bomb

Ukraine has provided imagery of its first homegrown glide bomb, which it says is now ready for combat. Developments by both sides in the Ukraine conflict underscore the fact that standoff munitions of all kinds are in particularly high demand, to counter the increasing density and lethality of enemy air defenses.

According to the Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Mykhailo Fedorov, the development of the weapon — the name of which hasn’t been revealed — took 17 months. A product of Brave1, the defense tech arm of the Ukrainian government, the weapon is said to carry a 250-kilogram (551-pound) warhead, to which is attached a wing kit and some kind of guidance system, the nature of which has not been disclosed.

In a statement today, Brave1 said the glide bomb “has completed all required trials,” and has now been declared ready for combat. The weapon is said to be able to hit targets “dozens of kilometers behind enemy lines.”

With the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense having placed a first order, pilots are now said to be training with the weapon, meaning that combat deployment is “imminent.”

Ukrainian authorities claim that the weapon was designed from scratch and was “not copied from Western or Soviet systems.”

An accompanying video shows the release of the weapon from a Ukrainian Air Force Su-24 Fencer swing-wing attack jet. The bomb is then seen with its range-extending wings deployed; interestingly, these are seen extended immediately after release. Otherwise, the weapon also features notably large cruciform tailfins. The apparent lugs seen under the body of the munitions suggest that, like Russian glide bombs, the weapon ‘topples over’ to assume the correct profile before the wings deploy.

We have reached out to Brave1 for more details on the glide bomb.

It is also worth noting that a previous video, from August 2024, showed another type of air-launched munition, apparently also homegrown, being released from a Ukrainian Su-24, as you can read about here.

Again, we have reached out to Brave1 to better understand if there is any relationship between these weapons. However, the development of the new weapon officially began in December of 2024, several months after the mystery munition appeared.

As for the Ukrainian Air Force, the new glide bomb should provide an important addition to Western-supplied weapons in this class.

Ukraine already employs the Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) and AASM-250 Hammer bomb supplied by the United States and France, respectively. The Ukrainian Air Force also makes extensive use of the U.S.-supplied Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which also has pop-out wings.

At the same time, the new weapon helps Ukraine match similar weapons that are proliferating in the Russian inventory. The Russian Aerospace Forces have, for several years now, been making extensive use of increasingly larger dumb bombs fitted with add-on precision guidance kits. Russia has also been working to refine its glide bombs, making them more effective than the original, fairly crude designs.

Based on Ukraine’s experience with its expanding roster of longer-range kamikaze drones and glide bombs currently in service with both sites, a satellite navigation-assisted inertial guidance system would be used to direct the glide bomb to a specific set of coordinates. Additional seekers are possible, but not probable at this time.

It is not clear if the new Ukrainian weapon has any kind of powerplant. Ukraine has already been employing multiple types of jet-powered kamikaze drones. More importantly, Ukraine’s French-supplied Hammer precision-guided bombs also feature a rocket booster. This feature is of unique utility for Ukraine, which often slings its glide bombs via pop-up launch profiles from low level executed by its fighter and attack aircraft. This is due to the extremely heavy air defenses near the front lines. Even without a motor, however, the weapon provides an important capability and one that is increasingly important as stocks of Western-supplied munitions are eroded or their supply is otherwise interrupted.

A video compilation provides a look at the French-made Hammer munition being used by Ukrainian Su-25 attack jets, including low-level toss bombing:

ЖАБА. ЗСУ Су-25 . З Новим роком , друзі !

We will likely have to wait to see the weapon in action before establishing whether it can be launched from platforms other than the Su-24, although this would seem almost guaranteed.

While Ukraine’s Su-24s are the country’s launch platforms for stealthy Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles provided by the United Kingdom and France, its MiG-29 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flankers have been the primary carriers for other Western-supplied air-launched precision air-to-ground munitions like the JDAM-ER, SDB, and Hammer bombs, as well as AGM-88 High-speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM). The size of the weapon would allow it to be carried by any of these platforms, as well as Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets, which also deliver Hammers.

Whatever the launch platforms and the new weapon’s exact capabilities, its biggest advantage is that it offers a domestic source of air-launched precision-guided munitions with some kind of standoff range. The longer-range Storm Shadows and SCALP-EGs were provided only in relatively limited quantities to Ukraine. They can only be launched by the Su-24 and are reserved for more strategic targets.

Meanwhile, the JDAM-ER has never been in widespread use with the U.S. military or other foreign armed forces, so the quantities available are questionable.

To help meet the shortfall, the U.S. Air Force launched a project to develop a new, relatively low-cost precision-guided air-launched standoff munition focused primarily on meeting Ukrainian demands for weapons of this kind. In August of last year, it was reported that Washington had approved the transfer of thousands of these Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM) to Ukraine. As well as the Rusty Dagger from Zone 5 Technologies, CoAspire developed the Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM) under the ERAM program. 

However, evidence of these weapons being employed by Ukraine has yet to emerge.

There is also the fact that a domestically developed standoff weapon can be used without restriction against any kind of target. Previously, longer-ranged Western-supplied weapons have come with restrictions on their employment. As a result, Ukrainian officials have repeatedly and publicly called for more flexibility in striking targets inside Russia proper. This became especially critical during the Ukrainian incursion into the latter country’s Kursk region.

The apparent rapid pace of development of Ukraine’s first homegrown glide bomb suggests that this is an urgent requirement and one that may well have been driven by problems in the availability of equivalent Western munitions. With that in mind, combined with claims that the weapon is now ready for combat, we may not have to wait too long for evidence of it being used in action.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Bomber and several fighters detonate explosives-laden vehicle near security post in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, near Afghanistan.

A car bombing at ⁠a police post followed by an intense firefight has killed at least three officers ⁠in northwestern Pakistan, according to police and security sources.

The attack took place in Bannu, a district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan, late on Saturday.

Police official Zahid Khan told The Associated Press that a suicide bomber and several fighters detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a security post. Shortly after, multiple explosions were heard and the security post collapsed from the impact of the blast, he said.

Pakistan’s Dawn reported that nearby civilian areas also suffered severe damage due to the blasts, and two civilians were injured.

The Reuters news agency, citing security officials, reported that after the bombing, there was an ambush on police personnel rushing ⁠to the scene to provide backup.

Police official Sajjad Khan told Reuters that more casualties were feared. He added that fighting was ongoing and the extent of the damage would only be known once ‌the operation was over.

Police sources told Reuters ⁠the aggressors also used drones in the attack.

Ambulances from ⁠rescue agencies and civil hospitals were dispatched to the scene, with officials saying a state of emergency has been declared in government hospitals in Bannu.

No group immediately claimed responsibility. However, such attacks have the potential to reignite fighting along Pakistan’s border ⁠with Afghanistan.

The worst fighting in years erupted ⁠between the allies-turned-foes in February, with Pakistani air strikes inside Afghanistan that Islamabad said targeted fighters’ strongholds.

Fighting has since eased, with occasional skirmishes breaking out along the border, but no official ceasefire ‌has been brokered.

Islamabad blames Kabul for harbouring armed groups who use Afghan soil to plot attacks in Pakistan. The Taliban has denied the allegations and ‌said ‌militancy in Pakistan is an internal problem.

The Pakistan Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and allied fighter groups have carried out similar attacks in the past. The Pakistan Taliban is a separate group but is often aligned with the Afghan Taliban, who seized power in Afghanistan in 2021.

The Department of Energy is seeking millions of dollars for work in part on a new bunker-busting nuclear weapon called the Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A) in its latest budget request. At present, there is only one specialized air-delivered deep-penetrating weapon known to be in America’s nuclear stockpile, the B61-11 gravity bomb, and there have been discussions about a potential successor for decades now.

The Fiscal Year 2027 budget request for the Department of Energy, which was released last month, includes a new line under Weapons Activities for Future Programs. The Department is asking for $99.794 million in the next fiscal cycle to support those efforts.

“The Increase represents the start of one new Phase 6.X program, currently known as Phase 1 Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A), as well as supporting production assessments for two new Rapid Capability Team (RCT) projects,” according to a public summary of what the Future Program funding would support.

The Department of Energy, in cooperation with the U.S. military, develops, produces, and sustains nuclear weapons, and uses a multi-phase rubric to categorize where they are in their respective life cycles. The Phase 6.X process is itself broken into several stages, spanning all the way from the definition of the basic concept of a weapon and its requirements through to full-scale production.

Where the NDS-A may already be in the process is unknown, but the mention of “Phase 1” here could point to Phase 6.1, which is the basic concept assessment stage. Beyond that it will be air-delivered, there are also no details currently available publicly about the weapon’s design, including whether it will be based on something already in the stockpile. It is also not known if it will be an unpowered bomb or a missile/rocket-assisted weapon of some kind. We will come back to this point later on.

“The Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered will provide the President with additional nuclear options to defeat Hard and Deeply Buried Targets, ensuring that adversaries cannot place their most valued assets beyond the reach of America’s nuclear forces,” a spokesperson for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) told TWZ when asked for more information. “The program is moving aggressively, and further information will become publicly available when it is strategically beneficial to the United States.”

Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is specifically responsible for nuclear weapons-related activities.

As noted, at present, the B61-11 is the only air-delivered nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile today that is specifically designed to address this target set. The B61-11 is based on the earlier B61-7, but is substantially different in form and function. It has a heavily reinforced outer shell, possibly with a depleted uranium penetrating nose section, and a rocket booster at the rear to help it penetrate down into underground facilities. Sources differ on the maximum yield of the B61-11, but it is said to either be between 340 and 360 kilotons (identical to that of the B61-7) or to be closer to 400 kilotons. There are also reportedly fewer than 100 of these bombs in the stockpile.

You can learn more about the entire B61 family, the first versions of which entered service in the 1960s, here.

For a time, the newer B61-12 variant, which has a precision guidance package in a new tail kit, was considered as a potential successor to the B61-11. The B61-12 is also a dial-a-yield design with multiple yield settings, but the highest one is reportedly 50 kilotons. The logic was that improved accuracy would allow for more precise placement of the bomb, and, by extension, of its explosive force. This, in turn, would make up for its lack of deep-penetrating capability and more limited yield. The plan to supplant the B61-11 with the B61-12 was subsequently abandoned.

B61-12 Flight Test with F35-A Lightning II

More recently, a more powerful B61-13 variant, which features the same precision guidance tail kit as the B61-12, was developed explicitly to provide “the President with additional options against certain harder and large-area military targets.” This version is understood to have a maximum yield in line with the B61-7. However, the U.S. government has also previously said that the B61-13 is not intended as a direct replacement for the B61-11, according to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).

The U.S. military also has B83-1 nuclear gravity bombs in the stockpile, which are of a completely different design from the B61 series and have a far more powerful megaton-class maximum yield. By virtue of that high yield, the B83-1 is also intended to be used against certain deeply buried and otherwise hardened facilities, as well as large-area targets.

In the early 2000s, NNSA, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, did explore the possibility of developing a B61-11-like bomb on the basis of the B83-1, as well as a new deep-penetrating version of the B61 itself. In 2005, Congress brought a halt to work on what was dubbed the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP).

There have been hints since then, however, about possible revivals of the RNEP concept and/or other plans for a true successor to the B61-11.

What may be prompting the requirement for the NDS-A now is unknown. There are deeply-buried targets only a nuclear weapon can realistically destroy. The development of the B61-11 is understood to have been prompted heavily by one such facility in particular, Russia’s Kosvinsky Kamen bunker. Kosvinsky Kamen is a key node in the Russian nuclear command and control enterprise and was built under a mountain of the same name in the northern Urals. The nature of its location and design also means it could serve as a so-called “continuity of government” site for senior leadership to operate from before or after a nuclear strike or in response to some other major emergency.

However, the landscape of deeply-buried, hardened facilities that U.S. authorities would be interested in holding at risk has grown substantially in the past two decades since work, at least publicly, on RNEP came to an end.

The Russian and Chinese governments have been expanding on their already significant arrays of subterranean facilities. In China, this includes the construction of vast fields of new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, as well as work on a new underground command center outside of the capital, Beijing, just in recent years.

Other, smaller countries, like North Korea and Iran, have been investing in new underground and other hardened facilities, as well. This has been driven in many cases by concerns about the prospect of conventional strikes carried out by the U.S. military and others.

In the past year, the matter of Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities, and the limits of U.S. conventional options for prosecuting those targets, has been an especially hot-button issue. During Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, U.S. B-2 bombers struck Iranian nuclear sites at Fordow and Natanz with 30,000-pound-class GBU-57/B conventional bunker buster bombs. The outcome of that operation remains a subject of heated debate and is deeply intertwined with the justifications for U.S. and Israeli forces launching the latest campaign against Iran in February. U.S. officials are now at a crossroads with how to proceed with operations targeting Iran, which has now turned to a maritime blockade, at least for the time being, following the announcement of a ceasefire in April.

The video below is a montage of imagery from GBU-57/B MOP tests over the years.

GBU-57 MOP test

Broader concerns about just getting the B61-11 to its intended target in the future may also be a factor driving plans now for the new NDS-A nuclear bunker buster. Unpowered bunker buster bombs, nuclear or conventional, need to be released relatively close to their targets. The kinds of facilities that the B61-11 is intended to be employed against are deep inside hostile territory, behind layers of integrated air defenses. Major potential adversaries, as well as smaller nation states and even non-state actors, are only expected to expand the scale and scope of their defensive architectures in the coming years. With all this in mind, it is not surprising that the more survivable B-2 is currently the only platform certified to employ the B61-11, as well as the conventional MOP. It is more or less a given that both of those weapons will be integrated onto the forthcoming B-21 Raider for the same general reasons.

That being said, as TWZ regularly highlights, stealth aircraft are not invisible or invulnerable. This reality is part of the argument for the planned integration of the new nuclear-tipped AGM-181 Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) air-launched cruise missile onto the B-21, as well as the venerable and non-stealthy B-52. LRSO will also just extend the B-21’s reach, with that aircraft already expected to be an extremely long-range platform. This all raises the possibility of the NDS-A being a powered design offering some degree of standoff capability.

As an aside here, powered designs have also been part of the discussions about potential conventional successors to the MOP. A follow-on to the GBU-57/B, the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), is now in development, but it is unclear whether or not that will be a powered weapon. Still, when it comes to the NDS-A, it seems more likely that it will be a traditional bomb that adapts elements of existing designs, including the B61-11, -12, and -13.

Whether or not the NDS-A effort reaches fruition also remains to be seen. The previous RNEP effort prompted significant criticism, including from members of Congress, in part because of concerns about what steps it might prompt other countries to take in response. At the same time, there has been a change in tenor in U.S. nuclear policy in recent years, driven by other global developments, especially efforts by the Chinese to rapidly and substantially expand their stockpile.

There is also a question of affordability. The U.S. military is already in the midst of a major modernization push across all three legs of America’s nuclear deterrence triad that is set to cost hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming decades. This could impact support for funding another ‘new’ nuclear weapon, even if it is derived from an existing design.

More definitely remains to be learned about the NDS-A program and the design of that weapon. What is clear is that the Department of Energy is requesting funding to kick off at least the initial development of a new air-delivered nuclear bunker buster that could succeed the B61-11.

UPDATE: 5:27 PM EST –

It has been brought to our attention that some additional details about the NDS-A effort have been tucked away in U.S. budget requests in recent years.

In its Fiscal Year 2025 budget, the Air Force asked for, and ultimately received just over $39 million for work on NDS-A, but under a budget line titled “Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System (HDBTDS) Prototyping.”

“The Air-delivered Nuclear Delivery System (NDS-A) is a new start project to address a capability gap identified in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). A congressionally directed study based on the NPR led to endorsement of the Deputy’s Management Action Group (DMAG) and initiation of this project,” according to the 2025 Fiscal Year budget documents. “The Air Force will work with the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its National Laboratories to develop a prototype NDS-A system to demonstrate the capability to close this gap in the near term.”

“Early development will include Model and Simulation (M&S) analysis of several nuclear explosive package (NEP) options to refine the proposed NEP,” the budget documents add. “Ground tests may include wind tunnel, static ejection, vibration and thermal, cable pull-down, and sled tests. Flight tests will be performed by USAF F-15E developmental flight test aircraft, with final prototype demonstrations flown on B-2 aircraft.”

The video below shows flight testing of the B61-12 using a U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle.

B61-12 full-weapon system demonstration at Tonopah Test Range

In the Air Force’s proposed 2026 Fiscal Year budget, the line item was renamed “Nuclear Delivery Systems Prototyping,” but references to NDS-A by name were also omitted. A nearly $18 million year-over-year increase in requested funding (from roughly $39 million to almost $57 million) was attributed “to greater emphasis on prototype design after completion of Modeling and Simulation of mission effectiveness of design space options; increased procurement and development of components; the initiation of subsystem and test unit assembly; and the initiation of ground tests of the Prototype Weapon Assemblies.”

The Fiscal Year 2025 and 2026 budget documents do not provide any details about the design of the weapon or say what aircraft it will be integrated onto operationally.

More details about the current state of the Air Force side of this program are likely contained in the service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request documents. However, at the time of writing this update, they are inaccessible online.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

A highway bomb attack in southwestern Colombia has killed 19 people and injured at least 38, the latest spate of violence ahead of next month’s presidential election.

Buses and vans were left mangled in the blast Saturday on the Pan-American Highway, in the restive southwestern Cauca department.

Several cars were flipped over by the force of the explosion and a large crater was blown out of the roadway.

The department’s governor on Saturday evening provided a death toll of 14, with more than 38 injured, but the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences said Sunday morning it had begun the examination of 19 bodies.

Military chief Hugo Lopez told a news conference on Saturday that the bomb had exploded after assailants stopped traffic by blocking the road with a bus and another vehicle.

The attack comes just over one month ahead of national elections, in which voters will pick a successor to President Gustavo Petro.

Petro blamed the bombing on Ivan Mordisco, the South American country’s most-wanted criminal, whom the president has compared to late cocaine kingpin Pablo Escobar.

The violence came after a bomb attack on Friday on a military base in Cali, Colombia’s third-largest city, injured two people and set off a string of attacks in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments.

According to Lopez, 26 attacks have been recorded in the two departments over the past two days.

Authorities have boosted military and police presence in the areas, Defence Minister Pedro Sanchez said.

Security is one of the central issues of the May 31 presidential election. Political violence was brought into sharp focus last June, when young conservative presidential frontrunner Miguel Uribe Turbay was shot in broad daylight while campaigning in the capital Bogota and later died from his wounds.

Leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda, an architect of Petro’s controversial policy of negotiating with armed groups, is ahead in polls.

He is trailed by right-wing candidates Abelardo de la Espriella and Paloma Valencia, both of whom have pledged to take a hard line against rebel groups.

All three have reported receiving death threats and are campaigning under heavy security.

Videos and other imagery bearing witness to the awesome destructive power of nuclear detonations remain some of the most enduring legacies of the Cold War. But of the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons tests that have been carried out since 1945, only very, very few have involved a live weapon dropped from a fighter-bomber.

A nuclear strike performed by the Su-7

At least one such test took place in the Soviet Union, however. On his X account, Sam Wise, an aviation analyst at Janes, brought our attention to footage that purportedly shows that test, or at least portions of it.

The test in question was especially notable in that it involved a free-fall tactical nuclear bomb that was delivered by a crewed fighter-bomber, specifically a Su-7 Fitter attack jet, in an end-to-end test.

Of those 2,000-plus nuclear tests, only a small fraction involved bombs dropped from aircraft of any kind — roughly 200 to 250 according to records compiled by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Those tests almost always involved bombers, aircraft with multiple engines, several crew members, and, often, dedicated to delivering nuclear weapons.

The vast majority of nuclear tests were conducted underground, at sea, or on land. In the latter case, the devices were typically detonated from an elevated position, either atop a tower or suspended from a balloon. This better replicated the conditions of a typical nuclear detonation, with the weapon engineered to explode in an air burst above the ground, for maximum effect.

One reason for the relative scarcity of air-dropped nuclear bomb tests was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which pushed testing underground.

At the same time, dropping a live nuclear weapon from a crewed aircraft brings additional risks for relatively little benefit.

At the beginning of the nuclear age, air-dropped tests were useful to prove that bombs could be delivered, but they were inefficient in terms of scientific measurement and riskier to conduct from a safety point of view. Dropping a nuclear device from an aircraft adds variables (altitude, speed, trajectory) that complicate measurements. If something goes wrong, you risk losing a plane, or worse, an accidental detonation or contamination spread.

Based on the available information, it appears that the U.S. military never tested a live tactical nuclear bomb dropped by a tactical combat jet, despite the very many platforms, both Air Force and Navy, that were cleared to carry them operationally.

It should be noted that the U.S. Air Force did detonate one tactical nuclear weapon after launch from a fighter. However, this involved an air-to-air rocket, the nuclear-tipped Genie, which was fired on this occasion from an F-89 interceptor, in 1957’s Operation Plumbbob John.

Project Genie : Air-to-air rocket nuclear testing

France does appear to have conducted a live test of an air-dropped tactical nuclear bomb, with an AN52 dropped from a Jaguar attack jet in August 1972, to help prove that weapon for service.

Returning to the Soviet Union, on August 27, 1962, pilot Lt. Col. A. I. Shein took off in a single-seat Su-7B, with a live 244N nuclear bomb carried on the centerline station below the fuselage. He then headed for the Semipalatinsk test site on the Soviet steppe. Also known as “The Polygon,” the Semipalatinsk range was the main test site for Soviet nuclear weapons. It is in the Abai region, in what is now Kazakhstan.

Shein put the jet into a climb at an angle of around 45 degrees. This was an ‘over-the-shoulder’ toss maneuver, typical for fighter-bombers of this era. This involved the attacking aircraft pulling upward before releasing its bomb to compensate for the weapon’s gravity drop in flight. The result would put the weapon on the target, without the aircraft having to pass over it. Instead, the jet would complete a half roll and (hopefully) avoid the blast effects so it could escape. The launch maneuver sequence, as shown in the video, is apparently simulated, or at the least, heavily edited.

Shein later recalled:

“I take off, the excitement subsides, I enter the combat course, and make an approach. Everything is normal, I make an approach for a combat release, bring the aircraft into a nose-up attitude, and monitor the G-forces. After four seconds, I hear a signal, then a second, a short third, and I press the ‘release’ trigger. The green light goes out, indicating the release has been completed. The bomb’s release is felt by the shaking of the aircraft. I continue the nose-up attitude. For control, I note the release angle; it is almost constant and equal to 44–50 degrees. After passing the top point, I then descend at a 50-60 degree angle, perform a half-roll, increase engine speed and, consequently, aircraft speed, descend to the lowest possible altitude, and try to get as far and as quickly as possible from the target.”

This method required a bomb computer to calculate the release point. For the U.S. Air Force, this was the Low Altitude Bombing System, or LABS, while the Su-7 was fitted with the equivalent PBK-1 device, a separate box that was added to the left side of the instrument panel. In this context, PBK denoted Pritsel dliya Bombometaniya s Kabrirovaniya, or toss-bombing sight.

A video shows a U.S. Air Force B-47 bomber flying the LABS maneuver:

Boeing B-47 Stratojet (Low Altitude Bombing System) LABS Maneuver

After release from the Su-7, the bomb exploded at an altitude of around 800 feet, at the coordinates of 50.4°N and 77.8°E. The detonation had a yield of 11 kilotons.

As for the Su-7, this was the Soviet Union’s first-generation supersonic attack jet. It was rapidly equipping fighter-bomber regiments, and nuclear strike would become one of its most important duties.

The streamlined 244N was the first mass-produced Soviet tactical nuclear bomb specifically intended for carriage by supersonic jets.

A photo showing the earlier, non-streamlined RDS-4 tactical free-fall bomb:

RDS-4 “Tatyana” was a Soviet atomic bomb that was first tested with a yield of 27 kilotons at Semipalatinsk Test Site, on August 23, 1953. The Soviet Union’s first mass-produced tactical nuclear weapon. pic.twitter.com/c7xdODw0tZ

— NUKES (@atomicarchive) August 24, 2023

At this point, it should be noted that there is a possibility that the video shows not the 244N, but an IAB-500, a so-called ‘imitation bomb’ that replicated the shape, dimensions, weight and flight characteristics of the nuclear device. Filled with a mixture of liquid petroleum and white phosphorus, it also produced a large fireball that subsequently turned into a mushroom cloud.

With that in mind, the video could at least show portions of an IAB-500 test, although the location and the original voiceover point squarely to the 1962 Semipalatinsk test. The apparent installation of a camera pod below the Su-7’s wing, to record the detonation, also suggests a nuclear test rather than training.

Regardless, the 244N was successfully tested and was put into operational service in several variants, including with different yields up to a maximum of 30 kilotons. Most of these bombs were deployed by Soviet units stationed close to what would have been the front line in the event of a confrontation with NATO: in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

Starting in 1967, Western intelligence began to note training activities involving nuclear weapons at Soviet airbases in East Germany, including Su-7s taking part in LABS-type maneuvers.

In one of its reports from 1967, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) noted that its staff identified Su-7s from Grossenhain Air Base performing at least four LABS practice delivery runs on October 7 of that year.

“The aircraft passed over the airfield at approximately 2,000 feet, pulled up into vertical climb to 3,500 feet, pitched over, flew inverted for several seconds, then rolled over again departing to the west.”

Two days later, the USMLM reported “A very active program of local navigational, touch-and-go landings, LABS maneuvers, and possible range activity flown by Grossenhain-based Fitter and [two-seat Su-7] Moujik” aircraft.

Air-dropped tactical nuclear weapons still play a significant role in Russia’s military strategy, as evidenced by recent moves to station tactical devices in Belarus. Many Russian combat aircraft have variants capable of carrying nuclear bombs, and most Russian air-launched missiles weighing over around 1,000 pounds have the option of a nuclear warhead.

Russia really wants West to see they’re doing a tac nuke exercise. After several exercise videos they put the head of the 12 GUMO in front of a Belarusian Su-25 (possibly at Lida air base) loaded with what is said to be “training nuclear ammunition.” https://t.co/h9rHp2qvGv pic.twitter.com/sTzAqSNd9f

— Hans Kristensen (also on Bluesky) (@nukestrat) June 13, 2024

Starting in the 1960s, the 244N was superseded by a modernized development of the same weapon, the 10-kiloton RN-24, as well as the one-kiloton RN-28. These were carried, among others, by the MiG-21 and Su-7.

These bombs were followed in the 1980s followed by the RN-40 and RN-41, carried by the MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29, Su-17, Su-24, and Su-27.

To this day, the IAB-500 also remains in use to train combat jet pilots in nuclear bomb delivery. Alongside it, although much less known, and barely ever seen, are tactical nuclear bombs, the descendants of the 244N that was proven in a unique test back in 1962.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

April 26 (UPI) — Police in Northern Ireland said Sunday morning that the New IRA is believed to have been involved in a car bombing near a police station in Belfast.

Detectives are treating a car bombing outside a police station in the Dunmurry area of outer Belfast as an attempted murder, and said called it a miracle that nobody was injured, The Guardian and the Belfast Telegraph reported.

A delivery car was hijacked late Saturday night in West Belfast, an explosive device was placed in the car’s boot and the delivery driver was told to drive to the police station and abandon it there, police said.

Bobby Singleton, deputy chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, told reporters that the attack was nearly identical to an attack earlier this year.

“As a consequence of that, our early working hypothesis is that this may well be the work of the New IRA, who claimed responsibility for the attack in Lurgen,” Singleton said.

“Thanks to the swift actions of police, no one has been injured, which is nothing short of miraculous,” he said.

The attempt on a Lurgen police station in March was unsuccessful because the device did not detonate, but the method — hijacking a car and forcing the driver to abandon the bomb on wheels somewhere — was nearly the same, Singleton said.

United States President Donald Trump has claimed that a new nuclear deal being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the US withdrew from in 2018 during his first term.

On Tuesday, Trump extended the two-week ceasefire with Iran a day before it was set to expire, with hopes for a second round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Key among the US demands is that Iran stop all enrichment of uranium.

Iran has always insisted its nuclear programme is for civilian use only, such as for power generation, which requires uranium enrichment of between 3 percent and 5 percent. To build nuclear weapons, uranium needs to be enriched to 90 percent.

In this explainer, we visualise what uranium is, how it is enriched and how long it could take Iran to make a nuclear weapon.

What is uranium, and which countries have it?

Uranium is a dense metal used as a fuel in nuclear reactors and weapons. It is naturally radioactive and usually found in low concentrations in rocks, soil and even seawater. About 90 percent of the world’s uranium is produced in just five countries: Kazakhstan, Canada, Namibia, Australia and Uzbekistan. Reserves of uranium have also been found in other countries.

Uranium is extracted either by digging it out of the ground or, more commonly, through a chemical process that dissolves uranium from within the rock.

Before it can be used as nuclear fuel, uranium is processed through several different forms, including:

• Yellowcake: Mined ore is crushed and treated with chemicals to form a coarse powder known as yellowcake, which, irrespective of its name, is usually dark green or charcoal in colour, depending on how hot it has been treated.
• Uranium tetrafluoride: Yellowcake is then treated with hydrogen fluoride gas, which turns it into emerald-green crystals known as uranium tetrafluoride or green salt.
• Uranium hexafluoride: Green salt is further fluorinated to create a solid white crystal known as uranium hexafluoride. When heated slightly, this crystal turns into a gas, making it ready for enrichment.
• Uranium dioxide: The gas is spun in a centrifuge machine, which chemically converts it into a fine, black powder.
• Fuel pellets: The black powder is pressed to form black ceramic pellets, which can then be used in a nuclear reactor.

How is uranium enriched?

Natural uranium exists in three forms, called isotopes. They are the same element, with the same number of protons but different numbers of neutrons.

Most naturally occurring uranium (99.3 percent) is U-238 – the heaviest and least radioactive – while about 0.7 percent is U-235 and trace amounts (0.005 percent) are U-234.

To generate energy, scientists separate the lighter, more radioactive U-235 from the slightly heavier U-238 in a process called uranium enrichment. U-235 can sustain a nuclear chain reaction while U-238 cannot.

To enrich uranium, it must first be converted into a gas, known as uranium hexafluoride (UF₆). This gas is fed into a series of fast-spinning cylinders called centrifuges. These cylinders spin at extremely high speeds (often more than 1,000 revolutions per second). The spinning force pushes the heavier U-238 to the outer walls, while the lighter U-235 stays in the centre and is collected.

A single centrifuge provides only a tiny amount of separation. To reach higher concentrations – or “enrichment” – the process is repeated through a series of centrifuges, called a cascade, until the desired concentration of U-235 is achieved.

What are the different levels of uranium enrichment?

The higher the U‑235 percentage, the more highly enriched the uranium is.

Small amounts (3-5 percent) are enough to fuel nuclear power reactors, while weapons require much higher enrichment levels (about 90 percent).

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers anything below 20 percent to be low-enriched uranium (LEU), while anything above 20 percent is considered highly-enriched uranium (HEU).

Low enriched – less than 20 percent

• Commercial grade – 3-5 percent: This is the standard fuel for the vast majority of the world’s nuclear power plants
• Small modular reactors – 5-19.9 percent: Used in more modern reactors and advanced research reactors

Highly enriched – More than 20 percent

• Research grade – 20-85 percent: Used in specialised research reactors to produce medical isotopes or to test materials
• Weapons grade – above 90 percent: This is the level required for most nuclear weapons
• Naval grade – 93-97 percent: Used in the nuclear reactors that power submarines and aircraft carriers

Depleted uranium, which contains less than 0.3 percent U‑235, is the leftover product after enrichment. It can be used for radiation shielding or as projectiles in armour‑piercing weapons.

How long does it take to enrich uranium?

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is not linear, meaning it is much more difficult to go from 0.7 percent natural uranium to 20 percent LEU than it is to go from 20 percent to 90 percent HEU. Once uranium reaches 60 percent enrichment, it becomes much quicker to reach 90 percent weapons grade.

The effort it takes to enrich uranium is measured in separative work units (SWU).

According to the IAEA, Iran is believed to have about 440kg (970lbs) of uranium enriched to 60 percent – enough to theoretically build 10 or 11 low-technology atomic bombs if refined to 90 percent.

Ted Postol, professor emeritus of science, technology and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), told Al Jazeera that before the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow, the country had at least 10 cascades of 174 IR-6 centrifuges in operation – meaning 1,740 IR-6 centrifuges.

The IR-6 is one of Iran’s most advanced centrifuge models. The country also has tens of thousands of older centrifuges.

Little is known about the conditions of these centrifuges or the stocks of uranium hexafluoride, which are still believed to be buried underground.

Postol has calculated that Iran’s cascade of centrifuges could produce 900 to 1,000 SWUs annually.

“Getting from natural uranium to 60 percent enrichment, which Iran has already achieved, takes roughly five years, and about 5,000 SWUs using Iran’s cascades.”

“If I want to go from 60 to 90 percent, I only need 500 SWUs. So, instead of five years, [by] starting with the 60 percent here, this might take me four or five weeks. Because I am already very enriched,” Postol said.

Using an analogy of a clock, Postol explained: “Let’s say it takes seven minutes to get 33 percent enrichment, and then eight minutes to get to 50 percent enrichment. It only takes me one minute to get to total [90 percent] enrichment.”

How easy would it be for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?

Postol said Iran’s stockpile is held underground, meaning a military strike would not necessarily eliminate the nuclear threat.

A single centrifuge cascade capable of enriching weapons-grade uranium could take up “no more floor space than a studio apartment, making it easily hidden in a small laboratory”, he said, estimating the area at 60sq metres (600sq feet).

“A single Prius Compact Hybrid car can produce enough electric power to run four or more of these cascades at a time,” Postol added, meaning “Iran can covertly convert its 60 percent uranium into weapons-grade uranium metal”.

“What they have done is put themselves in a position where anybody who thinks about attacking them with nuclear weapons has to know that they could be sitting in those tunnels after such an attack, refining [and] enriching the final step they need to build atomic weapons and converting it to metal, and building a nuclear weapon, and that they have the means to deliver it,” Postol said.

“They would have all of the technical equipment they need to build the atomic weapons. And they have the missiles, which are also in the tunnels and can be manufactured in addition to what they already have. And the atomic weapon would not need to be tested, because uranium weapons do not need to be tested before they’re used.”

What does the NPT say about enrichment?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), established in 1968, is a landmark international agreement aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Iran is a signatory to this pact.

The treaty supports the right of all signatories to access nuclear technology and enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, including energy, medical or industrial purposes, with precise safeguards to ensure it is not diverted to make weapons.

Under the NPT, nuclear-weapon states agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing them. Non-nuclear-weapon states also agree not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons.

Despite this, most nuclear powers are currently modernising their arsenals rather than dismantling them.

Most of the countries are signatories, except five: India, Pakistan, Israel, South Sudan and North Korea.

What agreements has Iran made about its nuclear programme in the past?

In 2015, under the Obama administration, Iran struck a deal with six world powers — China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the US — plus the European Union, known as the JCPOA.

Under the pact, Tehran agreed to scale down its nuclear programme, capping enrichment to 3.67 percent, in exchange for relief from sanctions.

“The Iranians agreed to it, and they were following the treaty. There was no problem with the treaty at all, absolutely no problem,” Postol said.

“They were allowed to have 6,000 centrifuges, which, if they had natural uranium, they could probably build a bomb within a year if they were secretly using these centrifuges, but that was all under inspection. They were just simply going to enrich to 3.67 percent, which is for a power reactor. They’re allowed to do that by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

But in 2018, Trump pulled out of the deal, calling it “one-sided” and reimposing sanctions on Iran. Iran responded by eventually resuming enrichment at Fordow.

After the US killed Iran’s General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, Tehran stated it would no longer follow the set uranium enrichment limits.

Former President Joe Biden made attempts to revive the deal, but it never came to fruition due to disagreements over whether sanctions should be lifted first or Iran should rejoin the JCPOA first.

Trump has repeatedly said Iran should not have the ability to produce nuclear weapons. It has been one of Washington’s red lines during talks with Iranian officials over the past year, and was also the central justification that Washington used when it bombed Iranian nuclear facilities during the 12-day US-Israel war on Iran last year.

In the current negotiations, Iran has said it is willing to “downblend” its 60 percent enriched uranium to about 20 percent – the threshold for low-enriched uranium. The process of downblending involves mixing stocks with depleted uranium to achieve a lower percentage of enriched U-235 overall.

“From the point of view of showing goodwill, I think it’s good, it shows that the Iranians are thinking of ways to address what the Americans claim are their concerns,” Postol said.

Which countries have nuclear weapons?

Nine countries possessed roughly 12,187 nuclear warheads as of early 2026, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Approximately two-thirds are owned by two nations – Russia (4,400) and the US (3,700), excluding their retired nuclear arsenals.

Some 9,745 of the total existing nuclear weapons are military stockpiles for missiles, submarines and aircraft. The rest have been retired. Of the military stockpile, 3,912 are currently deployed on missiles or at bomber bases, according to the Federation of American Scientists. Of these, some 2,100 are on US, Russian, British and French warheads, ready for use at short notice.

While Russia and the US have dismantled thousands of warheads, several countries are thought to be increasing their stockpiles, notably China.

The only country to have voluntarily relinquished nuclear weapons is South Africa. In 1989, the government halted its nuclear weapons programme and began dismantling its six nuclear weapons the following year.

Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, with a stockpile of at least 90. It has consistently neither confirmed nor denied this, and despite numerous treaties, it faces little international pressure for transparency.

Russia’s FSB accused the woman, found with a bomb in her backpack, of taking part in a plot hatched by Ukraine.

Russian authorities say they have thwarted a Ukraine-linked bomb plot against security services and arrested a German woman found with a makeshift bomb in her backpack.

Russia’s FSB security agency said the unnamed woman was detained on Monday in the southern city of Pyatigorsk.

In a statement cited by Russia’s state-run TASS news agency, the FSB said it had “prevented a terrorist attack planned by the Kyiv regime against a law enforcement facility in the Stavropol region, involving a German citizen born in 1969”.

It said the woman had been recruited by a citizen from a Central Asian country, who was working on orders from Ukraine. That man was found and arrested near the targeted site.

According to the FSB, the device contained an explosive charge equivalent to 1.5kg (3 pounds) of TNT and was intended to be detonated remotely. The agency said the blast was ultimately prevented by electronic jamming.

Video of the purported arrest published by Russia’s state RIA Novosti news agency showed armed Russian security agents approach the woman as she was face down in a car park.

Another video showed masked plainclothes agents pulling a man into a station, followed by a controlled explosion of the backpack.

Russia’s previous allegations

Russia has arrested dozens of people throughout the four-year war, mostly its own citizens, on allegations of working for Ukraine to carry out sabotage attacks.

Russia has previously accused Ukraine of working with Islamic fundamentalists to carry out attacks inside Russia, without providing evidence.

Officials initially alleged that the perpetrators of a 2024 massacre at a concert hall on the outskirts of Moscow that killed 150 people were ISIL (ISIS) members in coordination with Ukraine.

ISIL claimed responsibility for that attack, making no reference of any Ukrainian involvement, for which no evidence was presented by Moscow and which Kyiv denies.