cartel

MEXICO CITY — The highway from the Guadalajara city airport to downtown is newly paved and the city’s famous roundabout has gotten a $4-million facelift. The city is abuzz with renovation projects as Guadalajara prepares to host four World Cup soccer matches in June.

But there’s one thing the 3 million fans expected to flock to the city won’t see — the sites where hundreds of bodies have been found in clandestine graves dug by Mexico’s notorious New Generation Jalisco Cartel. Scores were discovered on the main route leading to Akron Stadium, where the games will be played.

One set of remains was that of a 17-year-old high school student who had gone out to sell his motorcycle to help his unemployed uncle. He disappeared. When his uncle began searching, he disappeared as well. At another site, the bones of a 34-year-old cellphone repairman were found. He was a father of two who’d simply ventured out to shop for used tennis shoes.

According to statistics compiled by the state of Jalisco, between 2018 and March of this year, 1,907 bodies were found in Guadalajara and surrounding cities.

The arrival of the World Cup is an opportunity for Mexico’s second-largest city to shine on the international stage, and the Jalisco state government launched an upbeat campaign highlighting the municipality where games will be played: “Zapopan, the heart of soccer,” the slogan goes.

Families searching for their loved ones sarcastically responded with, “Zapopan, the heart of clandestine graves.”

An aerial view of La Minerva roundabout fountain in Guadalajara, Mexico, taken on June 27, 2025.

(Ulises Ruiz / AFP via Getty Images)

Since January of 2025 alone, search groups and authorities have discovered 58 graves with 226 sets of remains inside city limits. Five graves were located within three miles of Akron Stadium.

Three graves with 15 bodies were found within a mile of the city’s iconic La Minerva roundabout, a huge traffic circle featuring fountains, greenery and a towering statue of the Roman goddess Minerva. Others were found not far from Chapultepec Street, a popular tourist destination.

Liliana Meza, mother of Carlos Maximiliano Romero Meza, who disappeared on Oct. 22, 2020, poses with a search card at the Glorieta de las Personas Desaparecidas in Guadalajara, Mexico, on Friday, May 15, 2026. Founders of the Luz de Esperanza Desaparecidos Jalisco collective created the cards, inspired by World Cup soccer stickers, to draw attention to missing persons cases ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup in Jalisco.

(Alejandra Leyva/For The Times)

Though tourists and tourist sites are rarely touched by cartel violence in Mexico, critics say the graves are an embarrassment for state and city administrators.

Amid all the cleanup, little official attention has gone to the growing number of clandestine graves that groups of persistent, family-funded search teams have found in recent months.

Large machinery and backhoes are working nonstop across the city ahead of the games, said Jaime Aguilar, a spokesperson for the group Warrior Searchers of Jalisco, which finds an average of two graves a month. “But when we ask for a backhoe to help in our searches, there is never one available,” he said.

Over the years, secret graves have been discovered in rural areas, at industrial sites, alongside roads, inside buildings and even in the heart of Guadalajara. The Jalisco state government tracks grave discoveries, but an analysis by The Times and Puente News Collaborative shows many have been concentrated in the Guadalajara area.

Flyers with photographs and identifying information about missing persons, posted by search collectives, have become a common sight along the main streets of the city’s historic center, as seen here on Friday, May 15, 2026.

(Alejandra Leyva/For The Times)

Earlier this year, authorities found a blood-soaked safe house a mile from Akron Stadium where cartel enemies were tortured. One person was found buried there. Within a 10-mile radius, nearly 100 sets of remains were found in 500 trash bags buried in shallow graves.

The graves, and the potential discovery of more, worried Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. She feared that FIFA, the international soccer association in charge of the games, might move the Mexico games to the United States or Canada, the other countries co-hosting the games, because of the violence, said one Mexican official familiar with planning for the tournament.

That fear burst into the open in February, when Mexican special forces killed Nemesio “El Mencho” Oseguera Cervantes, leader of the hyper-violent New Generation Jalisco Cartel. Law enforcement officials said Guadalajara is a stronghold for the criminal group.

Cartel members responded to El Mencho’s death by setting fire to cars and buses and blocking major exits from Guadalajara. The city was briefly paralyzed. Gunmen burned 80 convenience stores and a host of pharmacies, flexing their power in the city.

In the days after the violence, FIFA officials met with the Mexican government to review security for the Guadalajara matches. Sheinbaum laid out a plan to send 100,000 security personnel, including Army soldiers and police officers, to stadiums in Guadalajara and the country’s two other host cities, Mexico City and Monterrey. FIFA determined it would not change the World Cup venues.

U.S. law enforcement has been advising Mexico on counter-terrorism methods, including training in repelling drone bombs, a weapon increasingly used by cartels to terrorize communities, attack adversaries and target military convoys. U.S. special forces have been training Mexican military teams to repel attacks at stadiums.

Fliers with photographs and identifying information about missing persons are displayed throughout Guadalajara’s historic center alongside traditional city scenes and World Cup-related imagery.

(Alejandra Leyva / For The Times)

The Mexican government had already witnessed the Jalisco cartel’s proclivity for brazen killing. In December, some four miles from Akron Stadium, gunmen fired more than 3,000 bullets in broad daylight into the car of a director of a produce distribution center. The gun battle between his security guards and the cartel took place just a few blocks from a police station. It took officers nearly a half hour to arrive at the scene.

In recent years, Jalisco state has become a cartel killing ground, security experts say. Some graves discovered in the Guadalajara area contained a single body, some more than 40. A few had 95 or more.

In 2023, the remains of nine teenagers, chopped up and stuffed in trash bags, were found in a canyon in Zapopan. They had worked for a Jalisco cartel call center where telemarketers scammed Americans of millions of dollars in a time-share scheme. The teenagers are believed to have upset their employer.

Traffickers recruit young people, including minors, to serve as foot soldiers in their bloody quest to control drug-trafficking routes across Mexico. Some of those teenagers were lured by ads promising good-paying jobs, only to discover they were being funneled to a Jalisco cartel training camp an hour outside Guadalajara. There, as a test, Mexican security officials said, recruits were forced to kill fellow recruits.

Plaza Liberacion, the city’s main public square, with flyers with photographs and identifying information about missing persons, on Friday.

(Alejandra Leyva/For The Times)

The cartel has recruited more than 45,000 minors across Mexico in recent years, said one Jalisco state representative.

While some of Guadalajara’s upscale neighborhoods have escaped the violence, families across the metropolitan area have seen hundreds of children disappear, some to reappear, dead, on cartel battlefields across Jalisco and in the states of Sinaloa and Michoacán, searchers said.

The Jalisco state government lists more than 16,000 reports of missing people — the most of any Mexican state. Nationwide more than 130,000 people are reported missing.

Despite the preparations and the buzz among the nation’s vast population of soccer fans, World Cup fever has not caught on among families of the disappeared and the search teams that each week fan out across Guadalajara, looking for new graves.

Natalia Leticia García’s son disappeared in 2017. She began her own search and launched a group to help find other victims. Eight years later, García’s group has located 26 graves. Some finds have been bags full of severed heads, others holding just arms. It is a cartel tactic, she said, to make it harder to piece together remains.

“It is cruel,” García said. Her son, César Ulises Quintero García, remains missing.

Fisher is a special correspondent. This article was co-published with Puente News Collaborative, a bilingual nonprofit newsroom that covers stories from Mexico and the U.S.-Mexico border.

Security forces have intensified their presence across parts of Mexico’s Sinaloa, setting up checkpoints as rival factions of the Sinaloa Cartel battle for control. Despite the visible military deployment, more than 3,000 people have been killed in nearly two years. The conflict has deepened amid political instability following investigations and indictments linked to former officials.

Fifty-nine years of membership, ended with a statement on a Tuesday and an effective date of Friday. The United Arab Emirates announced it will exit OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, citing national interests, its evolving energy profile, and a long-term strategic vision that no longer aligns with the organization’s direction. The Energy Minister did not consult Saudi Arabia before making the announcement. He did not raise the issue with any other member country. He simply said the time had come. 

The timing tells the whole story. OPEC was preparing to meet in Vienna on Wednesday when the news landed. The Iran war had already wiped out 7.88 million barrels per day of OPEC’s production in March alone, resulting in the biggest supply collapse for the producers’ group in recent decades, surpassing even the 2020 Covid shock and the 1970s oil crisis. The UAE had been absorbing Iranian drone and missile attacks for weeks. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the UAE ships its own oil, has been functionally closed or severely restricted since early March. And sitting across the OPEC table was Iran, the country that had been targeting UAE infrastructure repeatedly, and Russia, which had been a steadfast partner to Iran throughout the conflict.

Walking out was not an impulsive decision. It was the logical conclusion of a calculation that had been building for years.

Why Abu Dhabi Was Already Done With OPEC 

The UAE’s frustration with OPEC production quotas is not new. The quotas have capped UAE output at around 3.2 million barrels per day, while the country has the ambition and the capacity to produce closer to 5 million barrels per day by 2027, suggesting production could almost double without OPEC’s constraints. For a country that has invested heavily in expanding ADNOC’s capacity and has the infrastructure to back it up, being told by a cartel committee how much it can produce has become an increasingly poor trade. 

The UAE’s sovereign wealth fund is so large that its economy is now more significantly tied to global economic growth than to the global price of oil. That shift in economic identity matters enormously for understanding why OPEC membership has become structurally uncomfortable. OPEC exists to keep oil prices elevated through production discipline. The UAE increasingly benefits from a growing global economy that demands more energy, more investment, and more trade, all of which are better served by producing at full capacity and building relationships with the countries that need what Abu Dhabi has to sell. 

An energy industry source familiar with the decision said the UAE felt it was “the right time to leave” and that “this decision is good for consumers and good for the world,” adding that the UAE would gradually increase production to supply global markets once freedom of navigation is restored in the Strait of Hormuz. The framing is deliberate. The UAE is not positioning itself as a cartel defector but as a responsible producer responding to a global energy emergency, which is a considerably more defensible diplomatic position. 

The Saudi Rupture Running Underneath It All

The official UAE statement was carefully worded, full of appreciation for “brothers and friends within the group” and “the highest respect for the Saudis for leading OPEC.” None of that diplomatic courtesy changes the underlying reality, which is that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been on a collision course for some time and the OPEC exit is the most visible expression of that tension yet.

The two countries had joined a coalition to fight the Houthis in Yemen in 2015, but that coalition broke down into open recriminations in late December when Saudi Arabia bombed what it described as a weapons shipment bound for UAE-backed Yemeni separatists. That incident was the visible rupture of a relationship that had been quietly fraying for years over economic competition, differing visions for regional leadership, and diverging approaches to normalization, China, and the post-war order. Within OPEC, the two countries have clashed repeatedly over quota allocations, with the UAE consistently arguing it deserves a larger share based on its expanded capacity. 

The OPEC exit does not resolve any of those tensions. It sidesteps them entirely, which is probably the more elegant solution. By leaving, the UAE removes itself from a framework where Saudi Arabia holds dominant influence and gains the freedom to pursue its own production and partnership strategy without needing Riyadh’s agreement. That is a significant shift in the regional power dynamic, and it happened without a single confrontational statement.

What Remains of OPEC Now 

The UAE’s exit could prompt other members to follow suit, with analysts pointing to Kazakhstan as another significant producer that wants to grow beyond its current quota constraints. “If there is a time to leave, now is the time,” one Dubai-based energy consultant told CNN. 

The cartel’s power has always rested on a specific mechanism: spare production capacity held back from the market to stabilize prices. That spare capacity is concentrated almost entirely in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with the other nine member countries possessing little to none. Removing the UAE from that equation means OPEC’s effective spare capacity narrows considerably, and the burden of price stabilization falls almost entirely on Riyadh and Kuwait City. Saudi Arabia will hold an even greater share of the cartel’s remaining leverage, but leverage over a smaller and weaker institution is not the same as leverage over a healthy one.

OPEC has lost members before, but the UAE is a much larger producer than previous departures, and its absence may over time pose an existential risk to the cartel’s sustainability. The organization that has shaped global energy politics since 1960 is now facing its most significant structural test, and it is doing so while simultaneously dealing with a historic supply shock from the Iran war, a closed strait, and a global economy pricing in the possibility that the disruption is not temporary. 

The Geopolitical Implications

Freed from production quotas, the UAE’s most immediate strategic move is likely to deepen its relationship with the countries that need its oil most urgently, and China sits at the top of that list. More production could help the UAE improve ties with oil-importing partners such as China, and given the economic damage caused by the Iran war, the prospect of maximizing energy revenues now is undoubtedly attractive to Abu Dhabi. 

The UAE-US relationship also stands to benefit. With the UAE free to leverage its spare capacity in pursuit of its own strategic interests, the move will likely strengthen the UAE-US relationship, particularly in relation to managing the strategic petroleum reserve and responding to the ongoing Hormuz supply shock. Trump has been publicly critical of OPEC for years, accusing the cartel of exploiting American military protection to keep prices artificially high. An OPEC that is smaller and weaker, with a major member now operating independently and aligned with US interests, is a more congenial arrangement from Washington’s perspective. 

For the global energy market, the picture is more complicated. Once the Strait reopens fully and UAE production ramps up without quota constraints, additional supply should exert downward pressure on prices that have been elevated since February. Whether that actually happens depends on a sequence of events, including a durable Iran settlement and the restoration of free navigation through Hormuz, that are still very much in progress.

Our Take: A Geopolitical Move Dressed as an Energy Decision 

The UAE’s OPEC exit is not primarily an energy story. It is a geopolitical statement about where Abu Dhabi sees itself in the emerging regional order, and the answer is: outside the frameworks that no longer serve its interests, and free to build the bilateral relationships that do. The exit from OPEC follows the same strategic logic as the Abraham Accords, the Huawei contracts, the US base agreement, and the China infrastructure ties. The UAE has been running a multi-alignment strategy for years, positioning itself as indispensable to every major power simultaneously, and OPEC membership was becoming a constraint on that strategy rather than an asset.

What happens to OPEC matters for energy markets in the short term. What the UAE’s departure signals about the fracturing of Gulf institutional solidarity matters considerably more for the regional order that everyone in the Middle East is trying to rebuild in the aftermath of a war that nobody fully planned for and nobody has yet fully ended.

The deeper story is what the UAE’s exit reveals about the post-war Middle East taking shape right now. The institutions that governed the region’s energy politics, security arrangements, and diplomatic alignments for decades were built in a different world, one where the Cold War defined choices, where oil producers had unified interests, and where the US sat at the center of every meaningful regional framework. That world is gone. What the Iran war accelerated, and what the UAE’s OPEC exit makes structurally visible, is that the Gulf’s most capable states are no longer willing to subordinate their individual strategic interests to collective frameworks that were designed for a regional order that no longer exists. 

Abu Dhabi did not leave OPEC because of a quota dispute. It left because it has decided that in the world emerging from this war, the countries that move fastest, align most flexibly, and free themselves from inherited institutional constraints are the ones that will define what comes next. Whether that calculation proves correct depends on what the Islamabad talks produce, how quickly the Strait reopens, and whether the ceasefire holds long enough for the region to build something more durable than a pause. But the signal Abu Dhabi sent on Tuesday was unmistakable, and every government in the region heard it.

US Attorney for the Southern District of New York Jay Clayton said in the statement: “As the indictment lays bare, the Sinaloa cartel, and other drug trafficking organisations like it, would not operate as freely or successfully without corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials on their payroll”.

The UAE’s decision to quit OPEC to prioritise its ‘national interests’ deals a blow to the oil group already grappling with the challenge of shipping Gulf exports through the Strait of Hormuz. Here’s what we know about why it’s withdrawing and the impact it might have.

The Mexican military released footage of an operation resulting in the capture of Audias Flores, a high-ranking commander in the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG). Flores was considered a potential successor to former cartel leader El Mencho, who was killed in February.