combat

In a State of the State speech that largely ignored any talk of the big, fat budget black hole that threatens to swallow the California dream, Gov. Gavin Newsom instead laid out a vision of the Golden State that centers on inclusivity and kindness to combat Trump’s reign of darkness and expulsion.

In a week dominated by news of immigration authorities killing a Minnesota mother; acknowledgment that “American First” really means running Venezuela for years to come; and the U.S. pulling even further out of global alliances, Newsom offered a soothing and unifying vision of what a Democratic America could look like.

Because, of course, far more than a tally of where we are as a state, the speech served as a likely road map of what a run for president would sound like if (or when) Newsom officially enters the race. In that vein, he drove home a commitment to both continuing to fight against the current administration, but also a promise to go beyond opposition with values and goals for a post-Trump world, if voters choose to manifest such a thing.

It was a clear volley against Republicans’ love of using California as the ultimate example of failed Democratic policies, and instead positioning it as a model.

“This state, this people, this experiment in democracy, belongs not to the past, but to the future,” Newsom told the packed Legislative chamber Thursday. “Expanding civil rights for all, opening doors for more people to pursue their dreams. A dream that’s not exclusive, not to any one race, not to any one religion, or class. Standing up for traditional virtues — compassion, courage, and commitment to something larger than our own self-interest — and asserting that no one, particularly the president of the United States, stands above the law.”

Perhaps the most interesting part of Thursday’s address was the beginning — when Newsom went entirely off script for the first few minutes, ribbing the Republican contingent for being forced to listen to nearly an hourlong speech, then seeming to sincerely thank even his detractors for their part in making California the state it is.

“I just want to express gratitude every single person in this chamber, every single person that shaped who we are today and what the state represents,” Newsom said, even calling out Assemblymember Carl DeMaio, one of his most vociferous foes, who released a questionable AI-generated “parody” video of Newsom in response to the speech.

It was in his off-the-cuff remarks where Newsom gave the clearest glimpse of what he might look like as a candidate — confident, at ease, speaking to both parties in a respectful way that the current president, who has labeled Democrats as enemies, refuses to do. Of course, he’d likely do all that during a campaign while continuing his lowbrow online jabbing, since the online world remains a parallel reality where anything goes.

But in person, at least, he was clearly going for classy over coarse. And gone is the jargon-heavy Newsom of past campaigns, or the guarded Newsom who tried to keep his personal life personal. His years of podcasts seem to have paid off, giving him a warmer, conversational persona that was noticeably absent in earlier years, and which is well-suited to a moment of national turmoil.

Don’t get me wrong — Newsom may or may not be the best pick for Democrats and voters in general. That’s up to you. I just showed up to this dog-and-pony show to get a close-up look at the horse’s teeth before he hits the track. And I’ve got to say, whether Newsom ends up successful or not in an Oval Office run, he’s a ready contender.

Beyond lofty sentiments, there was a sprinkling of actual facts and policies. Around AI, he hinted at greater regulation, especially around protecting children.

“Are we doing enough?” he asked, to a few shouts of “No,” from the crowd. This should be no surprise since his wife, Jennifer Siebel Newsom, has made oversight of artificial intelligence a priority in her own work.

Other concrete policy callouts included California’s commitment to increasing the number of people covered by health insurance, even as the federal government seeks to shove folks off Medicaid. In that same wellness bucket, he touted a commitment to getting processed foods out of school cafeterias and launching more medications under the state’s own generic drug label, including an $11 insulin pen launched last week.

On affordability, he found common ground with a proposal Trump put out this week as well — banning big investors from buying up single family homes. Although in California this is less of a problem than in some major housing markets, every house owned by a big investor is one not owned by a first-time buyer. Newsom called on the Legislature to work on a way to curtail those big buyers.

He also hit on our high minimum wage, especially for certain industries such as fast food ($20 an hour) and healthcare ($25 an hour), compared with states where the federal minimum wage still holds sway at just more than $7 an hour.

And on one of his most vulnerable points, homelessness, where Republicans and Trump in particular have attacked California, he announced that unsheltered homelessness decreased by 9% across the state in 2025 — though the data backing that was not immediately available. He also said that thousands of new mental health beds, through billions in funding from Proposition 1 in 2024, are beginning to come online and have the potential to fundamentally change access to mental health care in the state in coming years. This July, a second phase of Proposition 1 will bring in $1 billion annually to fund county mental health care.

Newsom will release his budget proposal on Friday, with much less fanfare. That’s because the state is facing a huge deficit, which will require tough conversations and likely cuts. Those are conversations about the hard work of governing, ones that Newsom likely doesn’t want to publicize. But Thursday was about positioning, not governing.

“In California, we are not silent,” Newsom said. “We are not hunkering down. We are not retreating. We are a beacon.”

It may not be a groundbreaking stand to have a candidate that understands politics isn’t always a battle of good and evil, but instead a negotiation of viewpoints. It’s surely a message other Democrats will embrace, one as basic as it is inspiring in these days of rage and pain.

But Newsom is staking that territory early, and did it with an assurance that he explained in a recent Atlantic profile.

He’d rather be strong and wrong than weak and right — but strong and righteous is as American as it gets.

In a major follow-up to three of our recent stories on China’s weapons developments, we can now report that what appeared to be a modular, road-mobile, electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) catapult capable of flinging advanced fixed-wing combat drones into the air is now set up on a ship. And not just any ship, but the same medium cargo vessel that was recently configured as an improvised surface combatant, with roughly 60 containerized missile launch cells, radars, and close-in defenses. The ship was rapidly reconfigured over a few days to go from an arsenal ship of sorts to a multi-role advanced combat drone carrier.

This is the latest news to come out of the Shanghai-based Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard, where the converted cargo ship first appeared a week ago. Just down the dock from this vessel, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) giant amphibious assault ship, the Type 076 Sichuan, sits in dry dock. That vessel features a built-in EMALS catapult for launching all types of drones.

Not long after the converted cargo ship was spotted, the stealthy collaborative combat aircraft (CCA)-like drones (which may very well be mockups) were spotted on the dock next to the ship. Then the modular, vehicle-based EMALS system appeared, with each truck locking into the next, creating what seemed like a scalable catapult track. You can read our full report and analysis on it here.

Such a capability would be a boon for land-based launch operations, but at the time of writing, we also stated:

“It is also worth noting that a modular electromagnetic catapult system might be usable on ships that do not have this capability built into their design. As mentioned, the drones and trucks seen at Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard were spotted near a cargo ship loaded with various containerized weapons and other systems. A drone launch capability of some kind would be a logical addition to a vessel with that configuration. At the same time, whether or not any catapult system made up of multiple segmented components would be stable enough for use on a ship rocking back and forth at sea is unclear.”

Now that the catapult system is indeed on the ship, there have been major configuration changes to the vessel to accommodate it. Just 24 of the 60 vertical launch cells remain, with six missile containers still on the ship, providing room for the catapult system and possibly other drones. The Type 1130 30mm close-in weapon system (CIWS), large phased array radar and other sensor and communications systems mounted on containers are also retained. The container on the starboard side of the 30mm CIWS that had decoy launchers and life rafts mounted on it is gone. It isn’t clear if the one on the port side remains. Regardless, when taken at face value, in this drone launching configuration, the ship would still be able to defend itself well (at least conceptually).

As for the catapult setup, we see four vehicles connected in a ‘train’ to create the catapult track, with a ‘ready to launch’ drone mounted atop the rear one and another sitting on the deck behind it. This is exactly the same configuration we saw on the dock in previous pictures, aside from the addition of the fourth catapult vehicle, although satellite images showed the fourth sitting nearby but not connected to the catapult train while pier-side. As we discussed in our previous piece, the length of the catapult could be presumably tailored to the aircraft types being launched and dimensional constraints of the launch area, creating a highly adaptable and mobile catapult launch system.

What isn’t perfectly clear is how much room remains on the deck with so many containers removed and the catapult train installed. If the remaining missile launcher containers are situated on the edge of the opposite side of the ship, there should be some room in between. As you can see in satellite imagery, the swept-wing, stealthy, advanced combat drone designs seen at the dock are quite large with a considerable wingspan.

Now we get into clearances needed for launch. It’s hard to tell the margin that exists vertically between the bow of the ship and an aircraft that would be careening off the catapult. It certainly doesn’t look like much, depending on the speed of the aircraft and where it would ‘liftoff’ from the catapult track. The clearance between the CIWS canister and the wing of the aircraft is also in question, although the container could be scooted over, presumably. With the catapult train on the opposite edge of the deck, clearing the wingtip should not be a problem.

The question of how this system would work on a rolling, heaving ship and how it would hold up to the harsh maritime environment while exposed on the ship’s deck is a major question that is totally unanswered at this time. In addition, such a system would require a lot of power to launch a relatively heavy swept wing drone over such a short distance. The drone would have to be engineered to deal with such a violent catapult stroke as well. So how feasible that is also isn’t clear.

There are no provisions for recovering the drones once they have finished their missions. This is a launch-only concept. Unless they can land with parachutes and air bags and be fished out of the water, refurbished and reused, and this would be tough to do all on this one ship, they would be going on one-way missions from this vessel. This kind of split operational concept is relevant in many scenarios though.

And that brings us to the biggest question of all: what are we really seeing here? What is real and what is aspirational? From the drones to the catapult train to the improvised surface combatant configuration for the cargo ship, this all could be a proof of concept or something more mature. There are indications toward the latter, as we have discussed in our previous posts, but this could still be exploratory and even somewhat performative — meant just as much for foreign consumption as it is for testing real systems.

From the start, this arsenal ship of sorts appeared configured for our viewing pleasure, and China knows full well what will ‘leak’ out in terms of most of its major military technological developments, if the government doesn’t have a direct hand in it itself. Now we are seeing another configuration change for this vessel in a very short period of time with some very impressive technology (mobile modular EMALS and advanced drones) needed to underpin it. All this screams “we can rapidly turn our vast commercial fleet into surface combatants and advanced drone carriers.” That is a powerful message and a troubling one for the U.S. and its allies that are already struggling to confront China’s massive naval expansion. The timing is also worth highlighting. A year ago to the week, a crescendo of major Chinese military technological developments also ‘leaked,’ ushering in a new year of highly impressive developments for the PLA. So this would fit that pattern.

While it does appear there is real technology and developmental thought put into all this, just how mature the mobile EMALS catapult system for use on such a ship is isn’t clear. But considering how fast China has been moving on pushing forward its defense technology repertoire, especially over the last year, it would be unwise to disregard the possible existence of such a capability.

Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com

Belarus has announced the deployment on its territory of Russia’s still-shadowy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile. The development comes soon after the appearance of satellite imagery that suggests that Moscow is likely stationing the nuclear-capable missiles in Belarus. However, there remain questions about the status of the Oreshnik, as well as its overall capabilities.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense today released a video that it says shows the deployment of the Oreshnik system on its territory. The footage shows a flag-raising ceremony involving Russian troops in Belarus as well as a column of vehicles moving out into a firing position in the field, where they are then covered in camouflage netting.

It’s notable that the vehicles shown appear to all be associated with support roles, rather than being transporter-erector launchers (TEL) for the missile itself. It could be the case that the TELs (and missiles) have yet to arrive in Belarus, or that they were deliberately omitted from the footage. It may also be that the missiles themselves are based elsewhere.

A senior officer is seen telling troops that the systems have officially been placed on combat duty and talks about the missile crews’ regular training and reconnaissance drills.

The location of the missile systems and the date of the video were not disclosed.

The release of the video follows Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s announcement earlier this month that the Oreshnik would be deployed in his country, part of his extensive military support for his staunch ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Only last week, evidence emerged pointing to the likely stationing of the Oreshnik at a former airbase near Krichev (also known as Krichev-6) in eastern Belarus, around 190 miles east of the capital of Minsk, and 300 miles southwest of Moscow.

After assessing available satellite imagery, researchers Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, in California, and Decker Eveleth of the CNA research and analysis organization in Virginia, said they were “90 percent certain” that mobile Oreshnik launchers would be stationed there, if they weren’t already.

Lewis and Eveleth highlighted a hurried construction project that began at the site between August 4-12, which was consistent with a Russian strategic missile base. By November of this year, key evidence included a “military-grade rail transfer point” surrounded by a security fence, from where TELs and other components could be unloaded. There were also signs of a concrete pad being constructed at the end of the former runway, “consistent with a camouflaged launch point.”

According to Lewis and Eveleth, the site near Krichev is large enough to accommodate three launchers. Previously, Lukashenko said up to 10 Oreshniks would be based in Belarus, suggesting that more might yet be fielded at other locations.

The researchers’ assessment “broadly aligns with U.S. intelligence findings,” Reuters reported, citing a person familiar with the matter who spoke to the news agency on the condition of anonymity.

After a December 2024 meeting with Lukashenko, Putin had made clear his plan to station Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, but the exact location had not previously been reported. The Russian leader had said the deployment would occur in the second half of 2025.

As for the Oreshnik (Russian for hazel tree) system itself, U.S. officials have said this is an intermediate-range design derived from the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The new missile first emerged in public after it was used in an unprecedented attack on Ukraine in November 2024. Ukrainian authorities said that the missile that was fired at them carried six warheads, each containing six more sub-payloads, but that these contained no explosives.

Ok, two reasons why I think Russia probably used a variant of the long-gestating RS-26 Rubezh IRBM: (1) Russia hinted that it resumed development of the RS-26 this summer and (2) that’s what the Ukrainians predicated a day ago, down to the launch site. https://t.co/eUIPx7eqVt

— Dr. Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk) November 21, 2024

Otherwise, details about the Oreshnik remain limited. After its use against Ukraine, Putin described it as a “medium-range missile system” and “a ballistic missile equipped with non-nuclear hypersonic technology” capable of reaching a peak speed of Mach 10. “The kinetic impact is powerful, like a meteorite falling,” the Russian president also said.

Overall, Russian claims of hypersonic performance for the Oreshnik are questionable. There is no evidence of true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, for example, but larger ballistic missiles, even ones with traditional designs, do reach hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal stage of their flight.

The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed that Russia struck the Ukrainian city of Dnipro with a conventionally armed ICBM this morning, marking the first combat use of an ICBM in history.

Footage from Dnipro showed glowing reentry vehicles hitting the ground around 5 AM local time. pic.twitter.com/PWTGajH9bT

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) November 21, 2024

Western estimates suggest the missile has a range of up to 3,400 miles.

While positioning the Oreshnik marginally farther west does extend its reach further into Europe, the difference is less significant, bearing in mind its already considerable maximum range is enough to hit every NATO capital city in Europe from within Russian territory. With that in mind, stationing these missiles in Belarus does little to practically enhance Moscow’s ability to deliver these kinds of weapons across Europe.

In fact, the missile’s likely minimum range, forward deploying the Oreshnik to Belarus might actually limit the ability to employ it against certain targets, such as those in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine’s capital Kyiv lies less than 60 miles from the border with Belarus.

Another option might be to use a very high lofted trajectory that would allow the missile to hit targets at shorter ranges, but there would still be a limit to what could be achieved in this way. At the same time, we don’t know for sure what kinds of trajectories the Oreshnik can actually be fired on.

Regardless, the deployment does carry important political and strategic signals. It means that Belarusian and Russian affairs are even more deeply intertwined, with the former firmly and openly under the protection of the latter’s nuclear deterrent umbrella. Russia had already begun deploying nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory in cooperation with that country’s armed forces in 2023.

Russia really wants West to see they’re doing a tac nuke exercise. After several exercise videos they put the head of the 12 GUMO in front of a Belarusian Su-25 (possibly at Lida air base) loaded with what is said to be “training nuclear ammunition.” https://t.co/h9rHp2qvGv pic.twitter.com/sTzAqSNd9f

— Hans Kristensen (also on Bluesky) (@nukestrat) June 13, 2024

Placing these missiles (and air-dropped nuclear bombs) in Belarus is indicative of the Kremlin’s new nuclear strategy, which includes basing these kinds of weapons outside its territory for the first time since the Cold War.

The apparent deployment also comes only weeks before the expiration of the 2010 New START pact, the last U.S.-Russia treaty that puts limits on the deployments of strategic nuclear weapons by these two powers.

For NATO, it’s very much arguable whether Russia’s placing of the Oreshnik in neighboring Belarus, rather than on Russian territory, will really be seen as a more direct threat.

“The military implications of this missile being in Belarus are not all that different from the missile being in Russia — the technical support site is already very close to the Russian border,” Eveleth wrote on X last week.

For Belarus, the situation is different. For a country in the international wilderness, the deployment does underscore Russia’s guarantee of providing Belarus with (nuclear) protection.

Russia’s revised nuclear stance also relies increasingly on these kinds of weapons to deter NATO members from supplying Kyiv with weapons that can strike deep inside Russia, although it’s questionable whether placing the Oreshnik in Belarus will have a significant, if any, effect in this regard.

More generally, the deployment of the Oreshnik has to be seen as part of Moscow’s response to U.S. plans to send its own intermediate-range strike capabilities to Germany, and potentially elsewhere in Europe, in the coming years. This includes planned “episodic deployments” of the U.S. Army’s Typhon ground-based missile system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and multi-purpose SM-6 missiles, as well as that service’s still-in-development Dark Eagle hypersonic missile. The U.S. Navy has also demonstrated its ability to deploy containerized launchers related to Typhon, which can be employed in a ground-based mode and also fire Tomahawks and SM-6s, to sites in Europe.

While these U.S. long-range strike systems are all conventionally armed, it’s worth recalling that the Oreshnik, too, can be utilized in a non-nuclear version, as demonstrated in Ukraine. The missile, therefore, presents a longer-range strategic-level threat that can be employed without crossing the nuclear threshold.

The potential value of a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which some countries may be looking at fielding if they haven’t already, is something that we discussed in detail in this previous story.

Provided that the Oreshnik is indeed now deployed on Belarusian territory, we still don’t know how many missiles might be involved, or what kinds of warheads they might carry. While we may learn more in due course, for now, the missile’s greatest significance is in the political domain.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com