Mali

Bamako, Mali – The ambush that killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps near the northern town of Anefis on July 18 was more than another battlefield setback.

It underscored how Mali’s armed groups are becoming increasingly coordinated, exposing the limits of the military government’s security strategy, despite growing Russian military support.

The Malian military confirmed the assault and said it had launched counter-operations, while Africa Corps later released footage it said showed drone strikes targeting fighters involved in the ambush.

The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated operations across northern Mali since April, raising questions about why armed groups are increasingly cooperating, whether Bamako’s security strategy is working, whether Russia’s military role has – and has not – changed, and what the conflict could mean for the wider Sahel.

Why are separatist and Islamic armed groups fighting together?

The July 18 ambush was jointly claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of predominantly Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.

Until recently, such cooperation would have seemed unlikely as they have different longterm political aims. The FLA seeks greater autonomy or independence for northern Mali, while JNIM aims to establish governance based on its interpretation of Islamic law across the region.

For Héni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) monitor, the answer lies in a shared battlefield enemy rather than a shared ideology.

“The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners from the Africa Corps,” Nsaibia told Al Jazeera.

“In doing so, they act as force multipliers for one another, allowing them to pool resources and mutualise their efforts to confront their adversaries more effectively. These groups also share kinship ties despite their ideological differences and regard one another as sons of the land, defending their ancestral territory against invading forces.”

For Mali’s military, that cooperation makes attacks harder to anticipate and more difficult to repel, allowing armed groups to combine local knowledge, manpower and operational experience while pursuing separate objectives.

The military government’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and deepen military cooperation with Russia reshaped the conflict. The collapse of the peace framework removed one of the few mechanisms managing relations between Bamako and northern armed groups, while the military’s increasingly confrontational approach encouraged former rivals to coordinate against a common adversary.

The shift became increasingly visible during coordinated attacks launched across several parts of the country in April, stretching Malian and Russian forces across multiple fronts. More recently, fighting around Anefis has shown that the alliance is capable not only of launching simultaneous operations but also of sustaining pressure on strategically important military positions.

With negotiations abandoned and military confrontation becoming the dominant strategy, armed groups that once competed with one another have found greater incentives to cooperate on the battlefield.

Has Russia changed the course of Mali’s war?

Since replacing the Wagner Group as Moscow’s principal military presence in Mali, Africa Corps has become an increasingly important partner for the Malian army.

Its personnel have provided combat support alongside Malian forces, while Russian drones and aircraft have expanded the military’s surveillance and strike capabilities. Those capabilities have strengthened the army’s ability to respond to attacks and defend key positions.

“Russia has helped strengthen Mali’s military, which was at risk of being overrun, and has given it more support on the battlefield,” Nimi Princewill, a regional analyst specialising in West Africa and the Sahel, told Al Jazeera.

“But this attack, as well as the earlier seizure of Kidal, suggests the Kremlin’s military support has not changed the overall picture. The conflict remains deeply rooted, with geographical and ideological dimensions that are proving difficult for the junta to tackle.” The army seized Kidal, a key town in the country’s north that the Tuareg rebels held for nearly a decade, in November 2023, but Tuareg and allied fighters retook the town in April this year.

Rather than transforming the conflict, Moscow’s military backing appears to have strengthened the army’s battlefield capabilities without addressing the political, governance and security conditions that continue to fuel the violence.

Recent operations reinforce that assessment. Convoys travelling through northern Mali continue to face frequent ambushes, particularly along routes linking Gao, Anefis and other military positions, exposing the continued vulnerability of military supply lines despite increased Russian support.

The shift away from Western security partners also changed the type of assistance available. While Africa Corps has strengthened Mali’s combat capabilities, the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ended an international presence that provided logistics, monitoring and intelligence support across much of northern Mali.

The result is a military that has become more effective in direct combat but continues to struggle to secure vast, remote territory against increasingly adaptable armed groups.

Has Bamako’s strategy paid off?

The limitations of Bamako’s security strategy raise broader questions about whether it is translating battlefield gains into lasting security.

Since seizing power in 2020, Mali’s military government has centred its strategy on military force, ending longstanding cooperation with Western partners while strengthening defence ties with Russia.

But the repeated ambushes around Anefis and along northern supply routes suggest the measurable gains of this approach on the battlefield have yet to translate into lasting strategic control.

More fundamentally, the growing cooperation between armed groups with different objectives suggests that Bamako’s strategy has not prevented them from adapting and reshaping the conflict.

What could this mean for the wider Sahel?

The implications of the Anefis ambush extend well beyond Mali.

JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate, already operates across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while fighting continues to spread across the central Sahel.

The evolving battlefield also presents a challenge for the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members all face persistent armed violence despite expanding military cooperation. The alliance was created to strengthen collective security, but increasingly coordinated attacks suggest that cooperation among governments is being matched by equally adaptable cooperation among armed groups.

At the same time, Mali’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has reduced opportunities for regional coordination with neighbouring countries confronting many of the same security threats.

If the FLA-JNIM partnership proves durable, it could encourage similar tactical cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, further complicating efforts to contain armed groups whose operations already span national borders.

“The AES was supposed to mean that our security was finally our own business. But when Mali bleeds, Niger bleeds with it, because the armed groups attacking those convoys do not recognise the Alliance of Sahel States any more than they recognised ECOWAS. We traded one set of partners we did not trust for another, and the war is still coming south,” a Niger-based security expert, who requested anonymity because he feared potential repercussions, told Al Jazeera.

Whether the tactical partnership between the FLA and JNIM proves durable remains uncertain. But the Anefis ambush suggests that as Mali’s security strategy shifts, armed groups are adapting in response, with consequences that could extend far beyond Mali’s borders.

Relations begin to thaw as both countries reinstate ambassadors and reopen airspace closed to each other since April 2025.

More than a year after a diplomatic fallout, relations between Algeria and Mali are beginning to thaw, with both countries reinstating their ambassadors and reopening their airspace to one another.

Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune announced on Saturday that the country’s ambassador would return to Mali, a day after Algiers fully reopened its airspace to civilian and military aircraft travelling to and from its southern neighbour.

Issa Ousmane Coulibaly, spokesperson for Mali’s military government, confirmed in a statement that Bamako had taken reciprocal measures.

Relations between the two African nations deteriorated in April last year after Algeria said it had shot down a Malian surveillance drone for violating its airspace. Bamako disputes this, saying the drone was downed within its own borders.

The fallout between Algeria and Mali has jeopardised security in the Sahel region. Mali is a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), along with Burkina Faso and Niger. Both Ouagadougou and Niamey also withdrew their ambassadors to Algeria in April last year in solidarity with their ally.

The AES has experienced a surge in attacks by armed groups linked to the ISIL (ISIS) group and al-Qaeda in recent years. Many analysts argue that such groups were able to establish a foothold in the Sahel partly because of the NATO-backed overthrow of longtime Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

The ousting of Gaddafi left a power vacuum that has been exploited by armed groups. Vast stockpiles of weapons belonging to forces loyal to him were looted and are believed to have been used by those groups.

Algeria has previously mediated peace talks between the Malian government and Tuareg separatist rebels waging an armed rebellion there.

However, last year’s diplomatic fallout led Algiers to step back from its role as mediator, raising concerns about Mali’s security and territorial integrity while also posing a threat to Algeria’s own internal security.

This April, Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf reaffirmed Algiers’s support for Mali’s territorial integrity, rejecting what he described as all forms of “terrorism”.

Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reports from West Africa where the Russian navy is carrying a shipment of weapons to help Mali’s government hold off a rebel advance. Al-Qaeda-linked militants and Tuareg separatists are laying siege to areas of Mali’s north, with Russian-backed forces stepping in to keep Mali’s military junta from collapsing.

Tuareg fighters in Mali have released footage claiming to show a Russian Africa Corps Mi-24 helicopter crashing after it was reportedly shot down. The incident comes amid escalating clashes between Malian forces, their Russian allies and armed groups.

Armed groups in military-run Mali have launched renewed coordinated attacks in several towns across the country.

The assaults on Saturday targeted army positions, including a base used by its troops and Russian forces.

A separatist Tuareg-led group and a regional al-Qaeda affiliate claimed responsibility for the attacks, which took place more than two months after the capital, Bamako, and several other locations were targeted in a coordinated ⁠assault by the same groups.

Here’s what to know:

Where did the attacks take place?

In an initial statement, the Malian army confirmed attacks on five positions: in Aguelhok, Anefis and Gao in the north; Sevare in central Mali; and Kenieroba in the south.

The army later said the situation was “totally under control”, adding that 20 “terrorists” were killed in Sevare and six in Gao. One pro-government fighter was killed in Gao and four others were wounded, it said.

In a separate statement later on Saturday, the army said it had also repelled attacks in the central towns of Konna and Somadougou with the help of Africa Corps, a Russian-backed paramilitary group.

Videos posted on the Africa Corps’ Telegram channel on Sunday purported to show a drone attack targeting a rebel position in Anefis and a Russian soldier on top of a building at a base in Aguelhok. The footage could not be independently verified.

In Kenieroba, a major prison complex where members of Mali’s political opposition are held reportedly came under attack.

Who was behind the attacks?

A spokesperson for the ⁠Tuareg-dominated rebel group, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), told the Reuters news agency it was involved in the attacks.

The al-Qaeda-linked group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) also claimed responsibility, saying in a statement it had attacked and taken control of at least seven positions held by the army or pro-government fighters. The claims could not be independently verified.

Who are these groups?

JNIM was formed in 2017 as a coalition between the Saharan branch of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Malian armed groups Ansar Dine, Katina Macina and al-Mourabitoun.

It is led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who founded Ansar Dine in 2012, and has fighters across the border areas of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

JNIM’s main goal is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggested that JNIM may be seeking to control major cities and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

The FLA was formed in 2024 from a coalition of separatist forces in northern Mali. Led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, it is engaging in the latest in a series of rebellions by the Tuareg fighting for self-determination and independence.

While often at odds, fighters from the two groups or their predecessors have also partnered on occasion to fight common enemies, namely Mali’s government and its allies.

In late April, they were behind a series of coordinated attacks that targeted locations across Mali and killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

What is Mali’s security situation?

Since gaining independence in 1960, Mali has experienced alternating cycles of political stability and instability, punctuated by rebellions, financial woes and military coups.

In 2012, ethnic Tuareg separatists, allied with fighters from an al-Qaeda offshoot, launched a rebellion that took control of the country’s north.

But the al-Qaeda-linked fighters swiftly pushed out the Tuareg rebels and seized key northern cities, triggering French military intervention in early 2013 at the request of the government.

In September 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected as Mali’s president. Under his government, the United Nations brokered a peace deal between the government and northern Tuareg groups fighting for an independent Azawad in 2015.

Keita was deposed in a military coup in August 2020 after months of mass protests over severe economic woes and the poor security situation.

In September that year, retired colonel and former Defence Minister Bah Ndaw was sworn in as interim president and coup leader Assimi Goita as vice president to lead a transitional government.

In May 2021, Goita seized power in a second coup and pledged to restore security. His government cut ties with Mali’s former colonial ruler, France, and expelled French forces and UN peacekeepers.

In December 2021, Goita invited the Russian mercenary group Wagner to support the military government in its fight against armed groups.

In June last year, Wagner said it would withdraw from Mali after more than three and a half years deployed there, but Russian mercenaries have remained in the country under the banner of the Africa Corps.

Alex Vines, the Africa programme director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told Al Jazeera the recent attacks have squeezed the control of Malian authorities into “securitised enclaves and corridors”.

“This has not improved overall security,” he said, noting that armed groups in the country have been coordinating their military action rather than competing with each other.

“In this context, foreign military support has limited success,” he added.

Tuareg-led armed ⁠group says it attacked northern town where Malian troops and Russian fighters are based.

Armed fighters have launched ⁠attacks in five ⁠locations across Mali, more than two months after gunmen attacked the capital and other parts of the country.

The attacks took place on Saturday in areas including ‌a northern town where government forces and Russian fighters are ⁠based, and ⁠a town south of ⁠the capital, ⁠Bamako, Mali’s military and security sources said.

The army said the attacks targeted Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevare and Kenieroba.

The AFP news agency said a prison in Kenieroba was attacked, citing residents and security sources.

It reported that the fighting in different locations started at about 5am local time (05:00 GMT).

A Tuareg-led armed ⁠group confirmed that it had attacked a northern Malian town early on Saturday.

Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, a spokesperson for the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), told the Reuters news agency that fighters from the group ⁠attacked the town of Anefis ⁠in the northeastern Kidal region.

Government and Russian troops deployed in Anefis in the wake of attacks on April 25 and 26, in which the FLA and the regional al-Qaeda ⁠affiliate seized control of Kidal town.

Ramadane also told AFP that “several positions have fallen, but fighting is still underway inside the city” of Anefis.

An Anefis resident contacted by AFP said “armed groups are in the town, but the army is still putting up resistance. The camp [there] has not yet fallen”.

Anefis and Aguelhok, both in the north, are the last remaining locations where Mali’s army maintains a presence in the Kidal region, following the April attacks.

Meanwhile, in ⁠the central city of Gao, a local official told Reuters that gunfire and rockets had been launched at a military ‌camp since before dawn. It was not immediately clear which fighters were responsible.

In Sevare, another central town, “explosions rang out … around 5am, though their origin is not yet known. Shortly thereafter, several aircraft were spotted flying over the area”, a security source told AFP.

In Kenieroba, the major prison complex was also under attack, a prisoner in the facility told AFP.

Saturday’s assault was the latest threat to the military-led government in the landlocked Sahel country where rebels staged high-profile attacks in ‌April, hitting the airport in the capital, Bamako, killing the defence minister and seizing a string of army bases in the north.

Casablanca court delivers landmark verdict in ‘Escobar of the Sahara’ case: up to 12 years for top figures.

A Moroccan court has handed prison sentences of up to 12 years to 29 individuals – including prominent politicians and sports figures – concluding a major international drug trafficking and corruption trial.

The verdicts, delivered late on Thursday in Casablanca following a two-year trial, mark one of the largest anti-corruption operations in Morocco’s history.

Among those convicted were Abdennebi Bioui, a construction tycoon and former regional council president, Said Naciri, former president of Casablanca’s Wydad AC football and sports club and former MP Belkacem Mir – all senior members of the governing PAM party. Naciri received 10 years, Bioui 12 and Mir 10.

Besides the three main defendants, sentences for the remaining ranged from two to nine years, depending on their individual role in the network.

The wide-ranging case was triggered by courtroom testimony from El Hadj Ahmed Ben Brahim, a notorious Malian drug trafficker nicknamed the “Pablo Escobar of the Sahara”.

Currently serving a 10-year sentence in Morocco, Ben Brahim told judicial investigators that his former Moroccan political and business associates had betrayed him, seizing millions of dollars worth of his luxury real estate and vehicles following his arrest in 2019.

The trial involved more than 20 defendants, 18 witnesses and two civil parties which centred on a sophisticated network that transported tonnes of Moroccan cannabis resin across North Africa to Europe, alongside Latin American cocaine shipments.

Defendants were convicted on charges including drug and gold trafficking, corruption, forgery and money laundering.

The court also ordered the seizure of assets and levied hundreds of millions of dollars in customs and exchange fines against the principal ringleaders.

Moroccan media reported that families of the convicted, present without legal representation due to a lawyers’ strike, were left in shock, with some collapsing in the courthouse.

The scandal reached the highest levels of state, prompting King Mohammed VI to demand a legally binding code of ethics aimed at “moralising” parliamentary life.

It has been almost nine months since rebel groups imposed a fuel blockade on Mali’s capital Bamako. In late April, the conflict escalated further. The Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with members of Tuareg separatist movements, launched a coordinated attack on the Malian army and its Russian allies, the African Corps (formerly Wagner), which killed the Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

The rebels seized control of military camps, recaptured the largest northern city of Kidal, and tightened the blockade on Bamako. This latest offensive is part of a long series of rebellions in what the Tuareg call Azawad, an area comprising the regions of Timbuktu, Taoudenit, Kidal, and Gao, which is predominantly populated by Tuareg communities.

The present crisis is compounded by the weakening of the Malian state following the 2021 coup and foreign intervention. In the absence of any serious effort to address it, instability could spill over across the whole Sahel region.

Ever since the country announced independence from France in 1960, Mali’s north has seen repeated upheaval as local Tuareg communities have demanded self-determination. Fourteen years ago, Tuareg groups allied with groups affiliated with al-Qaeda launched yet another rebellion. They managed to seize several cities in northern Mali, and had it not been for a French military intervention in 2013, they could have marched on Bamako.

Two French operations resulted in the weakening of the Tuareg movements and groups affiliated with al-Qaeda. This helped persuade them to participate in negotiations with the government, which ultimately ended with the signing of the Algiers Accords in 2015.

One of the most prominent clauses of this agreement was decentralisation in the Azawad region, which gave local leaders more power. Through this agreement, the Malian government secured the country’s territorial integrity in return for promises like the enhancement of development in the Azawad region, the integration of separatist fighters into the army, and the appointment of their leaders to political positions.

These accords helped maintain relative stability in Mali and the Sahel region by containing the sources of tension and secessionist calls. However, peace did not last long. Several challenges emerged, the most important of which was the failure of the government to honour its commitments to implement development projects in the north.

The situation got worse after the 2021 military coup led by General Assimi Goita. France, Algeria, and members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) refused to recognise the new authorities in Bamako. As a result, in 2022, the military government expelled French troops, and in 2024, abolished the Algiers Agreement. Thereafter, instead of diplomacy and dialogue, it adopted a militarised approach to controlling the restive north.

These steps strained Mali’s relations with Mauritania, Algeria, and France, with Bamako accusing them of providing logistical support to the rebels and interfering in its internal affairs. Consequently, the Malian state was weakened militarily and economically, as military coordination and trade with neighbours declined.

JNIM and the separatist movements exploited the situation. They sought to choke the capital by attacking key transport arteries where most imports and exports are routed. They disrupted supplies of gasoline and diesel coming from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, and began attacking Moroccan trucks carrying food supplies via Mauritania.

Like in 2012, the alliance between the Tuareg movements and al-Qaeda affiliates has proven successful. It has routed the Malian military, capturing more territory and operating freely close to Bamako.

This time, foreign forces have not been able to help the Malian army, as its Russian allies were forced to withdraw following the attack in late April. Meanwhile, Turkiye has seen its involvement in Mali grow amid growing instability. In early May, following the attacks on the Malian military, Ankara signed several defence agreements with the Malian military government.

The danger here is that the Malian crisis may not be contained only within the political crisis between the government and the separatist movements. It could also invite more foreign intervention as regional and global rivalries transfer onto Malian territory.

There is also the issue of the alliance between Azawadi movements and al-Qaeda affiliates, which could prove to be a ticking time bomb. There are clear contradictions within this relationship, as the two sides have no common ground except the agreement to overthrow the military regime in Bamako. This is why a future war in the north between the Azawadi movements and the Islamist groups is quite likely.

The Malian crisis inevitably has regional repercussions. The ongoing humanitarian crisis could trigger a major migration wave towards Europe and North America. Continuing instability in the north could open more space for the growth of extremist movements, which can expand their attacks across the region. Consequently, the Malian crisis can become a direct security threat to neighbouring countries, the region, and the world.

As the situation stands now, no warring side is able to achieve a decisive military victory. Therefore, a resolution of the conflict can only be achieved through dialogue and negotiation. Bamako needs to seriously consider the grievances of Tuareg communities in the north and their demands.

It is in the collective interest of neighbouring countries and regional powers to bring the parties to the negotiating table and seek peaceful solutions to this crisis. Under the threat of a regional spillover, there is no time to waste.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Niger’s military government has banned many local and foreign reporters since seizing power in 2023.

Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has condemned Niger’s suspension of nine French media publications as the military government continues to crack down on journalists.

Niger announced the suspension on Friday, citing “repeated dissemination of content likely to seriously jeopardise public order, national unity, social cohesion, and the stability of the institutions of the Republic”.

The suspended organisations are France 24, RFI (Radio France Internationale), France Afrique Media, LSI Africa, AFP (Agence France-Presse), TV5 Monde, TF1 Info, Jeune Afrique and Mediapart, according to a TV statement from the National Communication Observatory (ONC).

It added that the decision was “immediate” and it included “satellite packages, cable networks, digital platforms, websites and mobile applications”.

RSF described the decision as “abusive”.

“RSF condemns a coordinated strategy to repress press freedom within the AES [Alliance of Sahel States] and calls for the immediate reversal of this abusive decision,” said a statement posted on X, referring to Niger and allies Mali and Burkina Faso, all ruled by military governments.

Niger’s military seized power in July 2023, toppling the democratically elected government of President Mohamed Bazoum and detaining him.

The government has since targeted local and foreign media outlets, particularly those critical of its policies, by issuing bans or suspensions.

RFI and France 24 were suspended a few days after the coup, and the BBC from Britain was suspended in December 2024.

The targeting of French and other foreign media comes as Niger’s military government has largely severed ties with its former colonial power, France, and turned away from Western allies.

In late 2023, Niger asked leaders in Paris to withdraw thousands of troops involved in missions against armed groups operating in Niger, neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso.

The three AES states have since secured defence partnerships with other countries, notably Russia.

All three have regularly denounced France’s “imperialism”, saying they want to assert their “sovereignty”. French media and other foreign outlets have similarly been suspended or banned by the governments in Bamako and Ouagadougou.

Local journalists have also been affected. Two Nigerien journalists, Gazali Abdou, a correspondent for German broadcaster Deutsche Welle, and Hassane Zada, a regional newspaper editor, were released this week after being detained for months.

In 2024, leaders in the capital Niamey strengthened a law that criminalises the digital dissemination of “data likely to disturb public order”.

The United Nations said in November that 13 journalists were arrested in Niger and urged the government to release them. Local media organisations say six journalists are detained for allegedly “undermining national defence” and for “conspiracy against the authority of the state”.

According to AFP, Niger suspended nearly 3,000 local and foreign NGOs in 2025, accusing them of lacking transparency and supporting “terrorists” and armed groups.

Niger dropped 37 places in this year’s RSF World Press Freedom Index and now ranks 120th out of 180 countries. RSF and Amnesty International have repeatedly voiced concerns about the “decline” in press freedom in Niger.

Al-Qaeda-linked fighters have set fire to food trucks as they continue to blockade roads around the capital Bamako, cutting off supply routes. Officials and residents warn the blockade is worsening hunger in parts of the country already facing food shortages.

Fighters attack ‘Africa’s Alcatraz’, which detains high-value prisoners, and disrupt crucial supply chains to the capital.

In a new wave of attacks in Mali, an al-Qaeda-linked group has stormed a main prison housing fighters from the armed group and set fire to trucks with food supplies heading to the capital Bamako.

Fighters from the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group stormed the Kenieroba Central Prison, a recently built complex dubbed “Africa’s Alcatraz”, located about 60km (37 miles) southwest of Bamako, Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque reported on Wednesday.

The detention centre houses 2,500 prisoners, including at least 72 inmates considered “high value” by the Malian state, Haque said, adding that Malian armed forces were repelling the attack.

Among the prisoners are JNIM fighters and a number of people arrested following large-scale attacks last month by the group’s fighters and Tuareg separatists, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA).

The fighters attacked several military bases across multiple cities, including areas where senior government officials live, and took control of the northern city of Kidal in a coordinated offensive on April 25 and April 26, which struck at the heart of the West African country’s military government.

One of those attacks killed Malian Defence Minister Sadio Camara and his family in their home in Kati, a garrison town near the capital. On Monday, the leader of the country’s military government, Assimi Goita, took on the role of defence minister. At least 23 others were also killed in the attacks.

Since then, “there has been a wave of arrests of former and current military officers, members of civil society, lawyers, members of the political opposition – all accused of colluding with al-Qaeda fighters,” said Haque, who has been reporting for years on and in Mali. He added that fighters linked to the armed group were also arrested.

Security sources told AFP news agency that opposition figures Mountaga Tall, Youssouf Daba Diawara, and Moussa Djire are among those “abducted”.

According to family members and security sources who spoke to the agency, Tall, a lawyer, was taken on May 2 in Bamako by hooded men on charges of plotting with opposition figures in the Senegalese capital, Dakar, to overthrow the military government. Since his arrest, Tall has been questioned at least once for “attempted destabilisation”.

The security sources said Diawara and Djire were suspected of links with, respectively, the influential imam Mahmoud Dicko and Oumar Mariko, two opposition figures in exile. At least two other civilians who are close to Mariko were also arrested following the attacks, a judicial source told AFP, without giving further details.

The military prosecutor’s office said on May 1 that it had “solid evidence” of the “complicity” of certain military personnel, accusing them of helping with the “planning, coordination and execution” of the attacks.

In a report published on Tuesday, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) said there have also been “gravely concerning reports of extrajudicial killings and abductions, allegedly carried out by members of the security forces” following the attacks.

The violence has set off fighting across Mali’s vast desert north, raising the prospect of significant gains by armed groups that have shown an increasing willingness to strike neighbouring countries.

JNIM has called on Malians to rise up against the government and transition to Islamic law. The group has also pledged to besiege Bamako, and on Friday, it had reportedly set up checkpoints around the city of four million.

Haque said the blockade has the potential to cause a humanitarian disaster.

“These are al-Qaeda fighters that have pointed 12.7mm machine guns on their motorbikes, stopping any outgoing or incoming traffic,” the correspondent said. “We have seen on social media these fighters stopping food trucks trying to enter the area. This blockade is not just affecting people living in Bamako; it’s affecting people throughout Mali.”

On May 3, the mayor of Diafarabe village, in the Mopti region, called on the authorities to act before people started dying of hunger, as the village had run out of food.

The leader of Mali’s military government, Assimi Goita, has taken on the role of defence minister following the killing of the previous minister in last week’s uprising by rebel groups.

State television channel ORTM reported on Monday that Goita was taking on the post following the death of Sadio Camara in large-scale attacks by an al-Qaeda-linked group working with Tuareg separatists.

The report noted the presidential decree that Assimi Goita will remain president while also taking on the new role

General Oumar Diarra, who was military chief of staff, has been appointed as delegate minister to the defence ministry.

Car bomb blast

During the assault on strongholds of the military government, more than a week ago, Camara was killed by a car bomb blast at his residence. The rebel armed groups were able to capture the key northern town of Kidal in the largest attack in the West African country in nearly 15 years.

The fighting killed at least 23 people, with the United Nations children’s agency UNICEF reporting that civilians and children were among the dead and injured.

Mali has been beset by security crises since at least 2012. Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) controls large areas of rural territory, especially in the north and central regions, and has active cells around the capital. Similarly, the ISIL (ISIS) affiliate in Sahel Province (ISSP) controls areas in northeastern Menaka city.

At the same time also in the north, armed Tuareg separatists of the Liberation Front for Azawad (FLA) group are fighting for an independent nation called Azawad. They are battling Mali’s military and allied Russian mercenaries who have been deployed since 2021.

Together with the JNIM, they control Kidal, but also want Gao, the largest city in the north, as well as Menaka and Timbuktu, to complete the self-declared state of Azawad.

Those groups sometimes work together: they operate in the same areas and draw from the same pool of fighters from aggrieved communities. In the latest widespread attacks, the JNIM worked with the FLA against the army.

Goita’s military government took power after coups in 2020 and 2021, pledging to restore security, but has struggled to achieve that.t It has cut ties with its former colonial ruler, France, and expelled French forces and United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Last July, military authorities granted coup leader Goita a five-year presidential mandate, which can be renewed “as many times as necessary” without an election.

The previous month, Russia’s Wagner Group, which had been aiding Malian forces against armed groups since 2021, said it would complete its mission. It has now become the Africa Corps, an organisation under the direct control of the Russian defence ministry.

In the wake of last month’s attacks, the rebels announced a blockade of the capital Bamako in retaliation for “the population’s support of the army”. However, that blockade has only partially been effective, according to an AFP correspondent in the city.

Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatists continue their attacks against Mali’s military government.

Al-Qaeda-linked rebel fighters have reportedly set up checkpoints around Mali’s capital, Bamako, and seized the town of Tessalit in the north.

Reuters reported on Friday that Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has called on Malians to rise up to “bring down the junta”, and adopt Islamic law.

The latest developments come days after a series of attacks by JNIM and Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) resulted in the killing of the country’s defence minister, Sadio Camara.

Videos shared on social media by local accounts on Friday show armed fighters inside the Amachach base in Tessalit, with several military vehicles seen driving around.

Video verified by Reuters shows fighters driving through the town and raising the FLA flag.

Media outlets close to the Azawad armed movement, which seeks the independence of northern Mali, said the scenes show fighters in control of the base following the withdrawal of elements of the army and Russia’s African Corps, according to their description.

Russia is the principal foreign backer of Mali’s military-run government.

JNIM said on Thursday that it had captured the base of Hombori in central Mali and taken over two checkpoints near Bamako, after earlier threatening to completely besiege the city.

Russia’s African Corps said in a statement that the JNIM statement about the abandonment of the Hombori base was “not true”.

It said that its helicopters delivered ammunition and other items to Malian military personnel at a base in Hombori on Thursday, “after which soldiers of the Malian Armed Forces injured in battles with terrorists were evacuated”.

It noted that JNIM and AFL “continue to regroup, conduct reconnaissance of the bases of the units of the African Corps of the Russian Armed Forces and the Malian Army, and propaganda work is actively underway aimed at reducing the morale of the Malian Army”.

Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque, reporting from Dakar in Senegal, reports that the absence of a response from the Malian military to the rebel advances is surprising, and that four major military camps in the north of the country are now in the hands of armed groups.

“That’s a big development,” Haque said. “It seems that Malian forces are not even putting up a fight up north.”

Mali’s military leaders seized power in coups in 2020 and 2021, with a brief period of civilian rule in between. Official authorities are yet to issue a statement on the latest reports at the time of writing.

Coordinated attacks by armed groups and Tuareg rebels in Mali is threatening the ruling junta, driven Russian mercenaries from key northern areas, and left the defence minister dead. Al Jazeera’s Nada Qaddourah explains how the groups appear to be joining forces.