Mali

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

Agreements between the group and local leaders have reportedly already been signed in several towns across Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu regions, in which the group agrees to end its siege in return for the communities agreeing to JNIM rules, taxes, and noncooperation with the military.

A fuel blockade by al Qaeda-linked militants has severely impacted the capital of Mali, raising concerns that the jihadist group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), might attempt to impose its rule in the country. While analysts believe that JNIM currently lacks the resources to seize control of Bamako, they view the blockade as a strategy to weaken the government by cutting off fuel supplies, which has led to school closures and affected local businesses.

The blockade aims to pressure the military government, which took power in 2021 after promising to combat the Islamist threat. Analysts speculate that JNIM seeks to provoke another coup in Mali, potentially the third since 2020, which could destabilize the nation further and provide JNIM with more opportunities to gain power and resources. A recent report warned that the government’s stability is at high risk in the coming weeks due to the increasing pressure from JNIM.

JNIM announced the blockade was aimed at the ruling authorities, accusing them of oppressing citizens, particularly outside the capital. The group has been advancing from northern Mali into central areas and neighboring countries, increasing its attacks on military posts and acquiring more weapons. Recently, JNIM reportedly received a large ransom for hosting Emirati hostages and has begun extending its operations in southern Mali, intensifying its focus on Bamako.

The blockade is viewed as both an economic tactic and a means of instilling fear among Bamako’s leadership and its residents. Although there haven’t been significant protests despite the fuel crisis, tensions among military leaders and the arrest of several generals could threaten the current regime’s stability. Observers caution that the potential collapse of Mali’s government could have a domino effect on neighboring Burkina Faso and Niger, where military-led governments are in place, thus destabilizing the Sahel region.

Malians have remained relatively quiet about the fuel shortage due to fear of government reprisals. One resident explained the struggles of finding fuel, while the military continues to deal with internal challenges. Analysts believe that the situation may make the current military leaders vulnerable to being ousted, given the growing pressures from both political factions and armed groups.

If JNIM were to gain control of Bamako, it could lead to significant restrictions on daily life, as seen in areas previously occupied by the group. Recent warnings from foreign embassies have urged citizens to leave Mali, yet there hasn’t been a significant exodus or an increase in flight bookings at this time. The future remains uncertain, with risks of JNIM attempting to advance into the city still possible, according to diplomats.

With information from Reuters

Oct. 30 (UPI) — The U.S. Department of State on Thursday ordered non-emergency employees and their family members to leave Mali, where the government is in armed conflict with al-Qaida-linked terrorists.

“The Department of State ordered non-emergency employees and their family members to leave Mali due to safety risks,” the State Department said in an update to its travel advisory for the West African nation.

“The U.S. government cannot offer routine or emergency services to U.S. citizens outside of Bamako due to safety risks. Do not travel to Mali for any reason.”

The announcement comes two days after the U.S. Embassy in Mali issued a security alert urging U.S. citizens in the country to “depart immediately” via commercial flights.

“U.S. citizens who choose not to depart Mali should prepare contingency plans for any emergency situations that may arise, including a need to shelter in place for an extended period,” the embassy said.

The embassy has repeatedly issued warning about disruptions in the country of gasoline and diesel supplies, closure of public institutions, including schools, nationwide, and the armed conflict around the Mali capital of Bamako.

Mali has experienced a political and security crisis since January of 2012, with a rebellion and subsequent coup. The situation has intensified since Sept. 3, when the al-Qaida Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin declared a blockade on major fuel and food supply routes across in the country.

US Embassy urges citizens to leave Mali immediately on commercial flights as blockade makes daily life more dangerous.

Parts of Mali’s capital have been brought to a near standstill as a group affiliated with al-Qaeda imposes an economic siege on the country by blocking routes used by fuel tankers, in a bid to turn the screw on the military government.

As the Sahel country plunges deeper into crisis, the United States Embassy in Mali on Tuesday urged US citizens to “depart immediately” as the fuel blockade renders daily life increasingly dangerous.

Long queues have formed at petrol stations in the capital Bamako this week, with anger reaching the boiling point as the blockade bites harder. A lack of supplies has caused the price of fuel to shoot up 500 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre, according to Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque.

The Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) armed group, which imposed the blockade last month in retaliation for the military banning fuel sales in rural areas, appeared to be succeeding in turning public anger against the country’s rulers, Haque noted.

“It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action, to … uncover the real reason for this shortage,” Omar Sidibe, a driver in Bamako, told Al Jazeera.

Haque said the al-Qaeda fighters were burning fuel trucks as supplies ran out.

Schools and universities have also been shut for two weeks, and airlines are now cancelling flights from Bamako.

Meanwhile, the US Embassy has warned Americans to leave Mali immediately using commercial flights rather than travelling over land to neighbouring countries, owing to the risk of “terrorist attacks along national highways”.

It advised citizens who choose to remain in Mali to prepare contingency plans, including for sheltering in place for an extended period.

Yet, Haque said, the military rulers were insisting “everything is under control”.

The army first seized power in a 2020 coup, pledging to get a grip on a spiralling security crisis involving armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), but years later, the crisis has only escalated.

Tanks ’empty’

Amid tense scenes from a fuel pit stop in Senegal, which neighbours Mali, truck drivers ready to travel across the border did not want to speak to Al Jazeera on camera. Haque said some transport companies had been accused of paying al-Qaeda fighters to move their trucks.

“They’ve been waiting here not days, but months, their tanks empty. Ahead for them is a dangerous road or journey into al-Qaeda territory,” Haque said from Dakar.

Meanwhile, in Bamako, citizens are growing increasingly desperate. “Before, we could buy gas everywhere in cans. But now there’s no more,” gas reseller Bakary Coulibaly told Al Jazeera.

“We’re forced to come to gas stations, and even if we go there, it’s not certain that there will be gasoline available. Only a few stations have it.”

JNIM is one of several armed groups operating in the Sahel, a vast strip of semi-arid desert stretching from North to West Africa, where fighting is spreading rapidly, with large-scale attacks.

Under the military’s control, the country severed ties with its former coloniser, France, and thousands of French soldiers involved in the battle against the armed groups exited the country.

The fighting has resulted in thousands of deaths, while up to 350,000 people are currently displaced, according to Human Rights Watch.

On a hot October morning, fuel pumps at a dozen service stations in Bamako, the capital of Mali, sputtered to a stop. Drivers who had spent hours waiting in line left empty-handed. Motorbikes, taxis, and vans idled where they stood. Market stalls that depended on refrigeration closed early. Hospitals began counting fuel reserves. 

What appeared to Mali residents as an everyday shortage was, in fact, the result of a deliberate, sustained campaign by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, known as JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate operating in the Sahel, to choke the flow of fuel into the country. The group has moved beyond hit-and-run attacks to economic warfare, burning tankers, ambushing convoys, and enforcing a de facto embargo on fuel imports.

Videos shared online after the Oct. 21 attack showed dozens of burning tankers in Zégoua, near the border with Côte d’Ivoire. JNIM later released a propaganda message claiming responsibility for ambushing 37 vehicles that day.

The first publicly reported attacks began in early September, when the group blocked routes to Kayes and Nioro du Sahel in western Mali, bordering Mauritania and Senegal. That same day, Sept. 3, JNIM reportedly abducted six fuel tanker drivers from Senegal.

Despite an increased military presence, the jihadists struck again on Sept. 13 and 14, torching over 40 tankers under military escort while transporting from Senegal to Mali along the Diédiéni–Kolokani corridor. 

The consequences have rippled far beyond queues at fuel stations. There is currently a sharp inflation that has affected commercial activities. Mines operations have also slowed, and there is a steady erosion of the state’s control over basic life. Across the country, schools have also been closed, further disrupting daily life and cutting several young people off from education.

The residents of Mali expressed their grievances, urging the military junta led by Assimi Goita to step up the fight and counter the group’s atrocities.

JNIM has also sought to control the narrative. In a video released in early September, a spokesperson justified the blockade as retaliation against what he called “the bandit government’s persecution of the population” and “the closure of gas stations”.

This rhetoric points to a deeper cause. Mali’s government recently banned the sale of fuel outside official stations, a measure meant to disrupt the jihadists’ supply chains. 

Blockades and ambushes 

Mali is a landlocked country in West Africa, and it imports most of its fuel by road from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. Convoys, sometimes more than 100 tankers, travel through routes to Bamako, and that includes passing through jihadist-controlled areas. 

JNIM have staged checkpoints on key routes where they conduct their attacks by igniting the lead vehicles to create conflagrations. They have destroyed dozens of tankers, with a single ambush in mid-September affecting at least 40 tankers. Videos circulated online showed burning wrecks and stranded drivers. 

The attacks are designed to make transport by road both physically dangerous and economically untenable. As a result, many private companies have stopped sending fuel tankers; others now insist on military escorts, which often become targets in themselves, and neighbouring countries hesitate to transit fuel through overtly dangerous routes. 

Analysts note that by choking off fuel transport, JNIM aims to undermine public confidence in the junta’s competence, stir unrest, and increase its leverage in negotiating local control, taxation, or governance arrangements in contested areas. The approach aligns with Al-Qaeda’s long-standing strategy of exploiting social grievances and state fragility to entrench influence.

The group’s broader objective is to pressure Mali’s military government, which seized power in a coup five years ago, while expanding its own authority through informal taxation and control of smuggling routes. JNIM now holds sway over vast areas of Mali, particularly across the tri-border zone with Burkina Faso and Niger.

The economic shock 

Since the start of the attacks, Bamako and other urban centres have seen fuel queues stretch for hours and a surge in black-market operations, the very activity the government intended to stamp out in its recent ban.

One video posted on X on Oct. 23 captured the desperation: a long procession of cars trailing a fuel tanker to a station, hoping to secure a few litres.

The shortages have cascaded through every layer of the economy. Power supply has been hit as electricity utilities begin implementing emergency plans amid dwindling diesel reserves. For households dependent on private generators, costs have spiked overnight.

The price of goods transported by road has risen sharply in markets across Mali. Small traders who buy fresh produce daily for resale in Bamako say profits have evaporated. For ordinary families, higher transport costs translate directly into more expensive food.

Reports from the weeks following the convoy attacks documented widespread closures of petrol stations and soaring costs of travel and delivery. The military halted certain deliveries to mines over security concerns, and some tankers destined for large gold operations were stopped to avoid creating easy targets. 

For a country already weakened by years of conflict, coups, and economic instability, the fuel blockade has become a multiplier of hardship, a crisis that compounds every existing vulnerability.

Losing the grip 

At first glance, the scarcity hurts everyone, and JNIM gains leverage. 

By controlling or denying access to commodities, the group converts scarcity into political capital. In areas under its influence, it already collects taxes, fines, and “security levies” from traders. Smugglers who can move fuel through alternative routes find new profit, often paying bribes or cutting deals with armed groups to secure passage. 

Meanwhile, formal businesses tied to regulated supply chains and formal employment lose trust and capacity. Local elites who depend on state contracts feel the pinch. The junta, unable to guarantee basic services, faces a mounting legitimacy crisis. Analysts warn that such conditions hollow out institutions and entrench shadow economies, allowing parallel systems of governance to take root.

The government’s response has been uneven; part denial, part damage control. Initially, officials blamed the shortages on heavy rains delaying tanker arrivals. But when JNIM released its propaganda videos claiming responsibility, public outrage forced an acknowledgement of the crisis.

“The sellers should make things easy for the population; the hydrocarbon sellers should not raise the prices at this time of crisis,” said one resident in Bamako, interviewed by DW Africa, voicing his frustration over the difficulties of getting the fuel. 

The armed forces have since launched airstrikes, escorted convoys, and convened emergency committees to protect fuel shipments. Yet these measures have proven costly and largely ineffective.

Transitional Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga, who convened an interministerial crisis management committee, announced further steps, including price controls, new regional depots, and increased convoy protection, but they have done little to stem the attacks. Some local reports suggest negotiations or attempts at local truces in areas where the terrorists have influence, but negotiations are politically sensitive for a government that prizes a posture of strength.  

Complicating the situation further is the evolving role of foreign paramilitaries. The Wagner Group’s replacement by the so-called Africa Corps has yet to yield stability, and persistent accusations of human rights abuses risk undermining their counterterrorism efforts.

The longer the blockade continues, the sharper the choices before Mali’s leaders: concede territory and influence to armed groups, or escalate military operations that risk civilian casualties and further infrastructure damage. Either way, the cost of control grows heavier with each passing week.

Military government orders two-week closure for schools and universities as blockade on fuel imports declared by JNIM causes further disruptions.

Mali’s military government has announced schools and universities nationwide will be closed for two weeks, as the landlocked country continues to suffer from the effects of a crippling blockade on fuel imports imposed by an armed group in September.

Education Minister Amadou Sy Savane said on Sunday the suspension until November 9 was “due to disruptions in fuel supplies that are affecting the movement of school staff”.

He added authorities were “doing everything possible” to restore normal fuel supplies before schools resume classes on November 10.

In a separate statement, the Interministerial Committee for Crisis and Disaster Management said restrictions will be placed on fuel supplies until “further notice”, with priority given at dedicated stations to “emergency, assistance, and public transport vehicles”.

It comes nearly two months after the Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) armed group, one of the several operating in the Sahel, declared a blockade on fuel imported from neighbouring countries.

Since then, the al-Qaeda affiliate has been targeting fuel tankers coming mainly from Senegal and the Ivory Coast, through which most imported goods transit.

JNIM initially said the blockade was a retaliatory measure against the Malian authorities’ ban on selling fuel outside stations in rural areas, where fuel is transported in jerry cans to be sold later. Malian authorities said the measure was intended to cut off JNIM’s supply lines.

Endless queues

The blockade has squeezed Mali’s fragile economy, affecting the price of commodities and transport in a country that relies on fuel imports for domestic needs.

Its effects have also spread to the capital, Bamako, where endless queues have stretched in front of gas stations.

Mali, along with neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, has for more than a decade battled armed groups, including some linked to al-Qaeda and ISIL (ISIS), as well as local rebels.

Following military coups in all three countries in recent years, the new ruling authorities have expelled French forces and turned to Russia’s mercenary units for security assistance, which is seen as having made little difference.

Analysts say the blockade is a significant setback for Mali’s military government, which defended its forceful takeover of power in 2020 as a necessary step to end long-running security crises.

The measure comes after the US added Mali to its list of African countries required to post bonds of $5,000 and $10,000.

Mali has imposed visa bond requirements on United States citizens identical to those Washington placed on Malian travellers, in a tit-for-tat response to moves that its government has condemned as a violation of bilateral agreements.

The Foreign Ministry in Bamako announced the reciprocal measures on Sunday after the US began requiring Malian nationals seeking business or tourist visas to post hefty bonds of between $5,000 and $10,000 starting on October 23.

Mali said the US programme breaches a 2005 accord guaranteeing long-term visa access between the two nations, and vowed to apply the same financial barriers to US passport holders under the principle of reciprocity.

In a statement released by its Foreign Ministry, Mali said it “has always collaborated with the United States of America in the fight against irregular immigration, with respect for law and human dignity”.

The dispute highlights escalating tensions as the administration of US President Donald Trump deploys visa restrictions as diplomatic leverage to pressure African governments on immigration enforcement and deportation cooperation.

Mali is among seven African countries facing the bond requirements under a year-long pilot scheme that the US State Department says targets nations with high visa overstay rates.

Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, and Tanzania were also added to the programme alongside Mali in late October, while Gambia, Malawi and Zambia were added earlier.

Trump immigration moves

Travellers subject to the bonds must pay up front through a US Treasury Department portal, and can only enter and exit the US through three designated airports.

The money is refunded if visitors depart on time, but forfeited for overstays or asylum applications. Consular officers determine individual bond amounts based on applicants’ circumstances.

The US justified the pilot by citing national security concerns and US Department of Homeland Security data showing more than 300,000 business and tourist visa holders overstayed their authorised periods in 2023.

Critics warn the fees – imposed atop standard $185 visa costs – could deter legitimate travel and harm the US tourism economy ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Mali said it was interested in “fruitful cooperative relations”, but was introducing the measure against US citizens attempting to travel there in the spirit of reciprocity.

The visa bonds are the latest immigration measure following months of efforts by the Trump administration to pressure African nations into accepting deportees, including those not from their own countries.

Several governments have received expelled migrants in exchange for payments or political favours, while others faced swift punishment for refusal.

Burkina Faso had all visa services suspended at its US Embassy after rejecting demands to accept third-country deportees, forcing residents to travel to neighbouring Togo for applications.

South Sudan initially had visas for all passport holders revoked following a deportation dispute, though it later accepted eight people from Asian and Latin American countries.

Eswatini agreed to receive up to 160 deportees for $5.1m in US funding, while Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda have also accepted expelled migrants under bilateral arrangements, according to diplomatic sources.

French foreign ministry said it also ordered two members of Mali’s embassy in Paris to leave.

France has suspended counterterrorism cooperation with Mali and ordered two staff members of the West African nation’s consulate to leave, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs has said.

The two staff members from the Malian embassy and consulate in Paris have been declared persona non grata, France’s foreign ministry added, while Mali declared five French embassy staff members persona non grata.

The suspension announced on Friday comes after a French man, Yann Vezilier, was arrested in Mali last month on charges of plotting a coup.

Mali’s army said at the time that some civilians and soldiers had obtained “the help of foreign states” in their attempt to destabilise the country.

Mali’s security minister, General Daoud Aly Mohammedine, said Vezilier had acted “on behalf of the French intelligence service, which mobilised political leaders, civil society actors and military personnel” in Mali.

Paris said the charges were “unfounded”.

The French foreign ministry said Vezilier was a member of its embassy in the capital Bamako.

The two Malian diplomats being expelled were told to leave in response to Vezilier’s arrest, a French diplomatic source told the AFP news agency. French media reported that they had to leave by Saturday.

The source added that “other measures” would be implemented soon, “if our national is not released quickly”.

France said in August that it was in talks with Mali to “clear up any misunderstanding” and secure the “immediate release” of the arrested envoy.

France’s formerly strong ties with Mali, an ex-French colony, have deteriorated since soldiers took control nearly four years ago.

Under President Assimi Goita, the military government has distanced itself from France, expelling French forces and seeking security support from Russia.

Impoverished Mali has been gripped by a security crisis since 2012, fuelled notably by violence from armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the ISIL (ISIS) group, as well as local criminal gangs.

In June, Goita extended his rule for another five years, defying earlier assurances from the military government that civilian leadership would resume by March 2024.

The extension came after the military disbanded political parties in May.