon load-out.

Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the rapid growth of China’s naval power. PLAN is now commissioning highly capable naval combatants including flat-deck aircraft carrier (Fujian), next generation destroyers (Type-055 and Type-52DL) and frigates (Type-54B), and new class of conventional as well as nuclear submarines. Chinese coast guard, and maritime militia collectively operate more than 750 vessels – more than twice the number of hulls under US control. While the US Navy still retains qualitative advantages, especially in nuclear submarines and carrier aviation, trends in shipbuilding capacity significantly favor Beijing. China commands more than half of global commercial ship production, while the US share barely registers at a tenth of a percent. This allows China to mass produce modern warships for PLAN at a pace the United States cannot simply match.

Although USN plans to expand its fleet from 296 manned warships to 381 manned warships and 134 unmanned vessels by 2045, but so far trends of decline hull strengths have been observed. Ticonderoga class cruisers are gradually retiring, next-generation DDG(X) destroyers are still in far future, Ford class nuclear aircraft-carriers and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are facing delays, and Arleigh Burke Flight-III destroyers are not producing at rate faster enough to accommodate these growing gaps. Unmanned vessels are sometimes perceived as a viable solution to fill-up the gaps but these vessels cannot replace manned warships on one-on-one basis. In sum, aforementioned projects expose the persistent limitations of ship production capacity of US shipyards. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that reviving the shipbuilding sector to meet the USN long-term needs would require annual investments of more than $40 billion for three consecutive decades—a staggering commitment that would require political consensus and sustained strategic vision.

The cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate, just like past projects of Zumwalt and LCS- thus represents a persistent crisis in US naval build-up. As China accelerates its naval production and expands power projection into the Indo-Pacific, the United States finds itself struggling to revive its own shipbuilding capacity. Whether Washington can reverse this trajectory will depend on its ability to reform procurement processes, invest in industrial capacity, and adopt realistic designs aligned with strategic needs. Without such changes USN risks entering the next decade with too few ships to meet global demands.

The Central Economic Conference meeting in Beijing in December 2025 proposed that “adhering to opening up to the outside world and promoting win-win cooperation in various fields” should be one of the main tasks of China’s economic work in the coming year. In 2025, China issued the “Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment in 2025,” and simultaneously, the 8th China International Import Expo 2025 was held in Shanghai. It was also agreed that the Hainan Free Trade Port would officially launch island-wide independent customs operations on December 18, 2025. This would bring numerous opportunities and momentum to support China’s continued opening up for global economic development.

 The year 2026 marks the launch of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. The Central Economic Conference was held in Beijing in December 2025, a significant historical juncture as the 14th Five-Year Plan drew to a close and the 15th began. This held particular significance, as the world looked to China’s economic planning for the coming year for inspiration and opportunities. China’s continued opening up in 2025 represents a vital engine for the global economy, contributing approximately 30% to global growth.

–            The opportunities and momentum generated by these policies are evident in the following areas:

1)       Deepening Institutional Opening through the Hainan Free Trade Port

  The launch of independent customs operations at Hainan Port on December 18, 2025, marked a milestone, transforming the port into a special customs zone governed by high-level international trade regulations.  With China’s ambitious trade facilitation plan, the percentage of duty-free goods in Hainan has risen from 21% to 74%, attracting significant investment. The island has already attracted more than 1.2 million enterprises.

2)       Stabilizing Foreign Investment (2025 Action Plan)

The “2025 Foreign Investment Stabilization Action Plan” aims to boost international investor confidence through practical measures, including opening new sectors by expanding pilot programs in telecommunications, healthcare, and education and supporting manufacturing and services by lifting restrictions on foreign investment across the entire manufacturing sector and encouraging investment in high-tech industries and green development. This has yielded numerous positive results for the Chinese economy, with China registering more than 49,000 new foreign-funded companies in the first half of 2025, representing a year-on-year increase of over 16%.

3)       China International Import Expo (CIIE 2025)

  The eighth edition of the expo in Shanghai solidified China’s position as a global launchpad for new products, achieving record-breaking figures. The expo saw record initial deals worth US$83 billion, a 4.5% increase over the previous year. With broad international participation, more than 4,500 companies from 138 countries participated, showcasing 461 new products and technologies.

4)       The Strategic Direction of the Chinese Economy for 2026 and Beyond

  The Central Economic Work Conference, held in Beijing in December 2025, affirmed that the main task for the coming year, 2026, is to ensure a strong start to the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) while achieving mutually beneficial cooperation. This will be accomplished by China focusing on aligning its domestic regulations with high-level international economic and trade standards in areas such as government procurement, e-commerce, and finance.  This should coincide with achieving sustainable growth in the Chinese economy, especially given the International Monetary Fund’s upward revision of its growth forecast for China to 5% for 2025, which underscores the resilience of the Chinese economy in the face of global shocks.

  Accordingly, we understand the extent of China’s aspirations to achieve new developmental and economic leaps during 2026, with numerous promising future opportunities available to China. It possesses the capacity to simultaneously improve the quality and scale of development, achieve a strong launch for its 15-year plan, and offer more ambitious investment and development opportunities to the world. 

Dealmakers in 2025 enjoyed a near-record year for mergers and acquisitions, despite a turbulent spring that threatened hopes of a broader revival. So far this year, there were 70 global deals valued at more than $10 billion each, 22 of them in the fourth quarter, according to Dealogic. Total deal value has surpassed $4.8 trillion, up 41% from 2024, though the number of deals fell 6% to 38,395, marking the second-largest year ever behind 2021.

The spike in mega deals reflects a growing focus on scale. “M&A today is all about the mega deals, the race for scale,” said Anu Aiyengar, JPMorgan’s global head of advisory and M&A. There were at least four deals above $50 billion, with two notable bids for Warner Bros. Discovery totaling over $80 billion and Paramount Skydance’s $108 billion hostile offer.

Drivers of Late-Year Rally

A more permissive regulatory environment in the U.S., coupled with a calmer macroeconomic outlook, is encouraging companies to pursue transformative deals. With antitrust scrutiny easing under the Trump administration, boards and executives are seizing opportunities for strategic acquisitions, according to Frank Aquila, partner at Sullivan & Cromwell.

Dealmakers also say valuations are rising, prompting companies to pay higher multiples while expecting their own stocks to maintain relative strength. “Valuations have been bid up and we’ve seen clients be more aggressive in terms of multiples,” said Lazard’s Mark McMaster.

Technology and AI Influence

Technology deals, particularly those tied to artificial intelligence, have played a prominent role. OpenAI raised $40 billion in funding led by SoftBank, and Aligned Data Centers was acquired for $40 billion. Morgan Stanley’s John Collins said companies are pursuing scale to invest in AI-driven changes, both in tech and across other industries.

Cross-Border and Global Trends

Cross-border M&A activity surged in 2025, reaching $1.24 trillion, the highest since 2021. U.S. and UK companies were the most targeted, while U.S., France, and Japan were the most acquisitive. Multinational companies, particularly from Europe and Japan, are investing in the U.S. to capitalize on the world’s largest market. China and Japan are also seeing strong outbound activity, with Japanese deal values boosted by high-profile transactions like OpenAI and Toyota Industries.

Corporate divestitures are rising, up 30% in volume from last year, exemplified by Holcim’s $30 billion spin-off of its North American business, Amrize. Private equity is also regaining momentum, with global buyouts reaching $1.1 trillion, a 51% increase from 2024.

Outlook for 2026

Dealmakers expect the M&A rally to continue into 2026, with $50 billion–$70 billion deals already in the pipeline and a $100 billion tech transaction not ruled out. Analysts see a multi-year run of high-value deals, fueled by scale-seeking corporations, AI-related opportunities, cross-border expansion, and corporate restructuring. While caution remains in politically uncertain markets like the UK, the global appetite for transformative deals appears set to drive another strong year for mergers and acquisitions.

With information from Reuters.

Tesla’s board of directors has earned more than $3 billion through stock awards since 2004, an amount that dwarfs compensation at other major U.S. technology firms. CEO Elon Musk’s brother Kimbal has earned nearly $1 billion, while director Ira Ehrenpreis collected $869 million and board chair Robyn Denholm $650 million. Most of these windfalls came from stock options that appreciated dramatically as Tesla’s share price soared.

Why It Matters
The outsized compensation raises questions about corporate governance and board independence. Experts argue that such high pay could compromise directors’ ability to objectively oversee Tesla and Musk, as a large portion of their wealth is tied to stock performance rather than cash. Critics also note that Tesla is one of the few major firms where directors are paid predominantly in options rather than shares, magnifying upside potential with limited downside risk.

Stock Option Controversy
Tesla directors have received compensation primarily through stock options, rather than shares. This practice allows them to profit if Tesla’s stock rises without incurring losses if it falls, unlike restricted stock which better aligns interests with shareholders. Between 2018 and 2024, Tesla directors averaged $1.7 million annually despite suspending pay for four years, more than double the average of Meta directors, the next highest-paid among the “Magnificent Seven” tech companies.

Legal and Governance Issues
Tesla’s board suspended new stock grants in 2021 following a shareholder lawsuit alleging excessive pay. The board has also faced scrutiny in a Delaware court over Musk’s 2018 compensation package, with the judge ruling that excessive pay and personal ties compromised CEO-pay negotiations. The board proposed a new pay package for Musk in 2024 potentially worth $1 trillion in Tesla stock over the next decade.

Stakeholders include Tesla’s board members, CEO Elon Musk, shareholders, corporate-governance experts, and the wider investment community. Oversight and accountability are central concerns, as compensation structures can influence board decisions and shareholder trust.

Comparison With Tech Peers
Other major tech firms like Alphabet, Meta, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, and Nvidia (“Magnificent Seven”) have also seen stock-based wealth increases for directors, but none have granted awards as concentrated or directly tied to board service as Tesla. Lifetime earnings for Tesla directors far exceed peers when factoring in appreciated stock value.

What’s Next
Governance experts suggest reforms such as paying directors in restricted stock rather than options, and greater shareholder oversight of compensation plans. Tesla’s board must navigate the delicate balance of incentivising directors while maintaining independence in overseeing Musk and the company. Legal proceedings and shareholder scrutiny over Musk’s latest pay package are ongoing and may influence future board compensation practices.

Additional Considerations
The analysis raises broader questions about tech-sector governance, the risks of incentive structures tied to stock performance, and the potential misalignment between directors’ personal wealth and long-term shareholder interests. Tesla’s board, given its outsized compensation, will remain a focus for regulators and investors alike.

With information from an exclusive Reuters report.

The seventh Moscow Interior and Design Week has emerged as a major draw for entrepreneurs from the Middle East, underscoring shifting international interest in Russia’s design and creative industries.

Organizers and exhibitors said that while previous editions of the event were dominated by visitors from China and European countries, this year saw a notable increase in business delegations from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Attendees from the region praised the exhibition’s organization and the creative approach to showcasing design concepts.

“We had long heard that Moscow is becoming a global center for interior design, but the fact that this event is now in its seventh year convinced us to come as part of a large business mission,” said Mona Negm, chief executive officer of Masahat Interior & Architectural Design. Demand from clients for distinctive, one-of-a-kind interiors is growing, she said, adding that Moscow-based manufacturers demonstrated an ability to compete with leading international studios. Negm described the exhibition as “the most beautiful in the world.”

In addition to business visitors, the event also attracted a growing number of tourists from the Middle East, according to participants. Visitors frequently noted the distinctive aesthetic approach of Moscow designers, particularly in decorative elements.

Exhibitors said guests from the UAE showed strong interest in living room furniture, ceramics and floor lamps—items they view as versatile for both residential and office interiors. As a result, unique design pieces are finding buyers not only among professional procurement specialists but also individual tourists.

“In previous years, foreign visitors to our stand were mostly tourists from China and Western Europe,” said Semen Ivanov, founder of Burg&Glass. “This time, we were surprised by the strong interest from visitors from the Middle East. Many said they came to see Moscow ahead of the New Year holidays and decided to visit the city’s main furniture and décor exhibition as a priority.” Several visitors, he added, described the event as the most beautiful design week they had attended.

The seventh Moscow Interior and Design Week is being held from Dec. 11 to Dec. 14 in the Russian capital. Alongside the main exhibition, the event features an extensive business program with expert-led sessions. Speakers include Reem Bin Karam, chief executive officer of the UAE’s Irthi Contemporary Crafts Council, who is scheduled to speak on Dec. 13 about how professional designers combine styles, forms, textures and patterns to create cohesive interiors.

Tourism has been said to be The Gambia lifeline. The Smiling Coast has been receiving thousands of visitors who come to the region due to its warm reception and lively culture. Tourism has been touted as one of the greatest success stories in the country with almost a fifth of the national GDP and with thousands of employees in the formal and informal sectors. But it is a silent fact, seldom admitted, that beneath the smiling faces and the colorful postcards there is a lot more to be lost than gained by the Gambia in its tourism business. Tourism appears as a treasure of the state, however, to a great extent it turned out to be a trap in the economy.

The Gambia imported into its own country has followed an economic paradigm of liberalism, despite the fact that it idealizes open markets, deregulation, and foreign investment as the fastest way to development. The premise was straightforward, with opening up the tourism industry to foreigners, the nation would acquire employment, expertise, competition and eventually general prosperity. The tourism situation in Gambia today however tells a different story. It is not romantic, empowering or lucrative as many make it out to be. Interdependence has not brought about mutual prosperity; it has brought dependence.

 A report released by UNCTAD (2022), the Gambia is losing up to 70 percent of its tourism income to foreign owned hotels, offshore booking systems, imported goods, airlines and repatriation of earnings. Most of the payments that are made by many tourists are made in Europe prior to getting on the plane. The government of Gambians has lost most of the potential earnings by the time they find themselves in Banjul.

This trend in the economy is not solely possible. It is indicative of a world dynamic as such as defined by dependency theorist Andre Gunder Frank (1966) who opined that developing countries tend to provide labour, culture, and even resources, as wealth and power is drained to more dominant players in the global arena.

Control of tourism in Gambia by the foreigners is not merely a matter of cash but a question of power. Major tour operators, international booking networks and foreign hotel chains are often in charge of the decisions of marketing, pricing, target groups and national branding. The industry involves local stakeholders, such as guesthouse owners, tour guides, craft sellers, musicians, farmers, taxi drivers, etc., who are not architects of the industry.

According to Robert Gilpin, a political economist (1987) cautioned that the global marketplace does not operate in terms of morality and fairness but on the basis of power, interests and strategic advantage. The adoption of liberal optimism in Gambia presupposed that the openness would bring about prosperity by default. But openness lacks strategy, and interdependence has no bargaining power; it is easy to exploit such weaklings. Well-intended policies without strategic protection are now yielding their results on the Gambia.

This does not imply that The Gambia should isolate and give up tourism. Tourism is one of the most feasible pillars of development of the country with limited natural resources, small domestic market, small industrial capacity and its geographical location. The problem of the model is not its structure, but its structure. The problem is not the existence of the foreigners but the lack of Gambians in the core of the industry. The issue is with ownership and control, unequal distribution of ownership, control and value.

Here the contemporary mercantilistic approach applies. Global engagement is not rejected in mercantilism but there must be strategic engagement.  It does not see national wealth as the by-product of open markets, but a resource that has to be maintained and nurtured. A state that is mercantilist does not just watch over markets, it controls them. This is not to shut the borders but to make sure that national interests take precedence, relationships have to be founded on equal footing and economy has to feed its own citizens before it feeds others.

According to Peter Evans (1995), a political economist, refers to this as embedded autonomy a model, in which the state is strong, capable and visionary, but is also tightly related to society and local industries.

Three strategic pillars on which a mercantilist turn in Gambian tourism must be based are:

The ownership of the Gambians should be central and not peripheral.

The government assistance should be in form of available financing, taxation reforms, tourism incubators, land protection policies, investment literacy and procurement reforms which will favor Gambian owned hotels, lodges, transport organizations, tour agencies and tourism academies. No country can establish long term prosperity based on leased platforms.

Tourism has to be associated with agriculture, manufacturing, and creative industries.

Importation of food, drinks, furniture, art, souvenirs, and building materials has been a significant missed opportunity to most tourist hotels. The hospitality industry should be provided by Gambian farmers, carpenters, craft makers, tailors, artists, and designers. Once tourism sustains other industries, the money circulates and multiplies and is retained in the country.

The Gambia has to regain its tourism identity and branding.

It is now being promoted as a cheap winter resort to the rest of the world instead of a cultural giant. The Gambian culture, heritage, and values should become the driving force of the new tourism narrative, developed by Gambians themselves.

Critics tend to believe that The Gambia is too small to make bargaining power. However, size is not as important as strategy in international politics. Through ECOWAS and the African Union, small states are able to form regional blocs and speak with one voice.

The current trends in the world are not towards economic liberalism blindly. Even countries that were once the proponents of open markets are currently reshoring their industries, subsidizing, and empowering national value chains.

I recall how, when I was still teaching EU law at ULB, I used to point to Article 122 TFEU with a certain pride bordering on mischief. “Students,” I would say, “we always complain that the treaties leave us powerless in a crisis—but look, quietly hidden in plain sight, there is this little Swiss-army-knife provision that lets the Council act fast, by qualified majority, in a spirit of solidarity, when severe economic difficulties arise.” I presented it as one of the smartest pieces of constitutional engineering in the entire treaty. Today, I am no longer so proud.

The European Commission is now invoking that very Article 122(1) TFEU in December 2025 to make the immobilization of €210 billion of Russian central bank assets permanent and to transform them into collateral for massive loans to Ukraine. Yet Article 122 is an economic-policy tool—not a foreign-policy or sanctions instrument. Freezing a third country’s sovereign reserves is, by definition, a restrictive measure governed by Article 215 TFEU, which requires unanimity under the CFSP.

The objective behind this legal switch is transparent: to bypass the vetoes of Hungary and possibly Slovakia. But this is a textbook evasion of the unanimity rule, the very type of maneuver the Court of Justice has repeatedly condemned—most famously in its 2012 ruling on sanctions against Zimbabwe.

Nor are the textual prerequisites of Article 122(1) even remotely satisfied. Its triggers—“severe difficulties in the supply of certain products, notably energy” or threats to the balance of payments—simply do not correspond to political inconvenience in renewing sanctions. And the Court has never equated a geopolitical stalemate with an “economic emergency.”

The Commission’s approach also stretches the Union’s powers far beyond their constitutional limits. The EU does not possess a general emergency competence and has no authority to adopt quasi-confiscatory measures against the central bank of a third state. Under customary international law, central-bank assets enjoy near-absolute immunity; using them as loan collateral without judicial process or a peace treaty amounts, in many experts’ view, to unlawful expropriation.

Such a precedent would be economically reckless. The ECB has repeatedly warned—if mostly behind closed doors—of the catastrophic effects this could have on the euro’s status as a reserve currency. The “without prejudice” clause in Article 122 does not grant it supremacy over more specific legal bases that deliberately require unanimity.

And even if one were to ignore these structural limits, the litigation risk is enormous. Should the Court annul the regulation—a highly probable outcome once Belgium files—the assets will need to be released, the loans will become illegal, and both the Union and Euroclear could face joint liability in the hundreds of billions.

For all these reasons, the overwhelming majority of independent EU and international-law scholars view the attempt to rely on Article 122(1) as legally indefensible. The political majority may still force the measure through in December 2025, but litigation is inevitable. When the action for annulment reaches Luxembourg, the court is likely to strike it down within one or two years. And in the process, my once-beloved Article 122—the provision I used to celebrate as a masterpiece of flexible, solidarity-driven drafting—may emerge severely damaged, perhaps permanently.

I never thought I would live to see the day when this provision would be twisted into what the Belgian Prime Minister has openly called “theft.” One further doctrinal point makes the misuse even clearer: Article 122(1) defines its object and purpose with remarkable precision. It authorizes Council action “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States” when Member States face severe economic difficulties. This solidarity clause is not decorative; the Court has repeatedly affirmed its binding nature.

A systemic reading reinforces this conclusion. Article 122(1) cannot be used to grant financial assistance—a power explicitly reserved for Article 122(2), which functions as a lex specialis. Measures under paragraph 1 therefore cannot include loans or any other form of financial aid, let alone the conversion of a third country’s frozen sovereign assets into collateral for a €100–200 billion lending operation to another third country. The Commission’s proposal is not merely constitutionally illegitimate for hijacking a CFSP sanction; it is textually impossible.

Recent developments only underscore the trend toward abusing Article 122 as a general crisis-financing mechanism. On 19 March 2025, the Commission proposed a Council regulation establishing the “SAFE instrument” (Security Action for Europe) to rapidly expand Europe’s arms industry. Although the proposal generically cites “Article 122 TFEU,” it is clear from its substance—providing financial assistance to Member States to support urgent, large-scale defense investments—that it relies on Article 122(2).

The SAFE regulation would mobilize €150 billion from the EU budget in the form of subsidies and subsidized loans for national defense projects. Since Member States may receive financial aid from the Union budget on account of severe difficulties only under Article 122(2), the proposal cannot be grounded in Article 122(1). Its explanatory memorandum invokes the “exceptional security context” and the need for “massive investments” in defense manufacturing—but these are political arguments, not legal ones.

Taken together, the Russian-assets plan and the SAFE proposal amount to a systematic attempt to transform Article 122 into a universal crisis and security financing clause—a purpose it was never designed to fulfill.

The European Parliament, while strongly supportive of assisting Ukraine, has raised alarm over this distortion of a 1957 economic-emergency provision, adopted in secret, by a qualified majority, without parliamentary scrutiny. When the case reaches Luxembourg, the Parliament will argue—rightly—that the Emperor has no clothes. And on current jurisprudence, the Court is likely to agree.

Article 122 allows the Council to legislate alone. That was grudgingly tolerated for €3 billion of extraordinary own resources during COVID. For €210 billion of another state’s sovereign assets in peacetime, it is constitutionally explosive.

The real motive remains the neutralization of Hungary’s veto in the CFSP. But the Court has annulled every previous attempt to launder a CFSP measure through a non-CFSP legal basis (see Case C-130/10). And while the war undeniably harms Europe’s economy, the Court has never accepted “we need to bypass a veto” as equivalent to an energy-supply crisis or a balance-of-payments emergency.

If the General Court or the ECJ strikes down the €150 billion defense fund for exceeding the scope of Article 122, then the Russian assets regulation—which is even further removed from classic economic policy grounds—has virtually no chance of surviving judicial review.

China has successfully achieved economic development in recent years by shifting towards a model that relies on stimulating domestic demand. This not only ensures economic stability but also addresses crucial considerations related to China’s national security and international competitiveness. China has indeed succeeded in this by focusing on four key factors that are the main determinants of its remarkable economic growth: economic reform policies, the government’s commitment to Chinese-style reform, the government’s dedication to integrating into the global economy, and industrial upgrading and technological innovation. The Chinese government has also unveiled measures to boost service consumption and pledged to open up more sectors, such as the internet, culture, and the promotion of hosting international sporting events, in an effort to bolster the Chinese economy and connect it globally.

 China’s Fifteenth Five-Year Plan further spurred this shift from high-speed growth to high-quality growth, placing science and technology at the forefront of national priorities.  Over the past five years, China has strengthened its comprehensive opening-up policy, implementing practical measures to improve the business environment and fostering continued cooperation with all countries, especially developing nations of the Global South, through its Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative has become a model for a new type of international cooperation and has been recognized as such by international organizations, including the United Nations. During this same period, China has also made concerted efforts to improve the ecological environment and fulfill its international commitments through its “green economy” policy. This policy emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to environmentally friendly economic projects worldwide, particularly in African, developing, and Globally Southern countries. China is rapidly advancing a cleaner and greener economy, with strong commitments to environmental protection, clean energy, ecological protection, and the development of green industries.

 China’s economic development has achieved remarkable success in recent years through a long-term plan focused on economic reforms. This plan involved transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, adopting a policy of openness to foreign investment, establishing special economic zones to attract foreign investment, and investing heavily in infrastructure development, particularly in transportation, energy, communications, information technology, and artificial intelligence. China has also become the world’s largest exporter of advanced technology, with the Chinese government allocating approximately 2.6% of its GDP to research and development across various economic sectors. Furthermore, China boasts the world’s fastest-growing consumer market and is the second-largest importer of goods.  China’s industrial output is double that of the United States. The Chinese government has addressed poverty through development, guided by market principles, economic restructuring, the utilization of domestic resources, peaceful production development, and the strengthening of self-reliance and development capabilities. It has employed various methods and approaches to reduce poverty through self-reliance and hard work, building infrastructure in agriculture, industry, roads, and irrigation, providing the necessary funds for development and training, and allocating all necessary resources for technological advancements in each sector. Simultaneously, efforts have been made to protect the environment by conserving soil and water, promoting ecological construction, and implementing the sustainable development strategy set by the central government. China has not only eradicated poverty but has also raised the standard of living in all areas, enabling it to compete with developed nations in many fields.

 One of the most prominent strengths of the Chinese economy in recent years is its success in achieving high levels in education and scientific research. China spends 2.5% of its GDP on research and development.  The number of people employed in research and development sectors is approximately 1,687 per million inhabitants, enabling China to remain a leading exporter of high-tech goods globally. This has been achieved while the Chinese government has encouraged the formation of rural and private enterprises, liberalized foreign trade and investment, eased state control over certain prices, and invested in industrial production and workforce education.

What Happened

Netflix has announced a proposed $72 billion acquisition of Warner Bros Discovery, aiming to absorb HBO Max and consolidate a subscriber base of 428 million. To justify the massive scale, Netflix argues it needs this merger to compete effectively with YouTube, which Nielsen ranks as America’s most-watched TV platform. However, antitrust experts and former regulators are deeply skeptical, noting that YouTube’s model built on user-generated content, influencers, and advertising, differs fundamentally from Netflix’s premium, scripted, subscription-based ecosystem. The Department of Justice and global regulators are expected to scrutinize the deal closely, particularly Netflix’s claim that it competes in the same market as YouTube.

Why It Matters

This isn’t just another media merger, it’s a defining test for how regulators view competition in the digital entertainment era. If accepted, Netflix’s “YouTube as rival” argument could set a precedent allowing giant streaming platforms to consolidate further by defining their market extremely broadly. The deal would give Netflix unprecedented control over both premium original content and major legacy film/TV libraries, potentially allowing it to dominate pricing and distribution in the paid streaming sector. How regulators respond will signal whether antitrust enforcement can keep pace with the evolving, platform-driven media landscape.

Critical Analysis

Netflix’s YouTube argument faces several critical weaknesses. First, content and business models are fundamentally different: Netflix invests billions in exclusive, scripted originals and operates on a subscription-first model, while YouTube monetizes user-generated videos through ads and creator partnerships. Second, historical precedent works against Netflix: regulators have repeatedly rejected broad market definitions in favor of specific “sub-markets” (e.g., “premium natural supermarkets” in the Whole Foods case), and internal company documents often reveal how firms really view their competition.

Third, new merger review rules will force Netflix to turn over internal strategic documents early, which could undermine its public claims if those materials don’t mention YouTube as a primary competitor. Finally, Netflix’s claim that bundling will lower prices for consumers is viewed with extreme skepticism by regulators, who often see such promises as unenforceable and worry more about price hikes for non-bundled users.

Conclusion

Netflix faces an uphill battle to convince regulators that swallowing Warner Bros Discovery is necessary to compete with YouTube. The DOJ is likely to define the relevant market narrowly, around premium, subscription-based streaming, where the combined entity would hold overwhelming share and pricing power. Unless Netflix can produce compelling internal evidence that it genuinely views YouTube as a direct competitor for the same viewer time and dollars, this deal is at high risk of being challenged or blocked. The outcome will not only shape the future of streaming consolidation but also test the boundaries of modern antitrust logic in a platform-dominated world.

This briefing is based on information from Reuters.

Over the next eighteen months, Morocco aims to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Chinese counterparts in two main fields: artificial intelligence and electric vehicles, including batteries and components. This document examines the current factors driving cooperation, predicts the development of technology transfer and industrial growth, and highlights the promising prospects for Moroccan industries to expand into global markets by 2026. The analysis presents recent developments, such as plans for battery factories, the entry of Chinese electric vehicle brands, and increased AI initiatives, and offers policy suggestions to maximize benefits while reducing potential risks. 

Morocco’s industrial strategy over the past decade has been primarily focused on exports and anchored by major firms. Large assembly plants such as Renault and Stellantis, along with upgrades to ports and logistics networks like those in Tangier, have helped establish the country as a key auto hub serving Europe and Africa. At the same time, Morocco is actively advancing its digital and artificial intelligence capabilities through government conferences, initiatives to support startups, and collaborations between the public and private sectors. On the Chinese side, policies and corporate strategies aim to position battery and electric vehicle value-chain assets near Europe. They are also working to diversify manufacturing locations and secure supplies of rare earth elements and other upstream materials. Recent announcements, including plans for a significant Chinese gigafactory and several upstream projects around Tangier and Jorf Lasfar, suggest a strong potential for collaboration. Morocco’s strategic location, combined with China’s manufacturing ambitions, makes their partnership highly promising.

1.⁠ ⁠Two Pillars of Cooperation: What to Expect

 Electric vehicles and batteries.

Chinese companies are investing heavily in Morocco’s battery and component plants, including a gigafactory, while Chinese EV brands enter the local market through distributors. Meanwhile, global vehicle makers are expanding EV production, increasing demand for batteries and parts.

Likely near-term developments up to 2026:

1. Battery production will broaden, with final outputs (tens of GWh) from Chinese investments coming online or under construction. This will enable local assembly and some exports to Europe and Africa, transitioning Morocco from an assembly hub to also producing cells, cathodes, and anodes.

2. The local parts ecosystem will strengthen. Chinese upstream investments like copper and electrode factories will strengthen Moroccan suppliers in metal stamping, wiring harnesses, and thermal systems, enabling them to elevate and compete for supply contracts.

3. Chinese EV brands like BYD are expected to expand sales and may establish CKD (complete knock-down) assembly operations in Morocco or North Africa. This would reduce logistics costs and tariffs while serving regional markets.

Why this is likely to occur: Morocco’s strategic location near the EU, favorable trade agreements, and rising local content rates at key plants, combined with competitive labor and logistics costs, make it an attractive hub for Chinese firms aiming to serve Europe and Africa. These factors also help mitigate risks related to geopolitical trade tensions.

2. Technological Innovation

What is the current status? Morocco has initiated national projects focused on technological development, hosted numerous industry conferences, and is fostering innovation hubs in Casablanca and Rabat, supported by active universities and startups. Meanwhile, Chinese technology companies and research institutions are becoming increasingly engaged across Africa, especially in areas such as cloud computing, surveillance, smart cities, and industrial automation.

Short-term outlook to 2026:

1. Manufacturing technology: Chinese original equipment manufacturers and battery producers are likely to develop or collaborate on new systems for predictive maintenance, quality assurance via vision technology, and automation within factories. Moroccan suppliers and engineering companies are predicted to serve as key local partners, opening up opportunities to export services and software.

2. Data infrastructure and edge computing: Investments are expected in launching data centers or edge computing resources near ports and industrial areas. These will support electric vehicle telematics, smart logistics, and training systems, allowing Moroccan companies to offer combined telematics services across the region.

3. Skills and research partnerships: Agreements between Chinese and Moroccan organizations, including training programs and joint laboratories, will help develop expertise in areas such as machine learning, data management, and implanted systems—laying the footing for a domestic technology industry capable of exporting software and solutions.

By 2026, the combination of Chinese industrial commitments and Morocco’s own policy momentum is expected to bring several tangible benefits to the Moroccan industry in international markets:

First, the composition of exports will become more sophisticated, moving beyond a narrow range of assembled chassis or low-value parts. Instead, Morocco will export higher-value items such as battery modules, electric vehicle (EV) subassemblies, and software or telemetry services. Early shipments of these battery modules and vehicles with higher content will boost the average export value and enhance trade balances. The establishment of a battery gigafactory shifts the focus of value creation within vehicle exports.

Second, Morocco’s strategic geographic location and trade advantages—including proximity to the European Union and its role as an African gateway—combined with Chinese manufacturing capacity, will allow Moroccan producers to better serve markets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Chinese firms may use the Kingdom as a hub for assembly, battery-pack finishing, and software services, thereby generating re-export opportunities and local production credits, strengthening Morocco’s position as an electromobility export hub.

Finally, new factories and the adoption of artificial intelligence will generate employment opportunities not only in manufacturing but also in engineering, data management, and quality assurance. Local suppliers securing tier-1 contracts will be compelled to meet international standards such as ISO, IATF, and environmental requirements, thereby increasing their competitiveness for foreign contracts. Additionally, vocational training programs—both public and private—will develop a skilled technician workforce that is enticing to foreign original equipment manufacturers.

This part highlights the development of new exportable service lines, including software, telematics, and analytics. The adoption of industrial AI systems has increased demand for these technologies, including predictive maintenance platforms, battery management software, and analytics dashboards. Moroccan IT companies and startups that collaborate on or adapt these systems for French-speaking and African markets will gain a competitive edge as early movers. This approach broadens Moroccan exports into higher-margin digital services.

Additionally, branding around green initiatives and regulatory standards creates opportunities. Manufacturing electric vehicle (EV) components, especially alongside renewable energy sources, enables Morocco to position itself as an environmentally friendly supplier to European buyers, who are increasingly concerned about carbon footprints and ESG compliance. This strategy could open doors to premium markets and green procurement contracts. Recent government focus on renewable energy and desalination further supports a narrative of sustainable industrial growth.

However, some risks and constraints must be managed. These include overreliance on a limited number of foreign partners, particularly Chinese firms, which could lead to dependence issues. Morocco needs to diversify its investor base and contain clauses on technology transfer and local value creation. Another challenge is the country’s limited capacity to absorb rapid industrialization, calling for the expansion of vocational training and university-industry R&D partnerships. Environmental and social standards are also critical, especially in battery production and chemical manufacturing, requiring strict regulation and the integration of green energy to prevent reputational damage. Geopolitical tensions, especially with shifting trade policies in Europe and the U.S., may complicate export access, so transparency and strategic alignment are essential.

To cope with these challenges, Morocco should implement local-content requirements with phased incentives, establish joint R&D centers and training quotas, conduct thorough environmental impact assessments, and negotiate trade frameworks with EU partners that safeguard tariff protections.

3. Policy recommendations to redouble 2026 outcomes

            1. Conditional incentives: Connect tax breaks and land allocation to measurable local content, technology transfer, and training objectives.

            2. National AI+Industry platform: Fund applied AI labs that link Moroccan engineering institutions with Chinese corporate R&D to adapt industrial AI use cases for local SMEs.

            3. Export facilitation for services: Start up fast-track export credit and soft-landing programs for Moroccan software companies to pilot resolutions in francophone Africa and the EU.

            4. Green manufacturing mandate: Require or incentivize renewable energy sourcing (PPA) for battery and chemical plants to sustain green branding.

            5. Standards & accreditation push: Large testing/certification labs (battery safety, automotive standards, software security) to enhance compliance for global markets.

To that end, the strategic partnership between China and Morocco in AI and electric vehicles offers Morocco a valuable opportunity to advance along the automotive and digital value chains. This shift could transform its export model from solely assembly to one that also emphasizes battery production and software development. Suppose policies focus on increasing local content, developing skills, setting standards, and ensuring environmental responsibility. In that case, the partnership is likely to lead to greater export diversity, the creation of more high-value industrial jobs, and a more substantial Moroccan footprint in European, African, and Middle Eastern markets by 2026. Recent investments and industrial growth offer a timely opportunity; however, the real test will be how swiftly Morocco can establish effective technology transfer, training programs, and regulatory frameworks, turning these opportunities into a sustained strategic alliance.

Russia’s Lukoil has until December 13 to negotiate the sale of most of its international assets following U. S. sanctions and the rejection of Swiss buyer Gunvor. Lukoil’s international assets, which include oil and gas ventures, refining, and over 2,000 gas stations across various regions, are valued at around $22 billion, and any deals must be approved by the U. S. Treasury.

Potential buyers for Lukoil’s assets include major U. S. oil companies like Exxon Mobil and Chevron, the Abu Dhabi International Holding Company, Austrian investor Bernd Bergmair, Hungary’s MOL, and U. S. private equity firm Carlyle.

Lukoil’s significant upstream operations in the Middle East include a 75% stake in Iraq’s West Qurna 2 oilfield and a 60% stake in Iraq’s Block 10 development. In Egypt, the company holds stakes in various oilfields alongside local partners. In the UAE, Lukoil has a 10% stake in the Ghasha gas development. In Central Asia, Lukoil owns portions of important oil and gas projects in Kazakhstan and operates fields in Uzbekistan.

In Africa and Latin America, Lukoil holds interests in several offshore oil blocks in Ghana, Congo, Nigeria, and Mexico.

Lukoil also possesses refining assets, including the Neftohim Burgas refinery in Bulgaria, which is the largest in the Balkans. The Bulgarian government has made moves to potentially seize and sell these assets. The U. S. Treasury has allowed some transactions involving Lukoil’s Bulgarian refinery until April 29, 2026. In Romania, Lukoil owns the Petrotel refinery and has about 300 gas stations, with companies reportedly interested in purchasing these assets.

For fuel retail, the U. S. Treasury extended the deadline for transactions involving Lukoil’s gas stations outside Russia to April 29, 2026. Despite this, Lukoil’s Finnish subsidiary Teboil has filed for restructuring and anticipates selling its petrol stations. The Romanian government is also moving to take control of Lukoil’s assets in the country. Lukoil operates around 200 gas stations in the U. S.

U. S. sanctions are dismantling Lukoil’s trading arm, Litasco, causing significant layoffs in its offices worldwide.

With information from Reuters