Kabul

Islamabad, Pakistan – A series of explosions and bursts of gunfire rattled Afghanistan’s capital late Thursday evening, according to local media. The cause of the blasts and the extent of casualties remain unclear.

Taliban government spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed that an explosion had been heard in Kabul, saying the cause was under investigation.

“An explosion was heard in Kabul city,” he posted on social media platform X in Pashto. “But don’t worry, it’s all good and well. The accident is under investigation, and no injuries have been reported yet. So far there is no report of any harm done.”

The incident came amid worsening relations between Afghanistan and its western neighbour Pakistan, which has accused the Taliban government – in power since August 2021 – of providing safe havens to armed groups, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad blames for a surge in attacks on its security forces.

The explosions also coincided with the arrival of the Taliban administration’s foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in India for a six-day visit, the first such trip since the Taliban’s return to power.

Following the Kabul explosions, speculation swirled on social media that Pakistan was behind the attack, allegedly targeting senior TTP leaders, including its chief, Noor Wali Mehsud.

However, the Taliban have not levelled any accusations yet. Pakistani security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity as they were not authorised to talk to the media, neither confirmed nor denied involvement in the Kabul explosions. “We have seen the media reports and statements from Afghan officials about explosions in Kabul. However, we have no further details on this,” one official told Al Jazeera.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also did not respond to Al Jazeera’s queries.

While neither the Taliban nor the TTP has commented on Mehsud and whether he is safe, Mujahid’s comments suggest that no one was killed in the explosions.

Once seen as heavily backed by Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have been trying to recalibrate their foreign policy, engaging regional powers such as India, their former adversary, in a bid to secure eventual diplomatic recognition.

Pakistan, meanwhile, has accused India of supporting armed groups operating on its soil, a charge New Delhi denies.

Fragile thaw between Kabul and Islamabad

After a bloody 2024, one of Pakistan’s deadliest years in nearly a decade, with more than 2,500 people killed in violence, both countries tried to reset their relationship.

Pakistan’s deputy prime minister Ishaq Dar visited Kabul in April, with senior leadership on both sides holding a series of meetings, often mediated by China. That process led to upgraded diplomatic ties and a brief lull in violence over the summer.

Yet, according to the Pakistan Institute of Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), an Islamabad-based think tank, violence in the first three quarters of 2025 nearly matched the entire toll of 2024.

TTP remains the singular cause for the increasing attacks since 2021, according to US-based Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED).

“Our data show that the TTP engaged in at least 600 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the past year alone. Its activity in 2025 so far already exceeds that seen in all of 2024,” a recent report by the ACLED pointed out.

And in recent days, Pakistan has witnessed a further escalation in violence. A string of assaults has killed dozens of soldiers, mostly in the northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which shares a long and porous border with Afghanistan. The Pakistani military on Friday said it killed more than 30 fighters involved in a recent attack in the tribal district of Orakzai.

In September alone, at least 135 people were killed and 173 injured. After visiting wounded soldiers following raids that killed 19 personnel, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif issued a stark warning to Afghanistan.

“Choose one of two paths. If they wish to establish relations with Pakistan with genuine goodwill, sincerity and honesty, we are ready for that. But if they choose to side with terrorists and support them, then we will have nothing to do with the Afghan interim government,” Sharif said on September 13.

On Thursday, Defence Minister Khwaja Asif also accused Afghanistan of enabling violence in Pakistan while speaking on the floor of the parliament

“Despite years of negotiations with the Afghan government and delegations coming and going to Kabul, the bloodshed in Pakistan has not stopped. Daily funerals of military personnel are being held. We are paying the price of 60 years of hospitality to 6 million Afghan refugees with our blood,” he said.

Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since the 1980s, first after the Soviet invasion, then during the Taliban’s initial rule in the 1990s, and again after their 2021 takeover.

Since November 2023, Islamabad has been carrying out a mass expulsion campaign, forcing Afghans – many of whom have lived in Pakistan for decades – to return home. Government figures say nearly a million have been sent back so far.

Deepening mistrust

The tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban in recent years have also escalated into military clashes.

The Pakistani military has previously conducted airstrikes inside Afghan territory, the most recent one in December 2024.

Analysts say that if the latest explosions were indeed linked to Pakistan, the implications could be serious.

Tameem Bahiss, a security analyst based in Kabul, said the Taliban have consistently denied harbouring TTP fighters, and any formal acknowledgement of strikes inside the capital could inflame tensions.

“We’ve seen before those previous Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan yielded no concrete results. Instead, they only deepened mistrust and made cooperation on countering the TTP more difficult. This latest incident will likely harden positions further, making dialogue and coordination even more complicated,” he told Al Jazeera.

The last major targeted strike in Kabul took place in 2022, when al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in a US drone attack.

Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, an Islamabad-based security analyst, said that if Pakistan was involved in the attacks, they may have been intended as a warning following recent attacks on Pakistani soil.

Mehsud, who co-founded The Khorasan Diary, a security-focused news outlet, said the explosions could signal Pakistan’s intent to pursue high-value targets across the border.

“Pakistan could try and target individuals in Kabul, which is the political capital, as well as those in Kandahar, which is seen as the spiritual capital of Taliban, in case security situation in Pakistan remains dire and Afghan Taliban don’t rein in the TTP,” he cautioned.

Bahiss, however, warned that any cross-border strikes could backfire.

“If Pakistan continues to expand its strikes inside Afghanistan, more Afghans may begin to sympathise with the TTP. This sympathy could translate into new recruits, funding, and possibly even quiet support from some segments within the Afghan Taliban,” he said.

He added that if Pakistan indeed was targeting TTP leaders inside Afghanistan, that could provoke the group into escalating attacks inside Pakistan.

“If TTP leaders have indeed been targeted or killed inside Kabul, that would also serve as a warning to the group, showing that they are not safe even in the capital,” Bahiss said. “The TTP will likely adapt by tightening its security measures, relocating its leadership, and possibly retaliating through more aggressive attacks in Pakistan.” 

The reported visit follows one in March 2025 which led to the release of a US citizen held for more than two years in Afghanistan.

United States officials have agreed to a prisoner exchange after a rare talk with the authorities in Kabul, according to the Taliban administration’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Adam Boehler, the Trump administration’s special envoy for hostage response, and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former US special envoy for Afghanistan, met with the Taliban’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.

“Adam Boehler, referring to the issue of detained citizens between Afghanistan and the United States, said that both countries will exchange prisoners,” deputy prime minister Abdul Ghani Baradar’s office said after their meeting.

There was no immediate statement from Washington regarding the meeting, and Khalilzad did not immediately respond to a phone call from Reuters when asked for comment.

Mahmood Habibi, a naturalised US citizen and businessman who previously worked for a telecommunications company in Kabul, is the highest-profile American detainee, according to Washington. The US is offering a $5 million reward for information to find him, with the Taliban authorities denying any involvement in his 2022 disappearance.

The Taliban has reportedly pressed for the release of Muhammad Rahim, the last Afghan national held at Guantanamo Bay, who has been detained without charge since 2008.

Another American, airline mechanic George Glezmann, was freed after more than two years in detention during a March visit to Kabul by Boehler.

That deal, mediated by Qatar, was described by the Taliban as a “humanitarian” gesture and a “sign of goodwill”.

Before that, in January 2025, the two sides carried out a prisoner exchange in which US citizens Ryan Corbett and William Wallace McKenty were released in exchange for Khan Mohammad, an Afghan national serving two life sentences in the US.

Both sides also agreed to continue discussions regarding nationals imprisoned in each other’s countries, the statement added.

The Taliban administration, which took power in 2021 after 20 years of US military intervention in Afghanistan, is not recognised by Washington.

We’ve read quite a bit about President Trump’s “hot mic” comment, during a meeting with European leaders about the Russian war against Ukraine, that Vladimir Putin “wants to make a deal for me, as crazy as it sounds.”

Pundits debated whether this was an embarrassment for Trump; they wondered why he would say such an important thing in a whisper to French President Emmanuel Macron — as if Trump’s verbal goulash were something new. Headlines were full of the word “deal” for a while, including three days later, when they were reporting that Trump said Putin might not want “to make a deal.” And, of course, there is no deal.

The press coverage of the meeting in Alaska said there were lots of “constructive” conversations. Putin spoke about “neighborly” talks and the “constructive atmosphere of mutual respect” in his conversations with Trump. There were reports about agreements “in principle” on various things under discussion, although there were no details about what they might be.

I covered more than a few superpower summits, first as a reporter for the Associated Press and later for the New York Times. Although that was more than 30 years ago, the smoke and mirrors nonsense usually produced by meetings like these has not changed. Verbal gas is abundant and facts almost nonexistent. Trump’s comments were worth about as much as anything else he has said on the subject, which is almost nothing. And yet, they were reported and parsed endlessly as if they had the same meaning as other presidents’ words had in the past.

I had a powerful sense of deja vu from a five-day trip to Afghanistan in January 1987. The Kremlin had finally agreed to let a group of Western journalists visit Kabul and Jalalabad to witness the “cease-fire” that had been announced a few days before we arrived. The visit was billed as an Afghan government tour, which nobody — especially the Afghan government — believed.

We saw no fighting, although we could see artillery fire in the hills at night. Some of the “specials,” as we wire service correspondents called the major media then, reported that we were fired on. We were not.

Mostly, we shopped for rugs and drank cold Heinekens, which were unavailable in Moscow but mysteriously well stocked at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. We were ushered to various peace and unity events between the Afghan and Russian peoples and toured the huge Soviet military camps just outside Kabul with a U.S. official (allegedly a diplomat from the Embassy, but we knew from experience that this person was from the Central Intelligence Agency).

On Jan. 19, we were taken (each reporter in an individual government car with a minder) to a news conference by Mohammad Najib, the Afghan leader whose name had been Najibullah until he changed it to make it sound less religious for his Bolshevik friends. Najib said that Afghanistan and the Soviet Union had agreed “in principle” on a “timetable for withdrawal” of Soviet occupation forces.

At that point, the Reuters correspondent, who was fairly new to Moscow still, bolted from the room and raced back to our hotel, where there was one Telex machine for us all to send our stories back to Moscow. He filed a bulletin on the announcement. When the rest of us made our leisurely return, we were greeted with messages from our home offices demanding to know about the big deal to end the war in Afghanistan.

We wrote our stories, which were about a business-as-usual press conference that yielded no real news. We each appended a message to explain why the Reuters report was just plain wrong. Talk of Soviet withdrawal was common, and always wrong. The very idea that the puppet government in Kabul had something to say about it or was a party to any serious discussions about ending the war was absurd. The most pithy comment came from the Agence France-Presse reporter, who told her editors that the Reuters story was “merde.” The Soviet military did not withdraw until February 1989, more than two years later, following its own schedule.

Much of the recent coverage about Russia and Ukraine reminds me of that Afghan news flash in 1987. The Kremlin has never been, was not then and is not now interested in negotiation or compromise. Under Soviet communism and under Putin, diplomacy is a zero-sum game whose only goal is to restore Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe. And yet, for some reason, the American media and the country’s diplomats seem as oblivious today as they always were. After the summit, they announced breathlessly that there was no peace deal out of the summit, although they all knew going in that there was no deal on the table and there never was going to be one.

But of course Putin wants a “deal” on Ukraine. It’s the same deal he has wanted since he violated international law (not for the first time) and invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. He wants to redraw the boundaries of Ukraine to give him even more territory than he has already seized, and he wants to be sure Ukraine remains out of NATO and under Moscow’s military thumb as he has done with other former Soviet regions, like Georgia, which he invaded in 2008 as soon as the country dared to suggest it might be interested in NATO membership. His latest nonsense was to demand that Russia be part of any postwar security arrangements. He wants the NATO allies to stop treating him like the war criminal that he is and to be seen as an equal actor on the international stage with NATO and especially the United States.

That he got, in abundance, from Trump in Alaska, starting with the location. Trump invited Putin to the United States during a period of travel bans to and from Russia, immediately giving the Russian dictator a huge PR win. It also, conveniently, put him in the only NATO country where he is not wanted on charges of crimes against humanity.

As for peace talks, check the headlines from Ukraine before, during and after the Alaska summit: The Russians have stepped up their killing and destruction in Ukraine with new ferocity and have been grabbing as much land in eastern Ukraine as they can. Every square inch of that land — and more the Kremlin has not yet occupied — will be part of any “deal” that Putin will accept. Trump himself has been talking about “land swaps” (as he has from the start of the war, by the way) — a nonsensical idea when you consider the land Ukraine holds is its sovereign territory and the land Russian holds was stolen.

The brilliant M. Gessen, perhaps the leading authority on dictatorship, published an essay in the New York Review, “Autocracy: Rules for Survival,” shortly after the 2016 election. “Rule #2: Do not be taken in by small signs of normality,” they wrote.

A U.S. president and a Russian leader sitting down to talk and emerging with bluster about progress seems normal enough, perhaps encouraging when American-Russian relations have been at a historic low. Just remember that coming from these two men, the comments signify nothing — or, worse, make us wonder what Trump has given away to Putin with his talk of land swaps.

Andrew Rosenthal, a former reporter, editor and columnist, was Moscow bureau chief for the Associated Press and Washington editor and later editorial page editor for the New York Times.

Kabul, a city of over six million people, could become the first modern city to run out of water in the next five years, a new report has warned.

Groundwater levels in the Afghan capital have dropped drastically due to over-extraction and the effects of climate change, according to a report published by nonprofit Mercy Corps.

So, is Kabul’s water crisis at a tipping point and do Afghan authorities have the resources and expertise to address the issue?

The depth of the crisis

Kabul’s aquifer levels have plummeted 25-30 metres (82 – 98 feet) in the past decade, with extraction of water exceeding natural recharge by a staggering 44 million cubic metres (1,553cu feet) a year, the report, published in April this year, noted.

If the current trend continues, Kabul’s aquifers will become dry by 2030, posing an existential threat to the Afghan capital, according to the report. This could cause the displacement of some three million Afghan residents, it said.

The report said UNICEF projected that nearly half of Kabul’s underground bore wells, the primary source of drinking water for residents, are already dry.

It also highlights widespread water contamination: Up to 80 percent of groundwater is believed to be unsafe, with high levels of sewage, arsenic and salinity.

Conflict, climate change and government failures

Experts point to a combination of factors behind the crisis: climate change, governance failures and increasing pressures on existing resources as the city’s population has expanded from less than one million in 2001 to roughly six million people today.

Two decades of US-led military intervention in Afghanistan also played a role in the crisis, as it forced more people to move to Kabul while governance in the rest of the country suffered.

“The prediction is based on the growing gap between groundwater recharge and annual water extraction. These trends have been consistently observed over recent years, making the forecast credible,” said Assem Mayar, water resource management expert and former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University.

“It reflects a worst-case scenario that could materialise by 2030 if no effective interventions are made,” he added.

Najibullah Sadid, senior researcher and a member of the Afghanistan Water and Environment Professionals Network, said it was impossible to put a timeline on when the capital city would run dry. But he conceded that Kabul’s water problems are grave.

“Nobody can claim when the last well will run dry, but what we know is that as the groundwater levels further drop, the capacity of deep aquifers become less – imagine the groundwater as a bowl with depleting water,” he said.

“We know the end is near,” he said.

A vast portion of the Afghan capital relies on underground borewells, and as water levels drop, people dig deeper or in different locations looking for sources of water.

According to an August 2024 report by the National Statistics Directorate, there are approximately 310,000 drilled wells across the country. According to the Mercy Corps report, it is estimated that there are also nearly 120,000 unregulated bore wells across Kabul.

A 2023 UN report found that nearly 49 percent of borewells in Kabul are dry, while others are functioning at only 60 percent efficiency.

The water crisis, Mayar said, exposes the divide between the city’s rich and poor. “Wealthier residents can afford to drill deeper boreholes, further limiting access for the poorest,” he said. “The crisis affects the poorest first.”

The signs of this divide are evident in longer lines outside public water taps or private water takers, says Abdulhadi Achakzai, director at the Environmental Protection Trainings and Development Organization (EPTDO), a Kabul-based climate protection NGO.

Poorer residents, often children, are forced to continually search for sources of water.

“Every evening, even late at night, when I am returning home from work, I see young children with small cans in their hands looking for water … they look hopeless, navigating life collecting water for their homes rather than studying or learning,” he said.

Additionally, Sadid said, Kabul’s already depleted water resources were being exploited by the “over 500 beverage and mineral water companies” operating in the capital city,” all of which are using Kabul’s groundwater”. Alokozay, a popular Afghan soft drinks company, alone extracts nearly one billion litres (256 million gallons) of water over a year — 2.5 million litres (660,000 gallons) a day — according to Sadid’s calculations.

Al Jazeera sent Alokozay questions about its water extraction on June 21, but has yet to receive a response.

Kabul, Sadid said, also had more than 400 hectares (9,884 acres) of green houses to grow vegetables, which suck up 4 billion litres (1.05 billion gallons) of water every year, according to his calculations. “The list [of entities using Kabul water] is long,” he said.

‘Repeated droughts, early snowmelt and reduced snowfall’

The water shortage is further compounded by climate change. Recent years have seen a significant reduction in precipitation across the country.

“The three rivers — Kabul river, Paghman river and Logar river—that replenish Kabul’s groundwater rely heavily on snow and glacier meltwater from the Hindu Kush mountains,” the Mercy Corps report noted. “However, between October 2023 to January 2024, Afghanistan only received only 45 to 60 percent of the average precipitation during the peak winter season compared to previous years.”

Mayar, the former lecturer at Kabul Polytechnic University, said that while it was difficult to quantify exactly how much of the crisis was caused by climate change, extreme weather events had only added to Kabul’s woes.

“Climate-related events such as repeated droughts, early snowmelts, and reduced snowfall have clearly diminished groundwater recharge opportunities,” he said.

Additionally, increased air temperature has led to greater evaporation, raising agricultural water consumption, said Sadid from the Afghanistan Water and Environment Professionals Network.

While several provinces have experienced water scarcity, particularly within agrarian communities, Kabul remains the worst affected due to its growing population.

Decades of conflict

Sadid argued Kabul’s crisis runs deeper than the impact of climate change, compounded by years of war, weak governance, and sanctions on the aid-dependent country.

Much of the funds channelled into the country were diverted to security for the first two decades of the century. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, funding has been used to tackle an escalating humanitarian crisis. Western sanctions have also significantly stymied development projects that could have helped Kabul better manage the current water crisis.

As a result, authorities have struggled with the maintenance of pipelines, canals and dams — including basic tasks like de-sedimentation.

“The crisis is already beyond the capacity of the current de facto authorities,” Mayar said, referring to the Taliban. “In well-managed cities, such impacts are mitigated through robust water governance and infrastructure. Kabul lacks such capacity, and the current authorities are unable to address the problem without external support,” he added.

As a result, environmental resilience projects have taken a backseat.

“Several planned initiatives, including projects for artificial groundwater recharge, were suspended following the Taliban takeover,” Mayar pointed out. “Sanctions continue to restrict organisations and donors from funding and implementing essential water-related projects in Afghanistan,” he said.

Sadid pointed out one example: An Awater supply project -funded by the German Development bank KfW, along with European agencies – could have supplied 44 billion litres (11 billion gallons) of water annually to parts of Kabul from Logar aquifers.

“But currently this project has been suspended,” he said, even though two-thirds of the initiative was already completed when the government of former President Ashraf Ghani collapsed in 2021.

Similarly, India and the Ghani government had signed an agreement in 2021 for the construction of the Shah-toot dam on the Kabul River. Once completed, the dam could supply water to large parts of Kabul, Sadid said, “but its fate is uncertain now.”

What can be done to address the water crisis?

Experts recommend the development of the city’s water infrastructure as the starting point to address the crisis.

“Artificial groundwater recharge and the development of basic water infrastructure around the city are urgently needed. Once these foundations are in place, a citywide water supply network can gradually be developed,” Mayar recommended.

Achakzai agreed that building infrastructure and its maintenance were key elements of any fix.

“Aside from introducing new pipelines to the city from nearby rivers, such as in Panjshir, there needs to be an effort to recharge underground aquifers with constructions of check dams and water reservoirs,” he said, adding that these structures will also facilitate rainwater harvesting and groundwater replenishment.

“[The] Afghan government needs to renew ageing water pipes and systems. Modernising infrastructure will improve efficiency and reduce water loss,” he added.

Yet all of that is made harder by Afghanistan’s global isolation and the sanctions regime it is under, Achakzai said.

“Sanctions restrict Afghanistan’s access to essential resources, technology, and funding needed for water infrastructure development and maintenance,” he said. This, in turn, reduces agricultural productivity, and increases hunger and economic hardship, forcing communities to migrate, he warned.