cartel

Security forces have intensified their presence across parts of Mexico’s Sinaloa, setting up checkpoints as rival factions of the Sinaloa Cartel battle for control. Despite the visible military deployment, more than 3,000 people have been killed in nearly two years. The conflict has deepened amid political instability following investigations and indictments linked to former officials.

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.

US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jay Clayton said in the statement: “As the indictment lays bare, the Sinaloa cartel, and other drug trafficking organisations like it, would not operate as freely or successfully without corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials on their payroll”.

The UAE’s decision to quit OPEC to prioritise its ‘national interests’ deals a blow to the oil group already grappling with the challenge of shipping Gulf exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s what we know about why it’s withdrawing and the impact it might have.

The Mexican military released footage of an operation resulting in the capture of Audias Flores, a high-ranking commander in the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). Flores was considered a potential successor to former cartel leader El Mencho, who was killed in February.

March 26 (UPI) — Argentina’s government on Thursday formally designated the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, known as CJNG, as a terrorist organization and ordered its inclusion in the country’s public registry of individuals and entities linked to terrorism and its financing.

In an official statement, Argentina’s presidential office said the decision is based on reports documenting the group’s transnational criminal activities and links to other terrorist entities.

The move aligns Argentina with U.S. security policy, which designated the cartel as a terrorist organization in 2025.

Inclusion in the registry enables the government to impose “financial sanctions and operational restrictions aimed at limiting the capacity of these criminal organizations and their members,” according to the statement from President Javier Milei’s administration.

It also “protects Argentina’s financial system from being used for illicit purposes” and strengthens international cooperation in security and justice matters “in close coordination with countries that have already designated the Jalisco Cartel as a terrorist organization.”

The government said CJNG has become one of the world’s most powerful drug trafficking organizations over the past decade, with a presence in Mexico, operations in the United States and expansion into at least 40 countries, including Argentina.

The statement also highlighted the measure’s impact on international cooperation, saying it reinforces security and judicial coordination with countries that have already classified the cartel as a terrorist group.

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel emerged in Mexico in the early 2010s amid the fragmentation of major drug cartels. Its leader and founder, Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” died in February during an operation in Mexico supported by U.S. intelligence. The United States had offered a $15 million reward for information leading to his capture.

Milei’s government has previously designated as terrorist organizations groups already classified as such by the United States, including branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, the Palestinian militant group Hamas and Iran’s Quds Force.

Omar Oswaldo Torres, the leader of the Los Mayos faction of the Sinaloa criminal network, was detained in the raid.

Mexican authorities have revealed that 11 people were killed during a raid that resulted in the capture of Omar Oswaldo Torres, the leader of a faction of the Sinaloa Cartel.

In a social media post on Thursday, the Mexican Navy said the raid took place in Culiacan, part of the state of Sinaloa in northern Mexico.

It alleged that its personnel were attacked at the site of the raid and returned fire, killing 11 “assailants”. Their identities have yet to be released to the public.

“High-powered weapons and tactical equipment were seized at the scene,” the navy said in a statement.

The navy added that a woman identified as Torres’s daughter was also present during the operation, but she was released to her family due to a lack of connection to criminal activities.

Torres, known by the nickname “El Patas”, is the leader of the Los Mayos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel.

In recent years, Los Mayos have been in a fight with another faction, Los Chapitos. Each side is named for a different Sinaloa Cartel leader: Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, both of whom have been arrested and imprisoned in the United States.

Thursday’s raid comes as governments across Latin America seek to deliver US President Donald Trump tangible results in the fight against crime and drug trafficking.

Just this week, the Mexican government participated in a law enforcement operation with Ecuador and Colombia to arrest Angel Esteban Aguilar, the leader of the Los Lobos crime group.

A separate Mexican military operation in the state of Jalisco last month led to the death of Nemesio Oseguera, also known as “El Mencho”, the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.

Criminal groups responded with a burst of violence, including the erection of roadblocks and attacks on security force outposts across Mexico.

Critics have questioned the efficacy of the more militarised methods Trump has pressured Latin American leaders to use against cartel leaders.

Capturing or killing cartel leaders is sometimes referred to as a “decapitation strategy”, and the method is designed to weaken the structure of criminal networks.

But experts warn that the “decapitation strategy” risks increasing violence over the long term, as new conflicts emerge to fill the leadership vacuum.

Many also point out that such militarised approaches fail to address the root causes of crime, among them corruption and poverty.

Still, Trump has labelled groups like the Sinaloa Cartel “foreign terrorist organisations”, and has indicated he would consider taking military action on Mexican soil against such groups, despite concerns that such actions would violate Mexican sovereignty.

Trump told a summit of Latin American leaders earlier this month that he considered Mexico to be the “epicentre” of cartel violence.

“We have to eradicate them,” Trump said of the cartels. “We have to knock the hell out of them because they’re getting worse. They’re taking over their country. The cartels are running Mexico. We can’t have that.”

Mexican officials, meanwhile, have called on the US to stem the flow of illicit weapons into Mexico, to little avail.

Last year, the Supreme Court struck down a lawsuit from the Mexican government accusing US gun manufacturers of negligence, given that their products end up arming criminal networks in the Latin American country.