militant

Princeton Phd student freed from Iraqi militant captivity

Officials said Elizabeth Tsurkov was safe at the U.S. Embassy in Bagdad, seen here in 2019. Tsurkov was abducted in Bagdad in 2023, and was freed from militant captivity on Tuesday. File Photo by Ahmed Jalil/EPA-EFE

Sept. 10 (UPI) — Elizabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli-Russian citizen and a Princeton University student who has been held captive by Shiite militants in Iraq since March 2023, has been freed, President Donald Trump and Iraqi government forces confirmed.

Circumstances surrounding her release were not clear. The Iraqi government said its security forces had discovered Tsurkov’s place of detention Tuesday. It said they reached that location and then handed Tsurkov over to the U.S. embassy, without stating how her freedom was secured.

Trump, on his Truth Social platform, said she had been released by Kata’ib Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.

Sabah al-Numan, a spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, said in a statement that Tsurkov had been handed over to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, which Trump confirmed.

“On this occasion, we reaffirm that our armed forces and all our security agencies and formations will not hesitate to perform their duty to enforce the rule of law, defend the state and its institutions and hold accountable anyone who tries to harm the security and stability that has been achieved through great sacrifices and sincere national efforts,” al-Numan said.

Trump said, “I will always fight for JUSTICE, and never give up.”

A PhD student in political science at Princeton University, Tsurkov had traveled to Iraq in 2023 to conduct fieldwork when on March 21, eight days after her arrival, she was kidnapped from the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad.

Months after she was detained, Israel announced that Kata’ib Hezbollah had been responsible for Tsurkov’s abduction.

Emma Tsurkov, one of Elizabeth’s sisters and an American citizen, said in a statement that her family was “incredibly happy” and “cannot wait to see Elizabeth and give her all the love we have been waiting to share for 903 days.”

Among those she thanked for aiding in securing Elizabeth’s release were Trump, his special envoy Adam Boehler, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq and Global Reach, a nonprofit that advocates for Americans detained abroad and has been supporting her family following Elizabeth’s abduction.

“This is a day we have all been waiting for,” Global Reach CEO Mickey Bergman told UPI in an emailed statement.

“As an Israeli-born American, Elizabeth’s safe return was particularly personal for me. It is important to know that we live in a country that fights for those in need, especially those in need, especially those who are targeted just because of their status or relationship with the United States.”

Princeton President Christopher Eisgruber similarly said in a statement that Tsurkov’s release “brings relief and joy to the university community, and we celebrate that she will be reunited with her family.”

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How an al-Qaeda offshoot became one of Africa’s deadliest militant groups

Priya Sippy & Jacob Boswall

BBC News & BBC Monitoring

Al-Zallaqa JNIM fighters train in an undisclosed location in West Africa's Sahel region.Al-Zallaqa

Al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is the main group behind a surge in militant jihadist attacks sweeping across several West African nations, especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

On 1 July, the group said it had carried out a major coordinated attack on seven military locations in western Mali, including near the borders with Senegal and Mauritania.

There is growing concern about the impact JNIM could have on the stability of the region.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have struggled to contain the violence – and this is one of the factors that contributed to several military coups in the three Sahel countries over the last five years.

But like the civilian governments they replaced, the juntas are seemingly unable to stem the growing jihadist threat, especially from JNIM.

What is JNIM?

JNIM has become one of Africa’s deadliest jihadist groups within the space of just a few years.

It was formed in Mali in 2017, as a coalition of five jihadist militant groups:

  • Ansar Dine
  • Katibat Macina
  • Al-Mourabitoun
  • Ansar al-Islam
  • The Sahara branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

These groups started collaborating after the French military pushed back several jihadist and separatist organisations that were operating in northern Mali in 2012. Eventually, the leaders of the groups came together to create JNIM.

In recent years, they have expanded geographically, establishing new areas of operation.

JNIM is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Malian diplomat who belongs to the Tuareg ethnic group. He was at the helm of the Tuareg uprising against the Malian government in 2012 which sought to establish an independent state for the Tuareg people called Azawad. Deputy leader Amadou Koufa is from the Fulani community.

Analysts believe the central leadership helps guide local branches which operate across the Sahel region of West Africa.

While it is difficult to know exactly how many fighters there are in JNIM’s ranks, or how many have recently been recruited, experts suggest it could be several thousand – mostly young men and boys who lack other economic opportunities in one of the poorest regions in the world.

What does JNIM want?

The group rejects the authority of the Sahel governments, seeking to impose its strict interpretation of Islam and Sharia in the areas where it operates.

Analysts say that in some areas, JNIM has been known to impose strict dress codes, implement bans against music and smoking, order men to grow beards and prevent women from being in public spaces alone.

This version of Islam can be at odds with the religion as practised by local communities, says Yvan Guichaoua, a senior researcher at the Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies.

“These practices are clearly breaking from established practices and certainly not very popular,” he says.

“But whether it’s attractive or not, also depends on what the state is able to deliver, and there has been a lot of disappointment in what the state has been doing for the past years.”

Disillusionment with the secular justice system can make the introduction of Sharia courts appealing to some.

Where does JNIM operate?

After its beginnings in central and northern Mali, JNIM rapidly expanded its reach. While its strongholds are in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, JNIM has also carried out attacks in Benin, Togo and at one point Ivory Coast.

It is now operational throughout Mali and 11 of Burkina Faso’s 13 regions, according to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc), a civil society organisation.

In the last year, Burkina Faso has become the epicentre of the group’s activities – predominately the northern and eastern border regions. This is, in part, because of divisions and defections in the country’s military as well as how deeply embedded the militants are in the local communities, according to Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst for security consultancy firm Control Risk.

“JNIM have an ability to embed in local communities or to be able to use local grievances as a means of recruiting or winning sympathy towards their cause,” she told the BBC.

Are JNIM attacks increasing in scale?

In recent months violent incidents have spiked in Burkina Faso to previously unseen levels, according to analysis from BBC Monitoring’s jihadist media team. Major attacks have also recently been carried out in Mali, Niger and Benin.

In the first half of 2025, JNIM said it carried out over 280 attacks in Burkina Faso – double the number for the same period in 2024, according to data verified by the BBC.

The group has claimed to have killed almost 1,000 people across the Sahel since April, most of them members of the security force or militias fighting alongside government forces, according to BBC Monitoring data.

Almost 800 of these have been in Burkina Faso alone. Casualties in Mali were the next highest (117) and Benin (74).

“The frequency of attacks in June is just unheard of so far,” says Mr Guichaoua. “They have really stepped up their activities in the past weeks.”

The militants use a variety of tactics designed to cause maximum disruption, Ms Ochieng explains.

“They plant IEDs [improvised explosive devices] on key roads, and have long-range capabilities.

“They [also] target security forces in military bases, so a lot of their weapons come from that. They have also attacked civilians – in instances where communities are perceived to be cooperating with the government.”

Starlink – a company owned by Elon Musk which provides internet via satellites – has also been exploited by groups like JNIM to enhance their capabilities, according to a recent report by Gi-Toc.

The company provides high-speed internet where regular mobile networks are unavailable or unreliable.

Militant groups smuggle Starlink devices into the country along well-established contraband routes, G-toch says.

“Starlink has made it much easier for [militant groups] to plan and execute attacks, share intelligence, recruit members, carry out financial transactions and maintain contacts with their commanders even during active conflict,” an analyst from Gi-Toc told the BBC’s Focus on Africa podcast.

The BBC has contacted Starlink for comment.

How is JNIM funded?

The group has multiple sources of income.

At one time in Mali, funds were raised through kidnapping foreigners for ransom but few remain in the country because of the deteriorating security situation.

Cattle-rustling has now become a major source of income, according to an analyst from Gi-Toc. They did not want to be named as it could risk their safety in Mali.

“Mali is a big exporter of cattle so it’s easy for them to steal animals and sell them,” the analyst said.

Research by Gi-Toc shows that in one year in just one district of Mali, JNIM made $770,000 (£570,000) from livestock. Based on this figure, JNIM could be earning millions of dollars from cattle theft.

JNIM also imposes various taxes, according to experts.

“They tax the gold, but basically tax anything that goes through their territory, whether that’s listed goods or illicit goods,” Gi-Toc says.

“There can be an extortion type of tax, where JNIM tell citizens they need to pay in return for protection.”

The militants have also been known to set up blockades, at which people must pay to leave and enter the area, according to Ms Ochieng.

What about efforts to fight them?

France’s armed forces were on the ground supporting the government in Mali for almost a decade – with over 4,000 troops stationed across the Sahel region fighting groups that went on to form JNIM, as well as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.

While they had some initial success in 2013 and 2014, reclaiming territory from the militants and killing several senior commanders, this did not stop JNIM’s growth after it was formed.

“Counterinsurgency efforts have failed so far because of this idea that JNIM can be beaten militarily, but it is only through negotiation that the group will end,” Gi-Toc’s analyst suggested.

In 2014, Sahelian countries banded together to form the G5 Sahel Task Force, a 5,000-strong group of international troops. However, over the past couple of years, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn, undermining the task force’s ability to tackle the insurgency.

Minusma, the UN peacekeeping force – while not a counter-insurgency effort – was also in Mali for a decade to support efforts, however it left the country at the end of 2024.

What impact have military coups had on JNIM?

A line graph showing the number of attacks 2017-2024, with the various coups marked. The number increases steadily until 2023 when it flattens out

Military coups took place in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023.

Poor governance under the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger subsequently has allowed militant groups like JNIM to flourish, according to analysts.

These juntas were swift to tell French troops to leave, replacing them with Russian support and a joint force formed by the three Sahelian countries.

Though Russian paramilitary group Wagner has withdrawn its troops from Mali entirely, Africa Corps, a Kremlin-controlled paramilitary group, will remain in place.

In Burkina Faso, a so-called “volunteer” army, launched in 2020 before the military takeover, is one strategy being used to fight militants. Junta leader Ibrahim Traoré has said he wants to recruit 50,000 fighters.

But experts say many of these volunteers are conscripted by force. Inadequate training means they often suffer heavy casualties. They are also often a target for JNIM attacks.

The military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali have also been accused by human rights organisations of committing atrocities against civilians, particularly ethnic Fulanis. Human rights group say the government often conflates the Fulani community with Islamist armed groups, which has furthered hampered peace efforts.

Between January 2024 and March 2025, the military government and their Russian allies were responsible for 1,486 civilian casualties in Mali, according to Gi-Toc.

This extreme violence against civilians has generated anger towards the government, fuelling further recruitment for JNIM.

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Militant Democracy: When Democracies Defend Themselves

In the minds of liberals, democracy is a society that is open, tolerant, and diverse. However, history demonstrates that the most tolerant regimes occasionally have to go beyond, even if that means violating their own principles, in order to remain. This paradox is exactly what explains the concept of militant democracy: a variety of democratic self-defense that gives the right to restrict some of the rights because the main one—the democratic order—still has to be protected.

What Is Militant Democracy?

The idea of militant democracy was first discussed by a German scholar called Karl Loewenstein in the 1930s. While Loewenstein was exploring the downfall of the Weimar Republic, he claimed that democracies must not be passive if they are to survive against those who want to destroy them from within.

Within this concept, a democratic power is no longer the weak and helpless one. It may, thus, use legal and constitutional means to prevent radical parties—be they fascist, communist, or religiously radical—from abusing the very freedoms that democracy grants them to commit their acts of treason, thereby driving the democracy to annihilation.

Tools of Democratic Self-Defense

Modern-day militant democracies employ various instruments to secure their foundations:

·       Prohibiting extremist parties or movements (e.g., the ban of the neo-Nazi SRP by Germany in 1952 and of the Communist Party in 1956)

·       Constitutional clauses that forbid organizations if they are considered “hostile to democracy”

·       Limiting freedom of expression or gathering when these are used for the propagation of hate or the establishment of an authoritarian regime

·       Ensuring the loyalty of public officials towards the democratic values through monitoring of their activities

Through these tools, the democracies are the ones that are controversial with these questions of moral and political problems. Can a democracy still be accepted if it restricts participation? Does the suppression of any kind of speech in order to defend tolerance at the end of it actually lead to the loss of that?

Between Protection and Overreach

Critics point out that militant democracy may be misused. Governments might use it as an excuse not to protect democracy but, instead, to go after their opponents. The purges in Turkey after the coup are, for instance, examples of such self-preservation. However, they are considered by many to be the signs of an authoritarian regime.

The demarcation between “anti-democratic” and just “illiberal” is often very vague. The populist parties—like Fidesz in Hungary or Law and Justice in Poland—are acting within the democratic systems but openly negate the liberal norms. Should the concept of militant democracy be applied to them? And who is in charge of making this decision?

A 21st-Century Comeback

Nowadays, as authoritarianism is on the rise and there are more and more cases of disinformation, the concept of militant democracy is coming back.

  • Besides the extremist groups of the right and left, Verfassungsschutz also keeps an eye on parties that they consider to be actively working against the constitutional order in Germany.
  • Recently, in France and Austria, the government has decided to prohibit some Islamist organizations because they are not compatible with republican values.
  • Since the time Ukraine has been waging a war with Russia, it has forbidden the pro-Russian parties on the basis of national security.

At the level of the European Union, instruments such as Article 7 and the Conditionality Regulation are a manifestation of the concept of militant democracy in a power-sharing setting—they are means of pursuing the protection of the Union’s constitutional identity through the people’s mandate within the Union.

In Romania, the candidacy of Călin Georgescu, an intellectual nationalist and a local United Nations official, became a disaster because they effectively eliminated him from the race for political office. While his presidential bid was embraced by some segments of the public, his past affiliations and unorthodox views have led to institutional resistance and public denunciation. Proponents of this view claim that elites are overreaching; on the other hand, some people see it as a safety measure to prevent the spread of the extremist ideologies that are hidden under the pop era rhetoric—thus, the example of militant democracy.

A Difficult Balance

Militant democracy is a fascinating concept because it tries to protect democracy, but at the same time it can weaken it. The experience of the Weimar Republic is a very interesting one—it shows that democracies can be destroyed from the inside, usually due to their own excessive tolerance and lack of decisiveness. This is still true today. Democracies are at risk not only from external sources but also from insiders who use democratic freedoms to destroy democracy. This paradox makes the concept of militant democracy very important, yet quite complex: it is a protective agent intended to defend democratic order, but if it is used in a wrong way, it can become the very thing that it is fighting against.

Simultaneously, to protect democracy is not supposed to turn into a justification for the expansion of authoritarianism and political repression masked as democratic defense. There is a danger of misuse—where governments turn militancy democracy instruments into weapons to repress the political opposition that is not only to limit the protests or to consolidate power—that is always there. Hence, it is necessary that these steps are taken in a just, honest, and respectful way of the law. The rightfulness of the militant democracy rests on strict control and fidelity to democratic principles, guaranteeing that the attempts to defend democracy are not those that undermine the democratic matter.

To sum up, a militant democracy isn’t about limiting ideas but rather about saving a democratic space where ideas are not only allowed but also protected by safeguards that ensure the democratic order. The idea also asks for a subtle synergy—sufficient determination to make sure that anti-democratic elements cannot trick freedoms while being open enough to keep political pluralism and healthy discussions alive. In the current era, where we have witnessed an upsurge in populism, foreign meddling, and internal rifts, this equilibrium has become more vital than ever. Tolerance can’t be boundless if democracy wants to live on; hence, there have to be conditions—very cautiously and equitably implemented—that serve as the defense of democracy against those who are plotting to conquer it from the inside.

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Ngugi wa Thiong’o was not just a writer, he was a militant | Arts and Culture

Ngugi wa Thiong’o loved to dance. He loved it more than anything else – even more than writing. Well into his 80s, his body slowed by increasingly disabling kidney failure, Ngugi would get up and start dancing merely at the thought of music, never mind the sound of it. Rhythm flowed through his feet the way words flowed through his hands and onto the page.

It is how I will always remember Ngugi – dancing. He passed away on May 28 at the age of 87, leaving behind not only a Nobel-worthy literary legacy but a combination of deeply innovative craft and piercingly original criticism that joyfully calls on all of us to do better and push harder – as writers, activists, teachers and people – against the colonial foundations that sustain all our societies. As for me, he pushed me to go far deeper up river to Kakuma refugee camp, where the free association of so many vernacular tongues and cultures made possible the freedom to think and speak “from the heart” – something he would always describe as writing’s greatest gift.

Ngugi had long been a charter member of the African literary canon and a perennial Nobel favourite by the time I first met him in 2005. Getting to know him, it quickly became clear to me that his writing was inseparable from his teaching, which in turn was umbilically tied to his political commitments and long service as one of Africa’s most formidable public intellectuals.

Ngugi’s cheerfulness and indefatigable smile and laugh hid a deep-seated anger, reflecting the scars of violence on his body and soul as a child, young man and adult victimised by successive and deeply intertwined systems of criminalised rule.

The murder of his deaf brother, killed by the British because he did not hear and obey soldiers’ orders to stop at a checkpoint, and the Mau Mau revolt that divided his other brothers on opposite sides of the colonial order during the final decade of British rule, imbued in him the foundational reality of violence and divisiveness as the twin engines of permanent coloniality even after independence formally severed the connection to the metropole.

More than half a century after these events, nothing would arouse Ngugi’s animated ire more than bringing up in a discussion the transitional moment from British to Kenyan rule, and the fact that colonialism didn’t leave with the British, but rather dug in and reenforced itself with Kenya’s new, Kenyan rulers.

As he became a writer and playwright, Ngugi also became a militant, one devoted to using language to reconnect the complex African identities – local, tribal, national and cosmopolitan – that the “cultural bomb” of British rule had “annihilated” over the previous seven decades.

After his first play, The Black Hermit, premiered in Kampala in 1962, he was quickly declared a voice who “speaks for the Continent”. Two years later, Weep Not Child, his first novel and the first English-language novel by an East African writer, came out.

As he rose to prominence, Ngugi decided to renounce the English language and start writing in his native Gikuyu.

The (re)turn to his native tongue radically altered the trajectory not just of his career, but of his life, as the ability of his clear-eyed critique of postcolonial rule to reach his compatriots in their own language (rather than English or the national language of Swahili) was too much for Kenya’s new rulers to tolerate, and so he was imprisoned for a year without trial in 1977.

What Ngugi had realised when he began writing in Gikuyu, and even more so in prison, was the reality of neocolonialism as the primary mechanism of postcolonial rule. This wasn’t the standard “neocolonialism” that anti- and post-colonial activists used to describe the ongoing power of former colonial rulers by other means after formal independence, but rather the willing adoption of colonial technologies and discourses of rule by newly independent leaders, many of whom – like Jomo Kenyatta, Ngugi liked to point out – themselves suffered imprisonment and torture under the British rule.

Thus, true decolonisation could only occur when people’s minds were freed from foreign control, which required first and perhaps foremost the freedom to write in one’s native language.

Although rarely acknowledged, Ngugi’s concept of neocolonialism, which owed much, he’d regularly explain, to the writings of Kwame Nkrumah and other African anti-colonial intellectuals-turned-political leaders, anticipated the rise of the now ubiquitous “decolonial” and “Indigenous” turns in the academy and progressive cultural production by almost a generation.

Indeed, Ngugi has long been placed together with Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak as the founding generation of postcolonial thought and criticism. But he and Said, whom he’d frequently discuss as a brother-in-arms and fellow admirer of Polish-British writer Joseph Conrad, shared a similar all-encompassing focus on language, even as Said wrote his prose mostly in English rather than Arabic.

For Said and Ngugi, colonialism had not yet passed, but was very much still an ongoing, viscerally and violently lived reality – for the former through the ever more violent and ultimately annihilatory settler colonialism, for the latter through the violence of successive governments.

Ngugi saw his link with Said in their common experience growing up under British rule. As he explained in his afterword to a recently published anthology of Egyptian prison writings since 2011, “The performance of authority was central to the colonial culture of silence and fear,” and disrupting that authority and ending the silence could only come first through language.

For Said, the swirl of Arabic and English in his mind since childhood created what he called a “primal instability”, one that could be calmed fully when he was in Palestine, which he returned to multiple times in the last decade of his life. For Ngugi, even as Gikuyu enabled him to “imagine another world, a flight to freedom, like a bird you see from the [prison] window,” he could not make a final return home in his last years.

Still, from his home in Orange County, California in the United States, he would never tire of urging students and younger colleagues to “write dangerously”, to use language to resist whatever oppressive order in which they found themselves. The bird would always take flight, he would say, if you could write without fear.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

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