Americas

Latin America’s political landscape has seen sweeping shifts in recent years. On one hand, a so-called “second Pink Tide” has returned left-of-centre governments to power in key countries – Lula in Brazil, Petro in Colombia, and the broad left in Mexico – inspiring hopes of renewed democracy and social reform. On the other hand, strongman leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele (a populist outsider not usually labelled “leftist”) and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro (an entrenched Chavista) have consolidated control in ways critics call authoritarian. The question looms: are these developments evidence that the region is sliding back toward autocracy, cloaked in progressive rhetoric? Or are they legitimate shifts reflecting popular will and necessary reform? Recent trends in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, El Salvador, and Venezuela, show serious democratic backsliding, populist leadership styles, and the uses (and abuses) of leftist language to consolidate power rather than give it back to the people.

Brazil: Lula’s Left Turn and the Security State

Brazil’s democracy was violently tested in early 2023 when Jair Bolsonaro’s supporters stormed Congress, the Supreme Court, and the presidential palace. The crisis – and the swift legal response by institutions – helped vindicate Brazil’s checks and balances. When former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) won the 2022 election, many Brazilians breathed a sigh of relief as they felt and agreed that a second Bolsonaro term would have propelled Brazil further into autocracy, whereas Lula’s coalition blocked that outcome. Polls showed Brazilians rallying to defend democracy after the Jan. 8 insurrection, and Lula himself has repeatedly proclaimed Brazil a “champion of democracy” on the world stage. Under Lula, Brazil has indeed reversed some of Bolsonaro’s more extreme policies, especially on the environment and social welfare, and the Supreme Court remains independent and active.

At the same time, Brazil still grapples with brutal crime and controversial security policies. In October 2025 a massive police raid in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas – involving roughly 2,500 officers – killed at least 119 people (115 suspected traffickers and 4 officers). Human rights groups denounced the operation as a massacre, reporting that many of the victims were killed execution-style. President Lula’s justice minister stated that Lula was horrified by the death toll and had not authorised the raid, which took place without federal approval. Rights investigators noted that in 2024, approximately 700 people were killed in police actions in Rio—nearly two per day, even before this incident. The episode underscored the persistence of militarised and largely unaccountable security practices, rooted in decades of mano dura policing. Lula’s administration, however, has publicly condemned the use of excessive force and pledged to pursue meaningful reforms in public security policy.

In short, Brazil’s picture is mixed. Bolsonarismo (Bolsonaro’s movement) still holds sway in many state capitals, and violence remains high. But Lula’s presidency so far shows more emphasis on rebuilding institutions and fighting inequality than on authoritarian control. Brazil’s democracy has shown resilience: after the coup attempt, support for democracy actually peaked among the public. Lula himself has publicly affirmed free speech and criticised right-wing attacks, reversing some of Bolsonaro’s polarising rhetoric. Thus, we can view Brazil as democratic, albeit fragile. The major ongoing concerns are police brutality and crime – which are treated as security policy issues more than political power grabs by the president.

However, although Lula’s third term has been marked by a renewed emphasis on social justice, labour rights, and environmental protection, it has also been coupled with a discourse that often frames politics as a moral battle between the people and entrenched elites. This populist tone has reinforced his image as a defender of ordinary Brazilians while simultaneously deepening political polarisation and straining institutional checks and balances. His leadership style tends to concentrate moral and political authority around his persona, blending pragmatic governance with an appeal to popular sentiment. Even though Lula continues to operate within democratic frameworks, this personalisation of power highlights the persistent tension between populist mobilisation and institutional restraint in Brazil’s fragile democracy.

Mexico: Welfare Reforms and Power Consolidation

Mexico’s case is more worrisome. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO, 2018–2024), a self-declared leftist populist, implemented a dramatic concentration of power. By 2024 his ruling Morena party controlled the presidency, both houses of Congress, and most state governorships. His government pushed through constitutional amendments that bolstered the executive and weakened independent checks. By the end of his term, his party had achieved full control of the executive branch, both chambers of Congress, and most subnational states, and it overhauled the judiciary and strengthened the military through reforms aimed at executive aggrandisement and weakening checks and balances. In plain terms, AMLO used his majority to rewrite rules in his favour.

AMLO’s populist rhetoric was central to this process. He constantly framed his campaign as a fight against corrupt “elites” and the “old” political order. Slogans like “Por el bien de todos, primero los pobres” (For the good of all, first the poor) became rallying cries.  On the surface, that populist welfare agenda – pensions for seniors, higher minimum wage, social programmes – delivered what could be perceived as real results. Poverty fell sharply: by 2024 over 13.4 million fewer Mexicans lived below the poverty line, a historic 26% drop. These benefits helped AMLO maintain high approval from his base. Yet a closer look reveals a more complex picture. Independent analyses show that much of this reduction is linked to temporary cash transfers and post-pandemic economic recovery rather than structural improvements in wages, education, or healthcare. Inequality and informality remain deeply entrenched, and millions continue to rely on precarious, low-paid work. Moreover, Mexico’s social spending has not been matched by investments in institutional capacity or transparency, raising concerns that short-term welfare gains may mask longer-term fragility. In this sense,  López Obrador’s populist social model contrasted starkly with its narrative of transformation: it has lifted incomes in the immediate term but done little to strengthen the foundations of sustainable, equitable development.

Also the same rhetoric that promised to empower the poor also justified undermining institutions. AMLO’s blend of social policy with authoritarian tactics created a downward trend in freedoms. He openly clashed with autonomous agencies and critical media, called judges “traitors,” and even moved to punish an independent Supreme Court justice. AMLO began implementing his unique brand of populist governance, combining a redistributive fiscal policy with democratic backsliding and power consolidation. In 2024’s Freedom Index, Mexico plummeted from “mostly free” to “low freedom,” reflecting accelerated erosion of press freedom, judicial independence, and checks on the executive.

For example, AMLO mused about revoking autonomy of the election commission (INE) and packed federal courts with loyalists. He oversaw a lawsuit that temporarily replaced the anti-monopoly commissioner (though this was later reversed). Controversial judicial reforms were rammed through Congress with MORENA’s (National Regeneration Movement) supermajority. In the name of fighting corruption, AMLO and his party sidestepped democratic norms. By the time he left office, many prominent dissidents had been labelled enemies of the people, and civil-society watchdogs reported increasing self-censorship under fear of government reprisals.

Legitimate reforms vs. power grabs: Of course, AMLO’s administration did achieve significant social gains. His policies tripled the minimum wage and expanded social pensions for the elderly and students. From the left’s point of view, these are overdue redresses of inequality after decades of neoliberal policy. Nevertheless, one can also say that AMLO pursued these at the expense of Mexico’s democracy.

AMLO’s successor, Claudia Sheinbaum has largely extended the populist and centralising model of her predecessor. Her government has expanded the same welfare policies – including pensions for the elderly, youth scholarships, and agricultural subsidies – which continue to secure her strong approval ratings. At the same time, she has pursued a more nationalist economic strategy, favouring the state over private or renewable investment, a move seen by many as ideologically driven rather than economically sound.

Her administration’s approach to governance has reinforced concerns about democratic backsliding. Within months of taking power, her party used its congressional majority to pass a sweeping judicial reform allowing for the election of nearly all judges, a measure widely interpreted as undermining judicial independence. She also oversaw the dismantling of Mexico’s autonomous transparency and regulatory agencies, institutions originally created to prevent executive overreach after decades of one-party rule. Her rhetoric, while measured compared to López Obrador’s, has nonetheless targeted independent electoral and judicial authorities as acting against the popular will. Violence against journalists and judicial pressure on the press have continued under her watch, suggesting a continuity of the authoritarian tendencies embedded in her predecessor’s style of governance. In effect, Sheinbaum has presented herself as the guardian of López Obrador’s so-called “Fourth Transformation”, but her actions increasingly blur the line between social reform and the consolidation of political control.

Meanwhile, MORENA, the ruling party, has evolved into a hegemonic political force that increasingly mirrors the old Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Having consolidated control over the presidency, Congress, and most governorships, MORENA now dominates the national political landscape with little meaningful opposition. Its supermajority has enabled constitutional changes that weaken autonomous regulators and reconfigure the judiciary in its favour. Efforts to overhaul the electoral system – including proposals to curtail proportional representation and cut funding for opposition parties – further tilt the playing field towards one-party dominance. The party’s control of state resources and vast social programmes has also revived the clientelism and political patronage once characteristic of PRI rule. Many regional elites and former PRI figures have joined MORENA’s ranks, expanding its reach through local alliances and personal networks. This combination of electoral dominance, state control, and populist legitimacy has left few institutional counterweights to its power. In practice, Mexico’s political system is sliding back towards the PRI-style arrangement it once fought to overcome: a single dominant party using popular mandates and social welfare to entrench its hold over the state while constraining the mechanisms of democratic accountability.

Colombia: Peace Agenda and Institutional Pushback

Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro (in office since August 2022), is the country’s first-ever leftist head of state. He campaigned on ending historical violence and inequality, reaching a definitive peace with guerrilla groups, and “transforming” Colombian society. To that end, Petro has pursued ambitious reforms – agrarian, labor, climate, and constitutional – some of which have hit roadblocks in Congress and the courts.

One flashpoint has been his call for a constitutional rewrite. Petro announced he would ask voters (via the 2026 legislative elections ballot) whether to convene a national constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. He argues that traditional institutions (Congress and the courts) repeatedly blocked key reforms – for instance, an environmental tax and a gender law were struck down as unconstitutional – and that only a direct mandate could implement his agenda. In his own words, he has framed the move as carrying out “the people’s mandate for peace and justice”, implicitly casting political opposition as elitist roadblocks. Arguably, under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, a referendum on reform first requires legislation from Congress; the president alone cannot unilaterally change the constitution. Indeed, Petro’s coalition lost its majority in the Senate after the 2024 elections, and even has a minority in the House. That means he cannot force through a referendum law on his own.

Petro’s gambit is a stress test of Colombia’s institutions. Although Petro is popular with part of the electorate, and the checks and balances in the country have been holding– Congress and the Constitutional Court can still block overreach. Petro’s approval ratings hover around 37%, giving savvy opponents incentive to organise rallies or boycotts if he tries an end-run around Congress. Moreover, Colombia’s Constitutional Court has so far signalled it will strictly enforce procedural requirements before any reform, and it would likely strike down any effort to allow immediate presidential reelection (which the constitution currently bans). In fact, observers have flagged concern that Petro might push to permit his own re-election, raising alarm among civil society and international partners.

Thus far Petro has not succeeded in weakening institutions as Bolsonaro did in Brazil or Maduro in Venezuela. To the contrary, Colombia’s court and electoral tribunal have acted independently, even prosecuting members of Petro’s coalition for campaign irregularities. The country’s strong judicial branch remains a bulwark. That said, the tone of politics has become extremely polarised and personal. After a recent assassination of a presidential candidate (son of former President Uribe), the campaign trail saw shrill accusations: Petro’s supporters often label their opponents “far-right extremists,” while his critics call him a “communist” or worse. This combustible rhetoric – on all sides – could jeopardise stability.

Colombia today embodies both promise and peril. Petro has introduced progressive initiatives (such as a new climate ministry and child allowances) that appeal to many, but he also openly questions the role of old elites and considers dramatic institutional change. His proposals have not yet realised an authoritarian shift, but they have tested the separation of powers. The situation is dynamic: if Petro tries to override constraints, Colombia’s existing democratic guardrails (courts, Congress, watchdogs) will likely react strongly. The key question will be whether Colombia can channel legitimate popular demands through its institutions without them buckling under pressure.

El Salvador: The Bukele Model of “Punitive Populism”

El Salvador stands apart. President Nayib Bukele (in power since 2019, re-elected 2024) defies easy ideological labelling– he was not from the traditional leftist bloc – but his governance style has strong authoritarian features. His rise was fuelled by a promise to crush the country’s notorious gangs, and indeed El Salvador’s homicide rate plummeted under his rule. Bukele has remade a nation that was once the world’s murder capital. According to  figures, over 81,000 alleged gang members have been jailed since 2022 – about one in 57 Salvadorans – and Bukele enjoys sky-high approval ratings (around 90%) from citizens tired of crime. These results have been touted as proof that his “iron fist” strategy of mass arrests and harsh prison sentences (the world’s largest incarceration rate) has worked. In this sense, Bukele’s firm grip on security is seen by many supporters as a legitimate reform: a state that delivers safety, even at the cost of civil liberties.

However, the democratic trade-offs have been extreme. Since 2022, Bukele has ruled largely by decree under a perpetual state of emergency, suspending key constitutional rights (due process, privacy, freedom of assembly). Criminal suspects – including minors – are arrested en masse without warrants and often held in overcrowded prisons. The president has openly interfered in the judiciary: his pro-government legislators dismissed all members of the Supreme Court and Attorney General’s office in 2021–22, replacing them with loyalists. This allowed Bukele to evade the constitutional prohibition on immediate presidential re-election and secure a second term in 2024. Even ordinary political opposition has been effectively pulverised, party leaders disqualified, judges threatened, and dissenters harassed or driven into exile.

Human-rights groups accuse Bukele’s security forces of torture and disappearances of innocent people swept up in the dragnet. A 2024 Latinobarómetro survey found that 61% of Salvadorans fear negative consequences for speaking out against the regime – despite the fact that Bukele’s formal approval remains high. Many critics now call him a “social-media-savvy strongman” or “millennial caudillo”, suggesting he leads by personal charisma and social-media influence.

On the other hand, his defenders argue Bukele has simply done what past governments could not: restore order and invest in infrastructure (like child-care and tech initiatives) that were ignored for years. Indeed, El Salvador under Bukele has attracted foreign investment (notably in Bitcoin ventures) and even hosted international events like Miss Universe, as if to signal normalcy. But  Bukele has built his legitimacy on the back of extraordinary measures that sideline democracy. Bukele’s popularity may export a brand of ‘punitive populism’ that leads other heads of state to restrict constitutional rights, and when (not if) public opinion turns, the country may find itself with no peaceful outlet for change. In other words, El Salvador’s example shows how quickly a welfare-and-security-oriented leader can morph into an authoritarian ruler once key institutions are neutered.

Venezuela: Consolidated Authoritarianism

Venezuela is the clearest example of democracy overtaken by authoritarianism. Over the past quarter-century, Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro have steadily dismantled democratic institutions, replacing them with a one-party state. Today Venezuela is widely recognised as a full electoral dictatorship, not an anomaly but a case study in how leftist populism can yield outright autocracy. The 2024 presidential election was the latest illustration: overwhelming evidence suggests the opposition actually won by a landslide, yet the regime hid the true vote counts, declared Maduro the winner with a suspicious 51% share, and reinstalled him for a third term. Venezuela’s leaders purposefully steered Venezuela toward authoritarianism. It is now a fully consolidated electoral dictatorship

Since then, Maduro’s government has stamped out virtually all resistance. Leading opposition figures have been harassed, jailed, or exiled. Opposition candidate María Corina Machado – who reportedly won twice as many votes as Maduro was banned by the Supreme Court from even running. New laws passed in late 2024 further chill dissent: for example, the “Simón Bolívar” sanctions law criminalises criticism of the state, and an “Anti-NGO” law gives authorities broad power to shut down civil-society groups if they receive foreign funds. All justice in Venezuela is now rubber-stamped by Maduro’s hand-picked judges.

Any pretense of pluralism has vanished. State media and pro-government mobs drown out or beat up remaining critics. Despite dire economic collapse and mass exodus (millions of Venezuelans have fled hunger and repression), Maduro governs with an iron grip. In short, Venezuela today is an example of ideological rhetoric (Chavismo, Bolivarian Revolution) entirely subsumed by power. It also serves as a caution: the veneer of elections and redistributive slogans can sometimes hide total dictatorship. (In Venezuela’s case, the “leftist” regime never even bothered to disguise its authoritarian turn.)

Legitimacy, Rhetoric, and Checks

Throughout these cases, a common theme emerges: populist rhetoric vs institutional reality. Leftist or progressive leaders often claim to champion the poor and marginalised – a message that resonates in societies scarred by inequality. Yet in practice, that rhetoric sometimes becomes a justification for concentrating power. AMLO spoke of a “fourth transformation” of Mexico to overcome the “old regime,” and applied that mission to reshape institutions. Petro invokes “the will of the people” to override what he calls elite obstruction. Lula’s Brazil has been less about overthrowing elites and more about undoing his predecessor’s policies. And Bukele promises safety so absolute that he deems dissent a luxury Salvadorans cannot afford.

Of course, leftist governments do enact genuine reforms. The region has seen expansions of social programmes, pensions, healthcare, and education in many countries. In a sense, voters rewarded candidates like Lula, Petro, and AMLO precisely because they promised change and delivered temporary benefits (scholarships, pensions, workers’ pay raises, etc.). But even well-meaning reforms can backfire if the manner of governing ignores constitutional limits.

Where was the line crossed from policy to autocracy? The answer varies. In Venezuela, it was crossed long ago. In El Salvador, it was in 2020 when the Supreme Court was neutered. In Mexico and Colombia, it might yet be crossed if current trends continue. Notably, independent institutions have played the decisive role. Brazil’s judiciary and congress checked Bolsonaro and remain intact under Lula; Colombia’s still-revolutionary courts have so far blocked Petro’s more radical ideas;  under Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico’s courts remain constrained by the constitutional limits that formally prevent presidential re-election, yet her administration’s actions have significantly weakened judicial independence. By politicising judicial appointments and curbing the autonomy of oversight bodies, her government has consolidated influence over the very institutions meant to act as checks on executive authority. In practice, Mexico’s judiciary is now more vulnerable to political pressure than at any time since the end of PRI dominance, reflecting a growing concentration of power within the presidency and the ruling party. In contrast, Venezuela’s courts have no independence at all, and El Salvador’s were replaced wholesale.

This suggests that Latin America has not uniformly fallen back into classic authoritarianism under “leftist” governments. Instead, populist leaders of varying ideologies have tested democratic boundaries, and outcomes differ by country. Where institutions remained strong, they provided a buffer. Where institutions were undermined, democracy withered.

The Future of Democracy in Latin America

So what does the future hold? After a brief blip of improvement, democracy metrics in Latin America appear to be declining again. In 2023, a composite index actually rose slightly, driven by gains in Colombia (Free status by Freedom House) and Brazil. But by 2024 the region was “re-autocratising”, with rule-of-law slipping in Mexico and Peru, and older warning signs re-emerging across the continent.

Key factors will influence the coming years. On one hand, many Latin Americans remain hungry for security, equity, and an end to corruption – needs that populist leaders address. If such leaders deliver results (as Bukele did on crime), public tolerance for illiberal methods may persist. On the other hand, the region has a relatively robust civil society, and voters in countries like Brazil and Colombia have shown willingness to hold leaders accountable.

Balance is crucial. In well-functioning democracies, major changes do not require emergency decrees or friendly courts; they require compromise and open debate. The examples of Mexico and El Salvador show how quickly democratic norms can erode when populist leaders wield their mandate without restraint.

Ultimately, Latin America’s record is not hopeless, but neither is it fully reassuring. The early 2020s have demonstrated that both left-wing and right-wing populisms can strain democracy. Are we returning to authoritarianism under a leftist facade? – has no single answer. In countries like Venezuela, the answer is emphatically yes. In others, it is a warning under construction: Mexico and El Salvador caution us, Colombia is at a crossroads, and Brazil’s experience suggests that institutions can still provide meaningful checks on executive power, but their resilience is not guaranteed. The recent police raid in Rio de Janeiro, serves as a stark test for Lula’s commitment to reforming Brazil’s militarised public-security apparatus. How his government responds to this and similar incidents will be a critical measure of whether Brazil’s democratic institutions can withstand pressure from both public opinion and entrenched security structures, or whether longstanding legacies of unchecked police power will continue to erode accountability.

For the future of the region, the lesson is that rhetoric alone cannot safeguard democracy. Even popular leaders must respect independent judiciaries, free press, and electoral integrity. If those pillars are allowed to crumble, Latin America’s democratic gains will fade. The coming years will test whether each country’s citizens insist on true democratic practice or allow the allure of strong leadership to override constitutional limits.

When a Danish-flagged tanker named Torm Agnes quietly pulled into Mexico’s Port of Ensenada this spring, few took notice. The harbor, better known for cruise liners and pleasure yachts, seemed an unlikely setting for a large-scale energy delivery. But what followed was no ordinary unloading. Within hours, convoys of fuel-hauling trucks began siphoning off diesel from the tanker under the cover of night, an industrial cover that occurred so fast that witnesses said it operated “like clockwork.”

By morning, much of the shipment, worth roughly $12 million, had vanished into the Mexican black market. On paper, the cargo was listed as lubricants, exempt from Mexico’s high import taxes. In reality, it was a vast quantity of U.S.-sourced diesel smuggled by intermediaries working with one of Mexico’s most violent cartels; the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, or CJNG.

This was not a one-off operation. It was part of a sprawling, billion-dollar criminal enterprise linking Mexican cartels, U.S. traders, corrupt officials, and global shipping firms into what security analysts are now calling a “dark fleet.” And it underscores a deeper truth: the cartelization of Mexico’s energy market is no longer a localized issue, it’s a geopolitical problem touching the heart of North American trade, governance, and security.

A New Market Touched by Cartels:

For decades, Mexico’s cartels made their fortune in narcotics. Today, they are energy traders, exploiting systemic weaknesses in Mexico’s tax system and infrastructure to build empires rivaling legitimate fuel companies. According to Mexican officials, bootleg imports may now account for up to one-third of the country’s diesel and gasoline market, worth more than $20 billion a year.

The genius of the scheme lies in its simplicity. Mexico’s IEPS tax, a levy on imported fuels often exceeding 50% of a shipment’s value, creates a powerful incentive to cheat. Smugglers evade this tax by falsifying cargo documents, claiming their shipments contain lubricants or petrochemical additives, both of which are tax-exempt. The fake paperwork passes through customs with the help of bribes, while the actual diesel or gasoline floods Mexican markets at a discount.

Companies like Houston-based Ikon Midstream, which bought and shipped the Torm Agnes cargo, occupy the gray zone between legality and complicity. The firm purchased diesel in Canada, disguised it as lubricants in customs documents, and sent it to a Monterrey-based recipient called Intanza, a company authorities now suspect is a CJNG front.

It is the blending of formal and criminal economies that makes this phenomenon so dangerous. What once required violent pipeline theft now operates as a hybrid supply chain, complete with invoices, shipping manifests, and trade intermediaries. The same global infrastructure that powers legitimate energy commerce has been repurposed for organized crime.

The American connection:

The Ensenada case illustrates how deeply intertwined U.S. and Mexican energy systems have become. Nearly all the smuggled fuel originates in the United States or Canada. It passes through American ports, refineries, and shipping brokers, some unwitting, others complicit.

Texas, long a hub for legitimate fuel exports, has also become fertile ground for illicit operations. “The cartels have infiltrated many legitimate businesses along the border and further north,” warned Texas State Senator Juan Hinojosa, who has pushed for stricter licensing of fuel depots and transporters.

The U.S. Treasury Department and the Office of Foreign Assets Control  have since begun sanctioning dozens of Mexican nationals and companies tied to CJNG’s fuel operations. Yet the challenge lies in the complex nature of the trade; each shipment can involve multiple shell companies, international middlemen, and falsified documents. Even major firms like Torm, one of the world’s largest tanker operators, have been drawn into controversy. The company says it cut ties with Ikon Midstream after the Ensenada operation became public, citing contractual deception.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Justice has already prosecuted American citizens for aiding cartel-linked fuel schemes. In May, a Utah father and son were charged with laundering money and supplying material support to CJNG by helping smuggle Mexican crude oil. Such cases highlight that America’s own regulatory and commercial systems are being leveraged to sustain the very criminal organizations Washington seeks to dismantle.

Mexico’s Shaky Governance:

For Mexico, the rise of cartel fuel empires is not just an economic issue, it’s an existential one. The Mexican Navy, once regarded as among the country’s least corrupt institutions, is now under internal investigation for its role in facilitating smuggling at ports. Senior naval and customs officials have been arrested in connection with illegal tanker operations, while President Claudia Sheinbaum’s administration has made combating fuel theft a cornerstone of its early tenure.

But even high-profile seizures barely scratch the surface. Since Sheinbaum took office in late 2024, authorities have confiscated an estimated 500,000 barrels of illegal fuel, less than a fraction of the $20 billion trade. Prosecutors investigating the racket face mortal danger. In August, Tamaulipas’ federal prosecutor was assassinated after leading raids that uncovered more than 1.8 million liters of illicit fuel.

This combination of organized crime, corruption, and governance failure is a hallmark of what political scientists call “criminal capture”, the point at which state institutions become functionally co-opted by illicit economies. With cartels operating as false energy corporations, Mexico’s sovereignty over its own fuel sector is seemingly a facade.

The Global Shadow Market:

The implications stretch beyond Mexico. The term “dark fleet” was first used to describe tankers smuggling sanctioned Russian and Iranian oil. Now, it applies equally to the vessels carrying contraband fuel across the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific coastlines.

These ships exploit the same legal and logistical loopholes that sustain global energy markets; open registries, layered ownership, and limited oversight in maritime trade. Once a vessel’s cargo is reclassified or offloaded at an unsanctioned port, tracing its origins becomes almost impossible.

For Western energy giants, this black-market competition is tangible. Shell’s decision to sell its retail operations in Mexico earlier this year was due in part to its inability to compete with cheaper cartel-supplied fuel. Bootleg diesel sells at a 5–10% discount below legitimate imports, enough to distort prices across an entire sector.

Meanwhile, the illusion of “cheap” fuel comes at extraordinary cost. Mexico’s treasury loses billions in tax revenue annually, honest importers are squeezed out, and legitimate workers are drawn into dangerous informal economies. The trade also erodes trust in North America’s supply chains, just as Washington and Mexico City struggle to deepen cross-border economic integration under the USMCA framework.

Cartel Infiltration into Trade Routes:

The evolution of cartels from narcotics traffickers to fuel traders reflects a broader transformation in organized crime. Cartels have always been adaptive enterprises, but their pivot into energy reveals strategy: fuel is legal, high-margin, and logistically complex, making it perfect for laundering money under the guise of legitimate trade.

In this new landscape, the line between criminal and commercial actor has blurred beyond recognition. A U.S. trader signing a fuel invoice in Houston may be unknowingly financing a cartel warehouse in Jalisco. A Danish shipping company fulfilling a contract may inadvertently be enabling tax evasion worth millions. And a Mexican port official turning a blind eye may be advancing the interests of a criminal enterprise larger than the state itself.

The Torm Agnes episode is not merely a tale of smuggling; it is an example showcasing globalization’s vulnerabilities. As supply chains grow more complex and opaque, the ability of states to control what passes through their borders diminishes.

What’s Next?

Mexico’s “dark fleet” is more than a law enforcement issue, it’s a test of North America’s supply chain security. If cartels can operate international fuel logistics networks using legitimate Western infrastructure, the implications reach far beyond Ensenada. It raises fundamental questions about regulation, accountability, and the complicity embedded in global commerce.

President Sheinbaum’s crackdown, combined with U.S. sanctions, suggests the beginnings of a coordinated response. But the scale of the challenge is daunting. As one former OFAC official put it, “The cartels are not just criminals anymore, they’re businessmen with global reach.”

Whether Washington and Mexico City can curb this hybrid economy will define not just the future of bilateral relations, but the credibility and stability of the global energy system itself.

In recent months, a series of videos surfaced on Donald Trump’s social-media platform, showing what appeared to be drone footage of small vessels exploding somewhere in the Caribbean. The clips were accompanied by triumphant statements from the former president, who claimed that U.S. forces had struck “drug boats” operated by Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua cartel as they ferried narcotics toward the American coastline. Within hours of the first announcement, officials confirmed that “multiple interdictions” had taken place, that several suspected traffickers were dead, and that survivors were in custody.

For Washington, the operation was presented as a new frontier in counter-narcotics self-defense. For much of Latin America, it looked alarmingly like extrajudicial warfare. Colombia’s president protested that one of the destroyed boats had been Colombian, carrying his own citizens. Caracas called the attacks “acts of piracy.” And legal scholars, both in the United States and abroad, began to question not only the strikes’ legitimacy under international law but also who, exactly, had carried them out.

The Law of the Sea Meets the War on Drugs

The United States is not a signatory to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, yet successive administrations have claimed to act “in a manner consistent” with its provisions. Under that framework, ships on the high seas enjoy freedom of navigation. Interference is allowed only in narrow cases such as piracy, slavery, or “hot pursuit” when a vessel flees territorial waters after violating a state’s laws. The deliberate destruction of a boat on the open ocean—without proof of an immediate threat—sits uneasily within those boundaries.

“Force can be used to stop a boat,” observed Luke Moffett of Queen’s University Belfast, “but it must be reasonable and necessary in self-defense where there is an immediate threat of serious injury or loss of life.” Nothing in the public record suggests the crews of these vessels fired upon U.S. assets. The claim of self-defense, therefore, stretches maritime law close to breaking point.

International law’s broader prohibition on the use of force, codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is equally uncompromising. Only an armed attack, or an imminent threat of one, allows a state to respond with force in self-defense. Trump’s officials insist that Tren de Aragua constitutes a transnational terrorist organization waging “irregular warfare” against the United States. Yet, as Michael Becker of Trinity College Dublin argues, “Labelling traffickers ‘narco-terrorists’ does not transform them into lawful military targets. The United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with Venezuela or with this criminal organization.”

Nonetheless, a leaked memorandum reportedly informed Congress that the administration had determined the U.S. to be in a “non-international armed conflict” with drug cartels—a remarkable claim that effectively militarizes the war on drugs. If accurate, it would mean Washington has unilaterally extended the legal geography of war to the Caribbean, with traffickers recast as enemy combatants rather than criminals.

Domestic Authority and the Elastic Presidency

The constitutional footing for these operations is no clearer. The power to declare war resides with Congress, but Article II designates the president commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Since 2001, successive presidents have leaned on the Authorization for Use of Military Force—passed in the wake of 9/11—to justify counter-terror operations across the globe. That statute, intended to target al-Qaeda and its affiliates, has been stretched from Yemen to the Sahel. Extending it to Venezuelan cartels represents another act of legal contortion.

Rumen Cholakov, a constitutional scholar at King’s College London, suggests that rebranding cartels as “narco-terrorists” may be a deliberate attempt to fold them into the AUMF’s reach. But it remains uncertain whether Congress ever envisaged such an interpretation. Nor has the White House explained whether the War Powers Resolution’s requirement of prior consultation with lawmakers was honored before the first missile struck.

The Pentagon, asked to disclose its legal rationale, declined. The opacity has fuelled speculation that the operations were not conducted solely by uniformed military forces at all, but by an entirely different arm of the American state—one that operates in deeper shadows.

The “Third Option”: Covert Power and the CIA’s Ground Branch

In October, Trump confirmed that he had authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to “conduct covert operations in Venezuela.” The statement was brief, but within the intelligence world it carried enormous significance. For decades, the CIA’s Special Activities Center—once known as the Special Activities Division—has been Washington’s chosen instrument for deniable action. Its paramilitary component, the Ground Branch, recruits largely from elite special-operations units and specializes in missions that the U.S. government cannot publicly own: sabotage, targeted strikes, and the training of proxy forces.

These operations fall under Title 50 of the U.S. Code, which governs intelligence activities rather than military ones. By law, the president must issue a classified “finding” declaring that the action is necessary to advance foreign-policy objectives and must notify congressional intelligence leaders. Crucially, Title 50 operations are designed so that “the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

That distinction—between covert and merely secret—sets Title 50 apart from the military’s Title 10 authority. Traditional special-operations forces under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) operate as uniformed combatants in overt or clandestine missions authorized under defense law. Their actions are governed by the law of armed conflict, subject to military oversight, and, at least in theory, open to public accountability. CIA paramilitaries, by contrast, function outside those rules. They wear no uniforms, deny official affiliation, and are overseen not by the Pentagon but by the White House and select members of Congress.

Since 9/11, the line separating the two worlds has blurred. Joint task forces have fused intelligence officers and military commandos under hybrid authorities, allowing presidents to act quickly and quietly without triggering the political friction of formal war powers. The “drug boat” strikes appear to be the latest iteration of that model: part counter-narcotics, part counter-terrorism, and part covert action.

A Legal Twilight Zone

If CIA paramilitary officers were indeed involved, the implications are profound. A covert maritime campaign authorized under Title 50 would have required a presidential finding and congressional notification, but those documents remain classified. Conducting lethal operations at sea through the intelligence apparatus—rather than under military or law-enforcement authority—creates a twilight zone of accountability.

The law of armed conflict applies only when a genuine armed conflict exists; human rights law governs peacetime use of force. Covert paramilitary strikes sit uneasily between the two. They may infringe the sovereignty of other states without ever triggering a formal act of war, and they obscure responsibility by design. Survivors of the October strike—a Colombian and an Ecuadorian now detained by U.S. authorities—exist in a legal limbo, neither civilian nor combatant.

Mary Ellen O’Connell, professor at Notre Dame Law School, calls the rationale “utterly unconvincing.” No credible facts, she argues, justify treating these actions as lawful self-defense. “The only relevant law for peace is international law—that is, the law of treaties, human rights, and statehood.”

The Price of Secrecy

Covert action was conceived as a tool for influence and sabotage during the Cold War, not as an instrument of maritime interdiction. Applying it to counter-narcotics missions risks collapsing the boundary between espionage and war. Oversight mechanisms designed for covert influence operations struggle to accommodate lethal paramilitary campaigns. Only a handful of legislators—the so-called “Gang of Eight”—receive full briefings, and judicial review is virtually nonexistent. In practice, the president’s signature on a secret finding becomes the sole check on executive power.

The “drug boat” operations thus reveal how the United States’ shadow-war architecture has evolved since 9/11. The Special Activities Center, once reserved for coups and clandestine support to insurgents, now appears to function as an offshore strike arm for missions the military cannot legally or politically conduct. The public framing—protecting Americans from narcotics smuggling—masks a far broader assertion of authority: the right to employ lethal force anywhere, against anyone, without declaration or disclosure.

War Without War

Trump’s supporters hail the strikes as decisive. His critics see a dangerous precedent—a campaign that bypasses Congress, ignores international law, and blurs the line between defense and vigilantism. The tension runs deeper than partisanship. It touches the central question of modern U.S. power: who decides when America is at war?

The CIA’s motto for its paramilitary wing, Tertia Optio—the “third option”—was meant to describe a choice between diplomacy and open war. Yet as that option expands into an instrument of regular policy, it threatens to eclipse both. When covert action becomes a substitute for law, secrecy replaces accountability, and deniability becomes the new face of sovereignty.

Whether these “drug boats” carried cocaine or simply unlucky sailors may never be known. What is certain is that the legal boundaries of America’s global operations are eroding at sea. The United States may claim it is defending itself; international law may call it aggression. In that unresolved space—the realm of the third option—the world’s most powerful democracy is waging a war it will not name.

If you TikTok on any particular night and you can watch America arguing with itself. Most teenagers scroll through protest videos, culture-war debates, and endless outrage while rival nations quietly observe something far more consequential – the erosion of the attention of the American youth.

Think of two children, one spends an entire day watching protest clips and debating identity issues online. The other spends that same time learning robotics or coding. A decade later, only one of them is shaping the technologies that define the future. Multiply this very difference by millions and the picture becomes clear. This is how foreign countries can gain a subtle but powerful advantage by encouraging distraction.

While American youth is drawn into ideological skirmishes, China is building artificial intelligence laboratories, investing heavily in space technology, and cultivating discipline among its students. Russia, though economically weaker, still benefits by showcasing American confusion to its own citizens. By pointing to social division and cultural chaos, it strengthens the illusion that its own model offers stability. The battlefield today is not military; it is psychological.

The New Frontline of Power

I believe that the most contested territory of the 21^st century is not land or trade routes but attention. Data may have been the ‘New Oil’ but Attention and the ability to capture and control it is the ‘New Data’. If you control the minds, you control the country. Young Americans live in a constant world of images, arguments, and notifications that shape how they see their nation and their ideological beliefs. They are politically aware but emotionally exhausted.

Several Surveys by the Pew Research Centre show that nearly half of American teenagers believe social media has a mostly negative effect on their generation, and about 1 in 5 say it has harmed their mental health in one way or another. What began as a tool for connection, has become an arena for reactivity, chaos and following social media trends. News is consumed not to understand but to respond.

America’s openness which has been its defining strength, has become a point of vulnerability. During the 2016 election, Russian operatives deliberately amplified such issues online, pushing both liberal and conservative extremes to deepen mistrust and cause diversity. The aim was not persuasion but polarization. It was a targeted attack on the people of America.

TikTok on the other hand, which is China’s most successful global export is designed to capture attention through endless entertainment, while its domestic version, Douyin, restricts usage for minors and promotes educational and patriotic content. The Chinese youth are trained to create and compete, while American youth are taught, unconsciously, to scroll. Why is Douyin used in China and not TikTok? Why isn’t conventional social media banned in China? What does China know about these social debates that it wants to control the flow of media and western ideologies into their country? One should question what Is really happening

The Economics of Distraction

Attention is now a form of economic power. Nations that focus their youth on innovation and competence will dominate the coming century. Those that reward distraction will decline.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports that China graduates more than one million engineers each year, nearly four times the number produced in the United States. When a country’s young population spends more time debating cultural issues than mastering scientific ones, it weakens its long-term competitiveness.

Political consequences follow. Polarization has become both symptom and strategy. Congress spends increasing time performing ideological battles instead of solving practical problems. Rivals interpret this as evidence that democracy can be paralyzed by its own openness, and citizens begin to lose confidence in their institutions.

The Algorithmic Advantage

Algorithms have become invisible editors of public life. They decide what people see, what they feel, and eventually what they believe. A Wall Street Journal investigation found that TikTok’s recommendation system can guide users toward extreme or divisive content within minutes of signing up. Douyin, in contrast, enforces time limits for minors and promotes academic material.

The difference in design reveals a difference in philosophy. American platforms optimize for engagement. Chinese platforms optimize priamrily for control. Both shape human behaviour, but only one leaves its users fragmented and fatigued.

Every moment of outrage online generates data, engagement, and profit. The more polarized the conversation, the stronger the business model. That is the genius of this weapon, it destabilizes societies while appearing voluntary. It is a quiet killer of growth, it is the quiet killer of a bright future. Why? Because it changes the nature of the populus to focus on ideological differences, to argue and debate on that rather than focusing on innovation, growth and developing. The American Citizen has become vulnerable to these power plays.

The Psychological Toll

This constant exposure to ideological battles leaves deep psychological marks. A few studies link sustained online conflict to higher anxiety, moral fatigue, and declining trust in authority. People become more skeptical yet also more suggestible, believing less but reacting more quickly.

The youth, despite being more digitally focused, remain more adaptable in belief than older generations. The real danger here, is not what they believe but that they begin to doubt whether anyone can be trusted to tell the truth. When the trust has evaporated, societies become easier to manipulate and it gets much harder for the country to unite and focus on growth and development.

Building Cognitive Resilience

Safeguarding democracy today requires much more than merely armies and technology, rather it requires citizens who can think clearly in an environment designed to distract them. The solution lies in resilience, not censorship or media control. Lets discuss some points that can be adopted to fight this battle

Teach Media Literacy: Schools should help students understand how algorithms shape their perceptions and emotions. Research shows that even brief digital literacy training reduces belief in false information.

Make algorithms transparent: Tech platforms should disclose what content they prioritize and why. Independent audits can reveal manipulation before it spreads.

Rebuild Offline Living: Communities that meet face-to-face build empathy that online arguments cannot. Dialogue, Community building and local participation restore the sense of shared purpose that social media erodes.

Expose Interference very Quickly: Governments should publicly reveal foreign manipulation as soon as it is detected. Transparency disarms propaganda faster than denial.

The Human Cost and the National Risk

Beneath this jargon is a human story. It is the that teenager that watches TikTok before bed and wakes up anxious without knowing the reason for that very anxiety. It is the citizen who cannot trust any sources of news. It is the slow disintegration of focus and faith in the conventional media and the American government.

Many foreign powers have learned that it is cheaper to just divide America than try to defeat it using any Economic or Military power because they sure are too strong on that front controlling the one of the most globally traded currency and one of the strongest Military powers in the world. Their weapon is distraction, which is engineered with precision and amplified through emotion.

The remedy is not to close society but to strengthen it. Attention in itself needs to be treated as a civic skill, something to be trained and protected. The ability to pause, reflect and filter out unimportant and hate-causing content is America’s last line of defence.

The next great contest between open and closed societies will not be fought on a battlefield but in the minds of the populus deciding whether to react or to think. If America’s strength once came from its freedom to speak, its survival now depends on its willingness to listen and act be aware of what is really happening.

A HOLIDAY isn’t complete without a trolley-dash at the local supermarket, and honestly, forget about the beach – I was in Florida for the crisps and sweets.

For me, only one spot can claim the ultimate snack crown – America.

Having recently travelled to Miami, I couldn’t help but dive into a local supermarket as part of my holiday itinerary to find some tempting snacks.

And it isn’t just me that loves to do this – Expedia predicted that ‘supermarket tourism’ would be big for this year, with more and more travellers looking to bring home a special treat instead of a tacky keyring.

But sharing is caring, so here are my honest thoughts on some American cult snacks including whether it is worth taking them up space in your luggage or if you can find similar in the UK.

Butterfinger

Love it or hate it, peanut butter has definitely made its way into a lot of sweet treats – of which, more and more can be found in the UK – Reese’s is just one example.

Read more on travel inspo

SUN SWAP

I’ve visited Florida 50 times… my holiday costs less than a European all-inclusive

SHOW BOAT 

I tried new Omaze-style draw for superyacht holidays & lived like a billionaire

As a ‘love it’ fan, I of course was overjoyed when I discovered Butterfinger.

These treats are essentially caramelised peanut butter that has been crushed into a dense bar, and wrapped in milk chocolate.

I picked them up in mini form, in small treat boxes often found in the states.

For peanut butter fans, these crispy-crunchy bars are a treat – be warned though, after a couple they will hit you like a sugar-coated brick and have you begging for some water.

A 100g box before tax costs $2.29 (£1.71).

For a UK dupe, maybe grab a Snickers bar for a similar taste or a peanut butter KitKat Chunky.

But if you want more of a decadent peanut butter and chewy treat, we don’t really have something that matches.

Even Reese’s is smooth.

Verdict? Definitely stock up when in the US.

Birthday Cake Oreos

I still remember when Oreos made it to the UK and I was instantly hooked.

And ever since travelling to the US, I will bring back heaps of packets in crazy flavours such as carrot cake, peanut butter and jelly and blueberry pie.

This time I opted for perhaps the slightly tamer, birthday cake flavour.

Whilst super yummy, these taste very similar to regular Oreos – just perhaps with more of an icing flavour than cream.

The family pack cost $6.79 (£5.06), which gives you the same amount of Oreos that you’d get in three standard packets in the UK.

And there is good news if you do want to try them as you can often find them in some UK shops, like most recently Poundland.

Verdict? They’re great – but stick to the classics and save your dimes.

Pringles Mingles – sharp white cheddar and ranch

As an avid fan of Pringles, I was simultaneously excited but also shocked to find that my favourite crisps also had puffed snacks.

And in classic American style, I of course opted for the cheddar and ranch flavour.

Now ranch may be a acquired taste, but these creamy and herby puffed crisps are definitely moreish.

They are shaped liked the Pringles man’s bowtie as well, which is a fun feature.

A bag costs $4.99 (£3.72) – but don’t worry, you get a lot in there for your money.

Sadly, I haven’t seen anything like this in the UK – or even ranch-flavoured crisps, so you’ll need to grab them on your next visit to the states.

Verdict? Do not miss these when in America, particularly if you like ranch.

Skittles Gummies – wild berry

We all know Skittles and we all love them for not being like any other sweet you can get.

But I had never seen Skittles Gummies – essentially a soft version of Skittles.

I grabbed a bag in the wild berry flavour, and I won’t lie I was sceptical – the vibrant colours looked like I would just be eating food colouring.

As for the taste? Well, they were as expected – super sugary and artificial.

They weren’t cheap either at $3.99 (£2.97) a bag and that is before tax.

And they aren’t anything special, they taste like a lot of sweets you can get in the UK that are wild berry flavoured.

Verdict? I think if you picked up some 79p jelly cherries at ALDI and some red and black Wine Gums and you will get the same taste – potentially even better.

Save your money and suitcase space and opt for some hard ones instead once back in the UK,

Welch’s Fruit Snacks

Now before you scroll past at the thought of a fruit snack, don’t worry as these are more like sweets.

These small fruit gummies are packed full of flavour and – apparently – made with real fruit juice.

They look a lot like midget gems and I would say this is the closest the UK will get to Welch’s fruit snacks, though midget gems are much harder.

There are a number of flavours in each bag, such as grape, strawberry and orange.

A bag costs $2.99 (£2.23) but you can also get them in small bags or boxes.

Verdict? They taste a lot less artificial than the Skittles Gummies and definitely pack a powerful fruity punch – grab some when in the US.

Cinnamon Toast Crunch Cereal

Now I know a cereal isn’t exactly a snack, but when I wandered down the cereal aisle in an American supermarket, I couldn’t help but grab one of the brightly coloured boxes.

The shelves of fun and flavourful cereals also made me realise that cereals in the UK are boring.

Where are the marshmallows? And the exciting sugar rush?

Cinnamon Toast Crunch is the ultimate autumnal cereal – they are little cinnamon squares that are like a much sweeter – and more fun – version of Shreddies.

It costs $5.49 (£4.09) a box and makes breakfast a real treat, but I also will tip a handful into a zip lock bag to have as a snack.

The even better news is that the UK has a great dupe – Curiously Cinnamon.

Available at most supermarkets for between £3 and £5 a box, it is essentially the same product just with a different name.

Although I do think the UK version is less sweet – which is no surprise.

Verdict? Definitely grab a box in the US, but in the meantime the UK version will do.

mae day

Molly-Mae’s new show seriously concerns me… making Bambi centre stage will backfire

SCHOOL’S OUT

London’s best free indoor attractions for families – perfect for rainy days

If you are looking for some American holiday inspo, then there’s one hotspot with £229 flights from the UK – as well as huge sandy beaches and jungle zipline.

Plus, from sailing in the bay to an iconic island prison visit – San Francisco makes a perfect city break.

The U.S. Army has handed the American division of the Belgian gunmaker Fabrique Nationale (FN) a contract for further development of its semi-automatic Multi-Purpose Tactical Launcher-30mm (MTL-30). This comes as the service is still pushing to acquire a new Precision Grenadier System (PGS) that will give soldiers a new way to engage a wide range of targets, including lightly armored vehicles, enemy personnel behind cover, and drones in the sky.

FN America announced yesterday that it had secured what it called a Prototype Project Opportunity Notice (PPON) contract, valued at $2 million, for work on the MTL-30. The Army first put out the PPON in relation to the PGS effort in February. The service described it as a call for prototypes to support a “risk reduction effort separate from the Precision Grenadier Program of Record with the goal of developing technologies associated with the current capability gap.”

“This program is a U.S. Government priority with the shift in modern warfare and engagements, and FN is honored to be selected to develop this new, innovative solution,” Mark Cherpes, President and CEO for FN America, said in a statement. “Once developed and implemented, this weapon system could radically change future battlefield strategies. It will offer new capabilities at the squad level and upgraded tactical options, giving the warfighter a more effective system.”

“The FN MTL-30 shoulder-fired launcher can engage in close-quarter warfare, defeat targets in defilade, and engage unmanned aerial systems (UAS). It could also be networked with FN remote weapon stations to create a multi-layered defense against UAS,” John Bungard, Senior Director of Military Development Programs at FN America, also said. “Providing solutions that can counter multiple threats is critical for future battlefield engagements. We are excited that the Army is interested in maturing our PGS solution. We are fully committed to this system and its development.”

Though not explicitly mentioned in FN America’s release today, the MTL-30 looks very clearly to be an evolution of a previous design called the PGS-001. The Army picked the PGS-001 as one of two finalists in the xTechSoldier Lethality challenge to “showcase their innovative concepts for a Precision Grenadier System” last year. The service subsequently declared the other finalist, the Squad Support Rifle System (SSRS) from Barrett Firearms and MARS, Inc., as the winner.

Like the PGS-001, the current MTL-30 has the general outward appearance of an oversized assault rifle. The semi-automatic weapon is 35 inches long and weighs around 10 pounds. It feeds 30mm cartridges from three or five-round detachable box magazines.

The MTL-30 has a Picatinny-type accessory rail along the top, as well as additional accessory attachment points on the handguard utilizing the increasingly popular M-LOK system developed by another American firm, Magpul. No particular accessories are shown in the images FN America has released so far. The Army has not yet publicly stipulated the need for the future PGS to make use of any particular optics or other attachments. A computerized sighting system of some kind would be needed to make the most optimal use of the weapon.

“Real time soldier feedback has led to a prototype that is far more user-friendly, incorporating a footprint users will be familiar with due to the M4-style controls, grip and buttstock,” according to FN America’s release. “The system features a soft shooting launcher with low-felt recoil, enabling rapid target engagement with effective payloads from an extremely controllable system.”

More specific details about the rounds the MTL-30 fires are currently limited. PGS requirements that the Army has previously released have called for a family of ammunition that at least includes a “Counter Defilade Round” capable of engaging personnel behind hard cover and a companion round for use in training. The service has also expressed a desire for armor-piercing, dedicated anti-drone, and “Close Quarters Battle” cartridges, the latter of which could refer to some kind of buckshot-like canister round.

FN America has said the weapon has an effective range of 1,640 feet (500 meters), which is another known PGS program requirement, and that the ammunition it uses flies along a flat trajectory. The Army’s existing M203 and M320 grenade launchers both fire 40x46mm rounds that travel along a trajectory with a very pronounced arc. A flatter trajectory can be more advantageous for engaging certain target sets.

It is worth noting here that the Army primarily fields the M203 and M320 as under-barrel attachments for existing M16/M4-series guns, though the latter can also be employed in a stand-alone configuration. The maximum effective range of the M203 and M320 when firing typical high-explosive rounds is 1,148 and 1,312 feet (350 and 400 meters), respectively.

“The PGS will be a man portable integrated weapon system that enables precision engagements to destroy personnel targets in defilade and in the open with increased lethality and precision compared to the legacy M203/M320 grenade launchers,” according to another Army PGS contracting notice from February 2023. “The PGS will provide overmatch to comparable threat grenade launchers in near peer formations in future operating environments (jungle, urban, woodland, subterranean, desert, day/night/obscured). The PGS is envisioned to consist of a weapon, a fire control, and a suite of ammunition which enables the user to engage targets in defilade/cover, hovering UAS targets, conduct door breaching, engage close combat targets, and light armored targets.”

What timeline the Army might be currently targeting to start actually fielding PGSs is unclear. The program traces back to at least 2020.

Between the mid-2000s and the late 2010s, the Army had also pursued the development of a very similar weapon, designated the XM25, and known variously as the Individual Semi-Automatic Airburst System (ISAAS) or Counter-Defilade Target Engagement (CDTE) System. Also nicknamed “The Punisher,” the XM25 had itself evolved from next-generation infantry weapon efforts dating back to the 1990s.

A key feature of the XM25 was the advanced (and costly) programmable 25mm airbursting ammunition that it fired. The weapon’s computerized fire control system used a laser range finder to determine the distance to the target and then set the round to detonate at the optimal point in its flight.

The Army announced in 2018 that it had canceled work for good on the XM25, citing the weapon’s 14-pound weight and its physical bulk, as well as rising costs.

As has already been noted, FN America is also not the only company already angling to supply the Army with a new advanced grenade launcher. In addition to SSRS from Barrett and MARS, the American subsidiary of German firm Rheinmetall has been developing the Highly Advanced Multi-Mission Rifle (HAMMR), and Northrop Grumman and Colt are working together on their own as-yet-unnamed design.

The Northrop Grumman-Colt weapon is chambered to fire 25mm rounds, and you can read more about it overall here.

American Rheinmetall’s HAMMR is a version of its Squad Support Weapon 40 (SSW40), which was first unveiled in 2022. The SSW40 fires 40x46mm cartridges that are similar to the ones used in the M203 and M320, but have a higher muzzle velocity and, by extension, maximum range.

American Rheinmetall had also competed in the xTechSoldier Lethality challenge, along with two other companies, Knight Technical Solutions (not to be confused with Knight’s Armament Company) and Plumb Precision Products. At the time of writing, whether any other firms have received PPON contracts related to PGS is unknown.

The announcement of the PPON contract does show that the Army is continuing to lay the groundwork for a new semi-automatic grenade launcher that it hopes will give soldiers a major boost in capability over the M203s and M320s they have now.

Contact the author: [email protected]

WASHINGTON — Historically, the U.S. military has been an engine for cultural and social change in America. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s vision for the armed forces he leads runs counter to that.

In comments Tuesday to hundreds of military leaders and their chief enlisted advisers, Hegseth made clear he was not interested in a diverse or inclusive force. His address at the Marine Corps base in Quantico, Virginia, verbalized what Hegseth has been doing as he takes on any program that can be labeled diversity, equity or inclusion, as well as targeting transgender personnel. Separately, the focus on immigration also is sweeping up veterans.

For too long, “the military has been forced by foolish and reckless politicians to focus on the wrong things. In many ways, this speech is about fixing decades of decay, some of it obvious, some of it hidden,” Hegseth said. “Foolish and reckless political leaders set the wrong compass heading, and we lost our way. We became the woke department, but not anymore.”

Hegseth’s actions — and plans for more — are a reversal of the role the military has often played.

“The military has often been ahead of at least some broader social, cultural, political movements,” said Ronit Stahl, associate professor of history at the University of California, Berkeley. ”The desegregation of the armed forces is perhaps the most classic example.”

President Harry S. Truman’s desegregation order in 1948 came six years before the Supreme Court ordered school desegregation in the Brown vs. Board of Education case — and, Stahl said, “that obviously takes a long time to implement, if it ever fully is implemented.”

It has been a circuitous path

Truman’s order was not a short progression through American society. Although the military was one of the few places where there was organizational diversity, the races did not mix in their actual service. Units like the Tuskegee Airmen, the Navajo Code Talkers and the Buffalo Soldiers, formed in 1866, were segregated until the order opened the door to integrated units.

Women were given full status to serve in 1948 with the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act. There were restrictions on how many could serve and they were generally not allowed to command men or serve in combat. Before then, they had wartime roles and they did not serve in combat, although hundreds of nurses died and women were pilots, including Women Airforce Service Pilots, or WASPs.

The WASPs and Tuskegee Airmen were among the first groups this year to be affected when Hegseth issued his DEI order. The Air Force removed training videos of the airmen along with ones showing the World War II contributions of the WASPs at the basic training base in San Antonio. The videos were restored after widespread bipartisan outcry over their removal.

Other issues over time have included “don’t ask, don’t tell,” the policy that allowed gay and lesbian service members to serve as long as their sexual orientation was not public. That was repealed during the Obama administration. Women were allowed to serve on combat aircraft and combat ships in the early 1990s — then all combat positions after a ban was lifted in 2015.

“The military has always had to confront the question of social change and the question of who would serve, how they would serve and in what capacity they would serve. These are questions that have been long-standing back to the founding in some ways, but certainly in the 20th century,” said David Kieran, distinguished chair in Military History at Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia. “These are not new questions.”

Generally the answer has come down to what “the military writ large” has concluded. “‘How do we achieve our mission best?’” Kieran said. “And a lot of these things have been really hotly debated.”

Part of a larger, longer debate

Kieran offered one example: changes the Army made in the 1960s when it was dealing with a climate of racism and racial tensions. Without that, he said, “the military can’t fight the war in Vietnam effectively.”

The same considerations were given to how to address the problem of sexual harassment. Part of the answer involved what was morally right, but “the larger issue is: If soldiers are being harassed, can the Army carry out its mission effectively?”

While “it is important to see these actions as part of a longer history and a larger debate,” Kieran said, “it’s certainly also true that the current administration is moving at a far more aggressive and faster pace than we’ve seen in earlier administrations.”

Michael O’Hanlon, director of research in the foreign policy program at the Brookings Institution, questioned some of the actions that Trump’s Defense Department has taken, including replacing the chairman of the joint chiefs, Air Force Gen. CQ Brown Jr.

“He was a fine Air Force officer,” O’Hanlon said. Even if he got the job in part because of his race, “it wouldn’t be disqualifying in my book, unless he was unqualified — and he wasn’t.”

Matthew Delmont, a professor of history at Dartmouth College, said the current attitudes he is seeing toward the military suggest a misunderstanding of the armed forces and why the changes have been made.

“The military, for more than seven decades now, has been more on the leading edge in terms of figuring out how to put together an organization that tries to take advantage of the talents and capacities of all Americans,” Delmont said. Since Truman signed his executive order, “the military has moved faster and farther than almost any other organization in thinking about issues of racial equality, and then later thinking about the issues related to gender and sexuality.”

Delmont said bias, prejudice and racism remain in the military, but the armed services have done more “than a lot of corporations, universities, other organizations to try to address those head-on.”

“I wouldn’t say it was because they were particularly interested in trying to advance the social agenda,” he said. “I think they did it because they recognized you can’t have a unified fighting force if the troops are fighting each other, or if you’re actively turning away people who desire to serve their country.”

Fields writes for the Associated Press.

Sept. 29 (UPI) — Starting in October, Latin America will enter a decisive period with an intense calendar of presidential elections in a climate marked by polarization, institutional fatigue and economic pressure.

In that context, right-wing and center-right candidates who promote order, fiscal discipline and pro-investment policies appear to be gaining traction and could prevail or lead in first-round votes.

Still, the region remains volatile and cyclical — where the right governs without solving security or economic problems, voters may shift back to the center or left in the next cycle.

“The outcome of these elections will not only define the direction of each country’s economic and social policy, but also the region’s democratic stability and, most importantly, its international alignment, because the region is at a crossroads: whether it ultimately turns toward China or maintains its historic commitments with the United States,” said Guido Larson, an international analyst at the Universidad del Desarrollo in Chile.

Roberto Reyes, an analyst at the Universidad Gabriela Mistral in Chile, added: “The most likely scenario is that the region moves into a period of right-wing governments because of their message of fiscal discipline, security and economic pragmatism. These themes resonate strongly with voters tired of recurring crises.”

But this shift brings the challenge of balancing economic adjustments with social protection. Without a credible plan to ease economic pressure, Reyes said, even new conservative administrations will face the same fatigue they are trying to overcome.

The Real Instituto Elcano think tank, in a June analysis, highlighted three common features of this electoral cycle: fragmented opposition and governing coalitions, extreme polarization and the rise of “Trumpist” and “Bukelist” rhetoric.

The report warned that these dynamics point to minority governments and divided legislatures, making it harder to push through structural reforms and potentially fueling further institutional instability.

Bolivia will open the elections calendar. The country is headed for a presidential runoff Oct. 19, with two right-wing candidates ending 20 years of leftist governments. Center-right candidate Rodrigo Paz Pereira and right-wing candidate Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga will face off after a first round marked by high turnout.

On Nov. 16, Chile will hold a presidential election marked by sharp polarization, with Communist Party candidate Jeanette Jara and far-right contender José Antonio Kast vying for the top spot in polls.

The country faces challenges with crime, migration and economic growth, making calls for order and security dominant in the campaign. In that context, a shift to the right appears highly likely.

Honduras will hold its presidential election Nov. 30. Two candidates are seen as the main contenders: Salvador Nasralla, a reformist center-right leader, and Rixi Moncada, representing the ruling left.

As the date approaches, voters face deep uncertainty. Six polling firms have released contradictory results, fueling misinformation and sowing doubts among the electorate.

Costa Rica will hold presidential elections Feb. 1. Two candidates are seen as the main contenders: Álvaro Ramos Chaves and Natalia Díaz Quintana. Ramos, an economist and former head of the Costa Rican Social Security Fund, is running on a moderate centrist platform.

Díaz, a former presidential minister under President Rodrigo Chaves, represents a liberal center-right vision with a strong technical and business-oriented message and is expected to benefit from Chaves’ high popularity.

Peru faces a presidential race marked by heavy fragmentation and voter apathy, with elections set for April 12 alongside a return to a bicameral Congress. The process will bring an oversized ballot due to the proliferation of nearly 40 parties and thousands of candidates.

So far, 117 presidential tickets have been registered, pending ratification by the National Jury of Elections.

Recent polls show three right-wing candidates leading voter preferences, though none has more than 10% support: Lima Mayor Rafael López Aliaga, Keiko Fujimori and Mario Vizcarra. A significant share of voters say they plan to cast blank ballots or void their votes.

Colombia will hold its presidential election May 31. The main contenders come from three ideological blocs: right, center and left.

María Fernanda Cabal, a senator from the Democratic Center party, represents the right, aligned with former President Álvaro Uribe, with a strong message on security and free markets.

Sergio Fajardo, former governor of Antioquia, is running as a moderate centrist with an emphasis on education and fighting corruption.

Gustavo Bolívar, a former senator and figure in the Historic Pact coalition, seeks to continue President Gustavo Petro’s progressive project.

Making a concerted effort to join team bonding events has seemingly helped get him back on side, with US captain Keegan Bradley also pointing to DeChambeau’s “X-Factor ability” and “fiery” energy as further redeeming qualities.

“This is a tough thing for him, to come into guys that he doesn’t see every day,” said Bradley.

“But he’s done an exceptional job of making the extra effort – flying to Napa, flying to Atlanta – doing things that are really difficult with the schedule he has.

“He’s made every effort possible and been incredible in the team room.”

When the Americans were humbled by the Europeans two years ago, DeChambeau was even further on the periphery than he was at Whistling Straits.

The controversial switch to LIV Golf meant he was not eligible to earn qualification points for the Rome clash.

Then-US captain Zach Johnson did not deem him worthy of a wildcard – nor even a phone call relaying the news.

Harbouring an inescapable feeling of being ruthlessly snubbed, DeChambeau set about getting back on the team for Bethpage.

“It sucked. I wanted to be there,” DeChambeau said on Thursday.

“Seeing the guys lose really put a fire in my stomach. I wanted to make the team this time around.”

The same complications remained, though.

As a LIV golfer, DeChambeau could only earn points during the eight major championships over the two-year qualification process.

Demonstrating his insatiable appetite for the big stage, he earned six top-10 finishes – including victory at the 2024 US Open – to claim one of the half a dozen automatic spots.

However criticism about his suitability for the team environment has continued in the run-up to Bethpage.

Brandel Chamblee, a former American player and prominent commentator, still believes DeChambeau is an individualist and described him as a “captain’s nightmare”

“No doubt he is one hell of a golfer,” Chamblee said on the Golf Channel. “But he’s an odd duck when he’s trying to blend in with the team.”

US President Donald Trump has said Israel’s strike on Hamas targets in Qatar “does not advance Israel or America’s goals”, adding that he feels “very badly” about the location of the attack.

In a Truth Social post on Tuesday, Trump said he was notified that Israel was attacking Hamas in the capital Doha by the US military, but it was “unfortunately, too late to stop the attack”.

“This was a decision made by [Israel’s] Prime Minister Netanyahu, it was not a decision made by me,” he said, before praising Qatar as a “strong ally and friend”.

Six people were killed in the strike, Hamas said, including one member of the Qatari security forces, but the group said its leadership team survived.

The Israeli military said it had conducted a “precise strike” targeted at Hamas senior leaders using “precise munitions”. Israeli media reported the operation involved 15 Israeli fighter jets, which fired 10 munitions against a single target.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he authorised the strike and there would be “no immunity” for Hamas leaders.

In his statement on Tuesday, President Trump issued a rare rebuke of Netanyahu. “Unilaterally bombing inside Qatar, a Sovereign Nation and close Ally of the United States, that is working very hard and bravely taking risks with us to broker Peace, does not advance Israel or America’s goals,” he wrote.

White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said earlier that “The president also spoke to the emir and prime minister of Qatar and thanked them for their support and friendship to our country.”

“He assured them that such a thing will not happen again on their soil,” she added.

Trump said, however, that “eliminating Hamas, who have profited off the misery of those living in Gaza, is a worthy goal” and reiterated that he wants “ALL of the hostages, and the bodies of the dead released and this War to END, NOW!”.

The attack took place on early Tuesday afternoon, with footage showing a badly damaged building in Doha.

Qatar’s foreign ministry condemned the strike “in the strongest possible terms,” and said the attack was a “blatant violation” of international law.

It later said that Qatari officials were not notified of the Israeli strike ahead of time.

“The communication received from one of the US officials came during the sound of explosions,” said Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson Majed Al-Ansari in a post on X.

Qatar has hosted Hamas’s political bureau since 2012 and played a key role in facilitating indirect negotiations between the group and Israel since the 7 October attacks.

It has also been a close ally of the US. Around 10,000 American troops are stationed at a US airbase in al-Udeid, just outside Doha. In May, Trump announced a “historic” economic agreement signed between the two countries that he said is valued at least $1.2 trillion (£890bn).

Qatar has also recently gifted Trump a plane – valued at $400m – as an “unconditional gift” to be used as the new Air Force One, the official aircraft of the US president.

Hamas said their negotiating team in Doha survived Tuesday’s attack, adding that the action “confirms beyond doubt that Netanyahu and his government do not want to reach any agreement” for peace.

It said it holds the US administration “jointly responsible” due to its ongoing support of Israel.

The office for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu put out a statement shortly after the strike, which said the attack was “a wholly independent Israeli operation”.

“Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility,” the statement said.

A few days prior to the attack, Hamas said it welcomed “some ideas” from the US on how to reach a Gaza ceasefire, and that it was discussing how to turn them “into a comprehensive agreement”.

In its statement, the White House said Trump believes the “unfortunate” attack “could serve as an opportunity for peace,” and that Netanyahu had expressed to him after the attack that “he wants to make peace and quickly”.

Eighty years ago, on August 6 1945, the sky over Hiroshima lit up with the cataclysmic explosion of the atomic bomb Little Boy; a light that was not a sunrise of hope, but a shadow of death and destruction, reducing over 140,000 people to ashes in an instant. This tragedy became a lasting symbol of nuclear horror, a permanent warning to humanity: the power of nuclear weapons can obliterate civilisation entirely.

Now, on the anniversary of that catastrophe, the United States, through attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities and escalating confrontations with Russia, is steering the world toward the precipice of a “Hiroshima II.” These actions, which threaten the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and raise the risk of nuclear war to unprecedented levels, endanger global peace and reveal a dangerous shift in Washington’s foreign policy; one that could imperil the very future of humanity.

Attack on Iran: A blow to diplomacy and a spark for nuclear proliferation

On June 22, 2025, the skies over Iran thundered with Tomahawk missiles and stealth B-2 bombers targeting the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities in an operation dubbed “Midnight Hammer.” Occurring amid the short-lived Iran-Israel conflict from 13 to 24 June 2025, this strike was described by US President Donald Trump as a “decisive victory” to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet reports tell a different story: the attack only delayed Iran’s nuclear program by a few months, as the country had already secured enriched uranium in safe locations.

The roots of this aggression trace back to the controversial US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2018. Subsequent reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2025 indicated that Iran had enriched uranium to 60 per cent, still below the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. Pressure from Israel, especially information presented by Benjamin Netanyahu in February 2025, pushed Washington toward this military strike. But this first direct military assault on another nation’s nuclear program since World War II had profound consequences: Iran suspended cooperation with the IAEA and announced it would no longer adhere to NPT restrictions.

The US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities didn’t just torch years of diplomatic efforts; it’s pushed the world to the edge of a nuclear abyss. Since 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has stood on three shaky legs: stopping the spread of nukes, disarming those who have them, and ensuring nuclear energy stays peaceful. Now, Washington’s unilateral move threatens to kick those legs out from under it. Rafael Grossi, head of the IAEA, didn’t mince words: the strike could “bring the entire non-proliferation system crashing down.” Iran, now more determined than ever, might follow North Korea’s playbook, chasing nuclear weapons with renewed vigor. That could set off a domino effect, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or even Egypt eyeing their own nuclear arsenals to keep the regional balance from tipping.

From the collapse of nuclear order to human catastrophe

The fallout from America’s strike stretches far beyond the Middle East. By undermining the NPT, it’s fanned the flames of global nuclear ambition. Allies like South Korea, Japan, and Poland, long sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella, might start questioning their reliance on Washington and consider going their own way. In the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the UAE could hit the gas on their own nuclear programs, risking a full-blown arms race across the region.

At the 2025 Hiroshima memorial, Mayor Kazumi Matsui sounded the alarm, warning that “nuclear weapons are becoming normalized” amid crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. The Hiroshima Survivors’ Association, known as Nihon Hidankyo and honored with a Nobel Peace Prize, slammed the US for ignoring the scars of Hiroshima’s past. Pope Leo XIV and UN chief António Guterres issued a rare joint plea, urging a return to diplomacy and warning that nukes are once again tools of intimidation, not deterrence.

The stakes couldn’t be higher. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that 2025 has ushered in a new arms race, with defense budgets ballooning and nuclear stockpiles getting modern makeovers. In this tinderbox, one misstep, whether a rash decision or a simple miscalculation, could spark a disaster that wipes out millions and leaves the planet’s ecosystems in ruins for centuries.

The urgent need for multilateral diplomacy

History proves that nuclear stability hinges on global cooperation, not cowboy bravado. Treaties like the NPT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) only worked when big players respected each other’s red lines. The US strike on Iran, coupled with escalating tensions with Russia, spits in the face of that principle, shoving the world toward chaos. The only way out is to swap bombs for talks. Urgent negotiations, pulling in Iran, Russia, China, Europe, and others, are the last hope for shoring up the non-proliferation system and cooling global tempers.

Eighty years after Hiroshima, the world faces a gut-check moment. The US, which unleashed the first nuclear horror, is now steering humanity toward another with its reckless policies. Hiroshima taught us that nuclear weapons don’t bring security or triumph, only devastation. If this path continues, the next Hiroshima won’t be one city but the entire globe, with no one left to bear witness.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Aug. 22 (UPI) — Argentina’s iconic Perito Moreno glacier, one of Patagonia’s top tourist attractions, is entering a phase of rapid retreat that experts say is irreversible.

For decades, the massive ice formation was considered an exception. While most glaciers in the region were shrinking, Perito Moreno held a fragile balance. Its towering wall over Lake Argentino and dramatic ice ruptures — which attract large numbers of tourists from the city of El Calafate — made it one of the region’s most famous natural landmarks.

But a study published in Communications Earth & Environment has raised alarms. Led by German and Argentine scientists, the study found that the glacier has been retreating rapidly since 2019 after remaining nearly stable until then.

Between 2000 and 2018, its thinning rate was about 1 foot a year. That rate jumped to 18 feet a year between 2019 and 2024. In some areas, the glacier has retreated more than 2,600 feet in just five years.

The Perito Moreno glacier, located in Los Glaciares National Park, spans about 97 square miles, nearly one and a half times the size of Washington, D.C. Between 2018 and 2025, it lost about 0.7 square miles, equivalent to roughly 320 soccer fields.

Designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1981, it is one of the few glaciers in the world easily reached by land. That accessibility, along with its dramatic rupture and lake-damming events and the infrastructure built around it, has made it a major tourist attraction.

The study — which combined satellite data, airborne radar surveys and sonar measurements from the lake — also found that the glacier is losing contact with a subglacial ridge that historically provided stability. If the separation continues, the glacier could collapse and retreat several miles, driven by water building beneath the ice.

From a tourism perspective, the shift means the glacier’s iconic ruptures — the massive icefalls once thought eternal — could become more frequent, but now with the melancholy of knowing the spectacle may not last.

Scientists say the retreat is part of a “delayed response to climate change,” resulting from decades of warmer temperatures and reduced snowfall. Over the past three decades, average summer temperatures in the region have risen by 2.2 degrees Fahrenheit. The 2023-24 summer was the warmest in 30 years, reaching 52°F.

Los Glaciares National Park held about 150 active glaciers in 1850. By 2015, only about 26 remained.

MIAMI — When Republican Sen. Bernie Moreno visits Colombia this week as part of a three-nation tour of Latin America, it will be something of a homecoming.

The Ohio senator, who defeated an incumbent last year with the help of Donald Trump’s endorsement and the highest political ad spending in U.S. Senate race history, was born in Bogota and has brothers who are heavyweights in politics and business there.

Moreno has emerged as an interlocutor for conservatives in Latin America seeking to connect with the Trump administration.

In an interview with the Associated Press ahead of the trip, he expressed deep concern about Colombia’s direction under left-wing President Gustavo Petro and suggested that U.S. sanctions, higher tariffs or other retaliatory action might be needed to steer it straight.

The recent criminal conviction of former President Alvaro Uribe, a conservative icon, was an attempt to “silence” the man who saved Colombia from guerrilla violence, Moreno said. Meanwhile, record cocaine production has left the United States less secure — and Colombia vulnerable to being decertified by the White House for failing to cooperate in the war on drugs.

“The purpose of the trip is to understand all the dynamics before any decision is made,” said Moreno, who will meet with both Petro and Uribe, as well as business leaders and local officials. “But there’s nothing that’s taken off the table at this point and there’s nothing that’s directly being contemplated.”

Elected with Trump’s support

Moreno, a luxury car dealer from Cleveland, defeated incumbent Democrat Sherrod Brown last year and became Ohio’s senior senator on practically his first day in office after his close friend JD Vance resigned the Senate to become vice president.

In Congress, Moreno has mimicked Trump’s rhetoric to attack top Senate Democrat Chuck Schumer as a “miserable old man out of a Dickens novel,” called on the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates and threatened to subpoena California officials over their response to anti-ICE protests in Los Angeles.

On Latin America, he’s been similarly outspoken, slamming Petro on social media as a “socialist dictator” and accusing Mexico of being on the path to becoming a “narco state.”

Such comments barely register in blue-collar Ohio, but they’ve garnered attention in Latin America. That despite the fact Moreno hasn’t lived in the region for decades, speaks Spanish with a U.S. accent and doesn’t sit on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

“He’s somebody to watch,” said Michael Shifter, the former president of the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. “He’s one of the most loyal Trump supporters in the senate and given his background in Latin America he could be influential on policy.”

Moreno, 58, starts his first congressional delegation to Latin America on Monday for two days of meetings in Mexico City with officials including President Claudia Sheinbaum. He’ll be accompanied by Terrance Cole, the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who is making his first overseas trip since being confirmed by the Senate last month to head the premier federal narcotics agency.

Seeking cooperation with Mexico on fentanyl

Moreno, in the pre-trip interview, said that Sheinbaum has done more to combat the flow of fentanyl into the U.S. than her predecessor and mentor Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who he described as a “total disaster.” But he said more cooperation is needed, and he’d like to see Mexico allow the DEA to participate in judicial wiretaps like it has for decades in Colombia and allow it to bring back a plane used in bilateral investigations that López Obrador grounded.

“The corruption becomes so pervasive, that if it’s left unchecked, it’s kind of like treating cancer,” said Moreno. “Mexico has to just come to the realization that it does not have the resources to completely wipe out the drug cartels. And it’s only going to be by asking the U.S. for help that we can actually accomplish that.”

Plans to tour the Panama Canal

From Mexico, Moreno heads to Panama, where he’ll tour the Panama Canal with Trump’s new ambassador to the country, Kevin Marino Cabrera.

In March, a Hong Kong-based conglomerate struck a deal that would’ve handed control of two ports on either end of the U.S.-built canal to American investment firm BlackRock Inc. The deal was heralded by Trump, who had threatened to take back the canal to curb Chinese influence.

However, the deal has since drawn scrutiny from antitrust authorities in Beijing and last month the seller said it was seeking to add a strategic partner from mainland China — reportedly state-owned shipping company Cosco — to the deal.

“Cosco you might as well say is the actual communist party,” said Moreno. “There’s no scenario in which Cosco can be part of the Panamanian ports.”

‘We want Colombia to be strong’

On the final leg of the tour in Colombia, Moreno will be joined by another Colombian American senator: Ruben Gallego, Democrat of Arizona. In contrast to Moreno, who was born into privilege and counts among his siblings a former ambassador to the U.S., Gallego and his three sisters were raised by an immigrant single mother on a secretary’s paycheck.

Despite their different upbringings, the two have made common cause in seeking to uphold the tradition of bilateral U.S. support for Colombia, for decades Washington’s staunchest ally in the region. It’s a task made harder by deepening polarization in both countries.

The recent sentencing of Uribe to 12 years of house arrest in a long-running witness tampering case has jolted the nation’s politics with nine months to go before decisive presidential elections. The former president is barred from running but remains a powerful leader, and Moreno said his absence from the campaign trail could alter the playing field.

He also worries that surging cocaine production could once again lead to a “narcotization” of a bilateral relationship that should be about trade, investment and mutual prosperity.

“We want Colombia to be strong, we want Colombia to be healthy, we want Colombia to be prosperous and secure, and I think the people of Colombia want the exact same thing,” he added. “So, the question is, how do we get there?”

Goodman and Smyth write for the Associated Press. Smyth reported from Columbus, Ohio.

It all started with a cup of coffee … and a blindfolded clairvoyant.

As he sat beside me in a cafe booth, mentalist Thommy Ten asked me to take out some items from my bag at random.

Rummaging through pens and chargers, I wanted to find something that Amélie van Tass, his stage partner and wife, might struggle to predict as she faced away from us. I handed Ten my passport, my wallet and a bag of almonds.

Talking toward the wall, Van Tass said, “It’s an ID … is that a passport?” She was right. “And it expires April 2033?” I didn’t even know that — I checked and apparently, it does.

Van Tass quickly guessed the bag of nuts. It was when she started accurately rattling off my license and Visa card numbers that the phrase “sixth sense” came to my mind.

The Clairvoyants perform mentalism, the branch of magic that encapsulates all things mind-reading, precognition and extrasensory perception. The duo’s performances are theatrical and often break the fourth wall. They choose audience members at random and can accurately guess their birthdays, their hotel room numbers and the exact dollar amount they won after a night in Vegas. Many shows incorporate their dog, crowd favorite Mr. Koni Hundini. Of the trio, he messes up the most, but the people “still love him,” said Ten.

Ten and Van Tass are best known for coming in second place on Season 11 of NBC’s “America’s Got Talent” in 2016. They also appeared on two “AGT” spinoffs. Since then, they’ve headlined tours and Vegas residencies, drawing international recognition in the magic world.

The couple took a brief break from performing in late 2024 to expand their family. “It was always clear, we don’t want to give up our job,” Van Tass said. “They’re just part of the whole circus. We love to call it a circus because now we have two dogs and one baby.”

Amélie van Tass and Thommy Ten at home with their baby boy, enjoying downtime during their Vegas residency.

(Lukas Rauch)

Ten and Van Tass’ 8-month-old baby boy joins the Clairvoyants in their travels, but not on the stage. “We try to be as normal as possible when we’re at home. We’re just Mom and Dad and not the Clairvoyants,” Van Tass said. Ten added, “Of course, we try to keep it comfortable for him, for the dogs and for us. We don’t go crazy with seven shows in seven states a week. We limit it to weekends now.”

It’s only fitting that the “circus” headed to Vegas for the Clairvoyants’ U.S. comeback. The duo recently joined “AGT” champion magician Shin Lim in his Las Vegas residency with an act that merged their mental magic with Lim’s sleight of hand. The Clairvoyants will hit the road once again in late October for a winter tour, which includes a Dec. 20 show in San Jacinto.

Beyond their innovative psychic acts, the Clairvoyants have always challenged stereotypes about magic shows. “There’s always this picture of a magician and the assistant bringing tables in and out,” Ten said. “That’s the basic understanding of a magician. Our thing was always that we wanted to be equal on stage.”

Ten and Van Tass, both 38, bring different talents to the act. “You do more of the magic, magic stuff,” Van Tass said to Ten. “And I’m more the mind reading and feeling and sensing things, which I think is a female thing too.”

The couple first crossed paths on a set in 2011 — they started brainstorming a two-person magic act the next day. Less than a year later, the duo performed their first show, “Second Sight.” It was the first step in carving out their niche, the modern, theatrical mentalism that has since become their signature act.

The Clairvoyants soon began touring Europe, expanding their routine into a full-length show within the year. In 2014, they brought the tour to America, where they joined “The Illusionists,” the world’s largest traveling magic show. Two years later, they went even bigger: “America’s Got Talent.”

Over four months on “AGT,” the Clairvoyants performed eight times and beat out more than 100,000 other contestants. The duo came in second, behind singer Grace VanderWaal. Every episode of their season of “AGT” ranked No. 1 in its NBC time slot. “Suddenly, our season was watched by 16, 17 million viewers,” said Ten. With so many people tuning in and voting from home, the Clairvoyants became a household name.

They also returned in 2019 for the spinoff “America’s Got Talent: The Champions” and in 2024 for “America’s Got Talent: Fantasy League.” They were eliminated in the preliminary round on both shows.

“In our genre, mentalism, mind-reading, it’s normally very small. Like in a parlor setting or a face-to-face thing,” said Ten. “Our dream was always to make it big so we can perform in front of thousands of people. It should still feel like everybody’s part of it; everyone can be involved.”

While their “AGT” appearance opened doors to Broadway and tours worldwide, they aspired for more. From 2021 to 2022, the Clairvoyants performed 500 shows in one year. After the birth of their son, they performed five to 10 shows a week in Vegas. Their upcoming U.S. tour will take them cross-country over the holidays.

The fanbase they built from “AGT” added a layer of both excitement and pressure, but it isn’t necessarily what keeps the Clairvoyants moving at such an impressive pace.

“We have performed in front of 20 people and were as excited as we would have been in front of 20,000 people,” Van Tass said. “I’m most excited when I know that there are good friends and family in the audience.”

Amelie van Tass dazzles her audience on a swing, predicting the unknowable while blindfolded.

(Lukas Rauch)

The Clairvoyants didn’t just want a bigger audience, they needed one. Their spectacular stage performances couldn’t have possibly worked in the parlor rooms of the past. Performance highlights include Van Tass showcasing her mental magic while submerged in 2,000 liters of water, using a flamethrower and even being suspended in the air, à la Cirque du Soleil.

The Clairvoyants strive to make their show special to each audience member, every night. “They make it possible that we can do what we do. Every single person deserves the best version and 100%,” said Van Tass. Fans’ experiences are the key to keeping the magic alive — and keeping it confidential. Of course, the Clairvoyants can’t reveal their secrets, but that doesn’t stop viewers from speculating. One theory suggests that audience members are paid participants. But when a blindfolded Van Tass predicts what you have in hand, and you know you aren’t in on it, that theory falls apart.

Originally from Austria, the couple spends half the year performing in Europe and the other half in the U.S. — in Vegas or on tour. With German as their first language, English as their second and the “tiny bit of Spanish” Van Tass speaks, the Clairvoyants are prepared to acclimate. “It’s important that at least we have a couple of words in different languages to adapt to people and to new countries,” Van Tass said.

Performing worldwide has earned the duo awards from across Europe and the U.S. In 2015 they were dubbed the World Champions of Mentalism by the FISM, one of the most respected international magic organizations. In 2017, the Academy of Magical Arts and the Magic Castle Hollywood voted Ten and Van Tass Stage Magicians of the Year. In 2020 they received the Mandrakes d’Or — France’s “Oscar of magic.”

From their pre-”AGT” tours to their Las Vegas residency, the Clairvoyants have a long streak of reading minds and blowing minds too. And the pair shows no signs of slowing down. Their ambitious winter tour aims to spread holiday magic from coast to coast.

“We just want to take people and bring them into our magical world,” said Van Tass. “Just let them forget everything and feel like kids again.”

July 28 (UPI) — With more than $14.7 billion invested in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2024 and at least $9 billion in new credit lines announced this year, China is solidifying its role as one of the region’s leading economic players.

The growth of Chinese investment in Latin America has not only transformed infrastructure, trade and technological presence in the region. but It is also quietly reshaping the foundations of Latin American economic integration, experts and former leaders warned at the “Latin America in the New Global Geopolitics” forum, organized by the Latin American Presidential Mission in Costa Rica.

Evan Ellis, a U.S. research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, said China’s presence has created a form of functional but highly fragmented integration.

“China connects the dots that matter to its interests, not the ones our countries need to develop or integrate with one another,” he said.

Projects like transoceanic corridors, logistics routes and large-scale port construction are often framed as efforts to boost regional connectivity. In practice, however, many are designed to move raw materials to Asia rather than build a cohesive Latin American market.

“It’s integration with a Chinese purpose, not a Latin American one,” Ellis said.

While China has retrenched from mega-infrastructure projects of the last decade, it has surged in backing diversified, tech-related investments, such as electric vehicles, lithium mining and cloud infrastructure.

Beijing’s strategy has been clear: engage through low-institutional forums such as CELAC, where countries do not act as a unified bloc. That weakens efforts to negotiate common standards and gives China a stronger hand in bilateral agreements.

“It’s not just about infrastructure. It’s about how Latin America’s ability to think strategically as a region is being undermined,” Ellis said.

Former Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla echoed that concern. She said China’s expanding footprint, rather than fostering cohesion, has exacerbated historic divisions between the region’s subgroups.

“The north tends to align with the United States, the south with China. And in the middle, we’ve failed to build a shared vision for development,” Chinchilla said.

One of the most sensitive issues in this realignment is the geopolitical pressure China exerts to isolate Taiwan. Only 12 countries in the world currently maintain diplomatic ties with the island — seven of them in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Paraguay.

Former Paraguayan Vice President Luis Alberto Castiglioni firmly defended his country’s decision to maintain relations with Taipei.

“Our alliance with Taiwan is not based on conditions, but on transparent cooperation and shared democratic values. China demands that we break that relationship as a condition to access its market, and that is unacceptable.”

Ellis reinforced that view, noting that Beijing’s diplomatic and commercial pressure also has consequences for national sovereignty.

“The region should ask whether opening up to Chinese investment justifies giving up decision-making authority, regulatory standards or strategic alliances that have historically been beneficial,” he said.

Costa Rica, which cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2007, has been cited as an example of institutional resistance to conditions imposed by Chinese companies. Several infrastructure projects were halted due to local legal and technical oversight.

Still, the trade balance is revealing: Costa Rica’s exports to China are now nearly 10 times smaller than those to the United States.

In light of that, former presidents at the forum agreed on the urgent need for Latin America to regain control over its own integration agenda. “This isn’t about saying no to China,” Chinchilla said, “but about setting our own rules of the game, as a region, with vision and leadership.”

If you’re a Dodgers fan, of course, you would love to see the Dodgers win the World Series again. If you’re a baseball fan above all, though, you ought to be pulling for the Milwaukee Brewers.

The Dodgers served as a convenient bogeyman for owners of many other major league teams last winter. To fans pointing a collective finger at the owner of their local team, all too many of those owners pointed a finger in our direction: It’s not us. It’s them.

“The Dodgers are the greatest poster children we could’ve had for how something has to change,” Colorado Rockies owner Dick Monfort told the Denver Gazette last March.

How, those owners shrugged, can we compete against a team playing in a major market and spending half a billion dollars on a star-studded roster?

The Dodgers are 58-40.

The Brewers play in the smallest market in the major leagues — Sacramento included, Denver definitely included.

The Brewers are 57-40.

This is not about a sprinkling of fairy dust. The Brewers have made the playoffs six times in the past seven years, prospering even beyond the financially motivated departures of star shortstop Willy Adames, Cy Young winner Corbin Burnes and two-time National League reliever of the year Devin Williams, and even after manager Craig Counsell and president of baseball operations David Stearns left for teams in major markets.

“It’s not really an abnormal year,” said designated hitter Christian Yelich, the Brewers’ franchise anchor. “Each year, we’re picked to finish last or second-to-last in our division, regardless of what happened the year before.”

The Brewers cannot pay the going rate for power, so they do not try. Of the free agents signed by Milwaukee last winter, the most expensive one in the lineup for Friday’s victory at Dodger Stadium: outfielder Jake Bauers, signed for $1.4 million. Shortstop Joey Ortiz was obtained in the trade of Burnes; third baseman Caleb Durbin was acquired in the trade of Williams.

The Brewers rank in the bottom 10 in the majors in home runs, but they rank in the top 10 in walks, stolen bases, sacrifice bunts and fewest strikeouts.

Milwaukee’s Caleb Durbin celebrates after hitting a solo home run in the seventh inning of a 2-0 win over the Dodgers at Dodger Stadium on Friday night.

(Mark J. Terrill / Associated Press)

“We know what we are,” Yelich said. “We know we’re not going to have a lineup full of guys that hit 30 homers. You’ve got to force stuff to happen sometimes and try to put pressure on the other team and try to manufacture runs any way you can.”

They are one of two teams — the Detroit Tigers are the other — to rank among the top 10 in runs scored and in earned-run average. No NL team has given up fewer runs than the Brewers.

The Dodgers lead the majors in runs scored. In four games against Milwaukee, the Dodgers have scored a total of four runs.

“They can really pitch,” Dodgers manager Dave Roberts said. “The ’pen is lights out. They catch it. They play good defense. In totality, they do a good job of preventing runs.”

Whether they can do a good job of deterring a lockout, well, that might be a whole other ballgame.

The collective bargaining agreement expires after next season. The owners have not explicitly stated a salary cap is their goal but, at least the way the players’ union sees it, why else would commissioner Rob Manfred already be talking about a lockout as a means to an end?

At the All-Star Game, union chief Tony Clark blasted the concept of a salary cap.

“This is not about competitive balance,” Clark said. “This is institutionalized collusion.”

A salary cap would provide owners with cost certainty and potential increases in franchise values, not that fans would care much about either. So, to the extent that owners might settle on a talking point in negotiations, what Manfred said at the All-Star Game would be it: “There are fans in a lot of our markets who feel like we have a competitive balance problem.”

If you’re the union, you’ll say MLB has not had a repeat champion in 25 years. If you’re an owner, you’ll say no small-market team has won the World Series in 10 years.

If you’re the union, you’ll say expanded playoffs offer every team the chance to win a wild-card spot and get hot in October, as the 84-win Arizona Diamondbacks did two years ago. But, should the Brewers win the World Series this year, owners certainly would call it the exception that proves the rule.

Over the past seven years, the Brewers have made the playoffs as many times as the Yankees have. Yet, for all their success in the regular season, the Brewers have not won a postseason series since 2018.

Baseball has not lost a regular season game to a work stoppage since 1995, the last time the owners pushed hard for a salary cap. They might do so again next year, which would jeopardize the 2027 season, but to argue small markets need a salary cap to win after the team in the smallest market won the World Series might ring hollow.

If the Brewers’ success could derail the potential disaster that would be a work stoppage, America ought to be rooting on The Miz.