Aden

Aden, Yemen – Lying on the outskirts of Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, al-Basateen district starts where the paved roads end, stretching into narrow, sandy alleyways. It reveals a decades-old refugee story in which Arabic blends with Somali and the faces harbour memories of a different place, across the sea.

Residents know the area by several names, including “Yemen’s Mogadishu” and “the Somalis’ neighbourhood” – a reference to the demographic shift it has seen since the 1990s, when civil war in Somalia pushed thousands of families across the Gulf of Aden in search of safety.

Today, local sources estimate the district’s population at more than 40,000, with people of Somali origin making up the majority. They live in harsh conditions where economic vulnerability overlaps with an unresolved legal status.

Some arrived as children holding the hands of relatives, while others were born in Aden and have known no other home. But they all share one thing in common: the refugee label stamped on their official documents.

Harsh living conditions

As dawn breaks, dozens of men gather at the entrances of the area’s main streets, waiting to be picked up to do a day’s work in construction or manual labour. Many depend on this fragile pattern of employment to put food on the table.

Residents say the lack of regular work has become the defining feature of life in al-Basateen, as extreme poverty spreads and humanitarian aid declines.

Ashour Hassan, a resident in his mid-30s, waiting at a main road junction for someone to hire him to wash a car, told Al Jazeera that he earns between 3,000 and 4,000 Yemeni rials a day (less than $3). That amount is not enough to cover the needs of his family, which lives in a single room in a neighbourhood lacking basic services, surrounded by dirt roads and piles of rubbish.

In a voice mixed with fatigue and despair, Ashour summed up life in al-Basateen: “We live day to day. If we find work, we eat. If we don’t, we wait without food until tomorrow.”

Families in al-Basateen typically rely on both men and women to be breadwinners.

Some women work cleaning homes, while others run small businesses, such as selling bread and traditional foods that blend Yemeni and Somali flavours, and which become especially popular during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.

Many children also find themselves pushed into work despite their age. One of the main jobs for children involves sifting through waste for materials they can sell, such as plastic or scrap metal, to help support their families.

Little sense of belonging

Poverty is clearly visible in al-Basateen’s architecture and appearance, with tightly packed homes, some made of metal sheets and consisting of only one or two rooms, separated by dirt roads covered in rubbish.

But that is not the only burden weighing on al-Basateen’s Somali residents. A deeper feeling of what many here call “suspended belonging” hangs over them, with the first generation of refugees still carrying memories of a distant homeland and speaking its language, while the second and third generations know only Aden and speak Arabic in the local dialect, with Somalia only known through family stories.

Fatima Jame embodies this paradox. A mother of four, she was born in Aden to Somali parents. She told Al Jazeera: “We know no country other than Yemen. We studied here and got married here, but we do not have Yemeni identity, and in front of the law, we are still refugees.”

Fatima lives with her family in a modest two-room home. Her husband works as a porter in one of the city’s markets, while she helps support the family by preparing and selling traditional foods. Even so, she says their combined income “barely covers rent and food” because of the high cost of living and few job opportunities.

A bleak reality

Conditions in Yemen were never the best for migrants and refugees, but they have significantly worsened since a civil war began in 2014 between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the central government in Sanaa, in Yemen’s north.

The violence from that war, along with declining aid and shrinking job opportunities have increased pressure on both host communities and refugees.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that funding for support programmes in Yemen in 2025 met only 25 percent of the country’s actual needs, directly affecting the lives of thousands of families. Residents of al-Basateen say the aid they used to receive has sharply declined, and in many cases has stopped altogether.

Youssef Mohammed, 53, says he was one of the first Somali arrivals to the district in the 1990s, and now supports a family of seven.

“[We] have not received any support from organisations for years,” Youssef said, adding that some families “chose to return to Somalia rather than stay and die of hunger here”.

He believes the crisis affects everyone in Yemen, “but [that] the refugee remains the weakest link.”

Despite the bleak picture, a few have managed to improve their material conditions through education or by opening small businesses that have helped stimulate the local economy. But they remain an exception, and the flow of refugees continues.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, but is also the region’s only signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore allows foreign arrivals to apply for asylum or refugee status. According to the United Nations refugee agency, Yemen hosted more than 61,000 asylum seekers and refugees as of July 2025, the vast majority from Somalia and Ethiopia.

Arrivals in recent years have typically travelled to Yemen via boats, with many planning to use Yemen as a transit point before moving on to richer countries like Saudi Arabia.

Hussein Adel is one of those recent arrivals. He is 30, but leans on a crutch on a street corner in al-Basateen.

Hussein arrived in Aden only a few months ago, having made the dangerous journey on a small boat carrying African migrants.

He told Al Jazeera that he fled death and hunger, only to find himself facing a harsher reality. Hussein shelters on the rooftop of a relative’s home and spends his days searching the city for occasional work. His leg injury, he said, was caused by Omani border guards who shot him while he was crossing into Yemen.

As evening falls, the noise in al-Basateen’s alleyways quiets down. Men lean against the walls of worn-out homes, and children chase a ball through narrow passages barely wide enough for their dreams.

On the surface, life looks normal – like any working-class neighbourhood in a city exhausted by crises. But here, in “Yemen’s Mogadishu”, there is an extra trauma – the sense of a lack of belonging, the memory of refugees fleeing danger and poverty at home, and a lack of stability that will not go away.

Global markets rarely reveal their vulnerabilities quietly. They do so when shipping lanes come under threat, energy prices surge, or supply chains fracture. Few regions illustrate this reality more starkly than the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are now among the world’s most contested maritime corridors. What unfolds along these waters no longer remains local. It shapes economic security across the Arab world and far beyond.

Yet, amid growing attention to this strategic corridor, one factor remains persistently underestimated: Somalia.

For decades, Somalia was viewed primarily through the lens of conflict and fragility. That narrative no longer reflects today’s reality. The country is undergoing a consequential transition, moving away from prolonged instability, rebuilding state institutions, and re-emerging as a sovereign actor with growing regional relevance. Situated at the intersection of the Arab world, Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, Somalia is not peripheral to regional stability; it is central to it.

Geography alone explains much of this significance. With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, Somalia lies adjacent to the Bab al-Mandeb passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. A substantial share of global maritime trade and energy shipments passes through this corridor. Disruptions along Somalia’s coast, therefore, have immediate implications for shipping reliability, energy markets, and food security — issues of direct concern to Gulf states and Arab economies.

For the Arab world, Somalia should be understood not as distant terrain but as a front-line partner in regional security. Stability along Somalia’s coastline helps contain threats before they reach the Arabian Peninsula, whether in the form of violent extremism, illicit trafficking networks, piracy, or the entrenchment of hostile external military presences along Africa’s eastern flank.

Somalia is not attempting to build stability from scratch. Despite persistent challenges, tangible progress has been made. Federal governance structures are functioning. National security forces are undergoing professionalisation. Public financial management has improved. Diplomatically, Somalia has reasserted itself within the Arab League, the African Union, and multilateral forums. These gains continue to be built on daily and reflect a clear commitment to sovereign statehood, territorial unity, and partnership rather than dependency. Somalia today seeks strategic alignment grounded in mutual interest, not charity.

Somalia’s relevance also extends beyond security. Its membership in the East African Community integrates the country into one of the world’s fastest-growing population and consumer regions. East Africa’s rapid demographic expansion, urbanisation, and economic integration position Somalia as a natural bridge between Gulf capital and African growth markets.

There is a clear opportunity for Somalia to emerge as a logistics and transshipment gateway linking the Gulf, the Red Sea, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. With targeted investments in ports, transport corridors, and maritime security, Somalia can become a critical node in regional supply chains supporting trade diversification, food security, and economic resilience across the Arab world.

At the heart of Somalia’s potential is its dynamic population. More than 70 percent of Somalis are aged below 30. This generation is increasingly urban, digitally connected, and entrepreneurial. Somali traders and business networks already operate across Southern and Eastern Africa, spanning logistics, finance, retail, and services. A large and dynamic diaspora across the Gulf, Europe, North America, and Africa further amplifies this reach through remittances, investment, and transnational expertise.

None of these momentums, however, can be sustained without security. A capable, nationally legitimate Somali security sector is the foundation for durable stability, investment confidence, and regional integration.

For Gulf states and the wider Arab world, supporting Somalia’s security sector is therefore not an act of altruism. It is a strategic investment in a reliable stabilising partner. Effective Somali security institutions contribute directly to safeguarding Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime corridors, countering transnational terrorism before it reaches Arab shores, protecting emerging logistics infrastructure, and denying external actors opportunities to exploit governance vacuums. Such support must prioritise institution-building, Somali ownership, and long-term sustainability, not short-term fixes or proxy competition.

The stakes are rising. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are entering a period of heightened strategic contestation. Fragmentation along their African coastline poses a direct risk to Arab collective security. Recent developments underscore this urgency.

Israel’s unilateral recognition of the northern Somali region of Somaliland, pursued outside international legal frameworks and without Somali consent, is widely viewed as an attempt to secure a military foothold along these strategic waters, risking the introduction of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf’s security environment.

Even more troubling are emerging narratives advocating the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, with proposals to relocate them to Somaliland against their will. Such ideas, whether formally advanced or not, represent grave violations of international law and human dignity. Exporting the consequences of occupation and war onto African soil would not resolve conflict; it would multiply it.

For the Arab world, this should serve as a wake-up call. Allowing external actors to fragment sovereign states or instrumentalise fragile regions for unresolved conflicts carries long-term consequences. Somalia’s unity and stability, therefore, align squarely with core Arab strategic interests and with longstanding Arab positions on sovereignty, justice and self-determination.

Somalia is ready to be part of the solution. With calibrated strategic support, particularly in security sector development and logistics infrastructure, Somalia can emerge as a cornerstone of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden stability, a gateway to East Africa, and a long-term partner for the Arab world.

The question is no longer whether Somalia matters in the regional and global Red Sea and Gulf of Aden discussions and plans. It is whether the region will act on that reality before others do.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.