Weather & Climate

April 1 (UPI) — April’s full pink moon, the first full moon of spring, will be visible Wednesday night.

Peak viewing will be around 10:11 p.m. Wednesday.

Despite the colorful name, the moon will appear in its normal gray cast. It’s hued name is a tribute to the early bloom of Phlox subulata, a wildflower species native to eastern North America. It’s also known as the Paschal Moon because it happens after the spring equinox, according to the Old Farmer’s Almanac. It’s also known as the Breaking Ice Moon and the Budding Moon of Plants and Shrubs.

The next full moon will be on May 1 and is known as the Flower Moon. There will be two full moons in May, a phenomenon commonly known as a “blue moon.”

The moon may still appear full on Thursday, Noah Petro, chief of NASA’s planetary geology, geophysics and geochemistry laboratory at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Md., told CNN. He suggests finding a place to view the moon away from trees and buildings. The darker the environment, the more you can enjoy the event, he said.

Indigenous peoples call April’s full moon different names, including “kawohni,” meaning flower moon to the Cherokee; “kwiyamuyaw,” meaning moon of windbreak to the Hopi; and “tabehatawi,” meaning frog moon to the Assiniboine, CNN reported.

NASA’s Artemis II launch could also happen Wednesday evening, giving the astronauts a special view of the pink moon.

“When you look at this full moon, the crew may be on their way. They may have just launched,” Petro told CNN. “This will be the last full moon in the pre-Artemis II era, and it will look different not only to the four crew members but to all of us who journey along with them.”

March 17 (UPI) — A magnitude 5.8 earthquake struck eastern Cuba early Tuesday, hours after the island’s national power grid collapsed, leaving nearly the entire country without electricity and compounding an already severe economic and social crisis.

The U.S. Geological Survey reported the quake at magnitude 5.8, while Cuba’s National Seismological Research Center measured it at 6.0. The epicenter was located off the coast of Guantánamo province and was widely felt across eastern Cuba.

State local newspaper Granma reported no fatalities or significant material damage.

The tremor followed the total disconnection of Cuba’s National Electric System shortly before 2 p.m. Monday, the sixth nationwide blackout in roughly 18 months. The Ministry of Energy and Mines said on X that the causes remain under investigation.

The outage left nearly 10 million people without electricity, disrupting water pumping, telecommunications and Internet service. Residents relied on candles, torches and battery-powered radios, according to a report by Mexican broadcaster TV Azteca.

The ministry said the failure affected the entire country, including Havana. The U.S. Embassy in Cuba issued a security alert saying no information was available on when power would be restored.

Energy Minister Vicente de la O Levy said on X that authorities are following established protocols and working to restore electricity to the country’s largest generating units.

Independent outlet Diario de Cuba reported that the government has yet to explain the collapse, which coincided with renewed protests in Havana and growing signs of public discontent.

Officials initially said service was being partially restored through localized “microsystems” in several provinces, prioritizing essential facilities while attempting to restart major thermoelectric plants. Full recovery could take time, especially due to fuel shortages that have limited distributed generation since January.

Frequent blackouts have slowed industrial activity and strained public services nationwide. Recent demonstrations in several cities have resulted in arrests.

Official figures show the Cuban economy has contracted more than 15% since 2020. Much of the state-run industrial sector remains idle and essential services have deteriorated sharply.

Independent experts estimate that fully restoring the power system would require between $8 billion and $10 billion, sums widely seen as beyond the reach of the Cuban economy.

Days after President Miguel Díaz-Canel acknowledged talks with the United States to address longstanding disputes, the government announced measures to allow greater entry of private capital, including from U.S. companies and Cuban expatriates in Miami.

In an interview with state-run Canal Caribe, Vice Prime Minister Óscar Pérez-Oliva Fraga said investors could own private companies on the island and access the financial sector. He confirmed that Cuban emigrants may become partners or owners of private businesses without living in Cuba and may associate with local firms under the Foreign Investment Law.

They also would be allowed to enter the national financial system, open foreign currency accounts and create cooperation and investment funds with authorization from the Central Bank.

Pérez-Oliva Fraga said the measures respond to demands from the diaspora and aim to expand its role in economic development as the government seeks to attract foreign capital and diversify the private sector.

He said “Cuba’s doors are open” to foreign investment, including U.S. companies, while again blaming the U.S. embargo for the island’s energy crisis and fuel shortages.

On Monday, President Donald Trump said he would have “the honor of taking Cuba,” describing the country as weakened after decades of rule by what he called violent leaders.

“You know, all my life I’ve heard about the United States and Cuba. When will the United States have the honor of taking Cuba? That would be a great honor,” Trump said from the Oval Office, according to CNN.

“Taking Cuba in some way, yes, taking Cuba. I mean, whether you free it or take it, I think I can do whatever I want with it,” he added.

His comments came as senior administration officials have repeatedly said a conflict with Iran could end within days and after Trump suggested that Cuba could be next on his agenda.

March 12 (UPI) — Police divers in Australia’s Greater Sunshine Coast region on Thursday recovered the bodies of two missing Chinese backpackers after they were found dead inside their SUV vehicle beneath floodwaters.

The 26-year-old man and 23-year-old woman were found near Kilkivan, 100 miles northwest of Brisbane, after a major search operation by police and the State Emergency Service using helicopters and drones when the pair failed to arrive at their destination.

“Dive squad officers from the state dive unit arrived and retrieved two deceased persons from a car that had been washed off the road at Kilkivan. The formal identification process is still underway but it is believed that the two, as reported, are a 26-year-old male and a 23-year-old female who are international tourists,” said Queensland Police Minister Dan Purdie.

Purdie said their families had been notified and authorities were working with the Chinese Consulate in Brisbane.

Bundaberg Police Chief Inspector Grantley Marcus said the pair were driving from Brisbane to Mundubbera, where they were due to begin jobs picking fruit.

“They didn’t arrive and a friend of theirs from Australia contacted police on Tuesday and reported them as missing.”

Marcus said the families of the deceased were en route to Australia and pledged police would do everything they could to assist them when they arrived.

The couple was named by 7News as Yuchen Guo, 23, from Shandong Province in eastern China, and Qingwei Qiu, 26, from Fujian Province in the southeast of the country.

Extreme rainfall has seen large areas of Queensland hit with severe flooding in recent days, with some river levels still rising. Parts of the state recorded their highest three-day rainfall totals Sunday through Tuesday.

Glen Hartwig, mayor of nearby Gympie, said the deaths of the pair were “an absolute tragedy” and called for more to be done to make tourists aware of the danger from flooding.

“These people have come to Australia to see our beautiful country and tragically they’ve ended up losing their lives. We warn people about biosecurity when they come into the country, but I also think we need to warn them about the dangers of floodwaters,” he said.

“We’re very grateful that they chose to come and see our country and we’re so sorry for their loss and the pain that [family members] are now feeling,” added Hartwig.

March 5 (UPI) — This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Arctic Council, once a hallmark of post-Cold War cooperation in the far north.

For decades, the Arctic Ocean remained at the margins of global power politics — a remote, ice-locked expanse governed largely through scientific collaboration and consensus-based frameworks.

That balance is now shifting. Rapid ice loss is opening seasonal sea lanes, exposing fragile ecosystems and drawing new commercial and strategic interest, even as the suspension of routine cooperation with Russia has strained the council’s role.

The Arctic is emerging as a maritime crossroads where environmental risk, economic ambition and intensifying geopolitical competition increasingly converge.

Established by the 1996 Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council — bringing together eight Arctic states from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden the United States, Indigenous permanent participants and observers including China — remains the region’s central forum for coordinating science, environmental policy and cooperative governance. Despite mounting geopolitical strain, it continues to provide an institutional platform that could support future U.S.-China maritime cooperation in the Arctic.

Recent diplomacy suggests that even as tensions rise across trade, technology and security, cooperation is still possible when interests align.

The 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, in force since 2021, offers a case in point. By imposing a 16-year moratorium on commercial fishing while joint scientific research assesses the ecosystem, the pact places precaution ahead of competition and provides a model for managing emerging Arctic risks.

The significance of the fisheries decision should not be understated. The agreement brought together Arctic coastal states and distant-water fishing powers, including Washington and Beijing, to manage a region where no fisheries regime previously existed.

In doing so, it transformed an ungoverned expanse of high seas into a shared space of stewardship — governed not by territorial claims, but by science, restraint and a shared recognition of ecological risk.

“The Arctic Council is a dedicated body creating a platform for collaboration built on consensus. It is far from perfect, but it has produced a number of highly influential assessments and created an international community devoted to cooperation and shared stewardship,” said Henry P. Huntington, arctic science director of the Ocean Conservancy.

Science diplomacy as a foundation

For the United States, the Arctic is a strategic frontier and an environmental priority, tied to maritime access, national defense, Indigenous livelihoods and ecological protection.

For China, it is an emerging arena of economic opportunity and global governance engagement. Beijing’s self-description as a “near-Arctic state,” combined with its investments in polar research, ice-capable vessels and Arctic shipping studies, reflects a broader ambition to participate in shaping the rules that will govern the region’s future.

International law scholar Michael Byers said China’s Arctic posture differs sharply from its behavior in the South China Sea. While Beijing has strategic interests in the region through its “Polar Silk Road,” it has no territorial claims in the Arctic and has largely operated within the existing legal framework.

In contrast to its role as a resident power in the South China Sea, Byers notes that China presents itself in the Arctic as a “near-Arctic state,” focused on resource access and emerging shipping routes — a presence that Arctic nations are watching more closely as its footprint grows.

Despite competing strategic interests, both countries share a clear objective: preventing a governance vacuum in the Arctic. The fisheries accord underscores that even amid rivalry, Washington and Moscow recognize the dangers of unregulated exploitation in fragile waters and the need for baseline rules. As such, the agreement serves not only as a conservation tool, but as a diplomatic signal that pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic remains possible.

At its center is a commitment to joint scientific research. Participating states will collaborate to monitor fish stocks, map Arctic ecosystems and assess climate impacts, generating the shared data needed to determine whether any future fishing can be conducted sustainably.

“The Arctic Council’s 30th anniversary finds its consensus-based structure severely tested. Western states suspended cooperation with Russia in 2022, effectively paralyzing what was once exemplary post-Cold War diplomacy,” said Pavel Devyatkin, a senior associate at the Arctic Institute. He said the council’s experience offers practical lessons for managing contested waters elsewhere, including the South China Sea.

Arctic marine science has long bridged geopolitical divides, including cooperation with China, showing how shared environmental risks can transcend political tension. As Devyatkin noted, the region offers a clear lesson: ecological disruption can outweigh traditional security concerns. When U.S.-Russia fisheries monitoring was suspended, key data gaps emerged just as warming waters pushed fish stocks northward — a cautionary signal for any contested maritime region facing climate-driven change.

China’s Arctic engagement is anchored in scientific diplomacy. Unlike more securitized theaters such as the South China Sea, Beijing has framed its Arctic role around cooperation, climate research and environmental stewardship. Its Yellow River Station in Svalbard has supported long-term research since 2004, while icebreakers such as Xue Long and Xue Long 2, along with polar-capable satellites, have expanded China’s research reach and technological presence in the region.

At the same time, Western policymakers remain cautious about the potential dual-use nature of these activities. Concerns focus on whether data gathered from satellites, seabed mapping or subsea systems could support military applications. U.S. and NATO officials have questioned how China might use its growing Arctic data capabilities.

The model reflects a broader principle of science diplomacy — one that has long shaped cooperation in contested maritime regions. Scientific collaboration provides a low-politics entry point for engagement, allowing rival states to build trust, exchange data and establish working relationships even when political tensions remain high.

“Marine science is an area that can promote international cooperation. That is true in many contexts, including in relation to the next International Polar Year collaborations currently being planned, that will include China,” claimed Evan T. Bloom, polar governance chair at the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.

Collaborative mapping of sensitive habitats could inform conservation planning and risk management. Even the design of Arctic marine protected areas, an issue gaining attention as part of global “30 by 30” conservation goals, could become a platform for coordinated policy development.

From fisheries to shipping and conservation

Shipping governance is emerging as the next test of whether U.S.-China scientific cooperation can translate into operational rules in the Arctic. As sea ice recedes, a transpolar route linking Asia, Europe and North America could reshape global trade, but the region remains poorly charted, remote and environmentally fragile, with high risks of accidents and long-term damage.

Analysts say a cooperative framework on Arctic shipping, covering safety standards, environmental protections, data sharing and emergency response, could reduce those risks. Joint monitoring of ice and vessel traffic, coordinated search-and-rescue protocols and agreed-upon environmental rules for polar operations would form the backbone of such an approach.

Marine conservation offers another pathway for cooperation. The precautionary logic underpinning the fisheries agreement aligns with broader global efforts to expand ocean protection and safeguard biodiversity.

The United States and China have expanded marine protected areas domestically and have endorsed international conservation targets. Extending that logic to the Arctic through coordinated conservation zones or networks of protected areas would reinforce ecological resilience while creating a stabilizing framework for governance.

Such initiatives also would resonate with a wider global trend: the recognition that environmental security and geopolitical stability are increasingly intertwined. As climate change accelerates, the management of shared ecosystems is becoming a central component of international relations. The Arctic, like the South China Sea or the Mediterranean, is emerging as a test case for how science-based stewardship can mitigate strategic rivalry.

The obstacles to deeper cooperation, however, remain substantial. The broader U.S.-China relationship is marked by strategic distrust, trade disputes and military competition. Arctic policy cannot be entirely insulated from tensions in other theaters, including the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also disrupted Arctic diplomacy, limiting the functioning of multilateral bodies such as the Arctic Council and injecting new security concerns into the region.

Trust remains a central obstacle.

Washington remains wary of Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions in the Arctic, particularly the dual-use potential of infrastructure and emerging shipping routes.

Beijing casts itself as a legitimate stakeholder in global commons governance and is pressing for a greater role in shaping the rules of the evolving Arctic order.

At the same time, Russia’s continued isolation from Arctic Council processes since 2022 has pushed Moscow to seek new partners, further complicating the diplomatic landscape and slowing meaningful progress on joint conservation efforts for Arctic flora and fauna.

Against that backdrop, any expansion of cooperation will need to be incremental, transparent and anchored in verifiable scientific collaboration. The fisheries agreement provides a template: begin with a shared risk, rely on joint science, build institutional mechanisms and create habits of cooperation over time. That process is gradual, but it can be durable.

.