tactical

After City scored, they took a defensive approach unlike one Guardiola has opted for previously.

They sat deep and blocked the centre of the pitch, making it difficult for Arsenal to find striker Viktor Gyokeres or attacking midfielders between the lines. Guardiola has typically asked his team to defend in a 4-4-2 and did to begin with, but City moved into a 5-4-1 or 5-5-0 as the game progressed.

So why did he opt for this approach?

This was the third game in seven days for an unchanged City side who were fatigued, according to Guardiola. Most teams would struggle to stifle Arsenal’s excellent build-up play, but with City tiring, defending deep prevented them from being exposed trying to press Arsenal.

It wasn’t just about stopping the build-up, but preventing Arsenal creating chances.

Arteta’s men eventually got their equaliser but it was telling the goal came from a direct ball over a City defence that had stepped up, rather than when the visitors sat deep.

Arsenal dominated the ball, but the 68% possession they had amounted to 0.61 expected goals in the second half.

The Gunners have played through the middle this season with Martin Zubimendi and Riccardo Calafiori key to this, before releasing their direct attackers.

City aimed to nullify Arsenal’s dangerous central quality by putting numerous bodies in the middle of the pitch. They also aimed to nullify runners by reducing the space they had in behind by being close to their own goal.

It is unlikely City will play that deep consistently going forward, but it was interesting to see such an attacking manager like Guardiola deploy a shape without a recognised striker, given his previous quotes about the formation.

“In prehistoric times, now and in 100,000 years, it is always very difficult to attack a 5-5 formation,” were his words when facing a similar tactical gameplan deployed by Atletico Madrid in 2022.

Ultimately it was a combination of acknowledging City’s fatigue and strong counter-attackers, while wanting to minimise Arsenal’s quality – particularly the home side’s directness, build-up and central attackers – that help explain the unique approach.

The United Kingdom is seeking a new battlefield ballistic missile, a class of weapon that it last fielded back in the Cold War. The Nightfall program reflects expanding interest in long-range precision strike systems, not just in the United Kingdom, but in Europe more broadly, spurred by Russian aggression and its own expanding missile arsenal.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense yesterday published a request for information (RFI) for the missile, providing details of what is required. At this stage, the Nightfall program is in the “open early engagement” phase, with the ministry judging interest from potential suppliers, ahead of a firm procurement decision.

The key performance parameter of having a range of greater than 600 kilometers (373 miles) puts it in the category of a short-range ballistic missile, a class of weapon that can reach out to between 300 and 1,000 kilometers (186 and 621 miles). There is a stated requirement for each launcher to deliver at least two “effectors,” each of which should weigh around 300 kilograms (661 pounds), based on a high-explosive payload. There is no mention of any other types of warheads being required. The wording makes it clear that the two or more effectors requirement relates to each launcher, rather than each missile. It should be noted that, while the RFI uses the broad term “effectors,” it also specifically refers to the requirement for a ballistic missile.

The range figure puts the missile well beyond the reach of the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), for example, a short-range ballistic missile which has a stated maximum range of 300 kilometers (186 miles). While ATACMS has been exported, the United Kingdom is not an operator.

For its new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), another short-range ballistic missile, the U.S. Army has outlined plans for incremental development that will increase its range from 500 kilometers (311 miles) to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), with plans to extend this even further in the future.

As well as its basic ballistic trajectory, there is a demand for “some basic maneuverability,” suggesting that the United Kingdom might favor a weapon capable of being used on a depressed quasi-ballistic trajectory. This mode of launch renders a ballistic missile more capable of significant maneuvering in flight, presenting major challenges even for opponents with more robust missile defense capabilities.

As for the launcher, this is required to be a mobile platform, capable of operating in “a high threat tactical environment,” suggesting that a good degree of mobility and at least some armored protection are required. It also specifies that the launcher has a low multispectral signature, making it harder for enemy sensors to detect. All missiles are required to be fired from the launcher within 15 minutes of stopping at a launch location. After launch, the launcher must be able to rapidly leave the area, ideally within five minutes.

The U.K. Ministry of Defense wants the missile to be able to navigate in a GPS-denied environment and strike within five meters (16 feet) of a provided GPS coordinate 50 percent of the time. The missile is required to have a fast flight time, able to strike targets within 10 minutes of launch.

The ministry’s document provides relatively extensive information on resistance to jamming and other types of interference, likely reflecting lessons from the war in Ukraine. Here, Russian forces have reportedly been using electronic warfare systems to good effect against GPS-assisted guidance packages used on a variety of air and ground-launched munitions that Ukraine has received from the United States and other Western partners. Similarly, the ability of standoff precision-guided weapons to still operate effectively in the face of heavy electronic warfare jamming is also an area of considerable interest to the U.S. military.

In the Baltic region, Russia’s employment of jamming systems, likely to try to protect critical facilities and assets from long-range Ukrainian drone attacks, has become so pronounced that it is now having serious and potentially dangerous impacts on commercial aviation:

With this in mind, the U.K. Ministry of Defense states that it wants a missile that is “resilient in a complex electromagnetic environment (EME), including within a GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System] denied and degraded environment, and resistant against targeted electronic warfare attack and spoofing.”

Another area of great interest right now, as regards precision standoff munitions, is the ability to procure effectors of this kind at relatively low cost and to scale up production, when required, to meet the demands of high-end contingencies.

These factors are also reflected in the U.K. requirement, which calls for a minimum production output of 10 missiles per month, if required, with the option to further scale this up. A remarkably low price of £500,000 ($675,000) for each missile is presented as the goal, although this excludes the warhead, launcher, and any development costs. This contrasts with a reported cost of between $1 million and $1.5 million for each ATACMS missile, depending on the variant (although this includes the warhead).

The U.K. Ministry of Defense wants these capabilities to be packaged and ready for at least five all-up units to be delivered for trials within nine to 12 months.

At this stage, it appears that a sovereign solution is also preferred, with the system required to be “ideally […] free from foreign government trade and usage restrictions, such as export control.” There is also a requirement for further growth potential to be available from the start, including the option to increase the range, accuracy, in-flight maneuverability, and more. The combination of a sovereign weapon and a notably low cost point, per unit, would also point to the potential to export this weapon.

It is significant that the U.K. Armed Forces are looking for a new ballistic missile at this stage, having last fielded the U.S.-made Lance, a mobile field artillery tactical missile during the Cold War. With a range of less than 100 miles, this was primarily a nuclear-delivery system for the Central Front battlefield.

Now, driven primarily by concerns about the Russian threat, the United Kingdom is looking at the potential of various new missile systems and has even decided to reinstate an air-launched nuclear capability, albeit using U.S.-owned weapons.

Earlier this year, the United Kingdom and Germany announced they would jointly produce a “deep precision strike” weapon with a range of over 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles, considerably more than specified in the Nightfall program. At this point, it’s unclear whether a ballistic or cruise missile — or perhaps both types — will be the preferred solution for the longer-range requirement.

However, the project reflects growing ambitions among European NATO members to field long-range strike capabilities, faced by a growing Russian threat on the alliance’s eastern flank.

With Russia continuing to make extensive use of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles against Ukraine, the United Kingdom and other European NATO members are increasingly concerned about a major gap in their inventories when it comes to standoff precision-guided munitions.

As TWZ has pointed out before, among European NATO members, only Turkey possesses a conventional ground-launched missile with a range of more than 300 kilometers (186 miles). This is the locally developed Bora short-range ballistic missile.

In contrast, Russia has fielded or is developing multiple ground-launched ballistic and cruise missile systems that match this kind of performance, and which are able to carry conventional or nuclear warheads. This is before taking into account Russia’s air-launched and maritime long-range strike capabilities, which also vastly outmatch their NATO counterparts in Europe.

As there was in the Cold War, there is a growing demand among NATO members in Europe to develop a deterrent to Russian tactical nuclear missiles, which are being fielded in increasingly advanced and long-reaching forms, including in Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave on the Baltic Sea. However, at this stage, there is no indication that either of the aforementioned British missile programs envisages using a nuclear warhead, although this could conceivably be introduced, including on Nightfall, at a later stage.

Meanwhile, the United States has announced that it will deploy to Germany, on a rotational basis, starting next year, a range of advanced ground-launched weapons. These include the SM-6 multi-purpose missile and Tomahawk cruise missile, as well as “developmental hypersonic weapons.” The latter is a reference to the Dark Eagle and potentially others, like the Operational Fires (OpFires) ground-launched hypersonic missile system and the aforementioned PrSM short-range ballistic missile.

Developing a new ballistic missile that fulfills the outlined requirements within the United Kingdom, and without recourse to licensed production, may be a challenge. After all, it’s been many decades since the country was developing and producing these kinds of weapons.

It is also worth noting that the U.K. Royal Navy has outlined plans to adapt its two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers to fire undisclosed long-range missiles from their decks.

In the past, we suggested that the most likely option for the Royal Navy would involve launching a cruise missile from the carrier, perhaps even a hypersonic weapon. Nevertheless, a ballistic missile is also a possibility, albeit less likely.

It’s unclear at this point what sort of range requirement the Royal Navy is seeking, and what kinds of targets the missiles should prosecute.

As for the British Nightfall effort to develop a new ballistic missile, this points once more to a growing focus on long-range fire capabilities in Europe and, depending on its ultimate range and potential warhead options, it might ultimately have a significant effect on the military balance on the continent.

Contact the author: [email protected]

Islamabad, Pakistan – In his first address to a joint session of Congress on March 4 this year, after becoming United States president for a second time, Donald Trump made a striking revelation.

He referred to the deadly Abbey Gate bombing at Kabul airport in August 2021 – which occurred as thousands of Afghans tried to flee following the Taliban takeover – and said the alleged perpetrator had been apprehended.

The country he credited with the arrest: Pakistan. “I want to thank especially the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster,” Trump declared.

A little more than three months later, Trump hosted Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir for lunch at the White House on Wednesday — the first time a US president has hosted a military chief from Pakistan who isn’t also the country’s head of state. Munir is on a five-day trip to the US.

For a country that Trump had, just seven years earlier, accused of giving the US “nothing but lies and deceit” and safe havens to terrorists – and one that his immediate predecessor Joe Biden called “one of the most dangerous nations” – this marks a dramatic shift.

It’s a reset that experts say has been in the making for weeks, under Trump’s second administration, and that was solidified by the brief but intense military confrontation between India and Pakistan in May, during which the US tried to mediate a ceasefire.

Some analysts warn that the evolving relationship should be viewed as a product of Trump’s personal position, rather than institutional policy.

“We are dealing with an administration which changes its tune by the hour. There is no process here,” Marvin Weinbaum, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute (MEI), told Al Jazeera.

“One minute the US has no interest, and the next minute priorities change rapidly. You’re dealing with an administration that is mercurial and personalised, and you don’t associate that with traditional US foreign policy,” he added.

However, others point out that even the optics of Trump hosting Munir are significant.

“Trump’s lunch invite to Pakistan’s army chief isn’t just protocol-breaking, it’s protocol-redefining,” said Raza Ahmad Rumi, a distinguished lecturer at the City University of New York (CUNY). “It signals, quite visibly, that Pakistan is not just on Washington’s radar, it’s in the inner circle, at least for now.”

Reset amid regional crises

The meeting between Trump and Munir came amid heightened tensions in the Middle East, where Israel has been conducting strikes inside Iranian cities since June 13. Iran has retaliated with missile attacks of its own on Israel.

The Israeli offensive – targeting Iranian generals, missile bases, nuclear facilities and scientists – has killed more than 200 people. Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel over the past six days have killed about 20 people.

The Benjamin Netanyahu-led Israeli government has been urging the US to join the offensive against Iran, which shares a 900-kilometre-long (559-mile) border with Pakistan.

Speaking to the media in the Oval Office after the lunch with Munir on Wednesday, Trump noted that the Pakistanis “know Iran very well, better than most,” but added that they are “not happy”.

According to Trump, however, the main reason for meeting Munir was to thank him for his role in defusing the May conflict between Pakistan and India, a confrontation that brought the region, home to more than 1.6 billion people, to the brink of nuclear war.

“The reason I had him here was that I wanted to thank him for not going into the war [with India]. And I want to thank PM [Narendra] Modi as well, who just left a few days ago. We’re working on a trade deal with India and Pakistan,” said Trump, who is known to enjoy a warm relationship with Indian leader Modi.

“These two very smart people decided not to keep going with a war that could have been a nuclear war. Pakistan and India are two big nuclear powers. I was honoured to meet him today,” he added, referring to Munir.

The crisis had begun after an April attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that killed 26 Indian civilians. India blamed Pakistan, which denied the charge and called for a “credible, independent, transparent” investigation.

On May 7, India launched strikes inside Pakistani and Pakistan-administered Kashmir territories. Pakistan responded via its air force, claiming to have downed at least six Indian jets. India confirmed losses but did not specify numbers.

The conflict escalated as both sides exchanged drones for three days and eventually launched missiles at military targets on May 10. It ended only after intense backchannel diplomacy, particularly involving the US, led to a ceasefire.

Trump reiterated his role on Wednesday. “I stopped the war between Pakistan and India. This man [Munir] was extremely influential in stopping it from the Pakistan side, Modi from the India side, and others,” he said.

While Pakistan has acknowledged the US role, India insists the ceasefire resulted solely from bilateral dialogue. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated on Tuesday that Indian PM Modi had spoken to Trump by phone to underscore New Delhi’s view that there was no US-led mediation between India and Pakistan.

Arif Ansar, chief strategist at Washington-based advisory firm PoliTact, said Pakistan’s military performance during the confrontation prompted Trump’s engagement.

“It demonstrated that despite its political and economic challenges, the country can outmanoeuvre a much bigger adversary,” Ansar told Al Jazeera. “This has led President Trump to engage with Pakistan’s traditional power centres based on core strategic interests.”

“Opportunity to reassert relevance”

That engagement has a long history.

Pakistan’s relationship with the US dates back to its 1947 independence, after which it aligned with Washington during the Cold War. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan supported US objectives there, and the two collaborated closely to support the mujahideen that eventually forced Moscow to pull out its troops.

Subsequently, Pakistan also backed the post-9/11 US “war on terror”.

However, over the years, many within the US strategic community also started questioning Pakistan’s credibility as a reliable security partner, especially after 9/11 architect Osama bin Laden was found in Abbottabad, close to Rawalpindi, home to Pakistan’s military headquarters in 2011.

Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, the strategic partnership has waned further. Pakistan has increasingly turned towards China for economic, military and technological support.

But Weinbaum said that since Trump returned to office, Pakistan has been getting respect that was lacking under the previous Biden administration.

Trump wanted “counterterrorism assistance,” Weinbaum said – and seemingly got it.

On June 10, General Michael E Kurilla, chief of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), detailed how that cooperation led to the capture of the suspected Abbey Gate bomber.

“They [Pakistan] are in an active counterterrorism fight right now, and they have been a phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world,” Kurilla said, in a testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, DC.

According to Kurilla, who also oversees the US military’s Middle East operations including Iran, this progress, including the arrest of the Abbey Gate bombing suspect, was made possible due to direct coordination with Pakistan’s army chief. “Field Marshal Asim Munir called me to tell me they had captured one of the Daesh-K [ISKP or ISIS-K] individuals,” he said.

As the icing on the cake for the bilateral relationship, Weinbaum suggested, Pakistan has thrown in “more goodies, such as a trade deal with no tariffs, offering rare earth minerals, and crypto“. Weinbaum previously served as an analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan in the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Rare earth minerals, critical for industries like defence, robotics and electronics, are among Pakistan’s assets now being offered to foreign investors, including the US and Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan has also recently formed a crypto council and held talks with US officials to attract investment and partnerships.

Rumi called the Munir-Trump meeting “historic”.

“The US wants Pakistan’s help in de-risking regional volatility without offering much in return. For Munir, it’s an opportunity to reassert relevance and perhaps negotiate manoeuvring space at home,” he said.

Transactional ties and democratic costs

Historically, Pakistan’s ties with the US have been largely transactional, particularly in the security sphere. US aid and investment often followed Pakistan’s alignment with US strategic goals, helping build its infrastructure and military.

But the relationship has also been marked by distrust, with US administrations accusing Pakistan of double-dealing, while Pakistan claims the US has failed to respect the sacrifices it has made while siding with them.

Whether this latest engagement proves to be another fleeting phase or a more durable alignment remains to be seen, say experts.

Rumi, the New York-based academic, said the US has traditionally engaged Pakistan when it needed to, and retreated when it could.

“Unless this relationship is institutionalised, beyond the security lens with which it is viewed, it’s another tactical romance. And like past dalliances, it could fade once strategic goals are met or regimes change,” he said.

Ansar added that Pakistan again stands on the brink of a major strategic choice amid the global power shift.

“Much depends on whether it leans toward China or the US. That decision is also tied to the evolving Israel-Palestine conflict and the role of Iran,” he said.

But Weinbaum, the former State Department official, described the reset in ties as temporary, as “nothing is permanent in this administration”.

“If Pakistan does play some role in the Iran crisis, they have could have more substantial meaning to these ties. But it needs to be prepared that there is nothing settled with this administration. It can change on a dime, at any hour,” he said.

Power behind the scenes

The military remains Pakistan’s most powerful institution, exerting enormous influence over politics and society.

It has ruled directly for more than three decades, and the current government, elected in a controversial vote last year, is widely seen as secondary to the military leadership under Munir.

This is consistent with historical precedent. Pakistan’s first military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, had close ties with the US in the 1960s. Subsequent military rulers, including General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s and General Pervez Musharraf in the 2000s, also maintained strong US relations. All three were hosted by US presidents at the White House – but only after they became heads of state.

Munir, now only the second Pakistani to hold the rank of field marshal after Khan, reinforces the perception that Pakistan’s real power remains with the military, despite the presence of a civilian government, say experts.

Still, CUNY’s Rumi said it was important not to “confuse symbolism with transformation”.

“This [Trump-Munir] meeting validates the enduring military-to-military track in US-Pakistan [ties], but it also bypasses the civilian setup, which should worry anyone rooting for democratic consolidation. If this is the “reset,” it’s one where khaki once again trumps ballot,” he cautioned, referring to the colour of the military’s uniform.

Ansar from PoliTact concurred, saying that the meeting reflects adversely on the civil-military balance in Pakistan, as it showed who remains the “real power bearer” in Pakistan.

“In the long run, these dealings in the past have led to tremendous political, economic and security-related repercussions for the nation [Pakistan],” he said.

“But additionally, it has promoted a norm that critical decisions impacting the nation must be made in private without discussion, consensus or public ownership. This results in increased societal and political disillusionment regarding the future of the country.”