Somalia

Days after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed forging a network of allied nations, including in the Middle East and Africa, to stand against what he called “radical” adversaries, the country’s president is on an official visit to key ally, Ethiopia.

It is not yet known which Arab and African countries will form part of Netanyahu’s hypothetical “hexagon of alliances”, which he said on Sunday will include Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus and others to stand against their enemies in the Middle East. Chief among those enemies is presumably Iran and its network of resistance groups from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis of Yemen.

Analysts doubt Israel could secure enough influence over nation-states to form a formal security pact.

However, the country is deepening its ongoing charm offensive in Africa, which it began during the genocide in Gaza, as its reputation suffered a decline on the continent, with the African Union (AU) releasing multiple statements condemning Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians.

In a rare visit, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Ethiopia on Tuesday. The last presidential trip to the East African country took place in 2018.

“The relationship between our peoples is woven deep into the pages of history and human tradition,” Herzog said in a statement upon his arrival. “At the heart of the story of both our nations lies a clear common thread – the ability to join hands, unite resources of spirit and substance, to innovate, develop, and grow for the benefit of all.”

Herzog, on Wednesday, met with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed who said the two leaders talked about “ways to improve collaboration in areas of mutual interest,” without revealing further details.

But beneath the surface, observers say the visit also represents a battle for influence over Addis Ababa, which has received similar high-level delegations from Turkiye and Saudi Arabia in recent days.

Shared ties and shared anger

Ethiopia and Israel are bound by several links, from shared histories of their people to shared scrutiny over recent political moves in the Horn of Africa that have angered several of the region’s influential nations.

Both countries maintain friendly ties largely due to the Beta Israel community, or Ethiopian Jews, who hail from northern Tigray and Amhara. Historically, Ethiopian Jews suffered religious persecution, and after Israel’s formation, it sought their emigration under its Law of Return policy. Between the late 1970s and mid-1990s, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews were covertly transported to Israel – during a time when several African countries, including Ethiopia, had cut off ties with Israel over the 1973 Yom Kippur War and its invasion of Egypt. On the cusp of a civil war in Ethiopia in 1991, Mossad, Israel’s spy agency, launched a daring operation that airlifted 14,000 Ethiopians over the course of just two days.

About 160,000 Ethiopian Jews now live in Israel. Many within the community have struggled to integrate and have complained of discrimination and racism. In 2019, tens of thousands of Ethiopian Jews flooded the streets in protest across Israeli cities after a 19-year-old of Ethiopian origin was shot dead by the police.

Ethiopia-Israel state relations have, meanwhile, remained steady. In 2016, when Netanyahu visited the country in his first prime ministerial visit – Addis Ababa became one of the first African countries to voice support for Israel’s long-sought observer status at the AU. Fierce opposition from South Africa, Algeria and other countries supporting Palestine delayed the process until 2021. Later, in 2023, the AU confirmed it had withdrawn the status.

Mashav, Israel’s aid agency, has, in the past decade, provided aid to Ethiopia in the form of agriculture and water cooperation projects, although Addis Ababa receives much more significant funding from wealthier partners like China. When Israel sponsored several African journalists on media trips to the country last year, Ethiopia was among the countries it invited journalists from.

More recently, both countries are bound by their support for Somaliland, which Somalia claims as part of its territory and which Israel sees as critical to its own national security, Hargeisa-based analyst Moustafa Ahmad told Al Jazeera.

In December, Israel recognised Somaliland’s statehood, becoming the first country to do so. Months before, there were unconfirmed talks about plans to move displaced Palestinians to Somaliland or to South Sudan, another key Israeli ally in the region. Analysts speculate that countries like South Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, another close friend of Israel, may also recognise Somaliland.

Israel’s focus on the Horn of Africa intensified after a late 2024 report from a United Nations expert panel, which found that the Somalia-based armed group, al-Shabab, was actively collaborating with Yemen’s Houthis. Where the Houthis were providing weapons and drone training, al-Shabab was, in return, granting access to a smuggling corridor stretching along the Somali coast and connecting to the Gulf of Aden, where Iranian weapons could be smuggled into Yemen.

The move to recognise Somaliland was therefore meant to disrupt that cooperation by stationing an Israeli naval base in the region, analysts note.

“It’s part of their calculations even if they haven’t said it publicly,” Ahmad said.

Several countries, as well as the AU, have pushed back on Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, calling it a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty. In Somaliland, however, many have celebrated the move.

Addis Ababa under pressure

While neither Israel nor Ethiopia has provided details of topics on the agenda during Herzog’s visit, Somaliland is likely at the top of the list.

Addis Ababa had in 2024 enraged its neighbours after it signed a controversial port deal with Hargeisa that would allow it access to the sea, reportedly in exchange for a future recognition of Somaliland. Although massive and rapidly industrialising, Ethiopia is landlocked, having lost its sea access after Eritrea seceded in 1993. Prime Minister Abiy has often said sea access is critical for his country.

The fall-out between Ethiopia and Somalia was so severe that analysts sounded the alarm over possible armed conflict between the two neighbours until Turkiye, a key development partner for Mogadishu, stepped in to smooth things over by pressuring Addis Ababa to coordinate with Mogadishu instead.

It is likely, analysts say, that Israel is now hoping to push Ethiopia further towards recognising Somaliland, which boasts a 850km (528-mile) coastline. In Hargeisa, many are disappointed after more countries failed to follow Israel’s steps, Ahmad said.

Addis Ababa, though, might not appreciate further pressure at the moment as it faces increasing regional isolation on several fronts.

One key reason is the controversial Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt and Sudan say is blocking the water supply they need for irrigation.

A source of national pride for Ethiopians, the dam was funded almost entirely through citizens’ donations and government funds. Israeli engineers participated in the project, and Israel reportedly sold weapons to Ethiopia to protect the dam amid tensions with its neighbours, although the Israeli government denies this.

At the same time, Addis Ababa is also facing tensions with Eritrea, which has moved closer to Somalia and Egypt. Both countries have historically feuded, and recently, tensions have again risen over the 2020 Tigray War and Abiy’s repeated statements about his country needing access to the sea.

“Addis Ababa is cautious of making a decision that will cement its regional isolation at this time [because] it is clearly hedging among various actors seeking to influence the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region,” Ahmad said.

Pressure is also mounting on Addis Ababa from countries eager to keep the status quo.

On Sunday, Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Ethiopia and said in his speech: “I would like to emphasise that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland does not benefit Somaliland or the Horn of Africa.”

His statement drew a backlash from Hargeisa, which called it “unacceptable interference” aimed at wrecking relations between Somaliland and its partners.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, which is embroiled in an ongoing rift with the United Arab Emirates over how to deal with the conflict in Yemen, also intervened in the fray in February. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Waleed Elkhereiji was in Addis Ababa this week to discuss “regional peace”, just two weeks after Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud arrived in the city for talks with Abiy.

So far, it is unclear if Riyadh has recorded any success in influencing Addis Ababa.

How Israel will fare in that regard is also still unclear.

Aden, Yemen – Lying on the outskirts of Yemen’s interim capital, Aden, al-Basateen district starts where the paved roads end, stretching into narrow, sandy alleyways. It reveals a decades-old refugee story in which Arabic blends with Somali and the faces harbour memories of a different place, across the sea.

Residents know the area by several names, including “Yemen’s Mogadishu” and “the Somalis’ neighbourhood” – a reference to the demographic shift it has seen since the 1990s, when civil war in Somalia pushed thousands of families across the Gulf of Aden in search of safety.

Today, local sources estimate the district’s population at more than 40,000, with people of Somali origin making up the majority. They live in harsh conditions where economic vulnerability overlaps with an unresolved legal status.

Some arrived as children holding the hands of relatives, while others were born in Aden and have known no other home. But they all share one thing in common: the refugee label stamped on their official documents.

Harsh living conditions

As dawn breaks, dozens of men gather at the entrances of the area’s main streets, waiting to be picked up to do a day’s work in construction or manual labour. Many depend on this fragile pattern of employment to put food on the table.

Residents say the lack of regular work has become the defining feature of life in al-Basateen, as extreme poverty spreads and humanitarian aid declines.

Ashour Hassan, a resident in his mid-30s, waiting at a main road junction for someone to hire him to wash a car, told Al Jazeera that he earns between 3,000 and 4,000 Yemeni rials a day (less than $3). That amount is not enough to cover the needs of his family, which lives in a single room in a neighbourhood lacking basic services, surrounded by dirt roads and piles of rubbish.

In a voice mixed with fatigue and despair, Ashour summed up life in al-Basateen: “We live day to day. If we find work, we eat. If we don’t, we wait without food until tomorrow.”

Families in al-Basateen typically rely on both men and women to be breadwinners.

Some women work cleaning homes, while others run small businesses, such as selling bread and traditional foods that blend Yemeni and Somali flavours, and which become especially popular during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.

Many children also find themselves pushed into work despite their age. One of the main jobs for children involves sifting through waste for materials they can sell, such as plastic or scrap metal, to help support their families.

Little sense of belonging

Poverty is clearly visible in al-Basateen’s architecture and appearance, with tightly packed homes, some made of metal sheets and consisting of only one or two rooms, separated by dirt roads covered in rubbish.

But that is not the only burden weighing on al-Basateen’s Somali residents. A deeper feeling of what many here call “suspended belonging” hangs over them, with the first generation of refugees still carrying memories of a distant homeland and speaking its language, while the second and third generations know only Aden and speak Arabic in the local dialect, with Somalia only known through family stories.

Fatima Jame embodies this paradox. A mother of four, she was born in Aden to Somali parents. She told Al Jazeera: “We know no country other than Yemen. We studied here and got married here, but we do not have Yemeni identity, and in front of the law, we are still refugees.”

Fatima lives with her family in a modest two-room home. Her husband works as a porter in one of the city’s markets, while she helps support the family by preparing and selling traditional foods. Even so, she says their combined income “barely covers rent and food” because of the high cost of living and few job opportunities.

A bleak reality

Conditions in Yemen were never the best for migrants and refugees, but they have significantly worsened since a civil war began in 2014 between the Iranian-backed Houthis and the central government in Sanaa, in Yemen’s north.

The violence from that war, along with declining aid and shrinking job opportunities have increased pressure on both host communities and refugees.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that funding for support programmes in Yemen in 2025 met only 25 percent of the country’s actual needs, directly affecting the lives of thousands of families. Residents of al-Basateen say the aid they used to receive has sharply declined, and in many cases has stopped altogether.

Youssef Mohammed, 53, says he was one of the first Somali arrivals to the district in the 1990s, and now supports a family of seven.

“[We] have not received any support from organisations for years,” Youssef said, adding that some families “chose to return to Somalia rather than stay and die of hunger here”.

He believes the crisis affects everyone in Yemen, “but [that] the refugee remains the weakest link.”

Despite the bleak picture, a few have managed to improve their material conditions through education or by opening small businesses that have helped stimulate the local economy. But they remain an exception, and the flow of refugees continues.

Yemen is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula, but is also the region’s only signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore allows foreign arrivals to apply for asylum or refugee status. According to the United Nations refugee agency, Yemen hosted more than 61,000 asylum seekers and refugees as of July 2025, the vast majority from Somalia and Ethiopia.

Arrivals in recent years have typically travelled to Yemen via boats, with many planning to use Yemen as a transit point before moving on to richer countries like Saudi Arabia.

Hussein Adel is one of those recent arrivals. He is 30, but leans on a crutch on a street corner in al-Basateen.

Hussein arrived in Aden only a few months ago, having made the dangerous journey on a small boat carrying African migrants.

He told Al Jazeera that he fled death and hunger, only to find himself facing a harsher reality. Hussein shelters on the rooftop of a relative’s home and spends his days searching the city for occasional work. His leg injury, he said, was caused by Omani border guards who shot him while he was crossing into Yemen.

As evening falls, the noise in al-Basateen’s alleyways quiets down. Men lean against the walls of worn-out homes, and children chase a ball through narrow passages barely wide enough for their dreams.

On the surface, life looks normal – like any working-class neighbourhood in a city exhausted by crises. But here, in “Yemen’s Mogadishu”, there is an extra trauma – the sense of a lack of belonging, the memory of refugees fleeing danger and poverty at home, and a lack of stability that will not go away.

Heads of state are arriving in Addis Ababa for the 2026 African Union Summit, with a water-focused theme centred on climate change. Conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, DR Congo and the Sahel loom, while Israel’s recognition of Somaliland adds pressure over borders.

Somalia has signed a “military cooperation” agreement with Saudi Arabia, weeks after inking a similar deal with Qatar, as Mogadishu seeks regional support against Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland.

The memorandum of understanding was signed on Monday between Somali Minister of Defence Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, in Riyadh.

The agreement “aims to strengthen the frameworks of defense and military cooperation between the two countries, and includes multiple areas of common interest, serving the strategic interests of both parties”, Somalia’s Ministry of Defence said.

Prince Khalid confirmed the agreement in a post on X.

But neither country provided further details.

Last month, Somalia signed a defence pact with Qatar, aimed at “strengthening military ties and security collaboration”, according to the Somali state news agency.

The pact with Qatar “focuses on military training, the exchange of expertise, the development of defence capabilities, and enhanced security cooperation, in support of efforts to promote regional security and stability”, it said.

Doha said the agreement was “aimed at strengthening areas of joint cooperation in a way that serves mutual interests and enhances defense partnerships”.

The diplomatic offensive by Somalia comes amid growing tensions in the Horn of Africa region following Israel’s world-first recognition of Somaliland in December. Mogadishu has warned that Israel plans to set up a military base in the breakaway region, which could be used to launch attacks on neighbouring countries.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Al Jazeera last week that Mogadishu “will never allow” the establishment of an Israeli base in Somaliland and will “confront” any such move.

“We will fight in our capacity. Of course, we will defend ourselves,” he said. “And that means that we will confront any Israeli forces coming in, because we are against that and we will never allow that.”

A Somaliland official told Israel’s Channel 12 in January that an Israeli military base is “on the table”, though terms were still being negotiated.

Separately, Somalia also cancelled all agreements with the United Arab Emirates last month – including port operations, security and defence deals – citing “harmful actions” that undermine its “national unity and political independence”.

The move came amid reports that the UAE had facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.

The Gulf state, which normalised ties with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords, has cultivated deep economic and security ties with Somaliland. These include a 30-year concession at the strategic Berbera port held by the UAE company DP World.

The UAE declined to sign a joint Arab-Islamic statement condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but it released a joint statement with the African Union in January pledging “support for Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability”.

Somalia’s break with the UAE coincided with a deterioration in Saudi Arabian-Emirati relations.

Tensions erupted in December when Saudi forces bombed what Riyadh described as a UAE weapons shipment to the separatist Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. Saudi Arabia also backed a call by Yemen’s internationally recognised government for Emirati forces in the country to withdraw.

The UAE denied the allegations.

Separately, Abu Dhabi has also been accused of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces for nearly three years.

Saudi Arabia, an ally of Khartoum, condemned the RSF on Saturday over attacks in Sudan’s Kordofan region, which have killed dozens of people, including women and children.

Riyadh also denounced “foreign interference” by unspecified parties in Sudan, saying the “continued influx of illegal weapons, mercenaries and foreign fighters” was prolonging the continuation of the nearly three-year-old war.

It did not name the parties.

Sudan, meanwhile, filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice last year, accusing it of “complicity in genocide” allegedly committed by the RSF against the Masalit community in West Darfur state.

The UAE slammed the move as “nothing more than a cynical publicity stunt” and said it would seek the “immediate dismissal” of the case.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud responds to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland – a self-governing Somali territory, allegations of a possible Israeli military presence near the Red Sea and shifting power dynamics in the Horn of Africa. He addresses criticism by the United States as well as President Donald Trump’s remarks on Somalia, growing ties with regional allies and fears of wider instability as tensions rise between Israel, Iran and their rivals. At home, Mohamud faces pressing questions over security, human rights, media freedom and whether he will seek a third term ahead of crucial elections.

Global markets rarely reveal their vulnerabilities quietly. They do so when shipping lanes come under threat, energy prices surge, or supply chains fracture. Few regions illustrate this reality more starkly than the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are now among the world’s most contested maritime corridors. What unfolds along these waters no longer remains local. It shapes economic security across the Arab world and far beyond.

Yet, amid growing attention to this strategic corridor, one factor remains persistently underestimated: Somalia.

For decades, Somalia was viewed primarily through the lens of conflict and fragility. That narrative no longer reflects today’s reality. The country is undergoing a consequential transition, moving away from prolonged instability, rebuilding state institutions, and re-emerging as a sovereign actor with growing regional relevance. Situated at the intersection of the Arab world, Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, Somalia is not peripheral to regional stability; it is central to it.

Geography alone explains much of this significance. With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, Somalia lies adjacent to the Bab al-Mandeb passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. A substantial share of global maritime trade and energy shipments passes through this corridor. Disruptions along Somalia’s coast, therefore, have immediate implications for shipping reliability, energy markets, and food security — issues of direct concern to Gulf states and Arab economies.

For the Arab world, Somalia should be understood not as distant terrain but as a front-line partner in regional security. Stability along Somalia’s coastline helps contain threats before they reach the Arabian Peninsula, whether in the form of violent extremism, illicit trafficking networks, piracy, or the entrenchment of hostile external military presences along Africa’s eastern flank.

Somalia is not attempting to build stability from scratch. Despite persistent challenges, tangible progress has been made. Federal governance structures are functioning. National security forces are undergoing professionalisation. Public financial management has improved. Diplomatically, Somalia has reasserted itself within the Arab League, the African Union, and multilateral forums. These gains continue to be built on daily and reflect a clear commitment to sovereign statehood, territorial unity, and partnership rather than dependency. Somalia today seeks strategic alignment grounded in mutual interest, not charity.

Somalia’s relevance also extends beyond security. Its membership in the East African Community integrates the country into one of the world’s fastest-growing population and consumer regions. East Africa’s rapid demographic expansion, urbanisation, and economic integration position Somalia as a natural bridge between Gulf capital and African growth markets.

There is a clear opportunity for Somalia to emerge as a logistics and transshipment gateway linking the Gulf, the Red Sea, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. With targeted investments in ports, transport corridors, and maritime security, Somalia can become a critical node in regional supply chains supporting trade diversification, food security, and economic resilience across the Arab world.

At the heart of Somalia’s potential is its dynamic population. More than 70 percent of Somalis are aged below 30. This generation is increasingly urban, digitally connected, and entrepreneurial. Somali traders and business networks already operate across Southern and Eastern Africa, spanning logistics, finance, retail, and services. A large and dynamic diaspora across the Gulf, Europe, North America, and Africa further amplifies this reach through remittances, investment, and transnational expertise.

None of these momentums, however, can be sustained without security. A capable, nationally legitimate Somali security sector is the foundation for durable stability, investment confidence, and regional integration.

For Gulf states and the wider Arab world, supporting Somalia’s security sector is therefore not an act of altruism. It is a strategic investment in a reliable stabilising partner. Effective Somali security institutions contribute directly to safeguarding Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime corridors, countering transnational terrorism before it reaches Arab shores, protecting emerging logistics infrastructure, and denying external actors opportunities to exploit governance vacuums. Such support must prioritise institution-building, Somali ownership, and long-term sustainability, not short-term fixes or proxy competition.

The stakes are rising. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are entering a period of heightened strategic contestation. Fragmentation along their African coastline poses a direct risk to Arab collective security. Recent developments underscore this urgency.

Israel’s unilateral recognition of the northern Somali region of Somaliland, pursued outside international legal frameworks and without Somali consent, is widely viewed as an attempt to secure a military foothold along these strategic waters, risking the introduction of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf’s security environment.

Even more troubling are emerging narratives advocating the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, with proposals to relocate them to Somaliland against their will. Such ideas, whether formally advanced or not, represent grave violations of international law and human dignity. Exporting the consequences of occupation and war onto African soil would not resolve conflict; it would multiply it.

For the Arab world, this should serve as a wake-up call. Allowing external actors to fragment sovereign states or instrumentalise fragile regions for unresolved conflicts carries long-term consequences. Somalia’s unity and stability, therefore, align squarely with core Arab strategic interests and with longstanding Arab positions on sovereignty, justice and self-determination.

Somalia is ready to be part of the solution. With calibrated strategic support, particularly in security sector development and logistics infrastructure, Somalia can emerge as a cornerstone of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden stability, a gateway to East Africa, and a long-term partner for the Arab world.

The question is no longer whether Somalia matters in the regional and global Red Sea and Gulf of Aden discussions and plans. It is whether the region will act on that reality before others do.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has slammed Israel’s “interference” in his country, saying its recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland has further increased instability and weakened international order.

In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera broadcast on Saturday, Mohamud said Somalia “will never allow” the establishment of an Israeli base in Somaliland and will “confront” any such move.

He also warned that the proposed Israeli base could be used as a springboard to attack neighbouring countries.

Mohamud’s comments came amid a regional outcry over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision in December to recognise Somaliland, a breakaway part of Somalia comprising the northwestern portion of what was once the British Protectorate.

The territory sits astride one of the world’s most critical maritime choke routes, flanked by multiple conflicts in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

Israel’s move made it the first country in the world to recognise Somaliland as an independent state and came months after The Associated Press news agency reported that Israeli officials had contacted parties in Somaliland to discuss using the territory for forcibly displacing Palestinians amid Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

Israel and Somaliland have denied the claims, but a Somaliland official from the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation told Israel’s Channel 12 in January that an Israeli military base is “on the table and being discussed”, though its establishment depends on the terms.

Somalia has denounced Israel’s move as an attack on its territorial integrity and unity, a position backed by most African and Arab leaders, and urged Netanyahu to withdraw the recognition.

But Somaliland’s leader, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Cirro, has welcomed Israel’s diplomatic move, praising Netanyahu for his “leadership and commitment to promoting stability and peace” in the region.

‘We will defend ourselves’

In his interview with Al Jazeera, Mohamud described Israel’s diplomatic manoeuvre as a “reckless, fundamentally wrong and illegal action under international law”.

He also pledged to fight back against any Israeli military presence in Somaliland.

“We will fight in our capacity. Of course, we will defend ourselves,” he said. “And that means that we will confront any Israeli forces coming in, because we are against that and we will never allow that.”

The Israeli recognition represents a dramatic shift in Somaliland’s fortunes after years of diplomatic isolation.

The region seceded from Somalia during a brutal civil war that followed decades under the hardline government of Siad Barre, whose forces devastated the north. While large parts of Somalia descended into chaos, Somaliland stabilised by the late 1990s.

Somaliland has since developed a distinct political identity, with its own currency, flag and parliament. But its eastern regions remain disputed by communities that do not back the separatist programme in the capital, Hargeisa.

In recent years, Somaliland developed ties with the United Arab Emirates – a signatory to the Abraham Accords with Israel – and Taiwan as it sought international acceptance.

In his interview, Mohamud said Israel’s move “interfering with Somalia’s sovereign and territorial integrity” also “undermines stability, security and trade in a way that affects the whole of Africa, the Red Sea and the wider world”.

He added that Israel’s deadly use of force against Palestinians in Gaza cannot be separated from what is happening in Somaliland, adding that it reflects the weakening of the foundations of global governance.

“Key among the global concerns is the weakening of the established rules-based international order. That order is not intact any more,” Mohamud said.

He warned that institutions created after World War II “are under grave threat”, as “the mighty is right” increasingly replaces adherence to international law.

The United States, meanwhile, has yet to signal a major shift on the question of Somaliland.

But in August, US President Donald Trump – who has previously lobbed insults at Somalia and Mohamud – suggested he was preparing to move on the issue when asked about Somaliland during a White House news conference.

“Another complex one, but we’re working on that one – Somaliland,” he said.