A magnitude 6.3 earthquake has shaken northern Afghanistan, killing at least 20 people and injuring more than 500, a health official says, adding that the numbers could increase.
The quake’s epicentre on Monday was located 22km (14 miles) west-southwest of the town of Khulm, and it struck at 12:59am (20:29 GMT on Sunday) at a depth of 28km (17 miles), the United States Geological Survey said.
Sharafat Zaman, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Public Health, said 534 injured people and 20 bodies had been brought to hospitals in Balkh and Samangan provinces. Rescuers were on the scene and the figures were changing, he added.
In the nearby province of Badakhshan, the quake damaged or destroyed 800 houses in one village in the Shahr-e-Bozorg district, said Ihsanullah Kamgar, spokesperson for the provincial police headquarters.
However, due to a lack of internet service in the remote area, there were still no accurate casualty figures, he added.
Yousaf Hammad, a spokesperson for the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, said most of the injured suffered minor wounds and were discharged after treatment.
In the Afghan capital, Kabul, the Ministry of Defence announced that rescue and emergency teams had reached the quake-affected areas in Balkh and Samangan, which suffered the most damage, and were transporting the injured and assisting others.
The Defence Ministry said a rockslide briefly blocked a main mountain highway linking Kabul with Mazar-i-Sharif but the road was later reopened. It said some people who had been injured and trapped along the highway were transported to hospital.
For decades, Afghanistan has been dubbed the “graveyard of empires,” but a more enduring and painful truth is its role as a chessboard for regional rivalries. Today, a dangerous new chapter is unfolding: a tense disconnect between escalating violence on the ground and a quiet diplomatic normalization in foreign capitals. As powers like India recalibrate their stance toward the Taliban, a critical question emerges: is engagement building a pathway to peace, or merely rewarding impunity? In an exclusive Q&A, Mr. Masoud Andarabi, Afghanistan’s former Minister of Interior and Acting Director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), issues a stark warning from the front lines of this crisis: without verifiable conditions, this new diplomatic track risks cementing Afghanistan’s status as a proxy battlefield and an incubator for global terrorism, all while its people endure a silent crisis of “generational trauma.”
The Dangerous Illusion of Normalization
Q: In your article for Cipher Brief, you describe a “dangerous two-track dynamic” of kinetic escalation on the ground and diplomatic normalization in capitals. Given that India’s engagement with the Taliban seems to grant them legitimacy without verifiable commitments, what specific, verifiable actions should a power like India demand from the Taliban before such high-level visits to avoid fueling this dynamic?
A: India should set clear, verifiable conditions before any high-level engagement with the Taliban. At a minimum, New Delhi should insist on three measurable actions:
Restoration of women’s rights – including the right to education and employment.
Concrete counterterrorism steps – such as dismantling safe havens and arresting members of al-Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Protection of former Afghan security personnel – many of whom fought terrorism with Indian support and are now being detained, tortured, or executed by the Taliban.
The Taliban continues to persecute minorities, suppress free media, and rule through coercion, not consent. India, as the world’s largest democracy, should not normalize relations with an authoritarian movement that denies fundamental rights and harbors transnational militants. Engagement without conditions only reinforces the Taliban’s impunity and erodes regional security.
Q: You characterize the actions of both Delhi and Islamabad not as malice but as “strategic realism.” Does this mean that for Afghanistan to achieve stability, it must fundamentally accept that its neighbors will always act in their own competitive interests, and simply try to manage it?
A: Yes. Based on my own experience in Afghanistan, stability requires accepting a difficult reality: our neighbors will always act through the lens of their own national interests. The task for any Afghan government is not to escape this rivalry, but to manage it with discipline and balance.
During the Republic, India maintained four consulates in Afghanistan—two of them near the Pakistani border. That decision deeply alarmed Islamabad and fueled Pakistan’s perception that Afghan territory was being used to encircle it. Such steps may have had diplomatic value, but they carried strategic costs that were never fully weighed.
Going forward, Afghanistan must adopt a policy of strict neutrality—restricting both Indian and Pakistani use of its soil for competitive ends, while focusing on national interests above regional alignments. Stability will come not from choosing sides, but from ensuring that no side can use Afghanistan as a platform for its rivalry.
Q: Regarding your proposal for “conditional engagement,” what is a single, achievable benchmark on counter-terrorism that the international community could universally demand from Kabul, and how could it be verified in a way that is convincing to both the West and regional powers?
A: A single, achievable benchmark on counterterrorism should be the verifiable dismantling of terrorist training and recruitment networks inside Afghanistan, including those linked to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Verification must not rely on Taliban assurances. It should involve independent monitoring through UNAMA, supported by satellite imagery, shared intelligence from regional and Western partners, and credible field reporting. Only external verification can make any Taliban commitment meaningful.
Current backchannel intelligence contacts between the Taliban and Western agencies may offer short-term tactical benefits, but they carry long-term risks. The Taliban’s continued expansion of radical madrasas, its protection of foreign militants, and its repression of women’s education all point to a future threat environment in the making.
Without verifiable counterterrorism action, engagement risks legitimizing Afghanistan’s return as a sanctuary for global terrorism. Conditional engagement must therefore combine immediate, measurable security steps with sustained political pressure for broader governance and, ultimately, elections that allow Afghans to determine their own future.
The Regional Quagmire: A Shared Threat to All
Q: Pakistan’s deep leverage inside Afghanistan is well-documented, but it has also resulted in significant blowback, including attacks from groups like the TTP. From your perspective, is Pakistan’s current policy a net strategic gain or loss for its own national security?
A: Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan has been a net strategic loss for its own national security. For decades, Islamabad has pursued the illusion that supporting proxy groups could secure influence in Kabul. This approach began in the 1990s under Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar, when Pakistan helped create and arm the Taliban, a policy that ultimately contributed to the conditions leading to 9/11. After 2008, Pakistan repeated the same mistake, backing the Taliban’s resurgence. The result today is a regime that harbors transnational militants and allows the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate freely, threatening Pakistan itself.
Islamabad’s strategy has produced instability, international isolation, and the empowerment of extremist actors beyond its control. For Afghanistan’s de facto authorities, the lesson is clear: do not be drawn into the India–Pakistan rivalry. Kabul must restrict the use of Afghan soil against any neighbor, monitor foreign influence carefully, and assure both Delhi and Islamabad that Afghanistan will not serve as a platform for proxy competition. True stability will come only when Afghanistan acts as a neutral, sovereign state, neither a client nor a battlefield for others. And I believe a true democracy in Afghanistan can assure that.
Q: You propose a U.S.-led regional security initiative with monitoring mechanisms. Given the profound distrust between India and Pakistan, what would be a truly impartial body capable of monitoring such a pact? The UN? A coalition of neutral states?
A: Given the level of distrust between India and Pakistan and the nuclear dimension of their rivalry, a hybrid mechanism combining the United Nations with select neutral states would offer the most realistic path forward. The UN provides legitimacy and an existing framework for conflict monitoring, while a coalition of neutral states like Japan, could bring technical credibility and political distance from regional rivalries.
The United States should play a catalytic and convening role, even if its direct influence is limited. Washington’s engagement, alongside China and key UN partners, could help establish minimal confidence-building measures: verified incident reporting along the border, humanitarian coordination, and early-warning systems for escalation.
The June clashes underscored how quickly border violence between two nuclear-armed neighbors can spiral. It’s time for the U.S., China, and the UN to take a more active role in preventing South Asia’s oldest rivalry from becoming its most dangerous flashpoint.
Q: Your analysis focuses on India and Pakistan. How does China’s growing engagement with both Kabul and Islamabad—and its own security concerns about Uyghur militancy—complicate or perhaps even offer a solution to this entrenched India-Pakistan rivalry on Afghan soil?
A: China’s engagement with both Kabul and Islamabad is narrow and security-driven, not transformative. Beijing’s primary concern is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the risk of Uyghur militancy spilling into Xinjiang. Through close coordination with Pakistan and calculative engagement with the Taliban, China seeks to ensure ETIM remains contained, rather than to address Afghanistan’s broader instability.
While Chinese investments and economic outreach may give the appearance of regional engagement, Beijing’s strategy remains transactional and defensive, focused on countering specific threats, not building regional order. This limited approach neither resolves nor balances the India–Pakistan rivalry. If anything, China’s alignment with Pakistan reinforces the asymmetry in South Asia and risks deepening rather than mitigating the competition on Afghan soil.
The Path to Sovereignty: Neutrality and Legitimacy
Q: You’ve argued compellingly that external competition “saps Afghan agency.” In your view, what is the single most important step the Taliban’s de facto authorities could take right now to assert genuine sovereignty and reduce their vulnerability to being used as a proxy battlefield?
A: The single most important step the Taliban could take to assert genuine sovereignty is to return power to the Afghan people through free and inclusive elections. No state can claim true sovereignty while denying its citizens the right to choose their leaders. The Taliban’s current authoritarian model has isolated Afghanistan, empowered foreign interference, and turned the country into a proxy arena for regional powers.
By restoring democratic participation, allowing political diversity, women’s involvement, and media freedom, the Taliban would move from ruling by force to governing by legitimacy. Only then could Afghanistan reclaim genuine sovereignty and begin to shape its own future, independent of external manipulation.
Q: Finally, looking beyond crisis management, what is the first, most critical step in shifting Afghanistan’s trajectory from being a “chessboard for others’ strategies” back toward a truly sovereign state that determines its own future?
A: The first and most critical step is for Afghanistan to restore genuine neutrality—to stay out of the India–Pakistan rivalry and manage both relationships with strategic balance. Past governments, particularly during the Republic, had opportunities to do so but failed, despite strong international support. Instead, foreign competition seeped into Afghan politics, eroding sovereignty from within.
Moving forward, Afghanistan must rebuild legitimacy through democracy, not repression. Some argue that democracy cannot work in Afghanistan, but that view ignores the will of the Afghan people. Afghans risked their lives to vote—even losing fingers to prove their commitment. The Republic did not fail because Afghans rejected democracy; it failed because of poor leadership and mismanagement, both domestically and in foreign policy.
True sovereignty will come only when Afghans are again allowed to choose their leaders freely and when their government serves national interests rather than foreign agendas. Neutrality in regional politics and legitimacy at home are the twin pillars of a stable, independent Afghanistan.
Q: You state that the human cost is the “clearest metric of failure.” Beyond displacement and livelihoods, what is one less-discussed, tangible impact of this proxy war on the daily lives of ordinary Afghans that the world is missing?
A: When we talk about failure in Afghanistan, the clearest metric isn’t just economic collapse , it’s generational trauma.
Beyond displacement and loss of livelihood, the most enduring cost of this proxy war is the generational loss of normalcy. In nearly every Afghan village, there is a family that has lost someone—a father, a son, a husband—to four decades of conflict. Few countries have endured such continuous trauma. The wars of the mujahideen era, the Taliban’s rise, the Republic’s fall, and now renewed regional rivalries have left almost no Afghan household untouched.
Education and healthcare systems have collapsed, women and children bear the greatest suffering, and an entire generation has grown up knowing only conflict. This is not just a humanitarian tragedy—it is a strategic one. A population stripped of opportunity becomes vulnerable to radicalization and manipulation. If the current India–Pakistan tensions spill further into Afghanistan, they risk igniting yet another cycle of destruction that Afghans can no longer afford to endure.
This sobering assessment leaves no room for ambiguity: the current path of unconditional engagement rewards impunity and fuels regional insecurity. The alternative is a dual mandate. Externally, powers like India and Pakistan must anchor diplomacy to verifiable acts—on women’s rights, counter-terrorism, and protection of allies. Internally, the only exit from this cycle is for the Taliban to exchange coercion for consent. True sovereignty will not be gifted by neighbors nor won through proxy battles; it will be earned only when Afghans are once again allowed to choose their own leaders. The nation’s future hinges on this shift from being a chessboard for others to becoming a sovereign state for its people.
Islamabad, Pakistan – After three days, talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Istanbul, aimed at ending a tense and violent standoff between the South Asian neighbours, appeared to have hit a wall in Istanbul on Tuesday.
But even though officials and experts said that “last-ditch” efforts were expected to continue to try to pull the two countries back from a full-fledged conflict, the prospects of new hostilities between them loom large after their inability, so far, to build on the Doha truce, analysts say.
Pakistani security officials said that on Monday, talks went on for nearly 18 hours. But they accused the Afghan delegation of changing its position on Islamabad’s central demand – that Kabul crack down on the Pakistan Taliban armed group, known by the acronym TTP. One official, speaking to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the dialogue, alleged that the “instructions received from Kabul” for the Afghan team were complicating negotiations.
Kabul, however, blamed the Pakistani delegation for a “lack of coordination,” claiming the Pakistani side was “not presenting clear arguments” and kept “leaving the negotiating table”, Afghan media reported.
The Afghan team is being led by the deputy minister for administrative affairs at the Ministry of Interior, Haji Najib, while Pakistan has not publicly disclosed its representatives.
United States President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly sought credit for resolving global conflicts, also waded in, saying he would “solve the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis very quickly”, while speaking to reporters on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN) summit in Malaysia earlier in the week.
Yet, any long-term settlement appears difficult due to the two nations’ “profound mutual distrust and conflicting priorities”, said Baqir Sajjad Syed, a former Pakistan fellow at the Wilson Center and a journalist who covers national security.
Syed added that their historical grievances and Pakistan’s past interventions in Afghanistan make concessions politically risky for the Afghan Taliban.
“In my view, the core issue is ideological alignment. The Afghan Taliban’s dependence on TTP for dealing with internal security problems [inside Afghanistan] makes it difficult for them to dissociate from the group, despite Pakistani concerns,” he told Al Jazeera.
A fraught friendship
Historically, Pakistan was long perceived as the primary patron of the Afghan Taliban. Many in Pakistan publicly welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 after the withdrawal of US forces.
But relations have sharply deteriorated since, largely over the TTP, an armed group that emerged in 2007 during the US-led so-called “war on terror”, and which has waged a long campaign against Islamabad.
Pakistani security personnel have faced increasing attacks from the TTP armed group [Fayaz Aziz/Reuters]
The TTP seeks the release of its members imprisoned in Pakistan and opposes the merger of Pakistan’s former tribal areas into its Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Although independent from the Afghan Taliban, the two groups are ideologically aligned.
Islamabad accuses Kabul of providing sanctuary not only to the TTP but to other groups, including the Balochistan Liberation Army and the ISIL (ISIS) affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP), charges Kabul denies.
The Afghan Taliban have insisted that the TTP is a Pakistani problem, repeatedly arguing that insecurity in Pakistan is a domestic matter. And the Taliban have themselves long viewed the ISKP as enemies.
Mullah Yaqoob, Afghanistan’s defence minister who signed the ceasefire in Doha with his Pakistani counterpart, Khawaja Asif, last week, said in an interview on October 19 that states sometimes used the label “terrorism” for political ends.
“There is no universal or clear definition of terrorism,” he said, adding that any government can brand its adversaries as “terrorists” for its own agenda.
Meanwhile, regional powers including Iran, Russia, China, and several Central Asian states have also urged the Taliban to eliminate the TTP and other armed groups allegedly operating from Afghanistan.
That appeal was renewed in Moscow in early October, in consultations also attended by Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs Amir Khan Muttaqi.
Rising toll, rising tensions
In recent days, several attacks have killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers, including officers.
The year 2024 was among Pakistan’s deadliest in nearly a decade, with more than 2,500 casualties recorded, and 2025 is on track to surpass that, analysts say.
Both civilians and security personnel have been targeted, with most attacks concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. TTP operations have increased sharply in both frequency and intensity.
“Our data show that the TTP engaged in at least 600 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the past year alone. Its activity in 2025 so far already exceeds that seen in all of 2024,” a recent Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) report said.
Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, an Islamabad-based security analyst, says that Pakistani negotiators must recognise that ties between the Taliban and the TTP are rooted in ideology, making it hard for Afghanistan’s government to give up on the anti-Pakistan armed group.
Journalist Sami Yousafzai, a longtime observer of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, agreed, saying that the prospects of a détente now look increasingly remote.
Both Mehsud and Yousafzai pointed to the Taliban’s history of sticking by allies even in the face of international pressure, and even military assault.
“We have seen this same attitude from the Afghan Taliban in 2001, when, after the 9/11 attacks, they continued to remain steadfastly with Al al-Qaeda,” Mehsud said.
According to Yousafzai, “the Afghan Taliban are war veterans, and they can withstand military pressure”.
Failed diplomacy?
In recent months, both sides have pursued diplomacy, nudged also by China, which has mediated talks between them, in addition to Qatar and Turkiye.
Yet, analysts say Islamabad might soon conclude that it has few nonmilitary options to address its concerns.
Syed pointed to Pakistani Defence Minister Asif’s recent threat of an “open war” and said that these comments could presage targeted air strikes or cross-border operations against alleged TTP sanctuaries in Afghanistan.
“That said, mediators, particularly Qatar and Turkiye, are expected to make a last-ditch push to revive dialogue or shift it to another venue. There is also a small possibility of other countries joining in, especially after President Trump’s latest signal of readiness to step in and de-escalate the crisis,” he said.
Syed said that economic incentives, including aid, in exchange for compliance with ceasefire provisions could be one way to get the neighbours to avoid a full-fledged military conflict.
This is a tool Trump has used in recent months in other wars, including in getting Thailand and Cambodia to stop fighting after border clashes. The US president oversaw the signing of a peace deal between the Southeast Asian nations in Kuala Lumpur last weekend.
Afghan Defence Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid and Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif shake hands following the signing of a ceasefire agreement, during negotiations in Doha, Qatar, October 19, 2025 [Handout/Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Reuters]
Unintended consequences
While Pakistan has far superior military capabilities, the Taliban has advantages, too, say analysts, cautioning against overconfidence on the part of Islamabad.
Yousafzai argued that the crisis with Pakistan had helped bolster domestic support for the Taliban, and military action against it could further elevate sympathy for the group.
“The response by the Afghan Taliban of attacking the Pakistani military on [the] border was seen as a forceful response, increasing their popularity. And even if Pakistan continues to bomb, it could end up killing innocent civilians, leading to more resentment and anti-Pakistani sentiment in [the] public and among [the] Afghan Taliban,” he said.
This dynamic, according to Yousafzai, should be worrying for Islamabad, particularly if the Taliban’s supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, steps in.
“If Akhunzada issues an edict, declaring Jihad against Pakistan, many young Afghans could potentially join the ranks of [the] Taliban,” Yousafzai warned. “Even if it will mean a bigger loss for Afghans, the situation will not be good for Pakistan.”
The only beneficiary, he said, would be the TTP, which will feel even more emboldened “to launch attacks against the Pakistani military”.
Fighting comes as Taliban submits proposal at Pakistan-Afghanistan talks in Turkiye, while Islamabad warns of ‘open war’ if deal fails.
Published On 26 Oct 202526 Oct 2025
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Fresh clashes near the border with Afghanistan have killed at least five Pakistani soldiers and 25 fighters, Pakistan’s army says, even as the two countries hold peace talks in Istanbul.
The Pakistani military said armed men attempted to cross from Afghanistan into Kurram and North Waziristan on Friday and Saturday, accusing the Taliban authorities of failing to act against armed groups operating from Afghan territory.
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It said on Sunday that the attempted infiltrations raised questions over Kabul’s commitment to tackling “terrorism emanating from its soil”.
Afghanistan’s Taliban government has not commented on the latest clashes, but has repeatedly rejected accusations of harbouring armed fighters and instead accuses Pakistan of violating Afghan sovereignty with air strikes.
Delegations from both countries arrived in Istanbul, Turkiye on Saturday for talks aimed at preventing a return to full-scale conflict. The meeting comes days after Qatar and Turkiye brokered a ceasefire in Doha to halt the most serious border fighting since the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 2021.
The violence earlier this month killed dozens and wounded hundreds.
‘Open war’
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said the ceasefire remains intact and that Kabul appears interested in peace, but warned that failure in Istanbul would leave Islamabad with “open war” as an option.
Pakistan’s military described those involved in the weekend infiltrations as members of what it calls “Fitna al-Khwarij”, a term it uses for ideologically motivated armed groups allegedly backed by foreign sponsors.
United States President Donald Trump also weighed in on Sunday, saying he would “solve the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis very quickly”, telling reporters on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia that he had been briefed on the ongoing talks.
Separately, Taliban-controlled broadcaster RTA said on Sunday that Kabul’s delegation in Turkiye had submitted a proposal after more than 15 hours of discussions, calling for Pakistan to end cross-border strikes and block any “anti-Afghan group” from using its territory.
The Afghan side also signalled openness to a four-party monitoring mechanism to supervise the ceasefire and investigate violations.
Afghanistan’s delegation is led by Deputy Interior Minister Haji Najib. Pakistan has not publicly disclosed its representatives.
Analysts expect the core of the talks to revolve around intelligence-sharing, allowing Islamabad to hand over coordinates of suspected Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters for the Taliban to take direct action, instead of Pakistan launching its own strikes.
Islamabad, Pakistan – Allah Meer’s parents were among the millions of Afghans who fled their country after the then-Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
His family settled in a refugee village in Kohat in northwestern Pakistan. That’s where Meer, now 45, was born. Meer says that more than 200 members of his extended family made the journey from Afghanistan to Pakistan, which has been their home ever since.
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Over the past two years, as Pakistan has moved to send back hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, the family has feared for its future, but managed to evade Islamabad’s dragnet.
Last week, the threat of expulsion hit home: Pakistan announced it would close all 54 Afghan refugee villages across the country as part of the campaign it began in 2023 to push out what it calls “illegal foreigners”. These include the villages in Kohat, where Meer and his family live.
“In my life, I visited Afghanistan only once, for two weeks in 2013. Apart from that, none of my family have ever gone back,” Meer told Al Jazeera. “How can I uproot everything when we were born here, lived here, married here, and buried our loved ones here?”
Amid heightened tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban, which returned to governing Afghanistan in 2021, families like Meer’s are caught in a vortex of uncertainty.
Fighting erupted between Afghan and Pakistani forces along the border earlier in October, pushing already strained relations into open hostility. On Sunday, officials from both sides met in Qatar’s capital, Doha, and signed a ceasefire agreement, with the next round of talks scheduled in Istanbul on October 25.
Yet, tensions remain high. And families like Meer’s fear that they could become diplomatic pawns in a border war between the neighbours.
From welcome to expulsion
Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As civil war gripped Afghanistan and the Taliban first rose to power in 1996, successive waves of Afghans fled across the border.
After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 following the September 11 attacks on the US, the Taliban’s fall prompted thousands of Afghans to return home. But their return was short-lived.
The Taliban’s stunning comeback in August 2021 triggered yet another exodus, when another 600,000 to 800,000 Afghans sought refuge in Pakistan.
However, as relations between Kabul and Islamabad soured during the past four years, Pakistan – which was once the Taliban’s principal patron – accused Afghanistan of harbouring armed groups responsible for the cross-border attacks. The government’s stance hardened towards Afghan refugees, even those who have lived in the country for decades – like Meer.
An Afghan man rests in a mosquito net tent beside a loaded truck as he prepares to return to Afghanistan, in August, outside the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation centre in Nowshera, Pakistan [Fayaz Aziz/Reuters]
A father of 10, Meer earned a degree in education from a university in Peshawar, and now runs a vocational training project for Afghan refugee children backed by the United Nations refugee agency, the UNHCR.
Since 2006, the UNHCR has issued what are known as Proof of Registration (PoR) cards to document Afghan citizens living in Pakistan. These cards have allowed them to stay in Pakistan legally, giving them some freedom of movement, although this is restricted, as well as access to some public services, including bank accounts.
But from June 30 this year, the Pakistani government has stopped renewing PoR cards and has invalidated existing ones.
“We all possess the UNHCR-issued Proof of Residence cards, but now, with this current drive, I don’t know what will happen,” Meer said.
In 2017, Pakistan also started issuing Afghan Citizenship Cards (ACC) to undocumented Afghan nationals living in the country, giving them identification credentials to provide them with a temporary legal status.
But the ACC is not a protection against deportation any more.
According to the UNHCR, more than 1.5 million Afghans left Pakistan – voluntarily or forcibly – between the start of the campaign in 2023 and mid-October, 2025.
‘Illegal in our home’
About 1.2 million PoR cardholders, 737,000 ACC holders and 115,000 asylum seekers remain in Pakistan, Qaiser Khan Afridi, the UNHCR’s spokesperson in Pakistan, told Al Jazeera.
Pakistan’s tensions with the Taliban have added new precarity to their status.
“For over 45 years, Pakistan has shown extraordinary generosity by hosting millions of Afghan refugees,” Afridi said. “But we are deeply concerned by the government’s decision to de-notify refugee villages all over Pakistan and to push for returns [to Afghanistan].”
“Many of those affected have lived here for years, and now fear for their future. We urge that any return should be voluntary, gradual, and carried out with dignity and safety.”
Meer, who has volunteered for the UNHCR over the years, said that seven refugee villages in Kohat alone house more than 100,000 people. He accused both Pakistan and Afghanistan of using the refugee issue as political leverage.
“With the latest situation, our family elders have sat together to discuss options. We thought about sending some of our young men to Afghanistan to look for houses and means to do business, but the problem is, we have no connections there at all,” he said.
With his PoR card now invalidated by the Pakistani government, he has no recognised identity card, making it hard for him to access even medical facilities when his children need treatment for any illness.
“We are, for all practical purposes, considered illegal in a country that I and my children call home,” he said.
Caught between borders
Pakistan’s plan to expel Afghan residents began in late 2023, amid a rise in rebe attacks. Since then, violence has surged, with 2025 shaping up to be the most violent year in a decade.
Pakistani authorities argue Afghan refugees pose a security risk, accusing the Taliban government of sheltering armed groups, a charge Kabul denies.
Two years ago, Pakistan’s then interior minister, Sarfraz Bugti, alleged that 14 out of 24 suicide bombings in the country in 2023 were carried out by Afghan nationals. He did not provide any evidence to back his claim, and he did not clarify if the individuals were refugees living in Pakistan, or Afghan nationals who had crossed the porous border between the two countries.
But Meer fears that Afghan refugees in Pakistan will be distrusted back in Afghanistan, too, given the climate of animosity between the neighbours.
“We will be seen as Pakistanis, as enemies there, too,” he said.
Afridi, the UNHCR spokesperson, urged Pakistan to reconsider its repatriation drive.
“UNHCR calls on the government to apply measures to exempt Afghans with international protection needs from involuntary return,” he said.
“Pakistan has a proud history of hospitality, and it’s important to continue that tradition at this critical time,” he said.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to an “immediate ceasefire” after a week of deadly clashes along their border, as the ties between the two South Asian neighbours plunged to their lowest point since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
Both countries agreed to stop fighting and work towards “lasting peace and stability” after peace talks in Doha, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on Sunday, about the deal it mediated alongside Turkiye.
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Dozens of people have been killed and hundreds wounded in the worst bout of violence in recent years. The violence erupted on October 11 at multiple fronts along their 2,600km (1,600-mile) border, after Islamabad allegedly carried out strikes in Kabul and the southeastern province of Paktika against what it said were armed groups linked to attacks inside Pakistan.
So, what do we know about the truce agreement and what might come next?
What do we know about the ceasefire?
After a round of negotiations between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the Qatari capital, Doha, “the two sides agreed to an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries,” Qatar’s Foreign Ministry announced in a statement.
“The two parties also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in the coming days to ensure the sustainability of the ceasefire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner, thus contributing to achieving security and stability in both countries,” the statement added.
Following the Qatari ministry’s statement, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif posted confirmation of the deal on X.
“Cross-border terrorism from Afghan territory will cease immediately,” Asif wrote. “Both countries will respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Asif further confirmed a “follow-up meeting between the delegations is scheduled to take place in the Turkish city of Istanbul on October 25 to discuss the matters in detail.”
Residents remove debris from a house damaged by Wednesday’s two drone attacks, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, October 16, 2025 [Siddiqullah Alizai/AP Photo]
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said the truce was “the first step in the right direction”.
“We look forward to the establishment of a concrete and verifiable monitoring mechanism, in the next meeting to be hosted by Turkiye, to address the menace of terrorism emanating from Afghan soil towards Pakistan. It is important to put all efforts in place to prevent any further loss of lives,” he posted on X.
Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban spokesperson, said that under the terms of the agreement, “both sides reaffirm their commitment to peace, mutual respect, and the maintenance of strong and constructive neighbourly relations.
“Both sides are committed to resolving issues and disputes through dialogue,” Mujahid said in a post on X. “It has been decided that neither country will undertake any hostile actions against the other, nor will they support groups carrying out attacks against the Government of Pakistan.”
Mujahid said the countries have agreed on refraining “from targeting each other’s security forces, civilians, or critical infrastructure”.
Mujahid, as well as Dar and Asif, thanked Qatar and Turkiye for their role in facilitating the talks that led to the ceasefire.
Why Pakistan has blamed the Taliban for attacks inside its territory?
Pakistan wants the Taliban to rein in armed groups such as the Taliban Pakistan, known by the acronym TTP, and others blamed for carrying out attacks on its territory. Armed attacks by TTP rebels and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which operates in the resource-rich Balochistan province, have surged in recent years, with 2025 on track to become the deadliest year.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, which border Afghanistan, have borne the brunt of the violence.
At least 2,414 deaths have been recorded in the first three quarters of this year, according to the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an Islamabad-based think tank.
Pakistan and the Taliban, once allies over shared regional security interests, have fallen out as Islamabad claims that Afghanistan is giving haven to the TTP – an allegation Kabul has rejected.
Kabul and Islamabad have also clashed over their international border, called the Durand Line, which is recognised by Pakistan but not by Afghanistan.
TTP’s ideology is aligned with the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the groups have different goals and operate independently.
Pakistan has sought assurances from the Taliban that these groups, which operate in the porous border regions with Afghanistan, will not be allowed to operate freely and that the attacks across the border will cease.
In a post later on Sunday, Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman, stressed that the Afghan soil “will not be allowed to be used against any other country”. It is “the consistent stance of the Islamic Emirate” he said, referring to the official name of the Afghanistan government.
“It does not support any attack against anyone and has always emphasised this stance,” he posted on X.
People bring a man, who was injured in the border clashes between Pakistan and Afghan forces, for medical treatment at a hospital in Chaman, a town on the Pakistan side of the border, on October 15, 2025 [H Achakzai/AP Photo]
Islamabad also wants the Taliban to prevent the regrouping or expansion of anti-Pakistan networks within Afghanistan, which the government considers a threat to Pakistan’s stability and broader regional strategy.
Abdullah Baheer, a political analyst based in Kabul, said the bombing of Afghanistan and killing of civilians is “a problematic model”.
“Show me one piece of evidence that shows they hit any TTP operative in Afghanistan in the past week of bombing, despite the 50-odd dead and 550 injured,” he told Al Jazeera.
He added that the TTP is a local rebel group within Pakistan that far precedes the Taliban’s coming to power in Afghanistan. “Are you expecting the Taliban to come forth and stop the TTP from pursuing any of its political or military goals?” he asked.
“Let’s take the argument that TTP are operating from safe havens within Afghanistan. The question is, you mistake influence over a group that is an independent group to an extent of controlling them,” he added.
As previously mentioned, the Taliban denies providing safe haven to TTP within Afghanistan’s borders.
Why the spike in attacks inside Pakistan?
Islamabad was the prime backer of the Taliban after it was removed by US-led NATO troops in 2001. It was also accused of providing a haven to Taliban fighters as they waged an armed rebellion against the United States’ occupation of Afghanistan for 20 years.
But relations have soured over the surge in attacks inside Pakistan.
The TTP has re-emerged as one of Pakistan’s biggest national security threats, as it has conducted more than 600 attacks against Pakistani forces in the past year, according to a report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), an independent nonprofit.
According to the CRSS, the Islamabad-based think tank, the first three-quarters of this year have seen a 46 percent surge in violence compared with last year.
The violence attributed to the TTP had decreased from its peak in the late 2000s and early 2010s after Islamabad involved the armed groups in talks and addressed some of their demands in 2021, which include the release of their members from prison and an end to military operations in the tribal areas.
The TTP also demanded the reversal of the 2018 merger of the tribal region with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. A stricter imposition of their interpretation of Islamic law is also one of their demands.
A month after the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, it mediated talks between the Pakistani military and the TTP, a decision endorsed and pushed by Imran Khan, Pakistan’s then-prime minister. But Khan, who championed talks with the armed groups, was removed as prime minister in April 2022.
Violence surged after the TTP unilaterally walked out of the ceasefire deal in 2022, after accusing Islamabad of renewed military operations in the region.
Since its founding in 2007, the TTP has targeted civilians and law enforcement personnel, resulting in thousands of deaths. Their deadliest attack came in December 2014, when they targeted the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar, killing more than 130 students.
The group remains banned in Pakistan and has been designated a “terrorist” group by the US.
The Pakistani army has conducted multiple operations to eliminate the group, but has struggled to achieve its goal as fighters have used the porous border to move back and forth between the neighbouring countries.
Baheer, the political analyst, said that there are “no winners in war. There are only losers”.
“This logic of bombing Afghanistan into submission didn’t work for the United States for 20 years of their occupation. Why do we think it will work now?” the Kabul-based analyst asked.
The neighbours have agreed to an immediate ceasefire after a week of cross-border violence.
Pakistan and Afghanistan have agreed to stop fighting, after talks in the Qatari capital, Doha.
Cross-border violence in the past week or so marked the most serious escalation since 2021, when the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan.
Islamabad accuses Kabul of harbouring fighters from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an armed group that’s stepped up attacks in Pakistan. Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders deny the accusations.
Mediators say the foundations have been laid for long-term peace. But what are the guarantees? And how does the conflict play out regionally?
Presenter: Adrian Finighan
Guests:
Javaid Ur-Rahman – Investigative journalist and parliamentary correspondent for The Nation, a Pakistani daily newspaper
Elizabeth Threlkeld – Senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center
Obaidullah Baheer – Adjunct lecturer at the American University of Afghanistan
The Taliban has accused Pakistan of carrying out attacks on the Afghan capital Kabul
Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government have agreed to an “immediate ceasefire” after more than a week of deadly fighting.
The foreign ministry of Qatar, which mediated talks alongside Turkey, said both sides had agreed to establish “mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability”.
Zabihullah Mujahid, a spokesman for the Taliban, said ending “hostile actions” was “important”, while Pakistan’s foreign minister called the agreement the “first step in the right direction”.
Both sides claim to have inflicted heavy casualties during the clashes, the worst fighting since the Taliban returned to power in 2021.
Islamabad has long accused the Taliban of harbouring armed groups which carry out attacks in Pakistan, which it denies.
Clashes intensified along the 1,600-mile mountainous border the two countries share after the Taliban accused Pakistan of carrying out attacks on the Afghan capital Kabul.
Rumours had circulated the blasts in Kabul were a targeted attack on Noor Wali Mehsud, the leader of Pakistan Taliban. In response, the group released an unverified voice note from Mehsud saying he was still alive.
In the days that followed, Afghan troops fired on Pakistani border posts, prompting Pakistan to respond with mortar fire and drone strikes.
At least three dozen Afghan civilians have been killed and hundreds more wounded, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan said on Thursday.
A temporary truce was declared on Wednesday night as delegations met in Doha, but cross-border strikes continued.
Under the new agreement, the Taliban said it would not “support groups carrying out attacks against the Government of Pakistan”, while both sides agreed to refrain from targeting each other’s security forces, civilians or critical infrastructure.
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said the latest ceasefire meant “terrorism from Afghanistan on Pakistan’s soil will be stopped immediately”, with the two sides set to meet in Istanbul for further talks next week.
Pakistan was a major backer of the Taliban after its ouster in 2001 following a US-led invasion.
But relations deteriorated after Islamabad accused the group of providing a safe haven to the Pakistan Taliban, which has launched an armed insurgence against government forces.
Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban government have agreed to an immediate ceasefire, mediated by Qatar and Turkiye. The agreement was reached after a week of deadly clashes and strikes along their disputed border.
South Asian neighbours also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in coming days to ensure peace deal’s implementation.
Published On 19 Oct 202519 Oct 2025
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Afghanistan and Pakistan have agreed to an immediate ceasefire after talks mediated by Qatar and Turkiye following a week of fierce and deadly clashes along their disputed border.
Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said early on Sunday that Afghanistan and Pakistan had agreed to the ceasefire “and the establishment of mechanisms to consolidate lasting peace and stability between the two countries”.
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Doha said the two countries also agreed to hold follow-up meetings in the coming days “to ensure the sustainability of the ceasefire and verify its implementation in a reliable and sustainable manner”.
Earlier, both sides said they were holding peace talks in Doha on Saturday as they sought a way forward, after clashes killed dozens and wounded hundreds in the worst violence between the two South Asian neighbours since the Taliban seized power in Kabul in 2021.
— Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Qatar (@MofaQatar_EN) October 18, 2025
“As promised, negotiations with the Pakistani side will take place today in Doha,” Afghan government spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid had said, adding that Kabul’s negotiating team, led by Defence Minister Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob, had arrived in the Qatari capital.
Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said earlier that the country’s defence minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, had led discussions with representatives of Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership.
“The talks will focus on immediate measures to end cross-border terrorism against Pakistan emanating from Afghanistan and restore peace and stability along the Pak-Afghan border,” the Foreign Office said.
Cross-border fighting between the one-time allies and Pakistani air strikes along their contested 2,600km (1,600-mile) frontier were triggered after Islamabad demanded that Kabul rein in rebels who had stepped up cross-border attacks in Pakistan, saying the fighters were operating from safe havens in Afghanistan.
The Taliban has denied giving haven to armed groups to attack Pakistan, and accuses the Pakistani military of spreading misinformation about Afghanistan and sheltering ISIL (ISIS)-linked fighters who have undermined the country’s stability and sovereignty.
Islamabad has denied Kabul’s accusations. Pakistan has accused Kabul of allowing armed groups to reside inside Afghanistan and wage war for years against the Pakistani state in a bid to overthrow the government and replace it with their strict brand of Islamic governance system.
On Friday, a suicide attack near the border killed seven Pakistani soldiers and wounded 13, security officials said.
“The Afghan regime must rein in the proxies who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan and are using Afghan soil to perpetrate heinous attacks inside Pakistan,” Pakistani Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir said on Saturday, addressing a graduation ceremony of cadets.
After days of cross-border fighting, Pakistan and Afghan Taliban authorities agreed a temporary ceasefire. The clashes have left dozens dead and injured. So, what’s behind the worst violence between the countries in years?
The recent downward spiral in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations would have been hard to imagine when Pakistani military and civilian leaders welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021.
A Taliban government, Islamabad believed, would be friendly to Pakistan and would become a bulwark against any security threats to the country. After all, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services had for more than two decades supported the Afghan Taliban movement.
Between 2001 and 2021, this meant a contradictory foreign policy. On the one hand, by supporting the United States’ military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan recognised the US-backed governments that ruled the country. At the same time, Pakistan covertly tolerated – and even enabled – the resurgence of the Taliban inside Pakistani territory, which also included co-habitation with other Pakistani militant groups.
Yet, that relationship has now collapsed as Pakistani airforce struck targets in Kabul for the first time ever this week.
An apparent disconnect in their mutual expectations, and disrespect for each other’s capabilities, makes it harder for them to resurrect what they once had.
What is at stake for both countries?
The Pakistani security establishment, comprised of the army and the country’s powerful military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is responsible for devising and driving the nation’s Afghan policy.
Historically, the army has also exercised significant power over the civilian administrations, even when Pakistan has not been under military rule.
Pakistan has faced a surge of unprecedented attacks against its security forces since 2021, coinciding with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 deaths were recorded for the first three quarters of 2025, towering over last year’s figure of approximately 2,500 people killed in attacks across Pakistan.
Pakistan has blamed a majority of attacks on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the so-called Pakistan Taliban, whose leaders are now based in Afghanistan. TTP members hail largely from the tribal areas of Pakistan, along the Afghan border.
Pakistan had hoped that TTP leaders would leave Afghanistan once the Pakistan-friendly Taliban government was established in Kabul. Some TTP fighters reportedly did return home, but this did not translate into a decline in violence. The TTP demands a localised implementation of Islamic law and the reinstatement of the former semi-autonomous status of tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.
For Pakistan, confronting a deadly and persistent uprising at home has become a national security crisis. Pakistan is, meanwhile, also reeling from several other intersecting crises: a stunted economy, geopolitical tensions with archrival India – marked by the recent conflict in May – as well as a growing domestic political discontent, and natural disasters.
Taliban leaders in Afghanistan insist that the TTP is a domestic challenge for Pakistan to address. In 2022, shortly after forming an interim administration, the Taliban government mediated talks between TTP leaders and the Pakistani army in Kabul. After initial indications of progress, underpinned by a temporary ceasefire, the talks collapsed.
For the Taliban government, which is heavily sanctioned and isolated from international financial institutions, the realities of ruling a vastly underdeveloped and economically poor country are stark. Over four years since taking power, Russia is the only country that has formally recognised the Taliban administration, though a growing number of countries – China, India and Iran among them – have, in effect, acknowledged the group as Afghanistan’s rulers and are hosting their diplomatic representatives.
Afghans are suffering from the near-collapse of the economy, and public sector institutions – such as health and education services – are on the brink of a complete breakdown. Faced with severe food insecurity and humanitarian challenges, common Afghans suffer as United Nations-led aid agencies face funding cuts. A prolonged conflict with Pakistan is likely to further deepen these challenges.
Can both sides return to their past friendship?
Both sides appear, at the moment, to be digging their heels in. Though they have agreed to temporary ceasefires, neither side wants to look weak by admitting it needs to back down.
Official Pakistani government statements now refer to the Taliban government – whose return to power in Kabul was once celebrated – as a “regime”, calling for a more “inclusive” administration in Afghanistan. They warn of continuing attacks within Afghan territories if the Taliban fail to act against the TTP.
To be sure, Pakistan possesses a substantially more powerful military, technologically advanced weaponry, and considerable geopolitical leverage against the Taliban government. There is also a renewed sense of self-confidence as Pakistan considers it successfully fought the recent war with India in May 2025, including by downing multiple Indian jets.
Since the 1980s, it has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, a generation of whom were educated and have built livelihoods in Pakistani cities. This, according to Pakistani leaders and some public opinion, should mean that Afghans must bear goodwill towards Pakistan. Forcing out Afghan refugees will be a key leverage Pakistan would want to use against the Taliban government.
Fundamentally, Pakistani leaders view their country as a serious and powerful entity with strong global alliances – one that any Afghan government, especially one led by a group supported by Pakistan, should respect and cooperate with.
The Taliban, on the other hand, view themselves as victorious, battle-hardened fighters who waged a long and successful war against foreign occupation by a global superpower. Hence, a potential conflict imposed by a neighbour would be a lesser mission.
Taliban spokesmen are pushing back against Pakistani officials’ recent narrative, underlining the significance of the ongoing information war on both sides. They have alleged, for instance, that Pakistan’s tribal border areas shelter ISIS/ISIL fighters with tacit backing from elements of the Pakistani army.
Nonetheless, as a landlocked country, Afghanistan is heavily dependent on trade routes via Pakistan, which remain shut due to ongoing tensions, resulting in major losses for traders on both sides. The Taliban government lacks air defence systems, radars or modern weaponry to counter any further incursions by Pakistani drones and jets.
The path to de-escalation
The Pakistani army continues to frame its fight against TTP as part of the wider confrontation with India. It has alleged, without evidence, that the armed group is backed by New Delhi. Pakistan also expects the Taliban to disown and distance themselves from the TTP and instead align themselves with Islamabad.
However, the TTP and Taliban share long-term camaraderie, ideological compatibility and social bonds that go beyond stringent organisational peculiarities. For the Taliban, a conflict with the TTP could also risk creating space for minacious actors such as the ISIL-Khorasan armed group.
And while Pakistan is stronger militarily, the Taliban have their own tools that could hurt Islamabad.
What if the Taliban’s Kandahar-based supreme leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, were to issue a fatwa for jihad against Pakistan’s security establishment? The TTP leadership had already pledged allegiance to Akhunzada in 2021. But the Taliban’s top leader is also held in high religious regard by a large segment of Pakistani religious school students and religious leaders, and a call against Islamabad from Akhunzada could lead to serious internal security challenges for Pakistan.
Islamist political groups in Pakistan would also not support an all-out war with the Taliban. Meanwhile, any sustained Pakistani attacks against Afghanistan will likely bolster domestic support for the incumbent Taliban administration, even when there is palpable resentment among Afghans against the Taliban.
To prevent further escalation and seek meaningful political dialogue, there is an urgent need for a trusted mediation actor capable of sustainable engagement. This role is best suited for Middle Eastern and Muslim nations trusted by both sides, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
There is evidence that this is a fruitful pathway. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi confirmed in a news conference in New Delhi last week that the Taliban ceased retaliatory attacks against Pakistan after Qatar and Saudi Arabia mediated.
But first, there needs to be a real desire for peace from the leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Even as Afghan and Pakistani officials hurl warnings at each other, and their forces engage in repeated bouts of cross-border fire, both countries are acutely aware that war will cost them heavily.
However, this does not mean that relations will return to the erstwhile bilateral warmth anytime soon or that miscalculations cannot happen.
Geography and history bind Afghans and Pakistanis into interdependence, which needs to be capitalised upon.
Governments need to stop hoping in vain for the success of failed approaches that have been tried for decades. Afghan leaders must work at developing amicability with Pakistan. Pakistani leaders need to reciprocate by conceiving a wholesome foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is not coloured by rivalry with India.
The world does not need yet another war in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. It can never bear better dividends than peace.
Deadly clashes erupted overnight between the Taliban and Pakistani forces across the Afghanistan border, with each side claiming to have captured or destroyed outposts. The fighting follows an alleged Pakistani air strike on Kabul on Thursday, which the Taliban called a violation of their sovereignty.
Heavy fighting has broken out between Pakistani and Afghan forces at multiple locations on their border, and the rival sides claim to have captured and destroyed border posts in one of the worst border clashes in recent years.
The Taliban administration’s spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, said at least 58 Pakistani soldiers were killed in “retaliatory” attacks on Saturday night, two days after blasts were reported in the capital, Kabul, and the southeastern province of Paktika.
The Pakistani military admitted 23 of its soldiers were ‘martyred’ while claiming to kill 200 Taliban and affiliated “terrorists”. Earlier, Pakistan’s interior minister called the Afghan attacks “unprovoked firing”.
The Taliban government has accused Pakistan of carrying out the recent bombings. Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied the allegations.
Pakistan is said to have backed Taliban fighters during their rebellion against the United States-led occupation of Afghanistan and was one of only three countries that recognised the first Taliban government from 1996 to 2001.
But the rise of attacks inside Pakistan since the return of the Taliban to power in 2021 has strained their ties as Islamabad has accused the Taliban administration of providing safe haven to fighters from the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistan Taliban. Kabul has denied the allegations.
So what’s the latest on the fighting? What triggered the clashes? And is the situation expected to escalate further?
Pakistan accuses the TTP of carrying out attacks on its territory and the Afghan Taliban government of harbouring the group [File: Fayaz Aziz/Reuters]
What’s the latest?
The Taliban attack on Pakistan border areas began about 10pm (17:00 GMT) on Saturday, and the exchange of fire took place at multiple locations.
Pakistani officials and state-run radio noted that those locations included Angoor Adda, Bajaur, Kurram, Dir and Chitral – all in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province – and Bahram Chah in Balochistan.
Mujahid said Afghan forces killed 58 Pakistani soldiers, captured 25 army posts and wounded 30 soldiers in their attacks.
“The situation on all official borders and de facto lines of Afghanistan is under complete control, and illegal activities have been largely prevented,” Mujahid said at a news conference in Kabul.
Afghanistan’s TOLOnews channel reported on Sunday that the Ministry of Defence is deploying tanks and heavy weapons in several areas of Kunar province on the 2,640km (1,640-mile) border, also referred to as the colonial-era Durand Line.
The Pakistani military on Sunday condemned what it called “the cowardly action” aimed at destabilising the border areas to facilitate terrorism”.
“Exercising the right of self-defence, the alert Armed Forces of Pakistan repelled the assault decisively,” the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the military’s media wing, said in a statement.
“Last night’s episode vindicates Pakistan’s long-standing position that the Taliban government is actively facilitating the terrorists,” ISPR said.
At least 29 soldiers were injured during the overnight skirmishes, it added.
The Pakistani military claimed that multiple Taliban locations were destroyed along the border and “21 hostile positions on the Afghan side of border were also briefly physically captured and multiple terrorist training camps, used to plan and facilitate attacks against Pakistan, were rendered inoperative”.
While the exchange of fire is mostly over, residents of Pakistan’s Kurram area reported intermittent gunfire.
A Taliban fighter walks in front of female protesters during an anti-Pakistan demonstration in Kabul on September 7, 2021 [West Asia News Agency via Reuters]
What triggered the clashes?
On Thursday, Kabul was rocked by the sound of two explosions, and another took place in a civilian market in the border province of Paktika, the Taliban Defence Ministry said on Friday.
The Taliban government accused Pakistan of violating Afghanistan’s “sovereign territory”. Islamabad did not outright deny the blasts but asked the Taliban to curb the activities of the Pakistan Taliban.
A Pakistani security official told the Reuters news agency air strikes were carried out and their intended target in Kabul was the leader of the TTP, who was travelling in a vehicle.
Al Jazeera could not independently verify if the leader, Noor Wali Mehsud, had survived.
Pakistan and the Taliban, once allies over shared security interests, have grown increasingly hostile over Islamabad’s claim that the Taliban is giving refuge to the TTP, an armed group accused of carrying out years of attacks inside Pakistan.
At least 2,414 fatalities have been recorded in the first three quarters of this year, according to the Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), an Islamabad-based think tank.
In its latest report issued last month, CRSS said that if the current trend continues, 2025 could be one of the deadliest years in Pakistan. Last year, at least 2,546 people were killed in attacks.
The armed attacks have risen following the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in April 2022. Khan’s government had involved the Taliban to get the TTP to agree to ceasefire deal. Though the ceasefire deal unraveled during Khan’s tenure, the frequency of attacks remained lower.
Ties have deteriorated as Islamabad has increased its use of air strikes inside Afghanistan to target hideouts it says are used by TTP fighters.
Relations have also soured over Pakistan’s decision to deport tens of thousands of Afghan refugees. At least 3 million Afghan refugees have taken shelter in Pakistan after fleeing decades of conflict.
What have both sides said?
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif condemned the Afghan attacks late on Saturday, adding that the country’s army “not only gave a befitting reply to Afghanistan’s provocations but also destroyed several of their posts, forcing them to retreat”.
Mohsin Naqvi, the interior minister, said the Afghan attacks were “unprovoked” and civilians were fired at. Strongly condemning the Taliban’s attacks, he said: “The firing by Afghan forces on civilian populations is a blatant violation of international laws.”
“Afghanistan is playing a game of fire and blood,” he said in a post on X.
Enayatullah Khowarazmi, spokesperson for Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence, said its attacks on the Pakistan border posts were a retaliatory operation, adding that they concluded at midnight.
“If the opposing side again violates Afghanistan’s airspace, our armed forces are prepared to defend their airspace and will deliver a strong response,” Khowarazmi said.
Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi speaks to the media near an Islamic seminary in Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, India, on October 11, 2025 [Anushree Fadnavis/Reuters]
What has been the international response to the clashes?
The escalating tensions have prompted regional concern as they come amid rapidly changing security dynamics and relations in South Asia.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called on his country’s two neighbours “to exercise restraint”.
“Our position is that both sides must exercise restraint,” Araghchi said during a live interview with state television, adding that “stability” between the countries “contributes to regional stability”.
Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also urged “both sides to prioritise dialogue and diplomacy, exercise restraint, and work to contain the disputes in a way that helps reduce tension, avoids escalation, and contributes to regional peace and stability”.
Expressing concern, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs said: “The kingdom calls for restraint, avoiding escalation, and embracing dialogue and wisdom to contribute to reducing tensions and maintaining security and stability in the region.”
“The kingdom affirms its support for all regional and international efforts aimed at promoting peace and stability and its continued commitment to ensuring security, which will achieve stability and prosperity for the brotherly Pakistani and Afghan peoples,” it added.
India, which is currently hosting Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on his first visit there, has yet to comment on the border clashes. Islamabad has viewed New Delhi’s engagement with the Taliban with suspicion.
An Afghan girl and her family sit in a truck as they head back to Afghanistan at the Chaman border crossing on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in Balochistan province after Pakistan ordered Afghans out of the country [File: Naseer Ahmed/Reuters]
Could these clashes escalate?
Asif Durrani, a former Pakistani ambassador and special representative to Afghanistan, told Al Jazeera he believes “the chances of this clash [spilling over] to something bigger and more serious [are] minimal.”
“Afghanistan does not have any conventional military capacity when compared to Pakistan,” Durrani said, adding, “Guerrilla warfare is not the same as conventional warfare, which is a whole different beast and something where Pakistan is considerably ahead of Afghanistan.”
Underlining that “diplomacy should always be given a chance, regardless of how dire the situation is,” Durrani noted that the TTP remains the central issue in the countries’ fraught relations.
“The Afghan government refuses to acknowledge their [the TTP’s] existence on their soil, and as long as that irritant remains present, the situation will remain tense,” he added.
Islamabad, Pakistan – A series of explosions and bursts of gunfire rattled Afghanistan’s capital late Thursday evening, according to local media. The cause of the blasts and the extent of casualties remain unclear.
Taliban government spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that an explosion had been heard in Kabul, saying the cause was under investigation.
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“An explosion was heard in Kabul city,” he posted on social media platform X in Pashto. “But don’t worry, it’s all good and well. The accident is under investigation, and no injuries have been reported yet. So far there is no report of any harm done.”
The incident came amid worsening relations between Afghanistan and its western neighbour Pakistan, which has accused the Taliban government – in power since August 2021 – of providing safe havens to armed groups, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad blames for a surge in attacks on its security forces.
The explosions also coincided with the arrival of the Taliban administration’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in India for a six-day visit, the first such trip since the Taliban’s return to power.
Following the Kabul explosions, speculation swirled on social media that Pakistan was behind the attack, allegedly targeting senior TTP leaders, including its chief, Noor Wali Mehsud.
However, the Taliban have not levelled any accusations yet. Pakistani security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to talk to the media, neither confirmed nor denied involvement in the Kabul explosions. “We have seen the media reports and statements from Afghan officials about explosions in Kabul. However, we have no further details on this,” one official told Al Jazeera.
Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also did not respond to Al Jazeera’s queries.
While neither the Taliban nor the TTP has commented on Mehsud and whether he is safe, Mujahid’s comments suggest that no one was killed in the explosions.
Once seen as heavily backed by Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have been trying to recalibrate their foreign policy, engaging regional powers such as India, their former adversary, in a bid to secure eventual diplomatic recognition.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has accused India of supporting armed groups operating on its soil, a charge New Delhi denies.
Fragile thaw between Kabul and Islamabad
After a bloody 2024, one of Pakistan’s deadliest years in nearly a decade, with more than 2,500 people killed in violence, both countries tried to reset their relationship.
Pakistan’s deputy prime minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul in April, with senior leadership on both sides holding a series of meetings, often mediated by China. That process led to upgraded diplomatic ties and a brief lull in violence over the summer.
Yet, according to the Pakistan Institute of Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), an Islamabad-based think tank, violence in the first three quarters of 2025 nearly matched the entire toll of 2024.
TTP remains the singular cause for the increasing attacks since 2021, according to US-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).
“Our data show that the TTP engaged in at least 600 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the past year alone. Its activity in 2025 so far already exceeds that seen in all of 2024,” a recent report by the ACLED pointed out.
And in recent days, Pakistan has witnessed a further escalation in violence. A string of assaults has killed dozens of soldiers, mostly in the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which shares a long and porous border with Afghanistan. The Pakistani military on Friday said it killed more than 30 fighters involved in a recent attack in the tribal district of Orakzai.
In September alone, at least 135 people were killed and 173 injured. After visiting wounded soldiers following raids that killed 19 personnel, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif issued a stark warning to Afghanistan.
“Choose one of two paths. If they wish to establish relations with Pakistan with genuine goodwill, sincerity and honesty, we are ready for that. But if they choose to side with terrorists and support them, then we will have nothing to do with the Afghan interim government,” Sharif said on September 13.
On Thursday, Defence Minister Khwaja Asif also accused Afghanistan of enabling violence in Pakistan while speaking on the floor of the parliament
“Despite years of negotiations with the Afghan government and delegations coming and going to Kabul, the bloodshed in Pakistan has not stopped. Daily funerals of military personnel are being held. We are paying the price of 60 years of hospitality to 6 million Afghan refugees with our blood,” he said.
Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since the 1980s, first after the Soviet invasion, then during the Taliban’s initial rule in the 1990s, and again after their 2021 takeover.
Since November 2023, Islamabad has been carrying out a mass expulsion campaign, forcing Afghans – many of whom have lived in Pakistan for decades – to return home. Government figures say nearly a million have been sent back so far.
Deepening mistrust
The tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban in recent years have also escalated into military clashes.
The Pakistani military has previously conducted airstrikes inside Afghan territory, the most recent one in December 2024.
Analysts say that if the latest explosions were indeed linked to Pakistan, the implications could be serious.
Tameem Bahiss, a security analyst based in Kabul, said the Taliban have consistently denied harbouring TTP fighters, and any formal acknowledgement of strikes inside the capital could inflame tensions.
“We’ve seen before those previous Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan yielded no concrete results. Instead, they only deepened mistrust and made cooperation on countering the TTP more difficult. This latest incident will likely harden positions further, making dialogue and coordination even more complicated,” he told Al Jazeera.
The last major targeted strike in Kabul took place in 2022, when al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a US drone attack.
Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, an Islamabad-based security analyst, said that if Pakistan was involved in the attacks, they may have been intended as a warning following recent attacks on Pakistani soil.
Mehsud, who co-founded The Khorasan Diary, a security-focused news outlet, said the explosions could signal Pakistan’s intent to pursue high-value targets across the border.
“Pakistan could try and target individuals in Kabul, which is the political capital, as well as those in Kandahar, which is seen as the spiritual capital of Taliban, in case security situation in Pakistan remains dire and Afghan Taliban don’t rein in the TTP,” he cautioned.
Bahiss, however, warned that any cross-border strikes could backfire.
“If Pakistan continues to expand its strikes inside Afghanistan, more Afghans may begin to sympathise with the TTP. This sympathy could translate into new recruits, funding, and possibly even quiet support from some segments within the Afghan Taliban,” he said.
He added that if Pakistan indeed was targeting TTP leaders inside Afghanistan, that could provoke the group into escalating attacks inside Pakistan.
“If TTP leaders have indeed been targeted or killed inside Kabul, that would also serve as a warning to the group, showing that they are not safe even in the capital,” Bahiss said. “The TTP will likely adapt by tightening its security measures, relocating its leadership, and possibly retaliating through more aggressive attacks in Pakistan.”
Islamabad, Pakistan – Seated next to British Prime Minister Keir Starmer during a visit to the United Kingdom in September, United States President Donald Trump made clear he was eyeing a plot of land his country’s military once controlled nearly 8,000km (4,970 miles) away: Bagram airbase in Afghanistan.
“We gave it to [the Taliban] for nothing. We want that base back,” he said. Two days later, this time opting to express his views on social media, Trump wrote: “If Afghanistan doesn’t give Bagram air base back to those that built it, the United States of America, bad things are going to happen!”
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The Taliban, predictably, bristled at the demand and stressed that under “no circumstances” will Afghans hand over the base to any third country.
On Tuesday, the Taliban, who have ruled Afghanistan since their takeover of Kabul in August 2021, won a remarkable show of support for their opposition to any US military return to the country, from a broad swath of neighbours who otherwise rarely see eye-to-eye geopolitically.
At a meeting in Moscow, officials from Russia, India, Pakistan, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan joined their Taliban counterparts in coming down hard on any attempt to set up foreign military bases in Afghanistan. They did not name the US, but the target was clear, say experts.
“They called unacceptable the attempts by countries to deploy their military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighbouring states, since this does not serve the interests of regional peace and stability,” said the joint statement (PDF) published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 7 at the conclusion of the seventh edition of what are known as the Moscow Format Consultations between Afghanistan’s neighbours.
Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran had opposed “the reestablishment of military bases” in a similar declaration last month on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. But the Moscow communique brought together a much wider range of nations – some with competing interests – on a single page.
India and Pakistan have long vied for influence over Afghanistan. India also worries about China’s growing investments in that country. Iran has often viewed any Pakistani presence in Afghanistan with suspicion. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have long feared violence in Afghanistan spilling over into their territory. And in recent years, Pakistan has had tense relations with the Taliban – a group that it supported and sheltered for decades previously.
The confluence of these countries, despite these differences, into a unanimous position to keep the US out of the region reflects a shared regional view that Afghan affairs are a “regional responsibility”, not a matter to be externally managed, said Taimur Khan, a researcher at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI).
“Despite their differences, regional countries share a common position that Afghanistan should not once again host a foreign military presence,” Khan told Al Jazeera.
That shared position, articulated in Moscow, also strengthens the Taliban’s hands as it seeks to push back against pressure from Trump over Bagram, while giving Afghanistan’s rulers regional legitimacy. Most of their neighbours are deepening engagements with them, even though Russia is the only country that has formally recognised them diplomatically as the Afghan government.
A symbolic, strategic prize
The groundwork for the Afghan Taliban’s return to power was laid in Doha in January 2020, under Trump’s first administration; they ultimately took over the country in August 2021, during the tenure of the administration of former President Joe Biden.
Yet in February this year, a month after taking the oath for his second term, Trump insisted: “We were going to keep Bagram. We were going to keep a small force on Bagram.”
Bagram, 44km (27 miles) north of Kabul, was originally built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The base has two concrete runways – one 3.6km long (2.2 miles), the other 3km (1.9 miles) – and is one of the few places in Afghanistan suitable for landing large military planes and weapons carriers.
It became a strategic base for the many powers that have occupied, controlled and fought over Afghanistan over the past half-century. Taken over by US-led NATO forces after the invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, Bagram was a central facility in Washington’s so-called “war on terror”.
Afghanistan’s rugged, mountainous terrain means there are limited sites capable of serving as large military logistics hubs. That scarcity is why Bagram retains its strategic significance, four years after the US withdrew from the country.
Kamran Bokhari, senior director at the Washington, DC-based New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, said he was sceptical about the US seriously planning any redeployment of forces to Afghanistan, despite Trump’s comments.
“The new US geostrategy is about military retrenchment. There is no appetite in Washington for any such military commitment, which would be a major logistical undertaking,” Bokhari told Al Jazeera. “Even if the Taliban were to agree to allow the Americans to regain Bagram, the cost of maintaining such a facility far outstrips its utility.”
At the same time, Bokhari said that the Moscow meet worked as an opportunity for Russia to show that it retains influence in Central Asia, a region in which its footprint has been eroded by the war in Ukraine and by China’s rising geoeconomic presence.
But the concerns about any renewed US footprint in Afghanistan aren’t limited to Russia, or even China, America’s biggest long-term rival. Amid heightened tensions with the US and Israel, Iran will not want an American military presence in Afghanistan.
Other regional nations – India and Pakistan among them – are also eager to show that the neighbourhood can manage the vacuum created in Afghanistan by the withdrawal of US security forces, Bokhari said. Though a close partner of the US, India’s ties with Washington have frayed during Trump’s second term, with the American president imposing 50 percent tariffs on imports from India, in part because of New Delhi’s continued purchase of oil from Russia.
And then there are the Central Asian countries that share long, porous borders with Afghanistan – and fear their soil might be used by violent groups energised by any return of the US, militarily, to Bagram.
Blast walls and a few buildings can be seen at the Bagram airbase after the US military left the base, in Parwan province, north of Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2021 [File: Rahmat Gul/AP Photo]
Central Asia’s security calculus
The four Central Asian countries that were part of the Moscow Format – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – together with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, form a bloc of six landlocked nations whose geography gives them a unique vantage point in regional politics, while also compelling them to seek access to warmer waters for trade.
Analysts argue an American presence in the region would be “undesirable” for many of these nations.
“This is not knee-jerk anti-Americanism,” Kuat Akizhanov, a Kazakh analyst and deputy director of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Institute (CAREC) said.
“A US base would put host states on the front line of US-Russia-China rivalry. Moscow and Beijing have both signalled opposition to any renewed US presence, and aligning with that consensus reduces coercive pressure and economic or security retaliation on our much smaller economies,” Akizhanov told Al Jazeera.
He added that regional actors now prefer regional groupings such as the Moscow Format, or even the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) led by Moscow and Beijing, for cooperation on security and the neighbourhood’s stability, to any US presence.
What do the Taliban and Afghanistan’s other neighbours fear?
Many of Afghanistan’s bigger neighbours have their own concerns.
“They fear that a revived US military presence could potentially reintroduce intelligence operations, fuel instability, and once again turn Afghanistan into a proxy battleground,” Khan from the Islamabad-based ISSI said.
“This is the lens from which regional countries now view Afghanistan: a space that must be stabilised through regional cooperation and economic integration, and not through renewed Western intervention or strategic containment efforts,” he added.
For the Taliban, meanwhile, Trump’s Bagram demands pose a dilemma, say experts.
Ibraheem Bahiss, a Kabul-based senior analyst for Crisis Group, said he believed that Trump’s Bagram demand was primarily driven by the US president’s “personal inclination” rather than any consensus within the US strategic establishment. “There might be a sense that Afghanistan remains an unfinished business for him,” the analyst told Al Jazeera.
For the Taliban, surrendering Bagram is unthinkable. “Kabul cannot offer Bagram as it would antagonise their own support base and might lead to resistance against their own government if [the] US comes here,” Bahiss said.
At the same time, Bokhari, of the New Lines Institute, said that the Taliban know international sanctions are a major obstacle to governance and economic recovery, and for that, they will need to engage the West, and especially the US.
“The Taliban are asking for sanctions relief, but the question is, what do they offer? Washington is more interested in Central Asia, to which it does not have easy access to. The region is otherwise blocked by Russia, China and Iran,” he said.
Trump has cited Bagram’s proximity to China and its missile factories as a reason for wanting to take back control of the base. Bagram is about 800km (about 500 miles) from the Chinese border, and about 2,400km (about 1,500 miles) from a missile facility in Xinjiang.
“It is not in the US interest in allowing China to monopolise the region,” Bokhari said.
Against that backdrop, the Bagram demand might be a signal from the US that it is eager to explore new ways to do business with the Taliban, Bokhari and Bahiss agreed.
Washington isn’t the only one reaching out to the group, which until a few years ago was largely a global pariah. In fact, the US is late – the Taliban have already been making major headways, diplomatically, in its neighbourhood.
Engagement, not recognition
Since taking control of a country of more than 40 million people in August 2021, the Taliban have faced international scepticism over their style of governance.
Afghanistan’s rulers have imposed a hardline interpretation of Islam and have placed several restrictions on women, including limits on working and education.
International sanctions have further weakened an already fragile economy, while the presence of multiple armed groups – including Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) – continues to alarm neighbouring states. The Taliban insist that they do not support the use of Afghan soil to attack neighbours.
Pakistan, once seen as the primary benefactor of the Taliban, says it has grown increasingly frustrated over the past four years at what it sees as the Afghan government’s inability to clamp down on militants.
The year 2024 was one of the deadliest for Pakistan in nearly a decade, with more than 2,500 casualties from violence, many of which Islamabad attributes to groups that it says operate from Afghan soil, allegations rejected by Kabul.
On Wednesday, several soldiers were killed in an ambush by the TTP near the Afghan border in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
Still, Pakistan upgraded diplomatic ties with the Taliban in May. That month, Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi hosted his counterpart from Pakistan, spoke on the phone with India’s foreign minister, and flew to Iran and China for summits.
Muttaqi was in Moscow for the recent regional consultations that produced the criticism of Trump’s Bagram plans, and on Thursday is due to arrive in New Delhi for a historic, weeklong visit to India, a country that viewed the Taliban as a Pakistan proxy – and an enemy – until a few years ago.
Bahiss said the compulsion for regional nations to deal with the Taliban is driven by shared, pragmatic goals, which include keeping borders calm, guaranteeing counterterrorism assurances, and securing trade routes.
Akizhanov, the CAREC analyst, meanwhile, said that the wider regional interaction with Afghan officials “normalise working channels [with the Taliban] and reinforces their narrative that regional futures will be decided locally, not by outside militaries”.
However, “legitimacy remains conditional in capitals of each country, hinging on counterterrorism guarantees, cross-border security, economic connectivity, and basic rights, especially for women and girls,” said the analyst, who is based in Urumqi, China.
ISSI’s Khan agreed.
“What we are witnessing is not formal recognition, but a functional understanding that Afghanistan’s isolation serves no one’s interests,” he said.
A forum of regional countries, including India, voiced opposition to any foreign military infrastructure in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s regional neighbours, including India, have voiced a rare unified front by opposing foreign attempts to deploy “military infrastructure” in the country, as United States President Donald Trump presses to regain control of the Bagram airbase.
In a joint statement on Tuesday, members of the Moscow Format of Consultations on Afghanistan – which include US allies India and Pakistan – “reaffirmed their unwavering support for the establishment of Afghanistan as an independent, united and peaceful state”. The forum also includes Russia, China, Iran and Central Asian nations, all of whom strongly oppose any US return presence in Afghanistan.
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The members “called unacceptable the attempts by countries to deploy their military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighbouring states, since this does not serve the interests of regional peace and stability”.
Though the statement echoes last year’s forum language, it suggests broad regional opposition to Trump’s push to return to Bagram, which he handed over to Afghanistan’s Taliban five years ago as part of a deal paving the way for the US withdrawal from Kabul.
In the latest diplomatic outreach, India is set to welcome the Taliban’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi for a historic first visit to New Delhi this week, lasting from October 9-16.
After attending the Moscow forum, Muttaqi emphasised that Afghanistan will not accept any foreign military presence. “Afghanistan is a free and independent country, and throughout history, it has never accepted the military presence of foreigners,” he said. “Our decision and policy will remain the same to keep Afghanistan free and independent.”
Last month, Trump threatened “bad things” would happen to Afghanistan if it did not give back Bagram, and cited what he called its strategic location near China. The Taliban has rejected Trump’s calls to return the base.
Bagram is about 800km (about 500 miles) from the Chinese border, and about 2,400km (about 1,500 miles) from the nearest Chinese missile factory in Xinjiang.
Trump has referred to China as a key reason for wanting to retake control of Bagram, saying last month in London that the base is “an hour away from where [China] makes its nuclear weapons”.
Current and former US officials have cast doubt on Trump’s goal, saying that reoccupying Bagram might end up looking like a reinvasion, requiring more than 10,000 troops as well as the deployment of advanced air defences.
“The sheer logistics of negotiating redeployment and handing back would be extremely challenging and lengthy, and it’s not clear that this would serve either side’s strategic interests,” said Ashley Jackson, co-director at the Geneva-headquartered Centre on Armed Groups.
Bagram, a sprawling complex, was the main base for US forces in Afghanistan during the two decades of war that followed the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York and Washington by al-Qaeda.
Thousands of people were imprisoned at the site for years without charge or trial by US forces during its so-called “war on terror”, and many of them were abused or tortured.
The Taliban retook the facility in 2021 following the US withdrawal, which Trump first set in motion in his first term as president, and the collapse of the Afghan government with Joe Biden in the White House.
Pakistan Taliban claims responsibility for attack on military convoy, leading to a deadly gunfight.
Published On 8 Oct 20258 Oct 2025
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Eleven military personnel have been killed in a gunfight with armed fighters in the country’s northwest, according to the Pakistani army.
The gun battle erupted early on Wednesday during an intelligence operation in the Orakzai district near the Afghan border, the army said in a news release.
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During the intelligence raid, the military said, an “intense” exchange of fire broke out with “Khawarij”, a term it uses for banned groups such as the Pakistan Taliban, which claimed responsibility for the attack.
Among the dead were Lieutenant Colonel Junaid Arif and his deputy, Major Tayyab Rahat, along with nine other soldiers. The army said 19 fighters were also killed.
The Reuters news agency, citing Pakistani security officials, reported that the fighters ambushed a military convoy with a roadside bomb before opening fire.
In a statement, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif lauded security forces for their service and paid tribute to the troops who lost their lives.
In recent months, the Pakistan Taliban, which wants to overthrow the government and replace it with their hardline brand of Islamic governance, has stepped up attacks on Pakistani security forces.
Islamabad says the group uses neighbouring Afghanistan to train and plan attacks against Pakistan, while archrival India funds and backs them, charges denied by both countries.
In the wake of Afghanistan’s deadly earthquake, Al Jazeera’s photojournalist Sorin Furcoi captures both the devastation left behind and the strength of those determined to rebuild.