analysis

Off-year local elections will get national attention on cable news

Politics in the year after a presidential election are typically focused on local and statewide contests.

But the races decided on Tuesday — which include a pivotal mayoral contest in New York and California’s referendum on congressional redistricting — will have national implications. The gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey will be a report card on President Trump’s second term.

As a result, cable news will be paying special attention. The races will also serve as an important test run for a couple of cable news networks in transition.

“This is the first election of the 2026 midterms, and we know what happens 30 seconds after the mid-terms are over — 2028 starts in earnest,” said Chris Stirewalt, political editor for Nexstar Media Group’s NewsNation. “In New Jersey and Virginia, you have two states that look a lot like the country as a whole. President Trump’s approval ratings in those places is about the same as it is nationally.”

MSNBC will be covering its first election night without the resources of NBC News. The progressive-leaning network — which changes its name to MS NOW on Nov. 15 — is being spun off by parent company Comcast into a new entity called Versant.

NBC News no longer shares correspondents or analysts with MSNBC. The channel’s line-up of opinion hosts including Rachel Maddow, Joe Scarborough, Nicolle Wallace, Ari Melber and Lawrence O’Donnell remains intact.

Loyal MSNBC viewers will notice that election data maven Steve Kornacki will not be crunching numbers on his big board. Kornacki signed a new deal last year with NBC, where he works for the news and sports divisions.

Kornacki will be a part of the network’s coverage on NBC News Now, its free streaming channel. “NBC Nightly News” anchor Tom Llamas is leading the coverage with Hallie Jackson, the network’s senior Washington correspondent; and “Meet the Press” moderator Kristen Welker.

MSNBC host Ali Velshi will take on the voter analysis duties previously held down by Kornacki. The network said it will have 15 correspondents reporting throughout the country, including West Coast-based Jacob Soboroff delivering analysis on TikTok.

MSNBC national correspondent Jacob Soboroff.

MSNBC national correspondent Jacob Soboroff.

(MSNBC/Paul Morigi/MSNBC)

CNN will use the night to test the appeal of its new direct-to-consumer streaming service launched last week.

While CNN will have its usual array of anchors and experts led by anchor Jake Tapper, Anderson Cooper and Erin Burnett, the network will also offer an alternative streaming feed featuring its analyst Harry Enten alongside conservative commentator Ben Shapiro and “The Breakfast Club” radio host Charlamagne tha God.

“CNN Election Livecast” will be only be available from 5:30 to 7:30 p.m. Pacific to subscribers of CNN All Access. The program will be a discussion of the results presented as “a more casual option” for viewers, according to a representative for the network.

The feed will mark the first time CNN, owned by Warner Bros. Discover, has produced full-scale live coverage exclusively for a streaming audience.

Martha MacCallum and Bret Baier of Fox News

Martha MacCallum and Bret Baier of Fox News

(Fox News)

Fox News will rely on anchors Bret Baier and Martha MacCallum for a special telecast at 10 p.m. Eastern and 7 p.m. Pacific, pre-empting its comedic talk show “Gutfeld!”

The 2025 election night will also mark a change in calling the results. All of the major broadcast networks and cable channels will be using data analysis from the Associated Press, which teamed with Fox News and NORC at the University of Chicago several years ago to create an alternative to the research company used by CBS, NBC, ABC and CNN.

Starting Tuesday, all five networks will get voting results at the same time.

Leland Vittert, Elizabeth Vargas and Chris Cuomo will anchor election night coverage for NewsNation.

Leland Vittert, Elizabeth Vargas and Chris Cuomo will anchor election night coverage for NewsNation.

(NewsNation)

The exception is Nexstar Media Group’s NewsNation, which will use Decision Desk HQ to call its races during its coverage co-anchored by Stirewalt, Chris Cuomo, Leland Vittert and Elizabeth Vargas. The service was the first to call the results of the 2024 presidential election, beating the competition by 15 minutes.

The ability to call the races sooner means more time for analysis, which is expected to lean heavily into what the results say about the 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential campaign.

Stirewalt said the night has the potential to set up the political plot lines of the next two years. He believes the passage of Proposition 50 in California and a victory for New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani would elevate Gov. Gavin Newsom and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez as 2028 presidential contenders.

“That’s would be a big feather in the cap for AOC, who can say that she’s leading a movement,” Stirewalt said. “Gavin Newsom gets to ring the bell. He gets to say ‘I won. I did something that was controversial. I took it to Donald Trump. I’m delivering a win.’”

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Analysis: Trade deal or truce? Questions as Trump meets with China’s Xi

President Trump faces the most important international meeting of his second term so far on Thursday: face-to-face negotiations with Xi Jinping, who has made China a formidable economic and military challenger to the United States.

The two presidents face a vast agenda during their meeting in Seoul, beginning with the two countries’ escalating trade war over tariffs and high-tech exports. The list also includes U.S. demands for a Chinese crackdown on fentanyl, China’s aid to Russia in its war with Ukraine, the future of Taiwan and China’s growing nuclear arsenal.

Trump has already promised, characteristically, that the meeting will be a major success.

“It’s going to be fantastic for both countries, and it’s going to be fantastic for the entire world,” he said last week.

But it isn’t yet clear that the summit’s concrete results will measure up to that high standard.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Sunday that the two sides have agreed to a “framework” under which China would delay implementing tight controls on rare earth elements, minerals crucial for the production of high-tech products from smartphones and electric vehicles to military aircraft and missiles. He said China has also agreed to resume buying soybeans from U.S. farmers and to crack down on fentanyl components.

In return, Bessent said, the United States will back down from its stinging tariffs on Chinese goods.

Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador in Beijing under then-President Biden, said that kind of deal would amount to “an uneasy trade truce rather than a comprehensive trade deal.”

“That may be the best we can expect,” he said in an interview Monday. Still, he added, “it will be a positive step to stabilize world markets and allow the continuation of U.S.-China trade for the time being.”

But U.S. and Chinese officials have been close-mouthed on what, if anything, has been agreed on regarding Xi’s other big trade demand: easier U.S. restrictions on high-tech exports to China, especially advanced semiconductor chips used for artificial intelligence.

Burns said the two superpowers’ technology competition is “the most sensitive … in terms of where this relationship will head, which country will emerge more powerful.”

Giving China easy access to advanced semiconductors “would only help [the Chinese army] in its competition with the U.S. military for power in the Indo-Pacific,” he warned.

Other former officials and China hawks outside the administration have said, even more pointedly, that they worry that Trump may be too willing to trade long-term technology assets for short-term trade deals.

In August, Trump eased export controls to allow Nvidia, the world leader in AI chips, to sell more semiconductors to China — in an unusual deal under which the U.S. company would pay 15% of its revenue from the sales to the U.S. Treasury.

Matthew Pottinger, Trump’s top China advisor in his first term, protested in a recent podcast interview that the deal risked trading a strategic technology advantage “for $20 billion and Nvidia’s bottom line.”

Underlying the controversy over technology, some China watchers warn, is a basic mismatch between the two presidents: Trump is focused almost entirely on trade and commercial deals, while Xi is focused on displacing the United States as the biggest economic and military power in Asia.

“I don’t think the administration has a strategy toward China,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “It has a trade strategy, not a China strategy.”

“The administration does not seem to be focused on competition with China,” said Jonathan Czin, a former CIA analyst now at Washington’s Brookings Institution. “It’s focused on deal making. … It’s tactics without strategy.”

“We’ve fallen into a kind of trade and technology myopia,” he added. “We’re not talking about issues like China’s coercion [of smaller countries] in the South China Sea. … China doesn’t want to have that bigger, broader conversation.”

It isn’t clear that Trump and Xi will have either the time or inclination to talk in detail about anything other than trade.

And even on the front-burner economic issues, this week’s ceasefire is unlikely to produce a permanent peace.

“As with all such agreements, the devil will be in the details,” Burns, the former ambassador, said. “The two countries will remain fierce trade rivals. Expect friction ahead and further trade duels well into 2026.”

“Buckle up,” Czin said. “There are likely more sudden moves from Beijing ahead.”

In the long run, Trump’s legacy in U.S.-China relations will rest not only on trade deals but on the larger competition for economic and military power in the Pacific Rim. No matter how this week’s meetings go, those challenges still lie ahead.

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Analysis: Why Pakistan and the Taliban won’t find it easy to patch up | Conflict News

The recent downward spiral in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations would have been hard to imagine when Pakistani military and civilian leaders welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021.

A Taliban government, Islamabad believed, would be friendly to Pakistan and would become a bulwark against any security threats to the country. After all, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services had for more than two decades supported the Afghan Taliban movement.

Between 2001 and 2021, this meant a contradictory foreign policy. On the one hand, by supporting the United States’ military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan recognised the US-backed governments that ruled the country. At the same time, Pakistan covertly tolerated – and even enabled – the resurgence of the Taliban inside Pakistani territory, which also included co-habitation with other Pakistani militant groups.

Yet, that relationship has now collapsed as Pakistani airforce struck targets in Kabul for the first time ever this week.

An apparent disconnect in their mutual expectations, and disrespect for each other’s capabilities, makes it harder for them to resurrect what they once had.

What is at stake for both countries?

The Pakistani security establishment, comprised of the army and the country’s powerful military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is responsible for devising and driving the nation’s Afghan policy.

Historically, the army has also exercised significant power over the civilian administrations, even when Pakistan has not been under military rule.

Pakistan has faced a surge of unprecedented attacks against its security forces since 2021, coinciding with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 deaths were recorded for the first three quarters of 2025, towering over last year’s figure of approximately 2,500 people killed in attacks across Pakistan.

Pakistan has blamed a majority of attacks on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called Pakistan Taliban, whose leaders are now based in Afghanistan. TTP members hail largely from the tribal areas of Pakistan, along the Afghan border.

Pakistan had hoped that TTP leaders would leave Afghanistan once the Pakistan-friendly Taliban government was established in Kabul. Some TTP fighters reportedly did return home, but this did not translate into a decline in violence. The TTP demands a localised implementation of Islamic law and the reinstatement of the former semi-autonomous status of tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, confronting a deadly and persistent uprising at home has become a national security crisis. Pakistan is, meanwhile, also reeling from several other intersecting crises: a stunted economy, geopolitical tensions with archrival India – marked by the recent conflict in May – as well as a growing domestic political discontent, and natural disasters.

Taliban leaders in Afghanistan insist that the TTP is a domestic challenge for Pakistan to address. In 2022, shortly after forming an interim administration, the Taliban government mediated talks between TTP leaders and the Pakistani army in Kabul. After initial indications of progress, underpinned by a temporary ceasefire, the talks collapsed.

For the Taliban government, which is heavily sanctioned and isolated from international financial institutions, the realities of ruling a vastly underdeveloped and economically poor country are stark. Over four years since taking power, Russia is the only country that has formally recognised the Taliban administration, though a growing number of countries – China, India and Iran among them – have, in effect, acknowledged the group as Afghanistan’s rulers and are hosting their diplomatic representatives.

Afghans are suffering from the near-collapse of the economy, and public sector institutions – such as health and education services – are on the brink of a complete breakdown. Faced with severe food insecurity and humanitarian challenges, common Afghans suffer as United Nations-led aid agencies face funding cuts. A prolonged conflict with Pakistan is likely to further deepen these challenges.

Can both sides return to their past friendship?

Both sides appear, at the moment, to be digging their heels in. Though they have agreed to temporary ceasefires, neither side wants to look weak by admitting it needs to back down.

Official Pakistani government statements now refer to the Taliban government – whose return to power in Kabul was once celebrated – as a “regime”, calling for a more “inclusive” administration in Afghanistan. They warn of continuing attacks within Afghan territories if the Taliban fail to act against the TTP.

To be sure, Pakistan possesses a substantially more powerful military, technologically advanced weaponry, and considerable geopolitical leverage against the Taliban government. There is also a renewed sense of self-confidence as Pakistan considers it successfully fought the recent war with India in May 2025, including by downing multiple Indian jets.

Since the 1980s, it has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, a generation of whom were educated and have built livelihoods in Pakistani cities. This, according to Pakistani leaders and some public opinion, should mean that Afghans must bear goodwill towards Pakistan. Forcing out Afghan refugees will be a key leverage Pakistan would want to use against the Taliban government.

Fundamentally, Pakistani leaders view their country as a serious and powerful entity with strong global alliances – one that any Afghan government, especially one led by a group supported by Pakistan, should respect and cooperate with.

The Taliban, on the other hand, view themselves as victorious, battle-hardened fighters who waged a long and successful war against foreign occupation by a global superpower. Hence, a potential conflict imposed by a neighbour would be a lesser mission.

Taliban spokesmen are pushing back against Pakistani officials’ recent narrative, underlining the significance of the ongoing information war on both sides. They have alleged, for instance, that Pakistan’s tribal border areas shelter ISIS/ISIL fighters with tacit backing from elements of the Pakistani army.

Nonetheless, as a landlocked country, Afghanistan is heavily dependent on trade routes via Pakistan, which remain shut due to ongoing tensions, resulting in major losses for traders on both sides. The Taliban government lacks air defence systems, radars or modern weaponry to counter any further incursions by Pakistani drones and jets.

The path to de-escalation

The Pakistani army continues to frame its fight against TTP as part of the wider confrontation with India. It has alleged, without evidence, that the armed group is backed by New Delhi. Pakistan also expects the Taliban to disown and distance themselves from the TTP and instead align themselves with Islamabad.

However, the TTP and Taliban share long-term camaraderie, ideological compatibility and social bonds that go beyond stringent organisational peculiarities. For the Taliban, a conflict with the TTP could also risk creating space for minacious actors such as the ISIL-Khorasan armed group.

And while Pakistan is stronger militarily, the Taliban have their own tools that could hurt Islamabad.

What if the Taliban’s Kandahar-based supreme leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, were to issue a fatwa for jihad against Pakistan’s security establishment? The TTP leadership had already pledged allegiance to Akhunzada in 2021. But the Taliban’s top leader is also held in high religious regard by a large segment of Pakistani religious school students and religious leaders, and a call against Islamabad from Akhunzada could lead to serious internal security challenges for Pakistan.

Islamist political groups in Pakistan would also not support an all-out war with the Taliban. Meanwhile, any sustained Pakistani attacks against Afghanistan will likely bolster domestic support for the incumbent Taliban administration, even when there is palpable resentment among Afghans against the Taliban.

To prevent further escalation and seek meaningful political dialogue, there is an urgent need for a trusted mediation actor capable of sustainable engagement. This role is best suited for Middle Eastern and Muslim nations trusted by both sides, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

There is evidence that this is a fruitful pathway. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi confirmed in a news conference in New Delhi last week that the Taliban ceased retaliatory attacks against Pakistan after Qatar and Saudi Arabia mediated.

But first, there needs to be a real desire for peace from the leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Even as Afghan and Pakistani officials hurl warnings at each other, and their forces engage in repeated bouts of cross-border fire, both countries are acutely aware that war will cost them heavily.

However, this does not mean that relations will return to the erstwhile bilateral warmth anytime soon or that miscalculations cannot happen.

Geography and history bind Afghans and Pakistanis into interdependence, which needs to be capitalised upon.

Governments need to stop hoping in vain for the success of failed approaches that have been tried for decades. Afghan leaders must work at developing amicability with Pakistan. Pakistani leaders need to reciprocate by conceiving a wholesome foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is not coloured by rivalry with India.

The world does not need yet another war in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It can never bear better dividends than peace.

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News Analysis: For Trump, celebration and a victory lap in the Middle East

Summoned last minute by the president of the United States, the world’s most powerful leaders dropped their schedules to fly to Egypt on Monday, where they idled on a stage awaiting Donald Trump’s grand entrance.

They were there to celebrate a significant U.S. diplomatic achievement that has ended hostilities in Gaza after two brutal years of war. But really, they were there for Trump, who took a victory lap for brokering what he called the “greatest deal of them all.

“Together we’ve achieved what everyone said was impossible, but at long last, we have peace in the Middle East,” Trump told gathered presidents, sheikhs, prime ministers and emirs, arriving in Egypt after addressing the Knesset in Israel. “Nobody thought it could ever get there, and now we’re there.”

“Now, the rebuilding begins — the rebuilding is maybe going to be the easiest part,” Trump said. “I think we’ve done a lot of the hardest part, because the rest comes together. We all know how to rebuild, and we know how to build better than anybody in the world.”

The achievement of a ceasefire in Gaza has earned Trump praise from across the political aisle and from U.S. friends and foes around the world, securing an elusive peace that officials hope will endure long enough to provide space for a wider settlement of Mideast tensions.

Trump’s negotiation of the Abraham Accords in his first term, which saw his administration secure diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, were a nonpartisan success embraced by the succeeding Biden administration. But it was the Oct. 7 attack on Israel, and the overwhelming response from Israel that followed, that interrupted efforts by President Biden and his team to build on their success.

The Trump administration now hopes to get talks of expanding the Abraham Accords back on track, eyeing new deals between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, and most of all, Saudi Arabia, effectively ending Israel’s isolation from the Arab world.

Yet, while the current Gaza war appears to be over, the greater Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains.

Trump’s diplomatic success halted the deadliest and most destructive war between Israelis and Palestinians in history, making the achievement all the more notable. Yet the record of the conflict shows a pattern of cyclical violence that flares when similar ceasefires are followed by periods of global neglect.

The first phase of Trump’s peace plan saw Israeli defense forces withdraw from half of Gazan territory, followed by the release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas since Oct. 7 in exchange for nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody.

The next phase — Hamas’ disarmament and Gaza’s reconstruction — may not in fact be “the easiest part,” experts say.

“Phase two depends on Trump keeping everyone’s feet to the fire,” said Dennis Ross, a veteran diplomat on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict who served in the George H.W. Bush, Clinton and Obama administrations.

“Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction are tied together,” he added. “The Saudis and Emiratis won’t invest the big sums Trump talked about without it. Otherwise they know this will happen again.”

While the Israeli government voted to approve the conditions of the hostage release, neither side has agreed to later stages of Trump’s plan, which would see Hamas militants granted amnesty for disarming and vowing to remain outside of Palestinian governance going forward.

An apolitical, technocratic council would assume governing responsibilities for an interim period, with an international body, chaired by Trump, overseeing reconstruction of a territory that has seen 90% of its structures destroyed.

President Trump speaks during a summit of world leaders Monday in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt.

President Trump speaks during a summit of world leaders Monday in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt.

(Amr Nabil / Associated Press)

The document, in other words, is not just a concession of defeat by Hamas, but a full and complete surrender that few in the Middle East believe the group will ultimately accept. While Hamas could technically cease to exist, the Muslim Brotherhood — a sprawling political movement throughout the region from which Hamas was born — could end up reviving the group in another form.

In Israel, the success of the next stage — as well as a long-delayed internal investigation into the government failures that led to Oct. 7 — will likely dominate the next election, which could be called for any time next year.

Netanyahu’s domestic polling fluctuated dramatically over the course of the war, and both flanks of Israeli society, from the moderate left to the far right, are expected to exploit the country’s growing war fatigue under his leadership for their own political gain.

Netanyahu’s instinct has been to run to the right in every Israeli election this past decade. But catering to a voting bloc fueling Israel’s settler enterprise in the West Bank — long the more peaceful Palestinian territory, governed by an historically weak Palestinian Authority — runs the risk of spawning another crisis that could quickly upend Trump’s peace effort.

And crises in the West Bank have prompted the resumption of war in Gaza before.

“Israelis will fear Hamas would dominate a Palestinian state, and that is why disarmament of Hamas and reform of the PA are so important. Having Saudi leaders reach out to Israeli public would help,” Ross said.

“The creeping annexation in the West Bank must stop,” Ross added. “The expansion of settlements must stop, and the violence of extremist settlers must stop.”

In the immediate aftermath of Oct. 7, Netanyahu faced broad criticism for a yearslong strategy of disempowering the Palestinian Authority to Hamas’ benefit, preferring a conflict he knew Israel could win over a peace Israel could not control.

So the true fate of Trump’s peace plan may ultimately come down to the type of peace Netanyahu chooses to pursue in the heat of an election year.

“You are committed to this peace,” Netanyahu said Monday, standing alongside Trump in the Knesset. The Israeli prime minister added: “I am committed to this peace.”

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The Governor on the National Stage : An Analysis of George Deukmejian’s Standing in the National Political Arena and His Potential to Become a Major Player

Ronald Brownstein, a contributing editor of this magazine, is the West Coast correspondent and former White House correspondent for the National Journal. He is writing a book about the relationship between Hollywood and politics.

FOR SIX YEARS, Gov. George Deukmejian has successfully run a state bigger than most nations. But to the po litical elite of his own country, he couldn’t be much less visible than if he were the mayor of California’s insular state capital.

Interviews with more than two dozen Republican political consultants, Reagan Administration officials, California congressmen, and independent national policy analysts found that Deukmejian, for the governor of the nation’s largest state, has a remarkably low profile in national political circles–even as his name appears on lists of potential running mates for George Bush. The Iron Duke to his supporters, Deukmejian is virtually the Invisible Duke in national political terms. At best, with Massachusetts Gov. Michael S. Dukakis poised to accept the Democratic presidential nomination in Atlanta this month, Deukmejian has acquired an identity as the Other Duke.

“There are people I’ve run into in the higher reaches of the federal government who don’t even know who the governor of California is,” says Martin Anderson, former chief domestic policy and economic adviser to President Reagan and now a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “He is largely unknown in Republican circles,” agrees Republican political consultant John Buckley, press secretary for New York Rep. Jack F. Kemp’s presidential bid. “There is no perception of him,” says Roger J. Stone, another leading Republican political consultant.

Not all governors, of course, are national figures. But it has become increasingly common for the governors of major states to wield national clout. Many governors–from Republicans Thomas H. Kean of New Jersey and John H. Sununu of New Hampshire to Democrats Mario M. Cuomo of New York and Bill Clinton of Arkansas–are influential in shaping both the political agenda of their parties and the policy agenda of Congress, particularly on issues confronting the states.

By and large, Deukmejian hasn’t been among them. Deukmejian has not been a force on Capitol Hill. His relations with the California congressional delegation are cordial but distant, several members and aides say, and he has never testified before Congress. Nor has he been a significant participant in the Republican Party’s intramural ideological debates; he remained distant from the presidential primaries this year until the result was long decided. He rarely interacts with the national press corps or national conservative activists.

This parochialism is remarkable considering the lineage in which Deukmejian stands–one that traces back not only to such nationally prominent California governors as Ronald Reagan and Earl Warren, but also in a sense to New Yorkers Franklin D. Roosevelt and Thomas E. Dewey. In the first half of this century, when New York was the nation’s most populous and powerful state, its governors consistently shaped the national agenda. In the 12 presidential elections from 1904 to 1948, a New York governor headed the ticket for one or the other party nine times.

Since then, California has muscled its way to clear economic pre-eminence among the states, the economic boom fueling an explosion in population. Inexorably, if unevenly, political influence has followed. California now sends as many representatives to Congress as New York did at the height of its power; after the next congressional reapportionment (which will follow the 1990 Census), California will command a larger share of the Congress than any state in history. In the four decades before Deukmejian took office, every California governor save one made at least an exploratory run at the presidency. Earl Warren sought the Republican presidential nomination in 1948 and 1952. In 1960, Democrat Edmund G. (Pat) Brown seriously examined challenging John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and the rest of the Democratic field before deciding not to make the race.

Once California passed New York as the most populous state in 1964, it cemented its reputation as the launching pad for political trends, and its governors emerged as national figures almost as soon as they finished taking the oath of office. At the 1968 Republican convention, Ronald Reagan, just two years into his tenure as governor, offered himself for the presidency as the hero of the nascent anti-government conservative revolt. In 1976, Jerry Brown, also just two years into his term, declared the dawning of the “era of limits” and rocketed into the political stratosphere with a string of late primary victories over Jimmy Carter.

After Brown came Deukmejian, and as far as the spotlight of national attention was concerned, the heavy drapes fell around Sacramento. “I just sort of sensed the public at the time I came in was looking for a governor who would not be off running for some other office, and in fact, was going to be carrying a hands-on approach to state government,” Deukmejian says in a relaxed, wide-ranging interview in his small office in the state Capitol. “Also at the beginning we had some very severe financial difficulties (namely a $1.5-billion budget deficit he inherited from Brown). And when I won in my first election, it was by a very, very narrow margin, and I felt that I really had to concentrate on . . . what goes on in the state capital and building a much greater degree of support from the public before . . . taking some steps out toward more exposure on the national scene.”

Since then, though, Deukmejian has come a long way politically, which makes his low national profile remarkable for a second reason: None of his recent predecessors have been more popular or politically successful within the state than Deukmejian. His crushing reelection over Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley in their 1986 rematch was a more decisive victory than Pat Brown, Ronald Reagan or Jerry Brown ever managed. Two years into his second term–when most of his predecessors had been hobbled by nicks and bruises–Deukmejian’s job approval ratings from Californians remain buoyant; his latest numbers in the Field Institute’s California Poll exceed Reagan’s highest marks at any point during his two terms. “He’s been a far better governor than Reagan,” says conservative Rep. Robert K. Dornan (R-Garden Grove).

Sometimes governors get into trouble for paying too much attention to Washington and the bright lights of national politics. But Deukmejian has so secured his position in the state that no one would be likely to grumble if he examined the national terrain more purposefully. If anything, some Republicans are puzzled about Deukmejian’s passivity in pushing the cause of the party, the state and, not incidentally, himself. “Deukmejian is the first governor of the state that is the largest who is not a national factor,” Dornan says.

Politics, as much as nature, abhors a vacuum that immense, and events may be pulling Deukmejian, inch by inch, toward the national stage. Even though most Republican leaders have only vague impressions of Deukmejian, the popular governor cannot entirely escape notice. When the party gathers for its convention Aug. 15-18 in New Orleans, Deukmejian is bound to appear on the short list of Republicans positioned to compete not only for the vice presidency in 1988, but also for the party’s presidential nomination in the 1990s. And for all of his reticence, Deukmejian in recent months has become more willing to expose himself to audiences outside of the state. It is much too early, many national Republicans agree, to write off George Deukmejian as a force in the future of his party, well beyond the borders of California.

TODAY, however, Deukmejian stands on square one in national Republican circles. “People have no sense of him,” says political consultant Edward J. Rollins, who ran Reagan’s presidential reelection campaign and served as his chief political adviser in the White House from 1981 to 1985. “There is no question when he was first elected six years ago the potential was there for him to have a very big national profile, and I think a lot of people turned to him. There were a lot of comparisons between him and (New York Gov.) Cuomo, who was elected the same year. But he has sort of stayed where he’s at, and Cuomo has gone on to be a big national player.”

Cuomo has emerged partly because of his restless ambition, but also because he seems genuinely fascinated with public debate over the most fundamental social and moral issues. That’s a fascination Deukmejian, the diligent manager, doesn’t appear to share. He has always operated on the assumption that politicians who seek attention often find problems instead.

Whether for lack of interest or lack of time–as aides note, a governor of California has more to manage than a small-state governor such as Sununu or Clinton–Deukmejian simply hasn’t done the drill necessary to achieve national notice for himself and for issues affecting the state. Not much for mingling with the media at home, he has been aloof from the national media. His June appearance on ABC’s “This Week With David Brinkley” was his first on one of the national Sunday-morning interview shows, and his lack of experience in the fast-moving format showed. “It has been a mystery to those of us who are national conservatives why he will turn down appearances on the ‘Today Show,’ ‘Good Morning America,’ ‘CBS Morning News’ (and) ‘Nightline,’ ” Dornan says.

Deukmejian says he considers it “important, particularly on issues that affect California” to influence national-policy debates. “That’s why we have become very, very active in areas” such as national trade policy, he says. “Little by little, but in a very determined way, we’ve been trying to indicate our presence in that field of trade policy.” But almost all the outside observers interviewed had difficulty naming a front-burner national issue–trade or otherwise–on which Deukmejian has been a force.

“He has not become a national spokesman for quality education as an investment of the foundations of our economy; he hasn’t become a national spokesman on our relationship with Asia, which as a California governor he could do,” says Derek Shearer, a professor of public policy at Occidental College who has advised several Democratic presidential candidates.

Similarly, Deukmejian has had relatively little contact with the Republicans in the California congressional delegation. He has occasionally offered them opinions on pending legislation–he opposed, for example, protectionist amendments in the recent trade bill–but “there aren’t many such examples,” acknowledges his chief of staff, Michael Frost.

One California Republican representative, who asked not to be identified, complains that Deukmejian has virtually ignored Washington. “He has no dynamic presence, he hasn’t really pitched for anything, he hasn’t testified on stuff, he hasn’t looked for a role to play,” the representative says. “There are things the governor could do if he was looking to build a national base. Instead he comes back here quietly, has a quiet dinner and then quietly slips out of town. There has never been a closed-door, discuss-the-issues meeting with him and the delegation. He has come back a couple of times, but they have been very formal, overly organized, stilted lunches.”

Rep. David Dreier (R-La Verne), by contrast, defends Deukmejian, noting that “it bodes well” that the governor nominated a member of the congressional delegation, Rep. Daniel E. Lungren (R-Long Beach), to replace the late state treasurer, Jesse M. Unruh.

Nor has the Deukmejian Administration unveiled the dramatic initiatives that would bring Washington to him. Although Frost cites programs to combat AIDS and to commercialize research performed in state university labs, Deukmejian hasn’t turned many heads among Washington’s policy junkies–the analysts, authors and think-tank fellows who watch new ideas percolating in the state and bestow intellectual credibility on the creative politicians in the provinces. “In the 1980s, California has been in a state of governmental stagnation compared with previous decades,” says Jerry Hagstrom, author of “Beyond Reagan,” a recent book examining politics and policies in the 50 states.

To the extent Deukmejian has a national reputation, it is as a steadfast fiscal conservative, a skilled and dogged manager. “On the state level,” Deukmejian says, “I think people first of all expect us to run government in an efficient manner.” In his first term, Deukmejian withstood pressure to raise general taxes and used his line-item veto repeatedly to resist spending increases. From 1982 to 1986, the share of personal income claimed by state taxes in California declined slightly, whereas it increased in the states overall. That resistance to spending provides the one hook on which many national Republicans hang their vague images of Deukmejian. “The perception I find in many of my colleagues (outside of California) is that George Deukmejian exudes a kind of quiet competence,” Dreier says.

Deukmejian’s hesitant response to the recent state revenue shortfall–first proposing revenue-raising measures, then dropping them after Republicans rebelled–may stain that image, particularly if budget problems continue through the remainder of his term. But Deukmejian’s decision to back away from his tax proposal also enabled him to loudly reaffirm his opposition to new taxes. And that should serve him well over the long haul since anti-tax sentiments remain strong not only in the GOP but throughout the electorate. “I don’t think the average person feels as though they are overtaxed now,” Deukmejian says, “but they also aren’t asking for a tax increase.”

THIS SPRING’ Spersistent discussion about Deukmejian as a potential running-mate for George Bush has provided the governor with his first serious national attention. No matter how the rumor mill treats his prospects in the weeks leading up to the Republican convention, some Republican strategists believe the importance of California–which alone provides 17% of the electoral votes needed for victory–guarantees that Deukmejian “is absolutely permanently fixed in the top three vice-presidential choices,” as conservative political consultant David M. Carmen put it.

In the fall campaign, California may be not only the largest prize, but the pivotal one. Since World War II, the Republicans have owned this state in presidential politics, losing only twice. But they have almost always had the advantage of a native son on their ticket. In eight of the past 10 campaigns, the Republicans have nominated a Californian for President or vice president: Earl Warren was the GOP’s vice-presidential nominee in 1948; Richard M. Nixon was the party’s vice-presidential choice in 1952 and 1956, and its presidential nominee in 1960, 1968 and 1972; Reagan carried the GOP banner in 1980 and 1984. Only Warren, running with Dewey against Harry Truman, failed to bring home the state for his party.

No Democrat has carried this state in a presidential campaign since Lyndon Johnson. (Even without a Californian on the ticket, Ford edged Carter in 1976.) But Bush faces a surprisingly uphill battle. Independent polls show Dukakis leading Bush by double digits in California–a spread slightly larger than Dukakis’ margin in most national surveys. If Bush continues to trail so badly by the time the Republicans gather in New Orleans, he will undoubtedly face pressure for a dramatic vice-presidential selection. Those options are few: his chief rivals, Kansas Sen. Robert Dole or New York Rep. Jack F. Kemp perhaps, a woman such as Elizabeth Dole or Kansas Sen. Nancy Kassebaum to fight the gender gap, or Deukmejian to try to sew up California and block the Democrats from assembling an electoral college majority.

Deukmejian has said repeatedly he couldn’t take the vice-presidential nomination because, if the ticket won, he would have to turn over the statehouse to Democratic Lt. Gov. Leo T. McCarthy. Deukmejian has insisted about as firmly as he plausibly can that he does not want to take the job and hand over the reins to McCarthy. “I just can’t see any situation–I really can’t see any situation–where I would be able, even if I were asked . . . to accept it,” he says. “I honestly don’t expect to be asked. I really think he can carry California without . . . me on the ticket, and there will probably be either some other areas of the country Bush will want to shore up. I’ve said for a long time if they see there is a very major gender gap, he might very easily pick a woman.”

But Deukmejian’s certainty in June and July may be irrelevant in August. Even such a close adviser as former chief of staff Steven A. Merksamer agrees that, for all the governor’s firmness today, it is impossible to predict what Deukmejian would say if Bush actually offers him the position. If Bush’s advisers decide that he can win only by carrying California and only do that by picking Deukmejian, most national Republicans doubt that the governor would hesitate for long. In those circumstances, how could Deukmejian argue that maintaining control of the statehouse is more important than holding the White House? “It would be” difficult to make that case, Deukmejian acknowledges, “but I hope I don’t have to.”

Few analysts today expect it to come down to that. To some extent, Bush’s advisers have accepted the conventional wisdom that choosing Deukmejian would so roil local Republicans that his selection could hurt the campaign here. And if Deukmejian joined the ticket, his recent problems with an unexpected budget deficit would complicate Republican efforts to criticize Dukakis for the similar shortfall he faces in Massachusetts.

In all likelihood, though, neither of those arguments are compelling enough to disqualify Deukmejian. The Massachusetts revenue shortfall is unlikely to be a decisive issue in any case. And as Bush’s problems deepen, local opposition to Deukmejian as vice president diminishes. Instead, the key question is whether Deukmejian’s presence on the ticket really could ensure Bush victory in California. If Deukmejian can’t deliver California, there’s no reason to nominate him since he is unlikely to help much anywhere else.

Early polls differ on how much Deukmejian would help Bush. Pollster Mervin Field believes Californians are unlikely to vote for a ticket just because it has a local office-holder on it, though the state’s recent electoral history certainly suggests otherwise. On a more tangible level, Deukmejian may not have enough appeal for the crucial blue-collar suburban Democrats to put Bush over the top. “I think it is unlikely he will be chosen because I don’t think you would see any numbers where George Deukmejian would add that much to the ticket,” says one Bush adviser. Still, the talk of Deukmejian won’t die down soon because it may not take that much to turn the result in California–and the nation.

EVEN IF Deukmejian comes out of New Orleans with nothing on his plate but some gumbo and a return ticket to Sacramento, many local and national Republicans believe the governor could yet become a significant factor within the GOP, if he decides to work at it. As governor of a state this large, Deukmejian can always make himself heard. “It is inevitable,” predicts former Reagan aide Anderson, “that Deukmejian will become a major, if not the major, figure in the party in future years.”

If Bush doesn’t succeed this fall, and Deukmejian wins reelection in 1990, the objective factors for a Duke-in-’92 presidential bid are intriguing, some Republicans believe. Deukmejian’s name usually appears on the early lists of potential contenders, though admittedly more because of where than who he is. “He gets mentioned because The Great Mentioner turns to Republicans (and says) California is a big state and you have to mention Deukmejian,” says Washington-based Republican media consultant Mike Murphy.

In 1992, the Republican field mobilizing against a President Dukakis could be much like the Democratic field in 1988, with no clear front runner and no candidate with a deep national base of support. Texas-based Republican pollster V. Lance Tarrance, who advises Deukmejian, thinks that if Bush loses, some candidates (for example Sens. Phil Gramm of Texas and William L. Armstrong of Colorado) would run as issue-oriented ideological revolutionaries and another group would run as capable, tested administrators. As governor of this sprawling nation-state, Tarrance argues, Deukmejian brings to the table solid administrative credibility.

Deukmejian would bring another significant advantage to such a hypothetical nomination contest. As Dukakis demonstrated this year, in such a murky atmosphere, a candidate who can raise the large sums it takes to cut through the clutter is difficult to stop. With a huge and prosperous home state on which to draw, and a skilled team led by Karl M. Samuelian, Deukmejian’s fund-raising potential matches that of any Republican.

Before we pull this Deukmejian train out of the station, a few reality checks might be in order. Reality check No. 1: This is not a man who sets hearts aflutter. Deukmejian’s detractors–and even some of his friends–point out that as far as charisma goes, he makes “Dukakis look like the Beatles.” But if charisma was the key to national success, Dukakis and Bush would be looking for other work. Besides, Deukmejian’s campaign presence is usually underrated. It’s not hard to imagine Deukmejian performing at least at the level of this year’s nominees. Somewhat prosaic and uninspiring, Deukmejian is far from the best campaigner in the world, but he’s not the worst either–with an easygoing, unassuming amiability that wears well on voters. With the press he is personable and unaffected, and though he is sometimes defensive, Deukmejian can defuse tension with unexpected flashes of self-deprecating humor.

Second reality check: This is not a man who suffers from a visible need to make himself a household name. Deukmejian has always enjoyed governing more than campaigning, and many Republican strategists believe he lacks the fire to push himself through the demanding course that any effort to emerge nationally would require.”I just don’t know if the energy and the ideas and the intensity is there,” said an adviser to another Republican angling for the presidency in the 1990s.

While some of those around him would probably like the governor to seek the White House, Deukmejian clearly isn’t consumed with ambition to move up. Seeking the presidency someday now seems to him, “out of the question,” he says. “When I started in the Assembly and later in the Senate, I could say, yes, in my mind that if the opportunity presented itself I’d like to be governor. But I’ve never really had as a goal that I would want to seek the presidency.” He speaks with a combination of amazement and scorn of politicians “who seem to live and breathe and eat politics.”

On the other hand, Deukmejian only became governor by winning an arduous primary against Lt. Gov. Mike Curb, the choice of the California Republican establishment, and then hanging tough against Los Angeles’ popular Mayor Bradley. That is not the profile of a man impervious to ambition’s insistent tug. “He is modest in his demeanor,” says state Republican chairman Bob Naylor, “but there is ambition there.”

Midway through his second term, Deukmejian has shown flashes of interest in examining the world beyond Sacramento. The governor has not pursued opportunities as systematically as Kean and some others, and insists the recent increase in his out-of-state activity “has been primarily just to be of help to the national ticket.” Deukmejian denies any interest in raising his own profile for its own sake. “I’m not out looking for things to do,” he says, “but we do get requests, and I feel a little more comfortable in accepting some of those.” Whatever the motivation, his recent activity and upcoming schedule add up to a typically cautious effort to broaden his horizons.

In April, Deukmejian visited Texas to address a Republican party fund-raiser and drew high marks for a speech in which he gleefully bashed Dukakis. Deukmejian has scheduled four more out of state appearances at Republican fund-raisers through the campaign–including speeches in New York City and Florida. And in recent months he has become more active in governor’s activities. This winter, he assumed the chairmanship of a National Governors Assn. subcommittee on criminal justice–the first time he’s accepted such a responsibility. He’s currently vice chairman of the Western Governors Assn. and is scheduled to become chairman of the group next year. In the second term, he has also seasoned himself with international trade missions to Japan and Europe; later this month he’s scheduled to visit Australia, Hong Kong, the Philippines and Korea. He has formed a political action committee, Citizens for Common Sense, to build a statewide grass-roots political organization and fund his travel.

Deukmejian still isn’t looking for excuses to visit Washington. “I’m not anxious to make that trip back and forth anymore often than I have to,” he says. Earlier this year, he turned down an invitation to attend the Gridiron dinner, the annual closed-door gathering of the capital’s journalistic and political elite. But he did make a well-received address to the conservative Heritage Foundation last fall, and aides say his recent ABC appearance may signal a more open attitude toward the national press.

Third reality check: Even if he’s willing to hit the road, does Deukmejian have anything to say? Now that the Reagan era is ending, the GOP is groping for new direction. But unlike Reagan with his anti-government insurrection, or Kemp with his supply-side economic populism, or New Jersey’s Kean with his brotherly “politics of inclusion” aimed at broadening the party’s base, Deukmejian has offered no overarching vision of the Republican future. Asked to define the fundamental principles that have informed his administration, Deukmejian first listed “a common sense approach to running government.” Try constructing a banner around that. In Jesse Jackson’s terms, this is a jelly-maker not a tree-shaker.

The brightest ideological line running through Deukmejian’s politics is suspicion of government expansion. In that, he’s closer to Reagan than most of the emerging GOP leaders. In office, Deukmejian, like Reagan, has generally been more successful at saying no than yes. His first term, dominated by his unyielding resistance to Democratic spending, had a much sharper focus than his second term. That could be because the times are subtly changing. The polls have shifted, with more people demanding more services from government, and Deukmejian has been somewhat uncertain in his reaction– hesitancy demonstrated by his ultimately passive response to the revenue shortfall. (After he dropped his tax plan, the governor essentially told the Legislature to solve the problem.) He has pushed bond issues to pay for transportation and school construction needs, and increased education spending faster than his predecessors. But unmet needs are accumulating too; huge enrollment growth, for instance, is consuming the increases in school funding and driving the state back below the national average in per capita spending on elementary and secondary school education.

Those concerns about infrastructure and education, Deukmejian acknowledges, could threaten the state’s economic future. But so too, he maintained, would a tax hike that might make firms less likely to settle or expand here. “Our two main challenges are growth and the competition we’re faced with from other states for business investment,” he says. “So you have to try to strike a balance so you can meet the needs of the people in terms of growth, and at the same time be aware . . . that all the other states are out there competing very strongly for jobs, and foreign nations are out there competing.”

Democrats believe Deukmejian has struck too penurious a balance and hope the 1990 gubernatorial race will pivot on Deukmejian’s tough line against expanding government in a period of expanding needs. “They are too trapped in the present, worrying about this budget year, how much is it going to cost, and they are not thinking through in a systematic way how to plan for the future,” charges State Supt. of Public Instruction Bill Honig, who may challenge Deukmejian in 1990 as a Democrat.

Those accusations may ultimately cause Deukmejian problems, and the law of political gravity–which holds that everyone eventually comes down–virtually guarantees that his approval ratings will sag at least somewhat. Some Democrats believe Deukmejian has never really been tested because in his 1978 election as attorney general and his two gubernatorial races he bested liberal black Democrats–a tough sell statewide. His opposition in 1990 should be more formidable, with Honig, Atty. Gen. John van de Kamp, former San Francisco Mayor Diane Feinstein and Controller Gray Davis all considering the race.

But his position is solid, especially for a governor so long on the scene. After the June defeat of the Honig-backed proposition to loosen restrictions on state spending, the Democrats may have trouble constructing a campaign around the argument “that the government isn’t spending enough tax dollars,” says chief of staff Frost. With the economy roaring, public opposition to taxes undiminished, and his government free from scandals, even many Democrats and independent analysts believe Deukmejian must be favored for a third term. He says he will decide whether to run again “by the end of this year or early next year.”

If Deukmejian punches through that historic third-term barrier–something only Earl Warren has done–he may be in a much better position to emerge as a national Republican leader than it now appears, particularly if Bush falls this November. Though Deukmejian hasn’t produced the bold initiatives that attract the national press and political elite, his political identity rests on positions consonant with the mainstream Republican electorate: a tough stand against crime, taxes and government spending. “He fits the Republican party like a glove,” says Anderson.

And he has, in California’s blistering economic performance, a powerful calling card. Dukakis’s experience may be suggestive of Deukmejian’s possibilities. Unlike his California counterpart, Dukakis had the advantage of some innovative policies (welfare reform, and a tax amnesty program) to sell, and much more exposure to the national elite, which gave him early credibility. But ultimately Dukakis based his presidential campaign on a story of state economic success. Deukmejian has at least as compelling an economic success story.

Deukmejian’s tough stand against taxes and conservative approach to government regulation may or may not explain California’s success, but questions about Dukakis’ role haven’t hurt his efforts to identify with the Massachusetts miracle. (In both places, Reagan’s defense build-up deserves a significant share of the credit.) And if Massachusetts is a miracle, what’s the right word to describe California, which created 2.1 million new jobs–almost five times as many as Massachusetts, and nearly one of every six non-agricultural jobs in the nation–from 1983 through 1987? In the last five years, California has created almost half of the nation’s new manufacturing jobs, according to the state Department of Commerce. For Deukmejian, the path to prominence could be built on nothing more complicated than promising “to do for the nation what he did for California,” insists pollster Tarrance.

True, Deukmejian faces the risk that the state’s problems in education, infrastructure and growth will tarnish that claim. But if this stubborn governor can demonstrate the flexibility to confront those challenges without violating his conservative principles–the key open question looming before him–he can convincingly hold up California as the prototype of a state that’s racing pell-mell into the future. In a recent speech before a business group, Deukmejian offered what might become his slogan: “Each day our state gives the rest of the nation a glimpse of tomorrow–of the progress that is within our reach.”

Although he’s done little to cultivate them, California’s success has placed possibilities within Deukmejian’s reach, too: Now the question is, does the Duke have the right stuff to reach out and grab them?

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Super Micro Stock Analysis: Buy or Sell This AI Stock?

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News Analysis: With Gaza deal, praise and peril for Trump

At a moment when hope for peace seemed lost, senior U.S. officials, led by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in 2012 that would be touted for years as a historic diplomatic achievement. She would later campaign on her strategic prowess for the presidency against Donald Trump.

In 2014, a similar ceasefire was brokered between the two parties during yet another war by Clinton’s successor, John Kerry, also seen at the time as a diplomatic coup. But in the first 72 hours of that ceasefire, without clarity on the precise lines of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas operatives ambushed an Israeli Defense Forces patrol decommissioning a tunnel, throwing peace in doubt. The remains of the Israeli soldier caught in that raid have been held by Hamas ever since.

History shows that Trump’s achievement this week, brokering a new truce between Israel and Hamas after their most devastating war yet, is filled with opportunity and peril for the president.

A lasting ceasefire could cement him a legacy as a peacemaker, long sought by Trump, who has harnessed President Nixon’s madman theory of diplomacy to coerce several other warring parties into ceasefires and settlements. But the record of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shows that consistent interest and engagement by the president may be necessary to ensure any peace can hold.

Hamas and Israel agreed on Wednesday to implement the first phase of Trump’s proposed 20-point peace plan, exchanging all remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas since its Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel in exchange for 1,700 detainees from Gaza, as well as 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences in Israel.

Only the first phase has been agreed to thus far.

Guns are expected to fall silent Friday, followed by a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces that would initially leave roughly half of the Gaza Strip — along its periphery bordering Israel — within Israeli military control. A 72-hour clock would then begin after the partial withdrawal is complete, counting down to the hostage release.

Achieving this alone is a significant victory for Trump, who leveraged deep ties with Arab partners built over his first administration and political clout among the Israeli right and with its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to bring the deal to a close.

The president’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, had been working toward a ceasefire for months, starting back during the presidential transition period nearly one year ago. He found little success on his own.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio writes a note before handing it to President Trump during a White House meeting.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio writes a note before handing it to President Trump during a White House meeting Wednesday.

(Evan Vucci / Associated Press)

It was Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law who designed the Abraham Accords in Trump’s first term and maintains close ties with Netanyahu and Arab governments, took an unofficial yet active role in a recent diplomatic push that helped secure an agreement, according to a U.S. official familiar with the matter.

“None of this would have happened without Jared,” the source said.

Speaking with reporters from the White House, Trump took a victory lap over the truce, claiming not only credit for a hostage and ceasefire deal but the historic achievement of a broader Middle East peace.

“We ended the war in Gaza and really, on a much bigger basis, created peace. And I think it’s going to be a lasting peace — hopefully an everlasting peace. Peace in the Middle East,” Trump said.

“We secured the release of all of the remaining hostages,” he added. “And they should be released on Monday or Tuesday — getting them is a complicated process. I’d rather not tell you what they have to do to get them. They’re in places you don’t want to be.”

An opening emerged for a diplomatic breakthrough after Israel conducted an extraordinary strike on a Hamas target in Doha, shaking the confidence of the Qatari government, a key U.S. ally. While Doha has hosted Hamas’ political leadership for years, Qatar’s leadership thought their relationship with Washington would protect them from Israeli violations of its territory.

Trump sought a deal with Qatar, a U.S. official said, that would assure them with security guarantees in exchange for delivering Hamas leadership on a hostage deal. Separately, Egypt — which has intelligence and sourcing capabilities in Gaza seen by the U.S. government as second only to Israel’s — agreed to apply similar pressure, the official said.

“There’s an argument here, that presumably the Qataris are making to Hamas — which is that they lost, this round anyway, and that it’s going to take them a very long time to rebuild. But the war must come to an end for the rebuilding to start,” said Elliott Abrams, a veteran diplomat from the Reagan, George W. Bush and first Trump administrations.

“On Friday, the Nobel Peace Prize will be announced, and he won’t get it,” Abrams said, adding that, if the deal falls through, “I think the Israelis are going to be saying to him, ‘This is a game. They didn’t really accept your plan.’”

“I don’t think, in the end, he’ll blame the Israelis for ruining the deal,” Abrams continued. “I think he’ll blame Hamas.”

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News Analysis: Why Trump may have found his moment on Gaza

A peace plan for Gaza touted by President Trump as a historic breakthrough is facing its first test this week after Israel and Hamas agreed in principle to an initial list of terms that could end the war.

The 20-point American plan reflects an administration losing patience with Israel, while also leveraging its relationships with Arab partners to finally pressure Hamas into a deal that would release the Israeli hostages still in its custody two years since the Oct. 7 attack.

On Wednesday evening, Trump said both parties had agreed to the first phase of his plan, securing the hostage release in exchange for a limited Israeli troop withdrawal.

“I am very proud to announce that Israel and Hamas have both signed off on the first Phase of our Peace Plan,” Trump wrote on social media. “This means that ALL of the Hostages will be released very soon, and Israel will withdraw their Troops to an agreed upon line as the first steps toward a Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace.”

The president’s push comes amid an unexpected and growing divide within the Republican base over support for Israel — once seen as a bedrock of the alliance — and as Trump presents himself as a global peacemaker, ahead of the announcement of this year’s Nobel Peace Prize on Friday.

The president is expected to travel to the region over the weekend to secure the deal.

“All Parties will be treated fairly!” Trump wrote. “BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS!”

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Who controls Hamas?

Students hold banners reading "700 Days of Genocide" and other messages.

People attend a pro-Palestinian vigil and protest on Tuesday outside Columbia University.

(Adam Gray / Getty Images)

One former senior Biden administration official who worked on the Gaza crisis told The Times that Trump’s 20-point plan “is credible,” if not fully baked, and that Trump’s position of influence over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may give the proposal “a real chance of success.”

Devastated after two years of war, Hamas had seen its continued holding of the hostages as its only remaining leverage to ensure later stages of a peace agreement are implemented by the Israelis. Trump’s plan demands an immediate release of all of the hostages, both dead and alive, in an initial phase, preceding reconstruction of the Strip that removes Hamas from power.

An opening emerged for progress in the talks after Israel conducted an extraordinary strike on a Hamas target in Doha, shaking the confidence of the Qatari government, a key U.S. ally. While Doha has hosted Hamas’ political leadership for years, Qatar’s leadership thought their relationship with Washington would protect them from Israeli violations of its territory.

“A lot of this stems from the Israeli attack on Hamas in Doha,” said Elliott Abrams, a veteran diplomat from the Reagan, George W. Bush and first Trump administrations. “The Qataris panicked, and went to Trump to ask for defense and assurance that Israel would never do that again. And I think he had a price: to deliver Hamas.”

“Can they deliver Hamas? They can deliver the guys in Doha,” Abrams continued. “They can threaten them with expulsion. They can tell them that they’re living in fancy hotels, but they can be Palestinian refugees tomorrow morning. But the relationship between those people and the leadership on the ground is very unclear.”

U.S. officials believe it is the Egyptians, more so than the Qataris, with intelligence, sourcing and leverage on the ground in the Gaza Strip that can bring Hamas’ chain of command in compliance with a settlement. But whether Egyptian leadership is willing to exert its leverage is unclear. An unusual Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai Peninsula, in violation of the Camp David Accords that have secured Israel’s peace with Egypt since 1979, is causing widespread concern in diplomatic circles over Cairo’s intentions.

Talks over Trump’s plan have moved from Doha to Cairo.

“If talks in Cairo focus solely on the first phase of the peace plan — the release of hostages and prisoners, the first Israeli withdrawal in Gaza and the flood of humanitarian goods — there is a good chance of success,” said Robert Satloff, executive director of the Washington Institute. “But if the talks range into subsequent phases of the plan, including Hamas disarmament and deployment of third-country troops to Gaza, it will likely get bogged down as has been the case before.”

Pressure on Israel

Trump’s diplomatic push has also exposed growing concern within his administration over the damage Israel’s continued military campaign is inflicting on its global reputation — and on its support within the United States.

Over the weekend, speaking with an Israeli news outlet, Trump said that Netanyahu had “gone too far in Gaza, and Israel has lost a lot of support in the world.” It came amid reports that Trump had scolded Netanyahu over his initial reaction to Hamas’ willingness to negotiate over the plan.

“Whether you believe it was justified or not, right or not, you cannot ignore the impact that this has had on Israel’s global standing,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told CBS News on Sunday.

Much of the world supports Trump’s plan, which would see a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee oversee governance in the strip, and an international coalition funding the reconstruction of its economy and infrastructure. Palestinians would not be forced to leave the territory.

The proposal comes amid signs that Israel is rapidly losing support within the United States, with new polls showing 59% of Americans disapprove of its actions. A Pew poll showed that 55% of Republicans said they view Israel favorably — but that a growing generational divide, across party lines, risks eroding support for Israel over time.

“I think it’s gone on too long,” Megyn Kelly, a conservative commentator and former Fox News host, said last week on the Fifth Column Podcast. “I know what Hamas does, trust me. And I’ve been covering it. But that doesn’t mean that the devastation and destruction can go on forever.”

Other prominent figures on the right, including Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) and commentators Tucker Carlson and Nick Fuentes, have become more vocal criticizing Israel in recent months.

“Israel’s now taken out Hezbollah, it’s decimated Hamas, it had a war with Iran that we almost got dragged into,” Kelly added. “It’s time to wrap it up in this American’s view. I am entitled to that opinion. And I will not be shamed out of it by being called an antisemite.”

Netanyahu and his closest allies, including Ron Dermer, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs and a former ambassador to Washington, have long believed that Israel is best served relying more on deep ties to the American right than on Jewish Americans overall or on balanced bipartisanship. Increased opposition to the war among MAGA Republicans may force Netanyahu’s team to expedite its end.

Whether discontent on the right is driving Trump to push for a peace deal is unclear. But his personal involvement could prove key to success, regardless of his motives, Satloff said.

“The key new factor that is giving a chance to phase one is President Trump’s intense personal interest in freeing the hostages and the desire of key Arab players not to disappoint him,” Satloff said. “But we shouldn’t exaggerate the importance of even this critical factor — the entire house of cards can still collapse.”

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Analysis: How is Lebanon’s Hezbollah regrouping after war with Israel? | Israel attacks Lebanon

A year on from Israel’s assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, reports say Hezbollah, the Lebanese group he led, is regrouping.

Analysts believe that while a weakened Hezbollah can no longer pose a significant threat to Israel, it can still create chaos and challenge opponents domestically as it tries to find a political footing to preserve its clout.

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Long viewed as the strongest nonstate armed actor in the region, Hezbollah found its star waning in the past year, culminating in an international and domestic push for it to disarm entirely.

Handled recklessly, analysts believe, pressures to disarm the group could lead it to lash out and create internal strife that could outweigh international and regional pushes.

Hezbollah’s rhetoric remains defiant, and it has promised to reject Lebanese government efforts to disarm it – as its current leader, Naim Qassem, reiterated on Saturday to a crowd of thousands of people who had gathered at Nasrallah’s tomb to commemorate his assassination.

“We will never abandon our weapons, nor will we relinquish them,” he said to the crowd, adding that Hezbollah would continue to “confront any project that serves Israel”.

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Hezbollah started trading attacks with Israel on October 8, 2023, the day after the latter launched its war on Gaza. This continued until September 2024 when an Israeli military intensification and subsequent invasion killed about 4,000 people in Lebanon, injured thousands more and displaced hundreds of thousands.

By the time a ceasefire was announced on November 27, much of Hezbollah’s senior military leadership, including Nasrallah, the group’s secretary-general, had been killed by Israel.

The terms of the ceasefire were poorly defined, according to diplomatic sources with knowledge of the agreement, but the public understanding was that both sides would cease attacks, Hezbollah would disarm in southern Lebanon and Israel would withdraw its forces from the south. But soon after, Israel and the United States argued that Hezbollah must disarm entirely.

Seeing it weakened, Hezbollah’s domestic and regional opponents began calling for the group to give up its weapons. Sensing the changing regional winds, many of Hezbollah’s domestic allies jumped ship and voiced support for full disarmament.

The Lebanese government, under pressure from the US and Israel, announced on September 5 that the Lebanese armed forces have been tasked with forming a plan to disarm Hezbollah.

In the meantime, Israel has continually violated the ceasefire, bombing southern Lebanon. UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force in the south, said Israel is committing “continuous violations of this [ceasefire] arrangement, including air and drone strikes on Lebanese territory”.

Despite media speculation that Hezbollah is regrouping in southern Lebanon, particularly in anti-Hezbollah media outlets, it has only claimed one attack since the ceasefire was announced in November.

Analysts believe Hezbollah is no longer in a position to threaten Israel, meaning that any decision by the latter to expand attacks in Lebanon would be for considerations other than Hezbollah’s current capabilities.

Hezbollah and its supporters argue that Israel’s threats and continued violations as well as its continued presence occupying five points on Lebanese territory justify the need for resistance.

“The continued existence of a real threat justifies the maintenance of deterrence and defence capabilities because deterrence is not a one-time event but rather a cumulative process that requires a stable and integrated power structure within a broader political context,” Ali Haidar, a columnist with the pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al-Akhbar, wrote recently.

Al Jazeera reached out to Hezbollah for comment but did not receive a response before publication.

What does ‘regrouping’ mean?

“No military or political military force [will not] regroup after suffering a major defeat as [Hezbollah] did last year,” Michael Young, a Lebanese analyst and writer, said.

“But are they in a position to mount rockets and bomb northern Israel along the border? No. Are they in a position to fire missiles at towns and cities? No.

“So what does [regrouping] mean?”

Lebanese political scientist Imad Salamey told Al Jazeera: “Hezbollah is significantly degraded – leadership attrition, [communications] penetrations and blows to command and control have been real. They will try to recover, but the plausible path is a smaller, cheaper, more agile Hezbollah.

“Israeli assessments themselves note both the damage done and Hezbollah’s attempts to regenerate via smuggling/self-production under intense intelligence pressure, suggesting any rebound will be partial and tactical rather than structural in the near term,” Salamey added.

In early December, the regime of Hezbollah ally Bashar al-Assad was toppled in Syria, another blow to the group, as it cut off a direct land route for weapons and financing to reach the group from Iran.

In the meantime, however, analysts said Hezbollah has been trying to use its remaining leverage through diplomacy, even sending signals to longtime foes like Saudi Arabia.

“We assure you that the arms of the resistance are pointed at the Israeli enemy, not Lebanon, Saudi Arabia or any other place or entity in the world,” Qassem said in a speech on September 19.

The message to Saudi Arabia, which has previously funded Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon, is part of a shift in the group’s strategy, analysts said.

“There’s a hint that they feel they can deal with things politically,” Young said. “They may feel they don’t need to resort to force or weapons if they can get more out of the system.”

It is also a reflection of the new political reality in Lebanon and the region, where Israel and the US have ascended in power and Iran, Hezbollah’s close ally, has faltered.

“Hezbollah is starting to realise that it is entrapped,” Lebanese political analyst Karim Emile Bitar told Al Jazeera.

Before the war, Hezbollah had the ability to make or break governments. But President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam were elected in early 2025 despite neither being Hezbollah’s preferred candidate.

Still, Hezbollah was either unwilling or unable to disrupt the formation of Salam’s government. Analysts said the group is in dire need of foreign aid that the government could secure to help rebuild its constituencies damaged by Israeli attacks.

But that money has yet to arrive as there is regional and domestic debate over whether the government should receive reconstruction funds before Hezbollah’s disarmament and other banking or political reforms.

Analysts and diplomats told Al Jazeera Hezbollah is still capable of raising tensions but has avoided fanning any flames due to the Lebanese state’s rising support as well as the fatigue and trauma Hezbollah members and supporters have due to last year’s war and continuing Israeli attacks on Lebanon.

Still, on Thursday, Hezbollah supporters flocked to Beirut’s seaside in remembrance of Nasrallah. Supporters projected their late leader’s image onto the Raouche Rocks, defying orders from the prime minister’s office that banned the act.

The event was seen as an expression of love for Nasrallah by his supporters and a provocation by Hezbollah’s opponents. But the group, which has threatened violence to get its way in the past, has largely avoided provocations since the war, apart from occasional attempts to block roads that were quickly reopened by the Lebanese military.

If Hezbollah is pursuing military regrouping, a senior Western diplomat with knowledge of the issue said, it would be more likely in the Bekaa Valley than in the south, where the ceasefire mechanism had been largely effective at supervising Hezbollah’s withdrawal.

The group, however, does appear to be altering its political strategy, Young said, adding that Hezbollah, via instructions from Iran, may eventually be looking for certain compromises.

He pointed out proposals by parliamentarians Ali Hassan Khalil, a Hezbollah ally, and Ali Fayyad, a Hezbollah MP, in their subcommittees, where they spoke about implementing the 1989 Ta’ef Accord, an agreement that ended the civil war, declared all militias should give up their arms and Lebanon should transition to a nonsectarian system of power.

“Their implicit point is that ‘If we implement Ta’ef in its entirety, then that can give us a greater role with better representation, and then we can talk about weapons,’” Young said.

Supporters of the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah hold pictures of their slain longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah during a ceremony marking the first anniversary of Israel's assassination of Nasrallah, in Beirut's southern suburbs on September 27, 2025.
Hezbollah supporters hold pictures of longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut’s southern suburbs on September 27, 2025, during a ceremony marking the first anniversary of his assassination by Israel [AFP]

‘Time for Hezbollah to go’?

Amid the intensifying pressure to disarm Hezbollah, analysts and diplomats fear that if pressed too hard, the group could lash out.

The US has announced a $14.2m aid package for the Lebanese military to help it disarm Hezbollah, and visits by US officials – including Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, deputy special envoy Morgan Ortagus and special envoy Tom Barrack – have intensified pressure on Lebanon.

“It’s time for Hezbollah to go,” Graham said during his visit in late August.

But Lebanon’s military has rejected setting a strict timetable for Hezbollah’s disarmament over fears the tense situation in Lebanon could descend into violence.

TOPSHOT - US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria Tom Barrack listens to a question during a joint press conference following his meeting with Lebanon's president at the Presidential Palace in Baabda on August 18, 2025.
Special envoy Tom Barrack has been part of a US contingent applying pressure on Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah [AFP]

And news of the US aid has been received poorly in parts of Lebanon, where it is seen as part of a US effort to use Lebanon’s military to execute Israeli interests.

“[The Lebanese army] will never serve as a border guard for Israel. Its weapons are not weapons of discord, and its mission is sacred: to protect Lebanon and the Lebanese people,” Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally, said in a statement on Tuesday.

The fears of diplomats and analysts are that a confrontation between the army and Hezbollah could lead to internal strife and a potential fracturing of the army along confessional lines – similar to what happened in the early days of the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War.

“[Disarming Hezbollah by force] is the worst possible option, but obviously, this is how the Americans are increasingly pressuring the Lebanese government to resolve this,” Young told Al Jazeera.

“The Lebanese army is not willing to resolve it through the use of force because they don’t want to be pushed into conflict with Hezbollah.”

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