dilemma

Introduction: The Ambition at the Crossroads

Mexico currently faces an unparalleled economic juncture. Global geopolitical dynamics, driven by nearshoring and the imperative to diversify supply chains, have positioned the country for a development opportunity that far exceeds simple assembly manufacturing. The potential to build high-value ecosystems in artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor fabrication—the foundational pillars of the modern global economy—could fundamentally redefine Mexico’s standing in international trade.

But, this critical ambition is currently being stalled by a single, deeply rooted structural factor in the national infrastructure: the capacity, quality, and, above all, the reliability of the National Transmission Grid (RNT) operated by the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE). The power grid, therefore, is not merely an operational prerequisite; it has transformed into the primary strategic constraint jeopardizing Mexico’s technological sovereignty and its potential qualitative economic leap.

I. The Tensions of Demand: World-Class Requirements

The AI and semiconductor fabrication (FAB) industries impose energy demands that Mexico’s legacy infrastructure is struggling to meet. These sectors not only consume power on a massive scale but also require it with a precision and resilience that approaches technical perfection.

A. The Exponentials of AI and Data Centers

The core engine of AI is the data center. These facilities, especially those dedicated to training massive models using Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), require a constant power flow comparable to that of entire cities. Large hyperscale data centers can demand between 100 MW and 300 MW of installed capacity, and the aggregate demand from this sector in Mexico is projected to multiply tenfold in the near future.

This demand possesses one non-negotiable quality: 24/7 availability. AI operations cannot tolerate interruptions. A micro-power cut is more than just an economic loss; it represents the possibility of compromising the integrity of critical data or nullifying the progress of computation processes that have required weeks of execution—an unviable vulnerability for the industry.

B. The Precision Mandate of Semiconductors

Semiconductor manufacturing plants are arguably the industrial environments most sensitive to power quality. In the fabrication of microchips, where tolerances are measured in nanometers, a micro-unit of voltage fluctuation or an interruption lasting mere milliseconds can prove catastrophic. Such an event can instantaneously ruin entire batches of silicon wafers valued in the millions of dollars.

Therefore, the key to attracting advanced semiconductor fabrication facilities (FABs, typically requiring between 50 MW and 150 MW each) does not lie solely in guaranteeing the volume of energy but in certifying a power quality that the CFE, given constraints in transmission and distribution, struggles to consistently assure within the most desirable industrial hubs. The promise of availability must, by necessity, be a world-class guarantee.

II. The CFE Infrastructure: From Support to Barrier

The National Electric System (SEN) operates under a structural pressure that positions it as the decisive bottleneck. This barrier manifests across three critical dimensions that undermine the confidence of high-technology investors.

A. Saturation of Transmission and Distribution

Mexico’s fundamental problem is not a lack of total generation capacity but the systemic inability to move that power efficiently, a responsibility that falls squarely on the RNT. This infrastructure, much of which is aging or designed for industrial patterns of a past century, has simply failed to evolve at the pace required by nearshoring.

The consequence is severe congestion in substations and distribution lines, particularly in the vital industrial corridors of the north and center (such as Nuevo León, Coahuila, and the Bajío region). This congestion translates into something tangible and costly: industrial park developers face wait times exceeding a year just to obtain connection feasibility. This delay has led to a troubling phenomenon: the proliferation of “Dark Buildings”—industrial warehouses completely finished and ready for operation but lacking physical access to electrical power.

B. Reliability, Risk, and the Unacceptable Interruption

Recent waves of blackouts and recurrent service interruptions demonstrate that the SEN is consistently operating at its operational limit. Obsolescence in the generation fleet and deficiencies in transmission elevate the risk of system failures.

For any corporation managing mission-critical computing processes or high-value production lines like FABs, this level of risk is unacceptable. A multi-billion-dollar investment cannot depend on a grid that offers systemic uncertainty. Compounding this is regulatory volatility, where the perceived prioritization of fossil fuel generation over renewable energy dissuades global investors who seek clarity, stable long-term pricing, and a predictable framework for operation.

C. The Sustainability Imperative (ESG Factor)

Leaders in the technology industry (from Google and Amazon to major chip manufacturers) have adopted rigorous corporate commitments regarding sustainability and governance (ESG), including net-zero carbon goals or the use of 100% clean energy.

To establish AI or semiconductor operations in Mexico, these investors require contractual guarantees that a substantial portion of their consumption will be sourced from renewables. The difficulty imposed on the interconnection of private wind or solar energy projects to the RNT, coupled with the CFE’s reliance on generation based on natural gas and fuel oil, creates a sustainability impediment that automatically excludes Mexico from the list of viable destinations for many of these investments.

III. The Strategic Cost: Sovereignty and Dependency

If the electric infrastructure issue is not addressed with a decisive, long-term state vision, the cost to Mexico will be dual and profound:

Firstly, it will result in the loss of the value-added nearshoring opportunity. High-demand and high-precision firms will simply divert their investments to markets that offer solid power grids and transparent regulatory frameworks, such as the United States (driven by the CHIPS Act) or established Asian ecosystems.

Secondly, it will perpetuate technological dependence. Without the necessary energy infrastructure to host, power, and train large-scale AI models, and without the capacity to manufacture advanced components, Mexico will be relegated to being merely a consumer and assembler of technologies designed and produced elsewhere. This outcome has a direct, negative impact on national technological sovereignty and the capacity of Mexican research centers to compete at the global frontier of knowledge.

Conclusion: From Bottleneck to Catalyst

The CFE grid represents the single most fundamental challenge to Mexico’s digital ascension. While recent investments in transmission grid modernization signal a positive step, the sheer scale of the challenge necessitates a true paradigm shift that transcends institutional inertia.

To transform this bottleneck into a powerful catalyst, Mexico must execute a strategic course of action centered on efficiency and openness:

Agile Regulatory Reform: It is imperative to simplify procedures and drastically reduce the timelines for connection and feasibility studies for high-demand industrial projects.

Focalized Transmission Investment: The reinforcement of the RNT must be specifically prioritized in the industrial corridors that are the heart of nearshoring and the potential base for technological ecosystems.

Facilitating Clean Energy Integration: Creating mechanisms that not only permit but actively promote the interconnection of private renewable energy projects to meet the ESG demand and the volume required by technological leaders.

Deployment of Smart Grids: The massive adoption of AI-based technologies for distribution optimization, loss reduction, and ensuring resilient voltage quality is essential for the mission-critical needs of the AI and semiconductor industries.

Mexico’s technological future hinges upon the resolution of the CFE dilemma. It is the key that, when turned, will either open or definitively close the door to high-technology development.

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Nov. 7 (UPI) — Lebanon faces the dilemma of whether to go ahead with negotiations with Israel to end the ongoing cycle of violence and prevent a full-scale war despite Hezbollah‘s rejection of the talks — highlighting a deep political divide within the country.

The Hezbollah-Israel war, which broke out when the Iran-backed group opened a support front for Gaza on Oct. 8, 2023, never came to an end, even after a cease-fire agreement was reached on Nov. 27, 2024.

Israel has continued its unrestrained attacks on Hezbollah, causing further casualties and destruction. It has refused to withdraw from five strategic positions it still occupies in southern Lebanon, refrained from releasing Lebanese prisoners detained during the war, and prevented displaced residents from returning to their border villages turned to ruin.

The Lebanese Army’s successful advance in taking control of southern Lebanon and eliminating Hezbollah’s military presence along the border and south of the Litani River, as stipulated by the cease-fire agreement, does not seem sufficient for Israel, which wants Hezbollah to be completely disarmed.

In fact, Hezbollah, which suffered heavy losses during the war, has refrained from firing a single shot in retaliation to Israel’s continued air and drone strikes, which allegedly target the group’s remaining arms depots and military infrastructure beyond southern areas of the Litani River.

However, Hezbollah’s recent claims that it has fully recovered, restructured its military capabilities and rebuilt its command structure — coupled with its refusal to disarm or support Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in his new approach to negotiations with Israel — put the country at risk of another round of war.

While Aoun said that Lebanon has no choice but to engage in talks with Israel to end its occupation and halt its attacks, Hezbollah rejected any attempt to involve the country in new negotiations — outside the framework of the “mechanism” committee responsible for supervising the implementation of the ceasefire accord — arguing that they would only serve “the enemy and its interests.”

Hisham Jaber, a Lebanese military expert and former Army general, said it is the Lebanese state — not Hezbollah — that should negotiate with Israel, based on terms set by President Aoun: no direct or political negotiations, only military-security talks conducted via a third party, such as the U.S. or the United Nations, and no use of force to complete Hezbollah’s disarmament.

Jaber said that indirect talks with Israel had proven successful, recalling the 2022 U.S.-mediated maritime border deal that ended a years-long dispute between Lebanon and Israel over the ownership of natural gas fields.

“Why not do that again?” he told UPI. But to sit at the negotiation table, he added, the United States, which is pressuring Lebanon to accept the talks, should ensure that Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon and releases the prisoners, instead of “cornering us.”

What Lebanon wants is for Israel to abide by the truce accord through the “mechanism” committee, which is made up of Israel, Lebanon, the United States, France and the United Nations. However, the newly proposed negotiations, although their framework is still unclear, would also address land border disputes and other issues.

“There is a need for an agreement on the disputed points along the border, and this is not within the mandate of the mechanism,” said Riad Kahwaji, a Middle East security analyst, adding that the truce committee is charged with ensuring Hezbollah’s disarmament, the return of prisoners, and Israel’s withdrawal behind the [U.N.-drawn] Blue Line that existed before the last war in October 2023.

If the new negotiations with Israel proceed and result in a final land border agreement, it would lead to the cessation of the state of war between the two countries, and “the 1949 Armistice will prevail,” Kahwaji said..

“But, of course, Hezbollah does not want an end to the state of war between Lebanon and Israel, because that would require it to disarm, causing it to lose its value for Iran and its significance and standing within its own popular base,” he told UPI. “Its resistance will no longer be needed or relevant.”

However, Hezbollah’s attempts to rearm appear extremely difficult after the group lost its main supply route after the overthrow of its key ally, Syrian President Bashar Assad, as well as its long-standing access to Beirut’s port and airport, which it had used for years to smuggle weapons and funds.

It is now impossible for Hezbollah to smuggle large weapons, such as heavy missiles, across the border with Syria, though it may still attempt to acquire Grad rockets, anti-tank Kornet missiles and drones.

“If Hezbollah goes into another war with Israel, it will be using whatever is left from its arsenal, which is not that much,” Kahwaji said, noting that the group now has “a different leadership” after Israel killed most of its top leaders and military commanders, and that “its popular base is exhausted … so the repercussions will be huge.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “is acting as a victor,” refusing to make any concessions and imposing all his conditions, he added.

Lebanon has been facing mounting pressure, especially from the United States and Israel, to disarm Hezbollah even forcibly. Authorities prefer a quiet approach to avoid a confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the militant group, which could create divisions within the army and potentially spark a civil war.

Jaber, the former Army general who is well-informed about Hezbollah, said Washington should instead understand and support Lebanon’s approach, because the group “is ready to hand over its weapons” if Israel stops its attacks and withdraws in line with the truce accord.

“Hezbollah is prepared to relinquish its offensive weapons first, followed by its defensive weapons at a later stage, as part of a national defense strategy,” he said. “This is now an attrition war, not between two parties, but led by only one [Israel].”

Iran, which has funded and armed Hezbollah since its formation in the early 1980s, no longer is interfering in the group’s day-to-day affairs, but remains keen to preserve it as a political and military entity -a card in its hand — after “losing all its other cards in the region,” Jaber said.

With Israel threatening to expand its attacks and launch a full-scale war to force the complete disarmament of Hezbollah, Lebanon remains with few options: diplomacy and political pressure.

“It is in Lebanon’s best interest to seize this opportunity and drag Israel into negotiations to end the war and the conflict,” Kahwaji said.