competition

US and China have long competed to become world powers, particularly in the technology sector. Since 2022, the US has systematically restricted the supply of high-performance NVIDIA chips to China. In today’s world, competition for power is no longer achieved through traditional means, such as military power. The US uses chips (semiconductors) as an instrument of political pressure. This policy is not just about economic or trade value, but has become part of technological statecraft designed to counter China’s military potential and its use of Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Semiconductors as a Provision of Power

The US policy of restricting high-end semiconductors to China shows a paradigm shift, chips (semiconductors) are not only industrial commodities, but have shifted to become a tool for achieving power. Export controls on high-performance chips and components that enable their production have been implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). These steps show that the US is restructuring the geopolitical arena of technology.

AI today relies heavily on chips that can process vast amounts of data. The US restricts the export of high-end chips, such as the NVIDIA H100 and A100. A country’s AI development capacity could be severely compromised without access to these chips. The H100 is more than just a technological component; it serves as a strategic enabler that determines a country’s ability to maintain military dominance.

NVIDIA and the Security Logic Behind Export Control

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on 2023 announcement expanded export oversight, not only targeting on specific chip models but also on component values, most notably in frontier algorithm development. The NVIDIA A100 and H100 are highly advanced datacenter and AI chips. The guidelines are particularly high for training complex AI models on supercomputers, even for military applications or demanding research.

To prevent misuse, the US government has implemented licensing requirements for chips like the A100 and H100 chips, which have put chips like the A300 and H800, made by NVIDIA, under increased scrutiny, despite being categorized as “weak service” chips. Export restrictions stem from concerns that NVIDIA GPUs could be used by China in training AI models related to the US military, not only to slow China’s technological progress but also to safeguard its own national interests.

The US understands very well that high-performance chips are “brain machines” that can accelerate the development of military superiority, intelligence analysis, and even autonomous systems. So it is very clear that limiting the capacity of computing and high-performance hardware is the way to go. To delay a rival’s capabilities without resorting to direct military confrontation. This is a concrete manifestation of the shift in the “battlefield” taking place in the technological and regulatory arenas.

Vulnerable Supply Chains and Dependence on Taiwan

In chip control, the US must recognize that there are undeniable realities. NVIDIA’s chip production goes through a fabrication process that is almost entirely carried out in Taiwan, a country that lies in the geopolitical conflict between Washington and Beijing. The Congressional Research Service (2024) shows that approximately 90% of global advanced semiconductor chip production is based in Taiwan, manufactured by the leading Taiwanese foundry, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC). This creates a structural dependency that poses serious risks to US economic and technological security.

If semiconductor production were concentrated in a single region, it would create vulnerabilities that could destabilize the global technological system. Therefore, any tensions in the Taiwan Strait would disrupt US access to the computing infrastructure it maintains. Export restrictions are just one step in a much more complex strategy, requiring the US to diversify production locations and ensure that the chip supply chain is not concentrated in a single region.

Effectiveness and Adaptation Room for China

NVIDIA’s chip restrictions were intended to curb the pace of AI modernization in China, but China was still able to optimize the model’s efficiency. This demonstrates that limiting hardware performance doesn’t always equate to limiting innovation. On the other hand, unofficial market entities have emerged, allowing NVIDIA GPUs to remain accessible through third parties. This adaptation demonstrates that hardware control has limitations, especially when demand remains high and global distribution networks are not always transparent.

Looking at its overall effectiveness, US policy has been effective in slowing China’s computing capabilities, but it hasn’t stopped its strategic potential. Instead, it’s encouraging China to be self-sufficient in strengthening its technological foundation, even though the quality of local chips hasn’t yet matched NVIDA’s standards. In other words, restricting NVIDIA’s chip exports isn’t meant to end competition, but rather to transform it into a race toward technological independence. The policy’s effectiveness will only last as long as China finds a way to adapt, while China is working to fill that gap.

Policy Directions with Greater Strategic Opportunities

The effectiveness of the compute policy is based on a governance architecture that holds every allied country accountable to the same standards. Without a disciplined framework, export controls on China are merely an illusion that is easily penetrated by gaps in different economic and regulatory interests. By creating strategic alignment, which forces every democratic country to reduce the fragmentation of interests, it can open up greater policy opportunities to emerge. Many developing countries see this semiconductor race as a competition for dominance, not as an effort to maintain security.

In other words, a successful computing policy is not one that simply limits China’s space, but one that manages technological gaps without creating competing computing blocs. The geopolitical challenge is maintaining superiority without forcing the world into two technological divides that would be difficult to control. The US strategy to secure a leading position in future technologies requires flexibility in responding to global dynamics.

A Future Determined by Computational Capacity

The debate over NVIDIA chips demonstrates the growing integration of political and technological power. US policy aims not only to restrain the flow of strategic goods but also to build a new computing-based power architecture. However, this policy also presents challenges, including dependence on Taiwan, China’s flexibility, and economic pressure on US chip companies.

In a global world that continues to move toward an AI-driven economy, the future will be determined by who can manage geopolitical risks, understand supply chain dynamics, and design visionary policies. Ultimately, GPU regulation is no longer simply a matter of export control; it demonstrates how countries navigate a power struggle now measured in microchips.

LA28 released the detailed daily competition schedule for the biggest Olympics in history on Wednesday, laying out every event for the 19 days of competition that will feature more than 11,000 athletes across 51 sports.

Along with being the largest in Games history, the 2028 Summer Olympics will be the first to include more female athletes than men. The schedule honors the historic moment for women in sports by showcasing the women’s 100-meter final at the Coliseum as the primetime, marquee event on the first official day of competition on July 15, 2028.

“The reason we’re throwing out the women’s 100 meters on the first day is because we want to come on these Games with a bang,” Shana Ferguson, LA28’s chief of sport and head of Games delivery, said on a conference call. “And likely that race will be among the most watched of all the races in the Games. We just want to start that Day 1 with a massive, massive showcase of the fastest females in the world.”

The women’s 100-meter final will punctuate Day 1 competition that will feature eight women’s finals, the most for a single day at the Olympics. The men’s 100-meter final will follow on Day 2.

Scheduling the women’s final on Day 1 will require the top athletes to run up to three, 100-meter races in one day as opposed to putting qualifying on a separate day as the semifinals and finals. Olympic organizers presented the idea to athlete commissions within LA28 and through World Athletics. While some preferred to keep the status quo for the women’s 100 meter, Janet Evans, LA28’s chief athlete officer, said the majority of competitors simply wanted to know when their races would be so they could plan their training accordingly.

“I think a lot of athletes will be looking immediately at the schedule and planning their training around it,” said Evans, a four-time Olympic gold medalist in swimming. “That was certainly top of mind as we made this decision.”

Making the schedule came with extensive consultation with athletes and international sport federations. Organizers considered the sun position for diving, which will be held outdoors at the Rose Bowl Aquatics Center. They wanted to ensure that fans waiting to enter arenas wouldn’t be left in the sun during a mid-day competition. Weary of heat affecting horses in Santa Anita, they took care to schedule equestrian events for either early morning or evening sessions.

With track and field setting the stage in the first week, swimming competitions traditionally take place first were shifted to the second week to allow organizers to build an indoor swimming pool in SoFi Stadium after the venue helps host the opening ceremony on July 14.

But keeping with Olympic tradition, the marathon will still take place on the final weekend of the Games, with the women running at Venice Beach on Day 15 (July 29), and the men competing on Day 16 (July 30). As one of the final Olympic events, marathon medalists typically receive their medals during the closing ceremony, which will take place at the Coliseum on July 30, beginning at 6 p.m.

The 2028 Games are approaching major checkpoints with less than three years until the opening ceremony. The Paralympic competition schedule will be released later this year. The volunteer program has already opened for community opportunities while applications for Games time volunteers will open in summer of 2026. Olympics ticket registration will open in January 2026.

Fans can begin registering for the ticket lottery in January and purchasing windows for those who are selected in the lottery will begin in spring 2026. Prices start at $28. With concerns about sky-high ticket prices for sporting events such as the FIFA World Cup or the World Series, Ferguson said LA28 will not use dynamic pricing, but didn’t state any specifics about the prices.

Ferguson said the organizing committee has 14 million tickets for the Olympics and Paralympics, which would break the ticket record set by Paris 2024. The biggest Olympics, and the most jam-packed schedule, would warrant that kind of attendance.

“What a great responsibility that is for us,” Ferguson said of hosting the biggest Olympics in history. “The care and concern that went into building this competition schedule — I will tell you that the folks on the team who did it really, truly, had a lot of sleepless nights because they wanted to get this right for every single athlete, regardless of sport.”

LA28 competition dates

Opening Ceremony: July 14
3×3 Basketball: July 17-22,
Archery: July 21-28
Artistic Gymnastics: July 15-25
Artistic Swimming: July 25-29
Athletics: July 15-30
Badminton: July 15-24
Baseball: July 13-19
Basketball: July 12-30
Beach Volleyball: July 15-29
BMX Freestyle: July 28-29
BMX Racing: July 15-16
Boxing: July 15-30
Canoe Slalom: July 14-22
Canoe Sprint: July 25-29
Cricket: July 12-29
Cycling Road: July 19-23
Cycling Track: July 25-30
Diving: July 25-30
Equestrian: July 15-29
Fencing: July 15-23
Flag Football: July 15-22
Football (Soccer): July 12-29
Golf: July 19-29
Handball: July 12-28
Hockey (Field): July 12-29
Judo: July 15-22
Lacrosse: July 24-29
Modern Pentathlon: July 15-18
Mountain Bike: July 15-18
Open Water Swimming: July 17-18
Rhythmic Gymnastics: July 27-29
Rowing: July 15-22
Rowing Coastal Beach Sprints: July 24-25
Rugby Sevens: July 12-18
Sailing: July 16-28
Shooting: July 15-25
Skateboarding: July 18-27
Softball: July 23-29
Sport Climbing: July 24-29
Squash: July 15-24
Surfing: July 15-23
Swimming: July 22-30
Table Tennis: July 22-30
Taekwondo: July 26-29
Tennis: July 19-28
Trampoline Gymnastics: July 21
Triathlon: July 15-20
Volleyball: July 15-30
Water Polo: July 12-23
Weightlifting: July 25-29
Wrestling: July 24-30
Closing Ceremony: July 30

Over the last two decades, the Horn of Africa has witnessed an increase of foreigntroops in Djibouti, a rise in investments along the Red Sea, and more pronounced engagement in its internal affairs by confirmed and emerging powers all of which showcase the geopolitical appetite for influence in the region. Yet current crises – the war in Sudan, persisting insecurity in Somalia, renewed tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and contentious relations between countries – underscore an uncertain future that could make the volatile region even more prone to external influence. Will local leadership step up to the task of preserving stability through improved regional relations or leave its most pressing issues unresolved?

An analysis by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Mwachofi Singo, and Hallelujah Wondimu published earlier this year by the Center for Strategic and International Studies provides key insights on the risk posed by the absence of a clear pillar state(s) to push for peace and security within the region which could worsen its vulnerability to competing middle powers.

The three experts on African geopolitics argue that given its history of conflicts and ongoing tensions, the region demands the rise of Ethiopia and Kenya as stronger leaders able to drive reform initiatives aimed at protecting the interests of the Horn of Africa. As such, the two nations offer strong, suitable and strategic advantages for the region despite facing their own internal and regional challenges which they must also attend to.

The CSIS report view Ethiopia’s role as central to transforming the region towards a stable and self-sufficient neighborhood capable of addressing its own tensions, preserving peace and promoting economic development. Whether Ethiopia intends to assume this role, however, rests on the success of its current transition that began since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power in 2018 following decades of Tigray dominance over the country. Yet the envisioned reinforcement of the federal structure led by a strong central government has had setbacks in the last few years with the occurrence of the violent war in Tigray and ongoing security concerns over autonomy seeking movements.

This suggests that Ethiopia will inevitably have significant nation building to do to preserve the unity of the country hence the recent inward focus to stabilize domestic tensions. The achievement of the Renaissance Dam stands as good symbol of national harmony that could be replicated across other sectors of society to reinforce inclusion and equity. This image of improved and steady stability in Ethiopia is crucial to consolidate its leadership position in the region.

According to the researchers, Ethiopia’s (re)emergence as a leader in the Horn is also closely linked to its capacity to improve its relations with neighbors which have deteriorated the last few years. They cite the territorial dispute with Sudan, the sudden outreach to Somaliland irritating Somalia and Djibouti or one could add renewed animosity with Eritrea. Ironically, these frictions could lead to Ethiopia’s further rapprochement with external emerging actors eager to increase their influence in the region that will further complicate regional cooperation imperative for stability. This signals a pressing need for the country to reset its relations with its neighbors as the current trajectory could end up being an obstacle towards its economic development. Again, the Grand Renaissance Dam which is already a major component of Ethiopia’s trade policy in the region could be the catalyst needed to reinvigorate diplomatic ties.

While Ethiopia remains focused on its introspection and on pursuing a more bilateral approach to regional diplomacy, Kenya could seize the opportunity to accentuate its leadership position and diplomatic consistency. Kenya’s relatively peaceful independence transition and constant display of neutrality when engaging mediation processes forged its image as a credible leader for the region. The report also highlights a long history of proactive foreign policy by successive Kenyan presidents which emphasized economic development through regional trade integration. However, Kenya’s recent actions with regards to the Sudan conflict and the war in the DRC might alter its reputation and ability to conduct peace initiatives in the region while similar moves may instead translate an incoherent foreign strategy.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine Kenya further jeopardize its stabilizing role as the country’s own development ambitions largely rests on its capacity to promote regional stability crucial to economic trade with its neighbors. This underscores the need for Nairobi to remain committed to its traditional diplomatic playbook to support impartial interventions while preserving its leverage and reputation throughout such processes.

In addition, Kenyan legacy could be further undermined by internal challenges in light of the gen z movement which may be a decisive political factor ahead of the 2027 elections. Latest developments in Morrocco or Madagascar could give a glimpse of the consequences of such social efforts in Kenya. Whether or not Kenyan youth are able to shake the government, political leaders should implement policies responding to the youth socioeconomic concerns as prolong unrests could diminish its global influence capacity so dear to the current administration.

In a rapidly shifting world order where middle powers are keen on exerting their own vision in the Horn of Africa, it becomes imperative for local leadership to assert regional autonomy to solve issues. Stability and improved inter-state relations should then discourage governments from seeking external support when pursuing domestic interests.

Kenya and Ethiopia both retain significant assets to affirm their influence in the Horn despite their own challenges. However, their capacity to assume an independent leading position might be more uncertain. The almost complete monopolization of the conflict resolution processes in Sudan or the DRC by the United States and the Gulf States clearly reveals the consequences of weak regional leadership. Kenya and Ethiopia could instead harmonize their regional policies through platforms such as the East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Ultimately, Kenya and Ethiopia’s ability to intensify their strategic partnerships could lay the foundation for regional autonomy and stability.  

The English Football League has criticised the “undermining” of the Carabao Cup after it was forced to compromise on the date of Crystal Palace’s quarter-final because of fixture congestion.

Palace will now face Arsenal in the last eight at Emirates Stadium on Tuesday, 23 December at 20:00 GMT.

The other three quarter-finals take place the previous week but the Eagles’ commitments in the Uefa Conference League – they host Finnish club KuPS at Selhurst Park on 18 December – has left them with four games in nine days.

Palace host Manchester City on 14 December and are away to Leeds on 21 December, either side of the KuPS game.

A statement from the EFL was critical of the “expansion of European cup competitions” which it believes was “implemented without adequate consultation with domestic leagues”.

The EFL said it had “shown a willingness to compromise” but scheduling conflicts are “now entirely unavoidable”.

“To continue making endless concessions only serves to undermine the reputation of the EFL Cup,” said the statement.

“It also challenges the traditional scheduling of the English football calendar and strength of our domestic game.”

Uefa’s European calendar now stretches across 10 midweeks, rather than the six of two seasons ago, with the Champions League, Europa League and Conference League each given a standalone week for exposure.

It has caused a huge logistical headache, with the third round of the EFL Cup having to be seeded and played across two weeks to keep clubs in the Champions League and Europa League apart.

Palace boss Oliver Glasner said last week it would be “irresponsible” if the club were forced to play two games in three days.

The EFL said it shared the “frustration and concern” of managers and players concerning the congested programme which deprived clubs of the “necessary time for preparation” and ability to “field their strongest line-ups” in the EFL Cup.

The Premier League recently blamed the increased number of European fixtures for there being just one game on 26 December in the English top flight.

Boxing Day fixtures have been a long-standing tradition in English football but this year the only Premier League game will be Manchester United’s home match with Newcastle United (20:00 GMT).