new world order

The United Nations General Assembly’s 80th session was meant to be a sombre assessment of a world on fire. The Sustainable Development Goals are failing, wars rage on multiple continents and the planet itself is burning. Yet the most significant drama of the 80th session was not about any single crisis but a deeper, more fundamental schism that played out in the very language used within the hall. It seems that the UN is no longer a forum for managing a shared global order; it has become the arena where two irreconcilable visions of world order are fighting for supremacy.

On one side stands the traditional, albeit, weary mulitlateralist project. Its champions, exemplified by European leaders cautiously inching towards recognition of a Palestinian state, still operate on the premise that legitimacy is derived from international law and consensus. Theirs is a world of treaties, institutions and patient diplomacy. On the other side stands a resurgent sovereigntist assault, championed most vocally by President Donald Trump, who returned to the UN stage not to engage, but to dismantle. In a nearly hour-long speech Trump admonished the UN over what he views as its ineffectiveness, framing global cooperation not as a necessity, but as a folly. The 80th UNGA revealed that the transatlantic split is no longer a policy disagreement; it is a philosophical chasm over the soul of global governance.

The issue of Palestine serves as a perfect case study in this clash of legitimacies. The moves by a growing number of countries to recognize Palestine were calculated acts of multilateralism. They were an attempt to salvage the two-state solution, a cornerstone of UN resolutions for decades, by working within the established system. The recognition was a message: that statehood is not a prize to be won through force but a status conferred by the international community.

This logic is an anathema to the Trumpian worldview. From this perspective, such recognition is not diplomacy; it is a dangerous reward for adversaries. Trump framed it as a “reward for Hamas”, reducing a complex decades-long struggle for self-determination to a simplistic binary form of terrorism. The sovereigntist argument holds that these decisions are not the UN’s to make. Power, not consensus, is the ultimate arbiter. The conflict is no longer about land; it is about who gets to decide the rules of the game.

Nowhere is this divide more stark than on the existential threat of climate change. For the multilateralist project, the climate crisis is its ultimate validation. A warming planet is a problem that no single nation, no matter how powerful, can solve alone. It necessitates the very cooperation the UN was founded to foster.

Trump’s address systematically dismantled this premise. He pulled the rug out from under the entire premise by blasting climate change as “the greatest con job ever perpetuated on the world.” This is not merely a policy difference; it is a declaration that the central problem the UN is trying to solve is a fiction. If there is no global problem, there is no need for a global solution. The institution, in this view, becomes not just ineffective, but illegitimate.

The sovereigntist vision extends to a radical critique of domestic governance, further highlighting the divide. When Trump declared that some countries “are going to hell” over their immigration policies, he was doing more than critcizing a policy. He was asserting a model where nationa borders are absolute and the internal choices of sovereign nations, particularly those of his allies, are open for public condemnation if they deviate from his ideology. This creates a world not of mutual respect and non-interference, but of perpetual, transactional pressure.

The  consequence of this great unraveling is a world adrift. The UN was built on the fragile hope that great powers, despite their rivalries, would see a greater interest in maintaining a common system. That foundation is now cracked. We’re moving towards a multi-order world, where countries selectively engage with institutions, cherry-picking rules that suit them and ignoring those that don’t. The Global South watches this spectacle with a cynical detachment, caught between a multilateral system that has often failed them and a sovereigntist alternative that promises even greater volatility.

The 80th session offered no resolutions to this core conflict. Instead, it held up a mirror. The speeches, the sideline meetings, the starkly different vocabularies – all revealed an institution that can no longer paper over its divides. The question is no longer whether the UN can solve the world’s problems, but whether the world believes in the idea of the UN itself. As the great powers turn inward, the 80th General Assembly may be remembered not for what it achieved, but as the moment the post-war order finally conceded that it’s no longer governed by a shared vision, but by a deepening and potentially unbridgeable rift.

States no longer employ war as a tool to achieve their goals. Preferring to utilize more peaceful methods, states employ it to pursue highly consequential objectives. BRICS serves as a manifestation of this notion. The emergence of BRICS increasingly challenges the Global North. The establishment of this cooperation reflects the efforts of the Global South to alter the global order and break free from the long-standing dominance of the Global North.

BRICS represents more than a symbol of cooperation. It is actively engaged in a geopolitical chessboard that shapes today’s global economy. Gradually yet steadily, it is shifting the global balance of power through the strength it has accumulated. This is evident in the growing interest among developing countries to join the group.

Led by two major powers perceived as threats to the Global North, China and Russia hold substantial leadership roles. China dominates the global economic landscape and poses a challenge not only to the United States but also to Europe. The European Union consistently asserts that China is a rival in the renewable energy sector, particularly in electric vehicles. Russia, on the other hand, holds significant energy leverage over Europe and poses a geopolitical challenge to NATO, which is led by the United States. The development of this cooperation is further reinforced by the accession of strategically significant global actors such as Iran and the United Arab Emirates, with their vast oil reserves; Ethiopia, with its port access; and Egypt, with its strategic geographic position in relation to the West.
The inclusion of these countries further destabilizes the seemingly absolute dominance of the Global North.

Power has long been synonymous with the realist approach, which is grounded in strength.
However, the definition of strength and power has evolved. Power is no longer solely defined in terms of military capability or weaponry. In today’s global context, power is also measured by a state’s influence in shaping the rules of the game. Cooperation serves as the foundation of this new form of power.

BRICS leverages this expanded notion of power and influence. It builds coalitions to undermine dominance not by overt force, but by subtly shifting the balance—leaving its opponents unaware that a transformation is underway. BRICS undoubtedly presents a substantial challenge to the Global North’s dominance. In response, Western countries have adopted equally measured diplomatic strategies aimed at undermining BRICS from within.

During a G7 summit, former U.S. President Donald Trump expressed regret over Russia’s removal from the G7 following its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

“I would say that was a mistake, because I think you wouldn’t have a war right now if Russia were still in, and you wouldn’t have a war right now if Trump had been president four years ago.”

Trump also did not object to the possibility of China joining the G7, stating:

“Well, it’s not a bad idea. I don’t mind that. If someone wants to suggest China joining, I think we should suggest it, but you want people you can talk to,” he added.

At first glance, these remarks appear to suggest a constructive approach to U.S.–China relations. However, upon closer examination, they may be interpreted as part of a broader strategic effort to weaken U.S. involvement in China’s global agenda.

This statement illustrates the extent to which the Global North powers are monitoring and responding to the actions of two principal BRICS members—China and Russia—as part of their efforts to undermine alliances among the Global South countries. Beyond these two core members, the G7 extended invitations to three strategically important BRICS countries—India, South Africa, and Brazil—to attend the forum as guest participants. This move represents a calculated geopolitical effort by the Global North to engage selectively with the Global South actors on the international stage.

In early July 2025, BRICS convened a summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 6–7 July. The summit was attended by all member states, including Indonesia as the newest addition to the group. Amid widespread global instability, the summit focused on pressing international issues, particularly those concerning the global economy and sanctions imposed by the United States. The meeting also addressed and condemned the Israel–U.S. military action against Iran, characterizing it as a violation of international law. These discussions served to foster a shared perspective and unity among BRICS members, with the expressed objective of challenging and dismantling systemic dominance.

The global chessboard, once governed exclusively by the most powerful Global North actors, is now being gradually redefined by emerging powers. These new actors, having grown weary of external direction, are seeking to establish their own platforms for influence and victory.

In conclusion, cooperation may serve as a strategic instrument for gaining power—one that cannot be easily condemned by any state. It represents the power to shape a new world order. Moreover, cooperation can also function as a tool for existing powers to engage with emerging actors and potentially undermine them from within the very system those new actors have established. Thus, cooperation in this context is not merely a symbol of unity but a form of conflict—one that is waged without conventional weaponry or the noise of warfare, yet still aimed at securing or contesting global dominance. Whether that dominance is preserved or overtaken remains the central struggle.

In today’s fast-changing world, where uncertainty and power rivalries are on the rise, some voices are calling for a return to old-style diplomacy—a new version of the 1945 Yalta Conference. This idea, often referred to as “Yalta 2.0,” imagines the world’s major powers—the United States, Russia, and China—coming together to divide up regions, settle territorial disputes, and determine the political fate of smaller countries. At a time when global tensions are high, this approach may seem tempting to some. But for China, the path forward does not lie in revisiting the power politics of the past. It lies in creating a peaceful, inclusive, and multipolar future.

From the outset, it is important to recall that the original Yalta Conference, while historic, was also deeply flawed. While it ended the horrors of World War II and contributed to the formation of the United Nations, it also sidelined the interests of many nations, including China. In exchange for Soviet participation in the final stages of the war against Japan, key Chinese interests in Northeast Asia were compromised without Beijing’s consent. As a country that once suffered from colonialism and great power bargaining, China cannot support any model that seeks to reintroduce a world order based on dividing the globe into spheres of influence.

China’s foreign policy has long been rooted in principles such as respect for sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, non-interference, and mutual benefit. These are not just abstract ideals; they are grounded in China’s own historical experience. China knows what it means to have its territory divided, its dignity trampled, and its voice ignored. That is why Beijing has always stood firm against unilateral changes to territorial status—whether in Kosovo, Georgia, Crimea, or elsewhere. Today, despite growing calls for the West to recognize Crimea as part of Russia, China’s position remains consistent: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine, must be respected.

Supporters of Yalta 2.0 often argue that China could benefit from such a deal. They suggest that a seat at the table with Washington and Moscow would elevate Beijing’s global standing and provide an opportunity to advance core interests such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. But this view misses the point. China’s rise has never been about bargaining away the rights of others. Rather, it has been about building a more connected world where all countries—big or small—have a voice. For China, diplomacy is not a zero-sum game. True leadership lies in lifting others, not containing them.

In fact, returning to exclusive power-sharing arrangements would be deeply harmful to China’s vision for the world. China’s global strategy is based on open connectivity, economic cooperation, and institutional reform. Initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), and China’s leadership in the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) all reflect this commitment to inclusiveness and fairness. These platforms are not about dividing the world, but about bringing it closer together. A Yalta-style settlement, by contrast, would create divisions, deepen mistrust, and undermine the very institutions that China has helped to strengthen.

Moreover, the return of ideological conservatism in parts of the West, marked by skepticism of globalization and rising right-wing nationalism, poses an additional risk. While such political movements may find common ground with Russia’s cultural traditionalism or even aspects of Trump’s America First approach, they diverge fundamentally from China’s pragmatic and development-focused policies. China does not seek to impose its model on others. Instead, it supports a world where countries choose their own path of modernization and development.

The current U.S. push to re-engage Russia and draw it away from China—sometimes called a “reverse Nixon” strategy—also reflects a Cold War mindset that China does not share. While trilateral dialogues can help improve global stability, using them to isolate or contain any one country is neither sustainable nor responsible. For China, multipolarity means balance, not blocs. It means cooperation based on mutual interests, not coercion or side-deals made behind closed doors.

Indeed, as the idea of Yalta 2.0 gains traction in some circles, we are already seeing signs of strain in global relationships. China’s trade with Russia has shown early signs of cooling, with car exports and overall bilateral trade declining in early 2025. This is a reminder that trust and interdependence must be nurtured carefully. China is prepared to deepen strategic ties with its partners—but always on the basis of equality and long-term vision.

Equally concerning is the risk that Yalta 2.0 would alienate the Global South. Countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America have increasingly turned to China not only as a trade partner but as a champion of equitable development and reform of global governance. To now support a return to great-power bargaining would undermine this trust. It would send a signal that the future of smaller states can still be decided without their consent. China must—and will—stand against such a return to outdated thinking.

As we approach the 80th anniversaries of the end of World War II and the founding of the United Nations, we are reminded of the importance of these historic moments. They marked the beginning of a global order based on dialogue, not domination. For all its imperfections, that rules-based order gave the world decades of relative peace and prosperity. It is this legacy that must be preserved—not through nostalgia for 1945, but through renewed commitment to shared responsibility and sovereign equality.

The world today is not the world of Yalta. It is more complex, more interconnected, and more hopeful. Emerging powers want dignity, not dependency. Regional blocs seek cooperation, not confrontation. And the people of the world want peace, not power politics.

For China, the answer is clear. A Yalta 2.0 is not the way forward. What the world needs is not a division of spheres, but a convergence of minds. Not backroom deals, but open partnerships. Not great power privilege, but global progress.

Let us work together, not to rewrite the map, but to build the bridges that will carry all of us toward a more just, peaceful, and inclusive future.