ballistic

A second example of Russia’s Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has been fired against Ukraine. Moscow claimed the overnight strike was in retaliation for a supposed attempted Ukrainian drone attack on President Vladimir Putin’s residence late last month — an allegation Kyiv and Washington have said is false. Ukrainian authorities described Moscow’s justification for the latest Oreshnik strike, part of a massive overnight missile and drone barrage, as “absurd.”

The Oreshnik (Russian for hazel tree) missile first emerged in public after it was used in what was then an unprecedented attack on Ukraine in November of 2024. The Pentagon states that the Oreshnik is based on the RS-26, a mysterious strategic weapon system, the development of which was supposedly halted in 2018. There was also an unverified report of a failed Oreshnik launch directed at Ukraine in February 2025, but this was subsequently refuted by Ukrainian authorities.

Late last month, the Oreshnik was in the news again, after Belarus announced the deployment of the missile on its territory, which you can read more about here. On this latest occasion, however, it appears that the IRBM was launched from the Kapustin Yar test range in Russia.

Ukraine confirmed the overnight Oreshnik strike, saying it took place in the west of the country, close to the Polish border. Videos posted to social media confirm that the Oreshnik’s target was in the Lviv region; the footage included the telltale signs of glowing reentry vehicles plunging toward the ground.

Unverified social media reports suggested the target may have been a large underground gas storage facility, something that at least one Ukrainian official denied, saying the missile struck a residential area. However, the local governor of the Lviv region confirmed that Russian strikes had damaged a critical infrastructure facility there.

Ukraine’s foreign minister said the use of an Oreshnik missile so close to the EU and NATO border posed a “grave threat” to European security and called on partners to increase pressure on Moscow.

Initial reports suggest that the Oreshnik used in last night’s strike may have carried inert warheads, as was apparently the case with the example fired in November 2024. On that occasion, Ukrainian authorities said that the missile carried six warheads, each containing six more sub-payloads, but that these contained no explosives.

It’s possible the missile was used in an attempt to penetrate the underground storage facility and damage it without the use of a large explosive warhead, instead having the reentry vehicles burrow deep into the ground upon impact at very high-speed.

While the Oreshnik is nuclear-capable, the potential value of a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which some countries may be looking at fielding if they haven’t already, is something that we discussed in detail in this previous story.

Dmitry Stefanovich, a research fellow at the Russian Center for International Security, IMEMO RAS, noted that the latest Oreshnik strike differed from the first in that it was combined with a large number of other ground- and sea-launched long-range weapons, and said that it was still unclear whether the United States was notified of the attack in advance, via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), as was the case when it was first employed.

Other nuclear analysts suggest that the United States did receive prior notification. We have approached U.S. authorities for clarification on that point.

As for the claim that the IRBM strike was in retaliation for an attempted drone strike against Putin himself, Stefanovich was less convinced:

“In general, the question remains that if Russia is engaged in the demilitarization of Ukraine and has been conducting a special military operation for many years, why link massive strikes to ‘terrorist attacks’? Of course, it takes time to accumulate weapons and find targets, but such rhetoric does not look very solid.”

Putin has repeatedly invoked the Oreshnik in recent months as a threat against Ukraine and the West, especially since its range — estimated at up to 3,400 miles — is enough to reach every NATO capital city in Europe from within Russian territory.

Putin has made some extravagant claims about the Oreshnik in the past, pointing to its supposed invulnerability to interception.

The Russian leader has described the Oreshnik as “a ballistic missile equipped with non-nuclear hypersonic technology” capable of reaching a peak speed of Mach 10. “The kinetic impact is powerful, like a meteorite falling,” the Russian president has also said.

As we have discussed in the past, Russian claims of hypersonic performance for the Oreshnik are factual, but also a bit misleading in a modern context. There is no evidence of true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, for example, but larger ballistic missiles, even ones with traditional designs, do reach hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal stage of their flight.

As for the claimed attempted Ukrainian attack on Putin’s residence, while this is now being used to frame the latest use of the Oreshnik, Ukraine and U.S. national security officials have denied that attempted attack. Furthermore, a CIA assessment also found no evidence of it having happened.

More significant is likely the fact that the latest Oreshnik strike came just days after Ukraine’s European allies agreed on key elements of postwar security guarantees, which would come into play in the event of a ceasefire with Russia. The agreement included a declaration that some of these allies would be ready to deploy troops to Ukraine after a peace deal.

This very significant new commitment regarding troops has been under discussion for months. The Kremlin has repeatedly said it will categorically oppose any NATO soldiers being based on Ukrainian soil.

Overall, the use of a single Oreshnik against Ukraine overnight appears to be more of a symbolic sideshow, engineered to create alarm in the West (as well as in Ukraine), rather than deliver a specific effect on a high-priority target.

After all, the IRBM was just one part of a much larger barrage launched against targets across the country last night. This is said to have involved 242 drones, 13 other ballistic missiles, and 22 cruise missiles, based on Ukrainian Air Force figures.

Russian forces carried out particularly heavy strikes on Kyiv, hitting several districts of the Ukrainian capital.

According to Ukrainian authorities, at least four people were killed in the region, and another 19 were injured. Meanwhile, at least five rescue workers were injured while responding to the attacks, Ukraine’s security service said.

The Kyiv mayor, Vitali Klitschko, said half of the capital’s apartment blocks were left without heating after the Russian strikes.

Qatar’s Embassy in Kyiv was damaged during an overnight Russian missile-drone strike.

Russian strikes left around half a million households without power amid emergency outages. pic.twitter.com/XAJfzn94uP

— Clash Report (@clashreport) January 9, 2026

Overall, the use of a single Oreshnik IRBM without warheads and the possibility that nothing of military value was hit, suggests that the missile was primarily used as an instrument of intimidation. It’s also unclear how many of these expensive IRBMs have actually been manufactured at this point, and whether Russia would even be able to fire multiple examples in any kind of sustained campaign. According to an assessment from the U.K. Ministry of Defense, Russia currently has only a handful of Oreshniks.

That said, the Kremlin clearly has reasons enough to lash out at Ukraine and its allies at this point, and has opted for this type of missile-based signaling. At this stage, it remains very much questionable whether it will have the desired coercive effect.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

Belarus has announced the deployment on its territory of Russia’s still-shadowy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile. The development comes soon after the appearance of satellite imagery that suggests that Moscow is likely stationing the nuclear-capable missiles in Belarus. However, there remain questions about the status of the Oreshnik, as well as its overall capabilities.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense today released a video that it says shows the deployment of the Oreshnik system on its territory. The footage shows a flag-raising ceremony involving Russian troops in Belarus as well as a column of vehicles moving out into a firing position in the field, where they are then covered in camouflage netting.

It’s notable that the vehicles shown appear to all be associated with support roles, rather than being transporter-erector launchers (TEL) for the missile itself. It could be the case that the TELs (and missiles) have yet to arrive in Belarus, or that they were deliberately omitted from the footage. It may also be that the missiles themselves are based elsewhere.

A senior officer is seen telling troops that the systems have officially been placed on combat duty and talks about the missile crews’ regular training and reconnaissance drills.

The location of the missile systems and the date of the video were not disclosed.

The release of the video follows Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s announcement earlier this month that the Oreshnik would be deployed in his country, part of his extensive military support for his staunch ally, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Only last week, evidence emerged pointing to the likely stationing of the Oreshnik at a former airbase near Krichev (also known as Krichev-6) in eastern Belarus, around 190 miles east of the capital of Minsk, and 300 miles southwest of Moscow.

After assessing available satellite imagery, researchers Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, in California, and Decker Eveleth of the CNA research and analysis organization in Virginia, said they were “90 percent certain” that mobile Oreshnik launchers would be stationed there, if they weren’t already.

Lewis and Eveleth highlighted a hurried construction project that began at the site between August 4-12, which was consistent with a Russian strategic missile base. By November of this year, key evidence included a “military-grade rail transfer point” surrounded by a security fence, from where TELs and other components could be unloaded. There were also signs of a concrete pad being constructed at the end of the former runway, “consistent with a camouflaged launch point.”

According to Lewis and Eveleth, the site near Krichev is large enough to accommodate three launchers. Previously, Lukashenko said up to 10 Oreshniks would be based in Belarus, suggesting that more might yet be fielded at other locations.

The researchers’ assessment “broadly aligns with U.S. intelligence findings,” Reuters reported, citing a person familiar with the matter who spoke to the news agency on the condition of anonymity.

After a December 2024 meeting with Lukashenko, Putin had made clear his plan to station Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, but the exact location had not previously been reported. The Russian leader had said the deployment would occur in the second half of 2025.

As for the Oreshnik (Russian for hazel tree) system itself, U.S. officials have said this is an intermediate-range design derived from the RS-26 Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The new missile first emerged in public after it was used in an unprecedented attack on Ukraine in November 2024. Ukrainian authorities said that the missile that was fired at them carried six warheads, each containing six more sub-payloads, but that these contained no explosives.

Ok, two reasons why I think Russia probably used a variant of the long-gestating RS-26 Rubezh IRBM: (1) Russia hinted that it resumed development of the RS-26 this summer and (2) that’s what the Ukrainians predicated a day ago, down to the launch site. https://t.co/eUIPx7eqVt

— Dr. Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk) November 21, 2024

Otherwise, details about the Oreshnik remain limited. After its use against Ukraine, Putin described it as a “medium-range missile system” and “a ballistic missile equipped with non-nuclear hypersonic technology” capable of reaching a peak speed of Mach 10. “The kinetic impact is powerful, like a meteorite falling,” the Russian president also said.

Overall, Russian claims of hypersonic performance for the Oreshnik are questionable. There is no evidence of true hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, for example, but larger ballistic missiles, even ones with traditional designs, do reach hypersonic speeds, typically defined as anything above Mach 5, in the terminal stage of their flight.

The Ukrainian Air Force confirmed that Russia struck the Ukrainian city of Dnipro with a conventionally armed ICBM this morning, marking the first combat use of an ICBM in history.

Footage from Dnipro showed glowing reentry vehicles hitting the ground around 5 AM local time. pic.twitter.com/PWTGajH9bT

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) November 21, 2024

Western estimates suggest the missile has a range of up to 3,400 miles.

While positioning the Oreshnik marginally farther west does extend its reach further into Europe, the difference is less significant, bearing in mind its already considerable maximum range is enough to hit every NATO capital city in Europe from within Russian territory. With that in mind, stationing these missiles in Belarus does little to practically enhance Moscow’s ability to deliver these kinds of weapons across Europe.

In fact, the missile’s likely minimum range, forward deploying the Oreshnik to Belarus might actually limit the ability to employ it against certain targets, such as those in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine’s capital Kyiv lies less than 60 miles from the border with Belarus.

Another option might be to use a very high lofted trajectory that would allow the missile to hit targets at shorter ranges, but there would still be a limit to what could be achieved in this way. At the same time, we don’t know for sure what kinds of trajectories the Oreshnik can actually be fired on.

Regardless, the deployment does carry important political and strategic signals. It means that Belarusian and Russian affairs are even more deeply intertwined, with the former firmly and openly under the protection of the latter’s nuclear deterrent umbrella. Russia had already begun deploying nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory in cooperation with that country’s armed forces in 2023.

Russia really wants West to see they’re doing a tac nuke exercise. After several exercise videos they put the head of the 12 GUMO in front of a Belarusian Su-25 (possibly at Lida air base) loaded with what is said to be “training nuclear ammunition.” https://t.co/h9rHp2qvGv pic.twitter.com/sTzAqSNd9f

— Hans Kristensen (also on Bluesky) (@nukestrat) June 13, 2024

Placing these missiles (and air-dropped nuclear bombs) in Belarus is indicative of the Kremlin’s new nuclear strategy, which includes basing these kinds of weapons outside its territory for the first time since the Cold War.

The apparent deployment also comes only weeks before the expiration of the 2010 New START pact, the last U.S.-Russia treaty that puts limits on the deployments of strategic nuclear weapons by these two powers.

For NATO, it’s very much arguable whether Russia’s placing of the Oreshnik in neighboring Belarus, rather than on Russian territory, will really be seen as a more direct threat.

“The military implications of this missile being in Belarus are not all that different from the missile being in Russia — the technical support site is already very close to the Russian border,” Eveleth wrote on X last week.

For Belarus, the situation is different. For a country in the international wilderness, the deployment does underscore Russia’s guarantee of providing Belarus with (nuclear) protection.

Russia’s revised nuclear stance also relies increasingly on these kinds of weapons to deter NATO members from supplying Kyiv with weapons that can strike deep inside Russia, although it’s questionable whether placing the Oreshnik in Belarus will have a significant, if any, effect in this regard.

More generally, the deployment of the Oreshnik has to be seen as part of Moscow’s response to U.S. plans to send its own intermediate-range strike capabilities to Germany, and potentially elsewhere in Europe, in the coming years. This includes planned “episodic deployments” of the U.S. Army’s Typhon ground-based missile system, which can fire Tomahawk cruise missiles and multi-purpose SM-6 missiles, as well as that service’s still-in-development Dark Eagle hypersonic missile. The U.S. Navy has also demonstrated its ability to deploy containerized launchers related to Typhon, which can be employed in a ground-based mode and also fire Tomahawks and SM-6s, to sites in Europe.

While these U.S. long-range strike systems are all conventionally armed, it’s worth recalling that the Oreshnik, too, can be utilized in a non-nuclear version, as demonstrated in Ukraine. The missile, therefore, presents a longer-range strategic-level threat that can be employed without crossing the nuclear threshold.

The potential value of a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which some countries may be looking at fielding if they haven’t already, is something that we discussed in detail in this previous story.

Provided that the Oreshnik is indeed now deployed on Belarusian territory, we still don’t know how many missiles might be involved, or what kinds of warheads they might carry. While we may learn more in due course, for now, the missile’s greatest significance is in the political domain.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com