Colombias

On Sunday, voters in the South American country of Colombia are facing a choice.

Four years ago, they elected the first left-wing president in the country’s modern history, Gustavo Petro. Now, they must decide whether to continue with Petro’s leftist push — or restore the political right to power.

Fourteen candidates will be on the ballot for the first round of voting in Colombia’s presidential election.  The packed field includes contenders from the left, right and centre, who are slated to face off over issues like security and the cost of living.

But Petro will not be among them: Presidents in Colombia are limited to a single four-year term.

The right wing is expected to have the advantage, particularly if the race proceeds to a second round. Petro is struggling with low poll numbers, and voters have expressed frustration with crime and violence, driven in part by the country’s six-decade-long internal conflict.

But leftist candidate Ivan Cepeda has surprised observers, consistently placing at the top of the polls ahead of the first round.

When is the election, who are the candidates, and which issues are top of mind for voters? We look at those questions and more in this brief explainer.

When is the election?

The first round of voting is set to take place on May 31, 2026.

Will there be a second round of voting?

A candidate would need to win more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round to avoid a run-off.

If no single candidate meets that threshold, a run-off will be held between the top two finishers on June 21.

Why is this election important?

In recent years, across Latin America, long-entrenched left-wing governments have met defeat at the ballot box.

Last year alone, right-wing candidates have been elected to replace left-wing presidents in Bolivia, Chile and Honduras.

But Colombia does not have a long history of left-wing presidents. Petro was the first. That makes this race one to watch, according to Gimena Sanchez, a Colombia expert at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), a human rights nonprofit.

“This is the first election to be held after the first-ever leftist administration in Colombia’s 200-year history,” Sanchez explained.

Colombia now stands at a fork in the road. One of the dominant issues in the election is how to resolve the country’s internal conflict, which forced more than 235,619 individuals from their homes in 2025.

Another 87,069 people were caught up in mass displacement events due to the fighting, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Petro has embraced negotiation as a tool to end the conflict, which has seen government forces, criminal networks, left-wing rebels and right-wing paramilitaries all battling one another.

But the political right has advocated a return to the more militarised approach backed by the United States, according to Sanchez.

“The leading candidates fall into two camps: continuity with the leftist government of Petro and an approach to security that focuses on negotiations with armed groups, and right-wing candidates who very much want to go back to a hardline security model that Colombia had in the past,” Sanchez said.

“You have polar opposite visions for the country.”

Who is the main candidate on the left?

Senator Ivan Cepeda has emerged as the primary candidate of the political left, running as the head of the governing coalition, known as Historic Pact.

Cepeda has largely pledged continuity with Petro’s platform, including social and economic policies meant to reduce inequality.

He has also embraced Petro’s “Total Peace” approach, which aims to resolve the country’s internal fighting by negotiating with armed groups and criminal networks, as opposed to solely relying on military force.

Confronting state-backed violence has become a hallmark of Cepeda’s life and career.

His father, who was also a senator, is believed to have been assassinated by a government-backed paramilitary. For years, Cepeda was also embroiled in a legal battle for accusing former President Alvaro Uribe of connections to right-wing paramilitaries.

Who are the main candidates on the right?

While Cepeda has become the standard-bearer for the left, the political right has had to contend with a more fractured field of candidates.

Running on the far right is Abelardo de la Espriella, a lawyer for the Defenders of the Homeland Party who has generated comparisons with Salvadoran President Salvador Bukele and Argentina’s Javier Milei.

Like those leaders, de la Espriella has offered a hardline vision for his country’s security. If elected, he says he would end negotiations with armed groups, bomb rebel camps, and resume the aerial fumigation of coca ⁠crops, which produce the raw material for cocaine.

Senator Paloma Valencia, a candidate with the Democratic Centre Party, is running as a more moderate alternative to de la Espriella. She too has promised a stricter approach to crime. Her platform involves expanding the police and armed forces, while cutting taxes and promoting pro-business policies in the economic realm.

Their election-season competition has become a source of acrimony for Valencia and de la Espriella, who have accused each other of paving the way for a leftist election victory.

“There is a more familiar, establishment right, represented by Valencia, and a far right in the form of de la Espriella, who pitches himself as an outsider,” said Sanchez.

Valencia, for her part, has criticised de la Espriella as two-faced, defending criminals in his legal practice but advocating for tighter security on the campaign trail.

De la Espriella, meanwhile, has dismissed Valencia as a member of the country’s political establishment and chided her in a social media post, stating that the presidential election is “not for little games”.

What are the polls saying?

Polls generally show Cepeda ahead of his rivals, with de la Espriella in second place and Valencia in third.

A May 24 poll from the National Consulting Centre (CNC) and the publication Cambio suggested that Cepeda had drawn 33.4 percent of voter support, the most of any candidate.

But de la Espriella was on the upswing with 30.9 percent. Valencia, meanwhile, trailed with 12.6 percent.

The same surveys, however, suggest that Cepeda would struggle to win a run-off against either of the two right-wing candidates, with de la Espriella eking out about three points in a head-to-head contest, and Valencia coming within a percentage point of victory.

Undecided voters could play a key role in deciding the outcome, though. An analysis cited by the Spanish paper El Pais estimates that undecided voters could account for as much as 28 percent of the electorate.

Which issues are front and centre?

Concerns over crime, security and economic issues like unemployment and affordability have dominated the election.

In a poll from the firm Invamer, the highest proportion of voters — 37 percent — identified security as the top issue facing the country.

Basic needs and unemployment ranked second and third, with 17 percent and 16 percent, respectively. Eleven percent of voters, meanwhile, named corruption as a leading concern.

The threat of violence has lingered over the presidential campaign over the past year.

Two political staffers with de la Espriella’s campaign were killed by gunmen on motorbikes earlier this month. And in June 2025, presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot while leaving a campaign rally. The 39-year-old died two months later from his injuries.

Political violence is a serious concern in Colombia, and all of the frontrunners in the race travel with heavy security.

Venezuela is becoming increasingly important in Colombia’s presidential election, though not necessarily from a policy perspective. The three leading candidates are not offering radically new approaches toward Caracas. Instead, they broadly accept that Colombia will not shape Venezuela policy in a vacuum, but within a regional framework increasingly defined by Washington.

Even among the Colombian Right, the differences are narrower than the rhetoric sometimes suggests. Some candidates favor preserving parts of the thaw in relations initiated under Gustavo Petro, while others align themselves more openly with the Trump administration’s emerging three-phase approach toward Venezuela, combining pressure, negotiation, and eventual normalization while maintaining support for María Corina Machado and the democratic opposition.

The real competition is happening elsewhere.

As Bogotá increasingly adapts itself to strategic realities designed in Washington, Venezuela has become less a matter of concrete policy and more a source of symbolic legitimacy inside the Colombian Right. The question is no longer simply who has the best Venezuela strategy, but who is most closely aligned with the hemisphere’s most internationally legitimized anti-chavista figure.

Both Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella have sought proximity to Machado, likely recognizing her growing political value among Colombian-Venezuelan voters and sectors of the Colombian Right that increasingly view her as a hemispheric democratic symbol after July 28, 2024. Early in the electoral cycle, both candidates publicized meetings with Machado and members of her team, presenting themselves as politically aligned with the Venezuelan opposition’s struggle. Valencia recently traveled to Panama to meet Machado personally, while De la Espriella has repeatedly emphasized his relationship with anti-chavista circles to position himself as part of a broader regional conservative realignment.

Yet the two candidacies embody very different political instincts.

Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

Valencia represents a more traditional conservative internationalism tied to institutional anti-chavismo, democratic legitimacy, and Atlanticist conservatism. De la Espriella, meanwhile, has increasingly embraced a far more populist style of politics, openly presenting himself as a Colombian version of Nayib Bukele that promises to build ten CECOT-style mega prisons in Colombia.

That contradiction becomes particularly striking when placed alongside one of the defining professional relationships of De la Espriella’s career: his representation of Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era. Saab became one of the clearest symbols of late-stage chavismo’s corruption architecture, embodying the opaque financial networks, sanctions arbitrage, and humanitarian corruption that increasingly defined the Maduro era.

The irony of Saab’s former lawyer attempting to embody Colombia’s hardest anti-chavista and anti-corruption posture is difficult to ignore. But the contradiction also reveals something deeper about contemporary Latin American politics, where anti-establishment rhetoric and proximity to opaque power structures are no longer necessarily disqualifying contradictions.

The contradictions are perhaps most visible within parts of the Venezuelan opposition’s own media ecosystem. Some anti-chavista pundits spent years cultivating reputations as uncompromising anti-corruption crusaders, often accusing opposition figures of moral weakness, accommodationism, or hidden financial interests. Their enthusiastic support for Abelardo de la Espriella, despite his long professional relationship with Alex Saab during the height of the CLAP era, suggests that ideological affinity and political aesthetics are increasingly overriding the moral rigidity that once characterized parts of anti-chavista discourse.

Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

At the same time, other sectors of Machado’s broader international coalition appear more naturally aligned with Valencia’s institutional conservatism. The result is an increasingly visible fragmentation within the anti-chavista ecosystem itself, one that reflects broader tensions inside the Latin American Right between institutional conservatism, populist maximalism, and Bukele-style punitive politics.

Washington has only reinforced those dynamics. As the US once again becomes the principal external actor shaping Venezuela’s political future, different Colombian candidates increasingly compete to position themselves as the preferred interlocutors of the emerging regional order. Support from figures close to Machado, Trump-world Republicans, Miami exile networks, and conservative media ecosystems now carries political value extending far beyond Venezuela itself.

In that sense, Venezuela’s role in the Colombian election is not primarily about foreign policy. It is about political identity.

And perhaps more importantly, it may also offer a glimpse into the future political terrain of a post-transition Venezuela itself. If chavismo eventually collapses or evolves into some form of negotiated transition, the country will not emerge into a region defined by liberal democratic consensus. It will emerge into a hemisphere shaped by Bukele, Milei, Trumpism, social media maximalism, and deep public exhaustion with traditional political elites.

The rise of figures like De la Espriella suggests that the post-chavista Right may not necessarily resemble the liberal democratic opposition that spent decades fighting chavismo. It may instead reflect a harsher, more punitive, and more performative political culture, one forged not despite the region’s prolonged crises, but because of them.

Voters in Colombia will head to the polls on May 31 for a presidential election. Some of the main concerns for Colombians are healthcare, corruption, and security. Al Jazeera’s Teresa Bo reports from Bogota. 

Caracas, April 24, 2026 (venezuelanalysis.com) – Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez hosted Colombian President Gustavo Petro for bilateral talks in Caracas on Friday. 

The meeting marked the first official visit by a head of state since the kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro during a US military operation on January 3.

Following talks at Miraflores Presidential Palace, Rodríguez said both governments committed to tackling organized crime along their shared border, one of the longest in the region at over 2,200 kilometers.

“We have undertaken a very serious and concrete approach to combating criminal groups and transnational crime,” she said, announcing the development of joint military plans and “immediate” mechanisms for intelligence sharing in a new level of security cooperation.

Petro, for his part, stated that both countries would work toward the “liberation of border communities” through coordinated military, police, and social action.

“Building a fully coordinated common effort to free border populations from mafias engaged in various illegal economies,” he said, accusing irregular groups of human trafficking, drug trafficking, and illegal gold trade activities.

The leaders also agreed on economic initiatives aimed at supporting Venezuelan and Colombian populations in border regions. Petro expressed hope that these efforts would help reintegrate the two territories and boost food security.

The joint action commitments come amid escalating violence in the Catatumbo region of Colombia’s Norte de Santander department, which borders Venezuela’s Táchira state, where clashes between armed groups have displaced thousands in recent weeks.

Armed organizations operating in the area include the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and the Segunda Marquetalia, both descendants of the former FARC, and the Clan del Golfo, among others.

Friday’s talks also included the neighboring nations’ trade relations. Rodríguez highlighted discussions on “import substitution” between the two countries.

“It makes no sense for Colombia or Venezuela to look to other regions or hemispheres for what we can produce within our own territories,” she said, noting that bilateral trade currently stands at approximately $1.2 billion per year.

The leaders further addressed electrical interconnection projects for western Venezuela, a region heavily affected by blackouts, as well as reopening a pipeline that would allow Venezuela to export natural gas to Colombia and beyond.

Rodríguez and Petro also discussed the revival of air connectivity to boost tourism, including the development of multi-destination travel initiatives.

Present at the private meeting were Colombia’s foreign minister Rosa Villavicencio and defense minister Pedro Sánchez, alongside Venezuela’s foreign minister Yván Gil and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello. The presidential summit followed an earlier meeting of the two countries’ Neighborhood and Integration Commission, with bilateral working groups established for a number of areas, including trade, energy and defense. 

A prior meeting scheduled between Rodríguez and Petro on the border in early March was suspended due to security concerns.

Rodríguez hosts new US chargé d’affaires

Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez also welcomed the Trump administration’s new chargé d’affaires to Venezuela John Barrett at the presidential palace on Friday.

Alongside Cabello and Gil, Rodríguez held a private meeting that reportedly focused on energy and a “long-term cooperation agenda.” For its part, the US embassy in Caracas stated that Barrett will continue implementing Washington’s “three-phase plan” for the Caribbean nation.

Barrett recently replaced Laura Dogu, who had been on the post since January. A career diplomat, he last served as chargé d’affaires in Guatemala, where he was accused of interference in magistrate elections in March.

Washington and Caracas fast-tracked a diplomatic rapprochement following the January 3 military strikes and kidnapping of Maduro. In March, the White House recognized Rodríguez as Venezuela’s sole leader, while the acting president recently thanked Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio for their “good disposition” in establishing “cooperation” between the two countries.

The diplomatic reengagement and US recognition have likewise led to a resumption of ties between Caracas and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Edited and with additional reporting by Ricardo Vaz in Caracas.