economics

Scotland-based rocket company Skyrora has secured a major boost in its latest funding round, thanks to a strategic investment from Ukrainian entrepreneur Max Polyakov. The new capital strengthens Skyrora’s central position in the UK’s plans to establish its own space launch capability.

Closing the UK Launch Gap

Skyrora’s Growing Launch Capabilities

Historic Launch Licence

Sovereign Launch for the UK

Polyakov’s Global Vision

Max Polyakov’s involvement brings not only funding but also a shared vision. He has long championed the idea that space technologies must address global challenges such as climate change and resource management. According to Polyakov, “There is a misconception that by investing in the space sector, we are ignoring significant issues on Earth. But we are no longer going to space just for the achievement: we are going there to seek climate solutions, and we must proactively minimise our impact.” His philosophy perfectly aligns with Skyrora’s mission to make space activity a driver of sustainability on Earth.

Max Polyakov, a Ukrainian-born entrepreneur and economist, is the founder of Noosphere Ventures, a US-based investment fund focused on space and advanced technologies. Through Noosphere, he has built a vertically integrated ecosystem that includes companies like EOS Data Analytics, Dragonfly Aerospace, and SETS.

Building a Global Space Network

In a time of great shifts, it is of note that the global development financial system is also at a crossroads and in need of reform for reform. From the articles listed below, I observe four developing themes, whether explicitly or implicitly mentioned. I will describe them below and conclude that these are the four main realities that the new development financial system would need to be shaped around.

First, we see the emergence of a new class of “middle class” emerging markets with a greater stake in the multilateral system, greater global economic connections, a greater desire for agency and voice in engaging with the Global North, and a greater ability to navigate the myriad cross-border economic systems that have evolved in the past 60 years. Let’s broadly generalize these as middle-income countries, including ASEAN, countries in Latin America, Central Asia, parts of the Middle East, and perhaps parts of Africa. For these countries, Alldo Januardy aptly comments: “The Global South is no longer waiting to be included. It is building something of its own—shaped by necessity, grounded in local priorities, and driven by the hard lessons of dependency.” Perhaps it is these countries that are most able and well-suited to take advantage of decentralized funding models with greater autonomy and choice. Financial innovations relevant for these groups of countries include multilateral regional development banks (Setser) or programs of public-private financing (Mundy) and require financial liberalization for them to have more access to existing global capital markets. These countries have the foundations of economic activity and are ready to access a more diverse array of funding mechanisms to fund a more diverse array of activities.

Second, we also note a bifurcation in what used to be lumped together as emerging markets. For poor countries vulnerable to debt, especially if they are also vulnerable to climate change and conflict, we observe a slide backwards in their internal economic capacity. These countries have not been able to withstand the pressures of COVID on their own and in some cases have fallen into distress. Further, it seems that the recent shocks may have so stressed their systems that their rates of growth have been dampened in the medium to longer term. These countries need access to immediate financing and fundamental support. IMF President Kristalina Georgieva says that these countries need $440bn in additional financing over 5 years to prevent further crises. Furthermore, these countries face difficulties as funding for the IMF and WB by developed countries retreats. Ms. Georgieva suggests further contribution to the IMF’s PRGT facility, leveraging up the World Bank balance sheet. Personally, I think targeted support of the type described by The Economist in “The Demise of Foreign Aid Offers an Opportunity”—wherein capital is deployed in targeted areas and projects where governments and UN agencies have coordinating power in relation to global crises like climate change and where there exist positive spillover effects—is more relevant. On the other hand, Makhtar Diop described a new securitization model of combining various EM loans and selling them at a higher credit rating. For these assets, I think such an approach is misguided and risks landing existing asset managers with toxic assets in the future. Many of these countries do not have the economic nor governance capacity to participate in financial markets as a normal member.

Third, China has become the largest bilateral creditor to many developing countries with a different model of lending driven by different priorities. Speaking from knowledge derived outside of this class, its early expansion into the Belt and Road Policy more than a decade ago was driven by an opportunity to offload pressure from the accumulation of massive FX reserves and internal spare capacity in primary and infrastructure industries. Now, those priorities have transitioned to a more transactional, targeted approach targeting specific sectors. Furthermore, Chinese creditors often took on projects that would qualify for participation of traditional Paris Club lenders. All that is to say, there is quite a gap between the Chinese and traditional Paris Club lenders that needs to be bridged. Efforts to do this are already underway through the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments. The US desires China to become a “responsible creditor” on its own terms (Crebo-Rediker), which China does not desire to do as it has its own model and priorities. A more cohesive global consensus on global lending will require China’s participation and hence the ability of China and the US-led Paris Club to come to some sort of agreement.

Finally, all these realities are underpinned by the backdrop of the globalization, economic development, and innovation of the last 70 years in the Pax Americana. Economic models and industries are now more numerous and diverse than ever before, with many variations of interlinkages, creating a complex and intricate web of economic relationships. Furthermore, within the financial system itself, technologies like electronic trading, online retail participation, new financial products, and blockchain have made capital more transmutable than ever before. It is no surprise that we are at an exciting crossroad and in need of reform. In fact, the Bretton Woods model has done remarkably well to facilitate and accommodate the changes up to this point! I am inspired by the amount of work that has gone into creating this system and hope that the global community will again find its way forward.

Recently, former National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) director general Karl Kendrick Chua said that the Philippines is standing at a “critical juncture” that could determine whether the country finally attains sustained high growth or once again falls into a cycle of lost opportunities.

Speaking during a Makati Business Club briefing, Chua, who now serves as a managing director at Ayala Corp., noted that depending on the policy crafted, the results have been varied. “You have years where the critical juncture led to economic recession or depression. There are years where it led to economic growth,” he added.

The current economic position of the Philippines is the effect of several critical junctures where policy choices either accelerated or derailed long-term development. For example, Chua noted that if the country had avoided the 1983 debt crisis and the 1997–2003 fiscal crisis, per capita income today could have matched or even exceeded Thailand’s. “These crises wiped out decades of growth,” Chua said.

To understand the magnitudes involved, it is instructive to go beyond these remarks. So, let’s take a closer look at these past losses and the more recent ones.

Debt, fiscal and corruption crises            

Starting in 1983, the debt crisis penalized the Philippine GDP for a decade.

Let’s assume that the economic trends that had prevailed prior to the crisis would have prevailed without a crisis. In this view, it was only after the early 1990s, that the Philippines GDP first got to level where it had first been 10 years before. In economic terms, the debt crisis was a lost decade.

Adding the cumulative losses, it cost the economy over $152 billion.

What about the fiscal crisis?

Starting in the mid-1990s, this crisis penalized the GDP until 2011. Again, let’s assume that the economic trend that had prevailed before the fiscal crisis would have prevailed without a crisis. In this view, it was only in the early 2010s that the Philippines GDP got to the level where it had first been almost two decades before.

Adding the cumulative losses, it cost the economy over $630 billion – over four times more than the prior crisis.

Although flood-control corruption is an old challenge, the present crisis associated with it – assuming the critics are right – moved to a new level after 2022. In that case, assuming the present trends prevail, it could penalize the GDP by more than $191 billion by 2028.

Notice that in the case of the debt and fiscal crises, we have historical economic data that allows us to test counterfactuals. Whereas in the case of the flood-control corruption, we are comparing economic performances in the Duterte years (2016-2022) and in the projected Marcos Jr. years (2022-28), in order to assess the economic value of missed opportunities.

The Costs of Three Crises. GDP, current prices; in billions of U.S. dollars. Source: IMF/WEO, author

Losses of almost $1 trillion in four decades        

In a current project, I am examining the economic development of most world economies from the 19^th century up to 2050. The kind of losses that the Philippines has suffered are typical to conflict-prone nations, but somewhat unique in countries that should benefit from peacetime conditions.

The lost opportunities and economic value associated with these crises indicate that in the past 45 years or so, the Philippine GDP has under-performed far more often than it has engaged in more optimal growth.

That translates to missed opportunities of massive magnitude, in light of the size of the economy. All things considered, these losses could amount to more than $970 billion.

Overcoming misguided and self-interested economic policies that serve the few at the expense of the many is vital in a nation, where poverty and food security is the nightmare of every second household.

Pressing need for development and smart diplomacy

According to public surveys, the national priority issues are topped by the need to control the rise in prices of basic goods and services (48%) and fighting corruption (31%). Other major concerns are also domestic featuring affordable food (31%), improving wages (27%), and reducing poverty (23%).

These are all pressing domestic, bread-and-butter issues. And yet, although foreign policy issues represent a fraction in popular national priorities, much of the country’s policy attention and resources have been allocated to precisely such priorities.

Of course, the country should insist on its national interest, but that interest should be defined by the needs of the many, not by the priorities of the few. And that should mean focus on inflation control, corruption, food security, rising wages and poverty reduction.

Most Southeast Asian nations have elevated their economic fortunes by accelerated economic development and smart regional diplomacy. There is no reason why the Philippines couldn’t or shouldn’t do the same.

Most Filipinos would certainly agree.

*Author’s note: The original version was published by The Manila Times on November 24, 2025

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy is racing to contain the fallout from a high-level corruption scandal that could undermine his authority, just as his country’s soldiers and civilians face potentially their toughest winter of the war with Russia.

A week after anti-corruption investigators said they had smashed an alleged $100 million (€86 million) kickback scheme centered on state nuclear power firm Energoatom, the furor is still swirling around Zelenskiy—even as Ukraine’s troops are under severe pressure on the battlefield with Russia, and its ailing energy grid suffers nightly attacks.

Justice Minister Herman Halushchenko and Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk have resigned over the scandal, but more damaging for the Ukrainian president is what appears to be significant involvement of businessman Timur Mindich, a protégé of Zelenskiy and co-owner of the media company that Zelenskiy founded before entering politics in 2019. Apparently having been tipped off, Mindich reportedly fled Ukraine shortly before last Monday’s raids and arrests.

The Ukrainian parliament has also voted to dismiss Energy Minister Svetlana Grinchuk, marking the second high-level ouster in a single day as the government struggles to contain a growing corruption scandal linked to a close ally of Vladimir Zelenskyy.

It is reported by the Kiev Post that Zelenskiy could fire his influential chief of staff, Andrey Yermak, this week. A full-scale “riot” has unfolded within parliament over the vast corruption scandal that allegedly links Yermak with the multimillion-dollar kickback scheme in the country’s energy sector. The scandal has also reminded Ukrainians of how the president curbed the independence of the nation’s top EU-initiated anti-corruption agencies in July—before being forced to backtrack by street protests and international criticism—in what critics called a brazen attempt to shield associates from scrutiny.

It threatens to become the biggest political crisis of the war for Zelenskiy and comes at a time when Ukrainian troops are under severe pressure from Russia in parts of four regions—Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk.

Bags of cash and a golden toilet

The West’s “dis-ease” with Ukraine and its president is no longer speculation. It’s happening in plain sight, slowly but ineluctably. The Financial Times, hardly a Kremlin mouthpiece, has published a piece titled “Bags of cash and a gold toilet: the corruption crisis engulfing Zelenskiy’s government.” Its reporters now openly state that Ukrainian elites expect even more explosive revelations from NABU investigations. And once outlets like FT put something like this in print, it usually means the groundwork has been laid behind the scenes.

That Western Europe and the United States are still approving new aid says little about confidence in Kiev. But it speaks volumes about bureaucratic inertia and the reluctance of those who profit from this war to let the tap close suddenly. Even so, you can now hear cautious whispers in Brussels asking whether it makes sense to send billions to a government whose officials seem determined to conjure up a scheme to steal the money before it arrives. These are not new revelations; rather, the surprise is that anyone actually pretends to be surprised.

The truth is easy to discern: the West knew exactly who it was dealing with from the inception. Nobody in Brussels, London, or Washington was under any delusion that Ukraine was somehow to be confused with, say, Switzerland. They knowingly entered into a political partnership with what is, and has long been, one of the most corrupt and internally unstable political systems in Europe. To pretend otherwise is to feign ignorance—pure theater.

For more than thirty years, Ukrainian statehood has rested on the same shaky foundations: competing clans, oligarchic rule, privatized security services, and a political class willing to plunder their own population. Changing leadership never went so far as to alter the underlying structure; it never happened because each leader owed his position to the same network of cash, patronage, and power.

Consider Leonid Kravchuk: under his auspices, Ukraine began its slow “Banderization,” while state assets were siphoned away and local power brokers entrenched themselves. Leonid Kuchma then perfected this system. Under his presidency, Ukraine saw questionable arms deals, the murders of journalists and opposition figures, and audiotapes revealing orders to eliminate critics. Economic sectors with predictable profits were carved up among regional clans who ruled their fiefdoms in exchange for loyalty. And a steady stream of kickbacks to Kiev.

Viktor Yushchenko’s years brought more of the same: corruption schemes around energy, political assassinations, and the continued exploitation of ordinary Ukrainians. Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko added their own layers to this hierarchy of detritus. Zelenskiy inherited it but then accelerated it, surrounding himself with loyalists whose main qualification was their willingness to feed at the same trough as previous leaders and look the other way.

Resistance to federalism

All of these leaders shared one common denominator: resisting federalization. Ukraine is a country with a large landmass; yet, it operates through a centralized, unitary form of governance in which a legislative body or a single individual is given supreme authority and thus ultimate power over regional and local needs of the country. There are distinct disadvantages inherent in such a structure:

·        It tends to subordinate local and regional needs to that of those in power.

·        It can encourage an abuse of power, which is one reason why the United States and a dozen other nations created a federated state instead. Instead of having one form of centralized power, there is a system of checks and balances designed to provide more equality and give greater voice to those being governed.

· Greater opportunities for manipulation exist. Those in power can pursue more wealth or governing opportunities for themselves, because few ways exist to stop such activity.

·        The governing structure will protect the central body first.

·        Sub-national regions are not allowed to decide their own laws, rights, and freedoms; there is no sharing of power.

·        The few control the many. If there is a shift in policy that takes rights away from select groups or individuals, there is little, if anything, the general population can do to stop it.

·        The central authority can artificially shape the discussions of society; it can decide that their political opponents are a threat, then pass laws that allow them to be silenced or imprisoned for what they have allegedly done.

The current scandal in Ukraine is testament to the issues noted above relating to its form of governance.

A federal Ukraine would devolve power and financial control to the regions, and that is the nightmare scenario for Kiev’s elites. It would loosen their grip on revenue streams, limit their political leverage, and allow regional identities to express themselves without fear of punishment from the center. So instead of reform, those with power offered forced Ukrainization and nationalist slogans about one people, one language, and one state. It was a political survival strategy, not a nation-building project.

This is why changing presidents will solve nothing. Remove Zelenskyy, and you likely get another figure produced by the same system. Perhaps Zaluzhnyi, perhaps a recycled face from a previous era. The choreography will be identical; only the masks of the actors will change. The deeper problem is the structure of Ukrainian statehood itself. As long as Ukraine remains in its current unitary form of central authority, it will continue producing conflict, corruption, and internal instability. War is not an aberration in such a system. It is an outcome.

If the elites refuse to reform and the population has no means to compel them, then the discussion must move beyond personalities. The uncomfortable truth is that the only lasting solution may be to abandon the current model of Ukrainian statehood altogether. No cosmetic change will save a system, the very design of which fosters autocracy and corruption.

The impact of Machine Learning (ML) on the global Foreign Exchange (Forex) is growing day by day. This results in a profound transformation of the algorithmic landscape, leading to a decrease in the dominance of human intuition, quantitative models, and macroeconomic analysis. These changes impact the growth of market efficiency, shift risk management patterns, and affect the very nature of global currency flow.

The ML-Driven Revolution in Forex Trading

Machine Learning, as an essential subset of Artificial Intelligence (AI), helps computer systems learn from extended datasets, identify sophisticated models, and make predictions without any pre-programmed patterns. Human traders simply cannot match the edge ML provides because the very environment of the currency market is getting faster and more data-rich.

Enhancing Predictive Analysis

ML models process vast volumes of market data pretty successfully. Their performance ranges from simple tick-by-tick price movements and trading volumes to social media responses and global news feeds. That is why forecasting with unprecedented accuracy becomes a reality. All this deals with the following:

1. Real-time data synthesis. The algorithms analyze time-series data, learn from historical market volatility, and immediately adapt to new information. Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) are especially efficient for that.
2. Sentiment analysis. ML systems use Natural Language Processing (NLP). That allows them to scan thousands of new articles, economic reports, and political statements. Therefore, they never miss leading indicators based on market sentiment towards a specific currency.
3. Pattern recognition. ML can detect and observe subtle, non-linear relationships between disparate currency pairs and timeframes. In that way, they analyze all possible opportunities. 

Automation and Execution Speed

The most obvious impact of ML is observed in spreading algorithmic trading. Trades executed by automated systems are based on ML-driven insights. So, they are speedy, precise, and independent of human emotional bias.

Such automation is clearly observed in Expert Advisors (EAs), or trading bots. They can operate autonomously on various platforms, for example, on MetaTrader. The industry needs and is continuously introducing new top-rated Forex EAs. Their algorithms have already demonstrated perfect performance and resilience. These ML-powered EAs can manage such strategies as:

• High-Frequency Trading (HFT), processing thousands of trades per second;
• Adaptable trend following, used for adjusting stop-loss and take-profit levels to the shifts in real-time market schedules;
• Risk mitigation strategies, implemented through changes in hedging positions and reducing leverage according to predicted spikes in volatility.

Strategic Implications for Global Finance

ML integration into the Forex environment has far-reaching consequences. It affects international capital flows and requires enhanced risk management for financial institutions and states.

Redefining Currency Risk Management

ML provides high-quality tools for hedging and managing currency exposure. It is vital for multinational corporations and central banks. The significantly improved forecasting accuracy is crucial for optimizing forward contract planning and international payment strategies.

ML models can ensure dynamic hedging by continuous reassessment of risk-return profiles. They are capable of recommending dynamic adjustments to hedging ratios due to changing geopolitical or economic situations.

Moreover, advanced AI models can detect unusual trading patterns. That can diminish market abuse, like front-running or spoofing, much faster than conventional surveillance systems can. So, market integrity becomes better managed and more sustainable.

Geopolitical and Regulatory Challenges

So, we have examined the obvious benefits of the strategic deployment of ML. However, what about drawbacks? There are certain challenges here that require regulatory foresight and diplomatic engagement. They involve the following:

1. Algorithmic bias. An ML model may be trained on biased or incomplete historical data. That can cause systemic flaws and market instabilities, especially during unforeseen global events.
2. Concentration of power. Large hedge funds and financial institutions can concentrate large power in their hands. That may happen because the resources needed to develop, deploy, and maintain advanced ML infrastructure are hardly available beyond their authority. The need for specialized hardware and proprietary datasets may result in a systemic risk to market decentralization.
3. Need for explainability. All regulators require transparency. Complex neural networks cannot provide that due to their ‘black box’ nature. It creates a compliance hurdle that must be overcome with the help of explainable AI (XAI) frameworks.

Conclusion: A New Era of Algorithmic Diplomacy

We need to understand and accept that Machine Learning is not an additional helping tool but a superior new operating system for global currency exchange. It strategically impacts everything related to international trading. Its ability to extract the most actionable intelligence from gigantic data volumes can result in hyper-efficient, instantaneous, and emotionless trade operations.

The rise of complex algorithmic systems, including top-rated Forex EAs, requires a new form of ‘algorithmic diplomacy.’ That is why global financial institutions and regulators must keep in touch, and their collaboration should be aimed at ethical frameworks and technical standards development. That can help them enhance the stability, transparency, and fairness of the international trading market for the benefit of the entire global economy.

President Donald Trump is set to welcome Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia at the White House, emphasizing the rehabilitation of the crown prince’s global standing after the controversial assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, and the strengthening of U.S.-Saudi relations. This visit marks bin Salman’s first return to the White House in over seven years, and he will experience a grand ceremonial reception orchestrated by Trump. The discussions are anticipated to enhance security cooperation, promote civil nuclear collaboration, and explore substantial business opportunities, including issues around a $600 billion investment commitment made during Trump’s earlier visit to Saudi Arabia.

However, despite these discussions, major advancements in Saudi Arabia’s normalization of relations with Israel are not expected. This meeting highlights the critical partnership between the U.S., the world’s largest economy, and Saudi Arabia, the leading oil producer, a relationship that has become a focal point for Trump during his presidency, particularly as the international outrage related to Khashoggi’s murder has diminished over time. While U.S. intelligence indicates that bin Salman sanctioned Khashoggi’s assassination, he has publicly distanced himself from the act, accepting accountability only in his capacity as leader.

The agenda includes strategic talks at the White House, a lunch in the Cabinet Room, and a formal black-tie dinner. Notably, Trump has indicated plans to approve the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, a significant policy adjustment that would be the first U.S. sale of these aircraft to the nation, potentially shifting the military dynamics in the region. Alongside military discussions, Saudi Arabia seeks new security guarantees, with expectations of an executive order from Trump forming a defense pact similar to that offered to Qatar, but less comprehensive than a NATO-style treaty.

Experts express that Trump is keen to forge a diversified partnership that secures Saudi Arabia’s alignment away from China’s influence, thereby deepening cooperation across security, finance, and technology sectors. Additionally, Trump is likely to push for Saudi involvement in the Abraham Accords to normalize relations with Israel, a notion the Saudis are hesitant to embrace without clear advancements towards Palestinian statehood amid current regional conflicts.

The overarching goal for Trump regards solidifying a broader Middle East peace arrangement through Saudi participation in the Accords, which represent a crucial geopolitical pivot. While pressure on bin Salman regarding normalization with Israel is expected, analysts believe that a U.S.-Saudi security agreement could still be established independently of significant progress on this front. Overall, the visit aims to reaffirm the longstanding U.S.-Saudi alliance while navigating the complex regional context.

With information from Reuters

Asian and global stock markets started the week cautiously as investors navigated geopolitical tensions and a packed week of corporate earnings and U.S. economic releases. A deepening dispute between China and Japan weighed on Tokyo shares, while market participants prepared for key data, including Thursday’s delayed U.S. September jobs report and Nvidia’s earnings due Wednesday after market close.

Expectations for a U.S. interest rate cut in December have fallen below 50%, following recent signals from policymakers. This shift has increased pressure on technology stocks, which are highly sensitive to interest rate changes.

Asia Markets and Geopolitics

Japan’s Nikkei fell 0.2%, with tourism and retail stocks hit hard after China advised its citizens against visiting the country. Major declines included Isetan Mitsukoshi, Muji parent Ryohin Keikaku, and Shiseido, each down around 10%.

In Australia, BHP dropped 0.6% after a UK court found the company liable for a dam collapse in Brazil, leaving the overall index relatively flat. Hong Kong’s Hang Seng and China’s CSI300 indexes each fell roughly 1%.

Japan’s economy contracted for the first time in six quarters, partly due to U.S. tariffs, while a reported $110 billion stimulus plan influenced bond markets, pushing 20-year yields to a 26-year high. Analysts caution that shaky fiscal credibility could further pressure the yen, drawing parallels to Britain’s recent market turmoil following uncertainty over tax hikes.

U.S. Data and Treasury Yields

The U.S. Treasury 10-year yield held steady at 4.163% in Asia trading, following a slight rise on Friday. Wall Street indexes ended last week mixed, with a modest drop for the S&P 500 and small gains for the Nasdaq.

Thursday’s U.S. September jobs report is expected to be closely watched, although private-sector surveys have already indicated a slowdown. Analysts note that the headline data may be too stale to significantly shift market expectations, with CPI data remaining the key factor for Fed policy.

Corporate Earnings Spotlight

Investor attention this week is also on U.S. corporate earnings. Retail giants Home Depot, Target, and Walmart are reporting results, but all eyes are on Nvidia. The chipmaker’s stock has soared roughly 1,000% since the launch of ChatGPT in November 2022, including a year-to-date gain of over 40%, making it the first company to surpass a $5 trillion market valuation last month.

Nvidia’s earnings are widely seen as a litmus test for technology stocks and the broader market rally.

Commodities and FX

The U.S. dollar held slightly higher, keeping the euro below $1.16 and strengthening against other major currencies. Gold stabilized at $4,060 an ounce after Friday losses, while Brent crude slipped 1% to $63.78 as Russian supply resumed at a previously disrupted hub.

Bitcoin, often a barometer for tech stocks, rebounded slightly from its largest weekly drop since March, trading at $95,000 after losing more than 10% last week.

Outlook

Markets are entering a pivotal week where U.S. labor data and corporate earnings particularly from Nvidia could influence stock sentiment and interest rate expectations. Geopolitical tensions in Asia add another layer of uncertainty, keeping investors cautious and highlighting the interlinked nature of global markets.

With information from Reuters.

Russia’s policy towards Southeast Asia is undergoing a remarkable adjustment period. From focusing on defense cooperation, which has been its traditional strength, Russia is gradually shifting its focus to more sustainable areas. This shift reflects Russia’s flexible efforts to maintain its presence in a region strongly affected by great power competition, while demonstrating its ambition to position itself as a reliable and independent partner, contributing to the balance of influence against the expanding US involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

From diplomatic presence to substantive cooperation

For many years, Russia’s Southeast Asia policy has been largely confined to diplomatic presence and participation in ASEAN-led multilateral forums. However, in the wake of Trump 2.0’s tariff adjustments, Moscow has increasingly recognized Southeast Asia as a potential market to fill the economic void left by sanctions. This realization has led to more proactive and substantive shifts in Russia’s regional policy.

Since the beginning of 2025, Russia has stepped up bilateral cooperation with key ASEAN economies such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, focusing on areas that the US and China have not yet focused on competing in, such as oil and gas exploitation, agriculture, and civil nuclear power. At the same time, Russia has also expanded its network of embassies, cultural centers, and trade promotion agencies in most ASEAN countries, thereby creating a multi-layered approach from politics to economics.

One of the most notable changes is the shift of Russia’s traditional trade to non-dollar payment mechanisms to minimize the risk of sanctions. According to statistics from the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, in 2024, trade turnover between Russia and ASEAN reached a record for the second consecutive year, increasing by 5.8%. Over the past decade, trade turnover has increased by 70%, with most transactions being settled in local currencies or currency swaps. At the same time, Southeast Asia is also a potential area to promote exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG), fertilizers, and military materials, helping to reposition Russia as a stable energy supplier.

Diversifying partners outside of China

The trend of diversifying partners beyond China has emerged as a new driving force in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy. After years of relying on the Chinese market as a “lifeline” for its wartime economy, Russia has increasingly recognized the asymmetry in its trade relations as China has gradually gained an overwhelming position. This has forced Russia to rebalance its dependence and expand its influence by seeking alternative partners.

The “multi-directional” policy that Russia is implementing is clearly demonstrated through the strengthening of bilateral economic relations with a number of countries in the region. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko, the international situation is opening up many new opportunities for Russia to strengthen relations with the region of more than 650 million people. On the contrary, from the perspective of ASEAN, cooperation with Russia has its own appeal, because investment capital from Russia is considered less politically binding than the “debt trap” risks often associated with projects within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, limited financial resources have caused this direction of Russia to largely stop at the level of framework agreements or projects waiting to be launched.

In addition, Russia has also proposed establishing cooperation mechanisms focusing on less sensitive areas such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief. Although these initiatives have not yet reached the institutional level, they reflect Russia’s efforts in the regional innovation race with the US and China.

Connecting Southeast Asia to the Eurasian Axis and the Global South

Since launching the “Pivot to the East” policy in 2014, Russia’s strategic interests have gradually shifted from the European region to a vision of Eurasian integration. While in the early stages, this policy was mainly aimed at demonstrating efforts to “pivot” according to the trend of global power shifts; entering the 2020s, Russia has concretized its orientation with in-depth initiatives.

Following the Free Trade Agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Vietnam in 2015, Russia continued negotiations with Indonesia and Thailand, aiming to form an economic network that is less dependent on the dollar system. Russia is also promoting initiatives for the construction of a connecting corridor between the Russian Far East and Central Asia with maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Speaking at the International Conference on Eurasian Security in Minsk, Belarus, on October 28, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia wants to build a common development structure for the entire region and does not exclude any country on this continent. Transcontinental connectivity projects such as the Vladivostok-Chennai transport corridor or the Asia-Europe maritime and air route are integrated by Russia into its vision of an expanded Asia-Europe economic space, reflecting its efforts to bring Southeast Asia into the Russia-led “Greater Eurasia” strategy.

At the same time, Russia has been actively promoting the “multipolarization” discourse through mechanisms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in collaboration with China and India, to strengthen the image of a post-Western order. Russia’s support for Indonesia’s entry into BRICS not only reflects the group’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence but also demonstrates Russia’s strategy of integrating Southeast Asia into the emerging South-South partnership network. Through this, Russia wants to demonstrate its flexible integration into the Asia-Pacific region while also being a voice to show that Russia is not isolated in the process of restructuring the global order.

Taking advantage of ASEAN principles

One of the factors that helps Russia maintain a stable position in Southeast Asia is its ability to effectively exploit ASEAN’s neutral space. Unlike the US or China, which often pursue a strategy of competing for influence by “choosing sides” under pressure, Moscow chooses a flexible approach based on the principle of non-interference in ASEAN’s internal affairs and consensus.

Thanks to these principles, Russia’s participation in ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms is not interpreted as an attempt to form political alliances or challenge the existing order, but on the contrary, is seen as consistent with the spirit of openness and inclusiveness. It is ASEAN’s neutral space that provides Russia with access in a variety of roles, from observer to dialogue partner to direct participant, thereby legitimizing Russia’s presence in Southeast Asia.

In fact, Russia actively participates in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) to promote cooperation in less sensitive areas, helping Russia both strengthen its image as a constructive contributor and avoid creating suspicion from the West.

Rebooting defense and energy diplomacy

Through the two pillars of defense and energy, Russia has put into its foreign policy to reaffirm its position. These are considered the spearheads by which Russia still maintains its most substantial competitive capacity compared to the US.

In the defense sector, Russia is restoring bilateral cooperation with traditional partners such as Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Indonesia. Previously, Russia accounted for about 25% of the arms market share in Southeast Asia, maintaining its position as the largest supplier in the region. However, instead of continuing to rely on sales contracts, Russia is now focusing on expanding the “after-sales” sector, such as training, maintenance, technology transfer, and joint research in the defense industry. At the multilateral level, Russia actively participates in high-level defense dialogue mechanisms such as ADMM+ and ARF to demonstrate the voice of a responsible partner, promoting peace and stability in the region.

Along with defense, Russia considers energy a common concern to expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Russia takes advantage of its deep-sea oil and gas exploitation techniques and develops nuclear power technology to strengthen cooperation with developing economies with large energy consumption needs. Leading energy corporations such as Zarubezhneft and Rosatom have been cooperating with Vietnam in gas exploitation projects on the continental shelf of the East Sea. Russia also boosts LNG exports to Thailand and the Philippines to expand its market share in the region while cooperating with Indonesia’s Pertamina Group in developing petrochemical refining and building civil nuclear energy infrastructure. These steps reflect Moscow’s efforts to establish an Asian energy supply chain to replace the disrupted European market.

Position on the East Sea dispute

Russia’s stance on the East Sea dispute is clearly cautious. Basically, Russia supports the settlement of disputes by peaceful means based on international law and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), while emphasizing the central role of ASEAN in conflict management. Unlike the US, which always emphasizes the issue of freedom of navigation, Russia chooses the role of a “balancing third party,” maintaining cooperative relations with all parties. However, Russia also avoids making specific statements regarding China’s sovereignty claims in order not to harm the Russia-China relationship, which is currently the leading pillar of its foreign policy.

In addition, Russia also supports the early completion of the Code of Conduct in the East Sea (COC), considering it an important tool to maintain stability and calling on all parties to exercise restraint. Instead of directly engaging in disputes, Russia maintains its presence through limited oil and gas cooperation within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), demonstrating Russia’s commitment to the legitimate sovereignty of its partner countries. At the same time, participating in joint exercises with ASEAN countries also helps Russia affirm its image as a responsible power, promoting trust and the ability to coordinate security at sea.

However, Russia’s influence in the South China Sea is still limited. The war in Ukraine has significantly reduced the frequency of Russian military patrols in the region. In addition, the increasingly close relationship between Moscow and Beijing has also made some ASEAN countries cautious, worried that Russia’s “neutrality” could be broken.

The adjustments in Russia’s Southeast Asia policy clearly reflect Russia’s efforts to adapt to a situation where it has to allocate resources to multiple goals. It is easy to see that Russia has chosen to shift from an ideological orientation to a pragmatic strategy, focusing on areas that can generate specific benefits. Instead of directly confronting the US or competing for influence with China, Moscow seeks to exploit gaps to position itself as a balancing factor.

Russia’s current Southeast Asia policy is a survival adaptation, reflecting a strategic effort to maintain influence in a regional structure that is reshaping under the pressure of US-China competition. Under increasing pressure from the US, Russia is forced to pursue a more autonomous path in Southeast Asia to maintain its strategic space. However, Russia’s influence is still limited by its internal capacity and competition from other powers. Russia may not be able to shape the rules of the game or lead the order, but it is certainly a factor that cannot be left out of the Southeast Asian strategic chessboard.

Saudi firms are reducing the large salary bonuses that used to attract foreign talent in sectors like construction and manufacturing as the kingdom adjusts its spending and economic aims, according to four recruiters interviewed by Reuters. Saudi Arabia, the leading exporter of oil, is making progress with its Vision 2030 plan, which focuses on decreasing reliance on oil revenues, generating jobs, and diversifying into industries like tourism, real estate, mining, and finance.

The nation has invested heavily in large-scale projects that increase the need for skilled foreign workers, but there have been challenges with project delivery and timelines. Foreign workers can no longer expect to negotiate high salary premiums, which could reach 40% or more, as offers are now much more modest. Recruiters note that the changes are partly due to the kingdom’s economic adjustments and an increase in available candidates eager to work in the region.

The shift in pay reflects a broader change by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, which previously backed major infrastructure projects but is now leaning towards sectors like artificial intelligence, logistics, and mining for better returns. Projects like NEOM, a planned futuristic city, and the Trojena tourism hub, which will host the 2029 Asian Winter Games, face delays due to the current economic strategy.

With decreasing oil prices affecting public finances, the government’s budget continues to struggle, necessitating oil prices around $100 for balance, according to the IMF. Recruitment has slowed, and companies are now more cautious in salary negotiations, shifting their focus towards high-demand jobs in technology sectors.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE remains a preferred choice for many skilled workers due to its tax-free salaries, established facilities like schools and healthcare, and social reforms for a more liberal lifestyle. This has made it challenging for Saudi Arabia to compete; salary differences between the two regions are minimal now. The Saudi government is pushing for labor market reforms to increase private sector jobs for citizens, which has led to record low unemployment rates among Saudi nationals. To attract top talent, companies need to offer competitive packages that account for living costs, work-life balance, and a clear project vision.

With information from Reuters

Confusing messages about Britain’s budget are damaging the government’s credibility, according to investors, businesses, and think tanks. Bond prices fell after finance minister Rachel Reeves changed her stance regarding income tax. After suggesting that she might raise income tax to stick to her fiscal plans, a Financial Times report confirmed that she had decided against it, raising concerns about the government’s commitment to its fiscal promises.

Reeves’ initial comments during a pre-budget speech hinted at a possible income tax increase, which would contradict the Labour Party’s pledges for the upcoming 2024 election. Andrew Goodwin, chief UK economist at Oxford Economics, described the situation as a communication failure, especially after the government had already retracted welfare reforms earlier in the year, making many question their ability to make tough financial decisions.

A government official mentioned that a better forecast from the budget watchdog might allow the abandonment of the income tax plan, further undermining the credibility of the government’s financial assumptions. Ben Zaranko from the Institute for Fiscal Studies criticized the inconsistent messaging, stating that it reflects poorly on the policy-making process, which appears rushed and unstable.

Business leaders are worried about these mixed signals, fearing the budget may only include minor tax adjustments that introduce uncertainty for companies. Mohammad Jamei from the Confederation of British Industry emphasized that such unpredictability would lead businesses to delay investment decisions. A senior executive expressed frustration over the political implications of the situation.

Financial markets are also concerned about a return to inconsistent tax increases, with experts believing this could suggest a lack of support for the chancellor from her party. Jane Foley from Rabobank noted that Reeves’ changing statements have harmed her credibility, affecting the UK asset market negatively. Long-dated government bond yields rose significantly in response to these developments.

Investors are reminded of the economic turmoil caused by former Prime Minister Liz Truss’s policies, which still impact their confidence in the UK’s financial stability. Stephen Millard from the National Institute of Economic and Social Research suggested that Reeves needs to create a financial buffer to ensure stability and reduce speculation about the government’s fiscal policies, leading to clearer communication and more dependable budget planning.

With information from Reuters

China’s major stock indexes rose on Thursday, buoyed by strong gains in the new energy sector, as investors positioned ahead of a fresh batch of economic data due Friday.

At the midday break, the Shanghai Composite Index (.SSEC) gained 0.4% to 4,017.94, while the blue-chip CSI300 (.CSI300) advanced 1%, recovering earlier losses.

Sector Highlights

New energy stocks led the rally. The CSI New Energy Vehicle Index (.CSI399976) surged 6.9% to a three-year high, and the CSI New Energy Index (.CSI399808) climbed 5.5%, marking its strongest session in two weeks.

Key players posted sharp gains:

CATL (300750.SZ) jumped 8.2%, nearing record highs last seen in October.

Tianqi Lithium (002466.SZ) rose 9.9%.

The rally followed comments from a senior Ministry of Industry and Information Technology official, who said Beijing would soon unveil a comprehensive plan to boost the new energy battery industry and its supporting infrastructure.

Investor Moves

Zhikai Chen, head of Asian equities at BNP Paribas Asset Management, said domestic institutional investors may be shifting portfolios as their November fiscal year-end approaches.

Meanwhile, the artificial intelligence (.CSI930713) and semiconductor (.CSI931865) sectors edged higher, gaining 0.5% and 0.9%, respectively, after recent declines.

“There’s been a move toward booking strong year-to-date returns and rotating into dividend-paying sectors,” Chen noted, adding that the trend could continue into December.

Hong Kong Markets and Outlook

In Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index (.HSI) slipped 0.6% to 26,766.71, while the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (.HSCE) also fell 0.6%, following Wednesday’s one-month high.

Investors now await October credit data along with retail sales, industrial output, and fixed-asset investment figures due Friday, which are expected to provide clearer signals on China’s economic recovery and potential policy adjustments.

With information from Reuters.

In a world where 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on debt interest than on health and education combined, the global financial system isn’t just flawed, it’s fundamentally unjust. This alarming reality formed the core of our conversation with Bodo Ellmers, Managing Director of Global Policy Forum Europe, following the recent UNCTAD 16 conference in Geneva. Against the backdrop of widening inequality and escalating debt distress across the Global South, Ellmers—a veteran policy expert with over two decades in the field—offered a stark diagnosis of the systemic failures in our international financial architecture and charted a path toward meaningful reform.

The Double Squeeze: How Debt Worsens Inequality

For Ellmers, the debt crisis represents a double-edged sword cutting through global development. “It squeezes fiscal space,” he explains, “constraining governments’ ability to finance public services and development.” This creates a vicious cycle where indebted nations must choose between servicing external debts and investing in their people’s well-being.

The impact manifests in two dimensions: nationally, through reduced spending on social protection, education, and healthcare; and internationally, as debt service payments flow from poor countries to rich creditors, effectively widening the gap between Global North and South.

An Architecture of Imbalance

When asked about characterizations of the international financial architecture as “neo-colonial,” Ellmers focuses on the concrete imbalances. The IMF and World Bank operate on a “one dollar, one vote” system that gives wealthy nations disproportionate power, with the US holding veto rights. Meanwhile, crucial financial regulation bodies like the OECD and Financial Stability Board exclude smaller developing countries entirely, despite setting rules with global impact.

The reform path remains blocked, Ellmers notes, because any meaningful redistribution of voting power would reduce US influence below its veto threshold. This impasse has forced regions to develop alternatives, from China’s new development banks to Africa’s proposed stability mechanism. Yet these solutions come with their own challenges, potentially creating new dependencies even as they offer welcome alternatives to traditional donors.

The Missing Piece: A Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism

Perhaps the most glaring gap in the current system, according to Ellmers, is the absence of a fair sovereign debt restructuring process. Unlike corporate insolvency, where independent courts balance interests, indebted nations must negotiate from weakness with diverse creditors.

Ellmers advocates for a system that would prioritize human rights, ensuring that “a state needs to have the financial capacity to fulfill its human rights obligations towards citizens. This money cannot be touched by creditors.” This approach would fundamentally reorient debt negotiations from purely financial calculations to human-centered outcomes.

Climate Finance or Climate Debt?

The conversation turned to climate finance, where Ellmers describes a “scandal” in the making. Wealthy, high-polluting nations continue to provide climate finance primarily as loans rather than grants, pushing vulnerable countries deeper into debt while addressing climate challenges they did little to create.

While mechanisms like Special Drawing Rights offer temporary relief, Ellmers sees them as treating symptoms rather than root causes. The deeper issue remains the voluntary nature of climate finance commitments and the reluctance of wealthy nations to provide adequate grant-based funding.

A Path Forward: Protest and Policy

For activists and social movements seeking change, Ellmers emphasizes the need for dual strategies. The successful Jubilee campaign of the 1990s combined technical advocacy with mass mobilization, creating pressure that neither approach could achieve alone. This combination remains essential today, expert analysis must meet street-level mobilization to drive meaningful reform.

Conclusion: Reclaiming Sovereignty: The Unfinished Fight for Debt Justice

As Ellmers soberly concludes, “debt kills the SDGs.” With 3.4 billion people affected by this crisis, the need for structural reform transcends economic policy, it becomes a moral imperative for global justice and human dignity. The insights from our conversation paint an unambiguous picture: the current international financial architecture perpetuates inequality, undermines development, and fails to address interconnected crises from debt to climate change.

Yet within this challenging landscape, Ellmers’ analysis also reveals pathways for change. From institutional reforms that rebalance power toward Global South nations, to innovative mechanisms that protect human rights in debt restructuring, to the powerful synergy between grassroots mobilization and technical advocacy, the tools for transformation exist. What’s needed now is the political will to implement them.

Ellmers’ analysis leaves us with a crucial takeaway: the power to change this system lies in a combination of technical precision and unrelenting public pressure. The solutions—from a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that protects human rights to shifting climate finance from loans to grants—are within reach. What has been missing is the political will to implement them. That will must be forged, and it must be forged now. The future of global justice, and the lives of billions, depend on it.

U.S. President Donald Trump has targeted China with a cascade of tariffs on imports worth billions of dollars in 2025, aiming to narrow the trade deficit, revive domestic manufacturing, and curb the fentanyl trade. The year has seen a mix of escalating tariffs, export controls, partial trade truces, and diplomatic talks as both sides navigate the high-stakes economic and geopolitical confrontation.

Timeline of Key Events:

November 11: China announces it will broaden access and investment opportunities for U.S. companies, especially in the services sector.

November 10: China pauses port fees on U.S.-linked vessels and suspends sanctions on affiliates of South Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean. The FBI director visited China to discuss fentanyl and law enforcement issues.

November 9: China suspends its ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony exports to the U.S., though licences are still required under dual-use controls.

November 7: Export control measures imposed on October 9, including restrictions on rare earths, lithium battery materials, and super-hard materials, are suspended. China begins forming a new rare earth licensing regime to potentially speed up shipments. U.S. soybean and log import licences are restored.

November 6: China purchases U.S. farm products, including wheat and sorghum shipments. COFCO holds a soybean procurement signing ceremony.

November 5: Beijing suspends retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports from November 10, including farm goods, while maintaining some duties in response to Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs.

October 30: Trump and Xi Jinping strike a new trade truce in South Korea, agreeing on tariff reductions, increased U.S. soybean purchases, and measures against illicit fentanyl trade.

October 25-26: Malaysia talks produce a trade deal framework to be finalized by leaders after U.S. and Chinese officials meet.

October 17: U.S. State Department condemns Chinese sanctions on Hanwha Ocean as coercive.

October 15-16: U.S. officials criticize China’s expanded rare earth export controls; Apple pledges investment in China.

October 14: Both nations impose additional port fees; China sanctions five U.S.-linked Hanwha Ocean units.

October 12-13: China calls new U.S. tariffs hypocritical; U.S. negotiators maintain Trump-Xi talks are on track.

October 10: Trump announces additional levies on imports and export controls on critical software, while threatening Boeing-related measures. China investigates Qualcomm over its purchase of Israeli Autotalks.

October 9: China widens rare earth export controls; U.S. plans to ban Chinese airlines from overflying Russia.

October 1-August 11: Both sides discuss soybean purchases, extend tariff truces, and negotiate rare earth and AI chip licences.

July-June: Framework deals reached for rare earths and magnets; trade truce discussions continue with limited breakthroughs.

May-April: U.S. and China escalate tariffs repeatedly, targeting key goods and tech sectors. Measures include punitive duties, export restrictions on dual-use items, and sanctions on companies.

March-February: Tariffs on Chinese imports rise sharply, with China retaliating on U.S. agricultural exports and key industrial sectors.

Why It Matters:
The trade war has disrupted global supply chains, affected technology access, and influenced agricultural markets. It also carries geopolitical consequences, particularly for U.S.-China relations and for allies in Asia relying on stable trade flows. Rare earths, semiconductors, and AI chips essential for defense and emerging technologies are central to the strategic stakes.

United States: Trump administration, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

China: President Xi Jinping, Vice Premier He Lifeng, negotiators Li Chenggang and industry regulators.

U.S. Companies: Apple, Nvidia, Boeing, Qualcomm, among others, affected by tariffs, export controls, and investment restrictions.

Global Markets: Critical minerals, rare earths, semiconductors, agricultural commodities, and shipping sectors.

What’s Next:
Despite temporary truce agreements, negotiations remain fluid. Both countries must finalize terms for rare earths, agricultural imports, tariffs, and enforcement mechanisms. Any failure to do so could trigger new rounds of tariffs, impact global supply chains, and increase diplomatic tensions. Private investment and corporate strategy will continue to pivot in response to policy changes.

With information from Reuters.

As companies focused on buying bitcoin and major cryptocurrencies face challenges from market oversaturation and negative sentiment, new players are exploring less popular, riskier tokens, raising concerns about volatility. Following U. S. President Donald Trump’s supportive stance on cryptocurrencies and the success of Michael Saylor’s investment strategy, the number of public companies investing in cryptocurrencies has surged. By September, there were over 200 digital asset treasury (DAT) companies, primarily invested in bitcoin, with a total value of around $150 billion, tripling from the previous year according to DLA Piper.

Many new companies, often penny stocks looking for profit increases, are emerging daily. As bitcoin prices decline, these companies are turning to more volatile tokens to enhance returns, with firms like Greenlane, OceanPal, and Tharimmune announcing plans to invest in assets such as BERA, NEAR, and Canton Coin. This shift indicates a growing connection between the cryptocurrency market and traditional sectors, which could pose risks for investors. Moody’s analyst Cristiano Ventricelli warns that the move toward less stable cryptocurrencies could lead to higher risks, especially when markets decline.

Since April, many DAT companies have raised funds for token purchases through private placements (PIPEs), selling shares to private investors at discounted prices. Between April and November, more than 40 DATs collectively raised over $15 billion through these PIPEs, with only a handful focusing on bitcoin. Bitcoin itself saw its first monthly loss since 2018 in October. Notable crypto investors involved in these deals include Winklevoss Capital and Kraken. While some institutional investors can directly buy tokens, DATs provide regulated exposure to cryptocurrencies for more cautious investors. However, reliance on PIPEs can cause stock price fluctuations, particularly during market downturns.

This vulnerability was highlighted on October 10, when tensions between the U. S. and China caused market declines, leading to significant drops in share prices for companies like BitMine and Forward Industries. Peter Chung from Presto Research noted that while initial hype around DATs has decreased, there is potential for a rebound. Some companies, such as OceanPal, are promoting their token acquisitions for their technological advantages, while Greenlane chose not to comment.

Earlier this year, many DAT companies traded at higher prices than their crypto holdings, as investors believed they could leverage credit for more purchases. However, as bitcoin prices have diminished and competition from similar strategies has risen, some companies are struggling, with at least 15 trading below their assets’ net value. Retail investors incurred losses of about $17 billion from investments in these companies, while others face pressure to repurchase shares to support stock prices.

Overall, DATs hold 4% of all bitcoin, 3.1% of all ether, and 0.8% of all solana, which could significantly influence coin values. Analysts project further consolidation in the sector. Company executives emphasize the importance of making prudent investment choices to ensure long-term success. Companies like SUI Group are also diversifying by launching stablecoins to boost shareholder value, warning that merely acquiring tokens without strategic actions could lead to failures in the long run.

With information from Reuters

FBI Director Kash Patel visited Beijing last week to hold talks with Chinese officials on fentanyl and law enforcement issues, according to sources familiar with the trip. The visit came after a summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, where both leaders highlighted a new “consensus” on controlling the flow of the deadly synthetic opioid.

Patel’s stay in Beijing lasted about a day and was not officially announced by either government. The trip coincided with China’s announcement that it would adjust its catalogue of drug-related precursor chemicals and require export licenses for shipments to the U.S., Canada, and Mexico.

Why It Matters

Fentanyl continues to be the leading cause of overdose deaths in the United States, making international cooperation on its regulation a critical security concern. The trip signals a shift in U.S. policy from punitive measures to bilateral collaboration with China on law enforcement issues.

It also has broader implications for trade relations, as President Trump had already halved tariffs on Chinese goods following the summit, linking law enforcement cooperation with broader economic negotiations.

The key stakeholders include the U.S. government, led by FBI Director Kash Patel and President Trump, as well as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who is overseeing the implementation of mechanisms to curb fentanyl exports. Chinese authorities, including the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Commerce Ministry, are responsible for regulating precursor chemicals and managing export controls.

North American countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Mexico are also involved, as they are primary recipients of controlled chemical exports and partners in enforcement.

What’s Next

The details of the Trump-Xi consensus are expected to be finalized through a new bilateral working group. China will continue to regulate and monitor precursor chemical exports more strictly, while U.S. and Chinese law enforcement agencies may deepen their cooperation. The visit may also influence broader trade dynamics, including the resumption of U.S. soybean purchases by China and the suspension of previously announced rare-earth export curbs.

With information from Reuters.