corridor

During a recent meeting of Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi, on Friday, October 17, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Abdelatty reiterated that “the resolution of the Palestinian question” remains central to the progress of the IMEC connectivity project and strengthening the strategic ties between India and Egypt. His comments captured the essence of the challenge that confronts the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), that grand infrastructure schemes in this region cannot be separated from enduring political conflicts. Abdelatty’s emphasis indicated that IMEC, which was launched with so much enthusiasm at the 2023 G20 Summit hosted by New Delhi, will only move from rhetoric to reality if its architects reconcile geography with geopolitics.

The Strategic Vision: What IMEC proposes

IMEC was announced as a transformative connectivity framework which aims to link India, the Arabian Peninsula, and Europe through maritime, rail, energy, and digital networks. The project promised to reconfigure the trade routes and foster sustainable growth by involving India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, Israel, and the EU with the support of the United States and major European economies. It also emerged as a counterpart initiative against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the “IMEC vs BRI” debate is as much about the narrative competition as about logistics. Yet translating that narrative into a functioning framework is a complex process.

IMEC’s blueprint comprises two interconnected legs. An eastern maritime route between India and Gulf ports and a northern corridor of railways across Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel leading into Europe. Furthermore, it envisions plans for electricity grids, a hydrogen pipeline, and digital fibre networks. The idea is to reduce shipping time between India and Europe by nearly 40% and diversify global supply chains away from vulnerable checkpoints such as the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Barriers to the Vision

The road to the execution of this vision remains riddled with obstacles. IMEC’s future depends on bridging political divides and closing financial gaps. The physical links across the Arabian Peninsula are still incomplete, and key rail segments between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel exist largely on paper. Different technical standards and varied customs regimes with no unified authority to synchronise investment or implementation make the project susceptible. Moreover, the funding model lacks transparency. Neither a dedicated corpus nor a multilateral mechanism has been finalised, which leaves the corridor vulnerable to delays and competing priorities.

Furthermore, there is uncertainty due to diplomatic and security dynamics. The Israel-Gaza war has frozen Saudi-Israeli normalisation efforts that initially spirited the IMEC. Egypt’s renewed engagement suggests that Cairo intends to shape any connectivity framework that intersects its sphere of influence. Given the role of Egypt in the control of the Suez Canal and its political weight in the Arab World, Cairo’s participation is crucial. Abdelatty’s linkage of IMEC’s viability to progress on the Palestinian question implies that diplomatic legitimacy will precede logistical cooperation. Unless the participants address the regional trust deficit, the corridor politics may remain trapped between ambition and ambiguity.

Divergent Priorities of Participants

Each participant in IMEC has divergent goals. For India, the project aligns with its “Act West” policy and its long-time desire to consolidate middle-power status through connectivity leadership. For the Gulf monarchies, IMEC represents a channel to diversify beyond hydrocarbons and attract investments in technology and management. Europe views it as a hedge against over-dependence on Chinese infrastructure. To reconcile these varied interests, it is required to focus on continuous negotiations and proper planning. Tensions among Gulf states and between regional powers such as Iran and Turkey could further complicate the situation. The overlapping interests may blur the line between cooperation and competition, which will undermine cohesion before the corridor gains momentum.

From India’s viewpoint, IMEC holds immense significance if managed strategically. It will not only strengthen the supply-chain resilience but will also enhance energy security and expand India’s diplomatic footprint in the Middle East. The corridor perfectly aligns with global efforts to provide transparent alternatives to Chinese financing, for instance, the U.S.-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. However, this association might expose IMEC to great power rivalry, turning a development initiative into another strategic sport. This might dilute the economic rationale of the corridor.

Egypt and the Latest Turning Point

A new dimension has been added as Egypt re-emerges as a key stakeholder in the project. Cairo’s interests not only stem from geography but also from economic logic. The Suez Canal is the lifeline of the Egyptian economy, so any alternative corridor must complement rather than compete with it. Abdelatty’s emphasis on integrating political stability with economic planning reflects a broader regional lesson that peace and prosperity must progress together. Incorporating Egypt as a central player through port linkages or co-investment in logistics could enhance IMEC’s legitimacy and reliability. Contrary to this, if Egypt gets excluded, it may trigger diplomatic resistance or perceptions of marginalisation.

The most important question in the current context is whether IMEC can survive the cyclical turbulence of the world’s most unstable region. The region where energy markets are unstable and unresolved conflicts fuel the mistrust among participating states. Moreover, the delays in implementation might erode momentum. To demonstrate progress and sustain the confidence of investors, IMEC needs measurable milestones such as pilot projects, customs harmonisation or digital integration.  Even partial success, such as improved India-Gulf maritime connectivity or cooperation in renewable energy, could build credibility.

The Way Forward for IMEC

IMEC challenges the prevailing assumptions about how connectivity projects emerge in contested regions on a conceptual note. It suggests that strategic corridors can no longer depend solely on geopolitical alliances. They require inclusive governance, transparent financing, and conflict-sensitive design. Egypt’s diplomatic stance on the palestinian question and IMEC implies that development without justice is unsustainable. For India, the opportunity lies in using its credibility with multiple actors, such as Arab states, Israel, Europe and the U.S. to keep the corridor protected from zero-sum politics. This would present New Delhi not just as a participant but also as a facilitator.

In conclusion, IMEC is both a promise and a puzzle. It incorporates the aspiration for cooperative connectivity but remains hostage to the very divisions it aims to bridge. Abdelatty’s statement in New Delhi, which echoed across regional capitals, was less a warning than a reminder that infrastructure cannot transcend politics and it must be engaged with constructively. The corridor might evolve from a strategic deal into a genuine intercontinental partnership if India and its allies can translate this vision into sustained diplomacy and practical implementation. However, if it fails, IMEC will join the long list of visionary projects that turned out unsuccessful in the Middle East.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian says in Yerevan that ‘governance in the Caucasus region must remain Caucasian’.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has told Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that a planned corridor linking Azerbaijan with its exclave would be under Armenian control, days after Iran said it would block the project included in a United States-brokered peace accord that puts a potential Washington presence on its doorstep.

“Roads passing through Armenia will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Armenia, and security will be provided by Armenia, not by any third country,” Pashinyan said at a meeting with Pezeshkian in the Armenian capital Yerevan on Tuesday. He added that the corridor would open new economic perspectives between the two countries, and could offer a rail route from Iran to the Black Sea coast through Armenia.

The land corridor, dubbed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), is part of a deal signed this month in Washington between former foes Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Under the agreement, the US will hold development rights for the proposed route, which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave bordering Iran and Turkey.

“Governance in the Caucasus region must remain Caucasian – outsourcing the resolution of Caucasus issues to extra-regional forces will complicate it,” Pezeshkian said during his visit on Tuesday. “Iran’s position has always been to reject any changes to international borders in the Caucasus region.”

Iran has long opposed the planned transit route, also known as the Zangezur corridor, fearing it would cut the country off from Armenia and the rest of the Caucasus while bringing potentially hostile foreign forces close to its borders.

Since the deal was signed on August 8, Iranian officials have stepped up warnings to Armenia, saying the project could be part of a US ploy “to pursue hegemonic goals in the Caucasus region”.

The proposed corridor has been hailed as beneficial by other countries in the region, including Russia, with which Iran has a strategic alliance alongside Armenia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought a series of wars since the late 1980s when Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan that had a mostly ethnic Armenian population at the time, broke away from Azerbaijan with support from Armenia. Azerbaijan Baku took control of the territory in a military operation in 2023, leading to an exodus of the ethnic Armenian population.

Armenia last year agreed to return several villages to Azerbaijan in what Baku described as a “long-awaited historic event”.

Iran rejects ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’ (TRIPP), says the presence of American companies in the region would be ‘worrying’.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is visiting Armenia for talks on a planned corridor linking Azerbaijan near the border with his country, days after Iran said it would block the project included in a United States-brokered peace accord that puts a potential Washington presence on Iran’s doorstep.

The land corridor, dubbed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), is part of a deal signed earlier this month in Washington between former foes Armenia and Azerbaijan.

US President Donald Trump said the deal granted the US exclusive developmental rights to the transport corridor. Washington was also signing bilateral agreements with both countries to increase cooperation in areas like energy, trade and technology, including artificial intelligence.

Before departing for the Armenian capital Yerevan on Monday, Pezeshkian described the possible presence of American companies in the region as “worrying.”

“We will discuss it [with Armenian officials] and express our concerns,” he told state television.

The proposed route would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, passing near the Iranian border. Tehran has long opposed the planned transit route, also known as the Zangezur corridor, fearing it would cut the country off from Armenia and the rest of the Caucasus while bringing potentially hostile foreign forces close to its borders.

Since the deal was signed on August 8, Iranian officials have stepped up warnings to Armenia, saying the project could be part of a US ploy “to pursue hegemonic goals in the Caucasus region”.

On Sunday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi described it as a “sensitive” issue, saying Tehran’s main concern is that it could “lead to geopolitical changes in the region”.

“They [Armenian officials] have assured us that no American forces … or American security companies will be present in Armenia under the pretext of this route,” he told the official IRNA news agency.

The proposed corridor has been hailed as beneficial by other countries in the region including Russia, with which Iran has a strategic alliance alongside Armenia.

Ali Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, said Tehran would block the initiative “with or without Russia”.

Trump “thinks the Caucasus is a piece of real estate he can lease for 99 years”, Velayati told state-affiliated Tasnim News soon after the deal was signed, adding that the area would become “a graveyard for Trump’s mercenaries”.

Moscow cautiously welcomed the deal, saying that it supported efforts to promote stability and prosperity in the region. Similarly to Iran, however, it warned against outside intervention, arguing that lasting solutions should be developed by countries in the region.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought a series of wars since the late 1980s when Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan that had a mostly ethnic Armenian population at the time, broke away from Azerbaijan with support from Armenia. Azerbaijan Baku took control of the territory in a military operation in 2023, leading to an exodus of the ethnic Armenian population.

Armenia last year agreed to return several villages to Azerbaijan in what Baku described as a “long-awaited historic event”.

Iran has said it will block a corridor planned in the Caucasus under a United States-brokered peace accord between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which has been hailed by other countries in the region as beneficial for achieving lasting peace.

Ali Akbar Velayati, a top adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, said on Saturday that Tehran would block the initiative “with or without Russia”, with which Iran has a strategic alliance alongside Armenia.

US President Donald Trump “thinks the Caucasus is a piece of real estate he can lease for 99 years”, Velayati told state-affiliated Tasnim News, referring to the transport corridor included in the peace deal.

“This passage will not become a gateway for Trump’s mercenaries — it will become their graveyard,” he added, describing the plan as “political treachery” aimed at undermining Armenia’s territorial integrity.

The terms of the accord, which was unveiled at a signing ceremony at the White House on Friday, include exclusive US development rights to a route through Armenia that would link Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani enclave that borders Baku’s ally Turkiye.

The corridor, which would pass close to the border with Iran, would be named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP, and operate under Armenian law.

Velayati argued that it would open the way for NATO to position itself “like a viper” between Iran and Russia.

Separately, Iran’s foreign ministry issued a statement expressing concern about the negative consequences of any foreign intervention in the vicinity of its borders.

While it welcomed the peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the ministry said any project near Iran’s borders should be developed “with respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and without foreign interference”.

For its part, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs cautiously welcomed the deal, saying on Saturday that Moscow supported efforts to promote stability and prosperity in the region, including the Washington meeting.

Similarly to Iran, however, it warned against outside intervention, arguing that lasting solutions should be developed by countries in the region.

“The involvement of non-regional players should strengthen the peace agenda, not create new divisions,” the ministry said, adding that it hoped to avoid the “unfortunate experience” of Western-led conflict resolution in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Turkiye on Saturday said it hoped the planned transit corridor would boost exports of energy and other resources through the South Caucasus.

A NATO member, Turkiye has strongly backed Azerbaijan in its conflicts with Armenia, but has pledged to restore ties with Yerevan after it signs a final peace deal with Baku.

The Turkish presidency said President Recep Tayyip Erdogan discussed the peace agreement with Ilham Aliyev, his counterpart from Azerbaijan, and offered Ankara’s support in achieving lasting peace in the region.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also addressed the planned corridor during a visit to Egypt, saying it could “link Europe with the depths of Asia via Turkiye” and would be “a very beneficial development”.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought a series of wars since the late 1980s when Nagorno-Karabakh, a region in Azerbaijan that had a mostly ethnic Armenian population at the time, broke away from Azerbaijan with support from Armenia.

Armenia last year agreed to return several villages to Azerbaijan in what Baku described as a “long-awaited historic event”.

Ahmad Shahidov, of the Azerbaijan Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, told Al Jazeera that he expected a final peace declaration between Armenia and Azerbaijan to be signed in the coming weeks.

Shahidov said Friday’s US-brokered deal constituted a “roadmap” for the final agreement, which appears imminent given there are no unresolved territorial disputes between the two neighbours.