alliance

March 7 (UPI) — The author prefers to use the lowercase “n” to challenge the Kim family regime’s legitimacy.

Calls for an end of war declaration on the Korean peninsula return with steady rhythm. Each time they appear, they promise a step toward reconciliation.

The latest proposal came when South Korea’s Unification Ministry urged a political declaration formally ending the Korean War as part of a broader effort to restart dialogue with north Korea and move toward a peace regime.

The argument is simple: A declaration would signal political will for peace and reduce tension on the peninsula.

The desire for peace is genuine. Koreans want peace. Americans want peace. Soldiers who have stood watch along the Demilitarized Zone for seventy years want peace.

The real question is not whether peace is desirable. The real question is whether a declaration contributes to peace when the military reality remains unchanged.

Paper and rhetoric do not trump steel.

The Military Reality That Has Not Changed

The Korean War ended in July 1953 with an armistice agreement, not a peace treaty. The armistice halted the fighting but preserved the underlying conflict.

The security architecture that followed rests on deterrence. It rests on the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance, the presence of American forces in Korea, extended deterrence and the readiness of combined forces.

Across the DMZ sits the fourth largest army in the world, as north Korea fields roughly 1.2 million troops.

More than seventy percent of those forces remain deployed between Pyongyang and the Demilitarized Zone. Their posture is offensive. Their purpose has not changed since 1950.

The Republic of Korea’s forces are organized differently. They are structured for defense. They rely on alliance integration and American reinforcement in crisis. The combined posture has deterred major conflict for seven decades.

None of that changes with a declaration.

Artillery remains within range of Seoul. Ballistic missiles remain deployed. Nuclear weapons remain part of the regime’s strategy.

Words do not move artillery tubes.

The Strategic Misreading Behind the Proposal

Supporters of an end of war declaration often argue that symbolic gestures can change political dynamics in Pyongyang.

The belief is that such a declaration would demonstrate that the alliance is abandoning what the regime calls its “hostile policy.” This signal, the argument goes, might restart negotiations and encourage denuclearization.

This logic rests on a misunderstanding of the Kim family regime.

For more than seventy years the regime has pursued the same strategic objective. It seeks to dominate the Korean peninsula under its rule. The tools have changed over time, but the objective has not.

The regime uses coercion, subversion, diplomacy, and military pressure in combination. Negotiations are not an alternative to this strategy. They are part of it.

When the regime speaks about hostile policy, it does not refer to rhetoric. It refers to the structural pillars of deterrence. The regime defines hostile policy as the ROK/U.S. alliance, the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, and the nuclear umbrella that protects South Korea and Japan.

Removing these pillars is central to the regime’s long-term strategy.

How a Declaration Can Undermine Deterrence

Advocates often describe an end of war declaration as symbolic and not legally binding. That may be correct in a narrow legal sense. In strategic terms, however, symbolism matters.

Politics follows narrative.

Once the war is declared over, critics of the alliance will ask a simple question. If the war is over, why are U.S. forces still stationed in Korea?

The argument will not remain academic. Political factions in both countries will push for reductions in American troop presence. They will question combined exercises. They will challenge extended deterrence.

The declaration would not cause these debates, but it would accelerate them. It would provide rhetorical oxygen to arguments that already exist.

From Pyongyang’s perspective this outcome would be ideal. The regime has long defined the alliance and U.S. military presence as the central obstacles to its objectives. Weakening alliance cohesion through political pressure achieves what military confrontation cannot.

The Political Warfare Dimension

An end of war declaration would not occur in a vacuum. It would unfold in a contested information environment shaped by political warfare.

north Korea, China, and Russia have repeatedly used narrative and diplomacy to shape perceptions about security on the peninsula. If negotiations over a declaration stall, the narrative battlefield will shift quickly.

Pyongyang will argue that peace is blocked by American hostility. Beijing and Moscow will echo that message in international forums. The United States will be portrayed as the obstacle to reconciliation.

Sanctions policy will become the central battleground. north Korea has already signaled that meaningful progress requires sanctions relief. Yet the United Nations Security Council resolutions remain in force precisely because of the regime’s nuclear and missile programs.

If sanctions remain in place, the regime and its partners will claim that Washington refuses to embrace peace. The propaganda line will be clear. The United States talks about diplomacy while clinging to confrontation.

The goal is not persuasion alone. The goal is alignment. By shaping public debate in South Korea and internationally, these narratives seek to weaken alliance unity and pressure policymakers.

This is political warfare conducted through diplomacy, media narratives, and strategic messaging.

Diplomacy Without Illusions

None of this means the United States or South Korea should reject diplomacy. Peace on the peninsula remains the long-term objective of the alliance.

Diplomacy, however, must be grounded in reality.

An end of war declaration can only contribute to security if it is tied to concrete military measures. Negotiations would need to address conventional force deployments near the DMZ. They would need to include ballistic missile programs and nuclear weapons. Verification would be essential.

Absent those steps, a declaration would alter language while leaving the balance of power untouched.

The alliance cannot afford that illusion.

Strategic Theater Versus Strategic Stability

Political leaders understandably seek symbolic achievements that demonstrate progress toward peace.

A declaration ending the Korean War would carry powerful historical meaning. But symbolism is not strategy.

A declaration without corresponding changes in military posture risks becoming strategic theater. It produces headlines but not stability. Worse, it may erode the deterrent structure that has preserved peace for generations.

The paradox is clear. A gesture meant to signal peace could weaken the very mechanisms that prevent war.

The Question That Matters

The central question remains unchanged.

Will the Kim family regime behave like a responsible member of the international community?

If it reduces conventional forces, dismantles nuclear weapons, and abandons its hostile posture, then an end of war declaration could become part of a genuine peace settlement.

If those conditions remain absent, the declaration becomes something else. It becomes leverage in a broader campaign aimed at weakening the alliance.

History suggests caution.

For seven decades the regime has used negotiations to gain concessions while preserving its core capabilities. It has advanced nuclear weapons even during diplomatic engagement.

Why should a symbolic declaration suddenly transform that pattern?

Conclusion

Peace on the Korean peninsula is a worthy goal. It is a goal shared by Koreans, Americans, and the broader international community.

But peace is not achieved through declarations alone.

It is secured through credible deterrence, alliance unity, and diplomacy grounded in the behavior of adversaries rather than hopes about their intentions.

The ROK/U.S. alliance has preserved stability for generations because it rests on credible military power. That credibility depends on readiness, presence, and integration. Until the military threat from the north changes, the war cannot truly be declared over.

Paper and words do not trump steel.

David Maxwell, executive director of the Korea Regional Review, is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia-Indo-Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he works on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

March 4 (Asia Today) — Hyundai Motor and Kia said Tuesday they have launched an industry partnership to accelerate commercialization of their mobile robot platform MobED and expand a broader ecosystem for customized robotic solutions.

The automakers said they held a launch ceremony for the MobED Alliance at the 2026 Smart Factory and Automation Industry Exhibition at COEX in Seoul and began domestic sales of MobED.

The alliance includes Hyundai Motor and Kia’s Robotics Lab, parts suppliers such as Hyundai Transys and SL, robotics solution firms including LS Tira U-Tech and Gaon Robotics and related organizations including the Korea AI and Robotics Industry Association, the companies said.

Hyundai Motor and Kia described the alliance as a multi-party cooperation framework designed to meet demand for robot solutions that can be deployed quickly in industrial settings.

MobED is a compact mobile platform built on four independently driven Drive-and-Lift mechanisms in an eccentric structure designed to improve mobility on uneven ground, the companies said. The platform can be paired with different “top modules” for tasks including logistics delivery, patrol operations, research and video production.

Hyundai Motor and Kia said they plan to move beyond selling MobED as a stand-alone platform and instead work with specialized partners to provide complete, industry-specific solutions, targeting business-to-business and business-to-government markets.

Under the partnership model, Hyundai Motor and Kia’s Robotics Lab will provide the platform and core technologies, parts suppliers will provide components such as sensors, electronic systems and batteries and solution companies will handle deployment and services at worksites. Related institutions will support testing and adoption environments, the companies said.

The automakers said solution firms plan to develop 10 types of industry-specific top modules, including modules for logistics delivery, drone stations for patrol missions and advertising signage.

Hyun Dong-jin, head of Hyundai Motor and Kia’s Robotics Lab, said MobED will evolve into more advanced robotic solutions through the alliance and the companies will work with partners to expand what he called a “physical AI” ecosystem.

Hyundai Motor and Kia said MobED won a best innovation award in the robotics category at CES 2026 in January and the companies plan to expand applications that combine intelligent software and hardware in industrial settings.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260304010001126

March 3 (Asia Today) — South Korea’s three major telecom operators laid out competing but converging visions for the artificial intelligence era at the Mobile World Congress in Spain, redefining themselves not as simple network providers but as designers of AI infrastructure.

At MWC 2026, themed “IQ Era,” executives from SK Telecom, KT and LG Uplus emphasized that telecommunications networks will serve as the core platform enabling AI ecosystems.

LG Uplus: Human-centered AI

Hong Beom-sik, chief executive of LG Uplus, took the stage as the only Korean telecom CEO to deliver an opening keynote at MWC 2026. He introduced a voice-based AI call agent, “ixi-O,” positioning it as a human-centered interface in an age crowded with AI devices and services.

Hong said voice will remain the most intuitive and human interface. The company combines on-device AI with large language model technology to balance privacy protection and personalized user experiences. He called for global cooperation to establish common standards for voice-based AI services.

SK Telecom: Sovereign AI package

SK Telecom framed telecom operators as “designers and drivers” of AI infrastructure. CEO Jung Jae-heon unveiled a “Sovereign AI Package” strategy integrating AI data centers, a proprietary AI model known as A.X K1 and industry-focused AI services.

The approach aims to build domestically controlled infrastructure that integrates foundation models and industrial services, strengthening data sovereignty while supporting industrial innovation. During MWC, SK Telecom met with telecom operators from Europe, the Middle East and Asia to expand what it described as an AI cooperation belt across regions.

KT: 6G as integrated AI infrastructure

KT presented its vision for 6G as an integrated infrastructure capable of ensuring stable AI operations. The company described 6G competition not as a race over individual technologies but as a contest in integrated architecture combining AI, satellite, optical networks, security and operations.

KT said it plans to apply AI to network management while guaranteeing the ultra-low latency and high reliability required by AI services. It outlined concepts including three-dimensional coverage across land, sea and air, network slicing, photonic-based end-to-end ultra-low latency structures, quantum-safe security and autonomous networks.

From carrier to orchestrator

Across their presentations, the three telecom leaders delivered a shared message: in the AI era, telecom companies must evolve from data carriers into infrastructure orchestrators that design and operate the entire ecosystem.

Their blueprints also reflect a broader industry shift. Amid recent security and network stability concerns, executives suggested that the next phase of AI competition will hinge less on speed alone and more on reliability, control and integrated system design.

— Reported by Asia Today; translated by UPI

© Asia Today. Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution prohibited.

Original Korean report: https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/kn/view.php?key=20260304010000736

The Writers Guild of America West has canceled its awards ceremony scheduled to take place March 8 as its staff union members continue to strike, demanding higher pay and protections against artificial intelligence.

In a letter sent to members on Sunday, WGA West’s board of directors, including President Michele Mulroney, wrote, “The non-supervisory staff of the WGAW are currently on strike and the Guild would not ask our members or guests to cross a picket line to attend the awards show. The WGAW staff have a right to strike and our exceptional nominees and honorees deserve an uncomplicated celebration of their achievements.”

The New York ceremony, scheduled on the same day, is expected go forward while an alternative celebration for Los Angeles-based nominees will take place at a later date, according to the letter.

Comedian and actor Atsuko Okatsuka was set to host the L.A. show, while filmmaker James Cameron was to receive the WGA West Laurel Award.

WGA union staffers have been striking outside the guild’s Los Angeles headquarters on Fairfax Avenue since Feb. 17. The union alleged that management did not intend to reach an agreement on the pending contract. Further, it claimed that guild management had “surveilled workers for union activity, terminated union supporters, and engaged in bad faith surface bargaining.”

On Tuesday, the labor organization said that management had raised the specter of canceling the ceremony during a call about contraction negotiations.

“Make no mistake: this is an attempt by WGAW management to drive a wedge between WGSU and WGA membership when we should be building unity ahead of MBA [Minimum Basic Agreement] negotiations with the AMPTP [Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers],” wrote the staff union. “We urge Guild management to end this strike now,” the union wrote on Instagram.

The union, made up of more than 100 employees who work in areas including legal, communications and residuals, was formed last spring and first authorized a strike in January with 82% of its members. Contract negotiations, which began in September, have focused on the use of artificial intelligence, pay raises and “basic protections” including grievance procedures.

The WGA has said that it offered “comprehensive proposals with numerous union protections and improvements to compensation and benefits.”

The ceremony’s cancellation, coming just weeks before the Academy Awards, casts a shadow over the upcoming contraction negotiations between the WGA and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers, which represents the studios and streamers.

In 2023, the WGA went on a strike lasting 148 days, the second-longest strike in the union’s history.

Times staff writer Cerys Davies contributed to this report.

Days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed forging a network of allied nations, including in the Middle East and Africa, to stand against what he called “radical” adversaries, the country’s president is on an official visit to key ally, Ethiopia.

It is not yet known which Arab and African countries will form part of Netanyahu’s hypothetical “hexagon of alliances”, which he said on Sunday will include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and others to stand against their enemies in the Middle East. Chief among those enemies is presumably Iran and its network of resistance groups from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis of Yemen.

Analysts doubt Israel could secure enough influence over nation-states to form a formal security pact.

However, the country is deepening its ongoing charm offensive in Africa, which it began during the genocide in Gaza, as its reputation suffered a decline on the continent, with the African Union (AU) releasing multiple statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

In a rare visit, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia on Tuesday. The last presidential trip to the East African country took place in 2018.

“The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition,” Herzog said in a statement upon his arrival. “At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance, to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog, on Wednesday, met with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who said the two leaders talked about “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest,” without revealing further details.

But beneath the surface, observers say the visit also represents a battle for influence over Addis Ababa, which has received similar high-level delegations from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia in recent days.

Shared ties and shared anger

Ethiopia and Israel are bound by several links, from shared histories of their people to shared scrutiny over recent political moves in the Horn of Africa that have angered several of the region’s influential nations.

Both countries maintain friendly ties largely due to the Beta Israel community, or Ethiopian Jews, who hail from northern Tigray and Amhara. Historically, Ethiopian Jews suffered religious persecution, and after Israel’s formation, it sought their emigration under its Law of Return policy. Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews were covertly transported to Israel – during a time when several African countries, including Ethiopia, had cut off ties with Israel over the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its invasion of Egypt. On the cusp of a civil war in Ethiopia in 1991, Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, launched a daring operation that airlifted 14,000 Ethiopians over the course of just two days.

About 160,000 Ethiopian Jews now live in Israel. Many within the community have struggled to integrate and have complained of discrimination and racism. In 2019, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews flooded the streets in protest across Israeli cities after a 19-year-old of Ethiopian origin was shot dead by the police.

Ethiopia-Israel state relations have, meanwhile, remained steady. In 2016, when Netanyahu visited the country in his first prime ministerial visit – Addis Ababa became one of the first African countries to voice support for Israel’s long-sought observer status at the AU. Fierce opposition from South Africa, Algeria and other countries supporting Palestine delayed the process until 2021. Later, in 2023, the AU confirmed it had withdrawn the status.

Mashav, Israel’s aid agency, has, in the past decade, provided aid to Ethiopia in the form of agriculture and water cooperation projects, although Addis Ababa receives much more significant funding from wealthier partners like China. When Israel sponsored several African journalists on media trips to the country last year, Ethiopia was among the countries it invited journalists from.

More recently, both countries are bound by their support for Somaliland, which Somalia claims as part of its territory and which Israel sees as critical to its own national security, Hargeisa-based analyst Moustafa Ahmad told Al Jazeera.

In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.

Israel’s focus on the Horn of Africa intensified after a late 2024 report from a United Nations expert panel, which found that the Somalia-based armed group, al-Shabab, was actively collaborating with Yemen’s Houthis. Where the Houthis were providing weapons and drone training, al-Shabab was, in return, granting access to a smuggling corridor stretching along the Somali coast and connecting to the Gulf of Aden, where Iranian weapons could be smuggled into Yemen.

The move to recognise Somaliland was therefore meant to disrupt that cooperation by stationing an Israeli naval base in the region, analysts note.

“It’s part of their calculations even if they haven’t said it publicly,” Ahmad said.

Several countries, as well as the AU, have pushed back on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Somaliland, however, many have celebrated the move.

Addis Ababa under pressure

While neither Israel nor Ethiopia has provided details of topics on the agenda during Herzog’s visit, Somaliland is likely at the top of the list.

Addis Ababa had in 2024 enraged its neighbours after it signed a controversial port deal with Hargeisa that would allow it access to the sea, reportedly in exchange for a future recognition of Somaliland. Although massive and rapidly industrialising, Ethiopia is landlocked, having lost its sea access after Eritrea seceded in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy has often said sea access is critical for his country.

The fall-out between Ethiopia and Somalia was so severe that analysts sounded the alarm over possible armed conflict between the two neighbours until Turkiye, a key development partner for Mogadishu, stepped in to smooth things over by pressuring Addis Ababa to coordinate with Mogadishu instead.

It is likely, analysts say, that Israel is now hoping to push Ethiopia further towards recognising Somaliland, which boasts a 850km (528-mile) coastline. In Hargeisa, many are disappointed after more countries failed to follow Israel’s steps, Ahmad said.

Addis Ababa, though, might not appreciate further pressure at the moment as it faces increasing regional isolation on several fronts.

One key reason is the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt and Sudan say is blocking the water supply they need for irrigation.

A source of national pride for Ethiopians, the dam was funded almost entirely through citizens’ donations and government funds. Israeli engineers participated in the project, and Israel reportedly sold weapons to Ethiopia to protect the dam amid tensions with its neighbours, although the Israeli government denies this.

At the same time, Addis Ababa is also facing tensions with Eritrea, which has moved closer to Somalia and Egypt. Both countries have historically feuded, and recently, tensions have again risen over the 2020 Tigray War and Abiy’s repeated statements about his country needing access to the sea.

“Addis Ababa is cautious of making a decision that will cement its regional isolation at this time [because] it is clearly hedging among various actors seeking to influence the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region,” Ahmad said.

Pressure is also mounting on Addis Ababa from countries eager to keep the status quo.

On Sunday, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and said in his speech: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

His statement drew a backlash from Hargeisa, which called it “unacceptable interference” aimed at wrecking relations between Somaliland and its partners.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen, also intervened in the fray in February. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Waleed Elkhereiji was in Addis Ababa this week to discuss “regional peace”, just two weeks after Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud arrived in the city for talks with Abiy.

So far, it is unclear if Riyadh has recorded any success in influencing Addis Ababa.

How Israel will fare in that regard is also still unclear.

In a significant foreign policy shift, Bolivia has reopened its doors to the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The move, confirmed on Monday, ends a nearly two-decade hiatus in bilateral efforts to stem drug trafficking.

Bolivian Minister of Government Marco Oviedo told local media this week that DEA agents were already operating in the country.

“The DEA is in Bolivia,” he said. “Just as the DEA is now present, we also have cooperation from European intelligence and police bodies.”

Oviedo explained that the initial focus of the law enforcement efforts would be to tighten border surveillance and dismantle trafficking networks.

He added that the cooperation with the DEA and European agencies was only the start of Bolivia’s expanded international efforts.

“We want neighbouring countries’ anti-narcotics agencies on board as well,” Oviedo said.

End to Morales order

The announcement marks an end to an order issued under former left-wing President Evo Morales in 2008, effectively expelling all DEA agents from the country.

Morales, the leader at the time for Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS), had accused the US of using drug enforcement efforts to pressure countries in Latin America to bend to its political and economic agenda.

Under Morales, all drug enforcement cooperation with the US came to a halt, and he refused to let DEA officers into the country, accusing them of destabilising his government. Diplomatic relations were likewise suspended.

In turn, MAS received strong support from rural parts of Bolivia, where the cultivation of coca, the raw ingredient in cocaine, is a key economic driver.

Bolivia, along with other Andean countries like Colombia and Peru, is a key producer of coca, which has traditional uses, including as a remedy for altitude sickness. Morales himself led a union of coca growers, or cocaleros, before taking office.

Advocates have accused the US’s militaristic “war on drugs” of harming impoverished rural farmers through the forced eradication of coca crops. Such campaigns, they argue, can leave farmers without a means of supporting themselves and their families.

MAS remained in power from the start of Morales’s term in 2006 until 2025, when its coalition fractured amid economic instability and internal fighting.

New political direction

In October 2025, two right-wing candidates proceeded to a run-off for the presidency: centrist Rodrigo Paz of the Christian Democratic Party and a former right-wing president, Jorge Quiroga.

It was the first presidential run-off in modern times for Bolivia, and it marked a sharp turn away from two decades of socialist government.

Both candidates made improving the relationship with the US a central pillar of their campaigns, viewing it as essential to solving Bolivia’s severe economic crisis.

Paz, who was educated in Washington, DC, argued that normalising ties would attract the international investment needed to modernise the energy and lithium sectors.

Meanwhile, Quiroga, a conservative who studied at Texas A&M University, campaigned on a more aggressive platform, including fiscal austerity and security partnerships with the US.

His vice presidential candidate, Juan Pablo Velasco, is credited with popularising the tagline “Make Bolivia Sexy Again”, a twist on US President Donald Trump’s slogan, “Make America Great Again”.

Paz ultimately emerged as the victor in the race, with nearly 54.9 percent of the vote. After his inauguration in November, Paz moved quickly to fulfil his promises by restoring diplomatic ties with the US.

The US, meanwhile, called Paz’s presidency a “transformative opportunity” for the region.

Earlier this month, both Bolivia and the US agreed to appoint ambassadors to one another’s countries for the first time in nearly 18 years.

Uncertainty remains

But it is unclear to what extent the DEA will be operating in Bolivia. Left-wing leaders like Morales continue to have strong pockets of support, particularly in highland and rural areas.

Bolivian Foreign Minister Fernando Aramayo has said negotiations are still under way to finalise the specific areas of cooperation between his country and the DEA, as well as operational limits for the US agency.

A full agreement outlining the scope of the agency’s activities is expected in the coming months.

Since returning to office on January 20, 2025, Trump has intensified the US campaign against drug trafficking in Latin America, including by designating several major cartels as “foreign terrorist organizations”.

Trump has also pressured Latin American governments to take more aggressive actions against the illicit drug trade, using economic sanctions and military threats as leverage.

Already, in late December and early January, Trump has authorised two strikes on Venezuela on the premise of combating drug trafficking.

One, on December 29, targeted a port that the Trump administration said was used for drug smuggling. The second, on January 3, resulted in multiple explosions, dozens dead and the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. He remains in custody in the US, where he faces drug trafficking and weapons possession charges.

Critics have argued that Trump’s anti-drug campaign has blurred the line between law enforcement and military activities.

The increasing use of military force against criminal suspects has raised concerns that human rights are being violated and legal processes circumvented, including through the use of extrajudicial killings.

One example has come as part of a military campaign called Operation Southern Spear.

On September 2, the US announced the first of nearly 44 “lethal kinetic strikes” against suspected drug-smuggling vessels in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

As many as 150 people have been killed in the attacks. Operation Southern Spear has continued, despite international organisations like the United Nations questioning its legality and calling for its end.

Israel to join with India, Greece, Cyprus and other Arab, African, Asian countries that ‘see eye to eye’, says PM.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that Israel plans to build a network of allied nations in or around the Middle East to collectively stand against what he called “radical” adversaries.

Netanyahu made the comments on Sunday while announcing the upcoming visit to Israel of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, whose country the Israeli leader said would be part of the “axis of nations that see eye to eye” with Israel.

Netanyahu, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court on war crimes charges, also referred to Greece, Cyprus and other unnamed Arab, African and Asian countries.

“In the vision I see before me, we will create an entire system, essentially a ‘hexagon’ of alliances around or within the Middle East,” Netanyahu said, according to the Times of Israel.

“The intention here is to create an axis of nations that see eye to eye on the reality, challenges, and goals against the radical axes, both the radical Shia axis, which we have struck very hard, and the emerging radical Sunni axis.”

Modi said he fully agrees with Netanyahu on the “bond between India and Israel”, including the “diverse nature of our bilateral relations”.

“India deeply values the enduring friendship with Israel, built on trust, innovation and a shared commitment to peace and progress,” Modi wrote in a post on X.

Since the start of Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, its assaults have been weakening the Iran-led “axis of resistance”, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel and Iran also directly clashed last June in a 12-day war, in which the US military also joined to attack Iran’s nuclear sites.

Netanyahu did not elaborate on what he meant by “emerging radical Sunni axis”, but he has previously identified the Muslim Brotherhood as its leading element.

Relations between Israel and several predominantly Sunni Muslim states have soured amid the bloodshed in Gaza, including with Turkiye, whose President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has sharply criticised Netanyahu, and Saudi Arabia, which has accused Israel of genocide.

Prospects for normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia also appear to be eroding. In recent months, the kingdom has rebuked Israel’s recognition of Somalia’s breakaway region, Somaliland, as well as the Israeli moves towards annexation in the occupied West Bank.

Since 2020, Israel has pushed to establish formal ties with Arab and Muslim states as a way to shore up its regional standing as part of the US-backed so-called “Abraham Accords”.

Under that framework, Israel has been enjoying close relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco.