diplomacy

The world is closely watching the potential meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping, which could take place at the APEC summit at the end of October, as well as the formal state visit in January of next year. Undoubtedly, the top priority for both the U.S. and China is to ease tensions, with Washington even more eager than Beijing to achieve a “truce.” This is because Beijing imposed large-scale countermeasures against Washington in October, in retaliation for the various sanctions the U.S. has levied on China since August. China’s countermeasures caught the U.S. off guard and left it struggling to respond.

China’s strict restrictions on rare earth exports have shocked the West, particularly the automotive and semiconductor industries. On the other hand, China’s halt to soybean purchases from the U.S. has frustrated Trump’s most loyal supporters. Washington’s initial reaction was one of anger, with threats of retaliation, but within days, its tone softened. This signals that Beijing has struck at the opponent’s sore spot, while Washington lacks effective tools to fight back.

“You have no cards to play.” Trump’s famous rebuke to Zelenskyy has gone global and will undoubtedly go down in history. Embarrassingly, Trump now finds himself in a similar predicament with Beijing: nearly “out of cards.” To demonstrate that he still has some in hand, Trump has finally pulled Taiwan out of his pocket.

On October 20, in an interview with Bloomberg, Trump listed Taiwan as one of the four top priorities in U.S.-China negotiations—alongside rare earths, soybeans, and fentanyl—and stated, “We’ll get along very well with China.”

According to a report in The Guardian, Trump explicitly said that China “doesn’t want” to invade Taiwan and predicted that “nothing will happen.” He described Taiwan as “an apple in China’s eyes,” emphasizing that “America is the strongest military power in the world by far” and “no one dares to mess with us.” In a buddying tone, he added, “I love my relationship with President Xi. We have a great relationship, and that on the Taiwan issue, “we’ll get along very well.”

In the following days, Trump repeatedly made similar statements in the media. However, on October 26, during an interview aboard his plane en route to Asia, he refused to discuss the Taiwan issue and warned that if China invades Taiwan, “it would be very dangerous for China.”

Trump’s rhetoric follows a very simple logic, as is well known: he fabricates bargaining chips out of thin air, uses soft language to lure the opponent to the negotiating table, then employs tough rhetoric to hint at his confidence in making the opponent yield, while refusing to reveal his hand in advance.

In mid-October, the RAND Corporation—a think tank closely tied to the U.S. military—released a report titled Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry, urging Washington to abandon zero-sum thinking and instead adopt a “step-back” approach to stabilize U.S.-China relations and avoid military conflict. On the Taiwan front, the report suggests that the U.S. should encourage Taiwan and China to create shared interests and emotional bonds that gradually lay the groundwork for reunification. This proposal has been interpreted in Taiwan as “gradual unification,” drawing widespread attention and viewed as a signal of the U.S. abandoning Taiwan.

However, rather than “the U.S. abandoning Taiwan,” the RAND report is more accurately a “delaying tactic,” aiming to prolong the status quo in the Taiwan Strait through a “step-back” strategy, thereby securing U.S. strategic interests in the First Island Chain for the next 5-10 years.

The realist tone of the RAND report is becoming the mainstream view in the U.S. For instance, Time magazine recently published an article that enraged Taiwan’s ruling party: The U.S. Must Beware of Taiwan’s Reckless Leader. The piece argues that Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s reckless emphasis on Taiwan’s sovereignty is dragging the U.S. into the risk of military conflict with China. Furthermore, it stresses that Taiwan is a core interest for China but merely a non-treaty ally for the U.S.— America has no reason to get embroiled in war for Taiwan’s sake and should instead invest resources in treaty allies like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

In other words, the restraint-oriented thinking in the U.S. that advocates “focusing on the big picture” is gradually gaining the upper hand. Such arguments often come from individuals and organizations familiar with U.S. military capabilities. Simply put, this rhetoric merely underscores a fact: the U.S. military has low odds of winning a war against China, and it’s not worth risking for a non-treaty ally.

Of course, hawkish thinking in the U.S. remains resilient. In contrast to the restrainers, hawks believe that losing Taiwan would severely damage U.S. credibility in East Asia, and from a long-term perspective, the U.S. would suffer more harm than good, thus stressing that “Taiwan is not for sale” and advocating continuing arms sales to Taiwan, even shifting from “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic clarity” policy.

But we know Trump doesn’t think that far ahead. Before he leaves office, Taiwan must be “cashed in” to feed this narcissist’s ego. In other words, the one inevitably waving the “Taiwan is for sale” sign is Trump.

In fact, for the West, Taiwan is rapidly depreciating because its most valuable asset—the semiconductor industry—is being hollowed out by the U.S. Taiwan’s vice president recently admitted that not only TSMC but also the ruling party has decided to replicate an identical semiconductor supply chain cluster in the U.S.

Taiwan’s authorities explain this investment plan as “avoiding over-reliance on the single Chinese market,” but those familiar with the semiconductor industry know that Taiwan has always relied on the U.S. market, not China—especially for high-end chips. Relocating the industry to the U.S. will only increase corporate costs, raise chip prices, and introduce even more unpredictable risks.

Rare earths are one such unpredictable risk. Semiconductor manufacturing requires rare earths, albeit in small proportions, but without them, chips cannot be produced. If Beijing wants to keep the semiconductor industry in Taiwan, it could completely ban rare earth exports to the U.S. while continuing normal supplies to Taiwan. Even if the U.S. tries to use Taiwan as a rare earth transshipment hub, that’s impossible, as China’s export controls can precisely calculate buyers’ demand volumes, eliminating any transshipment possibilities.

A more fundamental approach would be to ban rare earth exports to both Taiwan and the U.S., driving Taiwan’s value to rock bottom and preventing Trump from demanding too high a price.

In line with Trump’s style, consolidating proxies across the First Island Chain to form a military deterrence against China is undoubtedly another chip in his hand, but this card no longer works on China. Throughout this year, Beijing has repeatedly flexed its military muscles to signal to the U.S. that China cannot be contained. The U.S. military’s front line has effectively retreated to Guam, and Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea all know that the U.S. is pulling back. Without their backer, they dare not confront China.

The key point is that China understands the U.S.’s strategic goal is to stabilize U.S.-China relations, not to break ties. Therefore, only by doubling down on countermeasures against the U.S. can China achieve a stable state of “competition without rupture,” and facts have proven that a hardline strategy leads to a “TACO” outcome. Beijing has no reason or room to concede, especially on the Taiwan issue.

China is testing various tools to offset Western sanctions, leaving the entire West shrouded in fear and anger over rare earth cutoffs, yet powerless to retaliate. This proves that countermeasures to fully offset Western sanctions are nearly complete. If there’s any vulnerability, it’s the financial defense line, which is not yet fully prepared. This explains why China is actively promoting the internationalization of the renminbi and continuing to reduce its holdings of U.S. debt.

On the other hand, Taiwan’s largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), replaced its party chairman in October with someone determined to change its U.S. policy. Due to the ruling party’s declining popularity, the KMT is poised to win majority voter support in next year’s elections and those in 2028. The new chairman opposes U.S. directives—demanding that Taiwan raise defense spending to 5% of GDP—and extends a peace olive branch to Beijing, potentially leading to dramatic changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations, a development unfavorable to Washington.

Admittedly, the KMT’s new chairman may neither be able nor willing to convince the Taiwanese people to unify with mainland China, but she could reverse the status quo where Taiwan’s major parties are all pro-U.S. Her support from over half the party members stems from two public opinion bases: first, acknowledging oneself as Chinese; second, opposing the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan. According to polls, 4 million KMT supporters accept Chinese identity, and over half (more than 9 million) of all voters, regardless of party, oppose the U.S. hollowing out Taiwan.

While Taiwanese public opinion is divided, most Taiwanese people oppose the Trump administration’s plundering of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and also oppose war across the strait—this is the main reason for the ruling party’s sagging approval ratings.

A “distrust of America” sentiment pervades Taiwanese society, along with dissatisfaction toward the anti-China president, prompting Beijing to establish “Taiwan Restoration Day” (October 25) to evoke Taiwanese people’s historical memory of China’s recovery of Taiwan after World War II. This aims to maximize nationalism to offset separatism and reduce Taiwanese resistance to unification. At the same time, Beijing uses this move to send a clear signal to the U.S. and neighboring countries: China is determined to resolve the Taiwan issue and is working to remove all obstacles.

Beijing now holds a strong hand; even the U.S.’s “Taiwan card” has become a card China can counter with. In line with Xi Jinping’s decision-making style, he will concede when unprepared, but once fully ready, he will strike suddenly, catching the opponent off guard.

Trump should be very aware that his current position is precarious, making it hard to reverse Beijing’s advantageous stance. Even the “chip card” is no longer effective. Thus, aside from selling Taiwan, he has no other good options—and this is the situation most feared by Taiwan’s elites: the window for “maintaining the status quo” is closing.

However, the sentiments of Taiwan’s elites are also shifting with the situation. Due to the KMT’s policy pivot, more and more Taiwanese elites may pragmatically reassess Taiwan’s future in the coming years, as KMT supporters lead the way, turning back to demand that elites devise countermeasures to change cross-strait relations and foster peace.

When U.S. hawks emphasize “Taiwan is not for sale,” it ironically highlights America’s intent to sell Taiwan. Yet, if this can lead to a peaceful resolution, the trend should be welcomed rather than doubted. After all, there are no winners in war, and those sacrificed are often innocent civilians.

Taiwan is for sale—the buyer is only one. The fear is that Trump might overprice it, backfiring and once again squandering his chance at a Nobel Peace Prize.

Pakistan’s diplomatic playbook for 2025 is shifting noticeably toward trade, sustainability, and the projection of soft power. Gone are the days when foreign policy revolved solely around security concerns or aid dependency. The country’s recent economic and diplomatic maneuvers suggest a clear intent to rebrand itself as a credible, reform-driven partner focused on growth, responsibility, and engagement. From seafood export approvals by the US to partnerships with France and major development financing commitments, Pakistan’s narrative is evolving, and for once, it’s a story of initiative rather than reaction.

The US government’s decision to extend Pakistan’s seafood export approval until 2029 is a quiet but significant achievement. The deal, worth roughly $600 million annually, underscores two critical things: the growing confidence in Pakistan’s sustainability standards and the country’s ability to meet global compliance norms. For years, Pakistani exporters have faced barriers due to outdated infrastructure and quality control issues. Now, improved regulations and environmental monitoring seem to be paying off. This approval not only secures a steady stream of revenue but also signals that Pakistani industries are capable of aligning with Western ecological and safety benchmarks, something that can serve as a model for other export sectors.

In a similar spirit, the Punjab government’s recent memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with France mark another leap toward deepening provincial and international trade ties. France’s interest in Pakistan’s Special Economic Zones (SEZs) reveals confidence in the country’s industrial potential. For Punjab, the partnership could attract sustainable technologies, investment in renewable energy, and expertise in urban development. It also decentralizes diplomacy, shifting some of the engagement from federal corridors to proactive provincial actors, an approach that could make economic cooperation nimbler and more region-specific.

At the macro level, multilateral institutions are showing renewed faith in Pakistan’s economic reforms. The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC) have jointly pledged a staggering $40 billion for development and private sector growth. This isn’t charity; it’s a bet on Pakistan’s capacity to absorb and utilize global capital effectively. The World Bank’s concessional loans, particularly targeting education and climate resilience, fit neatly into Pakistan’s national development goals. Meanwhile, the IFC’s $20 billion allocation to the private sector and small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) speaks to an evolving understanding that long-term economic health depends on entrepreneurial vitality rather than government-led expansion alone.

Domestically, the banking sector is mirroring this new wave of confidence. The Bank of Punjab, for instance, has reported record profits, reflecting a resilient financial system despite broader global headwinds. A profitable and stable banking environment is a prerequisite for sustained trade diplomacy; it assures foreign investors that local institutions are capable of managing large inflows and transactions transparently. When financial institutions thrive alongside industrial and export sectors, it sends a reassuring message to international partners that Pakistan’s growth is not a temporary surge but a maturing cycle.

But economic diplomacy alone doesn’t build soft power. What sets Pakistan’s recent approach apart is the coupling of trade initiatives with cultural and environmental diplomacy. The government’s efforts to promote interfaith harmony, expand cultural exchanges, and invest in green infrastructure reflect a broader understanding of influence in the modern era. Soft power, after all, isn’t about dominance; it’s about attraction. Pakistan’s reforestation programs, ecotourism initiatives, and partnerships in climate resilience not only improve its environmental record but also enhance its moral credibility on the global stage. These projects project a vision of Pakistan as a responsible global citizen, one that contributes to shared planetary goals rather than merely negotiating for its own interests.

Tourism, too, plays a key role in this narrative. The revival of heritage sites, promotion of religious tourism for Sikh and Buddhist pilgrims, and international film collaborations are creating a gentler, more relatable image of Pakistan abroad. These cultural bridges complement trade diplomacy by humanizing the country in the eyes of investors and tourists alike. They help replace outdated stereotypes with more nuanced perceptions of a nation that’s young, creative, and striving for balance between tradition and modernity.

This pivot toward soft power and trade diplomacy is not accidental; it’s strategic. Pakistan seems to recognize that credibility in global markets depends not just on economic incentives but on the consistency of reform and image. The focus on sustainability and governance reforms aims to reduce dependency on loans and shift toward mutually beneficial trade partnerships. In doing so, Pakistan positions itself not as a passive recipient of aid but as a contributor to global growth.

Critically, these moves also reflect a certain self-awareness. The emphasis on sustainability, whether in fisheries, industry, or climate policy, acknowledges that the old model of extractive growth is no longer viable. Similarly, engaging institutions like the World Bank and IFC shows that Pakistan understands the importance of credibility and transparency in attracting international capital. Trade diplomacy, when backed by responsible domestic governance and inclusive growth, becomes more than an economic tactic; it turns into a long-term strategy for stability and respect.

That said, this strategy will need to be carefully managed. The challenge isn’t just to secure deals but to ensure they deliver equitable benefits. For instance, trade approvals and foreign investments must be accompanied by support for small exporters, labor reforms, and environmental safeguards. Otherwise, the benefits will stay concentrated among elites, undermining the very soft power Pakistan seeks to build. Likewise, diplomatic capital must not be squandered on short-term optics or domestic political point-scoring. Consistency, patience, and institutional continuity will determine whether this new vision can endure.

In many ways, Pakistan’s 2025 diplomacy embodies a pragmatic realism. It doesn’t reject global partnerships or rely excessively on one bloc. Instead, it seeks balance between East and West, between economic pragmatism and moral purpose. By intertwining trade with culture, sustainability, and finance, the country is sketching the contours of a diplomacy that’s as much about persuasion as negotiation. And in a fragmented world increasingly defined by narratives rather than alliances, that’s a powerful pivot.

Recommendations

·       Establish specialized trade diplomacy desks in embassies to promote sectoral exports, green investment, and SME partnerships.

·       Strengthen provincial economic offices abroad to attract investors in key sectors like textiles, agri-tech, and renewable energy.

·       Implement domestic policies for export diversification and improve digital trade facilitation to empower smaller producers.

·       Expand cultural diplomacy programs, including art, film, sports, and education exchanges, to enhance people-to-people connections and global goodwill.

·       Ensure policy consistency and transparency across all levels of government to solidify Pakistan’s reputation as a credible, reform-driven partner in global trade and diplomacy.

China and the United States are set to resume high-level trade talks in Malaysia from Friday as both sides work to contain a sudden surge in tensions ahead of a crucial leaders’ summit in South Korea. Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng will meet U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer during his visit to attend an ASEAN summit from October 24 to 27.

The renewed strain in ties comes after Beijing expanded curbs on rare earth exports critical materials used in electronics and defense in retaliation for Washington’s decision to blacklist more Chinese companies from purchasing U.S. technology. The move has reignited fears of another trade war just as the two powers had shown tentative signs of improvement in recent months.

Why It Matters

These talks carry significant global implications. The world’s two largest economies are deeply interlinked, and renewed hostilities threaten to disrupt global supply chains, technological cooperation, and regional stability. Both Washington and Beijing are under pressure to prevent economic confrontation from spilling into diplomatic isolation ahead of the scheduled Trump-Xi summit.

The flare-up also underscores the fragility of U.S.-China relations. Despite earlier progress including a successful TikTok-related deal at a Madrid summit and a constructive Trump-Xi call in September the latest export and sanctions measures have quickly derailed the momentum toward reconciliation.

The main negotiators, He Lifeng, Scott Bessent, and Jamieson Greer, are expected to focus on two issues: China’s rare earth export restrictions and U.S. curbs on technology access. These topics strike at the heart of both countries’ strategic priorities industrial self-sufficiency for China and tech security for the U.S.

Southeast Asian nations, particularly Malaysia as the host, are watching closely. They stand to benefit economically if tensions ease but risk becoming collateral in any escalation, as both superpowers compete for influence in the region. Meanwhile, global markets are bracing for volatility, with tech and manufacturing sectors especially vulnerable to disruptions.

What’s Next

The Malaysia talks are being seen as a last attempt to restore calm before the Trump-Xi summit next week in South Korea. Both sides are expected to seek at least a symbolic agreement to keep communication channels open, though a comprehensive deal is unlikely given the current mistrust.

If the talks fail, trade and diplomatic friction could deepen, potentially leading to expanded sanctions or retaliatory measures that reverberate across Asia. For now, the focus is on whether Washington and Beijing can manage their rivalry without derailing global economic stability.

With information from Reuters.

Jared Kushner, a billionaire real-estate scion, is shaping the future of Gaza. Why is the United States president’s son-in-law at the heart of the Gaza ceasefire deal – and the future of the Middle East?

During a trip to the Middle East marking the end of Israel’s war on Gaza, United States President Donald Trump turned to another source of strife in the region: the tensions between Tehran and Washington.

In remarks to the Israeli Knesset on Monday, Trump, who took the unprecedented step of bombing Iranian nuclear facilities earlier this year amid a 12-day war between Israel and Iran, offered a “hand of friendship”.

“We are ready when you are, and it will be the best decision that Iran has ever made, and it’s going to happen,” Trump said of a possible agreement with Tehran.

“The hand of friendship and cooperation is open. I’m telling you, they [Iran] want to make a deal. It would be great if we could make a deal.”

But despite the dovish rhetoric, the Trump administration has continued to take a hard line against Iran, and analysts say that a path towards better relations between the two countries remains filled with obstacles.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a US-based think tank, said that the Israeli and US attacks in June, which came as nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran were ongoing, undermined advocacy for diplomacy in Iran.

“There’s a perception that the US is using diplomacy to lull Iran into a false sense of security,” Parsi said.

‘Iran is open to a deal’

Iran itself has not closed the door to diplomacy, but its leaders have not rushed to renew talks with the US, either.

“If we receive a reasonable, balanced, and fair proposal from the Americans for negotiations, we will certainly consider it,” Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi said during a television interview on Saturday.

Iran had rejected an Egyptian invitation to attend a summit on the war in Gaza in Sharm el-Sheikh on Monday, citing US attacks and sanctions.

Talks over Iran’s nuclear programme have not resumed since the Trump administration’s bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel started the war in June, days before the US and Iranian officials were set for another round of talks.

The US, which during Trump’s first term in 2018 withdrew from a previous deal limiting Iran’s nuclear programme, has also insisted that any new agreement include a total ban on Iranian uranium enrichment.

That demand goes beyond the original deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which only curbed Iran’s uranium enrichment programme under a strict international inspection system.

Iran has depicted that new demand as a denial of its rights as a sovereign country, noting that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not prohibit uranium enrichment.

The impasse over enrichment has become a sticking point in negotiations.

“Iran is open to a deal,” Parsi told Al Jazeera. “But regardless of Trump’s positive tone and kind words, what he is looking for is for Iran to capitulate. As long as he insists on zero enrichment, I don’t think he will get a deal.”

Israel’s war with Iran, which included Israel’s assassination of high-level military figures and civilian nuclear scientists, as well as air strikes that killed hundreds of people, has also increased scepticism about the prospects of a lasting deal with the US.

In a speech to the Knesset on Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lauded the US decision to bomb Iran during the war as a “biblical miracle”.

Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, Israel has struck a series of blows against Iran and allied groups, such as Hezbollah, across the Middle East, leaving it significantly weakened and giving the US little incentive to make concessions on uranium enrichment and other issues.

Trump often reiterates that Iran’s nuclear programme has been “obliterated” by the US strikes on key facilities, but the extent of the damage remains unclear.

The Pentagon said earlier this year that the Iranian nuclear programme had been set back by one to two years. But Rafael Grossi, the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has said that Iran could be enriching uranium again within months.

Trump can ‘let Iran sweat’

Iran insists that it is not seeking a nuclear weapon, while Israel is widely believed to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal.

Gregory Brew, an Iran analyst at the US-based Eurasia Group, argued that time is on Trump’s side in the confrontation with Iran.

“Trump can sound optimistic about diplomacy, but he can also afford to wait and let Iran sweat,” Brew told Al Jazeera via email.

“With its nuclear programme in ruins, and with new Israeli strikes likely if Iran takes steps to rebuild the programme, [Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei and the rest of the leadership don’t have many good options.”

Iran is also facing renewed sanctions from the UN after France, Germany and the United Kingdom triggered a so-called snapback of sanctions in August, arguing that Iran had violated the terms of the JCPOA.

Tehran countered that the US unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018, and called another deal allowing inspections of its nuclear facilities by the IAEA “no longer relevant” after the US and Israeli strikes.

Iran was incensed at the IAEA for failing to condemn strikes against its nuclear facilities, which Tehran argues are protected under international law.

“There’s no upside for Trump in resuming talks without Iranian concessions, and there’s currently little downside in letting pressure build, as Iran has been weakened to the point that its ability to threaten Israel or US interests in the region is fairly limited,” said Brew.

“Trump may be willing to let the matter rest for a few months to see if increased economic pain forces Iran back to the negotiating table on favourable terms.”

WASHINGTON — At a banquet table fit for a king, but set specially for him, President Trump called his state visit to the United Kingdom this week “one of the highest honors of my life.”

He then proceeded to tell guests at the white tie event that the United States was “a very sick country” last year before becoming “the hottest” again under his rule.

During a news conference with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the Chequers estate Thursday, hailing a bilateral deal on artificial intelligence investments said to be worth hundreds of billions of dollars, Trump called America’s relationship with Britain “unbreakable,” bigger than any single esoteric policy disagreement.

But he quickly pivoted from magnanimity on the world stage, denying the results of his 2020 election defeat and calling exclusively on conservative reporters, who asked questions about Britain’s Christian nature and his predecessor’s alleged use of an autopen.

It was a familiar study in contrasts from the president, who routinely mixes diplomacy with domestic politics in his meetings with foreign leaders. Yet the sound of Trump engaging in fractious political discourse — not at the White House or a political event in Florida or Missouri, but inside Britain’s most revered halls — struck a discordant tone.

The Mirror, a national British tabloid aligned with Starmer’s Labour Party, wrote that Trump’s “wild … political rant” at Windsor Castle alongside King Charles III “seriously broke royal protocol.”

On Wednesday evening, as the formal banquet concluded, Trump took to his social media platform to designate a far left-wing political movement called Antifa as “a major terrorist organization,” describing the group as “A SICK, DANGEROUS, RADICAL LEFT DISASTER.”

President Trump appears with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at a news conference Thursday at Chequers near Aylesbury, England.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

The move prompted a question to Starmer at the Chequers news conference from a right-ring reporter on whether he would consider taking similar action against leftist British groups.

“We obviously will take decisions for ourselves. I don’t want to comment on the decisions of the president,” Starmer said. “But we take our decisions ourselves.”

In another exchange, Trump repeated dramatically exaggerated figures on the number of undocumented migrants who entered the United States during the Biden administration, as well as false claims about the 2020 presidential election.

“I don’t want to be controversial, but you see what’s happened, and you see all the information that’s come out,” Trump said. “We won in 2020, big. And I said, let’s run. We gotta run. Because I saw what’s happening.”

The Royal Family went beyond its own rule book to show Trump extraordinary hospitality, honoring the president’s arrival with a 41-gun salute typically reserved for special, domestic occasions, such as the king’s birthday.

King Charles was hosting Trump for an unprecedented second state visit — a gesture never before extended to an American president — after the king’s mother, Queen Elizabeth II, greeted him at Windsor in 2019.

“That’s a first and maybe that’s going to be the last time. I hope it is, actually,” Trump said in his banquet speech, prompting the king to chuckle and balk.

At the stunning dinner, along a table seating 160 people in St. George’s Hall, guests were offered a 1912 cognac honoring the birth year of the president’s Scottish-born mother, as well as a whiskey cocktail inspired by his heritage. The president, for his part, does not drink.

First Lady Melania Trump, left, President Trump, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Lady Victoria Starmer watch the Red Devils parachute display team at Chequers, the country home of the British prime minister, on Thursday.

(Anna Moneymaker / Getty Images)

But it is unclear whether the king’s soft-power diplomacy helped shift Trump closer to London’s priorities on foreign affairs. A growing chorus in Britain opposes Israel’s continued military operations in Gaza, and major U.K. parties are aligned on a moral and strategic need to support Ukraine against Russia’s invasion.

“Our countries have the closest defense, security and intelligence relationship ever known,” Charles said at the dinner. “In two world wars, we fought together to defeat the forces of tyranny.

“Today, as tyranny once again threatens Europe, we and our allies stand together in support of Ukraine, to deter aggression and secure peace,” the king added.

A king’s request for Europe

Trump’s reciprocal remarks did not mention Ukraine. But at Chequers, the president repeated his general disappointment with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the ongoing war, a conflict Putin has escalated with attacks on civilians and the British Council building in Kyiv since meeting with Trump in Alaska a month ago.

“He’s let me down. He’s really let me down,” said Trump, offering no details on what steps he might take next.

Starmer, pressing to leverage the pomp of Trump’s state visit for actionable policy change, said that a coordinated response to Putin’s aggression would be forthcoming and “decisive.”

“In recent days, Putin has shown his true face, mounting the biggest attack since the invasion began, with yet more bloodshed, yet more innocents killed, and unprecedented violations of NATO airspace,” Starmer said, referencing Russia’s Sept. 9 drone flights over Poland. “These are not the actions of someone who wants peace.”

“It’s only when the president has put pressure on Putin,” Starmer added, “that he’s actually shown any inclination to move.”

The announcement of Archbishop Damianos’ resignation from St. Catherine’s Monastery in Sinai, after decades of leadership, has brought to light more than an internal monastic dispute. It has exposed a larger power struggle at the intersection of ecclesiastical diplomacy and international politics. The controversy surrounding the monastery, one of the most historic centers of Orthodoxy in the Middle East, has turned into a stage where rival patriarchates, foreign influence, and states assert their presence.

For many observers, Damianos’ departure was not simply the end of an era but the culmination of months of escalating tension between the Monastery, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and wider Orthodox dynamics influenced by Moscow.

Jerusalem’s contested claims

At the heart of the dispute lies the claim of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem over Sinai. In its official response, Jerusalem characterized Damianos’ statements as “anti-ecclesiastical” and questioned even the authorship of his lengthy announcement, suggesting manipulation by third parties. Ecclesiastical circles interpret this as a deliberate strategy of delegitimization, portraying the elderly Archbishop as incapable of independent action in order to undermine his authority.

Beyond rhetoric, Jerusalem has consistently sought to present Sinai as canonically dependent on its patriarchal throne, despite the historic sigillion of Patriarch Gabriel IV in 1782, which sealed the monastery’s autonomy. For Damianos and his supporters, such attempts constitute ecclesiastical encroachment and a direct violation of centuries-old canonical order.

Moscow’s shadow over Sinai

Damianos’ final announcement did not spare Moscow either. He accused the Russian Church of fueling division within Orthodoxy and exploiting internal fissures of the Sinai brotherhood. According to his account, networks and organizations aligned with Russian influence attempted to capitalize on the crisis, promoting narratives foreign to Orthodox theology and tradition.

For ecclesiastical diplomacy analysts, this dimension is crucial. It situates the Sinai crisis within the broader confrontation between Constantinople and Moscow over primacy in the Orthodox world, extending the arena of contestation from Ukraine to the deserts of Sinai. The monastery thus becomes more than a spiritual center; it is a geopolitical outpost in the struggle for influence.

Athens and Cairo as indispensable actors

The role of Greece has emerged as pivotal. Damianos repeatedly underlined that without the active involvement of Athens, the monastery would have faced existential threats. The recent law 5224/2025, combined with constitutional guarantees, was presented as a shield of protection for the monastery’s legal and institutional identity.

At the same time, Egypt remains a decisive interlocutor. The court decision of Ismailia in May 2025 that challenged elements of the monastery’s status placed the issue squarely within the Egyptian legal framework. Damianos himself acknowledged that any durable solution requires a tripartite understanding between Athens, Cairo, and the monastery’s leadership.

This triangular dynamic underscores that the future of Sinai cannot be separated from Greek–Egyptian relations, a strategic partnership already central in the Eastern Mediterranean. The monastery, therefore, becomes both a symbol and a test of bilateral trust.

Ecclesiastical diplomacy at a crossroads

The broader Orthodox world has also been drawn into the crisis. Several patriarchates expressed support for Sinai, including Constantinople, Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Serbia, while Jerusalem remained isolated in its claims. The silence of Moscow, combined with its indirect involvement, reinforced perceptions that Sinai has become a flashpoint in the Orthodox fragmentation that Russia has often been accused of exacerbating.

For Constantinople, Sinai’s autonomy is not negotiable. For Jerusalem, asserting control is both a matter of prestige and regional influence. For Moscow, exploiting divisions serves its wider strategy. And for Athens, safeguarding the monastery is part of its cultural diplomacy and historical responsibility toward the Eastern Christian heritage.

A power game with lasting implications

The resignation of Damianos closes a personal chapter but opens a much larger one. The crisis of Sinai illustrates how monastic autonomy, canonical tradition, and national diplomacy intersect. What appears as an ecclesiastical quarrel is, in fact, a power game of influence that involves patriarchates, states, and international alignments.

The outcome of the succession process, and whether a unified brotherhood can emerge, will determine not only the monastery’s internal cohesion but also the credibility of Greek–Egyptian partnership and the balance within Orthodoxy.

For analysts of ecclesiastical diplomacy, Sinai has become a microcosm of the wider struggle shaping the Orthodox world: the tension between autonomy and control, between local tradition and geopolitical leverage. The desert of Sinai, where Moses once received the Law, is today a battlefield of influence where spiritual heritage collides with political ambition.