ballistic

Ministry of National Defence says no casualties or damage after missile shot down over southern city of Gaziantep.

The Turkish Ministry of National Defence says NATO air defences have intercepted a ballistic missile launched from Iran towards Turkiye as concerns grow that the United States-Israel war against Iran will escalate.

The missile was intercepted on Monday over the Sahinbey district of Gaziantep in southern Turkiye, the ministry said in a statement. No casualties or damage were reported.

“Ankara emphasized its capability and determination to protect national airspace and border security, while warning that further escalation in the region must be avoided,” the statement said.

The ministry also urged all sides, especially Tehran, “to refrain from actions that could endanger civilians or undermine regional stability”.

Monday’s incident was the second time an Iranian ballistic missile was fired towards Turkiye since the US and Israel launched a war against Iran on February 28, according to local authorities.

The US-Israeli attacks have prompted a wave of Iranian missile and drone strikes across the wider region, including on targets in Arab Gulf countries.

Iran did not immediately comment on the Turkish ministry’s statement.

NATO spokesperson Allison Hart confirmed that the military alliance had intercepted “a missile heading to Turkiye”. “NATO stands firm in its readiness to defend all Allies against any threat,” Hart said in a post on X.

Iran denied firing a ballistic missile towards Turkiye on Wednesday after Turkish authorities said NATO air defences shot down a projectile over the Eastern Mediterranean.

NATO condemned that launch, expressing its “full solidarity” with Turkiye.

“This is a tangible demonstration of the Alliance’s ability to defend our populations against all threats, including those posed by ballistic missiles,” NATO said of the interception.

Article 5 of the alliance’s North Atlantic Treaty says an attack on one NATO country will be considered an attack on all. It also commits each NATO member state to taking action deemed necessary “to restore and maintain” security.

In an interview with the Reuters news agency last week after the first ballistic missile heading towards Turkiye was shot down, NATO chief Mark Rutte said there was no talk of invoking Article 5.

Iranian authorities have said they are firing at US military bases and other US- and Israel-linked targets across the region in self-defence, but civilian infrastructure has also been attacked.

“Iran’s targets are not just US bases; they are, in fact, primarily large-scale infrastructure and civilian targets as well,” said Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London.

“This is not a mistake. This is by design,” Pinfold told Al Jazeera, explaining that Tehran is seeking to “unleash as much chaos as possible to destabilise the region and global markets” in an effort to force Washington to abandon the war.

“We’ve seen that Iran is targeting every single [Gulf Cooperation Council] state. It’s prepared to burn its bridges with all of them to pursue this very uncertain and high-risk strategy,” he said.

“It really shows you how Iran feels like it’s facing an existential threat. For them, this is a real do-or-die moment.”

The U.S. military has employed new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) short-range ballistic missiles as part of ongoing operations against Iran. This looks to be the first combat use of the PrSM, which only began entering service roughly two years ago. The operational debut of the new missiles showcases the significantly greater range they offer compared to their predecessors, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and much expanded target areas that American units can now hold at risk as a result.

Overnight, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) released a video montage of still pictures documenting the “first 24 hours of Operation Epic Fury.” This is the nickname American authorities have given to their component of ongoing U.S.-Israeli operations targeting Iran. Included in that montage, seen in the social media post below, is an image clearly showing the launch of a PrSM from a wheeled M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launcher.

Defense and security columnist Colby Badhwar looks to have been the first to spot the PrSM image in the CENTCOM montage. The new missile is distinctly different, especially when it comes to the shape and configuration of its tail fins, from ATACMS.

There is also a picture of an M142 loaded with what looks to be a two-cell ammunition ‘pod,’ which is also in line with PrSM. The M142, as well as the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), fires munitions from pods with standardized dimensions. ATACMS pods only contain a single missile. M142 and M270 launcher vehicles can also fire 227mm artillery rockets, including guided variants, all of which come in six-round pods.

Yesterday, CENTCOM also released a montage of video clips showing HIMARS launchers firing short-range ballistic missiles. That footage – which came along with the caption “The Iranian regime was warned. CENTCOM is now delivering swift and decisive action as directed.” – may also show at least one PrSM launch, as well as ATACMS being fired.

As already noted, PrSM offers a major boost in range over ATACMS. The baseline PrSM variant, also known as Increment 1, has demonstrated its ability to hit targets at least around 310 miles (500 kilometers) away. The U.S. Army, the service in charge of the PrSM program, has a stated goal to eventually stretch that out to around 400 miles (650 kilometers), if that has not already been achieved. The service is also working toward an even longer-range version able to fly out to at least 620 miles (1,000 kilometers), if not further.

The longest ranged variants of ATACMS can hit targets out to around 186 miles (300 kilometers).

Where PrSMs or ATACMS have been fired from during strikes on Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury is unclear. Regardless, PrSM offering roughly twice as much reach would substantially increase the total breadth of targets that could be held at risk from any location in the region.

In turn, this would allow U.S. forces to hit more targets where the unique benefits offered by ballistic missiles could be advantageous. Ballistic missiles, in general, fly at relatively high speeds, especially as they come down in the terminal phase of flight. This makes them especially well-suited for employment against time-sensitive targets, like Iranian missile launchers and air defense assets, which have been a focal point of strikes in the conflict so far, in general. Using short-range ballistic missiles to help neutralize air defense nodes, shore radar sites, and similar assets would have made particular sense in the opening stages of the conflict to help clear the way for follow-on strikes.

High speed also creates additional challenges for enemy air defenses attempting to engage them compared to other kinds of missiles, including some subsonic air-breathing cruise missiles. How fast ballistic missiles are going when they impact inherently enables ballistic missiles to burrow deeper into hardened targets, which are commonplace in Iran, as well.

Demonstrating PrSM in real combat against Iran could also send signals to other American opponents. The importance of PrSM’s extended reach is often discussed in the context of a potential high-end fight in the Pacific against China, where launch points, at least on land, are much more limited. An anti-ship version of PrSM, also referred to as Increment 2, which features an additional seeker and is capable of hitting moving targets, is also now under development. Another version of PrSM is also in the works that could dispense payloads consisting of kamikaze drones or small precision-guided bombs, as you can read more about here.

We still have more to learn about how PrSM (as well as ATACMS) is being employed as part of Operation Epic Fury. Whatever the case, America’s newest ballistic missile is now a combat-proven weapon, and its use against Iran puts a spotlight on the immense value its greater range, in particular, brings to the table.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Last year, the U.S. government was able to reverse engineer a critical subcomponent for the 30,000-pound GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb. Leveraging technology from the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) short-range ballistic missile saved years of work that would have otherwise been necessary to “eliminate obsolescence issues and meet operational demands.” The reverse-engineering effort also highlights the impacts of being locked into a single vendor, and underscores why the Pentagon is now pushing to make changes to, if not end this practice.

Details about the reverse-engineered component and other aspects of the MOP program were contained in a recent U.S. Air Force contracting announcement regarding efforts to replenish stocks of those bombs following Operation Midnight Hammer. During that operation, B-2 Spirit stealth bombers dropped 14 GBU-57/Bs on Iranian nuclear facilities. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC) had to produce a detailed justification for awarding a sole-source contract to Boeing for the production of new MOPs and the sustainment of the existing inventory. Boeing is the bomb’s current prime contractor. A redacted copy of that document is available online.

“The Government has a follow-on need for additional production of [redacted] MOP Tail Kits with projected delivery starting 10 January 2028 to replace expended units and reach the United States Air Force’s [redacted],” the so-called Justification & Approval (J&A) document explains. “The Government has a need for replenishment production of GBU-57 MOP weapon system components.”

It is unclear what the total size of the GBU-57/B inventory was before or after Operation Midnight Hammer. As of 2015, prime contractor Boeing had delivered at least 20 of the bombs, according to the Air Force. However, additional orders have been reported over the years. In 2024, a story from Bloomberg had also said that a facility in Oklahoma was being expanded to help triple or even quadruple the annual output of these bombs.

The MOP’s tail kit, also designated KMU-612/B, contains the bomb’s GPS-assisted inertial navigation system (INS) guidance package and other systems. It is combined with a BLU-127/B penetrating “warhead” and other components, including advanced fuzes designed to help produce the maximum destructive effect on a target after burrowing deep down into the ground, to create a complete GBU-57/B bomb, or all-up-round (AUR).

GBU-57 MOP test

“In August of 2025, the Government successfully reverse engineered a critical subcomponent of the MOP weapon system saving 4-years of design work and enabling the utilization of existing Army ATACMS technology to eliminate obsolescence issues and meet operational demands,” according to the J&A document. “However, the time to reverse engineer all MOP components would result in unacceptable delays in meeting mission requirements.”

The MOP J&A does not elaborate on the ATACMS technology in question, or what company or companies may now be in line to produce the resulting subcomponent for the bombs. Lockheed Martin is the current prime contractor for ATACMS, a family of short-range ballistic missiles that you can read more about here. It should also be noted that the U.S. military’s reverse-engineering parts of key weapon systems is not entirely uncommon, especially if the original source of the components in question has gone out of business or otherwise no longer exists.

The J&A document says it would take an estimated 60 months, or five years, to create an entirely new MOP tail kit design and then go through the required processes to certify it for operational use. It also explains why the KMU-612/B tail kit, specifically, is so central to the need to award a new sole-source contract to Boeing.

“With regards to IP [intellectual property] rights, The [Redacted] Company is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the MOP weapon system and retains ownership of the intellectual property data associated with the munition’s tail kit,” it explains. “In particular, [redacted] owns the technical data package and manufacturing process methodologies of the tailkit unit entirely. [Redacted] has uniquely acquired expertise over a period of ~18 years of adapting this specialized weapon to meet evolving mission needs as MOP transitioned from proof-of-concept to full operational capability. This expertise pertains, but is not limited to, knowledge of the guidance algorithms, navigation systems, hardware components, specialized test equipment, and software critical to producing and sustaining the MOP weapon system.”

“The other components and sub-components, as noted above, have been proprietary to [redacted] from the inception of this weapon system. The USG [U.S. government] does not own or control, via license or by other IP rights, any computer software, methodologies, or technical drawings,” the document adds. “[Redacted] was queried in August 2025 as to the potential of selling IP rights to the USG for the MOP weapon system and the USG was denied.”

That being said, “over the course of the ~18 years of MOP development to the AURs acquired today the USG has, at certain junctures, been able to separate from the sole-source environment for this weapon with Boeing,” the J&A notes. “The USG was able to break away the Warhead Cases for the MOP under a weapon design agent effort, thereby giving the USG complete IP control over the Warhead TDP. Based on the IP ownership of this TDP the USG awards contracts competitively.”

The prospect now of new U.S. strikes against targets in Iran, including deeply buried nuclear sites and other facilities, highlights the continued importance of the depth and readiness of the GBU-57/B inventory. There is clear evidence that Iranian authorities have taken new steps to try to shield key elements of the country’s nuclear program from future attacks, either from the air or on the ground. MOP has been and continues to be the only conventional munition capable of prosecuting many of these targets, and was specifically designed from the outset with sites in Iran top of mind. A conflict with Iran is not the only scenario where the bombs would be relevant. North Korea and China, among others, have also invested heavily in underground and other hardened facilities.

The huge bunker busters are otherwise the definition of high-value, low-density munitions. At present, they can only be employed operationally by B-2 bombers. Each B-2 can also only carry two of the bombs at once. MOP is expected to be an important part of the arsenal of the future B-21 Raider, which is smaller than the B-2 and is expected to be able to carry a single one of these bunker busters.

The details in the MOP J&A document also underscore broader issues surrounding IP rights and ‘vendor lock’ in the U.S. defense contracting space that have increasingly been coming to the forefront in recent years. Competition inherently creates opportunities to lower costs and diversify supply chains. A broader supplier base also offers benefits when it comes to scaling up production of key subcomponents and complete systems.

The continued extent of Lockheed Martin’s control over the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program is perhaps the most widely known example of the negative impacts of vendor lock. U.S. officials have been outspoken about the maintenance and sustenance challenges this has created, especially when it comes to the timely sourcing of spare parts, and the operational risks this creates. TWZ previously explored the particular issues surrounding the F-35 in an in-depth feature.

Foreign F-35 operators, especially in Europe, are now also facing regular questions about what could happen to the jets if the U.S. were to cut off access to various sustainment pipelines in light of new diplomatic strains with Washington. Just this past weekend, Dutch State Secretary for Defense Gijs Tuinman caused a stir when he asserted it would be possible to “jailbreak an F-35 just like an iPhone” if necessary, as you can read more about here.

In recent years, successive U.S. administrations have made securing greater IP rights and ensuring opportunities for competition key elements in negotiating new defense contractors. As an example, the Air Force previously made clear that avoiding the F-35 program’s vendor lock was a top priority for the acquisition of the F-47 sixth-generation stealth fighter. President Donald Trump’s administration is now pursuing a host of new contracting reforms, in part to further break up the locks that private companies have on programs like the Joint Strike Fighter.

“We will enable third-party integration without prime contractor bottlenecks. Success will be measured by the ability of qualified vendors to independently develop, test and integrate replaceable — excuse me, replacement modules at the component level throughout the system life cycle,” War Secretary Pete Hegseth said in a speech last November. “There’s no more complacency and no more monopolies.”

At that time, Hegseth had also acknowledged Byzantine processes and other contracting hurdles that the U.S. military had created for itself over the years.

How “the sole-source environment” surrounding the GBU-57/B continues to evolve now remains to be seen. A successor to that bomb, called the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), is also now in development, and Boeing is involved in that effort, too. The Pentagon’s experiences with MOP, together with the new contracting reform push, are likely to inform how the replacement weapons are acquired.

In the meantime, U.S. authorities continue to try to free elements of the MOP program from vendor lock, including now by repurposing technology originally designed for the ATACMS short-range ballistic missile.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com